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SDR Special Drawing Rights (IFAD)
SDTFs Single-donor trust funds
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SECAL Sectoral Adjustment Lending
SECAP Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (IFAD)
SEWA Self Employed Women’s Association (India)
SF Strategic Framework
SIAC Strengthening Impact Assessment in CGIAR
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
SIMEC System Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (CGIAR)
SIPA Swedish Institute of Public Administration
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SISAN National System for Food and Nutrition Security (Brazil)
SITC Standard International Trade Classification
SLO System Level Outcome (CGIAR)
SMART Specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, timebound
SMB System Management Board (CGIAR)
SMEs Small- and medium-sized enterprises
SMO System Management Office (CGIAR)
SNAP Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
SO Strategic objective
SO System Organization (CGIAR)
SOFA State of Food and Agriculture (FAO report)
SOFI State of Food Insecurity and Nutrition (FAO report)
SP Strategic Programme (FAO)
SPAAR Special Program for African Agricultural Research
SPA–FS Strategic Plan of Action for Food Security (ASEAN)
SPEED Statistics on Public Expenditures for Economic Development (IFPRI)
SPIA Standing Panel on Impact Assessment (CGIAR)
SPS Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
SRF Strategic Results Framework
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
SSB Sustainable and balanced growth
SSN Social safety net
ST Structural transformation
Sub-IDO Sub-Intermediate Intermediate Development Outcome (CGIAR)
SUN Scaling Up Nutrition
SWOT Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
T&V Train and Visit (extension)
TAAT Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation
TAC Technical Advisory Committee (CGIAR)
TB Tuberculosis
TBT Technical Barriers to Trade
TCI Investment Centre (FAO)
TCP Technical Cooperation Programme (FAO)
TCPF Technical Cooperation Program Facility (FAO)
TF Trade facilitation
TFA Trade facilitation agreement
TFP Total factor productivity
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TNC Transnational corporation
TOC Theory of change
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TTCSP Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (University of Pennsylvania)
TTL Task Team Leader (World Bank)
TWG Technical working group
UHC Universal health care
ULYSSES Understanding and Coping with Food Markets Volatility towards More Stable
World and EU Food Systems (project)
UMIC Upper-middle-income country
UN HTLF United Nations High Level Task Force on Global Food and Nutrition Security
UN United Nations
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCCD UN Convention to Combat Desertification
UNCED United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNDS United Nations Development System
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UN-Habitat United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (the UN Refugee Agency)
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNISDR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UN–OAD United Nations Operational Activities for Development
UN–OHCHR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees
UNSCN United Nations Standing Committee on Nutrition
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UNSDCF UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
UNTT United Nations System Task Team
US EIA US Energy Information Administration
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
USMCA United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (replacement for NAFTA)
UTF Unilateral Trust Fund (FAO)
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WASH Water, sanitation, and hygiene
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WBG World Bank Group
WBI World Bank Institute
WCED World Commission on Environment and Development
WDI World Development Indicators
WDR World Development Report (World Bank)
WEAI Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index
WEF World Economic Forum
WEO Women’s Economic Opportunity Index (The Economist Intelligence Unit)
WEO World Economic Outlook (IMF)
WEOF Women Entrepreneurs Opportunity Facility
WFP World Food Programme
WGI Worldwide Governance Index
WHA World Health Assembly
WHO World Health Organization
WLE Water, Land, and Ecosystems (CGIAR Research Program)
WMO World Meteorological Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
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Introduction
Uma Lele
The world has produced enough food since the Second World War to feed itself despite
rapid population growth, owing to extraordinary technological and institutional change.
The rise in world food production, however, has been accompanied by unequal access to
that abundance, as well as soil degradation, loss of biodiversity, and growing water scar-
cities. There have also been dramatic changes in the world economic order and several other
transformations. They include successive food and energy crises, and debt and financial
crises, followed by the embrace of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris
Accord on Climate Change to deal with these challenges. Then, the COVID-19 pandemic
presented a tragic external shock for which the world was not prepared. The narrative on
food and nutrition has changed, too, from a single-minded focus on productivity growth of
cereals to sustainable and diversified food production and healthy food systems. A signature
event among these changing processes has been the rise of China and other emerging
countries, changing the global balance of power from the Organisation of Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in the (broadly defined) North to the
East and the South. A single, most important event was the US presidential election in
2020, with the hope for a return of multilateralism. However, the Biden–Harris victory is
complicated in changing to a more benign foreign policy due to the 72 million votes Trump
received. While Trump has departed, Trumpism may yet be alive and well and that will
determine the wiggle room the Biden–Harris administration will have in restoring US
leadership. The recent US election also presents an opportunity for a new dynamic of
how the United States, among other countries, including the European Union (EU), will
work with allies to pursue multilateralism on such matters as delivering on the Paris Accord,
Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, on the Middle East peace plan that is at the root of the refugee
crisis, and for more predictable trade and aid policies.
The first part of this book addresses how several developing countries, particularly in
Asia, have transformed and industrialized successfully through smallholder agricultural
development, becoming global players, while others in the same region and in sub-Saharan
Africa have lagged behind. Political instability, weak governance, weak internal capacity,
limited accountability, and a lack of understanding of what it takes to develop smallholder
agriculture, as a means to industrialize over a long haul, explain some countries’ slow
transformation, in contrast to the countries that have transformed successfully. China and
emerging economies play increasingly important roles in international commerce, finance,
and technology generation and transfer. Chapters 1–4 and 7 of this book explore structural
transformation of developing countries in a period of rapid change from such a perspective.
They show how complexity of development has increased, leading to the need for increased
international cooperation among a growing number of actors in addition to sovereign
governments. Yet, skepticism about multilateralism has also increased, especially in the
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very country—the United States—that was the key architect of international cooperation,
with increasing calls for transformative changes in our food and health systems.
The US leadership played a key role in the establishment of several international
organizations in the post-Second World War period. These organizations have played key
roles in this transformation process, including in the near universal embrace of SDGs and
the Climate Change Agreement by member countries, but their work is often seen as “black
boxes.” Alternatively, they face stereotyping by the general public and lack the broad public
support they need to play critical roles in an ever more complex world, which is calling for
transformative changes in our food and health systems.
The “Big Five” organizations of our focus are the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO), established in 1944; the World Bank, one of two Bretton
Woods institutions established in 1945, and the International Development Association
(IDA), the World Bank’s concessional window, established in 1961; the World Food
Programme (WFP), established in 1960; CGIAR (formerly, the Consultative Group for
International Agricultural Research), established in 1971; and the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD), established in 1974.
• FAO is the only global platform for agreements on international norms and standards,
and for global data and information on all aspects of food, agriculture, and related
natural resources, but norms of cooperation and agreements have changed radically
since FAO’s inception.
• The World Bank and IDA have been the largest public funders of policy advice and
investment projects for well over 75 years, but their role as suppliers of assistance has
declined in relative terms as investment needs of developing countries run into the
trillions.
• WFP is the largest provider of emergency food and cash assistance for people in
extreme need, and demands for its services have skyrocketed.
• CGIAR has been the largest provider of international agricultural research in the
public sector for well over 50 years.
• IFAD was founded initially with the thought of using recycled petrodollars, matched
by OECD donors, in the aftermath of the first world food crisis in 1972. It became the
focus for investment support to small-scale and marginal farmers, many of whom are
women.
Together, these organizations have seen the world economy through oil price shocks and
responded to a variety of changes in subsequent decades, including the latest migration
crisis associated with the largest displacement of human population since the SecondWorld
War. Chapters 5, 6, and 8–12 start with the rapidly changed global governance of food and
agriculture, followed by the discussion of the five international organizations as operating
arms of global governance.
Before the COVID-19 pandemic struck in 2020, much progress was achieved on poverty
reduction and food security. Nearly a billion people have moved out of poverty since 1990,
although only about a quarter of those are reportedly free of hunger, and the numbers of
food-insecure people are increasing yet again. Global under-five infant and child mortality
rates have declined, too. Irrigated agriculture was the driving force in food production
growth in Asia, also, as a resilience strategy, but now resilience has a new meaning—
maintaining production while conserving natural resources, an agenda which needs to
move more rapidly to contain climate change and other natural calamities. Whereas
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international organizations contributed to past transformations, huge challenges remain in
the 21st century.
As of 2015, 10 percent of the world’s people (736 million) lived on less than US$1.90 a
day.¹ More than 820 million, or 1 in 9 people in the world, are undernourished,² with more
than 2 billion suffering from one or more micronutrient deficiencies,³ and importantly,
nearly 2 billion are overweight or obese and their numbers are growing,⁴ while 5.4 million
children died in 2017 before reaching their fifth birthdays, mostly from preventable
diseases.⁵ Despite economic growth, more poor live in South Asia than in sub-Saharan
Africa, and 70.8 million people were displaced at the time of sending this book to the
publisher.⁶
Going forward, the challenges for the transformation of agriculture include:
1. Rebuilding and recognizing the role of strong, more participatory, multilateral pro-
cesses to reflect the changing balance and dynamics of power, as the US reengages,
Asia continues its emergence, Latin America reasserts itself, Africa further coalesces,
and Europe finds a common voice, all contributing to a multipolar world.
2. Population will reach 9.7 billion by 2050, with evident consequences for availability of
healthy food (SDG2). Most of the population growth is projected to occur in sub-
Saharan Africa, where the population will double by 2050, while some growth will
occur in South Asia. India is expected to overtake China by 2027, as the world’s most
populous country.⁷
3. Increased income inequality within and across countries can lead to further poverty,
unless political will is harnessed to meet the SDGs—in particular, SDG1 (no poverty),
SDG5 (gender equality), and SDG10 (reduce inequalities).⁸ COVID-19 has brought
this reality home starkly.
4. Climate change is an existential threat, especially to a billion poor people, bringing
planetary changes, with melting glaciers, rising oceans, and extreme events.
5. Increasing pressure on natural resources (land, water, and energy) is already leading
to calls for harnessing new knowledge to manage food and agricultural systems
sustainably without harming human health.
Will farmers, particularly small farmers in rural areas, be able to take advantage of the
dramatic technological changes taking place, known as the fourth industrial revolution, or
will they continue to leave agriculture to establish ever larger urban slums, in the absence of
productive, remunerative employment? FAO projects that, globally, there is little scope for
expansion of lands equipped for irrigation, with only a small increase possible in irrigated
¹ World Bank, “Poverty”: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview
² FAO et al., The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2019. Safeguarding against Economic
Slowdowns and Downturns: http://www.fao.org/3/ca5162en/ca5162en.pdf
³ HarvestPlus, “Nutrition”: https://www.harvestplus.org/what-we-do/nutrition
⁴ EatForum.org, “More Than Two Billion People Overweight or Obese”: https://eatforum.org/learn-and-
discover/more-than-two-billion-people-overweight-or-obese/
⁵ United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), “Under-five Mortality”: https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-
survival/under-five-mortality/
⁶ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Figures at a Glance, June 18, 2020”: https://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html
⁷ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “World Population Prospects 2019”: https://
population.un.org/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2019_DataBooklet.pdf
⁸ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “Sustainable Development: The 17 Goals”:
https://sdgs.un.org/goals
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hectares, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and South America, albeit a low base. Deforestation
is on the rise, and widespread soil degradation continues, often but not only as a result of
intensive agriculture, with both leading to biodiversity loss. Challenges of agriculture have
been made worse by extreme weather events and increasing risk and uncertainty, including
in the global trading environment. The interconnectivity of these changes and events,
however, is increasingly being realized. The consequence is the pressing need for better
understanding, evidence, and analysis of these relationships and systems.
International organizations have depended on the United States and OECD countries for
financing. The organizations are underfunded with fragmented funding support. Increasing
roles of emerging countries offer new opportunities for global governance of food and
agriculture, South–South international cooperation, and harnessing private and public
capital. However, international cooperation among traditional partners has changed slowly,
incrementally, and organically, and at times, moved in the wrong direction, often missing
the opportunities for new modalities of cooperation.
The basic foundations of the international architecture, starting with the founding of the
United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, FAO, and many others, were built with the
leadership of the United States. The US disengagement by the Trump administration from
the Paris Accord on Climate Change, withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
reduction of funding of IFAD, withdrawal of support for the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Court of Human Rights, and
reduction of support for some other UN operations raised questions about the existing
“rules-based,” old liberal order on which international cooperation was based for decades.
The US election in 2020 would presume a reset and reengagement. Nevertheless, a renewed
EU, philanthropic foundations, emerging countries, think tanks, private capital flows, and
civil society have become increasingly important players in global governance. It is timely,
given that the 17th SDG calls for multi-stakeholder partnerships to support the means of
implementation to achieving the SDGs. In addition, the fourth industrial revolution has
brought extraordinary technological changes in connectivity, computing, genomics, and
many other fields, not the least of which are the giant information technology (IT)
companies and social media.
As global governance dynamics shift, this book critically examines the roles played by
developing countries in partnership with major multilateral agencies and their bilateral
counterparts, in addressing agricultural and rural development, as a way to achieve eco-
nomic transformation. With most of the poverty now in low-middle-income and middle-
income countries, future challenges are multisectoral, multidimensional, and multilevel.
Developing countries need trillions of dollars of investment in infrastructure, health,
education, and agriculture. There is immense need for public goods: for example, agricul-
tural R&D, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, building of resilience by commu-
nities to address growing risks, and control of communicable diseases, among others. The
UN Secretary General’s Food Summit in 2021 is intended to address some of these issues.⁹
In several individual chapters, the book explores what member nations of the United
Nations, working with international organizations, have been able to achieve thus far in
food and agriculture and in economic transformation. How have they responded to the
rapidly changing external and internal factors, and how well equipped are they to address
future challenges of poverty, food security and nutrition, inequality, climate change, and
⁹ United Nations, “UN Food Systems Summit 2021”: https://www.un.org/en/food-systems-summit
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conflict, in the face of rapidly deteriorating natural resources? Discovering the answers
to these questions make this discussion all the more urgent. Most importantly, we explore
the roles of the international organizations vis-à-vis new actors, philanthropists, and the
private sector.
The book was written before the global COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic was
predicted for several years by experts, including Bill Gates, but ignored by policymakers
at the time. The International Monetary Fund estimates the pandemic has led to a global
gross domestic product (GDP) loss of US$9 trillion in nearly 200 countries.¹⁰ Timely
investments in preparing for the pandemic would have had high rates of return. The
pandemic has laid bare structural weaknesses among the mightiest economies of income
inequalities, lack of universal access to health, and lack of trust in government. Smaller
Asian Tigers—Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea—and China, where it originated, had
smarter responses, demonstrating their superiority in state capacity.
As historian Ramachandra Guha has noted, COVID-19 is at least a sixfold crisis—
medical, economic, humanitarian, social, psychological, and of governance—and the
worst hit are poor people throughout the world, including in the poorest countries.¹¹ An
astute response to it of testing, isolating, and treating the infected calls for scientific,
political, economic, medical, social, and psychological resources and international cooper-
ation, which most countries have lacked. They are also the kind of characteristic responses
that other global crises confronting the world—climate change, financial crises, and civil
strife—will require.
That is why this book is both relevant and timely. It is an account of international
cooperation over 70 years on food security and nutrition security and the implications for
addressing the remaining challenges of hunger and food insecurity, which have been
compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Such responses, as the book outlines, come from a spectrum of multilateral institutions,
only some of which are reviewed here. Those institutions have addressed, and continue to
address, their own challenges of roles, accountability, membership, financing, and actions.
Several of these changes are ongoing, driven both by current geopolitical and natural
(climatic) events and by initiatives such as the forthcoming Food Systems Summit 2021.
The UN Scientific Group for the Summit, an independent and diverse group of leading
researchers and scientists from around the world, including Uma Lele, is responsible for
ensuring the robustness and independence of the science underpinning the Summit, and
will inform the Summit’s content and recommended outcomes, as well as clarify the
commitments emerging from the Summit.¹² The successful adaption and change of the
institutions remains a critical prerequisite for the necessary agricultural transformation.
¹⁰ See Gita Gopinath, “The Great Lockdown: Worst Economic Downturn Since the Great Depression,” April 14,
2020, https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economic-downturn-since-the-great-depression/
¹¹ See Ramachandra Guha, “The Darkest Hour. Politics and Play: A Six-Fold Crisis Confronts India,”May 22,
2020, https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/coronavirus-a-six-fold-crisis-confronts-india/cid/1775032
¹² See the membership roster for the Summit’s Scientific Group: https://sc-fss2021.org/about-us/membership/
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Food for All: Setting the Scene
Uma Lele and Sambuddha Goswami
It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent, but
the one most responsive to change.
Leon C. Megginson¹
The Transforming Dynamics of Poverty, Food Security, and Nutrition
In 2015, member states of the United Nations (UN) embraced two global agreements of
historic proportions—one on sustainable development and the other on climate change.
Will it be possible, however, to generate the political will, set the rules, and undertake the
reforms in global and national governance that will be needed to achieve the promised
outcomes for humanity? How, in particular, will the world produce and consume food and
manage agriculture sustainably, to deliver healthy food for all, in a rapidly changing world?
And how will multilateral organizations support the opportunities and face the challenges
of “the fourth industrial revolution” (Schwab 2016) to achieve adequate, nutritious food for
all, for all time, in all places? The fourth industrial revolution, following on from the third
electronic and information revolution, is characterized by its extraordinary speed, disrup-
tive technological change, and breadth and depth of scientific, technological, and sociopo-
litical changes. We do not yet understand the full significance or likely impacts of these still
unfolding changes, but the revolution is occurring, with some long-term trends already
underway.
Among these trends are climate change, first accelerating and then slowing globalization,
expanding trade in food and agriculture, and yet, growing trade uncertainties, demographic
transition, rapid urbanization, dietary transition, and growing horizontal (cross-sectoral)
and vertical (from farm-to-fork) integration. Meanwhile, conflict has caused the largest
displacement of human population since the Second World War. Forced migration from
humanitarian disasters is making unprecedented demands on food and financial assistance,
not to mention the suffering of those displaced, including women and children, with no end
in sight.
Economists traditionally have viewed structural transformation from agriculture to
manufacturing as a pivotal ambition of developing countries. This transformation has
become increasingly difficult for lagging countries. Yet, other transformations are also
reshaping the global economy, including financial transformation (a shift from the
¹ This quote is frequently misattributed to Charles Darwin, even placed in the stone floor of the California
Academy of Sciences, only to have the original attribution removed. The quote actually comes from Megginson, a
professor of management and marketing at Louisiana State University. See https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/
people/about-darwin/six-things-darwin-never-said/evolution-misquotation
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traditional North–South global savings and investment pattern to South–North: that is,
developing countries, and particularly China, being the source of global savings and
investments), and energy transformation (shift from fossil fuels to renewables, which
could be faster with different energy policies).
Concurrently, the food and agricultural sectors are confronting new paradigms, such as
environmentally sustainable food production and shifting focus in agriculture from indi-
vidual energy (calorie) supply to nutritious foods with links to health, leading to a life-cycle
approach to diets. These new paradigms are influencing how structural transformation and
the role of agriculture are being viewed by the international development community,
particularly for countries with a large proportion of poverty and hunger in rural areas.
This chapter sets the stage for an inquiry into food, transformations, international organi-
zations and their interactions, and implications for a better outcome: nutritious food for all
that is environmentally sustainable.
Curious readers want to know, where does the food supply of a country come from? The
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) measures food support in
terms of Food Balance Sheets and defines it as:
Domestic supply quantity: Production + imports  exports + changes in stocks (decrease
or increase) = Supply for domestic utilization
There are various ways of defining supply and, in fact, many concepts are in use. The
elements involved are production, imports, exports, and changes in stocks (increase or
decrease). There is no doubt that production, imports, and stock changes (either decrease or
increase in stocks) are genuine supply elements.² The concept is not without its critics.
Estimates of production, utilization, and stocks are routinely criticized. Nevertheless, food
balance sheets in recent years suggest that nearly 90 percent of the food supply in the United
States and China in net terms (after allowing for imports and exports) comes from domestic
production, and as much as 97 percent in India, 85 percent in SSA, and only 70 percent in
Europe and Canada.
In the rest of this book, we discuss changes in the various components of the food balance
sheets over time and across countries, and how domestic policies and international trade
affect these food balance sheets.
Global Compacts: Sustainable Development Goals
and Climate Change
In 2015, the 193 member countries of the UN and nearly 200 member-parties of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) made two historic agreements. The
first, in September at the UN in New York, set forth, through the 2030 Agenda for Action,
17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with 169 targets (see UN [2020] for a description
of all SDGs and their targets). The SDGs take forward to 2030 the unfulfilled Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in 2000. The second agreement came, after a
prolonged stalemate, at the conclusion of COP21 (the Paris Climate Conference) in
² See Food Balance Sheets (http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/fbs/en/); New Food Balances: Description of
utilization variables (http://fenixservices.fao.org/faostat/static/documents/FBS/New%20FBS%20methodology.
pdf); and Food Balance Sheet Methodology (http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/fbs/ess-fbs02/en/).
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December 2015, when the world community reached the Paris Agreement on Climate
Change (UNFCCC 2015). At the time of the signing ceremony on April 22, 2016, 175
countries had already signed the agreement, showing their strong interest in pursuing its
objectives. However, at the UNClimate Change Conference (COP25) in Madrid in December
2019, UN Secretary-General António Guterres noted his disappointment with the results of
COP25 on Twitter: “The international community lost an important opportunity to show
increased ambition on mitigation, adaptation & finance to tackle the climate crisis.”
The Paris Agreement’s central aim is to strengthen the global response to climate change
by keeping the rise in the global average temperatures in this century to well below 2°C
above preindustrial levels, pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase further to
1.5°C. Additionally, the agreement aims to strengthen the ability of countries to adapt and
build resilience to impacts of climate change and to make finance flows consistent with a
pathway toward low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and climate-resilient development.
Scaling up countries’ efforts to strengthen their response to climate change and making the
most of co-benefits and synergistic action is vital to the aim of achieving the temperature
goal of the agreement, while at the same time building countries’ resilience to the adverse
effects of climate change.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on
the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C, the goal is possible, but requires urgent and
unprecedented transitions across all aspects of society, over the next 10 to 20 years,
including our energy, agricultural, urban, and industrial systems, the engagement of non-
state actors, and integration of climate action into the broader public policy framework,
which also addresses jobs, security, and technology (IPCC 2014). TheWorld Meteorological
Organization (WMO) reported that as 2019 ended, it was likely to be the second or third
warmest year on record, with melting ice, rising sea levels, coastal flooding, powerful
hurricanes, and wildfires. “Average temperatures for the five-year (2015–2019) and ten-
year (2010–2019) periods are almost certain to be the highest on record” (WMO 2019).
Climate change activism, particularly among the young who will face the brunt of warming,
gathered new momentum, with calls for changing the way we produce and eat food and
urging faster emission reductions.
Regrettably, the Trump administration announced it would withdraw from the Paris
Agreement, as it did from other international agreements, as outlined in this chapter. The
Biden administration has already reversed some of these policies and is reassessing others.
The Sustainable Development Goals: Resetting the Agenda
The SDGs are far more expansive and ambitious than the MDGs, which consisted of eight
goals and 21 associated targets (UN 2016), developed out of several commitments set forth
in the Millennium Declaration, signed in September 2000. The MDGs focused on devel-
oping countries, and SDGs have expanded the scope to acknowledge the interconnectedness
of global development by including all developing and developed countries. Thus, SDGs are
universal in scope. They have also shifted focus from inputs of aid and investment capital to
development outcomes and their measurement, cross-country monitoring of performance,
and accountability for results. The MDGs focused on outcomes in the low-income, devel-
oping countries of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). They were simple in scope and easy
to communicate to policymakers and citizens. They were developed by the initiative of
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international organizations, with input from academics and stakeholders, largely from
donor countries. Progress toward the global targets of the MDGs was measured over
25 years (to 2015), applying a 1990 baseline and a uniform standard by which each developing
country, irrespective of local content, was expected to achieve every goal. Based on more
recent data and more consultative processes, the SDGs are applicable to all developed and
developing countries, and progress toward these goals is being measured over a shorter
period (to 2030). So, to reach these goals, all parties need to do their part individually and
collectively—governments, the private sector, civil society, and private citizens.
The new post-2015 international development agenda, described in “Transforming Our
World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (UN 2015b), builds on the MDGs
and on the Rio +20 Summit principles, articulated in “The Future We Want” (UN 2013).
Based on the deliberations of the Secretary-General’s proposed framework in their synthesis
report (UN 2014b), the Sustainable Development Summit outcome document, “Transform-
ing Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” captures the broad scope
of the agenda in its preamble, which identifies the “five Ps”—people, planet, prosperity,
peace, and partnership. These are the key topics for policy dialogue and policy action (UN
2015b, 1–2). Table A.1.1 in the Appendix describes the five Ps in the outcome document
and the six clusters of the Secretary-General’s proposal, along with the related SDGs and
relevant MDGs.
Most of the 17 SDGs are interrelated, reflecting the growing complexity of the develop-
ment process in which many players are adapting to change and to each other. With
growing risks and uncertainty, the emerging future is hard to predict, and adaptive
management has become the central theme (Axelrod and Cohen 1999). SDG1 and
SDG10 address poverty and inequality, and they are integrally related to the rest of the
SDGs. SDGs 2, 6, and 7 are concerned with hunger, food security, improved nutrition and
sustainable agriculture, water and sanitation, and energy. The relationship between mon-
etary income/poverty in SDG1 and food security (SDGs 2, 6, and 7) is more complex than
appears on the surface. Increased income does not necessarily result in increased food
security, unless other SDGs have been achieved. SDGs 3, 4, and 5 focus on health, education,
and gender equality. They reflect the multidimensionality of poverty and affect food security
and nutrition in complex ways. SDG8 and SDG9 address economic growth, productive
employment, infrastructure, industrialization, and innovation. They are integrally related
to the extent of formality or informality of employment in agriculture and other sectors,
and influence the rate of structural transformation of economies from agriculture to
other sectors. SDGs 11 and 12 are concerned with human settlements and sustainable
consumption and production, including the quality and quantity of food. SDGs 13, 14, and
15 address climate change, oceans, and conservation of natural resources. Climate change is
an existential threat to agriculture and other sectors. SDGs 16 and 17 pertain to peaceful
societies and fragility, crime and violence, corruption, access to justice, capable and
accountable entities, and global partnerships (UN 2020).
SDG Target 8.3 aims to promote policies that support productive activities and job
creation, and to encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), including through access to financial services. The International
Labour Conference in 2015 adopted the Transition from the Informal to the Formal
Economy Recommendation (No. 204), the first international labor standard that focuses
on the informal economy in its entirety (ILO 2015).
The SDGs have galvanized the global community, but they also have critics. William
Easterly, in a Foreign Policy article, called them “utopian,” “unmeasurable,” “unactionable,”
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and “unattainable,” as well as being unfinanced, having “both too many items and too little
content for each one” (Easterly 2015). With fiscal woes and the pressure of refugees entering
Europe, progress on the financing of SDGs was slow at the Addis Ababa meeting in July
2015, and even the staunchest supporters of SDGs, including Jeffrey Sachs, have taken a
wait-and-see attitude (ADB 2015; Sachs 2015). A 2019 report on financing of SDGs notes
that the total revenue of the UN System in 2017 was a mere US$53.2 billion, coming from a
combination of assessed contributions, voluntary contributions, negotiated pledges, and a
small amount of fees. Governments still provided 74 percent of the direct funding to the UN
Development System (UNDS) in 2017, and as much as 57 percent came from Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development–Development Assistance Committee
(OECD–DAC) countries. The majority of government contributions actually came from a
small group of UN member states, with 12 member states providing 65 percent of the total
contributions in 2017 (the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, European Union
(EU) institutions, Sweden, Japan, Norway, Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark,
and Italy, in descending order of contribution) (Jenks and Topping 2019, 14–15). The
report contains arguments, such as that of John W. McArthur, Senior Fellow with the
Brookings Institution’s Global Economic and Development Program, that the headline
“From Billions to Trillions” after the Addis Ababa conference on financing was misleading
(Development Committee 2015; Jenks and Topping 2019, 89–92). More country-by-
country and regional approaches are needed to develop an understanding of the extent of
the financing gap.
The Sustainable Development Goals: The Need for Measurement
Beyond the ability of the MDGs and SDGs to focus attention on large development
challenges, their potential value critically depends on mobilizing international and domestic
efforts and monitoring progress. The biggest declines in poverty, hunger, and other social
indicators over the past 25 years have occurred in China and Southeast Asia, largely as a
result of domestic effort, but with critical access to international markets and finance made
possible by their memberships in Bretton Woods institutions. With few exceptions, attri-
buting achievements to external assistance is difficult in most circumstances, because unlike
the case of CGIAR, and more recently, that of the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD), there are no impact studies. Nevertheless, external assistance did
contribute in some cases to a strong domestic commitment that has continued, with
predictability of policies, investments, institutional capacity, and political will, is necessary
for the creation of an enabling environment with some direct assistance at the margin.
Much of the remaining poverty and hunger and other low social indicators that the SDGs
aspire to eradicate are in South Asia (SA) and SSA.
In part, the lagging indicators are a result of the absence of preconditions, misdirected
domestic policies, and external assistance, as we discuss in the chapters that follow. They are
also explained by rapid population growth. According to UN population projections,
Africa’s population will continue to grow well into the end of the 21st century, reaching
4.4 billion (UN 2015c). SA’s population is projected to peak at 2.5 billion in 2069, and its
total rural population will peak at 1.2 billion in 2028. By 2041, urban populations in SA and
Africa, 1.06 billion each, will exceed East Asia’s urban population. In Africa, however, rural
population will also continue to grow and will exceed SA’s rural population just after 2050,
putting immense pressure on natural resources (UN 2014c).
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By 2030, the World Bank projects that most of the world’s poverty will be eradicated, and
the remaining poverty will be concentrated in SSA. These projections were moderated in
2019–2020 to suggest poverty levels of 500 million by 2030. FAO, however, projects that
hunger will decline less rapidly in SA than the World Bank’s scenario, so that both SA and
SSA will experience the remaining incidence of global hunger. The real divergence among
regions will continue after 2030. Structural transformation of countries, discussed in
Chapter 2 in all its dimensions, which was taken for granted in the past, is proving to be
difficult for some countries to achieve, particularly, the ability to industrialize. For the
regions lagging behind in transformation, a greater burden will fall on agriculture, which
will support most of the population, and hence the achievement of SDGs—the future ability
to feed people and reduce hunger—will also be constrained by land availability and
productivity. Generally, Asia and SA, in particular, have already reached the limit of the
extensive margin of cultivable land, and pressures on natural resources have increased
considerably. Parts of SSA are rapidly shifting from having surplus land to being land-
constrained subregions. Agricultural productivity is low, productivity growth has been slow,
and sustainable intensification is the way for the two continents to feed their growing urban
and more prosperous populations.
The Paris Agreement: Progress to Date
The Climate Change Agreement sets out a global action plan to put the world on track to
limit global warming to well below 2°C. The agreement will enter into force in 2020. The
Kyoto Protocol’s principle of binding (industrial) countries to commitments, however,
already had to be abandoned for softer, “intended” commitments in the Paris Agreement,
which committed all (developed, as well as developing) countries to their declared intended
targets in order to reach agreement. Without the United States and China agreeing to
emission reductions through bilateral talks in advance of the Paris Agreement, reaching
even the diluted accord would not have been possible, given the lack of acknowledgment of
climate change in some key US constituencies. The good news is that, with the Biden–Harris
government in power, the United States has rejoined the Paris Agreement with great energy
and appointed former Secretary of State John Kerry as the US Special Presidential Envoy for
Climate with authority over energy policy and climate policy within the executive branch.
How disastrous the policy of Trump administration was, however, is worth recounting. On
June 1, 2017, under an “America First” policy, the US President Donald Trump announced
that the United States would not implement the Paris Agreement, citing a series of arguably
debatable and ill-informed reasons (WhiteHouse.gov 2017).
In December 2018, at a meeting of the parties, the US intention to withdraw was
reiterated in the statement, “absent the identification of terms that are more favorable to
the American people.” The US State Department notified the Secretary-General that it
would provide formal notification “as soon as it is eligible to do so.” Under Article 28 of the
Paris Agreement, the earliest possible date for the withdrawal to take effect was November 4,
2020. Until then, the US delegation continued to participate, which included reporting its
GHG emissions to the United Nations (CRS 2019), and the November 2020 US election has
provided an opportunity for reengagement, considering there is a significant body of US
public opinion in favor of climate action, much as the Democrats in Congress demonstrated
earlier (Holden 2019).
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International reactions to the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement were overwhelm-
ingly negative. World leaders rejected Trump’s claim that the Agreement could be renego-
tiated, expressing disapproval of his decision. France’s leader, Emmanuel Macron, stated
that Trump had “committed an error for the interests of his country, his people and a
mistake for the future of our planet” (Watts and Connally 2017). Nevertheless, the parties
have “agreed on most of the ‘rulebook’ for implementing the PA’s provisions” (CRS 2019).
China’s Special Representative on Climate Change suggested the concerns about the US
withdrawal had been lessened, in part, because of China’s pledge to meet its commitments
fully, asserting that China “sent out a strong political signal” by helping “stabilize” inter-
national climate change efforts (CRS 2019). Together, the Agreement partners pledged to
push onward without the “world’s second-largest emitter.” Bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments have arisen “to circumvent” traditional leadership in the US. Some of the participant
countries, including China, have strengthened their Paris pledges (Chemnick 2019). Still,
Chemnick noted in a 2018 essay reprinted by Scientific American that without the United
States’ involvement, other countries may be less motivated to cut their own emissions,
referencing a former Cabinet member of the Indian government, Montek Singh Ahluwalia,
who was concerned that in the United States’ absence, there would be less pressure on other
states to comply with the Agreement (Chemnick 2019). Without action on climate, food
security and nutrition will be severely set back for the poorest countries and people.
In the Paris Agreement, governments decided to work to define a clear roadmap for
ratcheting up climate finance to US$100 billion by 2020, while also agreeing to set a new
goal on the provision of finance from the US$100 billion floor before 2025. The Obama
administration and 19 other countries had promised to work toward doubling their spend-
ing over five years to support clean energy research (Goldenberg 2016). At the same time, 28
private investors, including Microsoft’s Bill Gates, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, and
Amazon’s Jeff Bezos, pledged their own money to help build private businesses based on
the public research. The 20 governments and investors are calling their joint effort “Mission
Innovation,” because incentives for individual private investment are less clear. As Bill
Gates indicated, returns to clean energy in the short term are less likely than in the
technology field, given the 20-year limit on patents, which are less applicable in the longer
maturation of energy investments (Bennet 2015, 58).
Following Trump’s rejection of the international agreement, 24 US governors joined
together to form a bipartisan coalition, representing 55 percent of the population. The
coalition, the United States Climate Alliance, with its Secretariat housed at the United
Nations Foundation, committed to aggressive climate action, including implementing
policies to advance the goals of the Paris Agreement and tracking and reporting progress
to the global community (US Climate Alliance 2019).
The Governance of Transition
The processes leading to these and other global agreements offer important insights into the
way the world community is governing itself without a global government—without a
mandate to tax global citizens, very limited ability to enforce rules, and unequal voice and
power in the “institutions” of global governance. The term “institutions” in this book is used
in the sense that Nobel Laureate Douglass North conceived the term: namely, formal and
informal rules by which players play the game (North 1990). By “players,”we mean member
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governments, international organizations, philanthropists, the private sector, civil society,
and professional organizations, among others (Box 1.1).
The global organizations that we review in this book form a subset of global institutions
of governance, as defined in this chapter. They are unable to address many of the current
challenges, or to deal with challenges of the fourth industrial revolution, consisting of
extraordinary changes in technology and the associated growing importance of social
media. Three important characteristics of these changes are their speed, disruptive nature,
and breadth and depth, and the changes have profound implications for the future
(Buytaert and Raj 2016). We do not fully understand the implications of this revolution,
but there seems to be consensus that there is a heightening of risk and uncertainty, already
incorporated in strategy formulations since the 2007–8 triple food, energy, and financial
crises, and now in addressing the scale, speed, and complexity of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Given the rapidity with which changes are occurring, management of the transition to
the fourth industrial revolution is urgently needed. Who should manage this transition?
Are current fora effective, with Davos increasingly seen as a white male preserve and
thereby missing a broader, more credible pool of talent and knowledge (Barry 2016)?
Since then, Davos has been diversifying. Addressing the World Economic Forum’s Annual
Meeting at Davos, on January 17, 2017, China’s President Xi Jinping stressed the impor-
tance of globalization, trade, and climate change (CGTN America 2017). At the next
World Economic Summit in Davos the following year, in January 2018, Prime Minister
Modi also stressed many of the same issues: the importance of globalization and climate
change, and the need for taking forward the Doha Development Agenda on trade (Financial
Express 2018).
Box 1.1 Institutions
Douglass North’s analytical framework explains the ways in which institutions and
institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and
over time. According to North, institutions are a system of rules, which explain the link
with the changes that they have undergone in terms of routines, transaction costs,
political practices, and other behavioral features. The nature of institutions explains
the role of transaction and production costs in their development. North’s framework
helps us to understand growth and development in the course of structural transforma-
tion. Institutions exist due to the uncertainties involved in human interactions; they are
the constraints devised to structure the interactions. Yet, institutions vary widely in their
consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that
produce growth and development, while other economies develop institutions that
produce stagnation. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and
organizations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a
given institutional framework. North argued that the kinds of skills and knowledge
fostered by the structure of the economy shape the direction of change and gradually
alter the institutional framework. He then explained how institutional development
could lead to a path-dependent pattern of development.
Source: North (1990).
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There is a broad scientific consensus that achieving sufficient mitigation requires an
unprecedented transition to a low-carbon economy. Limiting global warming to 1.5°
requires reductions of 45 percent in CO₂ emissions by 2030, and to reach net zero by
2050. Despite the 2015 Paris Agreement, GHG emissions are high and rising, fossil fuels
continue to dominate the global energy mix, and the price of carbon remains low, reinfor-
cing the need for a variety of complementary policies (UN 2019).
With the increasing number of actors, where will the leadership come from? Interna-
tional organizations, with their long experience, remain important players in helping to
develop consensus, mobilize resources, and bring together diverse, knowledgeable, interna-
tional stakeholders. Their strong legitimacy, however, has eroded since the global financial
crisis in 2008, and their roles have diminished relatively, in financial terms, with the
growing roles of other flows of finance, including from philanthropists, the private sector,
and remittances, as well as with the growing role of emerging countries. The same is true in
terms of ideas and policy prescriptions from a wider array of international stakeholders,
such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and think tanks. We discuss the emer-
gence and the role of the G20 vis-à-vis international organizations in later chapters on
global governance.
The State of Climate and Sustainable Development Goals Financing
The UNFCCC provides no official definition of climate finance, but its Standing Committee
on Finance (SCF) proposed to view it broadly as all efforts aimed at reduction in the
emissions of GHG (mitigation) or reduction of vulnerability (and increased resilience) to
climate change impacts (adaptation) (UNFCCC 2014). More specifically, climate finance
usually refers to finance flows from developed to developing countries in order to help them
to mitigate and adapt to climate changes (Fankhauser 2013). At the UN Copenhagen
Climate Change Conference in 2009, developed countries pledged to reach US$100 billion
in annual funding by 2020 to help developing countries adapt to climate change and invest
in low-carbon technologies. Leaders of developed economies also pledged to mobilize Fast-
Start Finance (FSF) of US$30 billion between 2010 and 2012. The report by the SCF
(UNFCCC 2014) indicated that the developed countries fulfilled this pledge, exceeding it
by US$33 billion, but the problem of how to build a mechanism for steady flows to reach the
US$100 billion annual goal is far from solved. Again, estimates vary, and it is likely that
most of the finance and efforts will have to come from developing countries.³
The current level of funding falls far short of these needs. As of November 2017, the
Green Climate Fund (GCF 2020) had raised US$10.3 billion equivalent in pledges from
43 state governments, of the estimated US$100 billion sought. According to the UNFCCC
(2016) Biennial Assessment, global total climate finance had increased by almost 15 percent
³ AWorld Bank report (2010) estimated annual funding needs of US$28 to US$100 for adaptation by 2030 and
US$139–$175 billion for mitigation (in 2005 prices) to limit climate warming to 2°C. The World Economic
Forum (WEF 2013) estimated that the total cost of additional, incremental infrastructure investments required by
2020 to secure the 2°C emissions path as US$700 billion annually. The International Energy Agency (IEA 2014)
predicted that achieving the UNFCCC climate target requires US$5 trillion more than in the core scenario for
global energy supplies. Flows of funds will have to be designed differently—less money should be spent on
extraction and transportation of fossil fuels and much more on energy efficiency, particularly in the field of
transport or the building industry.
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since 2011–12 (US$650 billion), to US$741 billion for 2014;⁴ with total finance at US$687
billion in 2013, the annual average was US$714 billion over 2013–14. Private investment in
renewable energy and energy efficiency represents the largest share of the global total.
Including the partial data on domestic public finance expenditures of US$192 billion per
year, the upper end of the range is raised to US$880 billion in 2013 and US$930 billion in 2014.
Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) takes a different approach to accounting, estimating
annual global climate finance to be US$342 billion and US$392 billion, for 2013 and
2014, respectively,⁵ an annual average of US$67 billion over 2013–14, only about 51 percent
of the UNFCCC estimate. The numbers differ significantly because the UNFCCC takes a
more generous approach to spending on energy efficiency. According to the CPI report,
total global climate finance was 9 percent higher in 2014 than in 2012, due to a steady
increase in public finance and record levels of private investment in renewable energy, the
dominant sector, with more than 70 percent of climate finance every year from 2012 to 2014
(Mazza, Falzon, and Buchner 2016).
The data on South–South climate finance are limited; it was estimated in the range of US
$5.9–9.1 billion for 2013 and US$7.2–11.7 billion for 2014, of which about half was
channeled through multilateral institutions (UNFCCC 2016). In December 2017, China
announced the largest carbon trading fund, several times the European fund and the
California fund, securing its position as a leader in climate finance.
China’s entry into climate finance is of considerable significance because most of the
investments are made in the country of origin. Flows from developed to developing
countries were much lower: public entities contributed from US$35 billion to US$50 billion,
and private agents contributed from US$5 billion to US$125 billion per year (UNFCCC
2014) (see, also, UNTT [2013]; Wąsiński [2015]). Most went to mitigation and relatively
little to adaptation.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff take an altogether different approach to finan-
cing by championing a carbon tax to address climate change, along with fiscal policies to
discourage carbon emissions from coal and other polluting fossil fuels, including increasing
the price of carbon emissions to give people and firms incentives to reduce energy use and
shift to clean energy sources (Gaspar et al. 2019).
The financing needs of the SDGs are similarly considerable, estimated to be US$4.5
trillion annually, exceeding 2014 levels of official development assistance (ODA) by
30 times (UNCTAD 2014). These are only ballpark figures, and estimates vary widely by
source and are not comparable—there is a range of estimates by different entities, covering
different issues—but the basic point remains.
In 2020, official development assistance (ODA) by member countries of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) amounted to USD161.2 billion, representing 0.32% of their
combined GNI [gross national income]. This total included USD158.0 billion in the form
of grants, loans, to sovereign entities, debt relief, and contributions to multilateral institu-
tions (calculated on a grant-equivalent basis); USD1.3 billion to development-oriented
⁴ Calculated as the upper range of CPI estimates (US$346 billion in 2013 and US$397 billion in 2014) plus the
investment in energy efficiency (US$334 billion in 2013 and US$337 billion in 2014), plus sustainable transport
(not available), land use (US$5 billion), and adaptation (US$1.5 billion), the same for both 2013 and 2014. This
estimate includes both public and private monies, from development banks, money spent domestically, and
money flowing between countries.
⁵ The CPI ranges for overall climate finance were US$346 billion (high boundary) and US$339 billion (low
boundary) in 2013 and US$397 billion (high boundary) and US$387 billion (low boundary) in 2014.
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private sector instrument (PSI) vehicles and USD1.9 billion in the form of net loans and
equities to private companies operating in ODA-eligible countries.
Total ODA in 2020 rose by 3.5% in real terms compared to 2019, reaching its highest level
ever recorded. (OECD 2021, 1)
The investment needs of developing countries are large, and ODA will not be a significant
source of future funding,⁶ as tax revenues and private investments provide much of the
resources for development of developing countries (Renwick 2015). “Given the global
economic impacts of the pandemic, it is uncertain if ODA volumes can continue to grow
or remain stable in the coming years” (OECD 2021, 1).
Whether these projections on aid and capital flows will materialize remains to be seen,
particularly in the context of slowed global economic growth.
The SDGs and the climate agreement have shifted the global dialogue from aid levels to
global financial flows, including domestic resource mobilization (World Bank and IMF
2015). With fiscal woes, aid weariness, and an influx of refugees into OECD countries, the
prospects for increasing aid are not bright. With rapid growth in emerging countries,
however, since the beginning of the millennium, the balance of economic power has shifted
from the Global North to a multipolar world, including, particularly, the Global South and
East. Combined with growing inequality and the rise of philanthropy from the billionaire
class, the nature of international cooperation and assistance has changed significantly, with
important implications for global and national governance.
The Pace and Direction of Transformation
In this inquiry, we focus on poverty, food security, and nutrition, addressed by SDGs 1 and
2 and drawing on several other related SDGs. Furthermore, we view the SDGs through the
lens of structural transformation of countries and the role of multilateral organizations. The
process of structural transformation has been of intense interest to economists and fre-
quently described as having several distinct characteristics: (1) declining share of agriculture
in the gross domestic product (GDP) and in employment; (2) rural–urban migration;
(3) growth of the service and the manufacturing sectors; and (4) a demographic transition
with a reduction in the population growth rates. The final outcome of transformation is a
state in which differences in labor productivity between the agricultural and nonagricultural
sectors narrow considerably, compared to early stages of development when there is
often a huge and even a widening gap in labor productivities between agriculture and
nonagricultural sectors. A turning point is reached when the difference between the share of
agriculture in employment and income begins to narrow.
Agricultural productivity growth is crucial to the transformation process, and analysts of
structural transformation have traditionally focused on changing labor productivities
among sectors over time. Analysts have noted that today’s developing countries in Asia
are taking longer to reach the turning point than was the historical experience of industrial
⁶ The International Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing (UN 2014a) estimated
investment requirement in infrastructure (water, agriculture, telecoms, power, transport, buildings, industrial,
and forestry sectors) amounting to US$5 trillion to US$7 trillion globally, and the cost of a global safety net to
eliminate extreme poverty at about US$66 billion annually. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda described the global
infrastructure gap as including “the $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion annual gap in developing countries” (UN 2015a).
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countries. Does the period of rapid economic growth in the post-2000 period offer a more
promising picture? Do these observations apply only to Asia? How do they differ among
countries within Asia and across regions, such as in Africa and Latin America?
Yet, agriculture is also critical to poverty alleviation, food security, and nutrition.
Agriculture is expected to perform multiple ecosystem functions from carbon sequestration
to saving biodiversity, forests, marine life, and water flows. Eliminating hunger, not just to
the level of the SDGs, but getting to a near zero share of the population in agriculture, as
part of the growth and development process, has been the ambition and challenge for
developing countries, particularly those with large shares of population, poverty, and
hunger in the agricultural sector. To achieve this transformation calls for massive transfor-
mation in other areas. For example, macroeconomists expect external financing for the
transformation to come largely from the East, mostly from China, and energy experts are
expecting a transformation from fossil fuels to renewable energy to be largely funded by
public–private partnerships. Each will be critical for structural transformation, increased
agricultural productivity, and a declining share of agriculture.
Productivity Growth, Structural Transformation, and Employment
Two narratives have prevailed in the development literature on transformation, on the one
hand by Kuznets (1955; 1966) and others (Lewis 1954; Johnston and Mellor 1961; Chenery
and Syrquin 1975; Timmer and Akkus 2008; Binswanger-Mkhize, McCalla, and Patel 2010;
Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; 2013), and on the other by those who question whether agricul-
ture has (and should have) a primacy, or whether other sectors play (or should play) key
roles, and within agriculture, whether smallholder agriculture—which has dominated in
Asia—is the route to industrialization, particularly in SSA. Adrian Wood (Owens and
Wood 1997; Wood 2003); Paul Collier and Stefan Dercon (Collier and Dercon 2014),
Douglas Gollin (Dercon and Gollin 2014); and John Page (Page 2015a, 2015b; Newman
et al. 2016; Page and Dews 2016) have questioned the role of agriculture and, in particular,
the role of smallholder agriculture relative to medium-sized and large farms and relative to
the industrial sector. With few exceptions, however, most recent developers in Asia and
Africa have found it difficult to create productive employment in manufacturing significant
enough to achieve transformation (Rodrik 2014, 2016; Page 2015a, 2015b; de Melo 2017).
Service sector growth has been rapid, and most of it is of low productivity (Hallward-
Driemeier and Nayyar 2018).
What does the experience of developed countries offer? Gardner (2006) in his landmark
study of American agriculture (in no way typical of all industrial countries, except in the
share of population in agriculture, which now involves less than 2 percent in the United
States), described how factor productivities between agriculture and nonagriculture were
equalized in the United States, a key feature of structural transformation, and reported the
good news and bad: tremendous productivity growth and land consolidation, combined
with misery, bankruptcies, and poverty. Schumpeter (1943) described this process as
creative destruction, andWillard Cochrane (1958) described it as a treadmill. Technological
change has been a major driving force in agriculture for all transformed countries, greatly
affecting farm structure and rural economies and societies. Cochrane (1958) argued that
this did not look like it was about to change. The treadmill has been part of agricultural
industrialization, with winners and losers. In explaining the treadmill, Cochrane (1958)
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noted that, with technological breakthroughs, agricultural output per acre of land and
farmer increased.
Farmers, determined to increase their production, adopted new technologies, such as
fertilizers and pesticides. Except for the early adopters, however, the transition would not
increase farmers’ profits, but rather place them on Cochrane’s treadmill, a self-perpetuating
cycle of technology, debt, exhausted soils, more technology, and more debt. The concept of
the treadmill is used to explain trends in modern agriculture toward bigger industrial farms
and agricultural practices that rely upon chemical inputs, either aggressively pursuing new
technologies, or staying small and using off-farm income to survive. Both responses rely on
government payments (Mitchell 2016). A question going forward is how technological
change in agriculture will affect farms of different sizes in developing countries, with quite
different initial structures, in a dynamic context with new paradigms of sustainable inten-
sification and healthy nutritious food? What will it do to farm incomes?
In Chapter 2, on structural transformation, we take up the question of the structure of
farm production in today’s dynamic context, and particularly the highly skewed pattern of
farm sizes throughout the world—divided between the dominance of very large farms in
high-income and upper-middle-income countries (UMICs), and in countries where exten-
sive livestock grazing is a dominant part of the agricultural system, mostly in North and
South America, and the vast majority of small or very small farms. According to FAO, of the
more than 570 million farms in the world that produce food and agricultural products,
manage agroforestry, or husband animals on range lands, the vast majority are small or very
small farms (Lowder, Skoet, and Raney 2016). Asia has 87 percent of the world’s 500 million
farms that are less than 2 hectares in size.
Advanced countries have shown a strong tendency toward land consolidation. Among
the recently emerging countries in Asia, and particularly, in China, land consolidation is
advancing rapidly (Zhang 2010). Contrary to a CGIAR study, which claimed a growing
tendency toward land consolidation in Asia (Masters et al. 2013), this is not a universal
phenomenon in Asia, where farms are becoming smaller and the incidence of landlessness
or near landlessness is growing in India (Chand, Prasanna, and Singh 2011), and it has
stabilized in Bangladesh (Gautam and Faruqee 2016). Indeed, 72 percent of all farms are less
than 1 hectare and control only 8 percent of all agricultural land. A similar share, 70 percent
of the small or very small farms, are in Asia (FAO 2014). Only 12 percent of all farms consist
of 1 and 2 hectares, and they control 4 percent of the land. Farms in the range of 2 to 5
hectares account for 10 percent of all farms and control 7 percent of the land. In Chapter 2,
we further address the relationships between farm size and farm productivity.
Tenure is how people gain access to land, fisheries, forests, and other natural resources.
Having secure and equitable access to natural resources can allow people to produce food
for their consumption and to increase income. Inadequate and insecure tenure rights to
natural resources, combined with climate change and resource degradation, often result in
extreme poverty and hunger. The dynamics of the tenurial structure of land and the roles of
labor and commodity and financial markets are, therefore, important to structural trans-
formation, particularly with growing demographic pressure on the land, rapid urbanization,
and concurrent growth in the vertical integration of agriculture.
These issues are the kinds that W. Arthur Lewis (1954) addressed in recognizing the
presence of dualism between agriculture and nonagriculture. Land registration records are
poor in many developing countries. Information technology now makes it possible to
achieve universal land registration faster and more easily. Experts note that greater clarity
in land rights will likely accelerate land markets and land consolidation, and poor farmers
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who cannot compete financially will lose access to the land, perhaps at a faster rate than they
are now under communal land tenure, as is the case in much of Africa. Others suspect that
even under communal ownership, it is possible to influence village chiefs and acquire large
tracks of land. FAO, working closely with the Committee on World Food Security,
supported an unprecedented international agreement on the governance of tenure intended
to promote secure tenure rights and equitable access to land, fisheries, and forests, as a
means of eradicating hunger and poverty, supporting sustainable development, and enhan-
cing the environment. The “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of
Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests” were officially endorsed by the Committee on
World Food Security on May 11, 2012 (FAO 2012). Since the endorsement, implementation
has been encouraged by the G20, Rio+ 20, the United Nations General Assembly, and the
Francophone Assembly of Parliamentarians (CFS 2012). How this plays out is discussed in
Chapter 2.
Transformation has traditionally been viewed in terms of shifting labor from agriculture
to manufacturing, and developing countries typically aspire to create more employment in
manufacturing than in the service sector. Service sector growth, however, has dominated all
regions, particularly in Africa, where growth of manufacturing has been very limited. Much
of the gain from structural change in Africa stems from movements out of agriculture and
into services; the positive contributions of structural transformation have largely bypassed
manufacturing. Although this raises concerns about the feasibility of expanding manufac-
turing in the region, it is also encouraging that the service sector is playing a positive role
(Diao, McMillan, and Rodrik 2017).
The shares of the manufacturing sector in GDP and employment show great range, and
there is a growing debate among economists as to whether the distinct characteristics of
manufacturing—which make it an “escalator” of growth, as Rodrik (2016), and Kaldor
(1966) before him, described—can be realized, and if some of these advantages also apply to
the modern service sector, in modern economies with complex supply chains that span
multiple continents. Failing to create productive employment outside agriculture will put
more than normal pressure on the agricultural sector to create productive employment, as
we discuss in Chapter 2 (Krugman 1994; Stiglitz 1996; Rodrik 2014; Page 2015b).
Evidence from China, Vietnam, Indonesia, India, and Bangladesh on productivity
growth shows that smallholder agriculture is the most cost-effective way to reduce poverty
(World Bank 2007; de Janvry and Sadoulet 2010; Loayza and Raddatz 2010). The relation-
ship, however, between farm size and employment, poverty reduction, and food and
nutrition security is complex and has led to much debate, as we discuss in Chapter 2.
Paradigm Shift to Sustainability
Developed countries have achieved productivity growth, often using high levels of modern
inputs, and only later considering the issues of sustainability. Other more advanced devel-
oping countries, such as China and parts of India, have followed this same route, but late
developers are increasingly having to address sustainability issues simultaneously with
productivity growth, with a focus on the increased role of knowledge. This is far more
challenging. Gardner (2006), for example, acknowledged but did not discuss the alternative
model of US agriculture, which advocates eco-friendly, “small is beautiful,” green
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agriculture, with parallels in the rest of the world (IAASTD 2009). Nevertheless, he has
highlighted the need to recognize the skepticism of those criticizing technology, together
with the concerns about environmental and human health threats from chemicals and
biotechnology and the need to better measure and assess cost, benefits, and both positive
and negative externalities from economic progress (Gardner 2006, 352). Although Gardner
considered US industrial agriculture, on balance, a great “success story” (Gardner 2006,
343), he agreed with the criticism of the greens about the traditionalists. The pro-growth
group is “too dismissive of criticism, pays little attention to the costs of and losers from
economic progress, and is too ready to spend billions of taxpayer dollars on the promotion
of commercial agriculture” (Gardner 2006, 352).
Interest in sustainable agriculture, or the so-called sustainable intensification paradigm,
has increased throughout the world, and it has many dimensions. It concerns the manage-
ment of numerous dimensions of agriculture, including crop choices, soil, water, forests,
climate, and their complex interactions. Evaluators of the 2009 multi-stakeholder Interna-
tional Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development
(IAASTD 2009) report, Agriculture at a Crossroads, credited the report with starting a long
overdue conversation about different development paradigms (Elliott et al. 2009). The
following year, a report of the Committee on Twenty-First Century Systems Agriculture
of the National Research Council of the National Academies (NRC 2010) acknowledged
that research on sustainability was not getting the attention it needs, noting that while a
number of environmentally sensitive improvements had been made at the margin in US
agriculture, no transformative changes had been made, and more research was needed on
sustainable agriculture. It is too early to say if the radical shifts proposed by IAASTD have
changed agriculture at scale, although concerns about sustainability are now reflected in a
variety of international reports, knowledge networks, government policies, and farmer-
driven innovations. They are reflected in a wide variety of paradigms and nomenclatures
under the broad rubric of sustainable agriculture, including “save and grow” agriculture,
conservation agriculture (CA), reduced-till or no-till (NT) farming—by far the most
broadly disseminated technology—climate-smart agriculture, landscape agriculture, eco-
agriculture, evergreen agriculture, and sustainable intensification.
Sustainable agriculture also includes a plethora of individual practices, such as Integrated
Pest Management (IPM), Integrated Plant Nutrient Systems (IPNS), soil organic matter
management (which is acquiring popularity with new sensors to measure soil moisture),
integration of crops and livestock for small farmers, water harvesting, stress-resistant crop
varieties, drip irrigation, as well as instruments such as certification and branding of food
produced using particular farming practices (for example, organically produced fruit and
vegetables). As the NRC report noted, however, adoption of these new models, with a few
exceptions, has not yet made a transformative difference at scale.
Advances in Biotechnology and Other Approaches
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and the subsequent gene editing technologies are
an exception—the biological revolution’s potential remains underutilized. Biotechnology
ranges from tissue culture, GMOs, fermentation technology, induced mutations, genomics,
biopesticides, and biofertilizers, to marker-assisted breeding, assisted reproductive
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
   23
technologies in farm animals, diagnostics, and gene editing. GMOs have been adopted
extensively in North and South America, but have become a lightning rod and will, perhaps,
become unnecessary with the rapid advances in genomics (Fedoroff 2020). The nature of
the gene editing debate is changing, as new methods to modify genomes that fall outside
current regulatory systems are being developed. In the scientific community, the debate
seems to be moving toward regulating what a new plant (or gene) can do and not how it was
obtained (NASEM 2016; Servick 2016).
Some advocates of sustainable agriculture include supporters of organic farming who
find GMOs unacceptable, even though genetically modified (GM) cotton has been adopted
extensively and has been shown to reduce the use of pesticides and their harmful effects on
human health (Gilbert 2013; Qaim and Kouser 2013; Hsiao 2015). In 2014, 95 percent of
cotton farmers, including 7.7 million small farmers in India, the second largest producer of
cotton in the world, grew cotton on 12.25 million hectares in 10 cotton-growing states
(Choudhary and Gaur 2015). Similar issues are imminent on edible GM crops in India, such
as eggplant (brinjal), developed in India and adopted in Bangladesh. Prospects were brighter
for GM mustard at the time of writing this chapter (Bagla 2016). India is one of the world’s
biggest producers of mustard (Brassica juncea), which is cultivated for its edible leaves and
oil. The GM variety is engineered with genes from a soil microbe that manipulate pollen
development, such that the variety produces hybrids more easily than in the usually self-
pollinating crop. The GM-derived hybrids produce about 25 percent more seeds—and thus
more oil, which is pressed from the seeds—than traditional varieties now in cultivation.
The safety review raises one cautionary note: it calls for more studies on whether GM
mustard could harm honeybees and honey production in mustard-growing areas. It stresses
the need for continued monitoring of insects and other organisms that live in or near
mustard fields.
These technologies have been on hold in India due to the resistance of environmental
lobbies and civil society, but their resistance efforts have strengthened the review process
and made it more transparent. GM crops have not, however, made headway. In SSA,
excluding South Africa, GMOs provide an excellent example of the role of institutions of
governance in setting the formal and informal rules, based on the voices of stakeholders.
Organizations, as players, try both to influence rules and also to implement them (Box 1.2).
Nigeria is adopting GMO technologies, including its first food crop, the GM cowpea (Falck-
Zepeda, Gruère, and Sithole-Niang 2013; Isaac and Conrow 2019).
IAASTD’s position against biotechnology has continued to provoke debate, particularly
by some member governments, whereas Qaim and others have documented the benefits of
genetically modified crops for the poor in food-insecure countries (Qaim 2010; Qaim and
Kouser 2013).
The report of the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine
provided a broader perspective that noted that enduring and widespread gains will depend
on institutional support and access to profitable local and global markets, especially for
resource-poor farmers (NASEM 2016). In addressing the unresolved institutional issues, the
increasing concentration of new technology in the hands of a few multinationals with
control of the intellectual property cannot be ignored. This situation, too, is changing
rapidly. In early 2016, China’s government-owned agrochemical firm China National
Chemical announced an all-cash proposal to buy Swiss-owned Syngenta for US$43 billion.
The deal underwent a regulatory review in the United States, where Syngenta does a
significant portion of its business, when a powerful US senator expressed alarm about the
purchase (Bunge, Spegele, and Mauldin 2016). The regulatory hurdles were cleared, and
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Syngenta was acquired by ChemChina in 2017 (Spegele and Wu 2017). The world of global
and national governance of food and agriculture, including the harnessing of agricultural
technology, is certainly changing with the increased roles for emerging countries, including
China, India, and the countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Two
additional resource management challenges are worth highlighting going forward.
Synthetic fertilizers have been critical to increasing agricultural productivity. Since they
were discovered and replaced organic material well over a century ago, while saving farm
labor, their use has led to the decline in soil carbon and the loss of knowledge of soil biology.
To improve soil fertility and increase its carbon content, steps are needed to ward off
“deleterious climate impacts.” Estimates of soils’ potential to sequester carbon vary, and
more location-specific research is needed to promote appropriate soil management prac-
tices. “Putting the carbon back in soil is not only mitigating climate change, but also
improving human health, productivity, food security, nutrition security, water quality, air
quality—everything,” said Rattan Lal, the director of the Carbon Management and Seques-
tration Center at Ohio State. “It’s a win-win-win option,” he said (Leslie 2017; see, also, Lal
and Stewart 2015). Fertilizer’s use, its pricing and subsidies, and the role of the public sector
have been matters of intense international debate since the generation of the Green
Revolution. We explore the implications of these debates for structural transformation.
Similarly, unsustainable water use (overdrafted aquifers, seasonally dry rivers, disappear-
ing lakes and wetlands) has become a problem across the developing world. Particularly in
regions with water shortages, human interventions have regulated water for food security,
domestic, and other uses (Molden 2007). The proliferation of large-scale, storage-based
systems and the development of deep tube well technology have resulted in dramatic
increases in water withdrawals and created interdependence and competition across new,
mostly unregulated, boundaries—often based on exploitation of nonrenewable resources.
The governance of these new relationships goes much beyond the scope of traditional
institutions. Many of the new improved engineering technologies to deal with problems of
unsustainable water use are supposed to save water, release it for other uses, and achieve
higher crop yields per unit of water. Perry and Steduto (2017) argued, however, that if yield
per unit area increases, then it is likely that water consumption also increases. “Hi-tech”
irrigation (which often ensures more controlled and better timed irrigation supplies) is one
of the various factors that encourage farmers to invest in higher return crops. What do these
changes mean for the future of food and agriculture?
From Sustainable Production Systems to
Sustainable Consumption
With urbanization and income growth, there is often rapid dietary transition as consumers
shift to more diversified, higher-value diets with an increasing share of processed foods
related to dairy, poultry, meat, fruits, and vegetables, and an important demand pull on
production and processing. Barrett et al. (2019) noted that the agri-food value chain
revolution, which has been underway throughout the developing world since the early
2000s, has played a critical role in the story of structural transformation of developing
economies. In much of the literature on transformation, however, it has often been over-
looked, including, particularly, in terms of its development implications. From his large
body of work on value chains, Reardon noted that 80 percent of the food consumed in
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developing regions (which he measures in value terms) goes through supply chains to
consumers: 60 percent of food consumption in developing countries is in cities, where
nearly all food is purchased, and rural consumption is 40 percent of the total, with rural
consumers buying as much as 50 percent of their food. Governments distribute about
1 percent of food consumed (again, presumably in value terms) in developing regions, so
those channels are not a substitute for the market (supply chains). Markets must continue to
feed the poor, and e-commerce and delivery have been a key lifeline for poor consumers.
We need to see the effect of COVID-19 on e-commerce, as part of a continuum of rapid
change in the retail sector of developing regions (Thomas Reardon, personal communica-
tion, June 13–14, 2020).
Barrett, Reardon, Swinnen, and Zilberman explained, in their paper, that “by the time
countries reach middle-income status, post-farmgate value addition already accounts for
roughly half of total consumer food expenditures and increases rapidly as economic growth
proceeds” (Barrett et al. 2019, 3). The changes tend to be influenced by the nature of
technological change, farm structure, foreign direct investment (FDI), and infrastructure
investments.
Farmers in SSA and Asia, where value chains have traditionally been relatively short, had
a closer relationship between production and consumption. “Agrifood value chains (VCs)
have shifted from being mainly local to being much longer, stretching from rural areas to
urban consumers,” and slightly, to export markets (Reardon et al. 2016, 2). They are
beginning to face challenges similar to farmers in the United States, whereas their share
in the prices that consumers pay is typically no more than 7 to 10 percent, with the rest of
the transaction cost consisting of transportation, processing, and as appropriate, canning,
freezing, and packaging. The implication is that development of supply chains has increased
return to farmers (Reardon et al. 2016). In later work, Reardon emphasizes that value chains
have evolved from the growth of supermarkets to the service sector, of restaurants and fast
food enterprises, and increasingly, to e-commerce and service delivery, a phenomenon
accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic (Lu and Reardon 2018).
The Challenge of Diversifying Production to Support
Diversified Dietary Choice
The gap of up to 90 percent that exists between producers and consumers needs to be
addressed to improve the nutritional content of foods that consumers eat in high-income
countries and are beginning to consume in developing countries. With growing evidence of
the use of energy-rich additives of sugars and fats leading to obesity and noncommunicable
diseases, this dietary trend is seen, particularly, in South American countries that have
adopted North American food habits, which Kenneth Rogoff attributed, in part, to the
effects of North American Free Trade Agreement (Rogoff 2017). Some patterns of produc-
tion and consumption during structural transformation are already emerging rapidly
enough across countries to necessitate developing and implementing strategies, including
getting the food and beverage industries to be part of the solution rather than the problem,
and independently assessing their impacts.
The current concern about healthy production, healthy consumption, and a healthy
planet goes back to the Brundtland Commission, formerly known as the World
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Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), which identified the need to
make sustainable development “ensure that it meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987, 8).
Since then, there has been a proliferation of literature on sustainability, but progress on
actually realizing sustainability has been slow, as noted in the growing GHG emissions, loss of
biodiversity, soil degradation, and decline in water quality. We explore these issues in the
book.
African farmers tend to have diversified farming systems, but most farms are rainfed,
and many soils have been severely depleted of nutrients. A lack of infrastructure often
inhibits access to outside resources and markets, leading to at least three classes of small
farmers—those with little or no market access, those with good market access, and those in
between. These and other developing countries are facing tension in making a transition
from the competing production paradigms: that is, of increasing the supply of cereals—a
paradigm well entrenched and in place—to production diversity consisting of livestock and
poultry, pulses, vegetables and fruit, and occasionally fish, to facilitate dietary diversity.
Concurrently, whereas some development advocates promote organic, on-farm diversity
and mistrust markets, especially global markets, even “traditional” Green Revolution
veterans, such as M. S. Swaminathan (2015) and Gordon Conway (2012), advocate an
evergreen or a doubly green revolution: that is, better natural resource management and
production of more with less, a result of the first Green Revolution experience and the
current global promotion of global food systems.
The production sustainability paradigm is complex and challenging, hard to define
operationally or measure (including trade-offs), with diversity in production systems that
defies generalizations—for instance, whether farming is rainfed or irrigated; temperate or
tropical; humid, sub-humid, arid, or semi-arid. It calls for long-term, interdisciplinary
approaches in situ, closer to the farmers’ fields, to address systematic, short- and long-run
costs and benefits, and trade-offs among competing objectives. It often tends to be location-
specific and hard to scale up. Whereas the simple technical fixes are unlikely to address all
four sustainability goals that the NRC has defined for the United States (Box 1.2), the
definition illustrates the complexity of the concept, which depends on where it is applied
and from whose perspective it is viewed.
US biofuel policies, promoted on the grounds of sustainability, were criticized during the
2008 crisis for having contributed to the global food crisis by reducing by up to 30–40
percent the corn/maize supplied on the global market for human consumption, contribut-
ing to the price increase (Wright 2014). Furthermore, with a sharp decline in energy prices,
Box 1.2 National Research Council’s Definition of Sustainability
• Satisfy human food, feed, and fiber needs, and contribute to biofuel needs.
• Enhance environmental quality and the resource base.
• Sustain the economic viability of agriculture.
• Enhance the quality of life for farmers, farm workers, and society as a whole.
Source: NRC (2010).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
   27
the economics of biofuels has changed, while the subsidies and mandates continue due to
the stickiness of policy reforms.
Integrated systems approaches are more likely to be successful when adapted to local
conditions. Scherr (2015) reported more than 450 such initiatives in Africa, Latin America,
South and Southeast Asia, and Europe, jointly pursuing sustainable agriculture, healthy
ecosystems, and improved livelihoods; and involving 5 or 6 sectors and 9–11 stakeholder
groups, including private sector companies, linking to value chains. There is little concrete
evidence yet about the impacts of their “sustainability” features.
The literature shows that governance of these multisectoral programs tends to be the
biggest challenge (Sayer et al. 2013). Even in the United States, conflicts among interest
groups in conservation programs can be daunting (Coppess 2017; Khanna and Shortie
2017). Additionally, research programs need to actively seek input and collaboration from
farmers to ensure that technologies are developed to meet their needs (IIRR and ACTN
2005). Women farmers, who play a pivotal role in African agriculture, need to be actively
engaged, provided with education and training opportunities, and involved in the develop-
ment of research agendas. FAO estimated that productivity can increase by up to 30 percent
with women’s inclusion and with farming systems that use locally available resources and
natural biophysical processes (FAO 2011). Skeptics have argued that collective efforts to
manage resources are doomed to fail because of “shirking” on the part of a few key
stakeholders who seek to reap the benefits without accepting the costs of collective action.
Elinor Ostrom, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, challenged the logic behind this
conclusion (Ostrom 1990). We explore the extent to which the conditions laid out by
Ostrom prevail in the case of resource management or can be created in areas such as
climate change, water, and land management.
Conservation Agriculture and the Need
for Measurement
Farmer-led transformation of agricultural production systems based on CA provides
another example.⁷ Now accounting for 157 million hectares, or 11 percent of the global
cropped area in 2013, CA systems include no or minimum tillage, organic mulch soil cover,
and crop species diversification, in conjunction with other good practices of crop and
production management (Kassam et al. 2015). The largest areas of CA are on large farms
in the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, Australia, and China, ranging from
35 million in the United States to 6.6 million in China. Much of the CA in the Americas
uses GM crops, which makes the practice easier. The spread of CA on small farms in Asia
and Africa has so far been quite limited (Mazvimavi 2011; Arslan et al. 2014; Rehman et al.
2015). In an analysis of CA adoption in SSA, Giller et al. (2009) suggested that, given present
circumstances including institutional and livelihood contexts, CA may be further constrain-
ing for most resource-constrained smallholder farmers.
Concerns about performance of CA for smallholder farmers in SSA include impacts on
yields and returns to labor, with the latter largely dependent on the former. Uncertainty in
⁷ See “Conservation Agriculture” at the FAO website: http://www.fao.org/ag/ca/index.html.
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CA efficacy, with respect to increasing yields, can be traced to the complexity of interacting
biophysical factors and process pathways and drivers that are influenced by CA technolo-
gies (Brouder and Gomez-Macpherson 2014). Cultural and economic entrenchment of
tillage agriculture, weeds, insect, pests, and disease management, as well as limited availa-
bility of seeding and planting equipment call for location-specific research and active
participatory extension (Stevenson, Serraj, and Cassman 2014). Additionally, the benefits
of CA (including better soils, carbon sinks, better yields, and reduced costs) tend to be
medium to long term, which large farmers are better able to afford, whereas many of the
costs, including the lack of silage for animals, for example, tend to be immediate and small
farmers may not be able to afford them.
Therefore, economic evaluations of new technologies, based on concrete, location-
specific data, are urgently needed for small farmers. Our working hypothesis is that there
is often too much advocacy and not enough concrete empirical evidence to know where
things work and why: that is, how technologies are deployed and institutions evolve in
response to challenges. For example, is miniaturizing of technology for small farmers the
answer? Or is land consolidation to take advantage of large machinery a better strategy?
How do rental markets or contracts evolve? Lu, Reardon, and Zilberman (2016) addressed
these issues in their article, “Supply Chain Design and Adoption of Indivisible Technology.”
Large farmers in the United States and Latin America are using advanced computers to fine-
tune application of sustainable practices and zero tillage, which means that machinery,
computers, and these modern technologies are increasingly being miniaturized, with new
organizations offering machinery-for-hire services, giving tremendous scope to accelerate
the spread of sustainable agriculture to smaller farmers in developing countries. Increas-
ingly, FAO and CGIAR have been adapting and researching CA on smaller farms, through
their respective workplans.
Issues in Improving Nutrition
Production and consumption of nutritious food for and by all in a globalized world pose
another set of challenges and concerns for the attainment of the SDGs. Undernourishment,
micronutrient deficiencies, and obesity now coexist in the same households and the same
countries. The numbers are staggering: an estimated 820 million are still hungry, with
2 billion people experiencing moderate or severe food insecurity (FAO et al. 2019, vii). At
least half of children worldwide, aged 6 months to 5 years, suffer from one or more
micronutrient deficiencies, and globally more than 2 billion people are affected
(CDC 2020). In 2016, more than 1.9 billion adults were overweight, of whom over 650
million were obese; 41 million children under the age of 5 were overweight or obese, and
over 340 million children and adolescents aged 5–19 were overweight or obese (WHO
2020b). Micronutrient deficiency may be declining, albeit slowly, whereas obesity has
been growing throughout the world, including in low- and low-middle-income countries
(LMICs).
Malnutrition in LICs and middle-income countries (MICs) is being described increas-
ingly by the world’s nutrition experts as a deepening crisis, and nutrition is at the center
stage of global policy among advocates (GLOPAN 2017). The key policy prescription from
the global panels of experts, which now abound, is to ensure that everyone has access to
healthy diets. The myriad recommendations on nutrition improvement blanketing the
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development community should be seen in the context of the experience since the 1970s
and its lessons. What is different now, compared to the past?
Our analysis, based on the historical experience, is outlined in Chapter 4. First, to
improve nutrition, consumers need to be educated and informed, and their knowledge
needs to influence household decisions and consumer demand. That information and
knowledge is currently lacking among most consumers, particularly in developing coun-
tries, and particularly among poor people. Second, high-quality diets tend to be more costly
than low-quality diets. Most consumers, particularly low-income consumers, lack the
income to be able to purchase high-quality diets. Evidence on the effect of increased income
on improved diets, too, is mixed. Finally, the relatively cheap price of junk food and its easy
accessibility made possible by the food and beverage industry has contributed to the
changed consumption patterns of foods high in sugar, salt, and fats and will need to be
called to account, with a focus on corporate social responsibility. We will explore the politics
of “do not harm” food, including preventing access of children to bad foods and the role of
global and national governance.
Recent shifts in production models raise issues of specialization versus production
diversity on farms, as a way to improve environmental and household consumption, and
directly health, by drawing on home production. The growth of value chains in a rapidly
globalized world provides a new set of challenges in influencing dietary diversity and
nutritional quality. Additionally, there are the issues of the scope for and the speed of
land consolidation, scale economies, and possibilities of nonfarm employment. Food safety
standards, trade policy, and dietary guidelines—vis-à-vis the regulation of the food proces-
sing industry—is a way to expand consumer choice while increasing consumer protection.
These have become particularly pressing issues with the rapid rise in obesity in developed
and developing countries alike. Therefore, in addition to the focus on poverty and hunger,
the problem of obesity has come to the forefront.
These issues call for economy-wide and ecology-wide approaches involving critical
choices, not only within agriculture, but across other sectors, in consideration of the
human and environmental health implications for the food we eat, with rapidly changing
lifestyles and their life-cycle impacts on food and agriculture. Developing countries face
complex choices in the face of rapid urbanization, climate change, growing pressure on land
and water resources, and the burgeoning demand for food and fiber from a growing and
prospering population. They are also striving for the goals of zero hunger and near zero
population in agriculture through structural transformation and creating productive
employment for the burgeoning youth population.
Demographic transition (or its lack) is also an important issue in Africa, to which
agricultural economists have paid little attention. Groth and May noted the four Asian
Tigers—South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong—experienced their demo-
graphic transition very rapidly, as “mortality rates in Asia decreased at a fast and steady
rate . . . followed by a decrease in fertility rates” and “when comparing South Korea to the
sub-Saharan African regions, it clearly appears that the [economic] surplus generated by the
demographic transition is going to be much lower in Africa than it has been in South Korea”
(Groth and May 2017, 189).
Gordon Conway, advocate of the concept of the “Doubly Green Revolution” in his book
One Billion Hungry: Can We Feed the World? (Conway 2012), outlined these and other
challenges and concluded with 24 requirements to be able to feed the world. Kofi Annan,
Raj Shah, and others have described the challenges as a bold and doable agenda, and Bill and
Melinda Gates have termed the agenda a reason to be optimistic (Weber 2014; Gates and
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Gates 2015; Shah 2017). Capable global and national institutions will be needed to address
the complex and interacting challenges.
Healthy Diets, Nutrition, and Health: Undernutrition, Overnutrition,
and Micronutrient Deficiencies—The Triple Burden of Malnutrition
Concern is growing about the triple burden of malnutrition, with an estimated 821 million
undernourished in 2018, including more than 2 billion with micronutrient deficiencies and
2 billion overweight, a third of whom are obese (CDC 2020; FAO et al. 2019). The three
phenomena can coexist in countries and, often, even in the same households, regardless of
income levels. The number of obese has been growing rapidly; the prevalence of under-
nourished had been shrinking until 2015, but was largely unchanged over the next three
years. The life-cycle nature of nutritional challenges, starting from conception of life to
death, is now taken as given, although health and economic impacts have become more
evident and have been articulated in a variety of prestigious publications, most notably in
the Lancet (2008, 2011, 2013, 2015), and in reports of various international organizations
(Development Initiatives 2017; FAO 2015; FAO et al. 2019; IFPRI 2014, 2015, 2016;
UNICEF 2016; UNICEF, WHO, and World Bank 2016; WHO 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c,
2014d, 2020a). The adverse economic impacts of poor nutrition have become focused on
learning disabilities of undernourished children, the long-term educational achievements
and earning capacities, and the rapid growth of noncommunicable diseases—including
diabetes, cancer, and heart-related ailments with life-threatening consequences.
Nutrition, nutrition-sensitive agriculture, and food consumption have been hotly de-
bated for the past decade. Margaret Mead famously noted issues of the cultural legacy of
gender bias, in 1976, with respect to agricultural production and consumption. In addition,
Mead thought a new approach was needed: “departments or schools in which all the skills
related to food—including plant genetics, animal husbandry, veterinary skills, nutrition,
child development, food management, etc.—are taught without discrimination to both men
and women. Only in this way can there be any hope of including women at every level of the
decision-making process and of restoring the concept that the primary function of food is to
feed people, and to feed them well,” not to serve as a form of national aggrandizement
(Mead 1976, 11, emphasis added). These days, the equality of men and women in agricul-
tural production is yet to come (see, also, Quisumbing et al. 2014).
Lately, there is also recognition and acceptance of social safety nets: that is, public
transfers in cash or kind, to augment incomes of the poor. Typically, in the 1980s and
1990s, they were frowned upon in Bretton Woods institutions, as being fiscally onerous
and of limited impact. The US Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) spent
US$78 billion in 2014—US$125 per beneficiary, to about 45 million people.⁸ Sporadic and
underfunded as it is, today’s welfare state in developed countries backstopped many
economies during the Great Recession and is believed to be capable of providing broad
security for poor people (World Bank 1981; Lancaster 1997). As with sustainable
⁸ According to Tim Josling, Professor Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, at
Stanford University, “The 1964 Food Stamp Act put the program on a more permanent footing and established a
powerful coalition between urban and rural Congressmen that has endured . . . The Food Stamp program
supporters have allowed the farm programs to continue in exchange for the agricultural lobby backing the food
stamp legislation” (Josling 2011, 6). The US Food Stamp program does not appear to address nutritional concerns
typically advocated in developing countries.
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intensification of production, the approach to consumption has been changing in other
respects as well. Dietary shifts, with increased income and urbanization, is leading to the
greater exploration of the relationship between the structure of production and patterns of
dietary consumption, and increased treatment in the development literature. Popkin (2001)
brought attention to the concept he termed “dietary transition.” He noted, “In country after
country we have documented a marked shift in the structure of the diet” (Popkin 2001,
871S), which has been taking place with related disease patterns over the last few decades
(Monteiro et al. 1995; Popkin 1994, 1998; Kim, Moon, and Popkin 2000; World Cancer
Research Fund and AICR 2007). Major dietary changes include large increases in the
consumption of fat and added sugar, often a marked increase in animal food products,
contrasted with a fall in total intake of cereals and fiber. In many ways, this seems to be an
inexorable shift to the higher fat Western diet, reflected in a large proportion of the
population consuming over 30 percent of energy from fat, with huge changes in disease
burden (Popkin 2001). Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are a few outliers among rich
countries in containing obesity, but their rates are also beginning to inch upward.
Finance for Development
Net ODA disbursement by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries,
as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) in 2015, was 0.3 percent OECD GNI.⁹ It
increased to 0.32 percent of combined GNI in 2020, up from 0.30 percent in 2019 (OECD
2021, 1). Even with this increase, ODA is a small share of public expenditures in large
LMICs such as India; most ODA is now devoted to LICs. Together, these countries
represent 73 and 76 percent of global poverty and hunger (FAO 2017, 2020; World Bank
2016). As the report of the multilateral institutions led by the IMF and the World Bank, in
preparation for the Addis Ababa financing meeting, made clear, ODA from OECD is not
expected to increase much (Development Committee 2015; UN 2015a). Greater financing
would need to come from domestic finance of developing countries, from international
finance from emerging countries (China and others), and from private sources (particularly,
philanthropic organizations and private investments). To effectively mobilize private cap-
ital, developing countries need to put into place enabling policy and institutional environ-
ments that address risk, transaction costs, and governance at national and regional levels.
Whether the SDGs will have adequate financing from all potential sources is increasingly
unclear. What is clear is that most of the funding will have to come from sources other than
ODA, included, as noted, from the private sector and domestically raised resources.
Secondly, while the agendas of international organizations have expanded, resources at
their disposal have not increased commensurately. Core budgets of several key international
organizations have stagnated in nominal terms and declined in real terms. More impor-
tantly, aid has become so fractionated as to greatly reduce its effectiveness (Birdsall and
Kharas 2010). Donors have made promises that they were unable to keep. At the UN’s
International Conference for Financing Development in Monterrey in 2002, donors pro-
mised to support the MDGs.
⁹ See “Final Official Development Assistance Figures in 2015”: https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-
sustainable-development/development-finance-data/final-oda-2015.htm
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Net ODAmore than doubled in real terms since 2000 (increasing by 110%). It rose by 69%
in real terms between 2000 and 2010, after the Millennium Development Goals were
agreed [upon] in 2000 and other commitments were made by donors to increase their
ODA, (at the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development in 2002 and the G8
Gleneagles Summit in 2005). ODA budgets fell afterwards, by 1% in real terms in 2011 and
a further 4% in 2012, due to the continuing financial crisis and euro zone turmoil, which
led several governments to tighten their budgets and had a direct impact on development
aid. ODA rebounded again in 2013 and continued to rise until 2016 when it reached a first
peak due especially to the influx in Europe of refugees and associated in-donor refugee
costs. It fell in 2017 and 2018 due to the tapering off of in-donor refugee costs and
remained stable in 2019. In 2020, ODA reached its highest level ever due in part to support
for the COVID-19 crisis. (OECD 2021, 5)
As a result, achieving the MDGs depended heavily on the policies, priorities, institutions,
and investments of developing countries. In the case of SDGs, as country priorities may not
coincide with the goals, the allocated domestic resources may turn out to be inadequate or
may be spent inefficiently, and donor and private sector funding may not materialize.
Development financing, therefore, will need more attention, as the clientele for aid is
changing, along with the supply of and demand for finance and knowledge. For that reason,
the purposes, tools, and role of the international aid system are critically important.
Role of International Organizations
There is plenty of accumulated evidence about what works and what does not, and it is
mixed on whether, where, and when aid works, but there is substantial evidence that
multilateral aid has been more effective than bilateral aid (Kharas et al. 2015; Morris and
Gleave 2015). The UK Department for International Development (DFID)—now the
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)—which routinely reviews its
contributions to international organizations, has described the role of multilateral organiza-
tions as “an essential part of the international system for development and humanitarian aid
[with] a global presence and the legitimacy to work even in politically sensitive contexts
where national governments are not welcome” (DFID and UK Aid 2011, 2).
While the multilateral system is, as DFID noted, “complex and fragmented” (DFID and
UK Aid 2011, v), a positive feature of multilateral aid (to be, arguably, noted under the new
governance arrangements) is that its activities are driven less directly by the domestic
political or commercial interests of its principal shareholders and more by concern for
humanitarian and development outcomes.
Ravallion (2016), Clemens and Kremer (2016), and Birdsall (MacDonald 2012; Birdsall
2000; 2015; Ahluwalia et al. 2016), among other economists, have asserted that the World
Bank has an important role to play in poverty reduction—that it does more than just
transfer money. There are critics, too, such as Devesh Kapur, who have highlighted the need
for agility and responsibility in their actions and programs (Kapur 2015).
Donors have repeatedly recognized the need for greater effectiveness, in Rome in 2003
(OECD 2019b), in Paris in 2005 (OECD 2019c), in Accra in 2008 (OECD 2019d), in Busan
in 2011 (OECD 2019a), and in Mexico in 2014 (GPEDC 2014). (See Burall and Maxwell
2006.) A Brookings Institution study confirmed what recipients of aid have always known,
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that the quality and “effectiveness” of aid programs, and their targeting, need to be
improved to have “significant global impact” (Kharas et al. 2015, 12).
A later Center for Global Development (CGD) study lent additional support to concerns
about the transparency of ownership and the extent of real capital transfers or institutional
capacity development of US assistance, among the “15 Feed the Future” recipients (Dunning
and McGillem 2016; Rose 2016). There are many areas in which both developed and
developing countries need to undertake reforms to create stronger international cooperation,
based on innovative approaches, shared objectives, agreed upon processes and agendas, and as
partners of equals, rather than the old-style, postcolonial, donor-recipient ODA.
Changing Global Governance—A Crowded and Fragmented Aid
Architecture with Evolving Needs
With the increased number of new actors, including, in particular, China and the G20
countries, philanthropists like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the 100 billio-
naires whom Bill Gates has persuaded to contribute a significant share of their wealth, aid
giving has become a crowded but fragmented field with huge transaction costs. Moreover,
bilateral donors have increased their role in multi-bilateral aid through the use of trust
funds, many of them vertical trust funds. It has been easier to raise funds for defined
objectives, but vertical programs have fundamentally altered the character of international
assistance and made it more difficult for developing governments to coordinate aid. The
role of multilateral organizations needs to be considered in the context of growth in MICs:
with a large incidence of poverty, their different funding needs, and the evolving and more
diversified sources of finance, including the increased reliance on the markets and bilateral
commercial credit.
Questions Addressed by This Inquiry
This book examines the challenges of global food, agriculture, and nutrition historically in
the context of the structural transformation of countries, while exploring the role of the five
largest international organizations concerned with food and agriculture going forward,
based on their record of performance since their establishment: the World Bank, FAO,
the World Food Programme (WFP), CGIAR, and IFAD, established in 1944, 1945, 1961,
1971, and 1977, respectively.
“The Big Five,” as we have dubbed them, were established over the years from around the
end of the Second World War until about the middle of the 1970s. Their evolution to adapt
to today’s radically changed world is a useful window through which to observe and
understand the changes at the global, national, and subnational levels, including the
implications of the explosion of new actors. By examining how the Big Five have responded,
we argue, incrementally, that we can gain insights about the changing rules of the game in
global and national governance. Those rules include the growing need for financing of
global and national public goods, the challenges of assisting conflict-affected and fragile
countries where 1.5 billion people live, and the projected graduation of 40 LICs into MICs
and their growing capital needs.
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The discourse that gave rise to the establishment of the Big Five has since evolved in
response to the entry of new players, the growth of information and knowledge, the breakneck
speed of communication, the upside and downside of social media, and rapidly advancing
science and technology, among other changes. The 2007–8 food crises brought together the
Big Five to deal with the crisis, and yet, global changes have put considerable stress on the
old modes of conducting business at all levels. So, the big organizations search for new ways
to operate and cooperate with the growing number of players on the global scene.
The five organizations form part of the larger architecture of international cooperation
and global governance of food and agriculture. That architecture consists of the United
Nations family with its member countries and their various groupings—G7, G20 (which
includes emerging economies), and G77 (which, in reality, is a group of 150 countries and
various regional groupings, the private sector, international nongovernmental organizations
[INGOs], civil society, philanthropists, celebrities, indigenous organizations, and scientific
communities).
While sovereign governments determine the global rules, increasingly and to varying
degrees, the new global actors and their new and kaleidoscopic coalitions influence the
formal and informal rules, standards, and norms of global governance and finance. In
context, where the SDGs have led, in principle, to collective ownership, there are signs that
the new actors, such as the emerging countries and philanthropic organizations, are already
beginning to exert considerable influence—although learning curves of new entrants on the
scene have been steep and the architecture is still evolving.
Each organization has a specific mandate, governance structure, and funding base
defined by its stakeholders. Each has undertaken structural reforms, but despite attempts
to adjust, the reforms fall short of the magnitude of the challenges in the external environ-
ment. Some consider the Big Five irrelevant. Increasingly, the Big Five are part of new
alliances that include philanthropists, emerging countries, and new banks—the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) established by China, and the BRICS Development
Bank, established in 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. It is imperative
that they continue to find ways to work together and truly complement their individual
strengths by partnering with the new sources of international financing.
The Establishment of the Big Five International Organizations
Concerned with Food and Agriculture
The United States was key in the establishment of the modern system of international
cooperation and remains critical as part of a larger coalition. At the end of the Second
World War, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was committed to avoiding the mistakes that
had led to the failure of the League of Nations in 1920, following the First World War. The
concept for an international organization for food and agriculture emerged in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries, primarily advanced by US agriculturalist and activist David Lubin.
In May–June 1905, an international conference in Rome had led to the establishment of the
International Institute of Agriculture. In 1943, President Roosevelt called a United Nations
Conference on Food and Agriculture. Representatives from 44 governments gathered at the
Homestead Resort in Hot Springs, Virginia, fromMay 18 to June 3, and decided to establish
an Interim Commission to formulate a plan for the permanent organization. The First
Session of the FAO Conference was held in Quebec, Canada, from October 16 to November
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1, 1945, tasked with bringing FAO formally into existence. The Second World War
effectively ended the International Agricultural Institute. It was officially dissolved by
resolution of its Permanent Committee on February 27, 1948, and its functions were
transferred to FAO (Phillips 1981).¹⁰ Since its founding, FAO has been the only interna-
tional organization with a complement of technical expertise in a range of areas related to
food and agriculture under one roof. The agency’s mandate is to improve nutrition, reduce
hunger, increase productivity in primary industries, raise the standard of living in rural
populations, and contribute to global economic growth through support of food and
agriculture. FAO collects, analyzes, and disseminates data; it assists member states by
providing guidance and promoting capacity development; preparing conventions, norms,
and guidelines; providing expert advice in development programs; and helping to rebuild
food production in disaster and conflict areas.
The term “United Nations,” too, was coined by President Roosevelt and was first used
in the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, when representatives of
26 nations pledged their governments to continue fighting together against the Axis Powers.
In 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the United Nations
Conference on International Organization to draw up the United Nations Charter. The
delegates deliberated on the proposals worked out by the representatives of China, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States at Dumbarton Oaks inWashington,
DC, in August–October 1944. The Charter was signed on June 26, 1945, by representatives of
50 countries.
A Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944, with leadership from the United States and
the victors of the Second World War, with the United Kingdom playing an important role,
resulted in the creation of IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (IBRD). IMF was established to provide monetary stability on an international
scale. In 2005, it adopted a poverty reduction mission.
IBRD was established in 1945 to make up for market failures in capital transfers, first for
reconstruction of the war-torn economies and later for assistance to developing countries. It
provides advisory services, loans, and technical assistance to governments in MICs and
creditworthy LICs. It has since evolved into a part of the World Bank Group of five
organizations. In 1956, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established as
the World Bank’s private sector arm. It offers loans and investment products, as well as
advisory services, to private enterprises and government authorities in developing countries.
The International Development Association (IDA), established in 1960, issues interest-free,
long-term credits, and grants to the world’s poorest countries. The credits and grants are
provided out of funds provided by donor countries. In 1966, the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was established to provide international facil-
ities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes. And the last component of the
World Bank Group, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), established in
1988, provides guarantees associated with political risk for foreign investments.
WFP was established within FAO in 1961, with the leadership of US Senator George
McGovern during the administration of President John F. Kennedy, to multilateralize
surplus US food aid. WFP is the world’s largest humanitarian organization. Its significance
¹⁰ The description draws heavily on the external reviews of the Norwegian, British, and Multilateral Organisa-
tion Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) reviews and organizational responses. See Table A.1.2 for
summary highlights of these organizations’ profiles and strategic frameworks.
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was emphasized during 2014 and 2015, when it handled six simultaneous severe emergen-
cies in response to humanitarian crises unfolding in Syria and the Middle East. WFP
uses food aid to meet refugee and other emergency food needs, and provides the
associated logistics support. It also supports economic and social development and pro-
motes world food security, consistent with the recommendations of the United Nations
and FAO.
CGIAR (originally known as the Consultative Group of International Agricultural
Research) was established in 1971 to deliver international public goods and develop high-
yielding varieties of food crops. It helped to advance the Green Revolution, which was
underway in India and other Asian countries, with the help of its first two Centers, the
International Maize andWheat Improvement Center (CIMYYT) and the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI), an approach CGIAR continued and has gained considerable
credit for. Built on the advantage of the latest agricultural science and the increasing
availability of low-cost nitrogenous fertilizer and irrigation, it has continued to conduct
research with wide spillover effects, given that many developing countries would not have
been able to mobilize the scientific talent, the gene pool, and the financial and scientific
resources necessary to generate them. Its focus has expanded substantially beyond cereals to
root crops, policy, water, livestock, forestry, and fisheries and to sustainability issues. In short,
its mission has expanded, and it has moved downstream to focus on participatory research on
natural resource management to achieve immediate impacts on poverty and hunger.
IFAD was established in 1977 to channel surplus petrodollars to the poorest countries in
the form of concessional financing for food production. Created after the 1972–3 food crises
and in the wake of a rise in energy prices, IFAD was established as a specialized agency of
the United Nations. IFAD provides loans on concessional terms to poor countries, as well as
to MICs with rural poverty. IFAD’s distinct mission has been to reach the poorest of the
poor by empowering them, such as poor rural women and men of socially and regionally
marginal areas, to achieve higher incomes and improved food security and to strengthen
their resilience.
Table A.1.2 presents strategic frameworks of the Big Five organizations. See Table A.6.1
in Chapter 6 for a summary of the governance of the Big Five.
Outline of the Chapters
The scope of this book expanded considerably in response to the consultations undertaken
in the course of its preparation. Collectively, Chapters 2–7 outline key challenges, accumu-
lated knowledge, and the evolving ideas and many unresolved issues in the context of which
international organizations and national governments operate today. The increasingly
cross-sectoral nature of agricultural transformation and the multidimensional nature of
poverty, hunger, and the environment call for seeing the work of international organizations
and national and global governance in the context of finance, resource allocation, and
rule-setting, with an integrative view of food and agriculture with health, education,
infrastructure, and power.
Chapter 2 examines the two overarching debates in development economics, the first that
questions the leading role of agriculture in structural transformation, and the second
that questions the role of small farmers in agriculture as a route to structural transforma-
tion, in different regions. The old conventional wisdom that small farms are more produc-
tive than large farms seems to have been replaced by a U-shaped curve on farm productivity
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by farm size. Farm productivity initially declines as farm size increases but then increases
again. It explores how regions and countries have performed in structural transformation.
Taking a deeper and wider look at the processes of structural transformation from agricul-
ture to other sectors, the chapter draws on cross-country data and evidence on develop-
ments in 127 countries over a 33-year period, using two sectors, and from 1990 to 2014,
using three sectors to explore the considerable differences across countries and regions in
performance, against the overall context of premature deindustrialization. A striking con-
clusion is the near absence of an overarching strategy for the farm sector in most transform-
ing countries, including, particularly, for land and capital markets and for access to
technology, infrastructure, and education to facilitate transition of massive labor forces
from agriculture to other sectors.
Chapter 3 discusses the food and financial crises of 2007–8 and the growing uncertainty
in the interconnected world. It addresses three questions: What caused the crises? Do we
have systems in place that will be able to diagnose the sources of crises relatively quickly,
and minimize, or avert altogether, these kinds of crises? Will we be able to address a crisis
better in the COVID-19 and post-COVID-19 future than we did in 2007–8? The chapter
reviews evidence on the causes and consequences of the crises and the subsequent price rise
and volatility until about 2013, and the steps taken and not taken by the international
community. The international environment in 2020 has changed with abundant supplies
and a larger role of trade, low energy prices, low international shipping costs, and more
competition in the world market. Disruptions in supply chains in individual countries
during 2020 did not seem to make a big difference in global supply chains because of
widening sources of supply and low international prices.
Chapter 4 discusses the transition from food security to nutrition security, the extent and
nature of the current food insecurity and nutrition challenge, and the recent reversal of the
declining trend of food insecurity. The chapter shows the key role that international
organizations have played in defining and influencing the agenda and the analytical issues:
that is, the extent to which SDG2 and, indeed, all SDGs enable us to address the multidi-
mensional challenge of food security and nutrition and implications. An intriguing question
is the disconnect between trends in poverty and trends in food insecurity. The world has
enough surplus food to eliminate undernutrition, provided access to surplus food by the
poor is assured on a consistent basis. Under a business-as-usual scenario, however, the
prospects of eliminating malnutrition and obesity are near zero. Transformational ap-
proaches are needed to reduce both, and there are no signs that they are forthcoming.
Chapter 5 addresses the changing nature of global governance—the shift from the
primary role of governments in global governance to the role of emerging stakeholders,
their different agendas and challenges in managing global governance, particularly in the
context of the abrogation by the United States of its leadership role.
Chapter 6 discusses global governance at the operational level by outlining the govern-
ance of the five international organizations that are the focus of this book. The chapter
examines the close relationship between governance, finance, and leadership of the organi-
zations. Humanitarian and emergency assistance at US$7+ billion in 2018 is larger than the
combined annual expenditures/commitments of FAO, CGIAR, and IFAD.¹¹
¹¹ See “Contributions to WFP in 2018”: https://www.wfp.org/funding/2018
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Chapter 7 discusses financing. The financing needs of developing countries for agricul-
ture and rural development run into the trillions if, in addition to investments in agricul-
ture, complementary investments outside of agriculture in infrastructure, education, and
health are considered. With few exceptions, most notably China, developing countries have
not been investing enough of their own resources in the food and agricultural sector.
Indeed, the most recent evidence suggests a decline in investment in agriculture and rural
development as a share of GDP. Foreign flows to developing countries have increased and
diversified, so that the role of ODA has shrunk relative both to the needs of developing
countries and to alternative sources of funding. These flows have all declined in recent years,
even before the COVID-19 pandemic, and now do not nearly meet the needs.
In Chapters 8 through 12, we discuss the work of the five organizations on the ground
through their historical evolution, their most recent reforms in the context of the changes in
the external and internal environment discussed in the preceding seven chapters, and the
various criteria by which their performance has been assessed over the years.
In the case of the World Bank, IBRD borrowing for agriculture and rural development in
MICs is relatively small, and there is resistance in the United States and elsewhere to
continue lending to them. Their overall capital needs are considerable, however, and the
Bank is in a position to exercise positive influence on their financial management. Thus, the
World Bank’s capital increase of US$13 billion was approved by governors in October 2018.
The agreement includes a capital increase of US$7.5 billion paid-in capital, US$52.6 billion
of callable capital for IBRD, and a US$5.5 billion paid-in capital increase for the IFC. “These
increases represent a substantial and much-needed strengthening of the WBG’s [World
Bank Group’s] financial capacity and an expression of confidence by the membership in the
World Bank. . . . [T]he annual WBG financing can grow from about US$60 billion now to
about US$100 billion in 2030” (Linn 2018). With the graduation of many previously LICs,
fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) now dominate IDA-eligible countries, in which
absorptive capacity and aid effectiveness have been limited. The chapter documents this
disjuncture between needs and absorptive capacity of most LICs.
Chapter 9 on FAO discusses how it evolved into an organization which fully embraced
and, indeed, even shaped SDG2. Its organizational framework logically explains the link
between SDG indicators and FAO’s program of work and budget. In addition to SDG
monitoring, FAO’s traditional mandate has been to promote global public goods, such as
norms and standards, with a focus on information and knowledge related to food security,
agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and numerous other issues concerned with land, water, and
climate. Its operational function of translating SDGs to match country priorities remains
debated among some OECD countries. FAO’s traditional strengths have been its cross-
cutting, multidisciplinary knowledge in all normative aspects of food and agriculture, its
convening power, and its reputation as a neutral broker with a potentially perfect arrange-
ment to promote and conclude difficult policy agreements in food and agriculture, making
it a trusted technical organization and a credible policy advisory forum. FAO’s mission has
expanded, but its assessed contributions have declined in real terms. It is unclear if its
growing reliance on trust funds and voluntary contributions as an instrument is sufficient.
FAO’s agenda is much too large, relative to its resources.
Chapter 10 examines CGIAR’s evolution. CGIAR was established in 1971 to deliver
international public goods, developing high-yielding varieties of food crops and other
regional public goods. It was built on a model of international research, complemented
by strong capacity to be created at the national and regional levels, to work in partnership
with CGIAR.
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CGIAR has gone through a series of reforms over nearly a quarter-century to meet donor
expectations, but increased funding has not been commensurate with the expectations. It
has become increasingly complex, and from 2016 to 2019, CGIAR underwent yet one more
organizational change, combining its finance and consortium offices, closing the World
Bank office, and changing into a single governance structure in place of the two-pillar
structure it had put in place only in 2010–11. CGIAR’s impacts have been extraordinary—
but the greatest challenges for CGIAR are in addressing the new issues of climate change
and sustainability, areas in which it is still searching for both research solutions and
organizational reforms attuned to those solutions. The Systems Council November 2019
approval of the One CGIAR approach and endorsement of an Executive Management Team
may provide the needed platform for further governance reforms, consolidation of its
fragmented financing, and agreement among CGIAR’s supporters on future directions.
IFAD, explored in Chapter 11, provides loans and grants to agricultural and rural
development projects with the perspective that smallholder agriculture can act as both a
crucial source of rural income and nutrition and a vector for rural economic growth. Many
of its projects seek to incorporate smallholders into value-chain development. The recent
withdrawal of several previous donors from IFAD’s latest Replenishment (IFAD11) meant
that IFAD’s lending program remained relatively static, unless the proposed sovereign
borrowing increases and discussions on market borrowing (under IFAD12) move forward.
Demand for IFAD resources and implementing approaches remains strong, but reduced
funding will curtail access, particularly, from UMICs, whose access to replenishment-
sourced resources is being severely reduced.
Chapter 12 explores how current demand for WFP’s assistance greatly exceeds supply or
WFP’s capacity to meet the needs of the largest displaced population in the world. WFP’s
focus has been on food assistance for the poorest and most vulnerable. Its unique role in
emergencies in preventing acute hunger and in disaster response and management is
supported by voluntary contributions. WFP’s logistical and emergency relief expertise is
often crucial for other actors, particularly through its leadership role in humanitarian
efforts. It also plays a role in crisis prevention and reconstruction in the wake of conflict
and disasters. It is well placed to play a major role in the continuum from emergency relief
to development. WFP gives priority to supporting disaster prevention, preparedness, and
mitigation, and to post-disaster rehabilitation activities, as part of its development pro-
grams, while using emergency assistance to serve both relief and development purposes.
In Chapter 13, we outline the world’s considerable, albeit lopsided, achievements on food
and nutrition before the COVID-19 pandemic, and the failure of the global community to
heed the warnings of pandemics from which we hope lessons are being learned. We argue
that international organizations are needed more than ever in a context of a weakened
international architecture, following Trump’s withdrawals from the global stage, even as the
Biden administration works to reestablish leadership. International organizations have
considerable achievements to their credit, but some real failures, particularly in Africa.
The chapter sets out both a set of organization-specific messages, as well as the broader
implications for national and global governance of food and agriculture. The hopeful sign is
the response of a number of nations to the Biden–Harris victory in the 2020 US presidential
election and their eagerness to work together to strengthen global cooperation.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
40   
Appendix: Frameworks for Sustainable Development
Goals/Millennium Development Goals and for the
Big Five Organizations




“Transforming Our World: The
2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development”
2014 SG Synthesis Report “The
Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending
Poverty, Transforming All Lives
and Protecting the Planet”
SDGs MDGs
People: to end poverty and hunger, in
all their forms and dimensions, and to
ensure that all human beings can fulfill
their potential in dignity and equality
and in a healthy environment
People: to ensure healthy lives,













Planet: to protect the planet from
degradation, including through
sustainable consumption and
production, sustainably managing its
natural resources, and taking urgent
action on climate change, so that it can
support the needs of present and future
generations
Planet: to protect our ecosystems for






Prosperity: to ensure that all human
beings can enjoy prosperous and
fulfilling lives and that economic,
social, and technological progress
occurs in harmony with nature





Peace: to foster peaceful, just, and
inclusive societies, which are free from
fear and violence. There can be no
sustainable development without peace
and no peace without sustainable
development
Justice: to promote safe and peaceful
societies and strong institutions
Goal 16
Partnership: to mobilize the means
required to implement this Agenda
through a revitalized Global
Partnership for Sustainable
Development, based on a spirit of
strengthened global solidarity, focused
in particular on the needs of the
poorest and most vulnerable, and with
the participation of all countries, all
stakeholders, and all people
Partnership: to catalyze global
solidarity for sustainable development
Goal 17 Goal 8
Note: For a detailed list of all SDGs and MDGs and their targets, see https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs
and http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
Source: UN (2016); UN (2020).
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Table A.1.2 Strategic framework of the big five organizations
Organization
World Bank Group Food and Agriculture
Organization of the
United Nations











1. End extreme poverty
Target: Reduce the
percentage of people living





growth for the bottom 40
percent of the population in
every developing country.
Sustainability: The goals of
ending extreme poverty and
promoting shared prosperity
must be achieved in an
environmentally, socially,
and fiscally sustainable
manner to ensure that
progress is sustained over
time and across generations.
A sustainable path of
Five strategic objectives and
what they are
accomplishing—
1. Contribute to the









2. Increase and improve
provision of goods and
services from agriculture,
forestry, and fisheries in a
sustainable manner—




support the transition to
sustainable agriculture; 3.
Promoting the transition to
sustainable agriculture;
4. Advocating the adoption
of international policies and
Four objectives: to achieve a
world with zero hunger
focusing on food assistance
for the poorest and most
vulnerable women, men,
boys, and girls
1. Save lives and protect
livelihoods in emergencies
Targets: 1.Meet urgent food




emergency levels; 2. Protect
lives and livelihoods while
enabling safe access to food
and nutrition for women
and men; 3. Strengthen the
capacity of governments and
regional organizations and
enable the international
community to prepare for,
assess, and respond to
shocks.
2. Support food security
and nutrition and (re)build
livelihoods in fragile
settings and following
Three goals (System Level





1. Increased resilience of the
poor to climate change and
other shocks; 2. Enhanced
smallholder market access;
3. Increased incomes and
employment; 4. Increased
productivity. Target: 100
million fewer poor people, of
which percent are women,
by 2030.
2. Improve food security
and nutrition for health—1.
Increased productivity;
2. Improved diets for poor
and vulnerable people; 3.
Improved food safety; 4.
Improved human and
animal health through better
agricultural practice.
Target: 150 million fewer
poor people, of which 50
percent are women by 2030.
Five strategic objectives for
enabling poor rural people
to improve their food
security and nutrition, raise
their incomes, and
strengthen their resilience
1. A natural resource and
economic asset base for poor
rural women and men that is




2. Access for poor rural
women and men to services
to reduce poverty, improve
nutrition, raise incomes,
and build resilience in a
changing environment;
3. Poor rural women and
men and their organizations




advantage of decent work
opportunities;



























(i) Manages the resources of
our planet for future
generations












14 Global Practices –
1. Agriculture
2. Education
3. Energy and Extractives
4. Environment and Natural
Resources
5. Finance and Markets
6. Governance





10. Social, Urban, Rural, and
Resilience





3. Reduce rural poverty—
1. Improving opportunities
for the rural poor to access
decent farm and nonfarm
employment; 2. Improving
social protection systems;
3. Empowering the rural
poor in gaining sustainable
access to resources and
services.




and efficiency of food





and efficiency of markets.
5. Increase the resilience of
livelihoods to threats and
crises—1. Helping countries
to govern risks and crises; 2.
Helping countries watch to
safeguard; 3. Helping
countries to prevent and




Targets: 1. Support or
restore food security and
nutrition of people and
communities and contribute
to stability, resilience, and
selfreliance; 2. Assist
governments and
communities to establish or
rebuild livelihoods, connect
to markets, and manage
food systems; 3. Through
food and nutrition
assistance, support the safe,
voluntary return,
reintegration or resettlement
of refugees, and internally
displaced persons; 4. Ensure
equitable access to and
control over food and
nutrition assistance for
women and men.
3. Reduce risk and enable
people, communities and
countries to meet their own
food and nutrition needs
Targets: 1. Support people,
communities, and countries
to strengthen resilience to
shocks, reduce disaster risks,
and adapt to climate change
through food and nutrition
assistance; 2. Leverage
purchasing power to





change; 2. Enhanced benefits
from ecosystem goods and
services; 3. More sustainably
managed agroecosystem.
Target: 190 million hectares
of degraded land restored by
2030
men and their organizations
able to influence policies
and institutions that affect
their livelihoods.
5. Enabling institutional and
policy environments to
support agricultural
production and the full
range of related non-farm
activities.









4. A broad range of inclusive
financial services
5. Integration of poor rural




7. Technical and vocational
skills development





























World Bank Group Food and Agriculture
Organization of the
United Nations













women and men, and
transform food assistance
into a productive investment
in local communities;
3. Strengthen the capacity of
governments and
communities to establish,
manage, and scale up
sustainable, effective, and










Targets: 1. Prevent stunting






























women, and people infected
with HIV, tuberculosis, and
malaria, by providing access
to appropriate food and
nutrition assistance;




nutrition and health for
children, adolescent girls,
and their families; 3.



















and processes that affect
the interactions of state







• Nutrition (new for
2016–17)
• Gender equality
• Climate risk analysis and
response










Mitigating and adapting to
climate change risks and
shocks
• Gender and youth—
Ensuring gender and
youth equity and inclusion







































World Bank Group Food and Agriculture
Organization of the
United Nations








Five specific principles to
frame the strategy:
1. Serve poor and vulnerable
people everywhere in a
sustainable manner
2. Recognize the diversity of
clients
3. Work as one World Bank
Group




The strategy sets out the
vision for a repositioned
WBG that helps clients to
address the most difficult
challenges to reducing
poverty and building shared
prosperity. The repositioned
WBG:
1. Aligned all WBG activities
and resources to the two
goals: maximize
development impact, and
Seven core functions to
achieve concrete results:





setting instruments, such as
international agreements,




access to data and
information in areas related
to their mandate
3. Facilitate, promote, and
support policy dialogue at
global, regional, and country
levels
4. Advise and support
capacity development at








1. Prepare for and respond
to shocks
2. Restore and rebuild lives
and livelihoods
3. Reduce vulnerability and
build lasting resilience
Two principles to achieve
their strategic objectives –
1. Deploy the right tool in
the right place at the right
time
2. Enable effective and
efficient implementation
Eight research priorities to
achieve targets:
1. Genetic improvement of
crops, livestock, fish, and
trees, to increase
productivity, resilience to
stress, nutritional value, and
efficiency of resource use
2. Agricultural systems—
adopt a systems approach to
optimize economic, social,
and environmental co-
benefits in areas with high
concentrations of poor
people





4. Enabling policies and
institutions, to improve the
performance of markets,
enhance delivery of critical
public goods and services,





















1. Increased incomes and
enhanced food security and
nutrition for rural people
served by IFADsupported




























2. Operationalized the goals
through the new country
engagement model to help
country clients identify and
tackle the toughest
development challenges.





evidence and focused on
results.
4. Sought transformational




strategically aligned with the
goals, and crowd in public
and private resources,
expertise, and ideas.
6. Worked as one WBG
committed to achieving the
goals.
investments, and programs
5. Advise and support
activities that assemble,
disseminate, and improve
the uptake of knowledge,
technologies and good
practices in the areas of their
mandate
6. Facilitate partnerships for








regional, and global levels, in
areas of their mandate
resilience of poor people








6. Nutrition and health—
emphasizing dietary
diversity, nutritional
content, safety of foods, and
development of value chains
of particular importance for





and mitigation options for





are safely maintained, and
genetically and
phenotypically characterized
to maximize the exploitation








3. Strengthened and more
inclusive rural producers’
organizations








2. Policy dialogue and
advocacy initiatives
3. Policies and strategies
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2
Transformation: From Sustainably Productive
Agriculture to Industry?
Uma Lele, Manmohan Agarwal, and Sambuddha Goswami
Summary
The concept of structural transformation has evolved radically. Industrialization has
progressed rapidly in some countries, like China, Indonesia, and Vietnam, following the
East Asian model (World Bank 1993). However, countries in South Asia (SA) and sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) are lagging in transformation, as visualized by W. Arthur Lewis
(1954) and Simon Kuznets (1955, 1966). Some explain the slow progress of countries
lagging in structural transformation in terms of the very success of East Asian countries,
and the growing global competition for industries in SA and SSA. Countries that have fallen
behind have not created enough productive jobs in the industrial/manufacturing sector and
have often relied on the low-productivity service sector to keep up with the growth in the
labor force. Slow growth has been accompanied by low productivity, overcrowded agricul-
ture, and declining farm size, with fewer people having left agriculture than would have if
industrialization had proceeded rapidly.
In the meantime, international organizations have steadfastly adhered to small farm
support, and their advice on industrialization through structural adjustment strategies has
invited criticism. Yet, in recent years, development economists have substantially added to
the complexity of the debate on structural transformation in a variety of ways. Central
among these has been the relative productivity growth between agriculture and industry,
and the appropriate roles of small, medium, and large farms in agriculture and of govern-
ment in steering manufacturing policies. Some have questioned the role of smallholder
farms, suggesting development policy, particularly in SSA, needs to consider fostering
medium and large farms, with a focus on reallocation of factors of production in their
favor, as the only way to achieve an increase in overall levels of productivity. Other research
has, however, shown that while differences in productivity across farm sizes are real, a large
share (as much as 70 percent) of that difference may be explained by measurement error
and stochastic factors, so that the potential for efficiency gains through reallocation of land
across farms and farmers may be relatively modest.
Recent research also suggests that there is no optimal farm size; both small and large
farms can be efficient. Growth in productivity in developing countries has been observed in
both very small and very large farms. In some cases, most notably in China among
developing countries, institutional reforms toward land governance in the last decade
have gone well beyond the household responsibility system. The small farm size resulting
from “village collective land ownership” is increasingly accompanied by “individual house-
hold land contracts” and “operational land” (Huang 2020). These steps have led to a
substantial growth in tenancy and an increase in operational farm size, which, when
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accompanied by mechanization and other technology, are contributing to productivity
growth by giving rise to scale economies, a phenomenon explained later in this chapter.
However, unlike small farms, middle-sized farms in some countries typically benefit
neither from sufficient household labor nor from economies of scale in the use of capital,
explaining the U-shaped curve of productivity. That is, productivity is high on small farms;
it declines as farm size increases, but then increases again, when larger farms are able to
mobilize information, capital, and other ingredients to increase productivity. Implicit in the
farm size debate is the reallocation of factors of production to more efficient use, either in
agriculture or in the nonagriculture sector, but new literature argues that pay-offs from
reallocation of factors of production may be smaller than economists have previously
argued. Moreover, even though some argue that there are too many small farms, politically,
it has not been easy to take land away from small farmers. This is why China’s reforms,
which secure land rights, are particularly interesting. Also, socially, it may create more
welfare losses, if unlike in China, there are no productive jobs in the manufacturing sector in
developing countries.
Returns to institutional reforms and investment in productivity growth are substantial;
total factor productivity (TFP) is a better measure of productivity to understand differences
across situations than partial measures, such as land and labor productivity. Most of the
recent growth in TFP is due to technological change rather than increased input use.
Therefore, policies and investments should be focused on productivity growth in agricul-
ture, which is fundamental to achieving the transformation of agriculture. Furthermore,
these new technologies, and associated institutional arrangements, such as emerging digital
technologies, precision agriculture, and equipment leasing, call for reassessment of size-
based advantages/disadvantages well suited to small farms (Fuglie et al. 2019, xxiv).
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 has accelerated digital transfor-
mation that was already underway, with many governments making use of new technology
to improve their service delivery. Lele and Goswami (2017) outlined this digital transfor-
mation in the case of India. The Government of India adopted the largest digital identifi-
cation program, opened millions of bank accounts for poor people who did not previously
have such accounts, and started transferring various kinds of subsidies and rural employ-
ment benefits directly into people’s bank accounts. Kenya has been at the forefront of using
its innovation of MPaisa to make rapid payments. Similarly, children with Internet access at
home have started attending classes remotely; many employees have started working from
home; and numerous firms have adopted digital business models to maintain operations
and preserve some revenue flows. Meanwhile, mobile applications were developed to help
“track and trace” the development of the pandemic; and researchers employed artificial
intelligence to learn more about the virus and accelerate the search for a vaccine. Internet
traffic in some countries increased by up to 60 percent shortly after the outbreak, under-
scoring the digital acceleration that the pandemic sparked (OECD 2020). New technologies
include:
• cloud computing/big data analysis tools
• artificial intelligence (AI)
• machine learning (ML)
• distributed ledger technologies, including blockchain and smart contracts
• the Internet of Things (IoT)
• digital communications technologies, such as mobile phones
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/9/2021, SPi
62   
• digital platforms, such as e-commerce platforms, agro-advisory apps, and e-extension
websites
• Global Positioning System (GPS)
• Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
• radio-frequency identification (RFID)
• precision agriculture technologies, including:
∘ sensors, including food sensors and soil sensors
∘ guidance and tracking systems (often enabled by GPS, GNSS, RFID, IoT)
∘ variable-rate input technologies
∘ automatic section control
∘ advanced imaging technologies, including satellite and drone imagery, to look at
temperature gradients, fertility gradients, moisture gradients, and anomalies in a field
∘ automated machinery and agricultural robots, leading to machine hire services
∘ digital extension, which has similarly achieved a revolutionary change in the case of
those farmers who have access to smartphones, but not all farmers can afford
smartphones or have access to reliable Internet connections.
Permutations and combinations of these new technologies and their adoption rates vary
across countries, and currently, there is limited research on how new technologies are
affecting agricultural transformation.
This is good news so far, but recent evidence also suggests that the digital divide has
increased, so that achieving total productivity growth requires investment, particularly in
lagging countries, in a variety of sectors to increase productivity of all factors of production,
rather than simply a seed–fertilizer revolution (OECD 2020). To advance the debate, in this
chapter, we focus on measures of inputs and outputs, particularly gross capital formation
(GCF) in the TFP estimates.
There also continues to be a debate on the role of agriculture versus industry, the latter
traditionally having been viewed as the escalator of growth rather than agriculture. A study
by Martin and Mitra (2001) challenged the conventional wisdom of the traditional Lewis
(1954) model, also elaborated by Kaldor (1966) and later by Rodrik (2016), that agricultural
productivity grows less rapidly than industrial productivity. Using panel data for 50
countries over the period 1967–92, Martin and Mitra (2001) showed more rapid technical
progress in agriculture than in industry, and a tendency for relatively rapid convergence in
agricultural productivity across countries, implying efficient transmission of knowledge
across countries in modern agriculture. This occurred mainly through public sector tech-
nology. These results also suggest that a large agriculture sector may not be a disadvantage.
On the contrary, it could be an advantage in terms of growth performance. The results also
“weaken the case for . . . discrimination against agriculture on the ground that it is a stagnant
sector” (Martin and Mitra 2001, 418). Their results potentially provide an explanation for
growth convergence at the macroeconomic level across countries. In this chapter, we show a
lack of convergence, however, between Africa and the rest of the developing world, and the
reasons why this is so in agriculture and manufacturing.
The recent narrative of global supply chains stresses close complementarity of industry
and service sectors under globalization, with less clear distinction of the “desirability” of
manufacturing as the escalator of growth. The future of globalization itself is uncertain,
however, with a combination of the 2008 financial crisis, the Sino-American trade war, and
the Trump administration’s withdrawal from major international agreements now followed
by the greatest recession since 1929, and the depressive effect of the pandemic on trade,
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travel, and global growth.¹ While the new US administration will rejoin the multilateral
system, it will need to reestablish both credibility and reliability and accept a rules-based
system, which is not necessarily a US rules-based system as in the past. For example, the
United States is not a member of China’s new trade agreement involving 14 other countries
in East and Southeast Asia, following the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP).
This chapter examines the concepts, the state of data and analysis, and the evidence in
these debates. It demonstrates differences in agricultural TFP growth across countries, in
agriculture of different farm sizes. Importantly, contrary to the usual Lewis assumption, it
provides some evidence of higher TFP growth in agriculture relative to industry and
confirms the hypothesis of premature deindustrialization in many low-income and low-
middle-income developing countries, a concept popularized by Rodrik (2016), but explored
earlier in the literature by Kaldor (1966) and his followers. Using panel data for well over
100 countries, the chapter documents the difficulty that currently lagging developing
countries have faced, not just in generating productive employment in the manufacturing
sector but in increasing agricultural productivity. The chapter also identifies some of the
causes, including, in particular, differences across regions in investment rates overall, and
especially, in the agriculture and rural sector.
Introduction
The world’s population is expected to increase by 2 billion persons in the next 30 years, from
7.7 billion currently to 9.7 billion in 2050, and 11 billion by the end of the century, according
to a new United Nations report (UN 2019). It will increase to 8.6 billion by 2030, the end of
the SDG period. The population of SSA is projected to double by 2050 (99 percent increase).
Nine countries will make up more than half the projected growth of the global population
between now and 2050, including some outside of the African continent: India, Nigeria,
Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania,
Indonesia, Egypt, and the United States (in descending order of expected increase). Around
2027, India is projected to overtake China as the world’s most populous country. Regions
that may experience lower rates of population growth between 2019 and 2050 include
Oceania, excluding Australia/New Zealand (56 percent), Northern Africa and Western Asia
(46 percent), Australia/New Zealand (28 percent), Central and Southern Asia (25 percent),
Latin America and the Caribbean (18 percent), Eastern and Southeastern Asia (3 percent),
and Europe and Northern America (2 percent) (UN 2019).
The proportion of urban population is expected to increase from 55 percent in 2018 to 68
percent by 2050. Projections show that urbanization, the gradual shift in residence of the
human population from rural to urban areas, combined with the overall growth of the
world’s population could add another 2.5 billion people to urban areas by 2050, with close
to 90 percent of this increase taking place in Asia and Africa, according to a new United
Nations data set.
Growing urban demand has been at the center of attention. Will new technologies allow
leapfrogging, which is less demanding of natural resources and more mindful of nutritious
¹ In 2020, the US tariff rate on imports was back to its highest level since 1993, and both the United States and
China had begun to decouple their technology industries.
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food for all? Will new technologies create enough productive employment to soak up the
increase in the burgeoning youth population?
Projected population growth and urbanization are expected to result in a demand-led
growth in agricultural production and productivity, including greater diversification of
agriculture away from carbohydrates such as rice, wheat, and maize to higher value,
nutritious foods like milk, fruits, vegetables, nuts, pulses, fish, poultry, and meat. And
urbanization is often seen as the means to achieve such a demand-led growth, but the latter
will depend on the nature of economic growth and food demand. Today, according to UN
data, SSA and SA have the highest shares of slums in the urban population of any region
(UN 2020). Essentially, rural poverty is being shifted to urban areas, not exactly a route to
healthy food systems. And yet, there is much about structural transformation that we still do
not fully understand.
Reardon and his colleagues have explored the phenomenon of supermarket revolution
throughout Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Specifically, they explored the triangle of (1)
rapid urbanization and urban food markets propelled by urbanization; (2) dietary changes
in Asian urban and rural areas, giving rise to the consumption of horticultural products,
meat, and fish, as well as lightly and more highly processed foods; and (3) an agrifood
system change, which highlighted the extent and composition of value chains (Reardon
et al. 2014). These enterprises constitute what Reardon et al. (2014) called a “Quiet Revo-
lution.” The triangle of changes has important implications for food sector innovations,
including the need for physical infrastructure—cold storages and roads; financing for trucks
and vehicles, processing, packaging, and milling facilities; and the financial infrastructure
including banking systems.
Urbanization rates and levels have varied throughout Asia, along with variations in the
rate of economic growth. Furthermore, urbanization has varied in terms of the extent to
which populations have migrated to megacities, as distinct from smaller cities and towns, of
different population sizes. These different patterns of urbanization influence the nature of
midstream linkages of value chains (Reardon et al. 2014).
China and East Asia are more urbanized than Southeast Asia, and SA is the least
urbanized, but in SA, too, rapid urbanization in the new millennium has been accompanied
by accelerated economic growth. About 50 to 70 percent of the value of consumption in
Asia is now in urban areas. Areas that have received less attention but form 40 to 70 percent
of the value-added and costs (and therefore, prices) are in processing, wholesale, logistics,
retail, restaurants, and take-outs (Reardon et al. 2014). Whereas cereal consumption has
received the most attention, two-thirds to three-quarters of food expenditures are in non-
grain foods (Reardon et al. 2014). Whether urbanization causes agricultural productivity
growth or whether productivity growth leads to rapid urbanization remains a debated issue.
In the process of structural transformation (ST) envisaged by W. Arthur Lewis (1954)
and Simon Kuznets (1955, 1966), they assumed productivity in the agriculture sector tends
to be lower than in the nonagriculture sector, and therefore, the reallocation of labor from
agriculture to the nonagriculture sector is necessary to transform economies and increase
income. As outlined in Chapter 1 and discussed later in this chapter, Barrett et al. (2019, 2)
have argued in a recent paper that the dualistic models of Lewis and Kuznets abstracted
from the phenomenon of value chain development (an “analytically convenient simplifica-
tion”) in the details of transformation from agriculture to industry or the service sector.
Furthermore, we reported earlier that some evidence (see, for example, Martin and Mitra
2001) has suggested that TFP growth in agriculture has been more rapid than in manu-
facturing, challenging the assumptions behind the theories of Lewis. And yet, in countries
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lagging behind in transformation, rapid population growth and slow industrialization are
leaving larger populations in rural areas than would occur with rapid industrialization,
leading to fragmentation of landholdings. However, there is also some evidence in the
literature, particularly in Africa, that small- or middle-sized farms are the major drivers of
growth.
At the same time, new technologies, including digitalization, are spreading rapidly in
developing countries. In principle, advances in crop science, for example, will help farmers
deal with changing weather patterns, and the spread of solar and wind energy, already
underway, will enable the use of more power without adding more greenhouse gases to the
atmosphere. Small farmers have increased access to wind and solar energy, which are
already cost competitive with carbon-based generation. The additional advantage of wind
and solar energy, with the possibility of decentralized generation distributed spatially, can
lower the cost of rural electrification and increase access by the poor. Small farmers will also
be helped by crop improvements involving developing varieties that increase yield and that
are pest and disease resistant, and drought and flood tolerant. Remote sensing is helping to
respond to climate change, soil analysis, and increased water use efficiency (FAO 2016). For
these technologies to benefit rural populations, there must be substantial investment in
research and development, physical and institutional infrastructure, skilled human capital,
and incentives, and most importantly, an appropriate mindset (World Bank 2015). The
solar revolution already underway is limited in scaling up by the lack of these prerequisites:
for example, in South Africa (Arndt et al. 2019).²
Extraordinary progress in the life sciences, combined with the rapid advancements in
digital and other technologies, widely referred to as the fourth industrial revolution, are
providing the world with new tools, products, and processes unimagined only a few decades
ago (Schwab 2016; Lele and Goswami 2017). The advances offer a cornucopia of innova-
tions very different from what Griliches (1957) described in the adoption of hybrid corn.
These developments offer scope for the incorporation of biophysical relationships into
growth models and complex interactions among them. Will these models translate onto
the actual fields of millions of small farmers, achieving agricultural growth and transfor-
mation under growing ecological constraints of land and water scarcity, loss of biodiversity,
and climate change? Or will large and medium-sized farms feed the world?³
Although sustainability means different things to different people, the Brundtland Re-
port’s definition of sustainable development has an enduring quality, as “development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs” (WCED 1987, 8). A new literature reminiscent of the 1970s, such as
the “The EAT-Lancet Commission on Healthy Diets from Sustainable Systems” (Willett
et al. 2019), stresses the planetary limits to growth posed by climate change, loss of
biodiversity, and increasing pressure on natural resources. The progress on containing
rising temperatures to 1.5°C is slower than needed, despite the Paris Accord (UNFCCC
2020). A UN report on biodiversity notes that human survival depends on biodiversity, but
species are vanishing faster than ever.⁴
² Based on the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) policy seminar, “Faster than You Think:
Renewable Energy and Developing Countries,” in Washington, DC, June 13, 2019. See also http://www.ifpri.org/
event/faster-you-think-renewable-energy-and-developing-countries.
³ Zilberman (2014, 385) predicts “the pursuit of sustainable development will lead to the expansion of a
bioeconomy that will be part of a larger transition from nonrenewable to renewable resource dependence.”
⁴ Human activity has now driven up to 1 million animal and plant species to the brink of extinction (IPBES
2019).
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The focus on the sustainability discussion has been further developed with a definition of
a sustainable food system as:
. . . one that delivers food security and nutrition for all in such a way that the economic,
social and environmental bases to generate food security and nutrition for future genera-
tions are not compromised. This means that it is profitable throughout, ensuring eco-
nomic sustainability, it has broad-based benefits for society, securing social sustainability,
and that it has a positive or neutral impact on the natural resource environment, safe-
guarding the sustainability of the environment [emphasis added]. (FAO 2020a)
With few exceptions, these environmental costs and benefits are typically not reflected in
the measurements of agricultural factor productivity, which we discuss in this chapter.
There is a plethora of literature on sustainability. We cite two examples here.⁵Whereas John
Landers’ study of zero tillage in Brazil clearly shows the profitability of the innovation,
explaining its widespread usage, examples of such scaled-up, environmentally sound in-
novations tend to be few and far between.
In short, taking the East Asian miracle as an example, much more investment in physical
and human capital, institutional change, and export orientation would be needed than
currently exists to pull the remaining households out of poverty and hunger, and to move
faster on the transformation growth path. The transitions entail new applications, poor
people’s access to relevant information and data, the spread of knowledge and skills to apply
new technologies, and access to finance and equip households and institutions to generate
and spread innovations. While the United States has adopted a protectionist stance, Africa
has taken a bold step in the opposite direction, creating the world’s largest free trade area
since the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995. The African Continental
Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which came into force on May 30, 2019, includes nearly every
country on the continent (see https://au.int/en/cfta). Implementation of the free trade
agreement, originally scheduled for July 1, 2020, has been delayed due to the disruptions
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Secretary General of AfCFTA, Wamkele Mene,
asserts that intra-African trade can help lift the economies post-COVID 19 (Ighobor 2020).
Intracontinental trade could boost agricultural and manufacturing production, and its
future effects on the African continent could be quite positive, provided there is more
investment in physical infrastructure and cross-border trade barriers come down quickly.
In any case, the transitions, while creating new jobs, will also result in the elimination of
many old jobs, with profound implications for employment prospects in the coming years.
Recent evidence from China, a global leader in digitization, offers a hopeful story. Although
robots have eliminated millions of jobs in the industry sector in China, during the five-year
period through 2016, the 14 million jobs created in e-commerce have meant a net positive
effect on employment and on productivity growth (Zhang and Chen 2019). China’s job
growth through e-commerce in five years is equivalent to what India needs every year,
nearly 7 million new jobs. Africa needs to find jobs for the 362 million young people
between the ages of 15 and 24 years old by 2050, based on population estimates (Page 2019).
Where will the region find so many jobs?
The African Transformation Report 2017, produced by the African Center for Economic
Transition (ACET 2017), notes the collapse of commodity prices (particularly, oil and
⁵ See, generally, Campanhola and Pandey (2019): Sustainable Food and Agriculture: An Integrated Approach.
Also, see Landers (2001); de Freitas and Landers (2014) on zero tillage in Brazil.
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minerals) since mid-2014, and the consequent slowdown in economic growth in many parts
of Africa. It further notes that the “average age of farmers in Africa is estimated by some
sources to be as high as 60, and few in the large and growing African youth population
are . . . interested in agriculture as it is now practiced in Africa,” with primitive farming
technology and back-breaking manual work (ACET 2017, 3). “An increasing number of
youth are educated, and education systems do not prepare them for farming (and even
orient them away from it)” (ACET 2017, 3). And, most farming does not provide an income
sufficient to maintain their modern lifestyle.
Data Challenges
Apart from slow growth in productive employment in lagging countries, reliable data on
various dimensions of transformation are not yet in place, and new debates have emerged
globally on the estimates of production, productivity, employment, and the emerging field
of value chains, which illustrate that gross trade flows data tell little about the nature and
composition of employment. As an example, an editorial in AMIS Market Monitor, titled
“The China Conundrum,” described the challenge of accommodating recent large official
reported increases in China’s annual cereal production data following the outcome of the
first agricultural census in 10 years.⁶ AMIS describes the challenge of distributing the 10-
year accumulative increase in cereal supplies of 312 million tons over the various forms of
utilization (AMIS 2019). In addition to China’s reported total 10-year incremental produc-
tion, maize production alone increased by 210 million tons. The reported increment is
larger than India’s total annual (bumper) grain production of 287 million tons in the year
2018–19. This would mean a higher TFP growth rate for China than those reported later in
this chapter, based on past data from the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) and data provided by Keith O. Fuglie, based on the International Agricul-
tural Productivity data of the United States Department of Agriculture.⁷
A different data challenge occurred in India in 2018. Government withheld publication of
a well-reputed national survey that showed slower employment growth than policymakers
would have desired, just prior to the national election, leading to the resignation of two
members of the government-appointed Statistical Commission (Basu 2019; Desai 2019).
Subsequently, Arvind Subramaniam, former Chief Economic Advisor to the Government of
India, has argued that India’s gross domestic product (GDP) may be smaller than reported,
and others including Rakesh Mohan, former Deputy Chairman of the Reserve Bank of
India, and India’s former executive director at the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
suggested the issue needs to be looked into (Mohan 2019). The new chief economic advisor
concluded there was not a major problem. There is a concern that India is interfering with
the respected institution of National Sample Surveys.
New trade-related data issues arise from the nature of value chains. The value-added in
traded goods may be very different than the gross value of traded goods as conventionally
reported in traditional trade data. In addition, value chain growth in the early years of the
new millennium has slowed since the global financial crisis, with the result that trade
⁶ AMIS (Agricultural Market Information System), a multi-stakeholder program established after the 2007
food crisis to obtain better information on world food stocks, is discussed in Chapter 3.
⁷ See https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/international-agricultural-productivity/.
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intensity, the share of output that is traded, has declined, and the share of service trade has
increased, relative to trade in goods (Lund et al. 2019).
Among key findings of the 2019 McKinsey Global Institute report on the future of trade
and value chains were the following:
• Goods-producing value chains have become less trade-intensive.
• Cross-border services are growing more than 60 percent faster than trade in goods.
• Less than 20 percent of goods trade is based on labor-cost arbitrage, and global value
chains are becoming more knowledge-intensive and reliant on high-skill labor.
• Goods-producing value chains (particularly, automotive as well as computers and
electronics) are becoming more regionally concentrated, especially within Asia and
Europe (Lund et al. 2019, vi).
Structural Transformation and Poverty and Hunger Reduction
Will transformative changes to food and agricultural systems, needed urgently, occur to feed
the world sustainably? Prevalence of hunger increased to 821 million in 2017, compared to
the low of 784 million previously (2014–15), due to a combination of climate change and
the growing incidence of internal conflicts (FAO et al. 2018). FAO has since adjusted these
numbers downward from 821 million in 2019, to 690 million in 2020, prior to the pandemic
(FAO et al. 2020, viii). The decline is mainly because undernourishment estimates for China
have been adjusted by over 100 million people, based on using a newly available series of
household data going back to 2000.
A 2019 FAO and the World Food Programme (WFP) update on conflict situations in
eight places throughout the world noted that Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Yemen had worsened in the latter
part of 2018, largely because of conflict, while Somalia, Syria, and the Lake Chad Basin had
seen some improvements in line with improved security. Conflict has led to the highest
number of people (56 million) in need of emergency food support (FAO and WFP 2019).
International Focus on Small Farmers
International organizations, such as FAO, theWorld Bank, CGIAR, and the International Fund
forAgriculturalDevelopment (IFAD)have supported small farmdevelopment forwell over half
a century, as the only way to address issues of food security and nutrition, and to facilitate
structural transformation from agriculture tomanufacturing. And this support has stood on the
foundation of literature produced by economists and agricultural economists favoring a small-
holder strategy. However, in recent years, there are growing questions about the effectiveness of
that strategy, and some economists have argued that governments, particularly inAfrica, should
support medium-sized and large farms as the way to achieve food security and accelerate
structural transformation. Urbanization provides additional strength to the arguments of
those in favorof large- andmedium-scale agriculture tomeet the rapidly growingurbandemand
but raises a question: Who is feeding the growing population, particularly in rural areas? FAO
data suggest the future of small farmers is unclear, as outlined in Box 2.1.
There are more than 475 million small farms of less than 2hectares (ha), mostly in Asia
and Africa (Lowder, Skoet, and Raney 2016, 24). While land consolidation, together with a
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Box 2.1 Distinguishing between Small and Family Farms: The
Future of Smallholders vs. Medium- and Large-Scale Agriculture
Data on farm structure are limited, particularly well-documented data. Among the
various estimates of farm structure, FAO estimates are, by far, the most comprehensive
and documented. They are based on national agricultural censuses carried out in more
than 100 countries, using standard concepts, albeit conducted at different times. Other
estimates are based on household surveys, which are typically not well documented or
representative. According to FAO, more than 570 million farms in the world produce
food and agricultural products and manage agroforestry and animals on rangelands. Of
these, more than 500 million are “family farms,” defined as using mostly family labor.
Although they range widely in size, they are sometimes confused with small farms (see,
for example, HLPE [2013]; IFAD and UNEP [2013]). In 2014, FAO noted that family
farms occupy nearly 70–80 percent of farmland, producing more than 80 percent of the
world’s food (including in the developing world), in value terms (FAO 2014a, 2014b),
but noted the methodology requires a more rigorous review.
Further research by FAO (2016) noted small farms (below 2ha) operate on only about
12 percent of the world’s land. Family farms are likely responsible for the majority of the
world’s food and agricultural production. However, a message that often gets lost is that
it is implausible that, with only 12 percent of the world’s land, small farms, operating on
less than 2ha, are able to produce a large share of the world’s food (Graeub et al. 2016;
Lowder, Skoet, and Raney 2016).
Importantly, further analysis by FAO has underscored “the importance of not refer-
ring to family farms and small farms (i.e., those of less than 2 hectares) interchangeably:
the latter account for 84 percent of all farms worldwide, but operate only around 12
percent of all agricultural land, and produce roughly 36 percent of the world’s food”
(Lowder, Sánchez, and Bertini 2019)
a From The State of Food and Agriculture 2014: Innovation in Family Farming:
This estimate is based on the share of land held by individuals or households (farming
families) in each of the 30 countries. In each country, it is assumed that the share of
food produced by family farms corresponds to their share of land. This allows
estimation of the value (in international dollars) of food produced by family farms
in each country based on the total value of food produced in the country. Adding the
values of food produced by family farms in each of the countries and dividing by the
total value of food produced in all 30 countries results in a share of 79 percent.
However, family farms tend to be smaller than non-family farms, and . . . small farms
in individual countries tend to have higher yields per hectare than larger farms. The
share of food produced by family farms is therefore likely to be larger than 80 percent,
although the exact share cannot be quantified. (FAO (2014b, 9, Footnote #13)
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slight increase in average farm sizes for a small sample of low- and middle-income
countries, indicates that average farm size has begun to increase, “for many low- and low-
middle-income, however, average farm sizes are likely to continue to diminish for some
time still” (Lowder, Skoet, and Raney 2016, 27).
Recent evidence suggests that farm size in Africa may be rising. In countries at lower
levels of income, according to FAO, smaller farms operate a far greater share of farmland
than do smaller farms in the higher income countries, but this, too, may be changing in
Africa, if recent evidence on the growth of medium-scale farms, for a few African countries,
is valid for the continent as a whole. As we discuss later in this chapter, in addition to a
foreign land grab, African investors have also acquired land since 2000, creating a major rise
in the number of farms between 5 and 200ha (Jayne and Muyanga 2018). Other evidence on
Africa suggests overall farm size may still be declining, perhaps implying a growing dualism.
Two additional nuances need to be added to this discussion, one related to land quality
and another related to measurement. While much research has shown that small farmers in
developing regions are often more efficient than those with larger farms, measured in terms
of output per hectare, some have challenged the validity of that evidence, citing potential
problems that come with farmers’ self-reporting of land size. Doubts about the validity
based on underreporting of farm size by smallholders, however, has not been supported by
measurements using GPS devices, which show that farmers overreport their size. Carletto,
Savastano, and Zezza (2013) showed that farmers systematically overreport the size of their
farms.
A second issue relates to land quality. Are small farms of higher land quality than larger
farms, and does it explain the inverse relationship? Bevis and Barrett (2020) show that
“characteristics such as soil quality cannot explain the relationship.”
Agriculture vs. Industry
The vast literature on structural transformation can be seen in two parts—that related to the
importance of agriculture and the role of small, medium, and large farms in transformation,
and that related to industrialization. We ask some key questions of this literature and
evidence.
Key Questions
1. How has agriculture performed relative to manufacturing and service sectors among a
number of developed and developing countries?
2. What has been the role of large, medium, and small farms in agricultural growth?
3. What are the lessons of experience, for future strategies for developing agriculture as a
way to contribute to transformation?
Structural Transformation, Farm Size, and Productivity Growth
Since the 1950s, literature on structural transformation, with respect to the roles that
agricultural growth and manufacturing growth have played in transformation, has grown
and evolved with less consensus and more debates on the roles and impacts of smallholder
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strategies on outcomes. This debate is more intense in SSA than in Asia, for at least two
reasons. First, the preponderance of smallholders in Asia leaves very little scope for
questioning that approach as the way to develop agriculture. Second, there is considerable
history of success of the smallholder strategy in Asia in achieving productivity growth, food
security, and employment generation. Nevertheless, our list of literature on the subject here
is illustrative rather than exhaustive, and our treatment of the issues is selective, too. See, for
example, W. Arthur Lewis (1954); Simon Kuznets (1955, 1966); Johnston and Mellor
(1961); Ranis and Fei (1961); Fei and Ranis (1964); Todaro (1969); Harris and Todaro
(1970); Chenery and Syrquin (1975); Lele and Mellor (1981); Datt and Ravallion (1992,
1998, 2011); World Bank (2007); Timmer and Akkus (2008); Timmer (2009); Binswanger-
Mkhize, McCalla, and Patel (2010); Christiaensen, Demery, and Kuhl (2011); Binswanger-
Mkhize (2012, 2013); Delgado, Porter, and Stern (2014); Jayne et al. (2014); Datt, Ravallion,
and Murgai (2016); Newman et al. (2016b); Mellor (2017); Lele, Agarwal, and Goswami
(2018); Monga and Lin (2019).
Economists have viewed transformation as the process of change in the structure of
production from low-productivity agriculture to manufacturing, and as the way to achieve
economic prosperity and reduce poverty. Andersson and Axelsson (2016), in writing on
relative backwardness, raise several important issues that are worth highlighting at the
outset. First, transformation is about optimism and catching up, and yet, is the relative
backwardness too great an obstacle to permit catching up? Their conclusion is that it is not
too late. According to Gerschenkron (1962), backwardness means that the earlier path
cannot be followed as initial conditions are different. Thus, different paths need to be
followed to deal with these different initial conditions. We are inclined to add to this the
important role of access to the right knowledge, as in the examples of East Asia and African
industrialization, which our subsequent discussion here illustrates.
The authors also assert the importance of agricultural change to achieve sustained
economic growth, a view that is not shared by all authors reviewed here. The Oxford
Handbook on Structural Transformation, for example, contains a number of unconven-
tional topics, such as Joseph Stiglitz’s piece, which argues that government policy has a
major role in deep downturns to ensure transformation remains on course, as witnessed in
the case of Vietnam after the Asian crisis (Monga and Lin 2019; Stiglitz 2019). There are also
deeper national governance issues that extend beyond periods of external shocks, discussed
in this chapter in the case of Malawi, and later in Chapter 5. Not all of these important
insights are covered here, but the reader is encouraged to review this literature.
Box 2.2 describes the five processes of structural transformation, which Timmer (2009)
articulated.
With Asian realities in mind, and mindful of differences among developing regions,
W. Arthur Lewis explained the existence of surplus labor in agriculture, the resulting
poverty due to low productivity of agriculture, and the need for smallholder agricultural
productivity growth to be the engine of economic transformation, as a way of stimulating
the movement of populations out of low-productivity agriculture to higher productivity
manufacturing. He considered increasing agricultural productivity as a sine qua non for
industrial development, declaring, “This is also why industrial and agrarian revolutions
always go together, and why economies in which agriculture is stagnant do not show
industrial development” (Lewis 1954, 173). Without growth in agricultural production to
keep up with the growing urban demand for food associated with industrialization, he
argued, wages rise and terms of trade move against the nonagriculture sector, thereby
reducing entrepreneurial profits and arresting savings and investment and the pace of
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economic growth and development. In an open economy, failure of agriculture to meet
growing food demand results in increased imports, taking resources away from domestic
investment (Lewis 1954).
Sen (1962) concluded that productivity is higher on small farms due to labor market
failure: family farm laborers lack employment opportunities outside their own farms and,
thus, work at levels at which marginal productivity of labor is low. Similar failures in
factor markets have been identified by others: for example, Feder (1985) in credit
markets; and Deininger and Feder (2001) in land markets. As a recent World Bank
publication, Accelerating Poverty Reduction in Africa, noted, some failures have been in
the relatively neglected areas in policymaking (population growth, gender inequality, risk
management, and fragility) or have only come to the forefront more recently (growing
natural resource dependence, a tightening fiscal environment, and the growing concen-
tration of the world’s poor in Africa). Recent technological developments provide new
leapfrogging opportunities, especially to overcome infrastructure gaps (Beegle and
Christiaensen 2019).
When improvements occur in technology and inputs, then labor, credit, and output
markets begin to work, and growth in agriculture and in the rest of the economy follows. In
this view, agricultural transformation refers to systematic changes in farm production and
food markets observed in the course of economic development, as part of the larger
processes of structural transformation and industrialization. The term focuses, particularly,
on the rising role of markets, land consolidation, specialization, and input use within
agriculture, as well as changes in labor use and farm size, the rise of nonfarm employment,
and increased consumption of nonfood goods and services. Such transformation was
observed in the 20th century, but it was also accompanied by degradation of natural
resources, among other effects, due to poorly developed property rights (Hayami and
Ruttan 1971).
Box 2.2 Structural Transformation
Structural transformation (ST) consists of:
1. Declining share of agriculture in the gross domestic product (GDP);
2. Declining share of agriculture in employment;
3. Rural-to-urban migration;
4. Growth of the service and manufacturing sectors; and
5. A demographic transition from high birth and mortality rates to low birth and
mortality rates, bringing about a reduction in the population growth rates.
The turning point is reached when the share of employment in agriculture has
declined at a faster rate than the share of agriculture in GDP. Differences in labor
productivity between the agricultural and nonagriculture sectors disappear in the final
stages of structural transformation. Before labor productivities among sectors converge,
a huge, and often even widening, gap occurs between labor productivities in the
agricultural and nonagriculture sectors. It explains intersectoral income inequalities
and concentrations of poverty in the agriculture sector (Timmer 2009).
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Among the aspects of transformation shown in Box 2.2, changes in economic structures
and labor productivity across sectors have received the most attention in the ST analysis.
Developing economies that successfully make the transition from low-income to high-
income status, typically experience significant changes in their economic structure (Clark
1940; Kuznets 1955; 1966; Chenery and Taylor 1968; Chenery et al. 1974; Chenery and
Syrquin 1975). As factors of production move from lower-productivity uses to higher-
productivity uses, there is a substantial growth payoff (Mellor 1976, 2017; Timmer and
Akkus 2008; Duarte and Restuccia 2010; McMillan and Rodrik 2011).
The World Development Report 2008 concluded that a dollar invested in agriculture
results in more poverty reduction than in other sectors (World Bank 2007). Since then, in
recent years, the assertion of the importance of smallholder agriculture has been questioned,
particularly in the African context, based on several key areas of potential economies of
scale: (1) skills and technology; (2) finance and access to capital; and (3) the organization
and logistics of trading, marketing, and storage. (See, for example, Collier and Dercon
[2014]; Dercon and Gollin [2014].) Related reasons for questioning traditional thinking
include: (1) questions about the historical, theoretical, and empirical validity of the body of
literature on the leading role of agriculture in transformation; and (2) changing comparative
advantage of small and large farms under globalization and its consequences, particularly
the growing injection of external capital into agriculture or foreign direct investment, also
often known as “land grab” in SSA; (3) investments by the African urban elite in farming
(Jayne et al. 2014); (4) inability of small farmers to compete in responding to the new
opportunities provided by the growth of value chains and supermarkets; and (5) returns to
investment in agriculture, relative to other sectors.
In an attempt to develop a new conceptual framework, Barrett, Reardon, Swinnen, and
Zilberman, in their paper, “Structural Transformation and Economic Development: In-
sights from the Agri-food Value Chain Revolution,” noted that W. Arthur Lewis and others
overlooked the central role of “revolution in the agri-food value chain that intermediates
between the shrinking [share] of . . . agricultural producers and the rising population of
urban food consumers with evolving demand for food products . . . [T]he crucial interme-
diation role played by aggregators, food processors, wholesalers, retailers, third party
logistics firms, and restaurants and other food service providers,” they argue, is almost
always abstracted from dual economy models with simplifications of complex development
processes (Barrett et al. 2019, 2). Their analysis was simpler, as these institutional changes
were not prevalent at the time, but rather were in the future. The result is economists’ focus
on technological change in farm-level production and neglect of markets. They note three
major trends: (1) the supermarket revolution; (2) foreign direct investment (FDI) in agri-
food value chains; and (3) the food services revolution. These trends are associated with
urbanization, which results in increased income and, in turn, increased demand for
diversified and higher quality foods (Barrett et al. 2019).
Increased profitability of value chain-related businesses raises product quality and
standards, and food safety, and even explains the increased share of foods purchased for
consumption by rural populations while the farm share of total consumer expenditure
declines rapidly. Some of these issues are debatable, and we discuss them later in Chapter 4.
The innovations in the supply chain could be mechanical or biological, and often enter
new markets. The speed of change of the “supermarket revolution,” including large-scale
retailers, has been astonishing and has been accompanied by the speed of agri-food value
chain transformation in today’s low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Barrett et al.
(2019, 20) noted: “Agri-food sector participation in GVCs [global value chains] share has
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increased as a share of agricultural output” (Greenville, Kawasaki, and Jouanjean 2019).
“That growth has been strongest in sub-sectors where product standards are most impor-
tant, i.e., in higher value sectors such as fruits, vegetables, seafood, fish, meat and dairy
products” (Maertens and Swinnen 2015).
The food services revolution in LMICs has proceeded much faster than it did in today’s
high-income countries. Product and process innovations, initially developed for high-
income markets, diffused relatively easily as multinational firms undertook FDI in search
of profitable new markets. Fast-food restaurants began appearing in secondary cities at a far
earlier stage of urbanization in LMICs than they did in high-income areas of the world. This
includes not just modern fast-food chains diffusing from North America and Europe, but
also South–South FDI from markets in earlier waves of food services transformation. The
paper by Barrett et al. (2019) largely presents a positive picture of value chains. It ignores the
often behind-the-scenes roles of multinationals in the establishment of World Health
Organization (WHO) standards, legislation on food standards, and food safety in develop-
ing countries, as well as impacts of fatty and sugary foods on obesity and health. We discuss
these issues in Chapter 4.
Also, does food quality and efficiency always increase with standardization, when much
produce is rejected by supermarkets, on the basis of appearance or size? These studies
consistently find that technology (and management) transfer through value chains gener-
ates significant productivity increases both for the product itself and for other production
activities at the farm level. For example, Minten, Randrianarison, and Swinnen (2009) also
found better technology and management practices related to contract-farming spillovers to
other crops, generating large productivity increases in rice production, and further improv-
ing the food security situation of rural households. However, Barrett et al. (2019, 42)
concluded: “The bulk of the welfare effects of revolutions within the agri-food system likely
accrue to consumers through reduced quality-adjusted food costs, and a steadily rising share
of consumer food expenditures go to value addition beyond the farmgate.”
The lack of consensus on the role of agriculture, and particularly of smallholder agricul-
ture, is evident in the writings of Collier, Dercon, and Gollin. Collier and Dercon (2014)
questioned how agricultural production and labor productivity in agriculture can be
increased massively in Africa, while requiring a vast reduction in the proportion of the
population engaged in agriculture and a large move out of rural areas, all with a continuing
commitment to smallholder agriculture, as the main route for growth in African agriculture
and for poverty reduction. The lack of productive employment elsewhere in the economies,
which we have documented elsewhere in the chapter, makes one wonder about the alter-
natives to agriculturally led growth. Collier, Dercon, and Gollin also questioned the
evidence base for an exclusive focus on smallholders: for example, a long-standing assertion
in the literature that small farms are more productive than large farms in terms of output
per unit of land, which, they argued, overlooks diseconomies of scale in marketing and
processing of agriculture and the high cost of transportation incurred in transferring
produce from remote rural areas to feed coastal populations. Further, they questioned the
cost effectiveness of developing agriculture, compared to other sectors: for example, greater
reliance on mineral resources and other strategies, such as trade, to achieve those same
objectives, in view of the diversity of countries’ resource endowments (Dercon and Gollin
2014). Indeed, much of the focus on smallholders, argued Collier and Dercon (2014), may
actually hinder large-scale poverty reduction: “Fast labor productivity growth is what is
needed for large scale productivity reduction but smallholders and the institutions to
support and sustain them are weak agents for labor productivity growth in Africa. The
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current policy focus ignores one key necessity for labor productivity growth: the kind of
growth that will trigger successful migration out of agriculture and rural areas” (Collier and
Dercon 2014, 93).
In the rest of this section, we review the accumulated literature on productivity growth by
farm size, including, particularly, the inverse relationship (IR) in Asia, Latin America, and
Africa, to derive implications for agricultural policy. This literature reflects considerable
advancement in data and methodology to address issues of productivity and farm size, with
important implications for policy.
Productivity and efficiency of farm size by scale has been a long-standing issue in Africa,
and evidence of higher yields per hectare on large farms is not new. In a study of
smallholder and estate or large-scale production (given that definitions have been
context-specific in different circumstances) of tea and coffee in Kenya and tobacco in
Malawi, spanning a period from the mid-1960s to mid-1980s, Lele and Agarwal (1989)
showed that large-scale/estate production was indeed more productive, with higher yields of
production per unit of land than smallholders. (The difference in yields was threefold.)
However, this higher productivity occurred on estate farms in Malawi because estates sold
their produce in open auctions, whereas small farmers sold their produce to ADMARK
(Agricultural Development Marketing Corporation) at much lower prices. Estates used
higher quantities of all factors of production per unit of land, including purchased inputs
and labor, than did small farmers. The reasons for the higher input use are many, and
context-specific, but can generally be described as owing to their increased and easier access
to credit and markets, including labor markets. And yet, careful analysis of the domestic
resource costs (DRCs) of these two types of farming organizations showed clearly that large
farmers were not necessarily more efficient than small farmers.⁸ Their DRCs were similar
per unit of production. The study outlined how public policy and delivery of information,
inputs, and markets were critical to improving access of small farmers to services and
overcoming diseconomies of scale.
In one of the few recent studies on farm size and productivity relationship in Africa,
Muyanga and Jayne (2019) conducted an analysis in Kenya. They examined the
relationship:
. . . over a much wider range of farm sizes than most studies, which is particularly relevant
in Africa given the recent rise of medium- and large-scale farms. Second, [they] test[ed]
the inverse relationship hypothesis using three different measures of productivity includ-
ing profits per hectare and total factor productivity . . . [instead of] yield or gross output
per hectare. [They found] a U-shaped relationship between farm size and all three
measures of farm productivity. The inverse relationship hypothesis [IR hypothesis]
holds on farms between zero and 3 hectares. The relationship between farm size and
productivity is relatively flat between 3 and 5 hectares. A strong positive relationship
between farm size and productivity emerges within the 5 to 70 hectare range of farm sizes.
Across virtually all measures of productivity, farms between 20 and 70 hectares are found
to be substantially more productive than farms under 5 hectares . . . [T]he productivity
advantage of relatively large farms stems at least partially from differences in technical
⁸ The domestic resource cost for a given sector (DRC) is “the ratio of the incremental increase in primary
inputs valued at their shadow prices to the incremental increase in net output valued at its shadow price in [the
sectoral] industry. Thus, it is a social cost/benefit ratio although it is not the best ratio. To calculate it, one must
know the shadow prices of primary factors” (Tower 1984, 21).
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choice related to mechanization, which substantially reduces labor input per hectare, and
from input use intensity. (Muyanga and Jayne 2019, 1140)
Based on evidence from four countries, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, Jayne et al.
(2016) noted, “Medium-scale farmers [with farms between 5 to 100 hectares] may be
altering the strength and location of agricultural growth and employment multipliers
between rural and urban areas . . . [M]edium-scale farms are likely to soon become the
dominant scale of farming in many African countries” (Jayne et al. 2016, 203).
Using farm-level panel data from Tanzania and Uganda and a theoretical framework,
however, Gollin and Udry (2019) came to a different conclusion. Unlike in developed
countries, crop yields and input intensities vary greatly on African farms with enormous
differences in productivity across farms. This, then, leads to a conclusion that there is
considerable scope to increase overall productivity by improving resource allocation across
farms. Gollin and Udry (2019) used a model that distinguished among various sources of
productivity differences, such as measurement error, unobserved heterogeneity, and poten-
tial misallocation of resources. The stochastic nature of agricultural production and large
shocks to production related to weather, pests, crop diseases, and so on are not well
observed in the data. A second source of variation in productivity is measurement error,
in spite of the high quality of the data, leading to imperfect and imprecise measurement.
Finally, the third source of variation in productivity is heterogeneity in unobserved land
quality. The authors found that measurement error and heterogeneity together account for
as much as 70 percent of the dispersion in measured productivity. They concluded that the
potential for efficiency gains through reallocation of land across farms and farmers may be
relatively modest (Gollin and Udry 2019).
Medium-scale farms control more land than foreign and domestic investors in the
countries they examined. In contrast, the share of land accounted for by small-scale (0–5
hectares) holdings, at least in these four countries, is declining, while the number of farms
between 10 and 100 hectares is growing rapidly. They speculated that under de facto land
policies, medium-scale farms will soon account for the majority of operated farmland in
many African countries. Many medium-scale farms are owned by influential rural and
urban people, who purchase land in customary areas and convert it to leasehold or freehold
titled land. What influence they will have on agricultural policies is an important question.
The authors emphasized the need to revive the study of agrarian structure to improve our
understanding of the implications of rapidly changing land distribution patterns. They also
noted that existing population-based surveys are poorly suited to understanding changes in
the distribution of farm size holdings. Correcting this informational blind spot is critical for
assessing what is happening in many African countries’ agriculture sectors (Jayne et al. 2016).
Earlier, Mburu, Ackello-Ogutu, and Mulwa (2014, 1), in a study of the effect of farm size
on economic efficiency among wheat producers in Kenya, estimated “the levels of technical,
allocative, and economic efficiencies among the sampled 130 large and small scale wheat
producers in Nakuru District.” The researchers showed that the technical, allocative, and
economic efficiency indices of small-scale wheat farmers, at 85 percent, 96 percent, and 84
percent, respectively, were only slightly lower than the 91 percent, 94 percent, and 88
percent, respectively, of large-scale farmers. From a strategic point of view, their observa-
tion, that the number of years of formal education that a farmer receives, the distance the
farmer must travel to obtain extension advice, and the size of the farm strongly influence the
efficiency levels, has important implications (Simpson et al. 2015). “The relatively high
levels of technical efficiency among the small scale farmers defy the notion that wheat can
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only be efficiently produced by the large scale farmers” (Mburu, Ackello-Ogutu, and Mulwa
2014, 1).
Methodologically and empirically, new studies have estimated the IR hypothesis, using
survey data over time, to understand the dynamics of change. A study by Deininger et al.
(2015), based on three rounds of survey data in India, spanning three decades, explored the
relationship between farm size and productivity. The authors noted, “While present
throughout, the inverse relationship weakened significantly over time; the estimated elas-
ticity of productivity with respect to farm size increased from 0.73 to 0.95 from 1982 to
2007. Key drivers are better functioning labor markets and a narrowing of efficiency
differences between own and hired labor, possibly due to greater use of machinery.
Structural transformation and a transition towards larger farms thus did not hurt produc-
tivity and economic efficiency” (Deininger et al. 2015, 1).
Otsuka, Liu, and Yamauchi (2016) reviewed evidence of different scales of production
from a number of Asian countries. They noted that an increase in wage rate is typically
associated with an increase in farm size, and that:
In order to reduce labor cost, farm size expansion and mechanisation must take place, as
land and machinery are complements . . . Also essential for farm size expansion is the
migration of rural labour to urban and industrialised areas.
High income countries in Asia (for example, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea) have
retained small farms and lost their comparative advantage in agriculture, thereby mas-
sively importing grains . . . If China and India, as well as other high-performing and
populous Asian countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia, become major importers of
grains in the future, world grain prices will rise and poverty will likely deepen. (Otsuka,
Liu, and Yamauchi 2016, 457–8)
The authors noted that the evidence reviewed in their study offered a warning against
maintaining small farms in Asia, with a risk to global food security, and argued for new
policy measures to enlarge the farm size in Asia, with a need for strengthening land
ownership rights and promoting land rental transactions, as well as land consolidation of
parcels and the promotion of mechanization to reach scale economies (Otsuka, Liu, and
Yamauchi 2016, 457–8).
A large body of conceptual and empirical evidence, including particularly the earlier
failed attempts at industrialization in developing countries, demonstrated that if agricultural
productivity growth does not precede, or at least accompany, labor transfers to urban areas,
wage price inflation ensues in the face of rural–urban migration and stalls industrialization
(Lele and Mellor 1981; Lele and Bumb 1995). This was the case in India during the 1964–6
balance of payments crises, and subsequently in 1990–1, leading policymakers to finally
focus on the development of agriculture as essential for overall development; this explained
the strong political support that the Green Revolution engendered (Lele and Goldsmith
1989; Lele and Bumb 1994). Notably, there was also much opposition to the Green
Revolution strategy from influential economists such as T. N. Srinivasan (1991).
Peter Hazell, a longtime champion of small farm development, also questioned the
relevance of small farms in Africa and Asia. The small farms are challenged by rapid
urbanization, reverse farm size transition (smaller farms growing smaller), and emerging
corporate farming. Hazell posits that some small farmers, with “resource endowments, good
location, or sheer entrepreneurial skill” have been able to succeed as commercial farms, but
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face challenges of access to value chains and market opportunities. Hazell argues that “if
more smallholder farms are to become commercially successful, policymakers will need to
do more to support them” in terms of improving markets, rural infrastructure, and financial
services, among other supports (Hazell 2015, 204–5).
Dercon and Gollin (2014) went further in asserting, “there is little evidence that would
support (or oppose) the claim that public investments in agriculture will generate greater
improvements in social welfare than investments in other sectors” (Dercon and Gollin
2014, 6). Others question CGIAR’s rates of return studies and other studies (Ravallion and
Datt 2002); or see flaws in the methodologies of studies (Fan, Hazell, and Thorat 2000; Fan,
Zhang, and Zhang 2002).
Given that it was “hard to disagree” with Collier and Dercon (2014), Hazell further
stated:
We need to move beyond the small vs. big farm debate, and think more about appropriate
portfolios of small, medium, and large farms that are relevant to the resource endowments
and stage of development of a country . . . [L]arge numbers of small farms are not going to
make it as commercial businesses, especially asset-poor farmers in backward regions.
Many of these kinds of farms are already diversifying their livelihoods out of farming,
but there are many instances where this is not yet possible on the scale required, or
where the returns to non-farm activities remain too low for them to escape poverty.
(Hazell 2015, 200)
And yet, the demographic reality and the history of agriculture in most Asian and African
countries are such that, under a business-as-usual scenario, small farms and small farmers
will continue to dominate the development of food and agriculture, unless there is a drastic
change in policies toward agricultural and industrial development. Hazell (2015) is right in
stressing that small farmers are getting smaller, whereas Masters et al. (2013), in a paper
prepared for CGIAR and published in Global Food Security, observed that the process of
land consolidation has begun in Asia, but China may be unique in having achieved
improved land governance, as compared to other Asian countries. Huang confirms the
rapid rate of land consolidation in China, despite the small farm size.
China has also undertaken reforms in extension, mechanization, water management, and
finance among other measures. In north and northeastern China, the average farm size has
doubled over the past decade. Huang and Ding (2016) noted the strikingly rapid emergence
of medium- and large-size farms in many regions. Bangladesh has had a stable farm size,
and other Asian countries, including India, have faced declining farm sizes. According to
Masters et al. (2013), rural population has peaked in Asia, partly “due to demographic
[factors] . . . but the average Asian farm size already has or will soon begin to rise, as some
rural households cultivate land released by neighbors whose workers have stopped farming”
(Masters et al. 2013, 157).
Upwards of 40 percent of all small farms in the world are in India, according to FAO
(2014b), but reforms have been slow in coming. The number of operational holdings in
India increased from 71.01 million in 1970–1 to 128.89 million in 2005–6, and the area of
operational holdings declined from 162.18 million ha to 156.62 million ha, resulting in
reduction of the average farm size from 2.28ha to 1.21ha. In the same period, the share of
small and marginal holdings in the operated area doubled. Smallholders now cultivate 42
percent of operated land and constitute 83 percent of total landholdings. Making the market
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/9/2021, SPi
:     79
for farmland leasing more efficient would be a major step forward, with a lower political cost
than full ownership (Chand, Lakshmi Prasanna, and Singh 2011).
Panagariya noted that, although many land laws were passed soon after independence,
they were not implemented due to resistance from the landowning classes; ownership rights
were conferred on only 4 percent of the land; and tenancy was abolished as seemingly
exploitative, with the policy having the unintended consequence of providing no protection
to tenants.⁹ Reform of tenure, a top priority of the government, has stalled because of the
opposition of the political parties to changing the Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act of 2013, which the Modi Government of
India considers heavy on transaction costs. Panagariya urged states to pass land bills if the
national government cannot get it done. He noted that the direct benefits of fertilizer
subsidies to farmers cannot be achieved without tenure reform, and access to bank credit
is difficult without tenure security.
There has been little progress on clarity of land rights in India. Constitutionally, the 28
states are responsible for land, water, and forests, and they have not acted on land rights.
In a personal communication with Uma Lele, Ramesh Chand noted:
Both ownership and operational size of holdings are declining over time. This is shown
both by Census data, which is based on revenue records and National Sample Survey
Office (NSSO) data based on sample households. The Census did not capture tenancy, but
NSSO data is expected to capture and reveal tenancy. According to NSSO data, tenancy in
India is rising and is widespread in some states. In the state of Andhra Pradesh [before it
was split in two], 37 percent of households reported land was leased in and 4.6 percent
reported lease out. Obviously, marginal farmers and the landless are leasing in land on a
large scale. There are also many cases of large farmers leasing in from small and marginal
farmers . . . [I]ncrease in lease in and lease out is not resulting in an increase in operational
area of farm size over time so far. Though government statistics do not reveal lease in and
lease out data, it does not mean that the size of farms is rising due to under reporting of
leasing. Farm size may be larger due to underreporting, but it is not rising over time.
(Ramesh Chand, personal communication, January 8, 2018)
See also Chand, Srivastava, and Singh (2017).
In June 2020, the Government of India adopted three long overdue reforms relating to
agricultural marketing that represented a fundamental reorientation of the existing regula-
tory framework. Although agriculture is a state subject, the central government took the
opportunity and initiative to use the COVID-19 crisis to push through reforms, without the
explicit involvement of the state governments. One bill relaxes restrictions governing the
purchase and sale of farm produce; the second bill relaxes restrictions under the Essential
Commodities Act (ECA), 1955, a vestige of colonial heritage; and the third introduces
dedicated legislation to enable contract farming on written agreements. Despite the con-
sensus among economists, the three bills are controversial. It is too early to know the impact
of these three reforms, but they offer substantial potential to liberalize markets; contract
farming could provide some security of tenure and increase overall productivity and
income. For details, see Narayanan (2020).
⁹ Arvind Panagariya, Professor of Economics and the Jagdish Bhagwati Professor of Indian Political Economy
at Columbia University, served as Vice Chairman of NITI Aayog, Government of India, in the rank of Cabinet
Minister, between January 2015 and August 2017.
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Land ownership would not change the lot of poor households much, unless they were
located in peri-urban areas where the land could be developed (and would then be priced as
urban land) (Hazell 2015). A part of the challenge is that the nonagriculture sectors (service
and manufacturing) have not been able to generate enough productive employment in
developing countries, as we demonstrate later in this chapter. Furthermore, land serves as
insurance. When industrial jobs are lost, workers go back to farming, as they did in
Indonesia in 1997, and in China after the 2007 financial crisis.
Africa faces a different structural problem altogether. As noted, African agriculture faces
an aging and illiterate farming community and youth uninterested in agriculture; lack of
formal land rights keeps land rental low; only 5.6 percent of land is irrigated; and govern-
ments are fiscally strapped (ACET 2017). In addition, some countries are afflicted by acute
governance challenges. A World Bank report documents the phenomenon of elite capture
and elite competition for power in the case of Malawi (WBG 2018). A multi-stakeholder
approach is needed, involving women, youth, the private sector, foundations, and involve-
ment of farmers of all sizes, in addition to the need for leadership.
Role of Medium- and Large-Scale Farms
Those questioning the ability of small farmers to feed the world increasingly look to
medium- and large-scale farms to meet that demand. Only 1 percent of all farms in the
world, those larger than 50 hectares, control 65 percent of the world’s agricultural land.
These large farms deploy state-of-the-art biological, mechanical, and information technol-
ogies in the form of precision agriculture and enjoy economies of scale and scope. Many are
becoming corporate farms (FAO 2014a).
Brazil contains farms of all sizes; it has an active agricultural policy toward agribusinesses
through the Ministry of Agriculture, and toward small- and medium-scale farms though the
Ministry of Agrarian Development. It has ample data, and it has attracted strong analysts.
So what role has farm size played in Brazil? Helfand, Magalhães, and Rada (2015) concluded
that the small and large farms are becoming more efficient more quickly than medium-sized
farms. Their first hypothesis is that:
Large and small farms, each through a separate and unique path, have advantageously
adapted or developed size-dependent technologies or processes that have accelerated
growth. The second is that Brazilian agricultural policy, through the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and the Ministry of Agrarian Development, has respectively focused on the large and
small producers and has, to a certain extent, ignored the needs of middling farm sizes.
(Helfand, Magalhães, and Rada 2015, iii, 1)
This situation may occur because the Ministry of Agriculture provides services to small
farmers, while large farms have access to technology from the market; middle-sized farmers
are underserved by both. We will show evidence later that large farms increase productivity
but do not generate much employment. Farm size can increase only if enough farm workers
leave farming for nonfarm jobs.
Foster and Rosenzweig (2017), in their paper, the title of which asks, “Are There Too
Many Farms in the World?” showed that “the existence of labor-market transaction costs
can explain why the smallest farms are most efficient, slightly larger farms least efficient and
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larger farms as efficient as the smallest farms.” They explained further that “the rising upper
tail of the U characteristic of high-income countries requires there be economies of scale in
the ability of machines to accomplish tasks at lower costs at greater operational scales.”Data
from India’s village-level panel surveys conducted by the International Crops Research
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) are consistent with these conditions. The
authors also noted, “that there are too many farms, at scales insufficient to exploit locally
available equipment-capacity scale-economies.”
Much of the debate on farm size and productivity has been focused on land or labor
productivity, generally showing respective productivity advantages to smaller or larger
farms. Rada and Fuglie (2019) brought together evidence from a set of rich and poor
countries, using panels of farm micro data and measures of TFP to compare performance
(see Figure 2.1). Their case studies in (1) Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda; (2) Bangladesh; (3)
Brazil; (4) Australia; and (5) the United States suggest:
There is no single economically optimal agrarian structure; rather, it appears to evolve
with the stage of economic development. Certain farm sizes face relative productivity
advantages, such as small farms in Africa. But with economic and market growth, that
smallholder advantage will likely attenuate, moving toward constant and eventually
increasing returns to size. Yet, importantly, small farms may be quite dynamic, and
need not be a drag on agricultural growth [for example, in Bangladesh; see Gautam

























Early period productivity Later period productivity Possible extrapolation
Figure 2.1 Total factor productivity over farm size varies widely by income class. (There is no
optimal farm size: both large and small farms can be equally efficient.)
Note: The lines compare productivity among farms of different sizes and how those productivity differences have
evolved over time, within a country. The lines should not be interpreted as comparing total factor productivity
(TFP) across countries (they do not compare agricultural TFP between Bangladesh and Brazil, for example).
Source: Fuglie et al. (2019); Rada and Fuglie (2019).
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Rada and Fuglie (2019) suggested flattened U-shaped curves on farm-level efficiency.
Their findings suggest that policymakers need not favor medium and large farmers, at the
cost of small farmers. By the same token, without attention to small farmers’ productivity,
differences in productivity growth between large and small farmers will continue to grow.
It is important to acknowledge some countervailing factors that may offset the negative
impacts of increasingly concentrated farm structure. Lele and Stone (1989) explored the
Boserupian intensification expected to occur, as a consequence of increasing relative land
scarcity. However, empirical evidence for such intensification in Africa is decidedly mixed,
suggesting constraints to land intensification, a conclusion that Headey and Jayne (2014)
also reached a quarter-century later. Researchers, based on new evidence, challenged the
inverse farm size–productivity hypothesis, with the incorporation of data on larger farm
sizes than are typically observed in farm household surveys (Nkonde et al. 2015; Muyanga
and Jayne 2019). The upshot of this work is that returns to scale may be an important source
of intrasectoral growth. The researchers have joined in questioning the cost-effectiveness of
promoting small-scale agriculture in Africa (see, for example, Collier and Dercon 2014;
Dercon and Gollin 2014). Their argument would have greater validity if the literature
suggested strong success in industrialization and ability of countries to absorb labor there.
Unfortunately, evidence presents a dismal picture on growth in manufacturing.
Environmental Costs and Benefits of Productivity Growth
Much of the traditional economic literature did not address the environmental costs and
benefits of technological change, but this is beginning to change. Modeling efforts are
underway to quantify environmental impacts and implications for policy. The examples
presented here are only illustrative. Taheripour, Hertel, and Ramankutty (2019, 19193)
estimated the impact of rapid output expansion of palm oil output in response to rising
global demand and concluded that:
Limiting palm oil production or consumption is unlikely to halt deforestation in M&I
[Malaysia and Indonesia] in the absence of active forest conservation incentives. Policies
aimed at restricting palm oil production in M&I also have broader consequences for the
economy, including significant impacts on consumer prices, real wages, and welfare.
(Taheripour, Hertel, and Ramankutty 2019, 19193)
Quite another kind of modeling is underway in the area of climate change. Parry, Mylonas,
and Vernon (2018), in their paper, “Mitigation Policies for the Paris Agreement: An
Assessment for G20 Countries,” provide an illustration of emissions pricing and that
“results underscore the generally strong case for (comprehensive) pricing over other
instruments” (Parry, Mylonas, and Vernon 2018, 2)
Jeuland and Whittington (2014) explored water resources planning with respect to
climate change under alternative scenarios, assessing the robustness of real options for
the Blue Nile. They concluded that “new, improved planning methods” are needed to
address deep uncertainties related to climate change and its impacts on water resource
development (Jeuland and Whittington 2014, 2086).
There are other important issues related to the process of small farm intensification and
productivity growth, which we do not address here. One such issue is agricultural intensi-
fication and human health. For example, “pesticide use is strongly correlated with increased
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value of harvest, but is also correlated with higher costs associated with human illness,
including increased health expenditures and time lost from work due to sickness in the
recent past” (Sheahan, Barrett, and Goldvale 2017, 27). At the same time, with improve-
ments in household incomes, “the content of the food basket is changing with a gradual shift
toward high-value foods such as animal products, fruits and vegetables and processed foods.
Overall, this dietary transition has important implications for the food security debate and
for agricultural and food policy” (Worku et al. 2017, 73), as discussed in Chapter 4. Also,
there are important trade-offs between nonfarm employment and income and farm pro-
ductivity growth under smallholder agriculture. In certain circumstances, agricultural
productivity declines as nonfarm income increases. This is because nonfarm employment
and income can increase farm hired labor and improve input intensity; but can have “a
negative effect on on-farm family labor use . . . [T]argeted policies are required to reduce
these potential trade-offs between nonfarm employment and agricultural intensification
and productivity change” (Amare and Shiferaw 2017, 59).
Industrialization and Structural Transformation
While Will Martin and Devashish Mitra (2001) presented evidence suggesting that there
has been convergence in growth between developed countries and Asia, this has not been
the case in SSA, with its special ecological challenges, diseconomies of scale, and high
transportation costs. Industrialization has been much harder to achieve in many lagging
countries.
Works on industrialization include: Owens and Wood (1997); Dasgupta and Singh
(2006); Wood and Mayer (2011); Rodrik (2014, 2016); de Vries, Timmer, and de Vries
(2015); Page (2015a, 2015b); Newman et al. (2016a); Page and Dews (2016); Tarp (2016); de
Melo (2017); Diao, McMillan, and Rodrik (2017); and Wood (2017).
John Page (2015b) stressed the importance of industrialization but noted Africa’s striking
failure to industrialize. The average share of manufacturing in GDP in SSA in 2013 was
about 10 percent, half of what would be expected from the region’s level of development.
Africa’s share of global manufacturing fell from about 3 percent in 1970 to less than
2 percent in 2013. Manufacturing output per person is about one-third of the average for
all developing countries. Manufactured exports per person, a key measure of success in
global markets, are about 10 percent of the global average for low-income countries.
By comparing the examples of Vietnam and Cambodia with eight African countries
(Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda), the
country studies carried out by Newman et al. (2016b) provided further support to Page
on the role that public policy and Bretton Woods institutions have played in Africa’s slow
industrialization, compared to East Asia’s rapid progress. We draw extensively on their
analysis, and at the end of the chapter, provide cross-country, econometric evidence to
document patterns of transformation for well over 100 countries in different regions.
The selected countries that they studied were, according to the authors:
. . . some of the stars of Africa’s growth turnaround. Six of the eight had been among its
fastest growing economies since 2000. Together they represent 54 per cent of the region’s
GDP and 56 per cent of its population . . . Their manufacturing sectors made about one-
fifth of SSA’s manufacturing value-added (excluding South Africa) . . . but they are not
emerging industrial economies. Senegal has the highest share of manufacturing in GDP at
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about 18 per cent. Nigeria has the lowest at less than two per cent. On average they are
quite similar to Africa as a whole. Their share of manufacturing in GDP is 9.5 per cent,
and the policies all eight countries adopted for industrial development closely parallel
those of the region more broadly. (Newman et al. 2016b, 2)
Their industrialization policies fall into three phases: state-led, import-substituting indus-
trialization in the early post-independence period; the “Washington Consensus”¹⁰ and
structural adjustment; and reform of the “investment climate,” the physical, institutional,
and regulatory environment for firms. Industrial performance has largely followed three
phases as well: an early boom until about the early to mid-1970s. Newman et al. (2016b,
9–10) noted:
By the 1980s, the state-led industrialization effort had reached its limits in most countries.
Between 1980 and 1985 manufacturing output began to decline in Ghana, Nigeria, and
Tanzania. Contrary to the intent of the import substitution strategy, dependence on
imports actually increased due to the heavy reliance of industry on imported capital and
intermediate goods. Public investment exceeded the fiscal capacity of the state, and the
state’s capacity to manage the enterprises. The efficiency of production, measured in terms
of international prices, was low, and in some cases, goods were produced at negative value-
added in international prices. There was substantial excess capacity in public manufactur-
ing enterprises, many of which were heavily constrained by lack of imported intermediates
and working capital . . .
Between 1985 and 2000 more than thirty African countries, including all those in the
country studies, adopted structural adjustment programmes (World Bank 2000).
The initial focus of public policy advice and conditionality by the IFIs [international
financial institutions:] World Bank and IMF in Africa were focused on macroeconomic
stabilization (World Bank 1992). Policy changes designed to improve resource
allocation—liberalization of trade and finance and regulatory reform—followed closely
thereafter. Across the continent governments liberalized trade and engaged in some
deregulation of the domestic market. Privatization became a major objective and was
often pushed, even in weak regulatory environments (Megginson and Netter 2001).
Divestiture of state-owned enterprises was viewed as important both because it reduced
the drain on the budget imposed by poor investment choices and because the state had
proved to be a poor entrepreneur (Nellis 1986).
The reform programmes eventually restored macroeconomic balance. Fiscal deficits in the
thirty-one countries covered by the Special Programme of Assistance for Africa had
¹⁰ The “Washington Consensus” was used to describe a set of 10 economic reforms, which the economist John
Williamson, who coined the term in 1989, argued were universally agreed upon in Washington as the “standard”
reform package promoted for developing countries facing crises by Washington, DC-based institutions, such as
the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and United States Department of the Treasury. The ten policy
prescriptions included: reduction of budget deficits; public expenditure for primary education and health and
infrastructure to improve income distribution; tax reform to broaden the tax base and cut marginal taxes; financial
liberalization; unified exchange rate; trade restrictions to be replaced by tariffs; removal of barriers for FDI;
privatization of state-owned enterprises; deregulation to permit more competitive business and entry of new firms;
and secure property rights. Through the years, the term acquired various meanings as a broader summary of
policies directed toward client countries, by Washington-based international financial institutions. Criticism
suggested the policy reforms were not actually based on consensus, and were prescribed without regard to local
context. Williamson argued for the soundness of the macroeconomic policies, to assist national policymakers
(Williamson 2004).
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dropped to an average of 5.3 per cent of GDP in 1997 (World Bank 2000). The currency in
the median African country was at PPP parity or undervalued in the early 1990s, and the
black-market premium for foreign exchange had virtually disappeared (Easterly 2009).
Quantitative trade restrictions were replaced by tariffs, and trade weighted average tariff
rates fell from 30–40 per cent in 1980 to 15 per cent or less by 2000 (World Bank 2000).
Privatization was more controversial and less widely embraced. In many countries the
principal motivation to privatize was to placate the IFIs (Nellis 2003).
The authors also noted:
The comparator Asian countries took quite different policy approaches to industrializa-
tion and had very different industrial development outcomes. [For example,] Tunisia in
North Africa . . . [has achieved] manufacturing growth exceed[ing] that for SSA for
three decades. Cambodia and Vietnam had per capita income levels and structural
characteristics similar to African economies as recently as 2005 in Cambodia and 2001
in Vietnam . . . After an early period of state-led industrialization, both countries followed
industrial development strategies very similar to those of other emerging East Asian
countries with considerable success. Since 1990 manufacturing growth has averaged
more than 10 per cent per year in both countries. (Newman et al. 2016b, 2–3)
Newman et al. (2016b, vii) argued that “Africa will not succeed in industrializing if the
conventional wisdom offered by the international aid community to African governments
continues to define their public policies to spur industrial development.” The authors
identified initiatives to address the challenge:
• Breaking into export markets will need an “export push” of the type undertaken by
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Tunisia: a concerted set of public investments, policy, and
institutional reforms focused on increasing the share of industrial exports in
GDP. Because governments have limited scope for public investment and public
action, the export push needs a government-wide commitment to focus investments
and policy actions first on boosting non-traditional exports.
• In Cambodia and Vietnam the export push was accompanied by policies designed to
promote the formation of industrial clusters. Spatial industrial policies are comple-
mentary to both the export push and capability building. African governments can
foster export-oriented industrial agglomerations by concentrating investment in high-
quality institutions, social services, and infrastructure in a limited physical area such as
an export processing zone (EPZ)—an industrial agglomeration designed to serve the
global market—but African governments have not yet succeeded in doing so. (New-
man et al. 2016b, vii)
A separate study of Growth, Structural Transformation and Rural Change in Vietnam, by
Finn Tarp (2016), based on longitudinal household survey data, since Vietnam’s adoption
of the Doi Moi reforms in 1986, shows similar substantial improvement in rural income
over time, including of women-headed households. The improvements are due, in addition
to a proactive industrial policy, to investment in infrastructure and water, education,
migrant income, and agricultural diversification to higher value crops, but also considerable
continued regional income disparity between the relatively more prospering south and the
north, much as China’s industrialization policies show substantial regional income
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disparities among the three Chinese regions—the coastal industrial areas, the agricultural
plateaus, and the forested, mountainous southwest.
Newman et al. noted further:
A short-lived industrial recovery
Perhaps no episode in Africa’s contemporary economic history has raised as much debate
as structural adjustment. The dramatic about-face in economic policies and more than a
decade of very poor development outcomes sparked considerable academic and popular
criticism. The early policy adjustments in combination with increased inflows of foreign
aid provided a stimulus to industrial production in some countries, as firms used capacity
that had been heavily constrained by lack of imported intermediates. Between 1980 and
1985 and 1985 and 1990 manufacturing growth shifted from negative to positive in
Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania, and accelerated in Kenya, Senegal, and Uganda while it
fell in Ethiopia and Tunisia.
The partial recovery of manufacturing was short-lived, however. Increased competition
from imports and rising production costs due to reforms in the foreign exchange and
financial markets put considerable pressure on manufacturing enterprises. Import com-
petition, lack of technical expertise, and the shortage of working capital resulted in most
government-owned firms operating at as little as 10 per cent of capacity. By 1990–5
manufacturing output was falling in Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Tanzania, and
growth of manufacturing had declined in every other country except Uganda. The textile
and clothing sector was especially hard hit. In Tanzania twenty-two out of twenty-four
textile factories had closed by 1990, and in Nigeria employment in the textile and
garments sector fell from 700,000 in 1980 to 40,000 in 1995. Tunisia in contrast main-
tained manufacturing growth rates of more than 5.5 per cent per year throughout the
1990s, despite embarking on its own structural adjustment programme.
Investment climate reform and new directions, 2000–
Africa entered the twenty-first century in substantially better macroeconomic shape than
it had been in the last decades of the twentieth. The region began to experience positive per
capita income growth around 1995, a trend that would accelerate through the 2000s.
Improved economic performance led to a retreat from structural adjustment lending, and
the Millennium Development Goals set a new agenda for aid to Africa, one mainly centred
on human development.
Investment climate reforms
In the area of industrial development, the World Bank and many bilateral donors shifted
their focus after 2000 to the “investment climate.” As defined by the World Bank, the
investment climate included: (1) macroeconomic stability; (2) openness; (3) good gov-
ernance and strong institutions; (4) the quality of the labour force and infrastructure
(Stern 2001, 2002). Led by the donors, investment climate reforms became widespread,
often becoming key components of budget support programmes. Around one-quarter of
official development assistance (some US$21 billion per year) currently supports invest-
ment climate reforms (OECD 2014).
The sub-Saharan case-study countries have all undertaken investment climate reform
programmes in the last decade. Ghana has focused on trade policy and regulatory reforms.
In Kenya reforms were undertaken to liberalize the regulatory regime. Mozambique
adopted a new Industrial Policy and Strategy in which a significant role was assigned to
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promoting private investment. Nigeria’s 2004 National Economic Empowerment and
Development Strategy was explicitly targeted at making the industry sector internationally
competitive. The 2005 Senegal Accelerated Growth Strategy set as its main objective
establishing a “business environment consistent with international good practice.” In
2010 Tanzania introduced an Integrated Industrial Development Strategy aimed at creat-
ing a “competitive business environment.”
New directions
In addition to implementing the investment climate reform agenda, a number of countries
have adopted more activist approaches to industrial development. In 1998 the Ethiopian
government launched a strategy aimed at promoting labour-intensive manufactured
exports. Kenya’s Vision 2030 also emphasizes manufactured export growth. Most of the
region’s strategy and planning documents list a range of instruments intended to encour-
age private investment in targeted sectors. Ethiopia has attempted to coordinate private
investment in textiles and garments, meat, leather and leather products, and agro-
processing industries. Ghana’s national industrial policy includes a number of highly
sector-specific objectives. A prominent feature of Mozambique’s industrialization strategy
has been the promotion of large mining, manufacturing, and energy projects, known as
“mega-projects.”
Tunisia was the only African country studied in which the government undertook
initiatives aimed at improving the competitiveness of individual industries and enter-
prises. An industrial upgrading programme, Programme de mise à niveau, was launched
in 1996 followed by the Industrial Modernization Programme (PMI). These programmes
were intended to provide technical assistance, training, financial subsidies, and infrastruc-
ture upgrades for firms to help them face international competition arising from the
preferential trade agreement with the European Union under the Euro-Med initiative.
Not yet a turning point
For Africa as a whole neither the widespread adoption of investment climate reforms nor
the new directions taken by some governments have reversed the four decade decline in
industry. Manufacturing growth has remained below the growth rate of GDP. Since 2000
industrial performance among the SSAn countries covered in the country studies has been
uneven. There has been some acceleration in the growth of manufacturing in Ethiopia,
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. . . .Manufacturing growth in Ghana and Senegal has
remained low and has lagged behind the overall growth of the economy. Nigeria was an
exception; manufacturing grew at about 8 per cent per year between 2000 and 2010.
(Newman et al. 2016b, 10–12)
De Vries (2015) similarly noted that manufacturing expanded during the early post-
independence period, and expansion led to a growth-enhancing reallocation of resources.
This process of structural change stalled in the mid-1970s and 1980s. Growth rebounded
in the 1990s, but workers mainly relocated to service industries. Although service
activities had above average productivity levels, productivity growth was low, and
increasingly fell behind the world frontier. They also found that this pattern of static
gains but with dynamic losses of reallocation, present since 1990 in many African
countries, is comparable to patterns observed in Latin America, but different from
those in Asia.
Rodrik (2016) has been, by far, the strongest modern advocate of the importance of the
manufacturing sector as the escalator to industrial growth, as was Kaldor (1970, 1975) in the
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1970s. Not only is factor productivity higher in the manufacturing sector, but there tends to
be convergence in productivity across countries in the industry sectors, due to global
competitiveness and the presence of exports. Rodrik noted, “It was the industrial revolution
that enabled sustained productivity growth in Europe and the United States for the first
time. . . . It was industrialization again that permitted catch-up and convergence with the
West by a relatively smaller number of non-Western nations—Japan . . . , South Korea,
[and] Taiwan . . . ” (Rodrik 2016, 1).
Rodrik’s assessment is also more pessimistic. Most developing countries are facing what
Rodrik (2016, 2) terms “premature deindustrialization,” or the increasing difficulty of
industrialization. In response to the relentless advances of technology, it will no longer be
easy to follow the path to wealth pursued by Asian countries, which used low-skilled
workers to build successful export industries.
Earlier, Dasgupta and Singh (2006) explained the triple phenomenon of premature
deindustrialization, jobless growth of manufacturing in the formal sector, and faster growth
of services than of manufacturing. They used the Kaldorian framework and generalizations
derived by Kaldor about the relationship between the growth of output and employment in
different sectors of the economy. “Kaldor’s laws,” as the generalizations were known,
explained the importance of industrialization. Like Rodrik, Kaldor had been an avid
advocate of a strong role for industrialization. He justified it by focusing on demand, noting
that elasticity of demand for industrial products tends to be higher than for the agriculture
or service sectors until the economy matures. In addition, technological change is faster, and
the scope for productivity growth in the industry sector is more rapid than in other sectors.
Therefore, he argued, the faster the growth of manufacturing, the faster the growth of
overall GDP. Indeed, today’s industrialized countries experienced more rapid growth of
manufacturing than GDP growth from the 1950s until 1973, after which their manufactur-
ing growth decelerated and even became negative, and the service sector came into
ascendancy, which was explained largely in terms of higher income elasticity of demand
for services than manufacturing in mature economies.
Dasgupta and Singh also explained the reasons for the challenges to the Kaldor frame-
work in the face of recent changes in the global environment: for example, the introduction
of revolutionary new technologies such as information and communications technology
(ICT). The service sector, consisting of ICT, telecommunications, business services, and
finance, is replacing or complementing manufacturing as a new or an additional engine of
economic growth in emerging countries, in much the same way that we documented in the
case of the changing structure of trade in goods and services in the introduction.
Dasgupta and Singh (2006, 16) noted “pathological deindustrialization,” in several Latin
American and African countries in the 1980s and 1990s. They explained:
As a result of Washington Consensus policies of international financial institutions (IFIs),
which Latin American as well as many African countries were obliged to follow in
response to the debt crisis, there has indeed been considerable structural change in
these countries. But Ocampo [2004, 2005] and Shafaeddin (2005) have persuasively
argued that this change has been of the wrong kind. Countries have begun to specialize
according to their current comparative advantage instead of their long-term dynamic
comparative advantage. (Dasgupta and Singh 2006, 16)
China is reshaping the global economy in a variety of ways. There is extensive discussion in
Jenkins (2010) of the adverse impact of Chinese imports on domestic industry in the most
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industrialized Latin American countries—Brazil and Argentina—and also in South Africa,
compared to the rest of SSA, which is not so industrialized. These countries have attempted
to thwart competition through the World Trade Organization (WTO).
In both SSA and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Chinese loans have played an
important role in expanding the market for Chinese products. Both regions have also been a
testing ground for China’s Go Global policy, encouraging the international expansion of
Chinese companies. Chinese construction and engineering firms have been particularly
active in SSA.
In the joint report of the World Bank Group, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), WTO, and others on global value chains, Nobel
laureate Michael Pence noted “a growing body of research on the impacts of globalization
and digital technology on individual economies,” suggesting that there has been “a huge and
productive effort to reconfigure and refine trade data so as to expose the complex value-
added structure of trade in goods and services” (WBG et al. 2017, iii).
The study of global value chains noted: “The patterns of specialization across countries
are much more visible and clearly defined when viewed through the lens of complex value-
added chains . . . [They explain] where employment is created, what drives productivity
growth, and what factors are affecting income distribution in a wide range of developed
and developing countries” (WBG et al. 2017, iii).
China has been a leader in driving growth of global value chains. As its incomes rise, it
is moving away from labor-intensive manufacturing and assembly, and GVCs are
moving to lower income countries, “creating growth and development opportunities
and momentum . . . But there are impediments . . . low wages are not enough. Connectivity
and . . . efficient processes for logistics and for meeting standards and regulatory require-
ments are critical. And lots of countries [including India] currently lose out on this front”
(WBG et al. 2017, iv).
What the World Bank Group (WBG) report probably means is that India is not
connecting its service sector to manufacturing within the region, as is China, serving as a
hub for Southeast Asian countries. India is exporting services to the West, albeit without
being a hub that serves manufacturing in SA. The report distinguishes between wages and
unit labor costs and the factors that drive a wedge between them. Low wages may help, but
are not necessary. For competitiveness, unit labor costs are critical, and they depend on
labor quality. The analysis explains “the divergent distributional impacts of globalization
across developed and developing countries” (WBG et al. 2017, iv) and between the tradable
and nontradable:
The tradables set is expanding with the support of enabling technology. For example,
small and medium-size businesses can access global markets in a way that was simply
impossible before because the transaction costs of doing so were prohibitively high. But
the nontradables part of any economy remains very large. The linkages between the
tradables and nontradables parts of an economy on both the supply and demand sides
are crucial in understanding the growth patterns . . . These linkages are complex. On the
supply side they come through labor market shifts, and on the demand side through
spillover effects of rapid income growth arising from specialization and growth on the
tradables side . . . [where your neighborhood matters]. (WBG et al. 2017, iv)
The report compares differences in the high degree of regional integration in East Asia to
South Asia, with vast differences in the extent of innovation and efficiency across countries.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/9/2021, SPi
90   
Savings, Investment, and Structural Transformation
Structural transformation is related to transformation in the behavior of savings and
investment, which Lewis (1954) articulated well. What comes first? Savings or investment?
There seems to be no agreement among economists on this issue. Savings and investment
rates have grown substantially in developing regions, and economic growth has also resulted
in declines in poverty and hunger. The lowest savings rates are in LAC, followed by the
African region, slightly exceeding 18 percent. They are as high as 30 percent in SA and well
over 45 percent in East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) (Figure 2.2) for net capital inflows (see
Chapter 7 on financing). To reignite growth, some economists, including Arvind Subrama-
nian, former Chief Economic Advisor in the Economic Survey of India, 2017–18
(Government of India 2018a, chapter 3), have argued that raising investment is more
important than raising savings. Based on cross-country experience, he argues growth
slowdowns are preceded by investment slowdowns but not necessarily by savings slow-
downs. This is, perhaps, because of the growing importance of international capital.
Economic performance in Asia, and especially of China and India, has been propelled by
investment growth and backed by increased savings. Without that, resulting current
























































































East Asia and Pacific (excluding high income)
Latin America and Caribbean (excluding high income)
High income
Middle East and North Africa (excluding high income)
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high income)
Figure 2.2 Gross domestic savings by region, 1980–2017 (% of GDP)
Source: WDI, World Bank.
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large current account deficits for a sustained period. As Figure 2.3 shows, investment ratios
in East Asia are almost twice those in Africa and Latin America. Investment rates in SA have
been increasing, and though still considerably lower than in EAP, China invests even more
than other countries in its region, almost half its GDP. In recent years, India has invested
about one-third of its GDP, slightly more than other countries in its region. Also, the
investment ratio is more similar between China and India than it is between either country
and the ratio in LAC or SSA.
Again, differences among regions are striking. Not only are investment levels in Asia
higher than in other developing country regions, but there is greater efficiency in the use of
capital, as measured by the incremental capital–output ratio (ICOR). After the oil price rise
of 1973, the capital–output ratio doubled in the rest of the world, and it has remained high
since (Agarwal andWhalley 2013). It increased considerably less in East Asia, and it actually
declined in SA. So, since the early 1980s, it has been the same in East and South Asia. The
incremental capital–output ratio was considerably lower in China than in India until 1998.
Since then, the ICOR in the two countries has been roughly the same, about 4 (Agarwal and
Whalley 2013).¹¹
According to Virmani (2018), China’s ICOR¹² was slightly less than 2 in 1984, reaching
























































































East Asia and Pacific (excluding high income)
Latin America and Caribbean (excluding high income)
High income
Middle East and North Africa (excluding high income)
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high income)
Figure 2.3 Gross fixed capital formation by region, 1980–2017 (% of GDP)
Source: WDI, World Bank.
¹¹ ICOR is calculated as the moving average of the sum of investment over five years, divided by the increase in
income during this period, with a one-year lag: that is,
P
i¼15 Ii=ðY6  Y1Þ (Agarwal and Whalley 2013).
¹² ICOR is calculated as investment rate/GDP growth rate.
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more capital-intensive, sophisticated manufacturing, moving out of more labor-intensive
commodities as wage rates increased. India’s ICOR was about 4 in 2016, but much more
unstable from year to year (Arvind Virmani, personal communication, February 16, 2019).
According to FAO (2020b), over the decade 2005–14, global annual physical investment
flows in agriculture, as measured by gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in agriculture,
rose by almost 50 percent from US$259 to US$378 billion in constant 2005 US dollars.¹³
However, this rise is again not uniform across all regions: while the annual flow of
physical investment in the agriculture sector doubled in Asia and Pacific over the last
decade, it remained stagnant in Europe and in the other developed regions. For the
remaining regions, agricultural physical investment flows increased by around 34 percent
in Africa, 54 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 62 percent in North America.
GFCF was a key driver of GDP growth, as it rose from US$3.6 trillion (2005 US dollars)
to US$13.8 trillion between 1970 and 2014. The investment ratio—GFCF as a proportion of
GDP—remained relatively stable at around 22 percent throughout the period. At the
regional level, the investment ratios for Africa, Europe, and Latin America and Caribbean
present downward trends, while North America, in contrast, saw its investment ratio
increasing from 0.18 in the 1970s to 0.20 at the beginning of the 21st century.
Dubey and Donckt (2016) showed that both groups (low-income countries and middle-
and high-income countries):
. . . present a similar average overall investment ratio [calculated for the total economy,
total GFCF to GDP), but] . . . the average AIR [Agriculture Investment Ratio: that is,
agriculture GFCF to agriculture value-added] is much lower in low-income countries,
indicating that in those countries—where agriculture often remains an important con-
tributor to GDP—the primary sector is behind in terms of investment in physical capital
with respect to the other sectors of the economy. On the other hand, industrialized
countries tend to have [a] much more mechanized agriculture sector. (Dubey and
Donckt 2016)
This means China, being a middle-income country, invests more than low-income coun-
tries. These differences are seen later when TFP estimates are discussed in Figure 2.7.
The differences in FAO reported gross capital formation, specifically in the Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries sector (AFF), and FDI in China and the rest of the world are even
¹³ Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) captures the net additions (acquisitions less disposals) to the stock of
fixed capital assets such as machinery, transport equipment, infrastructure, and buildings within an economy.
Data on agricultural GFCF are available for over 200 countries. For some 100 countries, data on agriculture
GFCF were completely missing and are imputed based on a panel regression approach (with an adjustment on the
series level to ensure coherence with the agriculture consumption of fixed capital series whenever available from
the United Nations Statistics Division Official Country Data [UNSD OCD] database). For many of the other
countries, data are available only for a limited number of years in which case data for the missing years have been
imputed using the available data as the base for investment ratio using ARMAX modeling. Data on net capital
stock (NCS), gross capital stock (GCS), and consumption of fixed capital (CFC) are available for just over 200
countries. It should be noted that most of the country data have been calculated by FAO following the perpetual
inventory method (PIM) approach as presented in the OECD (2009) Manual on Capital Stock.
The time coverage for the agricultural capital stock database is 1990–2014, as far as data availability permits. For
some countries, data on GFCF are available only from 1995. Therefore, regional aggregation regarding the GFCF
variable should not be performed for the period 1990–4. For many countries, NCS and GCS data start in the mid-
2000s. Therefore, the greatest care should be attached to the effective country coverage when compiling regional
aggregates.
For more information on the methodology regarding the agriculture capital stock database, please refer to the
metadata available through FAOSTAT.
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more striking. The extraordinary level of investment in Chinese agriculture is in contrast to
the next best performers: namely, the United States and India. Investments in Africa are
abysmally low, in both gross capital formation and FDI.
Convergence of Performance?
There is considerable debate in the literature on whether there is convergence in the growth
performance of developed and developing countries.
For a long time, developing countries were stuck in low-growth scenarios, whereas
developed countries were growing rapidly, thus increasing the gap between developed
and developing countries (Pritchett 1997). Will Martin (2018) showed this growing gap
in the rates of growth between developed and developing countries from 1820 until 1990, in
Figure 2.4.
Then, Martin (2018) emphasized convergence. Subramanian in the 2017–18 Economic
Survey of India also noted, “ ‘convergence with a vengeance’ (Subramanian 2011)”
(Government of India 2018b, 68). The percentage of countries growing faster than the
United States (a “frontier country”) increased from 43.7 percent between 1960 and 1980 to
68.6 percent between 1980 and 2017, and the average growth rate accelerated from 1.4
percent to 1.7 percent (Government of India 2018b, 68–9). The record on convergence,
however, is mixed. Per capita income growth has occurred mainly in Asian countries, China
with 8 percent annually and India with 5 percent annually, but income growth in some of
the Middle East and Latin America is barely equal to the population growth, and growth in
SSA and the other parts of the Middle East has been less than the population growth
(Figure 2.5). China’s growth has started decelerating since 2017, and with the spread of
coronavirus in 2020, it is expected to be close to 1 percent in 2020. Although India’s growth
increased temporarily, concern that Indian growth rates may have been overstated has been



























Figure 2.4 Levels and growth in per capita income by high-income and developing countries:
divergence “big time,” 1820–1990
Note: Average growth: High income: 1.6% per annum; Developing: 0.9% per annum.
Source: Martin (2018). Based on data from Angus Maddison, “Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per
Capita GDP 1–2008 AD.” Downloaded from http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Maddison.htm, July 13, 2018.
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IMF’s projected economic growth rates in 2018 for 2017–23 were substantially higher for
Asia and Europe, but they are significantly lower for Latin America and even lower for SSA
(IMF 2018) (Figure 2.6).
Indeed, SSA’s projected per capita income growth remains well below the population
growth rate in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. Fuglie et al. (2019, xxii) noted in their book, Harvesting
Prosperity: Technology and Productivity Growth in Agriculture: “Agricultural productivity is
lower and is growing more slowly in poor countries, impeding their convergence to the
advanced economies. Over four decades, crop yields in sub-Saharan Africa have barely
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Figure 2.5 Annual GDP per capita growth rates by region and key country: Rapid per capita
income growth in Asia, 1991–2017
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Figure 2.6 Projected economic growth rates, 2017–2023 (% per annum)
Note: MENA = Middle East and North Africa; SS Africa = sub-Saharan Africa.
Source: Based on World Economic Outlook, IMF (2018); Martin (2018).
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Divergence in Agricultural Productivity Growth
and Poverty Reduction
East and Southeast Asian countries have experienced a sharp decline in poverty, as shown in
Chapter 4, Figure 4.2, but their elasticities of poverty reduction, with respect to change in
per capita income, are the lowest in Asia (Agarwal 2017), moving significant populations
out of agriculture to higher productivity activities and changing the structure of production.
The performance of SA has been slower than that of East Asia, and the performance of SSA,
after a promising start in the 1960s and 1970s, has been slowest. East and Southeast Asia
managed to reduce extreme poverty dramatically over the last two decades; in SA, both the
share of poverty and absolute numbers have declined, whereas SSA has failed to keep pace.
The poverty rate has declined very little, and the absolute number of poor has increased,
partly due to a rapid population growth and because GDP per capita did not grow for
almost 25 years from 1982 onward, as documented in Agarwal and Whalley (2013), and
discussed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
(Osakwe and Poretti 2015). UNCTAD blames it on terms of trade losses, which according
to UNCTAD were larger than the aid the region received. The relationship between poverty
reduction and food security has been more complex than generally assumed in the literature
and is explored in the chapters that follow, particularly Chapters 3 and 4.
According to Virginia Tech’s “Global Agricultural Productivity Report”:
Globally, TFP is rising by an average annual rate of 1.63 percent, less than the estimated
1.73 percent needed to sustainably double agricultural output (2010–2050) through
productivity growth. TFP growth is strongest in China and South Asia, but it is slowing
in the agricultural powerhouses of North America, Europe, and Latin America. TFP
growth in low-income countries [including SSA, other than South Africa] is alarmingly
low. (Steensland 2019)
Figure 2.7 shows sources and rates of growth in agricultural production during the period
2001–16 through a growth accounting exercise. Not only did Northeast Asia (which
includes China) have the highest growth rate, but also most of the growth has come from
productivity growth with very little resource input (land, labor, machinery power, livestock
capital, synthetic NPK fertilizers, and animal feed) growth.¹⁴ During the period 1961–2016,
¹⁴ TFP growth is measured as the ratio of output growth to input growth, where output growth is FAO’s gross
agricultural output (GAO) growth, and input growth is the weighted-average growth in quality-adjusted land,
labor, machinery power, livestock capital, synthetic NPK fertilizers, and animal feed, where weights are input
(factor) cost shares.
Fundamentally, TFP is a ratio that measure changes in how efficiently agricultural inputs (land, labor, fertilizer,
feed, machinery, and livestock) are transformed into outputs (crops and livestock). If total output is growing faster
than total inputs, then the total productivity of the factors of production (that is, total factor productivity, or TFP)
is increasing.
Input growth in this estimation includes:
1. Area growth = Growth of (Agricultural land area extension  Area equipped for irrigation extension), where
“Agricultural land” is total agricultural land in hectares of “rainfed cropland equivalents.” This is the sum of
rainfed cropland (weight equals 1.00), irrigated cropland (weight varies from 1.00 to 3.00 depending on region),
and permanent pasture (weight varies from 0.02 to 0.09 depending on region).
2. Irrigation extension: Growth of area equipped for irrigation extension.
3. Input intensification: (Input growth  growth of agricultural land area extension), principally inputs per land
(that is, gross amount of fertilizer, machinery, feed, and labor per hectare of agricultural land). Input/resource-led
growth.
4. Productivity-led growth: TFP.
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agricultural output increased by 60 percent, while global cropland increased by just 5
percent (OECD and FAO 2019).
Differences in agricultural growth and its sources are also noticeable for the period
2001–16 by region. Area expansion (that is, rainfed cropland and permanent pasture) was
minimal in Northeast Asia, which includes China, and in SA, which includes India, was
negative. Extension of irrigated cropland (area equipped for irrigation) was greater in both
regions, and growth of input intensification (that is, labor, machinery power, livestock
capital, synthetic NPK fertilizers, and animal feed) was negative in Northeast Asia and
minimal in SA during that period. SA follows the Northeast Asia region in productivity

























































































Figure 2.7 Sources of agricultural growth by region, 2001–2016
Source: Based on data from https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/international-agricultural-productivity/ and
data provided by Keith O. Fuglie.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/9/2021, SPi
:     97
growth in production was slower, and most of it has come from land area expansion, with
very little from productivity-led growth. In the case of LAC, which includes Brazil, and
Southeast Asia, which includes Indonesia, a significant share of the overall growth has come
from area expansion, explaining land conversation and deforestation in the Amazon and in
the outer islands of Indonesia.
Separate figures (not shown here) for China, India, Brazil, and Africa show these differences
more strikingly. What is unclear is the extent to which the extraordinary differences in GFCF
in agriculture are reflected in these estimates as the flows of capital. Either the Chinese GFC
estimates and FDIs are overstated (as Fuglie suggested in the case of GFC in a personal
exchange on February 19, 2020), or we are understating the importance of capital investment
in agriculture (particularly in research and development) and related services (infrastructure,
communication, education, and health). Those investments are reflected in the quality of
inputs and incentives (for example, through enhanced market access and reduced market
costs), and these “quality” aspects of inputs are not reflected in the growth accounting estimates
in Figure 2.7 on agricultural output growth but are reflected in the national-level investments.
Complexity of Agricultural Development
and Demands of Policymakers
It is evident from the preceding discussion that developing agriculture is a complex business.
It requires a sophisticated understanding of the different elements of the country-specific
strategies that have to be put in place. In addition to political commitment, policymakers
need an understanding of their roles and those of other stakeholders in addressing the
multiple dimensions in a changing, highly dynamic context, such that different elements of
the strategy need to respond to those external and internal circumstances. The list presented
in Table 2.1 is based on Uma Lele’s experience of well over four decades, combined with the
analytical and operational work of the World Bank, including the World Development
Reports and the Agriculture and Rural Development Series, and FAO’s State of Food and
Agriculture (SOFAs) series and State of Food Insecurity series, and other specialized pub-
lications. All elements of the agricultural strategy listed in Table 2.1 cannot be realistically in
place at once, or indeed in many countries over time, and specific subsectors, such as
livestock, forestry, and fisheries, need their own strategies. The table does provide a useful
checklist that countries need to have in place over time. Rodrik (2006) argued, in the case of
the 10 original points of the Washington Consensus, that it is impossible to address all these
issues at once. He suggested picking the most important issue, addressing it, and then
continuing with the next one (either sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the issues
and resources). Table 2.1 contains a similar idea of addressing several of these elements of
agricultural policy either sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the country’s capac-
ity to put into place a policy framework. It will also help throw light on the country
performances that follow in the remainder of this chapter and the rest of the book.
Box 2.3 presents these and other multiple changes that are taking place globally with
which countries must cope.
The stages approach, proposed by de Janvry and Sadoulet (2018), suggests the need for a
regional, spatially oriented strategy, rather than focusing attention simply on urban metro-
poles. Several advocates, most notably Adrian Wood (Owens andWood 1997; Wood 2003),
Paul Collier and Stefan Dercon (2014), and Douglas Gollin (Dercon and Gollin 2014), have
suggested the need to go beyond the “agriculturally led” strategy narrative to search for the
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most appropriate strategies for lagging countries. They have argued for a more eclectic
approach, including, in particular, attention to value-added of the natural resource base of
primary commodity producers (Owens and Wood 1997). Like de Vries, Timmer, and de
Vries (2015), Owens and Wood (1997) noted poorer performance of SSA in resource-based
industry, relative to Latin America. Some also advocate or note the inevitability of a strong
role for large- and medium-sized farms (Muyanga et al. 2013; Collier and Dercon 2014;
Dercon and Gollin 2014; Headey and Jayne 2014; Jayne et al. 2014; Sitko and Jayne 2014).
Table 2.1 What transformation of agriculture needs and the frequent political economy
challenges
What transformation of agriculture needs Frequent political economy challenges
• Enabling public policies and institutions to
manage complex, diverse systems to foster
innovation, including a coherent science and
technology policy
• Bottom-up, disaggregated approaches that
foster community participation supported by
overarching macroeconomic and sectoral
policies
• Clarity and security of property rights and
transparent rules of governance toward:
∘ Tariff and nontariff barriers
∘ Pricing and subsidies
∘ Commodity markets and policies
∘ Financial markets and policies
∘ Acquisition of national assets, particularly
land
∘ Foodandother regulatoryandsafety standards
∘ Accountability mechanisms
• Investments in public goods:
∘ Rail, roads, power, transport, communications
∘ Information and knowledge
∘ Research
∘ Extension
• Effective management of common pool
resources
∘ Proactive management and conservation of
land, water, forests, and biodiversity
∘ Irrigation and drainage
∘ Technology—Access to biological, mechani-
cal, and information technologies (quality
seed, fertilizers, water)
∘ Education—Human and organizational
capacity education
∘ Markets—Existence of labor, financial, and
commodity markets
• An active role for the private sector
• An active role for civil society
• Farmers and community organizations
• An independent media
• An independent and fair legal system and
effective dispute settlement mechanisms
• Weak political support to agriculture
• Elite capture or civil society capture
• Resistance of landowning classes to tenure
reforms
• Lack of capacity to establish
• Harder to reform than investment in R&D
(World Bank 2007)
• Easy to legislate but difficult to enforce
• IT is not a silver bullet but is making an
increasing contribution (World Bank 2015).
• Content matters (for example, Digital Green
https://www.digitalgreen.org). See Chapter 9
on FAO.
• Informal and overlapping rights of poor and
marginal people to natural resources. One of
the hardest to manage. See Chapter 8 on
World Bank.
• Biodiversity loss faster than replaced, easier to
mitigate in protected areas but challenging
outside (GEF IEO 2016)
• Huge investment requirements, need land
access
• Increasingly resorting to social safety nets
∘ According to WDR 2008 (World Bank 2007)
easier than others, but, in reality, not so
• Needs an integrated package approach; donors
supplying them one by one
• Needs infrastructure, information; IT helpful
here
• Trade-offs between the short and the long run
• Subsidies reduce incentives to private sector
• Weak civil society in many countries
• Viable cooperative and farmers’ organizations
have proven difficult in practice
• Lacking in many countries
• Clogged system, does not work for the poor
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Urbanization provides additional strength to those in favor of large- and medium-scale
agriculture in Africa to meet the rapidly growing urban demand but raises a question: Who
is feeding the growing population? There is a huge opportunity for small farmers to meet
the growing market demand, particularly with respect to high-value crops, which typically
tend to be labor-intensive.
Structural Transformation: Data and Analysis
Our analysis of structural transformation has evolved from a two-sector to a three-sector
analysis providing new insights. It started with a transformation of the economies from
agriculture to the nonagriculture sector and formed an input into the World Bank’s study of
“Accelerating Agricultural Productivity Growth” in India (World Bank 2014). Our work
essentially followed Timmer’s approach to structural transformation, using more recent
data on 127 countries, covering a 34-year period (1980–2013) (Lele, Agarwal, and Goswami
2013, 2014, 2018). The data generated by FAO provided estimates of economically active
populations in the agricultural and nonagriculture sectors. The World Bank data were used
on per capita GDP and sectoral value-added, respectively. Timmer’s analysis (Timmer and
Akkus 2008; Timmer 2009) covered the period 1965–2000, for 86 countries. In extending
his analysis to 109 countries (88 developing + 21 developed), covering a 30-year period
(1980–2009), our purpose was to explore whether there were changes in results, using more
recent data, and how individual countries were progressing on structural transformation,
such as the progress of India relative to its Asian neighbors, particularly China and
Indonesia, and other large countries such as Brazil (Lele, Agarwal, and Goswami 2018).¹⁵
Box 2.3 Stages of Transformation Processes: The AB-GR-AT-RT-ST
Sequence
• Asset building (AB): Access to land and human capital for the landless and
subfamily farmers.
• Green Revolution (GR): Adoption/diffusion of high-yielding variety seeds and
fertilizers for staple crops.
• Agricultural transformation (AT):
∘ Access to water for irrigation
∘ Agricultural diversification toward high-value crops
∘ Development of value chains and contracting
• Rural transformation (RT):
∘ Mechanization and land concentration
∘ Development of land and labor markets
∘ Growth of a rural nonfarm economy
• Structural transformation (ST): Rural–urban migration
Source: de Janvry and Sadoulet (2018).
¹⁵ The data we used were the same FAO data that Timmer used in his analysis, and the estimates of TFP used
by Fuglie (2010). The Timmer analysis was for the period 1965–2000. FAO stopped publishing data before 1980,
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In 2013, we had performed a similar analysis on the countries of the East African Com-
munity, comparing them to other countries, including South Africa and Egypt (Lele,
Agarwal, and Goswami 2013). We then extended this analysis to 127 countries (96 devel-
oping + 31 developed), covering a 34-year period (1980–2013) (Lele, Agarwal, and
Goswami 2014).¹⁶ Some key findings of our analysis were as follows:
1. India had fallen behind in structural transformation relative to China and Indonesia,
by several different criteria—that is, decline in the share of population in agriculture at
the beginning and the end of the period, share of manufacturing sector in the
economy over time, and demographic transition—even though the three countries
started with similar initial conditions in the early 1960s of a small farm-dominated
agriculture. Indonesia had developed a thriving plantation sector, producing rubber,
palm oil, and other cash crops, albeit at the cost of rapid deforestation, typically not
measured either in the work on transformation, or on Fuglie’s TFP estimates. Labor
productivity, measured as value-added per worker, increased in all three countries in
both the agriculture and the nonagriculture sector, a unique achievement compared to
other developing regions.
2. Productivity in the nonagriculture sector grew faster than in agriculture in all three
countries, more so in China than in India. Indonesia’s growth stumbled during the
1997 financial crisis and resumed after a lag.
3. Internal terms of trade between agriculture and nonagriculture moved in favor of the
nonagriculture sector in all three countries: that is, relative prices moved against
agriculture.
In contrast, Brazil, with a more dualistic agriculture, achieved fast agricultural TFP growth,
while shedding labor in agriculture. Additionally, unlike in the three Asian countries
(China, India, Indonesia) which we studied in Lele, Agarwal, and Goswami (2018), Brazil’s
value-added per worker in the nonagriculture sector did not keep pace with productivity
growth in agriculture and declined relative to that in the agriculture sector. In Lele, Agarwal,
and Goswami (2013), we documented that South Africa’s bimodal pattern of development,
similar to Brazil’s, had behaved similarly. In South Africa, agricultural productivity growth
surpassed that of East African countries, but like Brazil, South Africa was shedding labor in
agriculture.
There has been a growing interest in the emergence of middle-sized farms. As we
discussed earlier, middle-sized farms in Brazil, as a group, are less productive than either
small or large farms. Rada and Fuglie (2019) have argued that small farmers show high
productivity, productivity declines as farm size increases, and then it rises again in the case
of large farmers: in short, there is a flattened U-shaped curve by farm size.
The next stage of our analysis (Lele, Goswami, and Nico 2017) used panel data on a
three-way sectoral breakdown of employment in agriculture, manufacturing, and service
sectors for 139 (104 developing + 35 developed) countries over the period 1991–2014, from
ILO–GET. ILO’s breakdown of employment in the agriculture, manufacturing, and service
when we started our analysis. Fuglie did backward estimation for his TFP calculation, using FAO’s methodology
to get values prior to 1980 (Keith Fuglie, personal communication, September 11, 2017).
¹⁶ FAO stopped publishing data in this form, as of 2014 (that is, economically active populations in agricul-
ture), and instead, publishes data on employment in agriculture, as part of the International Labour Organization
(ILO)–Global Employment Trend (ILO–GET) data, which contain data on three sectors—agriculture, service, and
manufacturing—based on surveys. Therefore, such analysis can only be conducted up to 2013.
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sectors is based on household labor force surveys and employment surveys, and therefore
likely measures labor input in sectors, including in agriculture, more accurately than FAO’s
earlier estimates of the economically active population in agriculture without the actual
input. It is an important breakthrough in understanding the process of structural transfor-
mation. Where does labor move when it leaves agriculture, to manufacturing or the service
sector, and what are the labor productivity differences in these sectors? A difference between
ILO and FAO data used earlier, apart from the intersectoral breakdown of employment, is
in the estimation of labor input.¹⁷ With a few notable exceptions, ILO estimates of labor in
agriculture, which measure labor input more directly than FAO, as the population depend-
ent on agriculture, are lower than FAO estimates of labor in agriculture: for example, in
Brazil. There are also some differences in trends in the labor inputs in agriculture between
the FAO and ILO data. This data set helped us to explore differences in employment
generated and changes in productivity of labor in the agriculture, industry, and service
sectors over time. The analysis covered the period of rapid economic growth in developing
countries—that is, from the 1990s—and the slowdown since the 2007–8 crisis. These
differences are outlined in Appendix A.
Differences in Behavior among Developed and Developing Regions
Using Data from the International Labour Organization
We examine and compare structural changes that occur within countries when per capita
income rises. Structural change is measured in terms of the behavior of the three sectors:
agriculture, industry, and services (see Appendix A on data and methodology). Structural
changes in developing countries are compared to developed countries, and then among the
different developing regions.
The agriculture sector share in developing countries is larger in both GDP and employ-
ment. The difference in shares between agricultural GDP and agricultural employment,
however, is much larger in developing countries: that is, a larger share of the population is
employed in agriculture than is agriculture’s share in GDP, and agricultural GDP share
decreases much faster as well. The behavior of the agriculture share of GDP is not
significantly different between developing countries and developed countries, but the
behavior of the employment share in agriculture is very different (Figures 2.8 and 2.9).
Employment share falls much more rapidly in developing countries than developed
countries.
As per capita income increases, the share of agricultural value-added in total GDP
decreases at an increasing rate (the coefficient of the quadratic term of per capita, as per
capita income increases, is positive) in both developing and developed regions, but after a
threshold, at the very advanced stage in which per capita GDP of $31,814 (in constant 2005
US dollars) is reached, the share of agricultural value-added starts to increase at a very slow
¹⁷ FAO’s data on economically active population refer to the number of all employed and unemployed persons,
including those seeking work for the first time. The data cover employers; self-employed workers; salaried
employees; wage earners; unpaid workers assisting in a family, farm, or business operation; members of producers’
cooperatives; and members of the armed forces. The economically active population is also called the labor force.
ILO’s data on employment refer to all persons above a specified age, who were, during a specified brief period—
either one week or one day—in the following categories: paid employment (whether at work or with a job but not
at work) and self-employment (whether at work or with an enterprise but not at work). For the purposes of the
aggregate sectors (agriculture, industry, and services), definitions of the International Standard Industrial Clas-
sification (ISIC) System are used.
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pace (Figure 2.8). The reason for this increase in agriculture’s share of GDP is not entirely
clear. It could be that there is more rapid diversification to higher value products in
developed countries. Changes in per capita income are associated with decreasing share
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VA in agriculture/GDP Fitted trend developed—agriculture Fitted trend developing—agriculture
Figure 2.8 Relation between share of value-added in the agriculture sector (in total GDP)
with respect to per capita income in 139 countries by developed (38 countries) and developing
(101 countries) regions, 1991–2014
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Emp in agriculture/total emp Fitted trend developed—agriculture
Fitted trend developing—agriculture
Figure 2.9 Relation between share of employment in the agriculture sector (in total
employment) with respect to per capita income in 139 countries by developed (38 countries)
and developing (101 countries) regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
(ILO)–Global Employment Trend (ILO–GET) data.
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Per worker productivity (value-added per worker) in agriculture is lower in developing
countries than developed countries. Initially, productivity per worker rises faster in devel-
oping countries as income grows, but then this growth in productivity tapers off, whereas in
developed countries agricultural worker productivity growth accelerates (Figure 2.10). This
is, perhaps, because FAO data on the Agriculture Orientation Index of government
expenditures, which measure the central government contribution to the agriculture sector
compared to the sector’s contribution to GDP, continue to increase in industrial countries—
that is, the governments continue to invest in agriculture—whereas developing countries,
other than China, have failed to do so. (See Chapter 7 on agricultural financing for further
discussion.) Figure 2.10 shows agricultural value-added per worker with respect to per
capita GDP in 101 developing and 38 developed countries. In developed countries, agri-
cultural value-added per worker increases at an increasing rate, unlike in developing
countries, perhaps because of continued higher investment in agriculture.
Difference in the shares in GDP and employment is at the heart of structural transfor-
mation, and the difference is much larger in developing countries at early stages of
development, reflecting the large backlog of labor in the traditional sector. This difference
narrows (approaches to near zero) rapidly, as per capita income increases and labor moves
out of agriculture into other sectors. In developed countries the shares of value-added and
employment are very close and reach near zero as income increases (Figure 2.11).
The share of value-added in the industry sector in total GDP increases with the increase
in per capita income, first in both developing and developed countries, but then the share of
value-added in the industry sector starts to decline, exhibiting the phenomenon of prema-
ture deindustrialization (Rodrik 2016). Further premature deindustrialization occurs at
earlier income levels in developing countries: that is, after GDP per capita of about US
$4,192, compared to US$8,099 for developed countries, is reached (in constant 2005 US
dollars). The inverted U-shaped curve trend in the share of industrial value-added with
changes in per capita income means that as countries mature in their economic growth
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Agriculture VA per worker (Ln) Fitted trend developed—agriculture
Fitted trend developing—agriculture
Figure 2.10 Relation between value-added per worker in the agriculture sector with respect
to per capita income in 139 countries by developed (38 countries) and developing
(101 countries) regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
(ILO)–Global Employment Trend (ILO–GET) data.
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Where Does Labor Move When Its Share in Agriculture Declines?
Labor moves mostly to the service sector. The share of employment in the industry sector in
developing countries increases (at a decreasing rate) (Figure 2.13), but in developed coun-
tries, changes in per capita GDP tend to be associated with an increase in the share of
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VA share minus Emp share in agriculture Fitted trend developed—agriculture
Fitted trend developing—agriculture
Figure 2.11 Relation between value-added share minus employment share in the agriculture
sector with respect to per capita income in 139 countries by developed (38 countries) and
developing (101 countries) regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
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VA in industry/GDP Fitted trend developed—industry Fitted trend developing—industry
Figure 2.12 Relation between share of value-added in the industry sector (in total GDP) with
respect to per capita income in 139 countries by developed (38 countries) and developing
(101 countries) regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
(ILO)–Global Employment Trend (ILO–GET) data.
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employment share in the industry sector in developed countries also peaks at a per capita
GDP of $15,582 (in constant 2005 US dollars), reflecting the deindustrialization process
thereafter. The regression results show the gap between the service and industry sectors.
Employment share increases as the development process advances and the change in
employment share in the service sector is 1.2 times higher than the change in employment
share in the industry sector in the developing countries.
Value-added per worker in industry rises faster in developed countries than developing
countries. Initially, the gap in productivity is higher in developing countries. Developing
countries are able to close this gap, as per capita income rises. Then, the speed at which the
gap is growing tapers off. This tendency is the mirror image and a contrast to the faster
growth in the service sector GDP share (Figure 2.14).
Finally, the service sector has a larger share in GDP, but a lower share in employment in
developing countries than in developed countries. The greater share is proportionate, so
that the value-added per worker and the difference between the value-added and employ-
ment shares are very similar in the two sets of countries. Regarding the variation with
respect to per capita income, the share of services in GDP initially rises faster in developed
countries than in developing countries, but then slows down so that they are increasing at
the same rate (Figure 2.15).
The share in developed countries is higher in employment, but the share rises faster in
developed countries, and the rate is constant in developing countries, whereas the rate of
increase begins to accelerate in the developed countries (Figure 2.16).
Also, value-added per worker increases at the same rate in the two groups of countries as
per capita income grows (Figure 2.17). The changes in the share in GDP and in employment
as income rises, which reflect shifting relative productivities, show that the gap first
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Emp in industry/total emp Fitted trend developed—industry
Fitted trend developing—industry
Figure 2.13 Relation between share of employment in the industry sector (in total
employment) with respect to per capita income in 139 countries by developed (38 countries)
and developing (101 countries) regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
(ILO)–Global Employment Trend (ILO–GET) data.
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The gap between the value-added in agriculture and the share of employment in
agriculture reflects the differences between per worker productivity in the agriculture and
nonagriculture (industry and service) sectors and is important for the process of conver-
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Industry VA per worker (Ln) Fitted trend developed—industry Fitted trend developing—industry
Figure 2.14 Relation between value-added per worker in the industry sector with respect to
per capita income in income in 139 countries by developed (38 countries) and developing
(101 countries) regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
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VA in service/GDP Fitted trend developed—service Fitted trend developing—service
Figure 2.15 Relation between share of value-added in the service sector (in total GDP) with
respect to per capita income in 139 countries by developed (38 countries) and developing
(101 countries) regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank.
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productivities in the two sectors begin to converge. For this to occur, agricultural produc-
tivity needs to increase rapidly. At very low levels of per capita income, labor productivity in
agriculture starts at levels far below levels for the nonagriculture (industry and service)
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Emp in service/total emp Fitted trend developed—service Fitted trend developing—service
Figure 2.16 Relation between share of employment in the service sector (in total employment)
with respect to per capita income in 139 countries by developed (38 countries) and developing
(101 countries) regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
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Figure 2.17 Relation between value-added per worker in the service sector with respect to per
capita income in 139 countries by developed (38 countries) and developing (101 countries)
regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank.
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parallel to the labor productivity in the industry sector. Labor productivity in the industry
sector also increases with a decreasing rate as per capita income increases, but the labor
productivity in agriculture increases almost 1.6 times as fast as the labor productivity in the
industry sector, although the gap in productivity between those two sectors still remains
substantial. Labor productivity in the service sector starts more or less at the same level, with
the industry sector labor productivity at very low levels of per capita income. Up to about a
per capita GDP level of US$1,201 (in constant 2005 US dollars), the labor productivity gap
between those two sectors increases, but then the gap starts to narrow between the devel-
oping region and advanced economies, until at about a per capita GDP level of US$66,117
(in constant 2005 US dollars), labor productivity in the service sector crosses labor produc-
tivity in the industry sector.
The results for all 139 countries suggest that the elasticity of labor productivity, with
respect to changes in per capita income, is highest in agriculture, followed by the industry
and service sectors in developing economies. In developed economies, however, the elas-
ticity of labor productivity is highest in industry, followed by the service and agriculture
sectors. This outcome in the developing economies could be a result of increased investment
in agriculture, but it could also be explained by the rapid movement of labor from
agriculture into the industrial or service sector. Indeed, both phenomena are necessary for
transformation to occur. In developing economies, the elasticity of the agriculture sector is
1.5, whereas in the industry and service sectors the elasticities are lower, 0.91 and –0.12,
respectively, and the elasticity in the service sector is not statistically significant.
In short, the above described scenario reflects the stylized facts behind the process of
development of the world economy (that is, 139 [38 developed and 101 developing]
countries).
Differences in Behavior among the Developing Regions
We first examine the differences in the behavior of the three sectors among developing
countries of different regions. We compare their performance with that of countries in
EAP. The pattern of change in the countries of LAC is very similar to those of EAP. There is
no significant difference in the behavior of shares in GDP or in employment as per capita
GDP varies. The only difference is that value-added per worker is lower in both agriculture
and services. It tends to rise faster in LAC than in EAP countries, as GDP per capita
increases. Comparing SA with EAP, there is no significant difference in the share of
agriculture in GDP (Figure 2.18). EAP and LAC seem to be approaching a constant level.
EAP started with a much higher share of agriculture in GDP but reduced it much faster than
any other developing regions. Share of agriculture in GDP in SA, SSA, andMENA is falling at
constant rates, whereas in EAP and LAC, the declining rate becomes slower as per capita GDP
increases (Figure 2.18). In the developing region in Europe (Armenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and
Turkey), the agriculture value-added share starts to increase at higher per capita GDP, as in
the developed region. In post-Soviet states, it decreases with decreasing rate.
The share of GDP is less in services (but more in industry) in SA than EAP (Figures 2.19
and 2.20). The actual shares are much lower in SA, but their incomes are also much lower,
and so, for low-income countries, the share of industry is more. However, reflecting the
slower rate of structural transformation in SA, the share of industry grows at a slower rate
than in EAP, and the share of services grows faster.
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Figure 2.18 Relation between share of value-added in the agriculture sector (in total GDP) with
respect to per capita income in 101 developing countries by developing regions, 1991–2014




















Figure 2.19 Relation between share of value-added in the industry sector (in total GDP) with
respect to per capita income in 101 developing countries by developing regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank.
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In our regression analysis of 101 developing countries, we found that EAP, LAC, MENA,
and the developing region in Europe are experiencing premature deindustrialization, as
seen in an inverted U-shaped trend for the value-added share in the industry sector.
The share of value-added in the industry sector in total GDP increases with the increase
in per capita income first in those four regions, but after GDP per capita of about US$3,568
(for EAP), US$1,630 (for LAC), US$2,376 (for MENA), and US$4,043 (for the developing
region in Europe) is reached (in constant 2005 US dollars), the share of value-added in the
industry sector starts to decline. This explains the inverted U-curve trend in the share of
industrial value-added with changes in per capita income (Figure 2.19).
SA, SSA, and post-Soviet states show increasing trends. There are significant differences
between SSA countries, which we discuss below in our regression analysis only for the SSA
region, classifying the countries based on their export orientation.
SA deviates the most from patterns shown by other regions. Bhutan and Sri Lanka are
responsible for this anomalous behavior. Bhutan’s industry share in GDP increases at a
much faster rate and is much higher than other SA countries, so SA’s trend (Figure 2.19) is
upward sloping, and the service sector share is declining and much lower than other SA
countries. Thus, SA (Figure 2.20) shows an inverted U-shaped trend. Significantly, Sri
Lanka’s agriculture share in GDP shows an upward trend, as per capita income increases,




















Figure 2.20 Relation between share of value-added in the service sector (in total GDP) with
respect to per capita income in 101 developing countries by developing regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank.
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employment share. Service sector employment share in Sri Lanka shows a declining trend,
whereas all the other countries in the SA region show an opposite trend. In contrast, the
value-added share of the industry sector in Sri Lanka shows a declining trend.
MENA deviates the most in the relationship of per capita income in the service sector
with respect to change in per capita income, as shown in Figure 2.20.
As far as employment shares are concerned, in SA, the employment share in
agriculture is more than that in EAP (Figure 2.21). There is no significant difference
between EAP and SA in the employment share of industry (Figure 2.22) and in services
are less (Figure 2.23).
Employment share in the agriculture sector is falling in all developing regions except
SA and the developing region in Europe. At higher per capita GDP, the trend is upward
sloping in those two regions. Sri Lanka is responsible for this anomalous behavior in SA
(explained above). EAP, SSA, and MENA are shedding labor in agriculture faster than
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Figure 2.21 Relation between share of employment in the agriculture sector (in total
employment) with respect to per capita income in 101 developing countries by developing
regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
(ILO)–Global Employment Trend (ILO–GET) data.
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In Latin America, the share of employment in the industry sector has been flat. In all
developing regions, the share of employment in industry is growing, except in MENA and
the developing region in Europe, where it shows an inverted U-shaped arc (Figure 2.22).
Employment share in the service sector is increasing in all developing regions, as per
capita GDP grows, except in SA, which is showing an inverted U-shaped arc. Again, Sri
Lanka is responsible for this anomalous behavior, as explained previously. Service sector
employment share is rising fastest in SSA (Figure 2.23).
Valued added per worker is lower in SA than in EAP in all three sectors (Figures 2.24,
2.25, and 2.26); while there is a tendency for value-added per worker to catch up in
agriculture (Figure 2.24) and services (Figure 2.26), this is not the case in industry
(Figure 2.25). The share of employment in services is commensurate with the share in
GDP. In agriculture, however, it is lower, showing that productivity in agriculture is less
than in services.
Valued-added per worker in agriculture is increasing in all developing regions, except
SA. Again, Bhutan and Sri Lanka are responsible for this anomalous behavior. In EAP,
value-added per worker in agriculture is accelerating, and SSA, LAC, MENA, and the post-
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Figure 2.22 Relation between share of employment in the industry sector (in total
employment) with respect to per capita income in 101 developing countries by developing
regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
(ILO)–Global Employment Trend (ILO–GET) data.
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Figure 2.23 Relation between share of employment in the service sector (in total employment)
with respect to per capita income in 101 developing countries by developing regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
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Figure 2.24 Relation between value-added per worker in the agriculture sector with respect to
per capita income in 101 developing countries by developing regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
(ILO)–Global Employment Trend (ILO–GET) data.
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Value-added per worker in the industry sector shows an increasing trend with per capita
GDP in all developing regions, except in MENA. In MENA, value-added per worker starts
to decline at a higher per capita GDP level (Figure 2.25).
Value-added per worker in the service sector shows a very similar pattern among the
developing regions, increasing in all regions and rising fastest in LAC. In EAP and post-
Soviet states, valued added per worker in the service sector is accelerating, and in SSA, it is
decelerating, as per capita GDP increases (Figure 2.26).
Comparing SSA with EAP, SSA has a lower share of agriculture in GDP (Figure 2.18),
but a larger share of industry (Figure 2.19), and a similar share of services (Figure 2.20).
The value-added share in agriculture declines faster as income rises (Figure 2.18), while
that in industry rises slower, bringing about convergence (Figure 2.19). The employment
share is less in agriculture in SSA (Figure 2.21) and more in services (Figure 2.23), but it is
similar in industry (Figure 2.22) to EAP. The employment share is rising faster in
agriculture (Figure 2.21) and slower in services (Figure 2.23), so again, there is a tendency
toward convergence toward levels in EAP. Though the employment share in SSA is lower
in agriculture, the share in GDP is lower still, so that value-added per worker in the
agriculture sector is lower than in EAP (Figure 2.24). Value-added per worker in the











4 5 6 7 8 9 10








Figure 2.25 Relation between value-added per worker in the industry sector with respect to per
capita income in 101 developing countries by developing regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank and International Labour Organization
(ILO)–Global Employment Trend (ILO–GET) data.
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(Figure 2.26). There is no significant difference in value-added per worker in industry, or
in the way it changes as income rises (Figure 2.25). There is no significant difference
between the share in GDP and in employment between the two regions. However, the
share in GDP is larger in employment than in the industry sector but lower in the service
sector in SSA.
The gap share (value-added share minus employment share) in the agriculture sector
approaches zero as per capita GDP increases in all developing regions, except SA and the
post-Soviet states (Figure 2.27). Again, Sri Lanka is responsible for this anomalous behavior
in the SA region. The gap narrows fastest in EAP, and SSA is faster than LAC, as per capita
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Figure 2.26 Relation between value-added per worker in the service sector with respect to per
capita income in 101 developing countries by developing regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
(ILO)–Global Employment Trend (ILO–GET) data.
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The gap share in the industry sector is almost flat in LAC, falling rapidly in EAP and
MENA, as per capita income increases (Figure 2.28). In SSA, it increases with a decreasing
rate, and it increases with an increasing rate (Figure 2.28). Bhutan is again responsible for
this anomalous behavior in the SA region.
The gap share in the service sector is decreasing in all developing regions, except in LAC
(where it has not changed), as per capita GDP increases. In SSA, the gap share has become
negative with increasingly higher levels of per capita GDP (Figure 2.29).
















Figure 2.27 Relation between value-added share minus employment share in the agriculture
sector with respect to per capita income in 101 developing countries by developing regions,
1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
(ILO)–Global Employment Trend (ILO–GET) data.
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Figure 2.28 Relation between value-added share minus employment share in the industry sector
with respect to per capita income in 101 developing countries by developing regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
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Figure 2.29 Relation between value-added share minus employment share in the service sector
with respect to per capita income in 101 developing countries by developing regions, 1991–2014
Source: Author’s construction based on data from WDI, World Bank, and International Labour Organization
(ILO)–Global Employment Trend (ILO–GET) data.
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Differences in Behavior among Sub-Saharan
African Countries
In the preceding section, we have shown the structural transformation of the SSA region as a
whole, compared to other regions, with changes in per capita GDP. There is considerable
heterogeneity, however, among African countries. To examine the differences in structural
transformation among SSA countries, we classified them into five subgroups (see Table 2.2),
based on their export orientation: exporters of food (19 countries), exporters of fuels
(6 countries), exporters of manufactures (8 countries), exporters of ores and metals
(4 countries), and exporters of agricultural raw materials (4 countries), to compare perfor-
mances of the other subgroups with the food-exporting countries.
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Notes: Classification based on the countries’ export percentage as a share in total merchandise exports.
a Food comprises the commodities in Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) sections 0 (food and live
animals), 1 (beverages and tobacco), 4 (animal and vegetable oils and fats), and SITC division 22 (oil seeds, oil
nuts, and oil kernels).
b Manufactures comprise commodities in SITC sections 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic manufactures), 7 (machinery and
transport equipment), and 8 (miscellaneous manufactured goods), excluding division 68 (non-ferrous metals).
c Fuels comprise the commodities in SITC section 3 (mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials).
d Ores and metals comprise the commodities in SITC sections 27 (crude fertilizers, minerals), 28 (metalliferous
ores, scrap), and 68 (non-ferrous metals).
e Agricultural raw materials comprise SITC section 2 (crude materials except fuels), excluding divisions 22, 27
(crude fertilizers and minerals, excluding coal, petroleum, and precious stones), and 28 (metalliferous ores and
scrap).
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the WDI, World Bank data.
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Transformation literature suggests that, as per capita income increases, the difference
between the share of value-added in agriculture and the share of employment in agriculture
approaches zero (as labor moves out of agriculture), as poverty in agriculture declines and
productivity differences between agriculture and nonagriculture close. Countries exporting
food, agricultural raw material, and manufacturing show these tendencies, but the rest of
the African subgroups do not.
To summarize, the share of value-added in the agriculture sector declines as per capita
income increases, but in countries exporting agricultural raw materials and in countries
exporting manufactures, that decline bottoms out at a threshold of US$373 (in constant
2005 US dollars) and US$2,246 (in constant 2005 US dollars), respectively, with the share
taking an upward turn. Value-added in the service sector increases with an increase in GDP
per capita, with the exception of these same two sets of countries. All countries, except food-
exporting countries, show signs of premature deindustrialization, as identified by Rodrik
(2016), at different per capita GDP thresholds (manufactures-exporting countries at US
$1,161; fuels-exporting countries at US$6,064; countries exporting ores and metals at
US$426; and countries exporting agricultural raw materials at US$515 (all in constant
2005 US dollars).
Appendix A: Data and Methodology
Data Source
This analysis is based on the sectoral (agriculture, industry, and service) breakdown of employment
data for 139 (101 developing + 38 developed) countries over the period 1991–2014, from the ILO–
GET. The value-added data by sector have been sourced from the World Bank’s WDI. The same
applies to per capita GDP and total population data. The remaining dependent variables (that is, the
share of value-added in total GDP by sector, the share of employment in total employment by sector,
value-added per worker by sector, and the difference between the share of value-added and employ-
ment by sector) and terms of trade have been constructed from the aforementioned variables.
Methodology
The baseline regression equation of our structural transformation analysis has been formulated as
follows:
Yi;t ¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t þ β4logðPopÞ2i;t
þβ5ðTOT1Þi;t þ β6ðTOT2Þi;t þ μ1ðDummy 1999Þt þ μ2ðDummy food crisisÞt þ εi;t ; ð1Þ
where index i denotes countries, and index t denotes time; GDPpc is per capita GDP. Pop is the
population in the i th country during the t  th year. The inclusion of squared terms for both per
capita GDP and total population in Equation (1) allows for a nonlinear functional form of the
equation. Such nonlinear functional form also allows for the estimation of the point at which Yi;t
starts to decrease or increase, depending on the sign of the estimated coefficients. Both terms have
been log-transformed. TOT is terms of trade, the ratio between the deflator of value-added of two
sectors. We used A def S (the ratio between the deflator of value-added in agriculture and the
deflator of value-added in services) as TOT1 and A def I (the ratio between the deflator of value-
added in agriculture and the deflator of value-added in industry) as TOT2, when we looked at the
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agriculture sector (our dependent variables are on agriculture). We used S def I (the ratio between
the deflator of value-added in services and the deflator of value-added in industry) as TOT1 and
S def A (the ratio between the deflator of value-added in services and the deflator of value-added in
agriculture), when we looked at the service sector (our dependent variables are on services); and
I def S (the ratio between the deflator of value-added in industry and the deflator of value-added in
services) as TOT1 and I def A (the ratio between the deflator of value-added in services and the
deflator of value-added in agriculture), when we looked at the industry sector (our dependent
variables are on industry).
Dummy 1999 is a dummy variable, taking on value 1 in the period from 1999 to 2006 and 0 in the
period before 1999 and after 2006. Dummy food crisis is a dummy variable equal to 1 after the 2007
food crisis and 0 from 1991 to 2007. Coefficient α captures the intercept in the model, whereas β1:::β6 are
the coefficients associated with the six independent variables. The coefficients μ1 and μ2 measure the
average difference in the dependent variables, with respect to the period, excluding the period 1999–2006
and the period preceding the 2007 food crisis. Finally, εi;t is a noise term. Five dependent variables ðYi;tÞ
are taken into account for each sector; for the agriculture sector, theymeasure (1) the share of agriculture
value-added in total GDP; (2) the share of employment in agriculture in total employment; (3) the log-
transformed agriculture value-added, expressed in constant 2005 US dollars; (4) the log-transformed
agriculture value-added perworker, expressed in constant 2005USdollars; and (5) the difference between
the share of agriculture value-added in total GDP and the share of employment in agriculture in total
employment. For the service sector, the dependent variablesmeasure: (1) the share of services value-added
in total GDP; (2) the share of employment in services in total employment; (3) the log-transformed
services value-added, expressed in constant 2005US dollars; (4) the log-transformed services value-added
per worker, expressed in constant 2005 US dollars; and (5) the difference between the share of services
value-added in total GDP and the share of employment in services in total employment. For the industry
sector, the dependent variables measure: (1) the share of industry value-added in total GDP; (2) the share
of employment in industry in total employment; (3) the log-transformed industry value-added, expressed
in constant 2005 US dollars; (4) the log-transformed industry value-added per worker, expressed in
constant 2005 US dollars; and (5) the difference between the share of industry value-added in total GDP
and the share of employment in industry in total employment.
The set of estimated equations is as follows:
i) As Applied to the Agriculture Sector
VAagri;t
GDPi;t
¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t þ β4logðPopÞ2i;t




¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t þ β4logðPopÞ2i;t
þβ5ðA def IÞi;t þ β6ðA def SÞi;t þ μ1ðDummy 1999Þt þ μ2ðDummy food crisisÞt þ εi;t ð1:2Þ
LogðVA agr US$Þ ¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t þ β4logðPopÞ2i;t
þβ5ðA def IÞi;t þ β6ðA def SÞi;t þ μ1ðDummy 1999Þt þ μ2ðDummy food crisisÞt þ εi;t ð1:3Þ
LogðVA agr per worker US$Þ ¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t
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þβ4logðPopÞ2i;t þ β6ðA def IÞi;t þ β5ðA def SÞi;t þ μ1ðDummy 1999Þt





¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t
þβ4logðPopÞ2i;t þ β5ðA def IÞi;t þ β6ðA def SÞi;t þ μ1ðDummy 1999Þt
þμ2ðDummy food crisisÞt þ εi;t ð1:5Þ
ii) As Applied to the Service Sector
VAseri;t
GDPi;t
¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t þ β4logðPopÞ2i;t
þβ5ðS def IÞi;t þ β6ðS def AÞi;t þ μ1ðDummy 1999Þt þ μ2ðDummy food crisisÞt þ εi;t ð2:1Þ
EMPseri;t
totEMPi;t
¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t þ β4logðPopÞ2i;t
þβ5ðS def IÞi;t þ β6ðS def AÞi;t þ μ1ðDummy 1999Þt þ μ2ðDummy food crisisÞt þ εi;t ð2:2Þ
LogðVA ser US$Þ ¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t þ β4logðPopÞ2i;t
þβ5ðS def IÞi;t þ β6ðS def AÞi;t þ μ1ðDummy 1999Þt þ μ2ðDummy food crisisÞt þ εi;t ð2:3Þ
LogðVA ser per worker US$Þ ¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t
þβ4logðPopÞ2i;t þ β5ðS def IÞi;t þ β6ðS def AÞi;t þ μ1ðDummy 1999Þt





¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t þ β4logðPopÞ2i;t
þβ5ðS def IÞi;t þ β6ðS def AÞi;t þ μ1ðDummy 1999Þt þ μ2ðDummy food crisisÞt þ εi;t ð2:5Þ
iii) As Applied to the Industry Sector
VAindi;t
GDPi;t
¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t þ β4logðPopÞ2i;t
þβ5ðI def SÞi;t þ β6ðI def AÞi;t þ μ1ðDummy 1999Þt þ μ2ðDummy food crisisÞt þ εi;t ð3:1Þ
EMPindi;t
totEMPi;t
¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t þ β4logðPopÞ2i;t
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þβ5ðI def SÞi;t þ β6ðI def AÞi;t þ μ1ðDummy 1999Þt þ μ2ðDummy food crisisÞt þ εi;t ð3:2Þ
LogðVA ind US$Þ¼ αþβ1logðGDPpcÞi;tþβ2logðGDPpcÞ2i;tþβ3logðPopÞi;tþβ4logðPopÞ2i;t
þβ5ðI def SÞi;tþβ6ðI def AÞi;tþμ1ðDummy 1999Þtþμ2ðDummy food crisisÞtþ εi;t ð3:3Þ
LogðVA ind per worker US$Þ ¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t
þβ4logðPopÞ2i;t þ β5ðI def SÞi;t þ β6ðI def AÞi;t þ μ1ðDummy 1999Þt





¼ αþ β1logðGDPpcÞi;t þ β2logðGDPpcÞ2i;t þ β3logðPopÞi;t
þβ4logðPopÞ2i;t þ β5ðI def SÞi;t þ β6ðI def AÞi;t þ μ1ðDummy 1999Þt
þμ2ðDummy food crisisÞt þ εi;t ð3:5Þ
The log-transformation approach for variables, capturing the sectoral value-added and value-added
per worker in Equations (1.3, 2.3, and 3.3) and (1.4, 2.4, 3.4), allows for interpreting the estimated
coefficients as elasticity.
Estimates of equations are based on the following approach:
1. Equation (1) is first estimated for all 139 (101 developing and 38 developed) countries. In this
specification, we introduced developed country dummy variables (both additive and multipli-
cative dummies), taking on value 1, to examine the differences in the behavior of the dependent
variables in our model among two subgroups (developed and developing regions) of the
sample in our study.
2. Second, Equation (1) is estimated only for all 101 developing countries. In this specification, we
introduced regional dummies (both additive and multiplicative dummies) in order to capture
the differences in the behavior of the dependent variables in our model among the developing
regions of the sample in our study. These developing regions are: EAP, 12 developing
countries; Europe, 4 developing countries; LAC, 19 developing countries; MENA, 7 developing
countries; post-Soviet countries, 10 developing countries; SA, 6 developing countries; and SSA,
43 developing countries. We used the EAP region as a base and 6 dummy variables (both
additive and multiplicative) for each region (Europe, LAC, MENA, post-Soviet countries, SA,
and SSA) taking the value of 1.
3. Next, to examine the differences in the behavior of the dependent variables in our model among
the SSA group of countries. we classified them into five subgroups based on their export
orientation: food-exporting countries (19 countries); fuels-exporting countries (6 countries);
manufactures-exporting countries (8 countries); ores and metals-exporting countries (4 coun-
tries); and raw agricultural materials-exporting countries (4 countries). In this specification,
Equation (1) is estimated only for the 41 SSA developing countries, introducing both additive
and multiplicative dummies for the aforementioned subgroups by taking food-exporting coun-
tries as the base.
4. Equation (1) is then estimated only for the 6 South Asian countries. In this specification, we
introduced both additive and multiplicative dummies for Bhutan and Sri Lanka, to capture the
differences in the behavior of the dependent variables in our model between those two
countries and with the other four South Asian countries (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and
Nepal).
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5. Equation (1) is finally estimated for all 139 countries. In this specification, we introduced both
additive andmultiplicative dummy variables (taking the value of 1) for the 20 largest IBRD+ IDA
borrowers¹⁸ to the Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) sector in order to capture the
differences in the behavior of the dependent variables in our model of the 20 largest borrowers,
with respect to the rest of the world (that is, the remaining 119 countries in our sample).
Data Description
On average, for all 139 countries, the service sector enjoys the largest share of employment (47
percent), larger than agriculture’s average 35 percent share of the total employed population. The
greatest variation tends to be in the shares of agriculture across countries, rather than in other sectors,
ranging from 0.2 percent in Singapore to 92 percent in Burundi (Table A.2.1). On average, the share
Table A.2.1 Key characteristics of 139 countries
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
VAagri;t
GDPi;t
3,336 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.94
VAseri;t
GDPi;t
3,336 0.53 0.14 0.02 0.87
VAindi;t
GDPi;t
3,336 0.30 0.13 0.01 0.97
EMPagri;t
totEMPi;t
3,336 0.35 0.26 0.002 0.92
EMPseri;t
totEMPi;t
3,336 0.47 0.20 0.06 0.85
EMPindi;t
totEMPi;t
3,336 0.18 0.09 0.02 0.43
VA agr US$ constant2005 million 3,336 9,929 28,616 31 386,794
VA ser US$ constant2005 million 3,336 190,613 805,411 5 10,600,000
VA ind US$ constant2005 million 3,336 80,975 270,734 2 2,826,341
VA agr per worker US$ constant2005 3,336 9,493 18,598 37 276,990
VA ser per worker US$ constant2005 3,336 17,594 24,407 28 101,377















3,336 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.83
GDPpc US$ constant2005 3,336 8,632.09 13,431.94 69.58 69,094.74
Pop million 3,336 43.03 145.65 0.19 1,364.27
A def S 3,336 1.15 0.42 0.22 5.53
A def I 3,336 1.15 0.47 0.19 6.39
S def I 3,336 1.03 0.35 0.16 5.50
S def A 3,336 0.95 0.29 0.18 4.46
I def S 3,336 1.07 0.39 0.18 6.33
I def A 3,336 0.97 0.36 0.16 5.31
¹⁸ India, China, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Vietnam, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Morocco, Turkey,
Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Argentina, Egypt, Tanzania, Colombia, and Ghana.
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of value-added is the lowest in agriculture at only 17 percent of total GDP, followed by industry (30
percent), and the service sector (53 percent) with the highest share. Again, on average for 139
countries, labor productivity, defined as value-added per worker employed, tends to be higher in
industry and services than in agriculture (Table A.2.1). On average, workers in the industry sector
tend to produce three times more value, and those in the service sector, twice the value produced by
workers in the agriculture sector. Large variation is noticeable in labor productivity across countries.
Industry has the highest standard deviation, followed by the service and agriculture sectors.
Table A.2.1 provides the descriptive statistics of each variable.
Appendix B: Differences between Our Two Studies
ILO uses data from both household labor force surveys and employment surveys, providing a
breakdown of employment in the agriculture, manufacturing, and service sectors. A difference in
the ILO and FAO data, apart from the intersectoral breakdown of employment, is in the estimation of
labor input (see Table B.2.1).¹⁹ In most cases, ILO estimates of labor in agriculture, with a few notable
exceptions, such as Brazil, are lower than FAO estimates. There are also some differences in trends in
the labor inputs in agriculture between the FAO and ILO data. This new data set helped us to explore
differences in employment generated and productivity of labor in the agriculture, industry, and
service sectors in the period of rapid growth in developing countries from the 1990s and during the
slowdown, since the 2007–8 crisis.
Table B.2.1 Differences in two analyses
Difference Structural transformation analysis
based on FAO Economically Active
Population data
Structural transformation analysis
based on ILO Global Employment
Trend data
Data and variable Used FAOSTAT data “Economically
Active Population in Agriculture,”
defined as “part of the economically active
population engaged in or seeking work in
agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry”
and “Total Economically Active
Population,” defined as “the number of
all employed and unemployed persons
(including those seeking work for the first
time). It covers employers; self-employed
workers; salaried employees; wage
earners; unpaid workers assisting in a
family, farm, or business operation;
members of producers’ cooperatives; and
members of the armed forces.”a To get
Used “ILO-Global Employment trend
(ILO-GET)”b data by sector
(agriculture, industry, and service), as
defined by the International Standard
Industrial Classification of all Economic
Activities (ISIC), where “the ‘employed’
comprise all persons of working age who
during a specified brief period, such as
one week or one day, were in the
following categories: a) paid employment
(whether at work or with a job but not at
work); or b) self-employment (whether
at work or with an enterprise but not at
work)”c
Continued
¹⁹ FAO’s data on “Economically Active Population” refer to the number of all employed and unemployed
persons (including those seeking work for the first time). It covers employers; self-employed workers; salaried
employees; wage earners; unpaid workers assisting in a family, farm, or business operation; members of producers’
cooperatives; and members of the armed forces. The economically active population is also called the labor force.
ILO’s data on “Employment” refer to all persons above a specified age, who during a specified brief period, either
one week or one day, were in the following categories: paid employment (whether at work or with a job, but not at
work) and self-employment (whether at work or with an enterprise, but not at work). For the purposes of the
aggregate, sectors (agriculture, industry, and services) are defined by the International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC) System.
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3
2007–2012 Food Price Spikes and Crisis—
A Decade and a Half Later
Uma Lele, Manmohan Agarwal, and Sambuddha Goswami
Introduction
Nearly a decade and a half after the food crisis of 2007–8, this is an opportune time to look
back at its causes and consequences and to ask:
1. What was the genesis of the food crisis, and the price rise and volatility that ensued for
several years following the crisis?
2. What were the responses of international organizations and developed and develop-
ing countries to the crisis?
3. What lessons and implications were drawn for action, which are relevant for Sustain-
able Development Goal 2 (SDG2) going forward?
4. Have the responses of developed and developing countries and the donor community
been commensurate with the challenges?
These questions need responses. What if similar conditions of successive droughts in major
exporting countries, combined with national policies such as support for biofuels, are
repeated in the future? And what are the lessons of the current COVID-19 crisis? The
first two questions are addressed in this chapter. Lessons for SDG2 are explored in
Chapter 4, and financing responses of developing and developed countries are considered
in Chapter 7, as well as in Chapters 8 through 12 on the international organizations. Lessons
of COVID-19, which were still unfolding as this book was being finalized, are discussed in
Chapter 13.
Australia experienced drought conditions throughout the first decade of the new millen-
nium, and as recently as the 2019–20 Australian bushfire season, starting with several
serious uncontrolled fires in January 2019, an estimated 18.6 million hectares (46 million
acres) had burned as of February 2020, with the largest loss of wildlife known to humankind
in modern history, an estimated 1 billion Australian animals (Give2Asia 2020). Strong
drought conditions during 2001–5 were due to El Niño, with extreme droughts in 2006 and
2007. Regional droughts and heat waves in the Ukraine and Russia occurred in 2007, then
again in 2009, damaging wheat crops and causing global wheat price spikes (Janetos 2017).
The record-setting drought in 2011–12 was the worst in the central regions of the United
States since the 1930s, and California has had an extraordinary and ongoing drought during
2012–15 (Swain 2015). Since 2015, Australia, California, Brazil, and Indonesia have had
some of the worst forest fires, arising out of and contributing to climate change. Figure 3.1
shows the fluctuating export volumes. Is the world prepared for similar circumstances?
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The chapter is organized in three parts around these questions. In the first part,
“A Perfect Storm,” the first section presents some background, and the second section
explores the different causes of the genesis of the crisis. The second part of the chapter,
“Global Responses to the Crisis” addresses the proximate responses of international orga-
nizations and developed and developing countries to the crisis. The third part of the
chapter, “Lessons Learned and Challenges of Implementation” summarizes lessons and
implications drawn and challenges among countries. A wide variety of more organized
responses of international organizations to the crisis are discussed in Chapters 5 and 8–12,
after exploration of food security and nutrition issues in Chapter 4.
I. A PERFECT STORM
Background
Memories are short. Most of our (nonfood expert) interlocutors, while very familiar with
the global financial crisis, could not recall the global food (and energy) crisis preceding the
financial crisis in 2008. Yet, the food crisis was one of the most dissected events among
agricultural economists during and following the crisis. Several factors were identified as
villains of the piece, with different weights attached to each of their contributions. Some
were completely off the mark. With the benefit of 20–20 hindsight and a telescopic view,
new insights, perhaps, can be gained from this review conducted a decade later. We present
the facts, as well as the way in which awareness of the causes of the crisis unfolded. The
revised understanding, in turn, has affected responses of stakeholders. An important
question is whether, with the information revolution, the quality of the information base
and the speed with which information is made available to all concerned stakeholders have
improved over time? The answer is partially yes.
The onset of the crisis was unanticipated by the development community at large,






























































































Figure 3.1 Export quantity, 1990–2013 (million metric tons): A. Australia: Wheat export
quantity; B. United States: Maize export quantity; C. India: Rice (milled equivalent) export
quantity
Source: http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data
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(IMF), although agricultural prices had been rising since 2000 (Figures 3.2 and 3.3).
The in-house independent evaluation of WBG’s response to the food crisis noted this
unexpectedness:
The WBG mobilized itself quickly, compared with past crisis episodes. The additional
funding it provided [to deal with the impact of higher oil and food prices] was sizable yet
modest, compared to the fall in private capital flows to emerging and developing econo-
mies and to the assistance provided by some other sources (for example, the IMF and the
European Union). (IEG 2009, v)
TheWorld Bank had been concerned with the neglect of agriculture starting in the 1980s,
a phenomenon discussed in detail in Chapter 8 on the World Bank (World Bank 2007; IEG
2013). The 1990s were frequently described as the “lost decade,” and with good reason, as
can be seen from the share of official development assistance (ODA) going to the Agricul-
ture, Forestry and Fishing (AFF) sector, which plummeted from the peaks reached in 1983
(Figure 3.4). It is noteworthy, however, that the share of lending to the AFF sector in 2016


























































































Deflated by World Bank’s MUV Price Index Deflated by US GDP Price Index
Figure 3.2 Long-term Agricultural Commodity Price Index, 1900–2016 (1977–9 = 100)
Note: Based on the Grilli–Yang Commodity Price Index, combining food and nonfood agricultural commodities
and deflated by World Bank MUV Price Index and US GDP Price Index.
Source: Pfaffenzeller, Newbold, and Rayner (2007), extended by Keith Fuglie, Economic Research Service,
US Department of Agriculture.
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2005–6, but has never reached the peak, 20.4 percent of total lending, which occurred in
1983. Chapter 7 on the financing of structural transformation discusses these domestic and
aid investment issues in more detail.
The World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (World Bank 2007),
drafted to highlight the importance of agriculture in development strategy, did not antic-
ipate the crisis. The first-ever Independent External Evaluation (IEE) of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), carried out in 2007, fared no better
in predicting a crisis at the doorstep. The IEE was prompted by long-term concern among
FAO’s donor stakeholders that FAO itself was in crisis (FAO 2007). The IEE zeroed in on
the reforms needed within FAO, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 9, but did not anticipate the
impending world food crisis. In 2007, FAO’s IEE panel, consisting of Uma Lele and Thelma
Awori, visited some countries that were later seen as “crisis” countries. In 2007, these
countries were engulfed in different internal political problems of their own, which also














































































Real Energy Price Index Real Food Price Index Real Fertilizers Price Index
Figure 3.3 Real Energy, Food, and Fertilizers Price Index, 1960–2019 (2010 US dollars, using
Deflator MUV Index 2010 = 100)
Source: Based on World Bank Commodity Price Data (The Pink Sheet), updated on August 4, 2020.
¹ In Bangladesh, with the fall of an elected government and threat of violence, a caretaker government was in
charge, working towards restoration of democracy, which occurred in early 2009. In Thailand, the democratically
elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted by a military junta, and the existing political institutions
were dissolved. In Ethiopia, a low-grade conflict with the Somalian Ogaden region was underway. Food policy was
a second-order issue in the context of these larger national political crises. Of the countries visited, only Tanzania
was peaceful, and with its continuing liberalization, it was enjoying increased donor support and thriving foreign
investment.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
142   
States in 1941 and the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in 1968, which were not anticipated despite
considerable intelligence, the COVID-19 pandemic at the end of 2019 was also not
anticipated, notwithstanding repeated predictions by health experts.
Most analysts conclude that, in the short term, the higher food prices that ensued raised
the poverty headcount in most developing countries, because poor farming households tend
to be net purchasers of food and, generally, do not benefit from higher sales prices of their
own production to offset the negative impact of higher food prices that they pay as net
consumers. As a result, large numbers of rural households are pushed into poverty (Ivanic
and Martin 2008; de Hoyos and Medvedev 2011; Ivanic, Martin, and Zaman 2012).
Estimating the number of poor people affected by the crisis was difficult, as “just-in-time”
survey data on countries potentially affected by the crisis were not readily available. The
FAO’s iconic Prevalence of Undernourishment (PoU) was not meant to provide just-in-
time estimates of the actual number of hungry, even under the best of circumstances,
because of its method of estimation (Wanner et al. 2014; Lele et al. 2016) (see Boxes 3.1
and 3.2). FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) keeps the world
food supply/demand situation under continuous review, reports on the world food situa-
tion, and provides early warnings of impending food crises in individual countries (FAO
2020a), but it does not provide global estimates, as some authors have claimed (Headey and
Fan 2008, 2010). The World Food Programme (WFP) has its own estimates, but its focus


































































































































ODA to Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing % of ODA to Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing
Figure 3.4 Declining share of ODA to Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, 1967–2016
Source: Based on data from OECD.stat, http://stats.oecd.org/
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global food crisis (issues discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 on “From Food Security to
Nutrition Security for All,” “Changing Global Governance Context for Food Security and
Nutrition,” and “Governance of the ‘Big Five’,” respectively).
FAO has since introduced a new measure called the Food Insecurity Experience Scale
(FIES), which is a more direct measure of voices of the hungry. It is discussed in Box 3.2 in
this chapter and in Chapter 4. The Independent Evaluation Group’s (IEG’s) evaluation of
the World Bank’s response to the crisis quoted the Bank’s analysis, “The global crisis is
expected to push more than 73 million people into poverty in 2009 alone” (IEG 2009, vi).
A subsequent report, based on the work of Ivanic, Martin, and Zaman (2012) noted,
“Simulation models suggested that poverty rose by 100–200 million people and the under-
nourished increased by 63 million in 2008,” with figures later adjusted to 100 million in
2008, and 48 million in 2011 (IEG 2013, x). The work was tremendously influential, with
impact on the World Bank strategy of emergency assistance, as discussed later in this
chapter and in Chapter 8.
Developing countries initially reacted less to the food crisis than did international
organizations. Accustomed to food shortages and confronted with important domestic
political developments, our own field visits to Bangladesh, Thailand, and Ethiopia, as
detailed in note 1, indicated that developing countries initially reacted to the food crisis in
2007, much as they had in the past, using an array of tools they had at their disposal. Case
studies carried out by Pinstrup-Andersen (2015) and colleagues provide details. Hazell,
Shields, and Shields (2005) showed that, in general, domestic shocks were a greater source of
price variability than border prices.² Freer trade reduced price instability in small African
countries, as we discuss later in this chapter. Circumstances of developing countries varied
greatly, in terms of population sizes, prevailing per capita food availabilities, food policy
histories, and degrees of external orientation, as described here.
Box 3.1 The Poor, Ultra-Poor, and Treatment of the Crisis by
International Organizations
Michael Lipton coined the term “ultra-poor” to describe the plight of people who live in
extreme poverty, earning less than $1.90 (originally $1 per day), and consuming less than
80 percent of their energy requirements, despite spending at least 80 percent of their
income on food (Lipton 1986). In South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which are
the global hot spots for hunger, the majority of the ultra-poor tend to be landless,
marginalized populations, including rural women. An additional 2.1 billion people live
on less than $3.10 per day in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP), which is equivalent to
the $2-a-day poverty line in 2005 PPP (World Bank 2012). Together, the poor and ultra-
poor comprise nearly half of the world’s population of 7.3 billion. Impacts of food prices
on them are complex, depending on whether they are producers, consumers, or both, as
we will see later. Food prices affect the poor disproportionately, however, with high
impacts on their food consumption and health.
² Pinstrup-Andersen (2015) showed the relative importance of domestic production variability versus inter-
national price variability.
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Box 3.2 Estimates of the Number of Hungry: The Food and
Agriculture Organization under Greater Fire than Other
International Organizations
FAO came under greater criticism than the World Bank for allegedly exaggerating its
estimates of the number of hungry, as a result of the crisis, and worse, was alleged to have
used the crisis for its own purpose of bringing more business to the organization
(Shelton 2013; Pinstrup-Andersen 2015). Our own research did not support such design.
The reasons had parallels to those of the World Bank’s varied estimates of the numbers
of poor that were pushed below the poverty line—namely, the lack of timely availability
of representative data on a scale that would enable regional and national estimates, and
the time it would take to collect and process the data obtained from individual countries.
FAO typically provides technical assistance and receives production estimates from
governments, on the basis of which it prepares food balance sheets (FAO 2001;
FAOSTAT 2019a, 2019b). FAO publishes food supply data as averages of three years,
since harvest times vary around the world and, typically, governments issue first
preliminary and then final estimates. Under pressure from the FAO’s director-general
at the time (who was, in turn, expected by Bretton Woods institutions to produce
numbers for the IMF–World Bank Spring Meetings to highlight the issue to the policy-
makers),a FAO staff drew on the IMF’s projections (of decline) of the gross domestic
product (GDP) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) model pre-
dictions to prorate its Prevalence of Undernourished (PoU) estimates (King 2011; FAO
et al. 2019, 148). The IMF later acknowledged that its projections of the likely decline in
GDP in emerging countries turned out, in retrospect, to be too pessimistic (IMF 2015),
and the USDA data covered only 70 countries, instead of FAO’s global coverage, all of
which led to a greater projected increase in the number of hungry (King 2011).
The need for better data, information, surveillance, and reporting is widely recognized
by IMF, the World Bank, FAO, and the G20. Indeed, with the data revolution, satellites,
and crowd sourcing, this state of affairs will likely change dramatically, provided FAO
and other international organizations are funded adequately on a long-term, consistent
basis to deliver results, with each playing to its comparative advantage and working
cooperatively. FAO’s inadequate funding to help developing countries generate high-
quality, “just-in-time” agricultural statistics is discussed in Chapters 6 and 9.
A Lesson that Emerged: Need for Different Data for Different Purposes
Since the crisis, the “Voices of the Hungry” project has developed a new global standard
for estimating the prevalence of food insecurity through the use of a tool popularly
termed the Voices of the Hungry and technically known as the Food Insecurity Expe-
rience Scale (FIES) (FAO 2020b). An experience-based measure, the FIES is similar to
measures used in the United States and in some Latin American countries to provide
direct and timely food security metrics. The FIES has been adopted as a global indicator
in the SDG process and will accompany the PoU in assessing progress toward SDG
target 2.1. We should expect the FIES to provide timelier and more actionable estimates
(FAO 2017).
aThe numbers were displayed on a board outside the IMF and World Bank headquarters at 1818 H and
Pennsylvania Avenue, in Washington, DC.
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The Proximate Cause of the Crisis
The World Food Summit was held in Rome in 2008, with 180 countries participating. The
subsequent publication of FAO’s State of Food and Agriculture 2008 (FAO 2008b) con-
cluded that rapidly growing demand for biofuel feedstock, combined with heavy subsidies
to biofuel production among the world’s major food exporters, particularly in the United
States and Europe, had diverted food production (corn, palm oil) to biofuel production and
“contributed to higher food prices, which pose an immediate threat to the food security of
poor net food buyers (in value terms) in both urban and rural areas” (FAO 2008b, 8).
Trade-distorting biofuel policies in developed countries may also have created the
conditions for unfair competition for developing country producers of biofuels, perhaps
also preventing a smooth transition to a lower carbon economy. As oil prices fell, market
dynamics for biofuels also changed. Shale gas exploitation in the United States and slower
economic growth in China also may have affected energy prices and, ultimately, prices for
other commodities including biofuels and farm goods. Differences of opinion among
members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on oil price
policy, too, may have played a role at the time, as well as other geopolitical considerations
(see Babcock [2011]; Meyer, Schmidhuber, and Barreiro-Hurlé [2013]; de Gorter [2014];
Schmidhuber and Meyer [2014]).
The Agricultural Outlook 2010, a joint publication of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and FAO, contained projections of higher and more
volatile food prices into the future, but food prices had started to decline after 2012
(Figure 3.2) (OECD and FAO 2010). With the low and declining food prices prevailing in
2016, the OECD–FAO Agricultural Outlook 2016–2025 expected no significant changes in
real terms until 2025 (OECD and FAO 2016). So much for predictions. As Yogi Berra
supposedly said, “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”³
FAO was not alone. The World Bank and the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) had also suggested that prices would remain high and more volatile
until at least the end of the next decade (World Bank 2013; Kalkuhl, von Braun, and
Torrero 2016), and that the prices have resulted from a complex set of interactive factors,
including rising energy prices, the depreciation of the US dollar, low interest rates, and
investment portfolio adjustments in favor of commodities—all in turn related to a range of
underlying global macroeconomic phenomena that have affected both food and nonfood
commodities (Headey and Fan 2010).
Notwithstanding the difficulty of making predictions, there are real reasons for concern
going forward. FAO’s State of Food and Agriculture 2016 warned of the impacts of climate
change on agriculture (FAO 2016).
Since then, the latest reports by Rome-based agencies, as they began to be jointly issued,
have stressed the increased incidence of hunger due to climate change and conflict. Such
impacts could lead to a similar crisis, and it could well occur much earlier than might be
predicted based on the existence of the 30–5-year food price cycle that Timmer suggested,
following Bruce Gardner (Gardner 1979; Timmer 2009, 2010). FAO also highlighted the
risk of trade policies of large, emerging countries—citing the case of China in destabilizing
world markets by unloading their stocks (FAO 2016). India’s export bans following the
crisis had already been at the center of controversy (Sharma 2011).
³ Neils Bohr, the respected physicist, is credited with saying something similar, as are others (see https://
quoteinvestigator.com/2013/10/20/no-predict/).
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In short, the crisis provided a real challenge to the world food system, shown in
Figure 3.5. The diagram depicts the interacting paths that food travels from the farmer’s
field to consumers’ plates, involving growing, harvesting, processing, packaging, transport-
ing, and marketing through a combination of production, trade and aid, consumption, and
disposal of food. Dynamic changes in the food system have occurred in how inputs such as
energy are produced using agricultural lands and agricultural production. These energy
inputs compete for cropland for food, influencing composition of output generated and
highlighting the competing demands, between food and fuel, on what were previously seen
largely as agricultural resources.⁴ Food systems increasingly also highlight the fact that
subsidies to biofuels and mandates created to mix ethanol with gasoline, as in the United
States, once provided are difficult to withdraw. They also highlight interconnectedness of
commodity and financial markets on a global scale. They serve domestic interests, such as
for biofuels, which compete with global interests for an assumed global food supply that can
meet the needs of consumers in import-dependent countries. As discussed in Chapter 4, the
use of food systems as a basis for analysis identifies the inputs needed to undertake the
activities that relate to the production, processing, distribution, preparation, and consump-
tion of food, to generate the outputs at each step of the food system, and recognizes that
food systems operate within and are influenced by social, political, economic, and natural
environments.
Defining the Crisis
It is evident from the preceding discussion that prices were seen as the key barometer of the
crisis. Concern about affordable access of the poor to food next ensued. The poor spend
50–80 percent of their income on food. In contrast, an average family in the United States
spends 10 percent on food, and a European family, 15 percent (Bread for the World
Institute 2013; Swinnen, Knops, and van Herck 2015). There was much confusion in the
international discourse between price levels, rises, volatility, and spikes—vocabulary that
quickly gained currency as part of the international discourse (Box 3.3) (see, also, Díaz-
Bonilla and Ron [2010]; Tangermann [2010]).
Price transmission of producer-to-consumer prices was another issue of interest. Con-
sumers in Europe and the Americas obtain most of their food in processed forms, in which
the share of the cost of actual food ingredients at the retail level is relatively small, compared
to transport, storage, processing, and packaging costs. Thus, international and domestic
farm-gate food prices are not easily transmitted into consumer prices to the same extent as
in developing countries, where most of the food sold at the retail level is without much value
added.
The degree of transmission is also determined by the extent to which markets operate
and the extent of transportation and storage costs, import and export taxes, and physical
bans. Food prices play a significant role in domestic inflation in low- and middle-income
⁴ Jonathan Hepburn, Senior Programme Manager, Agriculture, at the International Centre for Trade and
Sustainable Development in Geneva, noted that agricultural resources have long been used for food, fiber, feed,
and fuel (including vineyards involved in alcohol production for human consumption, and other nonfood
industrial production such as rubber and cotton). “This comes back to the question of whether inadequate supply
(availability) is the issue or whether the real concern is inadequate access to food due to low levels of purchasing
power among poor people (i.e., problems associated with the persistence of poverty and inequality)” (personal
communication, Jonathan Hepburn, February 19, 2018).
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developing countries because of the high share of consumer expenditures on food, and
because both the level of inflation and the rate of change of prices influence consumer
satisfaction with the government in power. Hence, food prices affect political stability—
consequences range from city riots, as occurred in more than 30 countries during 2007–9, to
voting at the ballot boxes. The proverbial onion prices in local markets decide election
outcomes in India (Jadhav and Bhardwaj 2018).
There was relatively little mention of nutrition during the crisis—that is, of food quality
and composition—even in international discussions, which described food security mainly
as the poor’s access to food and in terms of cereal prices and supplies. Nutrition burst onto
the international agenda around the time of the crisis in 2007–8 (see Chapter 4). FAO’s
“State of Food Insecurity 2011” report briefly discussed impacts on nutrition. It was more
the result, however, of the (parallel) advocacy underway by the nutritional community to
bring nutrition back onto the global development agenda. Its timing happened to coincide
with the crisis (FAO 2011).⁵
Figure 3.2 presents the Long-term Agricultural Commodity Price Index, from 1900 to
2016, and Figure 3.3 shows the Real Energy, Food, and Fertilizers Price Index from 1960 to
2017. After decades of decline, world food prices had begun to rise from about 2000. The
food price rise and volatility reached the first peak in 2008, and following a short lull during
2009, surpassed its 2008 peaks. In early 2011, the World Bank’s Food Price Index, which
Box 3.3 Terminology that Acquired Currency in the Crisis
Analysis and debates focused on three interrelated price variables: volatility, spikes, and
trends and related conceptsa—for example, real prices measured after allowing for
inflation rates, and prices quoted in dollars, based on changes in nominal and real
effective exchange rates—the latter based on relative inflation rates in trading countries,
as they explain impacts on consumers and producers.
Spikes and volatility are important in the short to medium term, and trends important
for the long term. Furthermore, higher prices may ultimately reduce poverty while spikes
do not (Ivanic and Martin 2014). Volatility is measured by variance within a period.
Volatility is different from variance in terms of the amount of change that can occur at a
point in time. Price spikes usually are sharp increases in prices from the trend lines: that
is, large deviations from the trend line typically last for a short time and, therefore, are
transient. There are hardly any examples of downward price spikes. This could be
because large price drops lead to additional stockholding, while there are limits to the
extent to which stocks (if they exist) can be released to moderate price increases (Deaton
and Laroque 1996; Gilbert and Morgan 2010; Wright 2011a).
a Most analysts consider more than one of these issues, particularly in the post-2008 period.
⁵ Lawrence Haddad differs with us on this issue and provided some samples of the mention of nutrition, some
in his own writings. He, too, had complained in his blogs, however, that the SDGs were largely focused on hunger
and not malnutrition (Haddad 2015). This situation, however, has changed over time. The 44th session of the
Committee on World Food Security convened in Rome, October 9–13, 2017, with the theme of “Making a
Difference in Food Security and Nutrition,” and a particular focus on the Committee on Food Security (CFS) and
the SDGs and nutrition (CFS 2017).
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had declined by 30 percent from mid–2008 to mid–2010, rose sharply, reaching a peak
again in February 2011. Then, in mid-2012, food prices escalated again, with the Food Price
Index rising by 14 percent from January to August 2012, as world maize prices soared to an
all-time high in July 2012 (surpassing their 2008 and 2011 peaks)—rising 45 percent within
a month. Hepburn noted that different commodities exhibited different market dynamics,
particularly rice and wheat (personal communication, Jonathan Hepburn, February 19,
2018). Nevertheless, price peaks in the recent period have not reached the high levels they
did in 1974. Yet, the phenomenon came to be known as the “world food crisis,” with much
debate about the extent and causes of price rises, volatility, and spikes, and impacts on the
poor (see World Bank [2017b]).
According to the analysis of de Gorter, Drabik, and Just (2013, 82), “the price increase in
the corn market had a spillover effect on the wheat market and caused policy responses and
speculation, including hoarding, which caused rice prices to spike.” This situation led the
researchers to conclude that “because of the sudden increase in commodity prices, the
developing countries were unable to benefit from the higher prices, even though they have
comparative advantage in biofuels production” (de Gorter, Drabik and Just, 2013, 82). The
authors note that their conclusion was true of only a few developing countries.
The striking difference is the sharp rise in fertilizer prices in 2008, compared to the past,
moving closely with food prices and steeply increasing the cost of production for fertilizer
import-dependent countries.
Prices and Poverty
Impressive strides had been made in poverty eradication in developing countries since the
1980s, with a decline from 1.85 billion people living in poverty in 1990 to 767 million in
2013, and the share of poor people falling by three-quarters. The poor are defined as those
earning incomes of less than US$1.90 a day in 2011 PPP (World Bank 2020). (For details on
how poverty thresholds and levels have changed over time, with multiple poverty lines
introduced in 2017, see Chapter 4.) Real food prices have seen a secular decline since 1900,
with occasional price increases (Figure 3.2). The COVID-19 pandemic has at least tempo-
rarily changed this direction (Laborde, Martin, and Vos 2020). The real food price decline
explains a huge progress in food security, with food production growth outstripping
population growth. However, most of this improvement in food security has occurred in
East Asia and Southeast Asia, particularly in China, and more slowly in South Asia (SA), as
we noted in Chapter 2. Thirty-four percent of the remaining global poverty and 34 percent
of the hungry are in SA, compared to 51 percent of global poverty and 26 percent of the
hungry in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (FAO 2020a). Such “just-in-time” estimations are
hampered by lack of data in least developed countries (LDCs).⁶
Lipton stresses that subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers should be helped to
increase their domestic production, even production that does not leave the farms, rather
than focusing only on markets and trade (Lipton 2017). This should be done by increasing
productivity. It is the most cost-effective way to increase their food security and nutrition.
⁶ Seventy percent of the IDA countries in SSA have had no statistical survey in 15 years. According to the
World Bank, over 70 countries do not meet the criteria of two surveys in a 10-year period at 5-year intervals
(personal communication, Gero Carletto, July 2016). Many of these countries are in SSA. The data gap is much
larger for food/calorie consumption and for gender.
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There is clear evidence of progress on several other dimensions of SDGs, beyond the decline
in poverty and hunger, which are discussed in Chapter 4.
Beyond the effects of food price increases on real incomes, many other factors intervene
to affect poverty: family illnesses; unexpected epidemics of human, animal, and plant
diseases; droughts, floods, variable and unpredictable rainfalls, rising temperatures, and
loss of coastal areas; and conflict and terrorism (Krishna 2010). Those at the margin of
subsistence fall into poverty as frequently as they get out of poverty, and these movements
are not measured in the World Bank’s type of poverty measurement. These transitory
shocks are increasing with: (1) population pressure (UN 2015); (2) climate change; (3) soil
degradation and loss of organic matter by erosion, salinization, nutrient depletion, and
elemental imbalance; (4) decreased availability of water; (5) competition for land by biofuel
and nonagricultural uses, including urbanization and brick-making; and (6) increased
preferences toward more diversified diets, including fruits, vegetables, dairy, and animal-
based diets, prices of which are rising far more rapidly than cereal prices (Sen 1987a, b; Lal
2013; Ganguly and Gulati 2015).
Again, at least two competing narratives about movement out of poverty exist, both
relating to trends in farm sizes in developing countries. A CGIAR study presented a
narrative of land consolidation in Asia (Masters et al. 2013), which also holds for China.
The other concurrent narrative argues that farm sizes in major parts of the developing world
have been declining, particularly in Asia and SSA; some farms amount to the size of
“postage stamps” (Vyas 2016). Chand also provided evidence of declining and highly
fragmented farm holdings in India (Chand 2016). Headey (2016) documented this global
evolution of farming land, based largely on FAO data: “The spatial distribution of global
farming land has changed dramatically, with developed countries substantially reducing
their share of global agricultural land, and land-abundant developing countries [in North
and South America] substantially increasing their share. In per capita terms, we see . . .
average farm sizes increasing in rich and more commercialized agricultural systems, and
generally declining or staying constant in poorer and less commercialized systems” (Headey
2016, 185).
In their volume entitled Rising Global Interest in Farmland, Deininger and Byerlee (2011)
noted that data on land tenure and operational holdings are very poor. They indicated,
“Data from country inventories highlight serious weaknesses in institutional capacity and
management of land information. . . . Official records on land acquisitions are often incom-
plete, and neglect of social and environmental norms is widespread” (Deininger and Byerlee
2011, xxxii). With unclear boundary demarcations, tenure security is necessarily reduced
and potential for conflict increased.
John Gibson noted that many studies have sought to measure the impacts of higher food
prices on the welfare of consumers. He noted the lack of reliable data:
Real welfare levels in poor countries are rare since surveys prioritize collecting
nominal living standards data over price data. Narrower questions about the impacts of
prices on food quantity consumed and on the availability of nutrients are poorly
answered. Most studies ignore coping responses that involved downgrading food
quality to maintain quantity and therefore overstate nutritionally harmful effects of
rising prices. A full accounting for the impacts of food prices on food security requires
spatially detailed food price data and household survey data on both the quantity
and the quality of foods. Surprisingly few developing countries have these required
data. (Gibson 2013, 97)
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Although the bulk of the poor still live in rural areas, a growing number are making their
livings from diversified, nonfarm income. They depend on the market for food and are
moving to urban areas to improve their livelihood prospects—or, with growing population
densities, rural areas are being transformed into densely populated townships. With vast
regional differences in endowments, stages of development, and histories of public policies,
it is not surprising that the responses of developing countries have differed greatly. This
raises major policy issues, which we take up in later chapters.
What Caused the Crisis?
Analysts from FAO, IFPRI, and the World Bank, as well as scholars like C. Peter Timmer
(2010), Brian Wright (2011b, 2012, 2013, 2014a), Will Martin (Lin and Martin 2010), Per
Pinstrup-Andersen (2015), and many others contributed actively to the understanding of
the crisis and its impacts. The list of factors that analysts believed to have contributed to the
crisis is long. It includes high energy prices, conversion of corn to biofuels, poor harvests in
major exporting countries, low public sector stocks, export bans by a number of countries,
poor information, an outsized financial bubble caused by the greatest recession since the
Great Depression of 1929, the ensuing commodity speculation, and macro policies in a
more integrated world, but also some misdiagnosed factors such as rising demand from
China and India. FAO’s SOFA 2009 noted, “Each one of those causes commonly cited
cannot of itself explain the pattern and extent of recent price movements. It is their
coincidence and combination that accounts for the dramatic changes. While disentangling
their separate effects is problematic, the evidence does point to biofuel demand and oil
prices as the principal drivers” (FAO 2009, 22).
Asia as Culprit #1 Soon Dismissed
The initial tendency in developed countries was to attribute the food price rise of 2007–8 to
the growing demand from China and India. It showed confusion between long-term
demand growth and spikes caused by short- and medium-term factors. Asian policymakers
were aggrieved at the G8 meeting in Japan in 2008, after US President George W. Bush and
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice attributed the crisis to the rapidly growing Asian
demand (Huang et al. 2008).⁷ In particular, increase in meat consumption in China was
believed to have created a derived demand for animal feed, contributing to the price
increase. FAO and several others, in thorough analyses, pointed to the broadly stable shares
of China and India in agricultural food commodity consumption, stressing that the two
countries are largely food self-sufficient, with a declared policy of self-sufficiency, and are
expected to remain so (Alexandratos 2008; FAO 2008a; Lustig 2008; FAO 2009; Baffes and
Haniotis 2010; Headey and Fan 2010; Sarris 2010; Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2012).
Furthermore, they did not change their net trade (Wright 2014b; Fukase and Martin
2020). Analysts from China and India also countered these observations early, noting the
confusion between the long-term growth trends of Asian food demand and the
⁷ They were not alone. A 2015 World Bank report noted that influential economists (Paul Krugman [2008];
Martin Wolf [2008]; Joel Bourne [2009]) had argued that rapid income growth in emerging economies, including
China and India, was a key factor behind increases in food commodity prices after 2007 (World Bank 2015a).
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consequences of the policies of biofuel subsidies and mandates in developed countries
(Huang et al. 2008). The World Bank similarly noted that secular growth in China and
India was not responsible for the sudden price increases (Mitchell 2008). Later, China and
India each contributed to rising prices by imposing export bans, as described later. Subse-
quently, China also modified its biofuel policy (Huang et al. 2008).
Energy Prices, Biofuel Mandates, OECD Subsidies,
and Global Food Security
By 2008, and continuing well into 2012, a strong consensus had emerged that biofuels were
the game changer during 2005–15. FAO’s SOFA 2008: Biofuels: Prospects, Risks and
Opportunities emphasized:
The rapid recent growth in production of biofuels was based on agricultural commodities,
[and] the boom in liquid biofuels has been largely induced by [varied] policies in
developed countries, based on their expected positive contributions to climate-change
mitigation, energy security and agricultural development. The growing demand for
agricultural commodities for the production of biofuels is having significant repercussions
on agricultural markets, and concerns were mounting over their negative impact on the
food security of millions of people across the world. . . . [T]he environmental impacts of
biofuels are also coming under closer scrutiny. (FAO 2008b, back cover)
The United States, one of the largest world food exporters, diverted more than 40 percent of
its corn in 2007 to biofuel production (US EIA 2012; Wise 2012). Babcock (2011) showed
that US corn ethanol was mostly market driven, but government policies did play a role;
Elliott (2015) found US governmental policies of subsidies and mandates were key to the
rapid expansion of corn ethanol. High oil prices made ethanol a competitive substitute for
gasoline. While the US Congress declined to extend the tax credit and tariff at the end of
2011, the Renewable Fuel Standard and blending mandate remained, keeping a floor
beneath ethanol demand, though corn ethanol expansion slowed in the following years
(Wisner 2014).
Other countries also contributed to this diversion of cropland to production for biofuels.
US import quotas and internal, insulated sugar price supports initially depressed world
sugar production and prices, leading Brazil to reallocate sugarcane production from sugar to
ethanol markets. Brazilian sugar ethanol production also responded to increases in crude oil
prices that have occurred since the mid-1970s. Wisner (2014) similarly showed the rela-
tionship between ethanol, gasoline, crude oil, and corn prices, including the role of US
mandates to use ethanol in the crisis.
Maltsoglou, Koizumi, and Felix (2013, 104) in their paper, “The Status of Bioenergy
Development in Developing Countries,” noted that, with the exception of the United States,
some European countries, and Brazil, bioenergy production “and more specifically, liquid
biofuels . . . is still limited, especially in the case of Africa where the sector is still in its
infancy.” The authors provided a “detailed overview of production in the African, Asian and
Latin American regions, illustrating how the three regions of the developing world are
working toward bioenergy development, the strategies and policies, and the main hurdles
being encountered” (Maltsoglou, Koizumi, and Felix 2013, 104).
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As Hertel (2015) and others have noted, and Wright (2011a) concluded in his
presentation to the annual Forum for Agricultural Risk Management in Development in
Zurich in June 2011: “Food competing with biofuels can do more harm to the welfare of the
poor and landless, globally, than the greatest conceivable aid efforts or productivity in-
creases could compensate.”⁸Other consequences of the US biofuel policy, even after the end
of the crisis, include increasing the cost of livestock feed to farmers, inadequate supply of
ethanol to meet the mandated requirements for mixing with gasoline in automobiles, and
unanticipated delays in the second generation of cellulose biofuels (Elliott 2015).
In an earlier paper, “Market-mediated Environmental Impacts of Biofuels,” Hertel and
Tyner (2013, 131) noted, “despite all the research that has been done and all the advances
made, there remains considerable quantitative uncertainty surrounding biofuels induced
land use change. Obtaining precise estimates of these impacts is likely beyond the reach of
current models and data.”
Indonesia is critical in the biofuels debate. It is the largest producer of palm oil and
contains some of the most carbon-rich peatlands and forests in the world. It also has the
highest rate of tropical deforestation globally, caused largely by the drive for palm oil. This
mix has contributed to Indonesia becoming one of the world’s top 10 greenhouse gas
emitters and the highest among them in terms of emission intensity: that is, emissions in
relation to gross domestic product (GDP) (Ge, Friedrich, and Damassa 2014). According to
some sources, the use of palm oil for European biofuels has increased sixfold since 2006
(Gerasimchuk and Koh 2013; Khairnur 2015). With decline in energy prices in 2019–20,
others have dismissed the role of Indonesia in biofuels.
Higher fuel prices, as noted previously, encourage the switch to biofuels, and thus,
reduction of crop production. Since biofuel policies in the United States and other OECD
countries interact with fossil fuel energy markets, the level and variability of crop prices are
highly susceptible to changes in oil prices, especially those that cause major shifts in
transportation fuel demand. US fiscal and monetary policies magnified the crisis (Rausser
and de Gorter 2015); beyond contributing to the 2007–8 food price volatility, the macro
policies increased aggregate demand for food, fertilizers, and transportation services.
The net effect of these new causal mechanisms is that US biofuel policies ultimately
increased, rather than lowered, world prices (without reducing volatility). High oil prices
elevated crop prices in 2006–8; lower oil prices in 2008–9 spurred crop prices to plummet.
Crop prices rose again to nearly the levels of the 2008 peak, and some studies have even
argued that oil prices have led to increased food grain commodity prices (see, for example,
Baffes and Haniotis [2010]). Rausser and de Gorter (2015) further noted that US agricul-
tural and biofuel policies have not been the sole influences on commodities’ prices,
especially corn, soybean, and wheat prices.
Food prices spiked in 2008, and then again in 2013; and in 2020, they were at their lowest.
Energy prices have had two important effects, by increasing (or decreasing) the price of
fertilizers and by diverting corn to the production of ethanol, in addition to direct effects on
farm sector costs of transport, heating, refrigeration, storage, and use of farm equipment.
Although incentives for corn ethanol have weakened considerably, the mandates have
remained in place. The US ethanol exports have increased by nearly 10 times in volume
since 2006, and in 2013 they were slightly more in volume than those of Brazil (Roberts and
Schlenker 2010; WTO 2016). With low gasoline prices, new stricter emission standards for
⁸ Brazil’s ethanol production comes mainly from sugarcane and, therefore, does not adversely affect Brazil’s
food-related exports, including soybeans in particular, but world sugar prices have been increasing.
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automobiles, and the prospect of electric cars, the justification for investment in biofuels is
weaker today than it was in the early 2000s, when the policies were introduced.
Biofuels may have less impact on food prices in the future, as alternative sources of
energy become more attractive. By 2015, investment in biofuels fell by 35 percent to US$3.1
billion, whereas solar energy became the leading sector by far, in terms of money commit-
ted, accounting for US$161 billion (up 12 percent over 2014), or more than 56 percent of the
total new investment in renewable power and fuels.
Derek Headey and Shenggen Fan, in Reflections on the Global Food Crisis, concluded:
A major effect of rising energy prices was the consequent surge in demand for biofuels.
Demand for biofuels had a stronger effect on maize than on other biofuel crops (such as
oilseeds), although knock-on effects for other food items may have been substantial
(especially for soybeans). Interestingly, . . . the surge in U.S. maize production for biofuels
was of an order-of-magnitude equivalent to the primary explanation of the 1972–74
crisis—the surge in U.S. wheat exports to the Soviet bloc. (Headey and Fan 2010, xiii)
Consequently, food prices have become intertwined with oil prices and are affected by
policies that affect the demand for oil.
Since the crisis, there have been proposals for the United States to end biofuel subsidies or
mandates (Elliott 2015), or to make them more flexible (FAO 2008a; G20 2011), so that in
periods of crisis, more food supplies could be released to the world markets; or for the
establishment of a global food safety net program, along the lines of the US food stamp
program to protect the poor (Josling 2011; Díaz-Bonilla 2014).
Several policy changes concerning biofuel markets were finalized in Europe in 2015. In
the European Union (EU), these included revisions to the Renewable Energy Directive and
to the Fuel Quality Directive, with a 7 percent cap on renewable energy to come from food
and feed crops in the transport sector by 2020. The United States, after a long delay, issued
mandates in November 2015, higher than those that had been proposed earlier in the year,
but considerably lower than the initial levels proposed in 2007 (OECD and FAO 2016).
Indonesia, previously one of the top biodiesel producers worldwide, saw production
decline by roughly 60 percent. China’s biodiesel production increased, almost overtaking
Indonesia’s 2015 levels (REN21 2016). According to the OECD–FAO Agricultural Outlook
2016–2025:
Indonesian exports of biodiesel are expected to remain marginal . . .
The future evolution of energy markets, as well as possible policy changes are key
uncertainties attached to the Outlook for biofuel markets over the next decade. However,
given recent policy decisions, uncertainties concerning the future of biofuel markets
should ease somewhat, at least over the short term. (OECD and FAO 2016, 117)
Payment for environmental services (PES) could arrest some of this land conversion. There
is not yet a significant alternate market for environmental services. What exists is small
and fragmented, based on aid resources (for example, Norway’s funding for Brazil and
Indonesia of US$1 billion each) and on domestic financing by middle-income countries—
most notably, by China, which has brought nearly 35 million hectares of land under forests
through PES (Uchida, Rozelle, and Xu 2009; Xu, White, and Lele 2010). More financing
for environmental services and cost-effective alternative sources of energy, such as solar
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and wind energy, will reduce the economic attraction of biofuels. Expansion of wind and
solar energy resources has occurred more rapidly than that of biofuels in recent years
(REN21 2016).
The greater global market integration in 2007–8, relative to the 1970s, was an underlying
factor in linking US markets with EU markets, and EU markets with those in Asia.
Although the growth in agricultural trade has not been as rapid as trade in manufacturing,
agricultural trade has grown considerably since the 1970s (Aksoy 2004; Xu 2015; Bouët and
Laborde 2017). Developing countries have been important players as agricultural exporters
and importers (Bouët and Laborde 2017). The policy responses of developing countries to
the crisis were closely intertwined with their development concerns, no matter how poorly
they were designed, implemented, and criticized by analysts, as we show here.
Whereas the food price rise (in 1972) preceded an oil price increase in 1973, as shown in
Figure 3.3, and was accompanied by the huge monetary expansion to finance the Vietnam
War and the largest US grain exports to the Soviet Union in history (Graefe 2013), the
increasing price of oil also had another effect on food production. From 2000, the steady rise
in fertilizer prices, caused by the rise in energy prices (Figure 3.3), has adversely affected the
cost of food production. Currently, this is not the situation, as oil prices are very low. This
situation was well documented in the case studies of developing countries in Food Price
Policy in an Era of Market Instability: A Political Economy Analysis, edited by Pinstrup-
Andersen (2015).
Declining and Low Grain Stocks and Stocks-to-Use Ratios
A major area of debate about food price increases in 2007–8 concerns the grain stocks-to-
use ratios. Cereal stocks-to-use ratio reached an all-time low (20.7 percent) in 2007–8.
Stocks and stock-to-use ratios were higher in 2017–18 (see Figure 3.6) (Lyddon 2017; FAO
2018). Equally important, information on stocks was not as readily and broadly available
(Ghanem 2011).
In his article, “The Economics of Grain Price Volatility,” Brian D. Wright argued:
In 2007/08 the aggregate stocks of major grains carried over from the previous year were at
minimal levels, much less than they would have been without mandated diversions of
grain and oilseeds for biofuels which were so substantial that they could not be made up by
a few years of yield increases, even if yields had not suffered due to years of global
underfunding of research and diversion of resources from production-increasing research.
Lack of stocks rendered the markets vulnerable to unpredictable disturbances such as
regional weather problems, the further boost to biofuel demand from the oil price spike in
2007/08, and the unprecedented extension of the long Australian drought which would
not, absent the mandates, have caused any great concern. (Wright 2011b, 56)
When stocks decline to a minimum feasible level, however, a modest supply reduction
creates price volatility simply because it must reduce consumption demand, which requires
a large increase in prices because consumption demand is inelastic. The resulting volatility
may be exacerbated by hoarding and price insulation. Timmer (2010) contended that the
export restrictions imposed by some of the major exporting economies induced panic
buying by importers, such as in the Philippines, and hoarding by governments and other
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
156   
agents—and this caused the rice price spike. The sentiment has been echoed by others
(Gilbert and Morgan 2010; Dawe and Slayton 2011; Wright 2011b).
The export bans, taxes, and hoarding raised prices more than they would have otherwise.
The bans and taxes cut off importers from their usual suppliers. Timmer (2010) noted the
same phenomenon with regard to rice in Asia, discussed later in this chapter in terms of the
responses of developing countries. Timmer (2010) and Wright (2011b) argued, independ-
ently of each other, that hoarding keeps stocks from the needy in times of global stress on
supplies, such as the period of excessive support of biofuels production.
The Role of Financial Speculation
The role of speculation has been controversial. Increased financialization of commodity







































































Figure 3.6 World stocks-to-use ratio, 2000–1 to 2017–18 (%)
Note: Data on soybeans are available from 2003–4.
Stocks-to-use ratio = (closing stocks/all forms of utilization); closing (or ending or carryover)
Stocks: Quantity of stocks at the end of the marketing year (before the following year’s harvest), held at all levels
within the food system, both by governments and by the private sector (including farm holdings and households).
Closing stocks of a given marketing year are always identical to the opening stocks of the following year.
Domestic utilization includes food use, feed use, and other uses. Food use refers to direct human consumption.
Feed use refers to the quantities fed to livestock.
Other uses include seed, industrial use, and postharvest losses.
Seed: Quantity used for the planting of the following production cycle.
Industrial use refers to products intended neither for direct human consumption nor for feed. It includes the
manufacture of secondary food products, such as starch, sweeteners, and alcohol.
Postharvest losses include losses incurred after harvest, from sorting, waste, storage, transport, packing, etc. For
soybeans, the breakdown differs from that used for cereals; to reflect this, the relevant balance sheets are currently
under modification.
See Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) Database, http://statistics.amis-outlook.org/data/index.
html#STATISTICALNOTES.
Source: Based on AMIS—Community Balance Sheet (AMIS 2011).
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similar to other financial instruments. Among other causes, Headey and Fan (2010)
attributed the crisis to exchange rates and speculation.⁹ Modeling by Torero (2012) and
others attributed increased stocks to significant financial flows into commodity markets.
Cooke and Robles (2009); Robles, Torero, and von Braun (2009); and Gilbert (2010) showed
that futures positions have huge effects on commodity markets (for details, see Kalkuhl, von
Braun, and Torero [2016]). Similarly, Frankel (2008) noted, “A monetary expansion
temporarily lowers the real interest rate (whether via a fall in the nominal interest rate, a
rise in expected inflation, or both—as now).” Although the precise channels of transmission
have remained in dispute, the latest evidence suggests that changes since 1995, in the
intensity of financial speculation in grain and livestock futures and the world business
cycle, taken together, have been an important driver of co-movements between food and
financial markets, especially after 2005 (Bruno, Büyükşahin, and Robe 2017). Others have
argued that the focus on the futures market is misplaced (Irwin, Sanders, and Merrin 2009).
Wright (2011b) argued, however, that speculation was not as important. He posited that
if speculation were the cause of the price increases, then one should observe increased
stocks, but the precise opposite had occurred.
II. GLOBAL RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS
Asian Countries’ Responses to the Crisis
Countries in East and Southeast Asia and South Asia have used food price stabilization as an
important part of their development strategy. And stabilization has remained a highly
debated strategy, as we can see in the discussion here. Dawe and Timmer (2012) noted
that most academic economists have objected to this strategy on at least four grounds:
First, . . . that trade restrictions reduce economic efficiency. Second, . . . trade restrictions
are not targeted to the poor and thus waste scarce resources. Third, . . . [with] persistence
of shocks to world prices, it is not possible to stabilize domestic prices without substantial
fiscal costs. Fourth, . . . trade based domestic stabilization policies destabilize the world
market, thus making it worse for consumers in other countries relative to the counterfac-
tual of no trade restrictions (see Anderson [2012]). [Dawe and Timmer argued that]
while all of these objections have merit, they are all overstated. (Dawe and Timmer
2012, 128)
The sharp spikes in food grain prices in 2007–8, 2010–11, and 2012 provided motivation for
the argument put forward by Dawe and Timmer. They argued that food price stability is
crucial for macroeconomic stability and growth, because it protects the incomes of the poor
who spend a large share of their income on food, particularly rice in the diets of most Asians
(Dawe and Timmer 2012). They further suggest that:
. . . in poor countries, consumer and producer welfare should not serve as the shock
absorber . . .
⁹ Indeed, some of our interlocutors complained that IFPRI had not taken as firm a stand on the biofuel policies
of the United States and the EU, or as frontally as it should have, stressing the need for independent policy
analysis.
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Probably the most serious objection to price stabilization programs is the practical
difficulty that many governments have in implementing them in a cost-effective manner
without destabilizing expectations ([G20 2011]; HLPE 2011 . . . . Price stabilization, which
should ideally lead to domestic prices being equal to world prices on average over the
medium-run, can also lead to domestic prices being consistently above world prices for
extended periods of time, which hurts the poor because most of the poor are net buyers of
food (FAO 2011). In the Philippines, price stabilization has turned into price support for
farmers, even though it worsens poverty. (Balisacan, Sombilla, and Dikitanan 2010)
The countries most successful at this task are in East and Southeast Asia, although the
experience in South Asia discussed in this chapter also has been instructive.
In a personal exchange with Madhur Gautam, however, he commented, “in a more
general equilibrium sense, in the long run stabilization erodes farmer incentives to improve
productivity and production, and a slow rate of growth persists. This was observed in other
places, too (for example, in Tanzania), where governments imposed ad hoc export restric-
tions to keep the price from rising, and hence, the domestic production levels never reached
[the] 110 percent (or whatever) self-sufficiency levels the policymakers wanted. Clearly,
with closed borders, any increase in production leads to a lower domestic price” (Madhur
Gautam, personal communication, June 17, 2020).
On the other hand, several countries experienced the fastest poverty reduction between
2005 and 2012—and many people complained that this was not “real,” but driven by higher
food prices.What happened? After the initial shock (bad for consumers but good for farmers),
the supply response kicks in and, in turn, higher food prices translate into higher wages,
resulting in more widespread poverty reduction. Seemingly counterintuitive, it actually makes
a lot of economic sense. This is also what happened in India. While the prices were kept stable,
over time there was a translation of global price increases to the Indian market as well. An
excellent study by Hanan Jacoby (2016) showed how the rise in rural wages in India outpaced
urban wages during this period, with wages rising faster where output price increases were
higher. In other words, the empirical evidence, at least in this case—as well as for Bangladesh
and Nepal—bears out the theory that dynamic general equilibrium results.
Of the 81 developing countries surveyed by FAO to assess their responses to the crisis, 43
reduced import taxes, and 25 (mostly in Asia) either banned exports or increased taxes on
them (Demeke, Pangrazio, and Maetz 2009). Forty-five developing countries implemented
measures to provide relief or partial relief from high prices to consumers. Having failed in
curbing exports by imposing an export tax (that is, a minimum export price higher than the
world price), India announced a complete ban on exports of non-basmati rice in April
2008—a policy that the government could enforce (Saini and Gulati 2015). Other rice-
exporting countries followed suit with their own controls, and rice prices started to spike.
For imposing a complete ban, India became a whipping boy of donors, in 2005–6, when its
wheat stocks reached an all-time low due to bad weather and excessive exports, and when
India’s milder approach of discouraging exports by imposing export taxes, which it tried
first, did not work (Figure 3.7) (Hindu Business Line 2017; MoneyControl.com 2017a,
2017b, 2017c; Mukherjee 2017).
Indonesia similarly tripled its domestic stocks from 1 to 3 million. Timmer (2010), an
ardent supporter of price stability, argued after the crisis that China, India, and Indonesia,
collectively, protected 2 billion people in a second-best world, and that Indonesia and India,
both democratic governments, were richly rewarded in the 2009 elections for having
imposed export bans and maintained price stability. Anderson, Ivanic, and Martin (2014)
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estimated that their price insulation contributed about 60 percent of the upward pressure on
world rice prices.
Indonesia’s overall trade regime has been relatively open, with low tariffs. Yet, in the case
of rice, the country established a complete ban on rice imports in April 2006, leading to a 30
percent increase in rice prices over the April 2005 level. The World Bank argued that the
import ban led to a significant upturn in poverty during 2006 (World Bank 2008). Timmer,
in his previous writings, had explained China’s agricultural policies of keeping producer
prices high as a way to contain rural unrest. Jikun Huang, founder and director of the
Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, confirmed this
in a personal communication (July 2015). Given China’s history of political movements
beginning in rural areas, the avoidance of restlessness in rural populations is an under-
standable concern for a country that does not tolerate political instability. The defeat of the
Bharatiya Janata Party government in India, in the 14th Lok Sabha (general) election of
2004, was often explained by the hollowness of the campaign slogan “India Shining.”
Beyond the role of agriculture in macroeconomic impacts, there is extensive debate about
the effectiveness of the price stabilization programs in achieving anti-poverty objectives,
and considerable experimentation is underway in Asia, as discussed later in this chapter.
The general conclusion in the case of Asian countries is that price stabilization policies have
been effective and important for political stability as well, albeit at huge fiscal costs.¹⁰ The
latter concern is leading to reforms in making stabilization more cost-effective.
A political consensus has emerged in large Asian countries, such as India, Indonesia, and
China, that stable consumer and producer prices are essential for political stability and that
a combination of trade and stabilization policies is essential to achieve price stability. Asian
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Figure 3.7 Total food grains stock in India, 1972–3 to 2016–17 (million metric tonnes)
Note: Stock at end of March, and total stocks include rice, wheat, and coarse grains.
Source: Food Corporation of India; and Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Government
of India.
¹⁰ The costs of alternate scenarios are never calculated. Not controlling prices may lead to political turmoil,
resulting in large growth and fiscal costs, and importing food would have costs in terms of, perhaps, a balance of
payments crisis.
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than be out of line with them. Dawe and Timmer (2012) provided a thoughtful case for this
argument. Saini and Gulati (2016) argued that this alignment is truer with respect to India
than to China. (See, also, an analysis of public stockholding programs for food security
[Montemayor 2014].) Free traders agree that Asian countries have often succeeded in
stabilizing domestic prices but claim that, with better policies for stabilization, costs could
have been lower (Gouel, Gautam, and Martin 2016). We return to these arguments at the
end of the chapter. Furthermore, Will Martin notes that whereas this argument applies to
countries individually, if advising the minister of a small country, he would agree that price
insulation is an effective, low-cost way of stabilizing domestic prices relative to world prices.
The problem occurs when almost everyone does it, so it does not actually stabilize prices
much, or at all, unless a country stabilizes more than the average. And everyone cannot
stabilize more than the average (Will Martin, personal communication, May 17, 2020).
Critics of public intervention have also argued that trade insulation increased prices and
volatility in international markets (FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2011).
Public Intervention in Africa
In the case of SSA, import dependence for rice and wheat has steadily increased, but the
imports are still small in the context of world markets. Jayne and Minot (2014) and others
(including case studies from Pinstrup-Andersen [2015]) have argued that domestic price
stabilization policies in Eastern and Southern Africa have had the contrary effect of
destabilizing prices. “By accepting a moderate level of price fluctuation within established
bounds under a rules-based approach to intervention, African governments will reduce
their chances of facing severe food crises” (Jayne 2012, 143).
OECD policies of protection, on the other hand, first caused a decline in international
agricultural prices, thus providing disincentive to production of commodities such as sugar
and cotton in developing countries, and later, by diverting production to biofuels, caused a
rise in prices for which developing countries were not prepared.¹¹
Use of export quantitative restrictions (QR) is a continuing problem in Africa. Govern-
ments continue to look at food availability, rather than access, and use QR policies that
create volatility both at home and abroad. While this is similar to India’s QRs during the
2008 food crisis, African countries do not have the ability to stabilize their markets via costly
storage, so they end up with increased price volatility at home and abroad (Will Martin,
personal communication, May 17, 2020). For an example of a ban on exports from Zambia,
see Koo, Mamun, and Martin (2020).
Small, import-dependent countries in Africa were thus deeply affected by the food and
economic crises. The countries most exposed to price swings on international markets were
typically poor and food importers, and most were in Africa (FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2011;
Konandreas 2012; Valdés and Foster 2012). The countries had few reserves and inadequate
budgetary means to procure food at high prices; generally, they also lacked the option of
restricting exports, although some, such as Malawi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zambia, did so
¹¹ The Uruguay Round disciplined the policies of OECD, which was initially reluctant to engage in trade
negotiations, and particularly the EU. It was the eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations conducted under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), from 1986 to 1993, involving 123 countries as “contracting
parties.” Effectively, it was a round of negotiations by and for developed countries, but with little voice or attention
to the concerns of developing countries.
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(Chirwa and Chinsinga 2015). They had to bear the brunt of the crisis, and domestic staple
food prices rose substantially in these countries. For example, rice prices increased consider-
ably in Senegal, following the export bans on rice imposed by several Asian countries. Some
researchers on Africa have shown, however, that unlike in Asia, public intervention has not
stabilized African food prices (Jayne 2012; Jayne and Minot 2014). On the contrary, it has
contributed to instability by untimely and unpredictable behavior of marketing parastatals.
Structural adjustment led to the elimination of government interventions in food markets,
with the expectation that the private sector would take its place. After liberalization in the
1980s, however, the private sector did not effectively take the place of marketing boards as fast
and as effectively as external reformers had expected in Africa (Lele 1991a, 1991b). This was
due in part to the very limited infrastructure, high internal transportation costs, poor market
information, and landlocked nature of some countries: for example, Malawi and Zambia.
Markets work when (1) there is competition in trading; (2) farmers have free and unfettered
market access; (3) transportation costs are low; and (4) information flows effectively (Lele
1990). Far too often these conditions have not prevailed in Africa. Ethiopia’s large investment
in physical infrastructure is paying off in improving market access (Bachewe et al. 2015).
In addition to promoting a privatized market setting (Byerlee, Jayne, and Myers 2005), the
World Bank promoted new market-based institutions and private risk management institu-
tions, including futures markets, crop insurance, and forward pricing, arguing that trade
liberalization was an important component of the strategy. These have been implemented in
many countries with somewhat mixed success. A key problem is that they find it difficult to
manage shocks arising from unpredictable government policies, such as export bans.
The need for some seasonal storage by the public sector is recognized (see, for example,
Basu 2015). Storage by farmers, using warehouse receipts to get credit, is also recognized
and increasingly encouraged: for example, in Ethiopia (Minot and Mekonnen 2012).
International trade can help mitigate production shocks through intra-annual response,
reducing commodity inventories and storage costs, improving efficiency, and reducing the
variance of crop prices. The dynamic, long-run implications of these effects on global food
markets could be considerable (Lybbert, Smith, and Sumner 2014).
African market development needs a consistent, predictable, gradual approach, including
substantial investment in physical infrastructure, information, storage, and access to credit,
among other requirements. Because markets do not work, traders lobby to keep control of
markets. Critics have argued that government intervention can exaggerate price instability,
unlike in Asia where it has stabilized prices. Since it is unlikely that public intervention in
markets will disappear completely anytime soon, public policy needs to focus on cost-
effective public interventions, transition to public and private partnerships, economic
analysis, transparent rules, and routine improved management of public sector interven-
tions (Lele 1971). There have been analytical/advisory efforts to this effect in Asia, as we
discuss later in the chapter.
Responses of Governments in Latin America
Even though many countries in Latin America are major exporters, Krivonos and Dawe,
editors of Policy Responses to High Food Prices in Latin America and the Caribbean, concluded:
Governments in Latin America applied an array of policy measures in reaction to
skyrocketing food prices, attempting either to contain the pass-through of world prices
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to consumers or to mitigate the negative consequences of high food prices through
transfers and food distribution. Market interventions to influence domestic prices ranged
from border measures to direct state purchasing and distributing of staple foods, primarily
cereals. At the same time, the vast majority of the countries in the region reinforced
programmes to stimulate production, typically by providing farmers with inputs, access to
credit and technical assistance. Some countries [most notably, Brazil and Mexico] coun-
teracted the negative implications of the price spikes by expanding safety nets to com-
pensate for the loss of consumers’ purchasing power . . . Other mitigation strategies
included the development of local markets and rural infrastructure to improve the flow
of food products from farms to cities, encouraging the diversification of consumption to
include traditional and locally produced products . . .
Policy makers . . . focused on the reduction or elimination of import tariffs and the
imposition of export restrictions on some key products. (Krivonos and Dawe 2014, 189)
Most importantly, with disorderly international markets and a lack of timely market
information, developing countries lost confidence in the reliability of the international
food markets, leading to increased support for the rhetoric of food self-sufficiency, some
of which has since receded into the background. Indeed, even donors were beginning to
change their stance. For example, the US State Department and the US Agency for
International Development (USAID) were advising policymakers in countries like Morocco
to focus more on food self-sufficiency and less on export orientation, quickly reversing their
own earlier advice and astonishing aid recipients (interviews with national policymakers in
Morocco and Bangladesh). This experience brought home the need to establish market
information. The Agricultural Market Information System has been one of the few signif-
icant responses to the crisis, among the many recommended by the two interagency reports
addressed to G20 after the crisis (G20 2011; Bioversity et al. 2012) (Box 3.4).
Box 3.4 The Agricultural Market Information System
The Agricultural Market Information System, established at the request of the Agricul-
ture Ministers of the G20 in 2011, has improved trade information on stocks and prices.a
AMIS is one of the most successful post-crisis initiatives (others are discussed in
Chapter 4).
Yet, there is scope for further improvement. The Doha Round of talks of the World
Trade Organization and recommendations by international agencies have seen little
progress. The huge tasks of investment in transport, communications, ports, and storage
facilities with big investment implications remain to be addressed.
The Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) is an inter-agency platform to
enhance food market transparency and policy response for food security. It was
launched in 2011 by the G20 Ministers of Agriculture . . . Bringing together the prin-
cipal trading countries of agricultural commodities, AMIS assesses global food supplies
(focusing on wheat, maize, rice and soybeans) and provides a platform to coordinate
policy action in times of market uncertainty. (AMIS 2015)
aAccording to the AMIS website (http://www.amis-outlook.org/amis-about/en/).
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Issues between Developed and Developing Countries Highlighted
by the 2007–8 Food Crisis
OECD’s Support to Agriculture
The high level of OECD support (Producer Support Estimates) has been a disincentive to
production in developing countries, and it is good that the support has been declining
(OECD 2016). The IMF’s independent evaluations have noted its unequal treatment of
developing countries with regard to agricultural subsidies in the course of loan negotiations.
In comparison to the light or nonexistent treatment of agricultural policies in developed
countries—where historically, the IMF only conducted surveillance—in developing coun-
tries, it provided loans for stabilization programs (IMF 2009). Having reduced their
protection in the 1990s, however, emerging countries in recent years have begun to provide
significant levels of support, particularly for import-competing commodities, which are













































































































11 emerging economies China OECD combined
Figure 3.8 Evolution of Producer Support Estimates, 1995–2016 (% of gross farm receipts)
compared to Chinese and OECD agricultural producer subsidies, 1990–2016 (US$bn)
A. Evolution of Producer Support Estimates, 1995–2016 (% of gross farm receipts)
Notes: The OECD total does not include the non-OECD EU member states. The Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia are included in the OECD total for all years and in the EU
from 2004. Latvia is included in the OECD and in the EU only from 2004.
The emerging economies are Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Russia,
South Africa, Ukraine, and Vietnam. Vietnam and the Philippines are included from 2000 onward. The 2016 data
for Indonesia were not available and proxies were used instead.
Source: Adapted from OECD (2017, Figure 1.6, 41); OECD (2019) and OECD Stat: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
888933506493
B. Chinese agricultural producer subsidies now equal those of all OECD countries combined: Producer Support
Estimate (PSE), 1990–2016 (US$bn)
Source: OECD (2019), 2017 Producer and Consumer Support Estimates, OECD Agriculture statistics (database);
http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?QueryId=77838&vh=0000&vf=0&l&il=&lang=en
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2010b; OECD 2017). Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Korea, and Japan still have high levels of
protection, and among emerging countries, China, Indonesia, Turkey, the Philippines, and
Colombia have protection levels about half the size of the former group of countries.
In the case of China, prices are higher, compared to the world market prices. Further-
more, whereas the EU has largely moved to non-production-distorting income support, the
United States has moved in the opposite direction, to a form that distorts commodity
production (OECD 2017). Anderson (2010b) supported the argument that protection of
import-competing commodities leads to higher food prices, and its overall impact on
poverty is generally adverse. Martin argues that, in the longer term, exogenously higher
prices tend to lower poverty (Ivanic and Martin 2014).
Citing Ivanic and Martin (2008), Anderson (2010a, 3244) elaborated, “A new proposal
for agricultural protectionism in developing countries . . . is based on the notion that agri-
cultural protection is helpful and needed for food security, livelihood security, and rural
development. This view has succeeded in bringing ‘Special Products’ and a ‘Special Safe-
guard Mechanism’ into the multilateral trading system’s agricultural negotiations, despite
the fact that such policies, which would raise domestic food prices in developing countries,
could worsen poverty and the food security of the poor.” Hertel has argued that special
products are a disastrous idea. A key problem is that they are a quantitative restriction that
would destabilize markets (Hertel, Martin, and Leister 2010).
Agricultural Policies of Large Developing Countries
in Asia: The World Trade Organization and Emerging
Food Policy Issues
Among emerging countries, Brazil and South Africa have had relatively open agricultural
trade policies. Protection of small farmers through input subsidies and minimum prices has
been an important feature of agricultural policies in China and India, each with high levels
of grain stocks (see Box 3.5). India and China, joined by the “G–33” countries (actually
Box 3.5 Food Self-Sufficiency and Price Stabilization Policies of
China and India
China
China is trying to increase domestic production (Ni 2013), but balancing supply and
demand has not been easy (Yu 2017). It is proposing to involve the private sector in
domestic purchases and storage. In 2016, China had accumulated substantial surpluses,
with maize stocks rising from an estimated 45 million tons in 2005, to over 100 million
tons in 2015. By 2013–15, stock-to-use ratios had reached 40 percent for wheat, 45
percent for maize, and above 60 percent for rice. The change in the internal terms of
trade seems to have been a result of the food crisis, which led China to double down on
the pursuit of food self-sufficiency (Huang, Yang, and Rozelle 2015). At the beginning of
the crisis, China released the government’s grain reserves, entered into long-term future/
Continued
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Box 3.5 Continued
forward contracts with trading firms in exporting countries, canceled support for storage
and transport of export grains, increased subsidies on grain production and input, and
enhanced social protection for urban consumers. China is exceptional in the extent to
which it learned lessons and improved its long-term strategy—for example, in addition
to revising its internal biofuels strategy, it has increased investment in research and
development (R&D).
China put into place a variety of policies to achieve national self-sufficiency. They
included: minimum prices for rice and wheat, ad hoc interventions for maize, direct
payments to support grain production, transfer payments to major grain-producing
counties, and comprehensive subsidization of agricultural inputs (see Figure 3.8), as
well as buffer stock norms and a few planting directives. Although price support also
exists for cotton and oilseeds, persistently higher returns for grains have led to land
being allocated to grain production, especially maize. With stocks rising and increas-
ing food demand, China decided to align domestic maize prices more closely with
world prices, with maize farmers receiving a deficiency payment equal to the differ-
ence between the market price and a target price since 2016. The abolition of
minimum prices and the unavoidable release of stocks was expected to lower domestic
prices. If the stocks-to-use ratio were to fall to a more sustainable 30 percent (implying
a total of 66 MT), then about 35 MT would need to be released. The release of stocks
tends to lower domestic prices, but some of the effect would be offset by increased
domestic quantities demanded at lower prices. If stocks were released gradually (say, at
5 MT per year), it could add 4 percent to annual trade in 2016 (or 130 MT) and 0.5
percent to world supplies (which run at 1,000 MT). The substitution of maize for
barley, sorghum, and distiller’s dried grains with solubles (DDGS) would potentially
result in much bigger effects on these markets. China’s self-sufficiency policy has
raised domestic prices and production, leading to huge stocks—100 million tons of
maize—but China can hardly be described as reluctant to trade. In 2014–15, China
imported 84.5 million tons of soybeans and 10 million tons of wheat, and maize
imports reached 8.9 million tons in 2015. With mounting surpluses, the USDA expects
its storage losses could amount to US$10 billion (see Gan 2017). China has set its
minimum support price (MSP) for wheat produced in 2018 at Yuan 2,300/MT
($345.94/MT), down Yuan 60/MT from the current level (has been unchanged since
2014, at Yuan 2,360/MT for major wheat producing areas); for the first time since
2006, a downward revision was made when China introduced the MSP for wheat (S&P
Global/Platts 2017).
India
India spent an estimated US$18.5 billion on subsidies annually and will spend US$4
billion annually under its right to food law, which will provide affordable food to 800
million people. Basu (2015) and others (Gulati and Saini 2015; Chand 2016; Gouel,
Gautam, and Martin 2016) have noted that price stabilization has been successful in
India, but it has been abominably unsuccessful as an anti-poverty program. India’s food
policy is highly contested within India, even among Indian intellectuals. India’s
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47 World Trade Organization [WTO] member countries) have been involved in an
extended dispute with the United States and the EU, described subsequently in the
chapter. Separately, the United States launched a complaint against China in September
2016, for providing domestic support to wheat, rice, and corn (Mehra 2018). The
complaint was joined by the EU and a number of Asian and Latin American countries,
including India.
Critics of the Indian food policy have argued that, instead of supporting agriculture by
distortionary input subsidies, India should invest more in agricultural support of the Green
Box variety,¹² particularly in public goods, in support of smallholder agriculture (Meijerink
and Achterbosch 2009)—a criticism with which we concur and that we discuss further in
Chapter 7 on the financing of agriculture.
OECD’s monitoring of price behavior included 49 countries that contributed 88 percent
of value-added to world agriculture, but it did not include India, the world’s second largest
producer of rice, wheat, and other cereals. A major global trader, India was at the center of
the export ban controversy during the crisis in 2007–8, and in the negotiation of the Bali
Package at the 9thWTOMinisterial Conference (FAO 2014). Countries like India sought to
achieve a “permanent solution” on public food stockholdings at Buenos Aires but talks
ended with no conclusive agreement (see Box 3.6 on the WTO and the controversy). India
joined in the OECD monitoring of price behavior in 2017.¹³
stabilization policies entail a combination of MSPs, food procurement and distribution,
and trade policies. The World Bank and FAO estimated the storage costs of the Food
Corporation of India (FCI) to be four times higher than long-run costs estimated for
other countries (World Bank and FAO 2012; Gouel, Gautam, and Martin 2016). Such
high costs make it difficult to justify public storage on economic grounds, as it would
be much less costly to rely on domestic private storage or on world trade and storage
abroad. Gouel, Gautam, and Martin (2016) demonstrated that, in India in the current
circumstances, significant cost savings could be made through a combination of
storage and trade costs, without any significant net loss in pure welfare (defined as
the sum of producers’ or consumers’ surplus), through a more open trade policy
together with storage rules that are similar to, but above competitive storage levels.
Some within India, however, argue that as the country is a large buyer, world market
prices rise when it goes on the world market to make purchases (see discussion in
Hoda and Gulati [2013]).
¹² The Green Box is a term used by the WTO in generally describing subsidies. The colors of boxes correspond
to those of traffic lights: green (permitted), amber (slow down—that is, needs to be reduced), and red (stop or
forbidden). The WTO explains, “In agriculture, things are, as usual, more complicated. The Agriculture Agree-
ment has no Red Box, although domestic support exceeding the reduction commitment levels in the Amber Box is
prohibited; and there is a Blue Box for subsidies that are tied to programmes that limit production. There are also
exemptions for developing countries (sometimes called an ‘S&D Box’)” (WTO 2020). For a further discussion, see
Chapter 7 on financing in this volume.
¹³ See the OECD document, “Review of Agricultural Policies in India” (TAD/CA(2018)4/FINAL), http://www.
oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=TAD/CA(2018)4/FINAL&docLanguage=En
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Box 3.6 The World Trade Organization
The world trading system is under stress from a variety of sources: climate change,
environmental degradation, unpredictable energy prices, biofuel policies, price volatility,
the changing nature of global and national food stocks, policies of major exporters that
jeopardize free and fair trade, changing long-term supply and demand patterns, incom-
plete information, and unequal bargaining power among trading partners. Global trade
agreements, on the other hand, have almost single-mindedly focused on freeing up
international trade and have not been able to address many of the issues that hinder free
and fair trade. The World Trade Organization (WTO), an intergovernmental organiza-
tion that regulates international trade, was officially established on January 1, 1995,
under the Marrakesh Agreement signed by 123 nations on April 15, 1994, replacing the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was established in 1948. When
the Agriculture Agreement of the Uruguay Round was signed by ministers of agriculture
in Marrakesh in 1994 to establish the WTO, the global environment for trade was very
different. The Uruguay Round, negotiated with a large voice for developed countries, was
a significant first step towards fairer competition, and a less distorted sector. WTO
member governments agreed to improve market access and reduce trade-distorting
subsidies in agriculture, which had been in place since the 1930s in response to food
shortages during the pre- and post-Second World War periods. The commitments to
reduce trade-distorting subsidies were to be phased in over six years from 1995 for
developed countries, and over 10 years for developing countries. Meanwhile, members
also agreed to continue the reform.
Further talks, which were separate from the committee’s regular work, began in 2000.
They were included in the broader negotiating agenda set at the 2001 Ministerial
Conference in Doha, Qatar. The so-called Doha Development Round, or Doha Devel-
opment Agenda (DDA), is the latest trade negotiation round of WTO, commenced in
2001. Its objective has been to lower trade barriers around the world and facilitate global
trade, but by 2016, Doha had stalled, owing to disagreements among members on the
terms of the next agreement—a period in which world agricultural trade, including, in
particular, the role of developing countries, had increased substantially. However,
developing countries were divided in their interests among exporters and importers,
middle- and low-income countries, and import-dependent countries.
Thus, at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali (MC9) in December 2013, several
proposals were presented to resolve the predicament of developing countries that were at
risk of violating WTO rules on domestic support because of their public stockholding
programs, which provide market price support to domestic producers. The problem is
that the same price is used for Public Distribution System (PDS) targets and price
stabilization. The two could be separated, the strategic stockpile at the MSP, to be
counted against the domestic support limit, and for PDS, purchases made at market
prices.
In Bali, WTO ministers decided to temporarily shield such programs from challenges
until a “permanent” solution could be worked out. Under the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, the distortive effect of market price support programs can be quantified into
a product-specific Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS). This is equal to the
difference between a fixed external reference price and an applied administered price,
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multiplied by the quantity of the product that is eligible to receive the administered price.
The resultant AMS figure must not exceed the de minimis value for such product, which is a
prescribed percentage of the value of annual production of the said product. Unfortunately, the
external reference prices based on import prices during 1986–8 are hopelessly out of date.
Consequently, their variance from current administered or buying prices has increased signifi-
cantly over time and now risks placing some countries in breach of their de minimis caps.
Montemayor (2014) presented several soft and hard options to arrive at a permanent solution,
including the use of dollar prices instead of local currency prices, shifting to subsidies on inputs
provided they are directed to poor deserving farmers, and equating “eligible” production only to
the proportion of local output that is actually marketed by producers. A possible area of
compromise would be to exempt developing countries from de minimis caps if their actual
procurement does not exceed a given percentage of local production. None of these options have
materialized. The mess of using 1986–8 prices as a base was introduced and should be fixed, but
this will not happen without a leader forWTO, andwithout developed and developing countries’
willingness to make compromises.
Trade facilitation (TF) emerged as a key deal maker/breaker. Major objectives of the
TF agreement were developed, and major exporting developing countries were to
accelerate customs procedures; reduce costs; and bring clarity, efficiency, and transpar-
ency into customs dealing, as well as to reduce bureaucracy and corruption, and promote
the use of modern tools and technology at customs clearance points. The deal was
estimated to generate about US$1 trillion worth of gains globally. The MC9 decision
stipulated that least developed countries (LDCs) would be required to undertake com-
mitments commensurate with their capacities. Both developed and developing country
members were asked to provide capacity-building support to the LDCs.
Despite the opposition to the agreement mounted by India and joined by China, with
the support of 33 other developing countries, the agreement was finally reached, marking
the first baby step in trade negotiations with a stalled Doha agreement, when developing
countries would have preferred a more comprehensive agreement to be reached. Pro-
ponents say the TF accord is a “good governance agreement” for customs procedures,
which industrialized countries want the developing and poorest countries to implement
in the coming days and years on a binding basis—failing which, the latter can be brought
before the WTO’s dispute settlement body. In return, the developing countries managed
to secure only “best endeavor agreements” on some issues of their concern in agriculture,
such as an interim mechanism for public stockholding for food security, transparency-
related improvements in what are called tariff rate quota administration provisions, and
most trade-distorting farm export subsidies and credits, which they argue give undue
advantage to developed countries in trade.
The poorest countries, as part of the “development” dossier, secured another set of
best-endeavor improvements concerning preferential rules of origin for exporting to
industrialized countries, preferential treatment for services and service suppliers in
LDCs, duty-free and quota-free market access for LDCs, and finally, a monitoring
mechanism for special and differential treatment flexibilities.
Developed countries, on the other hand, are interested in the issues of foreign direct
investment, intellectual property, food safety standards, and environmental manage-
ment. In the meantime, the US presidential election of 2016 demonstrated graphically
that globalization has turned sour in the United States, with a significant portion of the
Continued
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III. LESSONS LEARNED AND CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTATION
With substantial accumulated experience in price stabilization and trade, many lessons have
emerged.
Price Stabilization: Trade vs. Storage
Many developing countries have stabilized their domestic prices through stabilization
policies. Hence, domestic prices in low- and middle-income countries have typically
Box 3.6 Continued
American population believing they have lost in terms of employment and incomes, with
the consequent erosion of the middle class, when, in fact, they have benefited because of
lower costs of imported goods.
At the WTO’s Nairobi Ministerial Conference in December 2015, even though it had
been agreed that it was important to advance negotiations on remaining Doha issues
(including agricultural market access, domestic support, and export competition),
members acknowledged that there was no consensus on whether to reaffirm the Doha
mandate. The Nairobi agreement can be seen as “disciplining,” but not “eliminating”
those other “export measures with equivalent effect” (see Díaz-Bonilla and Hepburn
[2016] for further analysis of the Nairobi agricultural export competition outcome).
International cooperation on trade is in considerable disarray, since the arrival of the
Trump administration. Others have argued that major developed economies, whatever
they may say in public, have by now lost interest in continuing to pursue the Doha
Round in its present form. Separately, the Trump administration withdrew from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), in which the Obama administration had invested
considerable capital and secured a bipartisan agreement in the US Congress (Granville
2017). It is, perhaps, less clear with developing countries where they stand on the
DDA. Certainly, a very large number of developed countries at least say that they are
committed to it and still want it to proceed. Is that serious or tactical? Meanwhile, the
major developed economies have moved on. Bilateral or regional free trade agreements
and plurilateral agreements are in vogue. The two mega-regional agreements (TPP and
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), as well as the Japan–EU Free
Trade Agreement (FTA), represent a qualitative and a quantitative shift in that regard.
Meléndez-Ortiz (2016) suggested that policymakers and negotiators could usefully con-
sider a far broader development agenda fit for the new century—for example, whether
food security could be improved by adopting a value-chain approach to markets for food
and agriculture. What matters much more are issues such as foreign direct investment,
services, state-owned enterprises, intellectual property protection, and transparency, not to
mention such areas as the environment and labor. The rest of the world is convinced of the
need to tackle these issues collectively—whether globally or regionally is unclear. Martin
and Mattoo (2011) outlined the need for a more up-to-date agenda in a comprehensive
study of the Doha proposals in 2011, which has not yet been followed up.
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increased less than world prices (Dawe et al. 2015), and have been less volatile than world
prices, while broadly following world price movements, as many developing countries,
particularly those in Asia, now tend to do.
Movements in domestic prices are influenced by many factors, including public invest-
ment in R&D, policies that promote private investment, domestic and international trade
policies, and year-over-year changes in weather, as well as by stabilization policies. Finally,
domestic price changes have varied widely across countries. Thus, not all price changes in
domestic policies are necessarily caused by increases in world market prices.
International organizations have advocated government purchases at MSPs to promote
and accelerate adoption of new technologies. India provides a good case study, because it
was the largest recipient of World Bank loans and credits and US food and financial aid, the
latter in the 1960s and 1970s, with considerable interaction between external advice and
domestic policy. Some of India’s experience is generalizable to other developing countries.
Purchases of wheat and rice at guaranteed prices were meant to reduce the risks of adoption
of the new Green Revolution technologies. Indeed, the World Bank and the United States
(Orville Freeman, the US Secretary of Agriculture, at the direction of President Johnson)
helped to institute the organizational infrastructure of the Food Corporation of India (FCI)
and made other public sector interventions: for example, directing credit to farmers in the
Punjab and Haryana and MSPs for rice and wheat, conditional on lending to India during
the 1960s. During the 1970s, the World Bank supported parastatal marketing in Africa,
inherited from the British and French colonial period. Since the era of structural adjust-
ment, international organizations have promoted trade as the first-best solution.
In his book, An Economist in the Real World: The Art of Policymaking, Basu (2015), who
served as the Chief Economic Advisor to the Government of India and later as the Chief
Economist of the World Bank (2012–16), explained why producer and consumer price
stabilization is necessary in countries such as India, where agriculture contributes 14
percent of GDP, and yet, 59 percent of the population live in poverty. Most of the poverty
is found in rural areas and limits poor people’s abilities to take risk. A large proportion of
the poor depend on the market for food. Basu argued that the government needs to pay a
higher-than-market price to command supplies, and it needs to offer food to the poor at
lower-than-market prices. The nonpoor would pay a price higher than the market without
government intervention. The difference and the extent of subsidy would depend on the
amount the government undertakes to provide to the poor, both in quantity per person and
in coverage of the population, and how efficient the government is in its task—a relatively
simple piece of arithmetic that is affected by the political economy of a country.
Minimum support prices (MSPs) are a very rigid device that can easily cause programs to
collapse. Australia had one of these for wool, and it collapsed, as did all the international
agreements that used this approach. India combines stockholding with trade policy, which
makes it more sustainable than the US loan rates or Australian wool prices. An important
question, however, iswhether it is cost-effective. A similar degree of stabilizationwithout the rigid
floor would costmuch less and avoid the risk of collapse. See Gouel, Gautam, andMartin (2016).
Safety Nets to Deal with Chronic and Transitory Poverty in India
India’s price stabilization policy has been closely related to its safety nets, discussed later in
the chapter. Basu (2015) and others considered the problem of mounting stocks that India,
like China, has faced to be one of timing and the extent of release of the procured grain,
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which requires cabinet approval and lacks transparent rules for the timing and amount of
releases, rather than problems with procurement or physical or financial losses. Evidence
seems to suggest otherwise.
Basu (2015) made a useful distinction between price stabilization programs and anti-
poverty programs, although historically they are closely linked. In addition to the US$18.5
billion annual spending, India will spend US$4 billion annually under the right to food law,
in theory providing affordable food to 800 million people. Basu (2015) and others have
noted that price stabilization has been successful in India (Gouel, Gautam, and Martin
2016), but as an anti-poverty program, it is deeply flawed, making only a small dent in
poverty (Basu 2015). Others argue the Public Distribution System (PDS) was only relevant
for urban areas. The poor accessed PDS food either directly or indirectly through the
families they worked for. This situation distorts figures that are used to argue that the
middle class benefits, but the poor do not (FCI 2015).
Stabilization policies entail a combination of MSPs, food procurement and distribution,
and trade policies. If FCI’s storage costs are four times higher than long-run costs estimated
for other countries, then it raises questions about justification of public storage (Box 3.5)
(World Bank and FAO 2012; Gouel, Gautam, and Martin 2016). Critics in India have
disputed these storage and transaction costs (Drèze and Khera 2013).
Empirical Research on Prices, Consumers, and Producers
Academic research has begun to catch up with policy concerns, but some recent studies
have addressed only high or rising prices, and others, volatility. Some look at impacts on
consumers and others, on small subsistence producers. Holistic studies by economists with
policy experience, which we review later, provide a different perspective. Based on the
analysis of food prices and riots in cities of developing countries, including the toppling of
governments in Tunisia and Madagascar, Barrett and Bellemare (2011a, 2011b) acknowl-
edged that high price levels did indeed adversely affect poor consumers and even explained
social unrest. Anderson, Martin, and Ivanic (2017), on the other hand, argued that tempo-
rary high price spikes matter more to consumers than price volatility—that volatility has
positive welfare effects on high-income consumers.
There seems to be a consensus emerging among economists that small producers and net
buyers of food are adversely affected by increased price volatility, since it increases risks in
their production decisions. Whether to stabilize prices or incomes is a matter of debate. In
India, where the average farm size is less than 1 acre and declining, and where less than 50
percent of farm income and food supply comes from own production, Chand, Saxena, and
Rana (2015, 143) attributed “farmers’ distress” and even farmer suicides to the decline in
farmer incomes and heightened income volatility. Bellemare (2015) confirmed that high
food prices and political instability tend to be particularly high in low-income countries, as
also addressed by Arezki and Brückner (2011), but Bellemare did not address volatility.
Barrett and Bellemare (2011a) argued the need for different policy responses, depending on
whether the objective is to protect consumers from high (not volatile) food prices or to
protect producers (from low and volatile) prices. They, like others, have noted that policies
such as export bans, price controls, and price stabilization schemes, aimed at curbing food
price volatility, are misguided if the policymakers’ goal is to increase the welfare of the poor
or to avert political unrest in the country. Such policies have a poor record in achieving
those objectives. Instead, policymakers should consider policies that prevent sharp rises in
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food prices, such as removing barriers to international agricultural trade—although open
trade may not help when the crisis is a result of supply shortages (such as in 2007–8, when
shortages were due to diversion of production to biofuels) or of decreasing investment in
scientific research on crop productivity improvement, on soil and water conservation, on
reducing postharvest losses (some studies have argued these losses run to nearly 50 percent
in many low-income countries) (HLPE 2014), or on renewable energy sources that do not
compete with food for land and harvests (Barrett and Bellemare 2011a, 2011b).
Minten et al. (2016) also demonstrated that African countries with more open trade
regimes experienced less volatility than those without. They further noted that these
measures are the best long- and short-run policy responses, not only to high price levels
but also to high price volatility. This is generally true for countries with small imports.
When large countries go on the world market, it typically leads to increased prices. While it
is true that food price volatility today encourages farmers to reduce inputs, as a hedge
against price risk, thereby helping drive higher price levels tomorrow, it is equally true that
expanded production—or reduced harvest loss to spoilage, waste, and diversion to biofuels
production—drives down prices and encourages stockbuilding, which stabilizes prices.
Stocks depend, however, on expectations. Stocks will go up if expected prices, corrected
for storage costs and interest rates, rise and vice versa.
Most economists in donor organizations support the positions of Barrett and Bellemare
(2011a, 2011b) and have considered public storage and stabilization to be wasteful and a
bad idea (Larson 2014). Plenty of evidence supports their concerns, including India’s
officially produced report on FCI (FCI 2015) and the Policy Research Working Paper of
the Agriculture Global Practice Group of the World Bank, prepared by Gouel, Gautam,
and Martin (2016).
Not all economists share the view that stabilization should be avoided at all costs,
particularly for large countries. As noted earlier, Timmer (2010) argued that price stabili-
zation in Asia has served an important purpose of protecting 2 billion people, most of them
poor consumers, and maintaining political stability, even if that meant exporting instability
abroad. “In terms of aggregate global welfare, stabilizing domestic rice prices in these large
countries using border interventions might be an effective way to cope with food crises, even
after considering the spillover effects on increased price volatility in the residual world
market” (Timmer 2010, 6). Timmer did not explore, however, the high fiscal cost of these
policies and their limited impact on intended beneficiaries, and their contributions to global
market price volatility, as described here.
Wright (2013) and others have argued also that if large countries like China had not had
stabilization policies, and if they had relied completely on the international market, the food
price crisis of 2007–8 would have been much worse. Apart from stabilizing urban prices,
high rural prices are also set by governments out of concern about rural unrest.
In food-importing countries, pressure on the balance of payments increased due to (1)
the higher cost of imports; (2) the added fiscal pressures from increasing input subsidies and
price supports to compensate for price increases; (3) the hardship on import-dependent
consumers (for example, in the Philippines and Bangladesh) from export bans imposed by
neighboring exporting countries (for example, China and India); (4) the cushioning of
domestic prices from international price rises, leading to a muted supply response; and (5)
the exaggeration of international price rises by countries pursuing policies to protect
domestic consumers (for example, the Philippines entered into long-term rice import
contracts). Indonesia (rice) and Egypt (wheat) maintained their domestic prices by sub-
sidizing imports, and had to use export bans to stop this wheat flowing out.
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Why Has It Been Hard to Convince Developing Countries’
Policymakers to Abandon Price Stabilization Policies?
Most industrialized countries have promoted stable food supplies and prices through exten-
sive public interventions. In Europe, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was set up
explicitly for this purpose and succeeded in meeting this objective, though at a high cost until
it was reformed following the Uruguay Round. Agriculture also has been heavily subsidized in
Japan and in the United States, the latter as “a national security issue” (Bush 2001, 920).
Import dependence also has a political dimension. Basu (2015) noted that the United States
denied rice exports to Bangladesh in 1974, in a critical time of its need, because Bangladesh
was trading with Cuba. President Johnson’s “short tether” policy in India—food aid ship-
ments were conditional on India keeping silent about the VietnamWar—and known in India
as the “ship-to-mouth existence” of the 1960s, instilled a strong resolve in India to never again
put itself in the situation of being at a disadvantage (Lele and Goldsmith 1989). The United
States similarly restricted food aid flows to Bangladesh for political reasons.
Critics of the free trade policy argue that liberalized trade leads to import surges of a food
staple, displacing the domestic market and, thereby, decreasing domestic production and
employment by startling percentages. Anuradha Mittal argued that Indonesia’s import
liberalization, prompted by multilateral organizations following its economic crisis in
1998, resulted in a huge increase in imports, leading to farmer distress and to the govern-
ment reimposing import controls in 2002 (Mittal 2009). Others have a different take on the
impact of the import surge: a big surge in imports occurred before import controls were
loosened and was due to a massive El Niño that led in turn to a massive decline in
production. Throughout these years, domestic rice prices were higher than during the
period 1969–96, so it is hard to say that farmers were in distress because of additional
imports. Perhaps they were in distress because of bad weather and political instability
(personal communication, David Dawe, February 2019).
Crisis Response and Long-term Development: The Right to Food
and Social Safety Nets
Internationally, social safety nets were clear targets for cuts in the 1980s, during the decade
of structural adjustment. Yet, a broad consensus has emerged, particularly in the Bretton
Woods institutions, of the importance of safety nets in protecting the poor. Concurrently
with increased recognition that growth is necessary but not sufficient to reduce poverty,
institutionalization of safety nets has been increasingly advocated. The domestic dynamics
of safety nets, however, tends to be quite different.
India’s Right to Food and Domestic Support
India’s right to food law, the National Food Security Act (NFSA) of 2013, is an example of
the political economy of policymaking (Government of India 2016a, 2016b). Supported and
promoted by UN resolutions and covering two-thirds of the population—nearly 800 million
people—NFSA is the largest such safety net program. In reality, it typically distributes only a
third of the production. NFSA has had strong support in the United Nations and FAO,
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influenced in part by Amartya Sen’s ideas of capabilities of the poor (Sen 1985), and is
supported by Indian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and economists on the left
(Drèze and Sen 2013). Passed by Parliament in September 2013, on the verge of the
departure of the long-standing Centre-Left United Front Parties, the Act aims to provide
coverage far larger than existed previously.¹⁴
The right to food law has been questioned by economists on the right who advise the
Modi government currently in power (Bhagwati and Panagariya 2013). There is an active
debate on the merits of cash transfers versus food distribution, particularly with the passage
of the “Aadhaar” (the unique electronic identity card) bill in the Indian Parliament in
March 2016¹⁵ and universal bank accounts, which enable transfer of funds directly into the
bank accounts of women, reducing intermediaries and greatly increasing savings.
Drèze and Khera (2013) noted that the public distribution of food has reduced the
poverty gap index, and rural poverty has declined by a fifth nationally and by considerably
more in better functioning Indian states. They acknowledged, however, that the PDS still
has very little impact on rural poverty in a number of large states such as Bihar, Jharkhand,
Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal, where PDS reforms are long overdue. PDS suffers from
exclusion error, as well as inclusion error (Parikh 2013). Identifying the target group and
scaling up are the real challenges. Drèze and Khera (2013) also favored in-kind food
distribution, rather than cash transfers, since cash transfers can be spent on things other
than food. Gulati, on the other hand, has often forcefully argued that in India, there is huge
scope to improve the efficiency of public distribution, ensuring that benefits reach the
neediest, targeting direct payments more sharply to beneficiaries, and shifting to cash
transfers (see Saini and Gulati [2015]).
Indian states are beginning to experiment with cash transfers and to use information
technology to monitor distribution of publicly distributed grain, to minimize “leakages”
(inclusion and exclusion errors, meaning those not intended as beneficiaries benefit from
the program and those intended to be beneficiaries tend to be excluded): for example, in
Kerala and Bihar. Under “competitive federalism,” the Government of India sets MSPs for
23 commodities but leaves to the states the responsibility of setting examples of good
practice, which others may emulate. States have had a mixed record on the implementation
of MSPs (Chand 2018).
The role of public procurement and distribution of food relative to cash transfers and the
role of much needed investment expenditures in agriculture and related sectors to increase
farm productivity, relative to the amount of resources spent on safety net programs, will
continue to be debated in a country in which the majority of farmers are smallholders and
experience food deficit.
¹⁴ In their article, “The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness Theory and Evidence from India,”
Besley and Burgess (2002) found that:
Having a more informed and politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be
responsive. This suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring
that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy. The ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from
India, . . . [showing] that state governments are more responsive to falls in food production and crop flood damage
via public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure where newspaper circulation is higher and electoral
accountability greater. (Besley and Burgess 2002, 1415)
¹⁵ See “The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016”
(http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-aadhaar-targeted-delivery-of-financial-and-other-subsidies-benefits-and-
services-bill-2016–4202/).
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Minimum Support Prices, Diversification of Agriculture,
and a Lack of Consensus
The level of food distribution commitment in India has led to a de facto nationalization of
purchases of rice and wheat in surplus states, including Punjab, Haryana, Western Uttar
Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh. Recognizing the carbohydrate-centric diet of the Indian
population and the decline in pulse consumption, India has adopted a new pulse mission to
diversify agriculture beyond cereals, accompanied by price support and trade policies
toward pulses (Aditya et al. 2017). Basu (2015) did not question the objective of price
stabilization, across seasons or across poor years, nor the objective of providing food to the
poor at lower than market prices. He faulted the policy for not recognizing its full implica-
tions. The policy has not been so clearly devised. Furthermore, the problems are more in the
release of stocks than in procurement, and in the way the policy is executed. There is a need
for clear rules and transparency, not for more cabinet meetings.
Cash transfers are more cost effective than in-kind transfers, but NGOs working on the
ground do not accept this. The use of identity cards in India is the largest such experiment
in the world, but the debate will likely continue on the merit of alternative approaches.
There are still problems with identity cards, which need to be resolved.
Drèze and Khera (2013) argued that aid in-kind is more likely to lead to improved food
consumption. Others have argued that cash transfers—even when made directly to
women—are captured by the men of the household, and worse, often used for alcohol.
A recent survey of Indian women indicated they prefer food distribution to cash transfers.
Clearly, the precise forms of social safety nets are context specific. The efficiency of transfer
programs will certainly be better informed by independent impact evaluations of different
types of safety nets—payments in-kind or in cash—with results widely disseminated to
influence policy.
Gouel, Gautam, and Martin (2016, 3) argued that the current stock and hold policy is
costly, and furthermore, high costs “make it difficult to justify any level of public storage
in the country without significant overall loss in welfare” (Gouel, Gautam, and Martin
2016, 4). It is well worth exploring whether the private sector would be willing to store
across crop years, without engaging in excessively speculative behavior, and what policies
would be needed to achieve it.
In India, past governments have passed food security laws to supply subsidized grain at
Rs.1, 2, and 3 per kg to two-thirds of the population. To run PDS, food procurement is
required. The three pillars of food security in India were globally applauded: namely, food
procurement for MSPs, buffer stock-for-price stability, and the PDS.¹⁶ A Senate committee
found that if losses of FCI are included and one compares economic costs with market
prices charged by private traders in deficit states, the two are at par. So, the question
becomes whether to bear the so-called inefficiency of FCI or the exploitation by India’s
smart petty traders and middlemen. If market reforms are accomplished and prices are
competitive, the need for MSP procurement will decline or even become unnecessary. Then,
cash transfers rather than physical distribution of food would be preferable. China is also
wrestling with issues of public–private partnerships in its policy reforms, so it could be
beneficial for China and India to exchange experiences.
¹⁶ As defined by the World Health Organization, the three pillars of food security are food access, food
availability, and food use. See “India’s Water & Food Security/Three Pillars of Food Security,” https://sites.google.
com/site/indiaswaterfoodsecruity/home/three-pillars-of-food-security.
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Conclusion
The crisis highlighted the vulnerability of developing countries to a combination of factors:
policies of large countries with global reach in trade, such as the US biofuel policies; and
successive crop failures and responses of large individual countries, such as China, India,
and Indonesia, to protect their domestic consumers and producers from external shocks.
Import-dependent countries became particularly vulnerable. Trade is important to reduce
this vulnerability, but it has its limits. The recent debacle of medical supply chains, in the
context of the COVID-19 pandemic, shows that excessive focus on efficiency and cost-
effectiveness needs to be balanced with resilience.
The crisis also made more acceptable the concept of “food self-sufficiency” and protec-
tion of the domestic food sector, which China and India have practiced over decades, as they
emerged as important agricultural producers and traders. WTO discussions in Argentina
continued to show the limitations of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). The United
States—traditionally, the strongest champion of free trade—moved toward protectionism,
questioning the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and exiting from the
TPP (Strait Times 2018). Global trade rules were already in trouble, as biofuel policies had
demonstrated. The new US–Mexico–Canada Agreement was supposed to fix some of the
problems the Trump administration perceived in the old NAFTA, but it is too new to know
how well it will work (Mauldin and Salama 2019).
The most important challenge is to invest much more in R&D than many developing
countries are currently doing. As economies grow and diets diversify, relying on imports is
much less of a concern. Singapore produces no food but is very food secure, as is Hong
Kong. Japan has reduced its agricultural protection without loss of food security—although
its farmers still use food security as an argument for support.
Two key issues that the crisis highlighted, on which there has been relatively little
progress, are:
1. The conflict between the interest of individual nation states and global trading rules,
which place limits on national behavior that harms trading partners; and
2. The need to invest in agriculture for countries to achieve a certain degree of national
self-reliance in food and nutrition (Fukase and Martin 2016).
The Uruguay Round is credited with cleaning up the previously abysmal CAP price
insulation that pushed world price volatility onto much more vulnerable producers in poor
countries. The one area in which there has been considerable progress but could be more,
with greater financial investment in data, is information on production, food systems, and
trade (via AMIS), ranging from household to global levels, given the increased risk of
climate change and trade uncertainty.
The combination of factors, however, which ensued over time—the “perfect storm”—
compounded the impacts of the actions that developing countries took, including, in
particular, the export bans that several Asian countries imposed. Both the genesis of the
crisis and the bans highlighted how the solutions to the crisis seemed very different from
various national perspectives, particularly of major exporting countries like the United
States, India, and other developing countries trading in grain, and of other countries
impacted by their actions. In the end, all policymakers were responding to consumers
and producers in their individual countries, and there was little concern about spillover
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effects of their actions beyond their national borders and little progress on agreements such
as export bans, in the interest of all.
To maintain the political legitimacy of their domestic stakeholders, policymakers of
OECD continue to respond to their lobbies in support of biofuel policies, for which there
is little justification. Preoccupied with concerns about food prices and domestic inflation,
developing countries have pursued import and export strategies, and safety nets have
acquired increasing importance (World Bank 2015b, 2017a). The crisis highlighted many
of the long-standing issues between OECD countries and developing countries with respect
to free trade and development concerns, which stalled the DDA, notwithstanding the
economic logic of free trade. These issues were more significant in 2007 than they had
been in 1972, at the time of the first global food crisis, because food and energy markets were
more integrated in the new millennium than they had been in the 1970s, and developing
countries were more significant economic players on the world stage in 2007–8.
A number of useful steps have been taken since the latest crisis. At the WTO meeting in
Argentina, China reaffirmed economic globalization as an irreversible historic trend, and its
staunch support for economic globalization and the multilateral trading system as critical
safeguards for prosperity and development. More than 100 countries backed a joint
proposal by China and India for eliminating the trade-distorting farm subsidies of
US$160 billion in the United States, EU, Japan, Canada, Norway, and Switzerland,
among other nations at WTO’s 11th trade ministerial summit in Buenos Aires (ICTSD
2017c, 2017d). Another mandated issue concerned the permanent solution for public
stockholding (PSH) programs in developing countries, which had been agreed to four
years previously in Bali, Indonesia. India and China have pushed on the issue jointly with
other developing countries (see more at ICTSD [2017a]). Reflecting differences between
exporting and importing countries, Argentina, hosting the summit, warned that the China–
India proposal was a recipe for the breakdown of the Buenos Aires meeting (ICTSD 2017b).
India could easily solve this invented “problem” simply by changing its procedures,
which would allow India to focus on real problems, in contrast to trying to break these
rules to avoid making slight changes in its stockholding and PDS procedures. Interest
groups at the FCI are not interested in a solution, but India at large would be much better
off with such a solution.
India also took the position that new issues such as e-commerce and trade in services
should not be considered until the old ones, such as OECD subsidies and permanent
stockholding, had been addressed. The Trump administration refused to pursue the PSH
issue, while pushing ahead with talks on e-commerce and trade in services (ICTSD 2017e;
Kanth 2017). We have reviewed these developments in this chapter and in the rest of the
book, and it is unclear what the future holds for the global governance of food and
agriculture, including, particularly, agricultural trade rules, following the growing protec-
tionist tendency in the United States and WTO discussions in Argentina in 2017 (WTO
2017). The future of WTO is unclear. Much will depend on whether Trump is reelected.
If he is, many fear for WTO’s future. Will the crisis of 2006 repeat itself in 2020?
Effect of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Poverty
IFPRI projected that for any one percentage point slowdown of the global economy, the
number of poor—and with it the number of food-insecure people—would increase by 1.6 to
3 percent. Due to the paralysis of economies caused by COVID-19 containment measures,
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global poverty may increase by 14 million people based on a 1.9 percent increase in total
factor productivity (TFP) (and possibly much more depending on the nature of the
economic trade disruptions) (Vos, Martin, and Laborde 2020). This was a conservative
estimate. In April 2021, IMF estimated an additional 95 million people had entered the
ranks of the extreme poor in 2020, as compared to the pre-pandemic projections, and found
considerable divergence in the rates of economic recovery—that is, in 2020, growth of 6.4
percent in the United States and 8.4 percent in China, but losses of 5.4 percent in LICs and
4.4 percent in emerging countries (IMF 2021).
Kharas and Hamel noted 12 countries that are likely to see an increase in poverty of over
1 million people in 2020, as a result of COVID-19. These vulnerable countries—
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia,
India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan, and Zimbabwe—are mainly
located in Asia and Africa. Brazil is the exception in the Latin American region. India and
Nigeria are likely to add 10 million and 8 million, respectively, to the poverty rolls in 2020.
“In all these countries, COVID-19 has demonstrated the vulnerability of people who have
only recently been able to escape poverty” (Kharas and Hamel 2020). (See, also, Lele, Bansal,
and Meenakshi [2020].)
Schmidhuber, Pound, and Qiao (2020) of FAO note that with most countries more
dependent on food imports today than they were 20 years ago, disruptions caused by
COVID-19 could trigger a repeat of the food crisis of 2007–8, when a sharp rise in prices
led to panicking governments, which imposed trade restrictions (Schmidhuber and Qiao
2020).
However, there are some major differences between 2007 and 2020. Both agricultural and
energy prices in 2020 are low, and agricultural trade is much larger than in 2007, with the
numbers of both importers and exporters higher than in 2007, and with considerable
competition among exporters and importers. “Today cereal stocks are twice as high as
they were then. Bulk shipping is 20 times cheaper and crude oil is just $30 a barrel. That
makes all manner of inputs cheaper and pushes the price of fuel feedstocks like corn and
sugar lower still . . . ” (Economist 2020b).
Another important difference is that due to scale economies, and economies of agglom-
eration, a few multinational suppliers supply most of the volume of processed grains,
livestock, and poultry; due to well-developed global value chains, they are able to purchase
unprocessed agricultural materials from sources of cheapest supply and then ship, process,
and package them elsewhere. Due to uncertainty, consumers have been stocking up more
supplies than usual. However, due to a loss of demand from restaurants and the absence of
scale purchases, there also has been huge wastage of food in the short run—this could result
in farmers planting less and food prices rising. Another difference between 2007–8 and 2020
is the fewer trade barriers in 2020. The Economist briefing further notes:
In 2007–2008, 33 countries declared export controls. Those bans caused most of the 116%
rise in rice prices seen then. This time 19 states have so far limited exports and the impact
is much less. 2007–08’s control affected 19% of the world’s traded calories; this year’s so
far affect just 5 percent. (Economist 2020b)
Fortunately, the COVID-19 crisis has led to a variety of innovations in the areas of food
supply, delivery, small business enterprises, use of digital tools, food-related safety nets, cash
and food transfers, among others, to deal with the drop in consumer demand, detailed in
IFPRI’s COVID-19 and Global Food Security (Swinnen and McDermott 2020).
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The crisis has also reinforced the G20 support for AMIS, keeping market information
flows accessible to all and at center stage. It will also further spur the development of the
nexus between food systems and health systems, and the broader discussion on food
systems that will emanate from such a connection.
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4
From Food Security to Nutrition Security for All
Uma Lele and Sambuddha Goswami
Summary
The World Health Organization (WHO) declares malnutrition, in all its forms, to be a
critical global public health problem. Increasingly, undernutrition and overweight, obesity,
and diet-related noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) coexist in nations, communities, and
households—and even within the same individual across the life course. Undernutrition
continues to cause nearly half the deaths in children under 5 years and impedes achieve-
ment in surviving children, diminishing their economic, social, educational, and occupa-
tional potentials. Similarly, overweight, obesity, and diet-related NCDs, increasing in
children and adults, result in early onset of debilitating diseases, such as diabetes and
heart disease, leading to premature mortality.
In this chapter, we review the evolution of the international food security and nutrition
(FSN) discourse since the end of the SecondWorld War. Nutrition was part of the founding
principles of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), but as we
show in this chapter, the focus shifted to proteins and then to calories, before shifting again
in recent years to food security, defined and measured largely as calorie deficits to nutrition.
Attention to FSN, broadly defined, has accelerated in recent years, after its near neglect
starting in the 1980s, until about 2007. Then, a major series of empirical analyses and
advocacy brought nutrition to the forefront. Since, then, the food systems discourse has
intensified and become more complex with both the report of the Global Panel on
Agriculture and Food Systems for Nutrition (GLOPAN 2016), “Food Systems and Diets”
and the report of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS)–High Level Panel of
Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE), “Nutrition and Food Systems” (HLPE
2017), providing a broader and encompassing analysis of these systems, followed by the
much debated the EAT–Lancet Commission report (Willett et al. 2019), and then, the
planned United Nations (UN) Food Summit in 2021 (UN 2020b). With the increasing
role of value chains and purchased foods in consumption, the nature of the debate on food
systems has changed. Historically, policy focus and actions on food security have been
cyclical, with attention to food policies growing in periods of food shortages and waning
with surpluses. Now, climate change and resource degradation are long-term threats. They
have reduced the resilience of food systems and robbed food of its nutrient content. These
various factors have increased our understanding of the complexity of food and nutrition
security (WHO 2018b, 2020). The situation calls for transformative change in research,
information and outreach, political commitment, and financial and institutional capacity to
achieve sustainable and equitable food systems. Change, to date, has been incremental, not
transformative, however, to significantly improve outcomes, an issue to which will be a
central theme of the Food Systems Summit 2021 and the intensive discussions leading up to
it (UN 2020b).
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The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have powered the recent FSN discourse.
SDG2 reflects progress in conceptualizing FSN but also illustrates its complexity. It is
broader in scope than Millennium Development Goal 1 (to halve the number of hungry
by 2015). SDG2 aims to “end hunger and malnutrition in all its forms, double agricultural
productivity and income, ensure sustainability and practice resilient agriculture, maintain
genetic biodiversity, correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions, promote markets
and increase investments including through international cooperation” (UN 2020a).
And, yet, SDG2 is not broad enough; it does not pay enough attention to the growing
incidence of obesity, as do the World Health Assembly (WHA) targets for 2025 (FAO et al.
2019). Furthermore, the interrelationship of the subtargets of SDG2 is anything but
straightforward.¹ Growth in agricultural productivity does not necessarily increase incomes
of small farmers, and productivity growth does not always assure improved nutrition.
Increased income does not necessarily lead to improved nutrition. This also applies to the
relationship of SDG2 to several other of the 16 SDGs. The scope of this chapter is necessarily
broad, therefore, extending well beyond SDG2, in considering the relationship between FSN
and multiple dimensions of poverty and deprivation.
Traditionally, the World Bank and international organizations (IOs) have focused on
income poverty, but increasingly the concept of multidimensional poverty (MDP) has
rightly received attention in explaining FSN. MDP is substantially higher than income
poverty, particularly among children. It explains better the different aspects of nutritional
status than does income poverty. International aid is disproportionately skewed away from
countries with high incidence of MDP. This means that national policy and its implemen-
tation is more important in countries with the highest incidence of MDP. We provide
evidence in this chapter to support these observations. In addition, we examine the
relationship of gender inequality and nutrition, and gender and obesity, and the roles of
changing lifestyles, food systems, and modern food supply systems and value chains. We
conclude with the lessons of this body of knowledge for future research and action,
particularly in focusing on the multidimensional nature of poverty, the food systems
approach, critical role of gender, and the need for public policy to examine the critical
choices it faces in dealing with the private sector, ensuring the latter plays a more construc-
tive role in containing the scourge of obesity and food-related diseases, including diabetes,
cancer, and heart-related diseases, among others.
Introduction
In this chapter, we first outline some of the commonly used concepts of chronic and
transitory undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, and obesity, and then define the
concepts of FSN and implications of concepts for measurement. We then present some of
the recent trends in hunger including, in particular, the recent rise in the incidence of
hunger. We show the disconnect between trends in global and regional poverty and trends
in global and regional hunger. Reported incidence of poverty have declined very rapidly,
whereas reported undernourishment has declined far more slowly, and even that slow
decline has been reversed in recent years, whereas poverty trends had slowed but not
¹ See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg2 and “Targets & Indicators” for a list of all targets and
indicators for SDG2.
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declined until the onset of COVID-19. Given the focus of this book on food for all at all
times, we then look at the alternative approaches to exploring the relationship between
poverty and different concepts of food security: for example, calorie gap and nutrient gap,
as each relates to the issues of “sustainable” food systems, an idea increasingly in vogue.
We also consider an entitlement approach and the multidimensional nature of poverty.
Each provides a different way out of food insecurity. Half the multidimensionally poor are
children, a phenomenon that often gets overlooked in the discussion of income poverty,
including the distressing conditions of destitution. Having established the conditions of
poverty, we explore the relationship between MDP and different indicators of food
security: for example, traditionally measured undernutrition using FAO’s measures of
Prevalence of Undernourishment (PoU) and the more recent Food Insecurity Experience
Scale (FIES), and distinct from dietary diversity and the extent of its nutritional
content, stunting, and wasting. Equally important, we look at various indicators of gender
equality, as constructed by different IOs, across countries, and indicators of food security,
again showing significant correlation between reducing MDP and income poverty with
stunting.
This discussion is followed by how the concept of nutrition itself has evolved: for
example, from protein malnutrition to calorie deficit to micronutrient deficiency, concepts
that were in ascendancy in different decades. Advocacy in food and nutrition by different
organizations—FAO starting in the 1970s, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
from the early 1990s, and WHO, as reflected in its WHA targets to 2025—has in each case
played a role in emphasizing different aspects of food security: for example, FAO’s halving
the number of undernourished by 2015, UNICEF on the issues of child care and women’s
health indicators, and WHO on nutrition and health-related indicators. We discuss the rise,
fall, and subsequent rebound of prioritizing nutrition by decade, a combination of changing
expert opinion in ascendancy and the decline of attention to nutrition in the 1980s and
1990s, as a result of the external environment. Also, we describe how nutrition advocacy by
the development community brought nutrition to the center stage. After a lost decade, the
focus on food security from 2007 to 2012, coinciding with the period of the food and
financial crises, was based almost entirely on food prices, but then changed from food to
nutrition. Yet, there are some key aspects of nutrition that were overlooked in the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs) and later in SDGs, most notably the growing incidence
of obesity, associated with nutrition transition and changing lifestyles with life-cycle effects
on health. It is a phenomenon that has also been overlooked by economists, including
multinationals’ influence on the political economy and the US government’s influencing of
international food standards, the role of regulation and taxation in containing unhealthy
foods, and the role of information, consumer education and, more generally, the public
sector in the role of reining in obesity. Using empirical data from East and Southern African
countries in a recent paper, Khonje, Ecker, and Qaim (2020) showed that “modern retailers
contribute to higher consumption of ultra-processed foods and calories. But they also
increase protein and micronutrient intakes among adults and children, mainly through
higher consumption of meat and dairy.” The authors noted that “the findings underline that
modern retailers can influence diets and nutrition in positive and negative ways.” They
concluded: “Differentiated regulatory policies are needed to shape food environments for
healthy food choices and nutrition.” Such literature on both the positive and negative
impacts of rapidly changing value chains on nutrition is relatively recent, and it has not
yet led to a full examination of what healthy food systems or “sustainable” food systems
mean, although both of these terms are used. Nor is there yet a systematic exploration of
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implications for public policy at the local, national, and international levels to contribute to
better outcomes (see Béné et al. 2019).
Nevertheless, there has been an upsurge in literature on food and nutrition since 2006–7,
including reports from IOs and international public policy journals such as The Lancet.
They echo some common themes—the triple burden of food insecurity (undernourishment,
malnourishment, and obesity), urbanization, population, income growth, and the profound
changes in the food environment and consumption patterns, arising from the growth of the
food industry and the changing economics of purchased foods, and the need to move away
from business as usual (Willett et al. 2019).
The EAT–Lancet commission report (Willett et al. 2019), issued by The Lancet in January
2019, has become a subject of much debate and discussion and needs attention. It brought
together 37 experts from 16 countries to develop scientific targets for healthy diets from
sustainable food production. The report was supported by Wellcome Trust and had no
corporate interests promoting it. The Commission calls for “widespread multi-sector,
multi-level action including: a substantial global shift toward healthy dietary patterns;
large reductions in food loss and waste; and major improvements in food production
practices. The data are both sufficient and strong enough to warrant immediate action”
(Willett et al. 2019, 26).
Diane Hatz (2019), in a review of the report, further highlighted its findings:
• Our diets should include less meat and more plants. It’s healthier for us and the planet.
• By adopting a planetary healthy diet, we would help avoid severe environmental
degradation and prevent approximately 11 million human deaths annually.
• Food production is responsible for 30% of global greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions and
70% of freshwater use.
• Globally, over 2 billion adults are overweight or obese, and diet-related diseases such as
diabetes, cancer and heart disease are among the leading causes of global deaths.
• Currently, we waste 30–50% of our food, from the farm to your fridge. We must
substantially reduce food loss at both levels.
• We must stop creating new farmland, restore and reforest degraded land, and protect
50 percent of the Earth as intact ecosystems.
• We must improve how oceans are managed so that there remain fish to eat. Fish must
be harvested sustainably.
• “Sustainably intensify food production to increase high quality output”—or, in other
words, we must farm regeneratively and sustainably produce more food on the land we
have. Included in this is restoring the health of soil.
• Focus on producing healthy food, not large quantities of unhealthy food.
In summary, the EAT–Lancet commission report recommendations are:
• Adopt healthy diets: increase consumption of plant-based foods, substantially limiting
animal-sourced foods;
• Reorient agricultural priorities from producing high quantities to producing healthy
food;
• Sustainably intensify food production to increase high quality output;
• Feed humanity on existing cropland, adopt “Half Earth” strategy, improve ocean
management;
• Halve food loss and waste, move toward circular food economy (Willett et al. 2019).
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The opposition to the report comes in part from the livestock industry, with factory
farms producing intensive livestock with high GHG emissions and from people consuming
substantially larger quantities of meat than the report recommends. At the other end of the
spectrum, objection also comes from countries where livestock is range-fed, is not intensive,
and is an important source of livelihood for poor people: for example, when Ethiopia’s
livestock minister expressed concern about the report. There are also other issues on which
the report can be challenged. Estimates of food losses are highly debated, as is the definition
of a healthy diet, the relationship between diet and disease, and most importantly, the
knowledge in the populations at large about healthy diets.
Notwithstanding these reservations, the report does not say anything that was not already
known in general terms previously. An important question is whether it can make a
material difference to diets to change planetary outcomes. And the changes have to be
both in upgrading consumption, as in India, and in downsizing and improving the balance
of diets in countries in North and South America, where obesity is growing at alarming
rates. In India, a recent study shows a substantial gap in food consumption relative to the
EAT standards, in all but the highest income level category, also a fact that was well known
well before the EAT commission report was issued:
The average daily calorie consumption in India is below the recommended 2503 kcal/
capita/day across all groups compared, except for the richest 5% of the population. Calorie
share of whole grains is significantly higher than the EAT-Lancet recommendations while
those of fruits, vegetables, legumes, meat, fish and eggs are significantly lower. The share of
calories from protein sources is only 6–8% in India compared to 29% in the reference diet.
The imbalance is highest for the households in the lowest decile of consumption expend-
iture, but even the richest households in India do not consume adequate amounts of fruits,
vegetables and non-cereal proteins in their diets. An average Indian household consumes
more calories from processed foods than fruits. (Sharma et al. 2020)
Important questions at the national, institutional, and personal levels are of political will
and need for incentives to consume healthy diets and avoid harm—personal and planetary.
Those ingredients are often missing. Let us hope the UN Food System Summit creates
global resolve to do better.
A discussion paper, “Shift to Healthy and Sustainable Consumption Patterns,” produced
by the UN Food Systems Summit 2021 Scientific Group notes:
Food-based dietary guidelines (FBDGs) are intended to translate these common principles
into nationally or regionally relevant recommendations that consider these differences, as
well as context-specific diet-related health challenges. Most FBDGs recommend consum-
ing a wide variety of foods, plentiful fruits and vegetables, inclusion of starchy staples,
animal-source foods and legumes, and to limit excessive fat, salt, and sugars (Herforth
et al. 2019; Springmann et al. 2020). However, there can be wide variation in inclusion of
and recommendations for other foods. Only 17% of FBDGs make specific recommenda-
tions about quantities of meat/egg/poultry/animal source food to consume (20% make
specific recommendations about fish), and only three countries (Finland, Sweden and
Greece) make specific quantitative recommendations to limit red meat (Herforth et al.
2019). Only around a quarter of FBDGs recommend limiting consumption of ultra-
processed foods, yet this is emerging as one of the most significant dietary challenges
around the world.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
200   
Adherence with national FBDGs and recommendations around the world is shockingly
low. The average diet [based on adjusted food availability as a proxy for consumption] in
28% of countries with national FBDGs did not meet a single dietary recommendation, and
the vast majority of countries (88%) met no more than 2 out of 12 dietary recommenda-
tions (Springmann et al. 2020). Consumption surveys show vast regional and national
differences in consumption of the major food groups (Afshin et al. 2019). No regions
globally have an average intake of fruits, whole grains, or nuts and seeds in line with
recommendations and only central Asia meets the recommendations for vegetables. In
contrast, the global (and several regional) average intake of red meat, processed meat and
sugar-sweetened beverages exceeds recommended limits. . . .
The EAT–Lancet study demonstrated that rebalancing consumption will require different
consumer behaviour shifts in different locations and contexts. For example, in low-income
countries achieving the healthy diet from sustainable food systems would require increas-
ing the consumption of most nutrient-rich food groups, including animal sourced foods,
vegetables, pulses and fruits, while reducing some starches, oils and discretionary foods
(Willet et al. 2019). In contrast, in many-high income countries achieving the same
balance would require reducing the consumption of animal-sourced foods, sugars and
discretionary/processed foods, while still increasing the consumption of healthy plant-
based ingredients . . .Many countries experiencing the double-burden of malnutrition,
would require these actions to play simultaneously to achieve the desired benefits
(Willett et al. 2019; Development Initiatives 2020; HLPE 2020), while a smaller number
of countries (e.g., Japan) have smaller adjustments to make. . . .
Low- and lower-middle-income countries, where populations still suffer undernutrition
and nutrient deficiencies, may need to increase the consumption of nutritious foods even
when they might result in higher national carbon footprints in order to meet recom-
mended dietary needs and nutrition goals, particularly to prevent undernutrition. Other
countries, especially upper-middle-income and high-income countries, where diet pat-
terns exceed optimal energy requirements and people consume more animal source foods
than required, require major changes in dietary practices and system-wide changes in food
production, food environments and trade. (Herrero et al. 2020)
Large transformations in food systems at the producer, consumer, political economy, and
food environments levels will be required, and countries will need to rebalance agricultural
policies with a view to how they impact health and sustainability.
Food safety is positioned at the intersection of agri-food systems and health. Food safety
management systems (FSMS) are designed to prevent, reduce, or eliminate hazards along
the food chain (Herrero et al. 2020). According to a World Bank report, “The Safe Food
Imperative”:
No representative and comprehensive benchmarking program exists for food safety
management capacities in LMICs [lower middle-income countries]. This contrasts with
the situation in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries,
where several detailed comparative assessments of food safety performance have been
completed . . .
The widest gaps between needed and actual food safety management capacity are found in
lower-middle-income countries. Especially the larger of these countries are important
food safety “hot spots,” where the exposure of populations to food hazards is increasing,
consumer food safety confidence is waning, and neither decentralized food safety
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regulatory capacity nor the governance arrangements of the formal private sector food
industry are able to match the emerging challenges. These countries need comprehensive
measures to curb what is likely to be a substantially higher health and economic burden of
FBD [foodborne diseases] in the coming years. (Jaffee et al. 2019, xxv, xxvii)
Undernutrition, Micronutrient Deficiencies, and Obesity
Globally, the incidence of poverty and hunger (that is, people facing calorie gaps using
FAO’s measure of PoU) had declined steadily since 1990. Nearly a billion people had come
out of poverty by 2015. The number of undernourished was 785 million, and the number of
severely food insecure was nearly 80 million in 2015 (FSIN 2017; FAO et al. 2019).
Reversing the downward trend by 2018, 822 million (corresponding to about 1 in every
9 people in the world) were undernourished (FAO et al. 2019). The State of Food Security
and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) reported: “According to the latest estimates, 9.2 percent
of the world population (or slightly more than 700 million people) were exposed to severe
levels of food insecurity in 2018, implying reductions in the quantity of food consumed to
the extent that they have possibly experienced hunger” (FAO et al. 2019, 15).
The SOFI 2019 report stated further:
A broader look at the extent of food insecurity beyond severe levels and hunger reveals
that an additional 17.2 percent of the world population, or 1.3 billion people, have
experienced food insecurity at moderate levels. This implies that these additional 1.3
billion people did not have regular access to nutritious and sufficient food . . .
The combination of moderate and severe levels of food insecurity brings the
estimated . . . [total] to 26.4 percent of the world population, amounting to . . . about
2 billion people.” (FAO et al. 2019, 19)
SOFI 2020 has revised these numbers again, and we comment further on analysis and
methodology in this chapter.
Some 113 million were facing crisis-level food insecurity or worse (Integrated Food
Security Phase Classification [IPC], or Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 3 and above), accord-
ing to the “Global Report on Food Crises” (GRFC) of the Food Security Information
Network (FSIN 2019). In discussing differing food security assessments for different
objectives, the SOFI 2019 report noted:
. . . while chronic food insecurity as captured by PoU [described later in this chapter] or
FIsev [severe food insecurity] is a long-term or persistent inability to meet food consump-
tion requirements, acute or transitory food insecurity as captured in GRFC numbers is a
short-term, possibly temporary, inability to meet food consumption requirements related
to sporadic crises, conditions that can be highly susceptible to change and can manifest
in a population within a short time frame, as a result of sudden changes or shocks.
(FAO et al. 2019)
According to the SOFI 2019:
One in seven newborns, or 20.5 million babies globally, suffered from low birthweight in
2015; no progress has been made in reducing low birthweight since 2012. The number of
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children under five years in the world affected by stunting, by contrast, has decreased by
10 percent in the past six years. . . .
Overweight and obesity continue to increase in all regions, particularly among school-age
children and adults. In 2018, an estimated 40 million children under five were overweight.
(FAO et al. 2019, xiv–xv)
FAO’s aggregate estimate of PoU has declined from 821 million in 2019, to 690 million in
2020, prior to the pandemic (FAO et al. 2020, viii). The decline is mainly because under-
nourishment estimates for China have been adjusted by over 100 million people, based on
using a newly available series of household data going back to 2000, which resulted in a
substantial downward shift of the number of undernourished in the world. China’s under-
nourished decreased from 10 percent of its population to 2 percent. The new PoU estimates
of 690 million hungry amount to 8.9 percent of the world population, but it is still up by
10 million people in one year and by nearly 60 million over five years from 2014 to 2019,
confirming the trend reported in past editions, even as the number has changed from that
published in recent reports (FAO et al. 2020, 4–5). For more details on reasons why the
estimated number of undernourished changes, see Lele, Goswami, and Mekonnen (2020).
Depending on the concept of food insecurity and goals set for its eradication, the cost
varies considerably as Table 4.1, presenting four different concepts, indicates.
Food Security and Nutrition: Terms and Measurement
Hunger means different things to different people. FAO often uses the term “hunger,” a
popular term, interchangeably with “undernourishment,” a more technical term. The
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), on the other hand, states it has no
measures of hunger. USDA sought the guidance of the Committee on National Statistics
(CNSTAT) of the National Academies on the use of the word “hunger” in connection with
food insecurity. The Committee “concluded that in official statistics, resource-constrained
hunger (that is, physiological hunger resulting from food insecurity) ‘ . . . should refer to a
potential consequence of food insecurity that, because of prolonged, involuntary lack of
food, results in discomfort, illness, weakness, or pain that goes beyond the usual uneasy
sensation’ ” (USDA 2019a).
PoU is an estimate of the proportion of the population that has been in a condition of
undernourishment over a reference period (usually one year) (FAO et al. 2017, 95). For the
PoU, country-level estimates of food production, trade, and changes in stocks are used
annually to infer a food balance sheet for each country, using a distribution of income,
providing an estimate of total energy consumption. PoU, a national-level proxy measure of
undernourishment, is essentially a measure of calorie deficit from some prescribed mini-
mum bodily requirement. TheWorld Food Programme (WFP) measures degrees of severity
of undernourishment in populations requiring emergency operations, as we discuss later in
the chapter.
Until recently, there was not an individual-level measure that could be used to make valid
comparisons of food insecurity across countries. In 2013, FAO introduced a new measure of
food insecurity at the individual level, called Voices of the Hungry, developed, tested, and
used by the United States and some Latin American countries since 1995 (FAO 2020a).
FIES is a more direct measure of people’s access to food and represents the percentage of
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individuals in the national adult population (15 or more years of age) that have experienced
moderate or severe levels of food insecurity during the previous year. Relying on people’s
direct responses to eight questions, in the case of FAO (and 15 questions in the United
States), regarding their access to adequate food, the FAO survey module has been applied to























































































































Notes: IFAD = International Fund for Agricultural Development; IFPRI = International Food Policy Research
Institute; IISD = International Institute for Sustainable Development; WFP = World Food Programme; MIRAGE
= Modelling International Relations under Applied General Equilibrium; AGRODEP = African Growth and
Development Policy Modeling Consortium.
Source: Fan et al. (2018, table 1, 3). [Adapted from Mason-D’Croz et al. 2016. “IMPACT Projections of Invest-
ments in Agriculture and Implications for Reducing Hunger in Africa by 2030: Results from the IMPACTModel,
Version 3.3.” IFPRI Project report, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.]
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nationally representative samples of adult populations in 140 countries, since 2014, to cover
90 percent of the world’s population (FAO 2017b, 2020a, 2020b).
SDGs, unlike MDGs, include addressing all 17 goals in developed as well as developing
countries. Furthermore, some of FAO’s approaches—for example, FIES discussed later—
have been influenced by USDA. For both reasons, it is relevant to see how the United States
treats food insecurity analytically and the extent of the incidence of food insecurity. Neither
PoU, nor FIES tells us the actual number of poor. In the case of PoU, we do not know if the
hungry are men or women, or where they are located. We discuss data issues further in the
sections that follow. The relationship between poverty and food insecurity is of particular
relevance, whether in developed or developing countries.
The World Bank began to include poverty estimates for developed countries in 2013.
Of the 769 million people who lived on less at US$1.90 a day in 2013, the world’s very
poorest, 3.2 million lived in the United States, and 3.3 million in other high-income
countries (most in Italy, Japan, and Spain) (Deaton 2018).The World Bank adjusts its
poverty estimates for differences in prices across countries, but it ignores differences in
needs. Noting that Oxford economist Robert Allen estimated needs-based absolute
poverty lines for rich countries, which matched more accurately the US$1.90 line for
poor countries, with US$4 per day around the middle of his estimates, Deaton uses this
estimate to report “5.3 million Americans who are absolutely poor by global standards.”
This number is about the same as in all the poor in the rest of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. For further discussion, see
UN–OHCHR (2017).
Upturn in the Incidence of Hunger
The SOFI 2018 notes: “The number of extreme [climate-related] events, including
extreme heat, droughts, floods and storms, has doubled since the early 1990s, with an
average of 213 of these events occurring every year during the period of 1990–2016”
(FAO et al. 2018, 39).
Although there was a decline in the numbers of undernourished in developing
countries, FAO estimated that until 2015, this decline was smaller in number than the
decline in the number of poor that the World Bank estimated, and we explore the
relationship between changes in poverty and changes in hunger later.² “After decades of
steady decline, the trend in world hunger—as measured by the PoU—reverted in 2015,
remaining virtually unchanged in the past three years at a level slightly below 11 percent.
The 822 million hungry in 2018, following a steady rise from 785 million people in 2015,
underscored “the immense challenge of achieving the Zero Hunger target by 2030”
(FAO et al. 2019, xvi). FAO attributes the rise to the increasing incidence of conflict-
affected countries (often a leading cause of famine), compounded by climate-related
factors, such as the El Niño phenomenon, inflicting both drought and flood conditions
(FAO et al. 2018).
² SOFI 2017 defines undernourishment “as the condition in which an individual’s habitual food consumption is
insufficient to provide the amount of dietary energy required to maintain a normal, active, healthy life” (FAO et al.
2017, 95).
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The global PoU³ in 2018 increased to 10.8 percent of the global population, up from 10.6
percent in 2015, representing a return to the level reached in 2014, and suggesting a reversal
of the downward trend that was sustained over recent decades (FAO et al. 2018). SOFI 2019
reported:
Hunger is on the rise in almost all African subregions, making Africa the region with the
highest prevalence of undernourishment, at almost 20 percent. Hunger is also slowly
rising in Latin America and the Caribbean, although its prevalence is still below 7 percent.
In Asia, Western Asia shows a continuous increase since 2010, with more than 12 percent
of its population undernourished today. (FAO et al. 2019, xiv)
SOFI 2019 also reported an alarming situation in Africa, primarily a result of increased
conflict and compounded by droughts. In contrast:
In Asia, the PoU has been steadily decreasing in most regions, reaching 11.4 percent in
2017. The exception is Western Asia, where the PoU has increased since 2010 to reach
more than 12 percent of the population. This level in the region is second only to Southern
Asia, which, despite great progress in the last five years, is still the subregion where
undernourishment is highest, at almost 15 percent.
[Again,] within the Western Asian subregion, the difference is striking between countries
that have been affected by popular uprisings in Arab states and other conflicts, and
those that have not been affected. For those affected countries, . . . an increase in the
PoU from the already higher value of 17.8 percent, to 27.0 percent [is noted], almost
doubling the number of undernourished between 2010 and 2018. The PoU did not change
during the same period in the other countries in the region.
In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), [too,] rates of undernourishment have
increased in recent years, largely as a consequence of the situation in South America,
where the PoU increased from 4.6 percent in 2013 to 5.5 percent in 2017. In fact, South
America hosts the majority (68 percent) of the undernourished in Latin America. . . .
By contrast, prevalence rates of undernourishment in Central America and the Caribbean,
despite being higher than those in South America, have been decreasing in recent years.
This is consistent with the economic growth pattern observed in these subregions, where
real GDP [gross domestic product] grew at a rate of about 4 percent between 2014 and
2018, with moderate rates of inflation consistently below 3 percent in the same period.
Analysis of the distribution of the undernourished population across regions in the world
shows that the majority (more than 500 million) live in Asia. The number has been
increasing steadily in Africa, where it reached almost 260 million people in 2018, with
more than 90 percent living in sub-Saharan Africa. (FAO et al. 2019, 6–9, 11)
GRFC “focuses specifically on the most severe manifestations of acute food insecurity
in the world’s most pressing food crises” (FSIN 2019, 3), the majority of which are
conflict: Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, the Syrian
³ The PoU is an estimate of the proportion of the population that has been in a condition of undernourishment
over a reference period (usually one year) (FAO et al. 2017, 95). For the PoU, country-level estimates of food
production, trade, and changes in stocks are used annually to infer a food balance sheet for each country,
providing an estimate of total energy consumption.
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Arab Republic, the Sudan, South Sudan, and north Nigeria, nearly 72 million people
(FSIN 2019, 2).
Other forms of malnutrition include nearly 2 billion people with micronutrient deficien-
cies and 600 million obese or overweight, data monitored byWHO. The significant negative
impacts of the emerging food systems and lifestyle changes on health are associated with the
changing food consumption habits. A recent Lancet study of the global burden of disease
(GBD) suggests that dietary risks were responsible for 11 million deaths, 22 percent of all
deaths in 2017, demonstrating how healthy diets must be at the core of the Zero Hunger
challenge (GBD 2017 Diet Collaborators 2019). As obesity and overweight increasingly
become uncontrollable epidemics, easy access to cheap, energy-dense foods and sugary
drinks are a key part of the challenge. Rapid globalization of the food industry and
concurrent technological transformation has made prepared foods affordable. Technolog-
ical change has also significantly reduced physical activity and led to sedentary lifestyles.
With the abundance of foods, and the increased physical and economic access to food,
frequency of snacking has replaced three square meals. Together, all these factors are
leading to an epidemic growth in obesity and NCDs through a phenomenon called
“nutrition transition” (Popkin 1994; Ng and Popkin 2012).
Reversal of Undernutrition Trends and Disconnect between Trends in
Poverty and Hunger: A Cause for Concern about Achieving the
Sustainable Development Goals
FAO’s (2017a) projections of trends in undernourishment (Figure 4.1) offer a more pessi-
mistic picture than previous projections (FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2015). The numbers of
undernourished in 2030, based on a “business-as-usual” scenario, are estimated at 637
million people in low-income countries (LICs) and middle-income countries (MICs). This
figure exceeds by 95 million people, or 17.5 percent, previous projections to 2030. Those
LICs and MICs mostly overlap the set of developing countries in projections made earlier
by Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012). Projections of undernourishment in 2030 in
Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012) were relatively more optimistic. The number of under-
nourished, projected with respect to achieving zero hunger, definitely falls short of the SDG
target of eradicating hunger by 2030. The sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region shows an
increasing trend in terms of the number of undernourished people up to 2030. That is
also why FAO, IFAD andWFP (2015) called for a twin-track approach, merging investment
in social protection to immediately raise the food consumption levels of the extremely poor
with pro-poor investments in productive activities to sustainably increase the income-
earning opportunities of poor people (FAO 2017a). Kharas, McArthur, and Rasmussen
(2018) confirmed this observation, noting that some 30+ LICs, most located in SSA, will
likely not achieve SDG2 by 2030. Therefore, the importance of social safety nets (SSNs), or
social assistance, has increased. According to the World Bank Group’s The State of Social
Safety Nets 2018:
Of 142 countries in the [World Bank’s Atlas of Social Protection: Indicators of Resilience
and Equity] ASPIRE administrative database, 70 percent have unconditional cash trans-
fers, and 43 percent have conditional cash transfers. More than 80 percent of countries
provide school feeding programs. Also, 67 percent of countries have public works, and
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56 percent have various fee waivers. The number of countries with old-age social pensions
has also grown rapidly in the past two decades. (WBG 2018, 1)
Yet, the coverage of SSNs in LICs is more limited, entailing fiscal costs of 1.5 percent of the
GDP. Most SSNs in LICs are funded by donors (WBG 2018). The growing emphasis on
SSNs is an important departure from international approaches in the 1980s, which shunned
safety nets. And yet, there is much about the relationship between reduction in poverty and
food security that we do not understand.
In the SOFI 2020, FAO has revised the hunger estimates again, both retroactively and
prospectively, so that the overall hunger level in 2019 is 690 million, compared to the earlier
estimate of 822 million in 2018, and yet, incidence of hunger has been increasing by about
60 million people since 2014, with a substantially higher incidence of hunger in Africa by
2030 (FAO et al. 2020, viii). Virtually all the increase in hunger by 2030 is projected to take
place in Africa, with the number of undernourished (in millions) increasing from 234 in
2019 (PoU: 17.4 percent) to 411.8 (PoU: 29.4 percent) in 2030. South Asia’s (SA’s) numbers
of undernourished (in millions) declined, ever so slightly from 257.3 to 203.6 (FAO et al.
2020, 11, table 2). (The comparative picture is presented in Figures 13.1A, 13.1B, and 13.2).
The report concludes the world is not on track to achieve Zero Hunger by 2030. If recent
trends continue, the number of people affected by hunger will surpass 840 million by 2030,
but that number is very close to the level that FAO announced for last year—821 million
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Figure 4.1 FAO estimates of hunger and projections show slower decline in hunger thanWorld
Bank estimates and projections of poverty: Performance and projections by region, 1990–2050
Note: 2050 data from Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012).
Source: Authors’ construction. Based on data from FAO (2017a).
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Disconnect between Poverty and Food Security Estimates
The World Bank is responsible for monitoring poverty levels and changes in the context of
SDGs. Its macro level estimates suggest that there has been faster progress on reducing
poverty over recent decades than in reducing hunger (Figure 4.2), a puzzle that we explore
later in this chapter.
From 1990 until 2015, global extreme poverty declined on average by a percentage point.
Poverty declined by only by 0.6 percentage point per year, however, from 2013 to 2015, and
early estimates for 2018 show extreme poverty dropped merely 1.4 percentage points
between 2015 and 2018. Uneven progress across regions as well as in countries is significant
In 1990, East Asia and Pacific (EAP) and SA were the two regions with the most poor
people, accounting for 80 percent of the world’s extreme poor (Sánchez-Páramo 2020).
The World Bank projects poverty will decline more rapidly, with most of the remaining
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Figure 4.2 Poverty in developing regions has declined rapidly: Performance and projections by
region, 1990–2030
Note: Poverty estimates are based on a poverty line of US$1.90 per capita income per day and 2011 purchasing
power parity (PPP) prices. All numbers for 2015 and 2030 are statistical projections based on a growth scenario,
which assumes each country grows at the country-specific average growth rate observed over 2005–15, and using
distributional assumptions, should be treated with considerable circumspection. See, also, Ferreira et al. (2015).
Source: Authors’ construction. Based on data from World Bank (2018).
⁴ This projection answers the question of what would happen to extreme poverty trends if the economic growth
of the past decade (2005–15) continued until 2030. The World Bank made one projection that assumes the
continuation of the growth rate of each country and another projection that assumes the continuation of the
growth rate specific to the world region. The difference between these two alternatives is very small (World Bank
2018).
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SA, the projected 5 million poor would be only 1.04 percent of the global poor by 2030
(Figure 4.2). The world attained the first of the twin MDG targets—to cut the 1990 poverty
rate in half by 2015—in 2010, five years ahead of schedule. Nearly 1.1 billion people
are estimated to have moved out of extreme poverty since 1990. In 2015, 736 million people
lived in extreme poverty; this number was reduced to about 650 million in 2018, “defined by
the international poverty line (IPL) as consumption (or income) less than US$1.90 per
day in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP)”—down from nearly 2 billion in 1990 (World
Bank 2018, 1).⁵ The poverty rate in areas suffering from fragility, conflict, and violence
climbed to 36 percent in 2015, up from a low of 34.4 percent in 2011, and that rate will likely
increase (Barne and Wadhwa 2018). Twenty-nine percent of Africa’s poor live in fragile
states in 2015 and a share projected to increase to 50–80 percent by 2030 (Beegle and
Christiaensen 2019).
Despite progress, the number of people living in extreme poverty globally remains high.
And given global growth forecasts, poverty reduction may not be fast enough to reach the
target of ending extreme poverty by 2030 (World Bank 2018). In SSA, the poverty rate
remained high at 41.4 percent, and 413 million people lived on less than US$1.90 a day in
2015, 136 million more than in 1990 (World Bank 2020c). If the trend continues, by 2030,
nearly 9 out of 10 extreme poor will be in SSA (Wadhwa 2018). SSA now accounts for half
the world’s extreme poor, and a Brookings study concluded that 30 countries, most of which
are in SSA, may not reach the SDG targets (Chandy 2017). A vast majority of the global
poor live in rural areas, are poorly educated, are mostly employed in the agricultural and
related sectors, and over half are under 18 years of age (World Bank 2020c). Hence, gainful
employment of youth is a big challenge. Extreme poverty disproportionately affects
children—387 million, or 19.5 percent, of the world’s children live in extreme poverty,
compared to just 9.2 percent of adults. Children represent half of the poor, yet are just one-
third of the underlying population.
With higher poverty thresholds, for instance, US$3.10 per person per day, children
are still the largest impoverished group—47 percent of children are poor compared to
27 percent of adults (UNICEF 2016). Higher income countries, which are members of
OECD and use a relative poverty line, based on one-half of median income, show children
to be the most impoverished in almost all high-income OECD countries (UNICEF 2019).
Only 53 percent of the world’s population, about 3.9 billion of the 7.3 billion, earned at least
an income of US$5.5 per day (2011 PPP) in 2015, enough to afford a nutritious diet and
nearly three-quarters earned at least US$3.2 per day (2011 PPP). (See Figures 4.2A and
4.2B.) The total affected by moderate or severe food insecurity, which appears to be an
estimated 2 billion people in the world, did not have regular access to safe, nutritious, and
sufficient food in 2019 (FAO et al. 2020, 22). Different dimensions of nutritional maladies
are high in SA and SSA. Vitamin A, iron, and iodine are the most important in global public
health terms; the deficiencies represent major threats to the health and development of
populations worldwide, particularly for children and pregnant women in LICs. Anemia and
vitamin A deficiencies, including among pregnant women, is highest in Asia and SSA.
In an earlier blog post, Lele (2015) showed that at the global and regional levels, there was
little relationship between the decline in poverty and the decline in hunger. TheWorld Bank
announced that the poverty target was met by 2010 (Figure 4.3A and 4.3B), but hunger had
declined extraordinarily little by 2015 (Figure 4.1A and 4.1B). In particular, this was true in
⁵ World Bank estimated that the share of people in extreme poverty declined to 8.6 percent of the world
population in 2018 (World Bank 2018).
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the case of SSA. With the World Bank’s latest revised estimates of poverty (Figure 4.2A and
4.2B), and FAO’s revised estimates on hunger (Figure 13.1A and 13.1B), there is even less
relationship between changes in poverty and changes in hunger. In addition, the reasons for
this drastic acceleration of food insecurity to 2030 in SOFI 2020, compared to the projec-
tions of the previous year’s SOFI appear to be mainly due to revisions in population
estimates. Indeed, the report asks readers, who tend to be consummate readers of FAO’s
food insecurity estimates, not to compare the old and new estimates. Furthermore, the
changes appeared to be based on adjustments in just in a few countries.
We argued in Chapter 3 that the growing interest in nutrition had less to do with the food
crisis in 2006–7 than with unprecedented advocacy by the nutrition community, through a
series of journal articles in the influential public health journal, The Lancet (2008, 2011,
2013a, 2015); the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement (SUN 2010), and four Global
Nutrition Reports (GNRs) (IFPRI 2014, 2015, 2016b, 2017). Collectively, these efforts
brought nutrition back onto the international agenda after nearly three decades of hiatus.
All People, at All Times
An important aspect of the 1996 definition was the phrase “all people, at all times” (FAO
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Figure 4.3 World Bank’s old poverty estimates: Poverty in developing regions has declined
rapidly—Performance and projections by region, 1990–2030
Note: Poverty estimates are based on a poverty line of US$1.90 per capita income per day and 2011 purchasing
power parity (PPP) prices. All numbers for 2015 and 2030 are statistical projections based on a growth scenario,
which assumes each country grows at the country-specific average growth rate observed over 2004–13; and using
distributional assumptions, it should be treated with considerable circumspection. See, also, Ferreira et al. (2015).
Source: Authors’ construction. Based on data from Cruz et al. (2015).
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with the inclusion of developed countries in various roles, not just in the eradication of
poverty and hunger in low-income developing countries, as was the approach under the
MDGs. This means indicators are needed, which can be disaggregated to specific groups
and can identify even very brief episodes of deprivation. The degree of granularity is
important not only for equity and social inclusion, but also for accurately measuring
changes in population averages over the long run. The conceptual framework that reflects
this flexibility in the food security concept and measurement was adopted in the work of the
FSIN measurement task force, chaired by Lele and Masters (Lele et al. 2016). It allows for
classification of data into one of four nested categories of national, market-level, household-
level, and individual-level data, based on the social scale of analysis. Data was defined at the
country level, typically from national accounts and trade data, such as Food Balance Sheets
(FBS). In other cases, users want data about market conditions, in which transactions may
involve unknown people from various locations. Users seek data about households, typically
indicators of food consumption based on the definition of a household as a group. And very
often, users seek data about individuals, including anthropometric measurements of body
size, such as the measurement of a child’s height, or other measures such as weight, mid-
upper arm or waist circumference, biomarkers, and other clinical data.
The socioecological model and each type of data shown here can be used to classify
observations in any setting, from extreme undernutrition to obesity and diet-related disease.
Data from each of the four categories can be used to construct indicators at that particular
scale, or aggregated to a higher scale, such as the national prevalence of individual-level
malnutrition. The socioecological approach to FSN measurement encompasses a diverse set
of relationships that operate as a system within and across scales. For example, a country-
level trade policy can cause changes that, in turn, alter the status of markets, households,
and individuals, whereas individual-level vaccinations or feeding can alter decisions and
outcomes at household, market, and country levels. Policies and programs can intervene at
any scale, such as improvements in community-level marketing arrangements, and then
drive changes at both larger and smaller scales over time.
Disconnect between Changes in Poverty and Changes in Hunger:
Is the Disconnect Real?
We noted in the introduction to this chapter that estimated reductions in hunger (PoU)
have been very small relative to reductions in poverty. According to the World Bank, an
estimated 1.9 billion lived below US$1.90 a day (using 2011 PPP) in 1990, declined by more
than 1 billion to 783 million in 2015. Meanwhile, FAO estimated that about 991 million
suffered from hunger in 1990, declining to 775 million in 2015, a reduction of only 216
million in the same period, and only about one-fifth of the estimated decline in the numbers
of extreme poor. Again, the biggest decline occurred in China and Southeast Asia (Cruz
et al. 2015). It is clear we need more reliable measures of incidence of hunger and poverty,
and changes in each. Furthermore, incidence of hunger has increased since 2015, as
discussed previously.
The limited availability of empirical evidence provides a mixed picture of improvement
in income and nutrition. Based on the latest household surveys in India, Meenakshi (2016)
noted that the “Indian enigma,” identified by Deaton and Drèze (2009), continues; income
increase does not necessarily result in increased food consumption, creating the apparent
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
212   
paradox of the considerable income growth in India not leading to a commensurate
decrease in the PoU. Also, increased food production does not necessarily result in
improved nutrition—the so-called agriculture–nutrition disconnect (Gillespie, Harris, and
Kadiyala 2012). And, it does not translate into commensurate reductions in anthropometric
measures of undernutrition (Deaton and Drèze 2009). Other literature, including a series of
articles in the New York Times (2017, 2018) from Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, India,
China, and Ghana (the “Planet Fat” series, discussed later) have shown that, all else being
equal, diet quality worsens with increase in income, accompanied by consumption of
energy-dense foods and increased amounts of salt, sugars, and fats, contributing to obesity
and NCDs—the so-called dietary transition (Popkin 2001, 2009; Webb et al. 2006; Popkin,
Adair, and Ng 2012; Webb 2013; Masters 2015; Masters et al. 2016). Meenakshi (2016)
noted that more than food intake, the quality of diet appears to be strongly correlated with
the anthropometric indicators of malnutrition, yet improvements in diet quality have not
been very high. Food price inflation, driven increasingly by non-cereals, has likely hindered
larger improvements in diet quality, especially for the poor. It has become increasingly
difficult for them to have a diet rich in vegetables, legumes, dairy, and meat, as their prices
(per unit kcal) relative to cereals have risen faster than for the rich. Meenakshi also noted
that low elasticity appears to characterize the relationship between nutritional outcomes
and food intake, and yet, there is an emerging sharp increase in outcomes associated with
over-nutrition and obesity as a public health problem, widespread not only in urban but
also in rural areas, even as magnitudes of undernutrition and micronutrient malnutrition
remain large: the “triple burden of malnutrition” (Popkin 2001; Popkin, Adair, and Ng
2012; “Planet Fat” series, the New York Times 2017–18).
On a more positive note, some studies show positive evidence of increased household
agricultural production, even of nonfood crops such as Bt cotton, with increased income
leading to increased dietary diversity and diet quantity (Qaim 2003; Qaim and Janvry 2003;
Qaim and Zilberman 2003). Still other literature simply shows greater consumption of milk,
meat, fruits, and vegetables (Chand, Raju, and Pandey 2007; Kotwal, Ramaswami, and
Wadhwa 2011; Ramaswami, Pray, and Lalitha 2012).
A recent study in Bangladesh found a positive association between diversification of farm
production and the dietary diversity of the farmers, but the researchers also found that
market access, commercialization of farms, income diversification that included off-farm
sources of income, and women’s empowerment all showed positive and significant effects
on dietary diversity of households (Islam et al. 2018).
Increased dietary diversity, however, does not necessarily assure a nutritious diet, nor
does diversified production assure sustainable production unless, first, we have details on
farm production and individual consumption, issues well outlined in Béné et al. 2019:
“When Food Systems Meet Sustainability—Current Narratives and Implications for Ac-
tions,” and, second, unless public action is undertaken to improve diets.
Child dietary diversity is poor in much of rural Africa and developing Asia, prompting
significant efforts to leverage agriculture to improve diets. A recent household survey-based
study (Headey et al. 2019) found that children living in proximity to markets that sell more
nonstaple food groups have more diverse diets, but the association between market access
and child diet diversity is small and similar in magnitude to associations describing the
relationship between dietary diversity and household production diversity. Moreover, for
dairy, household and community production of that food is especially important. These
modest associations may reflect several specific features of the data and survey design, with
the study situated in very poor, food-insecure localities where even the relatively better off
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are poor in absolute terms and where, by international standards, relative prices for
nonstaple foods are very high.
At the same time, undernutrition and micronutrient malnourishment remain large.
While evidence on nutrition linkage between agricultural production income and con-
sumption is improving, there is still remarkably little location-specific evidence that stresses
the importance of information and knowledge, including the role of value chains. Therefore,
it has become clear that the earlier idea of dealing with hunger first, before worrying about
nutritious diets, may lead to improvements in only one form of malnutrition, while
neglecting (or perhaps worsening) the others (World Bank 2014).
A later World Bank report (2017) noted what Popkin and Reardon (2018) have also
recently concluded, that the rapid expansion of ultra-processed foods, more than any other
subsystem within the agriculture and food system, is the major factor in the obesity
epidemic. Late developers, however, do not have to follow the path of the advanced
countries. To chart a different course, such as the one Japan, South Korea, or Singapore
did, where obesity rates remain low despite growth in incomes, countries need to maintain
their traditional plant-based diets, even in the wake of rapid economic growth. The
situation, however, is now changing for the worst in South Korea after its entry into the
World Trade Organization (WTO) (personal communication, Barry Popkin, June 9, 2018;
Kim, Moon, and Popkin 2000; Lee, Popkin, and Kim 2002; Lee, Duffey, and Popkin 2012),
as we discuss later in the chapter.
Proactive public policies are called for, which can overcome powerful influences of value
chains that adversely affect diets. Currently, weak state capacity, inefficient redistribution,
and the inability to effectively regulate the private sector food industry take their toll. Later
in the chapter, we discuss how countries are handling these challenges. Stronger governance
is needed—an efficient and trustworthy government; an effective civil society; a private
sector that goes beyond corporate social responsibility rhetoric; a responsible media; and a
judicial system that holds stakeholders accountable. There is much work to do to achieve
SDG2 and the rest of the SDGs. As an illustration, Marion Nestle (2015), in her book, Soda
Politics outlines how food and beverage companies use their considerable economic and
political power to use marketing, lobbying, advertising budgets to influence policies toward
products they produce and sell, regardless of how harmful they may be to consumers.
Marcela Reyes et al. (2020) reported on changes in laws and possible impacts on consump-
tion in Chile in their paper titled, “Changes in the Amount of Nutrient of Packaged Foods
and Beverages after the Initial Implementation of the Chilean Law of Food Labelling and
Advertising: A Nonexperimental Prospective Study.” Sacks, Crosbie, and Mialon (2020)
identified the corporate political activity (CPA) of food industry actors in South Africa, by
mapping of food industry strategies to influence public health policy, using information on
ten different food industry actors, with information in the public domain. They showed that
food industry actors in South Africa established multiple relationships with various parties
in and outside the South African government, influencing science and involving themselves
in policymaking, thereby helping to frame the debate on diet and public health in South
Africa. They urged need for increased transparency, disclosure, and awareness of industry
strategies, and mechanisms to address and manage industry influence. Barry Popkin (2009),
in his book, The World Is Fat: The Fads, Trends, Policies, and Products That Are Fattening
the Human Race, presents evidence of the US food industry’s influence on WHO via the US
government. Stuckler, Ruskin, and McKee (2018) showed the influence of Coca-Cola, on
research on child obesity. More recently, the state of Oaxaca in Mexico has banned the sale
to children of sugary drinks and high-calorie snack foods. Lawmakers had more incentive to
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
214   
limit sales, as obesity crisis was associated with a higher death toll during the COVID-19
pandemic. “Coronavirus tsar Hugo López-Gatell has branded soft drinks ‘bottled poison’
and blamed their consumption for causing 40,000 deaths, along with high incidence of
diabetes, obesity and hypertension—all COVID-19 comorbidities” (Agren 2020).
An Alternative Approach to Exploring the Relationship between
Poverty and Food Security
Kakwani and Son (2016) took up the challenge of understanding the reasons behind the gap
between the poverty and undernourishment estimates of the World Bank and FAO,
respectively, that Uma Lele had identified in her Brookings blog post (Lele 2016). They
propose a methodology of measuring food insecurity, which explains and helps bridge this
huge gap.
Their approach is also consistent with the emerging literature on FSN, as well as with
Sen’s (1981) entitlement approach. Kakwani and Son (2016) provided an alternative
definition of food security: food security exists when all people, at all times, have entitlement
to sufficient and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs: that is, households or
individuals suffer from food insecurity if they do not command enough resources to buy
food sufficient to meet their nutritional needs. In short, food insecurity (or hunger) is an
extreme form of poverty. Concepts of poverty and food insecurity are closely related.
Policymakers can only ensure that people have the necessary resources to consume suffi-
cient and nutritious food. Individuals make their own choices on what food they want to
consume. Sen’s entitlement approach is more realistic than the access approach to measur-
ing food deprivation in the population. According to Sen (1981), every individual is
endowed with a bundle of resources, which can be exchanged for food and any other
commodities. A person’s entitlements depend on what is owned initially and what can be
acquired through exchange. If the entitlement does not include a commodity bundle with
an adequate amount of food, the person would go hungry and become food insecure, an
entitlement failure. Food security is influenced by factors such as poverty, food prices, social
protection, unemployment, and earnings, among others, and the entitlement approach is
directly linked to income or employment generation, food production, food prices, and
social security, all of which have an important impact on food security.
A household suffering from food insecurity is one with its entitlement, as measured by
per capita expenditure, of less than the cost of the food basket (that is, per capita monetary
cost of a food basket that satisfies the caloric and nutrient needs of 2,100 kcal per person per
day, meeting the recommended requirements for carbohydrates, protein, and fat to main-
tain a healthy body), estimated to be equal to US$1.59 in 2011 PPP (US$1.03 per day in
2005 PPP), using the data from the World Bank’s PovcalNet program for 124 countries,
which account for 5.7 billion people (for detailed methodology, see Kakwani and Son
[2016]). The paper’s approach reveals notable gains in reducing food insecurity worldwide
between 2002 and 2012, in contrast to FAO’s estimates.
According to the estimate of Kakwani and Son (2016), in just one decade, the percentage
of the global population struggling with food insecurity significantly decreased from
23 percent in 2002 to 10 percent in 2012; the number of food insecure people declined by
more than 576 million, from 1,133.7 million in 2002 to 557.3 million in 2012, in contrast to
FAO’s estimate of a reduction of 155 million (from 934 million in 2002 to 779 million in
2012) over the same period.
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FAO measures hunger by comparing calorie intake with a fixed value of caloric require-
ment; calorie consumption increases sluggishly, or may even remain the same, given
increased growth. With a fixed calorie requirement, progress in reducing hunger is expected
to be very slow. In contrast, poverty, which is measured through income or expenditure, is
reduced with growth, as people’s incomes increase (Kakwani and Son 2016).
Furthermore, FAO’s measure of food security (undernourishment) is unable to say
whether people are becoming nutritionally better or worse, since it is based on caloric
“needs,” and does not take undernutrition (or malnutrition) into consideration. Kakwani
and Son (2016) made a clear distinction between undernourishment and malnutrition by
taking into consideration the intake of the basic nutrients—carbohydrates, protein, and
fat—which are required to maintain good health. They, therefore, also suggested a need for
modification of FAO’s food security definition from access to entitlement.
There is another reason why the approach of Kakwani and Son (2016) was consistent
with today’s literature on FSN. It challenged Sukhatme’s (1961) earlier hypothesis that
intra-individual variation is the more important source of variation by far than inter-
individual variation. FAO’s (1996) cutoff for undernourishment at 1,800 kcal per person
per day is about 300 kcal less than the average calorie requirements of 2,100 kcal of a healthy
person, as defined by WFP in their Emergency Food Assessment Handbook.⁶ The Handbook
did make note of research by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) that
questioned the validity of the 2,100-kcal benchmark (WFP 2009). In “Validation of the
World Food Programme’s Food Consumption Score and Alternative Indicators of House-
hold Food Security,”Wiesmann et al. (2009) found that WFP offered no justification of the
2,100-kcal estimation of the basic dietary energy requirement. They reported that FAO uses
a minimum energy requirement. Based on survey data from Burundi, Haiti, and Sri Lanka,
the IFPRI study concluded that the WFP cutoff point of 2,100 kcal can lead to “serious
underestimation of food insecurity” (Wiesmann et al. 2009, 47).
Kakwani and Son (2016, 271) noted, “FAO’s lower cutoff point is justified on the ground
that the human body can adapt to a lower calorie intake without any adverse effect on
health,” as Sukhatme (1961) had argued. Nutritionists are deeply divided on this issue,
however, and many hold the opposite view that intra-individual variation is of a minor
order of magnitude (Gopalan 1992; Osmani 1992; Payne 1992; Srinivasan 1992).
Furthermore, FAO’s estimates are based on a log-normal distribution of calorie intake.
This model is convenient from an analytical point of view but not flexible enough to capture
the variation at the bottom of the distribution. It gives a reasonable fit in the middle range of
the distribution, covering about 60 percent of the population. Since undernourishment
primarily occurs at the lower end of the distribution, the log-normal distribution will
⁶ In the case of India, Chand and Jumrani (2013) and Srivastava and Chand (2017) argued that the PoU was
much higher when using the Indian Council of Medical Research–National Institute of Nutrition (ICMR–NIN)
recommended norms (2,400kcal per capita per day for rural areas and 2,100kcal per capita per day for urban
areas) than FAO’s uniform norm (the “minimum” amount necessary for maintaining good health is reflected in
FAO’s minimum dietary energy requirement [MDER] for sedentary activity) of 1,800kcal per capita per day for
both rural and urban areas for reporting undernutrition at global level and across countries. In total population
(rural and urban), prevalence of undernourishment was 34.2 percent based on the FAO norm and 65 percent
based on the ICMR–NIN norm (Chand and Jumrani 2013). Chand also challenges FAO’s use of a standard
deduction of 12.5 percent of food grains for feed, seed, industry, and waste, first assumed in 1951, but still being
used in the most recent calculations. In India, about 30 percent of food grains go to nonfood uses, and thus,
FAO overestimates food availability by 18 percent. Other methodological issues concerning the FAO’s
measurement of PoU are discussed in FAO’s SOFI 2013 and SOFI 2015 (FAO 2013, 2015); Chand and Jumrani
(2013); Wanner et al. (2014); and the FSIN Technical Working Group on Measuring Food and Nutrition
Security report (Lele et al. 2016).
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underestimate the percentage of population suffering from undernourishment because of its
limited flexibility (Kakwani and Son 2016).
Finally, Kakwani and Son (2015) noted:
Even if humans can adapt, households may still feel food-deprived if they purchase food
with no more than about 1,800 kilo/calories per person. To address food insecurity,
households and individuals must not only meet dietary energy needs, but also have
adequate amount of protein, fat, carbohydrates, and other micronutrients. If households
limit their consumption to only 1,800 kilo/calories per person, they may not meet other
nutritional needs. (Kakwani and Son 2015, 271)
Implications of Differing Poverty Definitions
Our primary interest in the debates on the merits of income poverty vs. MDP has been to
better understand determinants of food insecurity, including, particularly, their relationship
with multiple deprivations (Box 4.1). We show in this section that the incidence of MDP is
greater than income poverty. Low middle-income Asia has a larger incidence of MDP,
although the depth of MDP is greater in SSA. MDP better explains food insecurity than
income poverty, and donor aid is largely skewed against countries with the largest incidence
of MDP: that is, low middle-income Asian countries. The level and the quality of domestic
expenditures thus will be critical in reducing food insecurity going forward. Although this
analysis started with developing countries as the focus, it is now being applied in developed
countries, such as in the United States and in European countries (Alkire and Apablaza
2016; GWU 2020).
The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) uses 10 indicators to
measure MDP.⁷ The indicators and their weights are shown in Table 4.2. According to
OPHI, a total of 1.45 billion people from 103 countries (covering 5.4 billion people) are
multidimensionally poor, which is 26.5 percent of the total population in those countries.
About half of the multidimensionally poor (48 percent) live in SA, and 36 percent in SSA
(Alkire and Robles 2017).
India accounts for the highest absolute numbers and a staggering number of multidi-
mensionally poor people, more than 528 million Indians and more people than all the poor
people living in SSA (OPHI 2017a). The global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) has
national estimates for 39 SSA countries and 866 million people, or 96 percent of the
population of SSA. Of these, a total of 521 million are MPI poor—over half a billion people.
Of the regions covered by the Global MPI, SSA has the highest percentage of MPI poor,
although not the greatest number of MPI poor people (SA has the most). Ninety percent or
more of the population are poor in 49 African regions found in 15 countries—Chad, South
Sudan, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Niger, Madagascar, Ethiopia, Benin,
Central African Republic, Guinea, Gambia, Nigeria, and Mali (OPHI 2017b).
⁷ OPHI’s Alkire–Foster (AF) Method identifies multiple deprivations at the household level across the same
three dimensions as the Human Development Index (health, education, and living standards), including
10 indicators (that is, child mortality and nutrition under the health dimension; years of schooling and child
school attendance under the education dimension; and electricity, sanitation, drinking water, floor, cooking fuel,
and asset ownership under the living standards dimension). People are considered “multidimensional poor,” if
they are deprived in at least one-third of the weighted indicators. The first four of these indicators carry a weight of
one-sixth each (that is, 0.166), and the other six have a weight of one-eighteenth each (that is, 0.055).
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Box 4.1 Income Poverty, Multidimensional Poverty, and
Implications for Food Security and Nutrition
There is broad consensus that poverty is multidimensional. What then is the best measure
of poverty, how does it affect food insecurity and related policy and investment decisions,
and how much does the measure tell us about achievements on scores of deprivations
beyond income, such as FSN and, relatedly, the frequent lack of access of households to
clean water or sanitation, to primary schools and health, and to individual capabilities
beyond measurable outcomes, which Sen articulated (Sen 1981, 1983). In short, what does
the “poverty” measure signify about our view of development itself, about poverty
monitoring and the needed country-specific (and, indeed, location-specific) investment
strategies, given diversity within countries, to improve development outcomes?
In the 1990 World Development Report, the World Bank opted for US$1 a day as the
measure of income poverty, and later revised it in 2008 to US$1.25 and in 2015 to US
$1.90 (Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula 2009; Chen and Ravallion. 2010; World Bank
2020b, “Methodology”). Multidimensional measures develop an index of several differ-
ent dimensions and indicators of poverty, determine when a person is deprived of that
dimension, and arrive at the relative importance of the different deprivations and a
poverty cutoff to determine when a person’s deprivations are sufficient to be identified as
poor (Alkire and Foster 2011a, 2011b; Alkire and Seth 2015). The debate between the
champions of the income measure (Ravallion 2011) and the multidimensional measure
(Alkire and Foster 2011a, 2011b; Alkire et al. 2015) has rested on whether it is credible to
contend that any single index could capture all that matters in all settings. The debate on
the index has parallels with those on the construction of IFPRI’s Global Hunger Index
(Lele et al. 2016). In the case of the latter, it is often argued that it is a good tool for
advocacy but not for developing an investment strategy.
Ravallion (2011) has argued that a single index cannot be a sufficient statistic for
poverty assessments; Ravallion asks “whether one aggregates in the space of ‘attain-
ments,’ using prices when appropriate, or ‘deprivations,’ using weights set by the
analyst.” He argues that the goal for future poverty monitoring efforts should be to
develop a “credible set of multiple indices,” spanning the dimensions of poverty most
relevant to a specific setting, “rather than a single multidimensional index.” When
weights are needed, they should not be set solely by an analyst measuring poverty.
Rather, they should be, as much as possible, “consistent with well-informed choices by
poor people” (Ravallion 2011, 235).
Advocates of the multidimensional index (for example, Alkire, Foster, and Santos
[2011]) contend that: “multidimensional measures provide an alternative lens through
which poverty may be viewed and understood,” and a single measure, although not
always defensible, can have the same powerful effect as the measure of the gross national
product (GNP)—a position argued powerfully by the likes of Drèze and Sen (2011, 2013)
and Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2009) in their Report by the Commission on the Measure-
ment of Economic Performance and Social Progress. Sen, Drèze, and others have shown
that, while India’s per capita income has been higher than its neighbors, progress in social
indicators has been slower. And, Alkire and others provide much more recent evidence,
reported here, to show howmultidimensional measures of poverty provide deeper insights
into progress on poverty reduction. The debates have had three dimensions: methodolo-
gies, data, and evidence, and implications for policies and investments.
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The genesis of the debate can be traced to the Basic Human Needs (BHN) approach of
the 1970s. The BHN approach arose out of a reaction to the pro-growth approach, a
concern about growing inequalities, and the need to generate employment, much like in
2015 (ODI 1978). The BHN approach differed from an income approach that the World
Bank adopted in the early 1990s to begin monitoring poverty. The reasons were well
articulated by the principal champion of the BHN approach, Paul Streeten in the late
1970s.a Streeten (1979) argued that, from the perspectives of the basic needs approach,
the income-orientation of earlier approaches was inefficient, or partial, or both for
several reasons. Many of these reasons are germane to FSN goals, advocacy, and
measurement in the context of SDGs going forward. These reasons include:
(1) . . . consumers [may] not always [be] efficient optimizers, especially concerning
nutrition and health, or when changing from subsistence farmers to cash earners.
Additional cash income is sometimes spent on food of lower nutritional value than that
consumed at lower levels, or on items other than food. [This is very much today’s
concern as suggested by the work of Deaton and Drèze on India (2009)].
(2) The manner in which additional income is earned may affect nutrition adversely.
Female employment, for example, may reduce breast feeding . . . [UNICEF has made
similar arguments, and we discuss their position in this chapter].
(3) There is maldistribution within households, as well as between households;
women and children tend to be neglected in favor of adult males. . . .
(4) Perhaps twenty percent of the destitute are sick, disabled, aged, or orphaned
children; . . .
(5) Some basic needs can be satisfied effectively only through public services, sub-
sidized goods and services, or transfer payments. . . .
(6) The income approach has paid a good deal of attention to the choice of
technique, but has neglected the need to provide for appropriate products. In many
developing societies, the import or domestic production of over-sophisticated products,
transferred from relatively high-income, high-saving economies, has frustrated the
pursuit of a basic needs approach by catering to the demands of a small section of the
population, or by preempting an excessive slice of the low incomes of the poor. . . . [These
issues of consumption patterns of the poor and their local, urban, and international
linkages are even more germane in the age of globalization, for the creation of employ-
ment, as we demonstrate in Chapter 2 on Structural Transformation.]
(7) Finally, . . . the income approach neglects the importance of “nonmaterial” needs,
[such as water and sanitation, housing, and fuelwood], both in their own right and as
instruments of meeting some of the material needs more effectively and at lower costs.
(Streeten 1979, 137–8)
See, also Haq (1976); Hicks and Streeten (1979); Stewart (1985); Streeten et al. (1981);
and UNDP (1990).
The BHN approach morphed into the multidimensional nature of poverty, the United
Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) Human Development Index, and Oxford
University’s focus on the multidimensional nature of poverty. In McNamara’s 1973
Nairobi speech, Mahbub ul Haq contributed many of the ideas of MDP. Haq later
moved to UNDP and was instrumental in establishing UNDP’s Human Development
Index, involving Sen and Streeten.
a Poverty & Equity (World Bank 2020a); and “Povcalnet: An Online Analysis Tool for Global Poverty
Monitoring” (World Bank 2020b).
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Table 4.2 The dimensions, indicators, deprivation cutoffs, and weights of the Global
Multidimensional Poverty Index and related Sustainable Development Goals
Dimensions
of poverty
Indicator Deprived if . . . Weight Related SDG
Health Child
mortality
Any child has died in the family in the
five-year period preceding the survey
1/6 SDG3 (Health
and well-being)
Nutrition Any adult under 70 years of age or any
child for whom there is nutritional






No household member aged 10 years







Any school-aged child+ is not
attending school up to the age at





The household does not own more
than one of these assets: radio, TV,
telephone, bicycle, motorbike, or











The household’s sanitation facility is
not improved (according to MDG
guidelines) or it is improved but







The household does not have access to
improved drinking water (according
to MDG guidelines) or safe drinking
water is at 30-minute walk or more




Flooring The household has a dirt, sand, dung,














The household does not own more
than one of these assets: radio, TV,
telephone, bicycle, motorbike, or




Note: *Adults are considered malnourished if their body mass index (BMI) is below 18.5 m/kg². Children are
considered malnourished if their z-score of weight-for-age is below –2 standard deviations from the median of the
reference population.
**Unless the survey report definitions change, a household is considered to have access to improved sanitation if it has
some type of flush toilet or latrine, ventilated improved pit, or composting toilet, provided that they are not shared.
***A household has access to clean drinking water if the water source is any of the following types: piped water,
public tap, borehole or pump, protected well, protected spring, or rain water, and it is less than 30 minutes’ walk
(round trip).
+Data source for age children start school: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), Institute for Statistics database, Table 1. Education systems (UIS.Stat, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/
unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=163).
Source: Adapted from Alkire and Robles (2017, 7, table 2); and Alkire and Kanagaratnam (2018, 5, table 1).
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Over one billion people, almost three-quarters of all multidimensionally poor people
(72 percent), live in MICs. Further details of distribution can be found in Alkire and
Robles (2017).
Half of Multidimensionally Poor People are Children
Nearly half of all multidimensionally poor people (48 percent) are children, defined as aged
0–17. Nearly two out of every five children (37 percent) are multidimensionally poor. This
means 689 million children are living in MDP. Poverty rates are also higher among children,
with 37 percent of children poor, whereas 23 percent of adults aged 18 and older are poor.
Most multidimensionally poor children live in SA (44 percent of all poor children) and in
SSA. Across all 39 countries in SSA, with an average of 66 percent poor children, the highest
rate of poverty for any age group is in SSA. In 3 countries—South Sudan, Niger, and
Ethiopia—more than 90 percent of children are MPI poor (Alkire and Robles 2017).
Two-thirds of poor children live in MICs. Poor children are found to be deprived, on
average, in 52 percent of weighted indicators. In SSA, poor children are deprived in
58 percent of weighted indicators (OPHI 2017b). On average, India’s multidimensionally
poor face 47 percent of the 10 deprivations (OPHI 2017a). The largest proportion of poor
and deprived among children are in cooking fuel (35 percent), followed by sanitation
(30 percent), flooring (26 percent), nutrition and electricity (22 percent); among adults,
deprivations are in cooking fuel (19 percent), followed by sanitation (16 percent), flooring
(14 percent), nutrition (13 percent), and electricity (10 percent). Significantly, children are
poorer and more deprived than adults in each of the 10 indicators (Alkire and Robles 2017).
Results of the rank correlation analysis among MDP and its 10 indicators suggest all are
significant at the 0.01 level, and the coefficient of the nutrition indicator (adults are
considered malnourished if their body mass index (BMI) is below 18.5m/kg², and children
are malnourished if their z-score of weight-for-age is below –2 standard deviations from the
median of the reference population) against MDP is 0.92, which is lower than cooking fuel
(0.983), improved sanitation (0.977), electricity (0.968), flooring (0.946), improved drinking
water (0.944), child school attendance (0.94), and years of schooling (0.928); and higher
than assets ownership (0.908) and child mortality (0.851).
The Distressing Condition of Destitution
Nearly half of all MPI poor people (706 million) are destitute⁸ and experience extreme
deprivations such as severe malnutrition in at least one-third of the dimensions. Most of the
highest levels of destitution are found in SSA, but most of the destitute people—362 million
of the 706 million—live in SA. India has more destitute people (295 million) than SSA
(282 million), and Pakistan has more destitute people (37 million) than EAP (26 million) or
the Arab States (26 million) (Figure 4.4) (Alkire and Robles 2017).
Appropriate action is urgently needed because of the staggering numbers of poor in SA
and SSA. How well do income poverty and MDP explain the various food and nutrition
security indicators?
⁸ Destitute people are deprived in one-third or more weighted indicators, but the destitution indicators are
more extreme; since 2014, OPHI has reported a measure of destitution that identifies a subset of the MPI poor—
the poorest of the poor.
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Multidimensional Poverty and Income Poverty as Determinants of
Various Indicators of Food Insecurity
We measure relationship between food insecurity using two different measures of poverty
(MDP and income poverty) and including indicators of child deprivation, which the
preceding Kakwani and Son approach could not do: namely, stunting, wasting, overweight,
underweight, and PoU across developing countries. Association, of course, does not mean
causality. It is worth mentioning that one of the indicators (out of the 10 indicators) of the
MDP is nutrition (that is, any adult under 70 years of age or any child for whom there is
nutritional information is undernourished in terms of weight-for-age or underweight).
The regressions for the prevalence of stunting, wasting, overweight, and underweight are
based on 86 developing countries, and PoU is based on 75 developing countries for the latest
years’ available data.
Findings of the Analysis
MDP explains more variation (R² value) than income poverty in the case of each child’s
food security indicator, and income poverty explains slightly more variation (R² value) than
MDP in the case of PoU. Also, change in predicted values (that is, the coefficient value) of
the prevalence of wasting, underweight, and overweight are larger with the changes in MDP
than income poverty. The exception is prevalence of stunting (the same with income










































































































































































































Headcount ratio in multidimensional poverty (% population)
Destitutes (i.e., subset of the MPI poor who are the poorest of the poor (% population)
Headcount ratio in income poverty $1.90 a day (% of population)
Figure 4.4 Comparison of the headcount ratios of multidimensionally poor, destitute, and
US$1.90/day poor (87 countries)
Note: People are considered multidimensionally poor if they are deprived in at least one-third of the weighted
indicators. The 10 indicators relate to: years of schooling, child school attendance, child mortality, nutrition,
electricity, sanitation, drinking water, floor, cooking fuel, and asset ownership. The first four of these indicators
carries a weight of one-sixth each (0.166). The other six have a weight of one-eighteenth each (0.055).
Destitute people are deprived in one-third or more weighted indicators, but the destitution indicators are more
extreme; since 2014, OPHI has reported a measure of destitution that identifies a subset of the MPI poor, the
poorest of the poor.
Poverty headcount ratio at US$1.90 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $1.90 a day at 2011
international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be
compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions.
Source: Adapted from Global MPI Winter 2017/2018 (OPHI 2018); and PovcalNet (World Bank 2020b).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
222   
The analysis suggests that income poverty and MDP are statistically significant in the
case of all the five food security indicators (PoU, prevalence of stunting, prevalence of
wasting, prevalence of overweight and prevalence of underweight). Both income poverty
and MDP have positive impacts on PoU, stunting, wasting, and underweight and, as would
be expected, negative impacts on the prevalence of overweight.
Table 4.3 summarizes the regression results.
Results suggest the regression coefficient and R² values for the prevalence of stunting are
the highest among all the food security indicators for both MDP and income poverty (see
Figures 4.5 and 4.6).
Role of Gender Equality in Food and Nutrition Security
Despite major strides, gender inequality remains a major barrier to development, particu-
larly in food and nutrition security in countries lagging in development. All too often,
women and girls are discriminated against in health, education, political representation,
labor markets, etc.—with negative consequences for development of their capabilities and
their freedom of choice.
In the section that follows, we review different international efforts to measure gender
inequality and the extent to which they explain outcomes with regard to food and nutrition
security. As countries’ human development improves, women’s choices and opportunities
must be equal to those of men, so that everyone benefits from advances in human
development (see Box 4.2 on how the SDGs addressed gender equality).
Table 4.3 Regression results: Summary table comparing multidimensional poverty and income
poverty versus food security indicators (prevalence of undernourishment, prevalence of

















Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)
(75 countries)
(+)0.26* 0.31 (+)0.31* 0.34
Prevalence of stunting, height-for-age (% of
children under 5) (86 countries)
(+)0.32* 0.55 (+)0.32* 0.39
Prevalence of wasting, weight-for-height (% of
children under 5) (86 countries)
(+)0.09* 0.26 (+)0.05** 0.06
Prevalence of underweight, weight-for-age (% of
children under 5) (86 countries)
(+)0.26* 0.52 (+)0.19* 0.21
Prevalence of overweight, weight-for-height (% of
children under 5) (86 countries)
(–)0.10* 0.35 (–)0.09* 0.18
Note: * Significant at 0.01 level; ** significant at 0.05 level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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A more profound issue, the undernutrition of adolescent girls, which is particularly
acute in India, leading to a cycle of low birthweight and stunting of Indian children
and subsequent increased risks of NCDs. This is an entire intergenerational cycle of
both undernutrition and NCDs—the developmental origins, which is extremely impor-
tant in SA.
FAO’s State of Food and Agriculture (2010–11) on “Women in Agriculture—Closing the
Gender Gap for Development” noted that gender matters because 43 percent of the
agricultural labor force, on average, in developing countries is female. The agriculture sector
is underperforming in many developing countries, in part, because across countries and
contexts, women have consistently less access than men to agricultural assets, inputs, and
services and to rural employment opportunities. Increasing women’s access to land, live-
stock, education, financial services, extension, technology, and rural employment could
increase yields on their farms by 20–30 percent and raise total agricultural output in
developing countries by 2.5–4 percent, which alone could lift 100–150 million people out
of hunger and generate gains in food security, economic growth, and social welfare (FAO
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Figure 4.5 Multidimensional poverty versus prevalence of stunting (86 countries)
Note: Bubble size shows number of stunted children under five.
Source: OPHI (2018); UNICEF (2020).
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feeding of children (UNICEF 2015). Therefore, one would have expected a strong treatment
of gender in food and nutrition.
International agencies have developed a variety of indices on gender: for example, The
Economist Intelligence Unit’s Women’s Economic Opportunity (WEO) Index, World
Economic Forum’s (WEF’s) Global Gender Gap Index, UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index
(GII), and the Gender Development Index (GDI).
By working disproportionately in unpaid labor, particularly in developing countries,
women traditionally have had less access than men to income and resources. Expanding
opportunities for the 1.5 billion women not employed in the formal sector takes on even
greater importance. As the WEO Index shows, simply increasing the numbers of
working women will not be enough. The poorest regions of the world have some of
the highest levels of female labor force participation, and poverty in those regions
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Figure 4.6 Income poverty versus prevalence of stunting (86 countries)
Note: Bubble size shows number of stunted children under five.
Source: World Bank (2020b); UNICEF (2020).
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Box 4.2 Gender Equality in the Sustainable Development Goals
SDGs have placed considerable emphasis on gender, and if even a fraction of those
goals are realized, they should help FSN. SDG5, to “achieve gender equality and
empower all women and girls,” calls for ending all forms of discrimination against all
women and girls everywhere with various sub-SDGs (Target 5.1); for eliminating all
forms of violence (Target 5.2); for eliminating all harmful practices, such as child,
early, and forced marriages and female genital mutilation (Target 5.3); for recognizing
and giving value to unpaid care and domestic work (Target 5.4); for ensuring women’s
full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of
decision-making in political, economic, and public life (Target 5.5), for ensuring
universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights (Target
5.6); for giving women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to
ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial services,
inheritance, and natural resources, in accordance with national laws (Target 5a); for
enhancing the use of enabling technology, particularly information and communica-
tions technology, to promote the empowerment of women (Target 5.b); and for
adopting and strengthening sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promo-
tion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels
(Target 5c) to track and make public allocations for gender equality and women’s
empowerment.
SDG4 to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong
learning opportunities for all” also includes a number of targets related to gender: to
ensure all girls and boys complete free, equitable, and quality primary and secondary
education (Target 4.1); to ensure all girls and boys have access to quality early
childhood development, care, and pre-primary education (Target 4.2); to ensure
equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational,
and tertiary education, including university education (Target 4.3); to eliminate gender
disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and voca-
tional training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous
peoples, and children in vulnerable situations (Target 4.5); to ensure all youth and a
substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy
(Target 4.6); to ensure all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote
sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable
development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a
culture of peace and nonviolence, global citizenship, and appreciation of cultural
diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development (Target 4.7); and
to build and upgrade education facilities that are child-, disability- and gender-
sensitive and provide safe, nonviolent, inclusive, and effective learning environments
for all (Target 4a).
SDG3 to “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages” includes
Target 3.1 to reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 live
births by 2030.
Source: UN (2020a).
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social, financial, and educational barriers hindering women’s productivity need to be
removed. Women who are better educated, healthier, and have greater control over
household financial resources are also more likely to invest time in their children’s
health and education—an investment in the workforce of tomorrow. The global gender
gap has been widening for the first time since the WEF’s Global Gender Gap Report was
first published in 2006 (WEF 2017).
The GII is defined on the UNDP’s Human Development Reports website. The GII ranges
between 0 and 1, and the higher the GII value the more disparities between females and
males and the more loss to human development (for details, see Seth [2009]; UNDP
[2019b]). The GII is assessed in 160 countries.
First introduced by UNDP in 1995, the GDI: “ . . . measures gender gaps in human
development achievements by accounting for disparities between women and men in
three basic dimensions of human development—health, knowledge and living standards
using the same component indicators as in the HDI [Human Development Index]. . . . It is a
direct measure of gender gap showing the female HDI as a percentage of the male HDI”
(UNDP 2019a).
The closer the ratio is to 1, the smaller the gap between women andmen. (For details, see
Technical Notes on the calculation of the indices [UNDP 2016b].)
In the case of all these indices, countries in Northern Europe, Sweden, and Norway rank
at the top of the index, explained by robust, gender-sensitive legislation, and progressive
cultural norms. The world average score on the GII was 0.443 in 2015. It reflects a
percentage loss of 44.3 percent in achievement, across the three dimensions due to gender
inequality. Regional averages range from 27.9 percent in Europe and Central Asia (ECA),
followed by EAP (31.5 percent), LAC (39 percent), SA (52 percent), the Arab States (53.5
percent), to nearly 57.2 percent in SSA in 2015. At the country level, losses due to gender
inequality range from 4.03 percent in Switzerland to 76.8 percent in Yemen. Other countries
at the bottom of the ranking, with over 60 percent in losses due to gender inequality, were
Niger, Chad, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tonga,
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Central African Republic, Gambia, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Malawi,
and Benin. SSA, the Arab States, and SA suffer the largest losses due to gender inequality.
India has performed poorly in removing gender-based disparities, ranked 125 of 159
countries in the GII in 2015. In India, 52.9 percent losses were due to gender inequality.
Neighboring countries, such as Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar, which ranked
lower than India on the overall HDI, have performed much better when it comes to
achieving gender equality. In fact, across SA, only Pakistan (ranked 130) and Afghanistan
(ranked 154) ranked lower than India in terms of GII. China was ranked 37, Myanmar 80,
Sri Lanka 87, Bhutan 110, Nepal 115, and Bangladesh 119. Brazil, Russia, and South Africa
had higher rankings of 92, 52, and 90, respectively (UNDP 2019c).
According to a recent report by Nair (2015): “In India, merely 12.2 percent of the seats
are held by women as against 27.6 percent in Afghanistan with a record of violations against
women’s rights.”
In contrast, women’s representation was 13 percent in Myanmar, 20 percent each in
Bangladesh and Pakistan, 23.6 percent in China, and 29.6 percent in Nepal (Bahri 2018).
The top six countries for female representation in parliament were Rwanda, Bolivia, Cuba,
Seychelles, Sweden, and Senegal.
The GDI assessed 160 countries in the 2016 HDI report, which states that women, in all
regions of the world, have consistently lower HDI values than men. According to the HDI
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2016 Report, the largest differences captured by the GDI are in SA, where the HDI value for
women is 17.8 percent lower than the HDI value for men, followed by the Arab States with a
14.4 percent difference, and SSA with 12.3 percent (UNDP 2016a). The Human Develop-
ment Report 2016 further notes:
Much of the variation in HDI between women and men is due to lower income among
women relative to men and to lower educational attainment among women relative to
men. Part of the variation in the HDI between men and women is generated by barriers to
women working outside the home, to accessing education, to voicing their concerns in
political arenas, to shaping policies and to receiving the benefits of high-quality and
accessible health care. (UNDP 2016a, 54)
The world average score on the GDI was 0.938 in 2015. Regional averages ranged from
0.822 in SA, followed by Arab States (0.856), SSA (0.877), ECA (0.951), EAP (0.956), to
0.981 in LAC (UNDP 2016a).
India, which performed very poorly on the GDI, was 0.819 in 2015, compared to the
developing country average of 0.913, and just above 12 countries from the bottom of the
index. Afghanistan ranked lowest followed by Niger, Yemen, Pakistan, Chad, Central
African Republic, Guinea, Mali, Iraq, Côte d’Ivoire, Comoros, and Mauritania. Throughout
SA, only Pakistan and Afghanistan ranked lower than India in terms of GDI. On India’s
GDI, theHDI 2016 Report said the 2015 female HDI value for India was 0.549 in contrast to
0.671 for males, resulting in a GDI value of 0.624, ranked 131 among 188 countries in the
year 2015. Among its neighbors, Sri Lanka and China are at the top with the rankings of 73
and 90, in terms of HDI, respectively. Other neighbors ranked below India were Bhutan
(132), Bangladesh (140), Nepal (144), Myanmar (146), and Pakistan (147). India was,
however, ranked the lowest among Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa (the other
countries of BRICS), with Brazil, Russia, and South Africa ranked 79, 49 and 119, respec-
tively (UNDP 2016a). India’s maternal mortality ratio remained high at 174 per 10,000 live
births in 2015; its reduction goal to reach 140 was also an MDG.Women’s empowerment in
terms of mean number of years of schooling is only 4.8 years, compared to 8.2 years for
males. Income per capita for females per year was US$2,184 (in terms of 2011 PPP) and US
$8,897 for males. See Sengupta (2017).
According to UNDP’s Africa Human Development Report 2016: Accelerating Gender
Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Africa:
Gender gaps in income per capita contribute to lower achievement of human development
by females. On average, African women living in countries with lower levels of gender
inequality in income tend to achieve higher levels of human development than African
men (30 countries). For countries with low gender inequality in income and lower female-
to-male HDI ratios, the implication is that there is higher inequality in education and
health outcomes, which cancels the benefit of more equal distribution [of] income.
Countries in this category include: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone,
Togo, Central African Republic, Guinea, Liberia and Chad. . . .
In terms of Africa’s sub-regions, women in East and Southern Africa show the highest
achievements in terms of human development relative to men, followed by North and
Central Africa and least in West Africa. . . .
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
228   
North Africa has the most income inequality. The low female labour force participation
rate in North Africa, especially among youth, at 19.7 per cent in 2014 compared to 52.1
per cent for sub-Saharan Africa (ILO 2015), accounts for high gender income inequality in
this region. (UNDP 2016a, 27–8, 30)
Gender Indexes and Food Security Indicators
How is food insecurity related to gender? We explore the association of two different
measures of gender indexes (that is, WEF’s Global Gender Gap Index and UNDP’s GII
and GDI), with food security using four child food security indicators (stunting, wasting,
overweight, and underweight) and PoU across the world based on the latest year available
data (WEF’s Global Gender Gap index data are for 2017 and UNDP’s GII and GDI data are
for the year 2015). We exclude The Economist Intelligence Unit’s WEO Index from our
analysis, because it was published only once, in 2012.
Findings of the Analysis
UNDP’s GII explains more variation (R² value) than the other UNDP index (UNDP’s GDI)
in the case of each food security indicator, except prevalence of wasting, for which UNDP’s
GDI is able to explain more variation (R² value) than the other gender indexes. WEF’s
Global Gender Gap Index explains less variation (R² value) in all cases, among the three
gender indexes.
The analysis suggests that both UNDP gender indexes are statistically significant for all
five food security indicators (PoU, prevalence of stunting, prevalence of wasting, prevalence
of overweight, and prevalence of underweight). In all cases, both UNDP gender indexes
are statistically significant at 0.01 level, except in the case of UNDP’s GDI on PoU, which
is statistically significant at 0.05 level. UNDP’s GII, which is scaled from 0 (low inequality)
to 1 (high inequality), is associated positively with PoU, stunting, wasting, and under-
weight, as would be expected, and negatively associated with the prevalence of overweight.
UNDP’s GDI, which is the ratio of female to male HDI values (that is, the smaller the
ratio, the larger the gap between women and men) is associated negatively with PoU,
stunting, wasting, and underweight, as would be expected, and is positively associated
with the prevalence of overweight. These results confirmed that the incidence of PoU,
stunting, wasting, and underweight are substantial when gender inequality, the gap
between women and men, is high.
Our analysis does not find any statistical significance on PoU, stunting, and overweight,
except for prevalence of wasting and underweight for WEF’s Global Gender Gap Index.
Both prevalence of wasting and underweight are statistically significant at the 0.01 level and
negatively associated with WEF’s Global Gender Gap Index, which is scaled from 0
(imparity) to 1 (parity): that is, the prevalence of wasting and underweight of children
under 5 is high when gender disparity is prominent.
Table 4.4 summarizes all the regression results.
Results suggest the R² value for prevalence of stunting is highest among all the food
security indicators for UNDP’s GII, and the R² value for prevalence of underweight is
highest among all the food security indicators for UNDP’s GDI.
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Rise, Fall, and Rise Again of Nutrition in a Holistic
Conceptual Framework
Historically, nutrition has gone through many cycles, which explains the confusing foun-
dation of policy (Fanzo and Byerlee 2019). The League of Nations, following the Great
Depression, was concerned about the principles of an adequate diet, dietary standards,
implications for country policies, and cross-country comparisons of the physical standards
and the clinical and physiological methods best calculated to detect states of malnutrition.⁹
Nutritional thinking was dominated by research on vitamins, even wrestling with questions
of peripheral edema, wasting, diarrhea, and the role of breast milk (Semba 2008). A recent
Food Security Information Network (FSIN) study demonstrated how new cell phone and
geographic information systems (GIS) technology are improving the speed, accuracy, and
coverage of data (FSIN 2017).
Nutrition was in FAO’s mission statement when the organization was established in
1945. FAO’s first director-general, John Boyd Orr, a scientist, was awarded the Nobel Prize
for having employed science “to promote cooperation between nations that they become a
valuable factor in the cause of peace” (Jahn 1999, 408). Orr was guided by President
Roosevelt’s frequently articulated strong belief that freedom from hunger was the founda-
tion of peace, a concern relevant for the contemporary world.
Table 4.4 Regression results: Summary table comparing World Economic Forum’s Global
Gender Gap Index, UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index and Gender Development Index versus
food security indicators (prevalence of undernourishment, prevalence of stunting, prevalence of






















(+)18.6 0.01 (+)34.7* 0.21 (–)32.1** 0.05
Prevalence of stunting,
height-for-age (% of children
under 5)




(–)32.9* 0.17 (+)12.1* 0.21 (–)32.3* 0.31
Prevalence of underweight,
weight-for-age (% of children
under 5)




(+)8.1 0.008 (–)11.2* 0.12 (+)19.7* 0.08
Note: * Significant at 0.01 level; and ** significant at 0.05 level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
⁹ See the archive from The League of Nations, The Problem of Nutrition: https://archive.org/stream/pro
blemofnutriti02leaguoft/problemofnutriti02leaguoft_djvu.txt
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As Alan Berg (1973) and later, Gillespie et al. (2016) noted, the 1950s and 1960s were
dominated by concerns among nutritionists about famine, hunger, calorie requirements,
and the primacy of protein, leading to the work of numerous meetings of the Joint FAO/
WHO Expert Committee on Nutrition, set up in 1948, including work on childhood
malnutrition. The FAO, WHO, and UNICEF Committee on Protein Malnutrition had a
worldwide research program on high protein foods, leading to the concept of “protein–
calorie malnutrition,” with focus on nutrition education in proteins and calories (Burgess
and Dean 1962; Ruxin 2000, 152).
Although UNICEF received the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1965, “to produce food
rich in protein for children in the developing countries” (Lionaes 1999), and IOs rang the
alarm that the protein “gap” or “crisis” was a global emergency in need of immediate
attention—the “International Action to Avert the Impending Protein Crisis” (UN 1968)—
the scientific community began to question the role of proteins in isolation and to recognize
and stress the close complementarity between energy and protein (Sukhatme 1970).
Adequate protein intake in a low-calorie diet was not acceptable, and attention shifted to
increasing energy consumption. Thus, the term “protein–energy malnutrition” entered the
literature while efforts to strengthen protein content of foods continued. The 1981 Joint
FAO/WHO/United Nations University (UNU) expert consultation on Human Energy
Requirements reported that, except for children, sufficient information was available
to use energy expenditure to determine energy requirements (FAO, WHO, and UNU 1985).
1970s: Nutrition Enters the Development Agenda
In September 1971, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the first Interna-
tional Conference on Nutrition, National Development, and Planning brought nutrition
science to the center stage as a development agenda (Berg, Scrimshaw, and Call 1973). The
level of interest in nutrition was reflected in the creation of the United Nations Standing
Committee on Nutrition (UNSCN) in 1977 (Longhurst 2013), and as part of the FAO report
on Nutrition Planning (Call and Levinson 1973). The political efforts through FAO’s
meetings on food security provided nutrition advocacy. With the strong collaboration
that then existed between the World Bank and the Rome-based agencies, the World Bank
joined FAO, WHO, and UNICEF on the UN coordinating agency of the day, the Protein
Advisory Group. TheWorld Food Conference, following in 1974, kept hunger and nutrition
at the center of the international agenda. Nutrition began to be thought of as an essential
driver of economic growth, with nutrition programs treated as investments, rather than
simply for consumption and needed for specific actions, in the then famous The Nutrition
Factor: Its Role in National Development, which became required reading on college
campuses for every student of food and nutrition (Berg 1973). Robert McNamara, the
fifth president of the World Bank (1968–81), became a strong advocate for nutrition as part
of a multisectoral strategy, articulated in McNamara’s celebrated Nairobi speech that also
outlined the World Bank’s MDP reduction strategy in the Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment (ARD) and Population, Health, and Nutrition (PHN) sectors (McNamara 1973).
Separate departments were created for each. The World Bank’s lending to both ARD and
PHN sectors increased considerably in the 1970s. In July 1974, Donald S. McLaren’s “The
Great Protein Fiasco,” published in The Lancet, criticized the “the protein era” for produ-
cing little that was worthwhile and noted that the experts had unwittingly closed the
“protein gap” by lowering the dietary requirements for protein (McLaren 1974).
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Food security concerns shifted to developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s, with the
rise of food prices. “Food security” came to be defined relatively narrowly around
availability and stability of food supplies on global and national markets. When FAO
hosted the 1974 World Food Summit, food security was defined as: “availability at all
times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of
food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices” with a focus on
stability (FAO 2003, 27, quoting UN [1975]). The governments attending the World Food
Conference also placed emphasis on the right to food in their Universal Declaration on the
Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, adopted on November 16, 1974: “The Confer-
ence solemnly proclaims: 1. Every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be
free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop fully and maintain their physical
and mental faculties.” (UN–OHCHR 2019). Indeed, the rights-based approach to food—
with its roots in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which Eleanor
Roosevelt, as the chair of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, helped
craft—has grown into a huge agenda (see, for example, McClain-Nhlapo 2004; Duger and
Davis 2012; Raja 2014).
A decade of macro analysis first placed nutrition planning and then nutritional surveil-
lance among the dominant strategies for the countries most affected. Economists began to
take over from nutritionists and pediatricians, argued Gillespie et al. (2016), as the architects
of new policies, with much talk about national food security. The World Bank stressed the
importance of income generation. In a study by Reutlinger and Selowsky (1976), “Malnu-
trition and Poverty: Magnitude and Policy Options,” the authors pointed out the impor-
tance of increasing the poor’s access to income to purchase food. The UN Protein Advisory
Group evolved into the UN Administrative Coordination Committee’s Subcommittee on
Nutrition (ACC/SCN, or simply, SCN) in 1977, with its attention now focused on improv-
ing breastfeeding, maternal and child nutrition, and complementary feeding. Hugh Geach’s
work (1973), “The Baby Food Tragedy,” was a pivotal event in nutrition. Multinational
companies (Nestlé, in particular) were alleged to have contributed to infant mortality in
developing countries through the practices they adopted to market infant formula foods
(Nestle 2013). The replacement of breast milk unknowingly risked malnutrition and death
for the babies, leading to the WHA’s passage of the International Code of Marketing of
Breast-milk Substitutes in 1981 (WHO 1981).
1980s: “The Lost Decade”—Cross Currents of Increasing Access
and Retrenching Services
As global food prices declined in the 1980s, and as the concern about debt increased, there
was a strong external push on developing countries to recover costs and retrench health and
educational services during the structural adjustment era of that decade. At the same time,
in the Director-General’s Report on World Food Security: A Reappraisal of the Concepts and
Approaches, FAO (1983) expanded the concept of food security to include the third aspect—
access—in part influenced by Sen’s work on famines (1980, 1981): “Ensuring that all people
at all times have both physical and economic access to the basic food that they need,” with a
better balance between the demand and supply side of the food security equation. An
important World Bank report, “Poverty and Hunger,” further elaborated on the terms of:
“access by all people at all times to enough food for an active and healthy life” (World Bank
1986, v, emphasis added), focusing on the temporal dynamics of food insecurity. The report
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introduced the now widely accepted distinction between chronic food insecurity, associated
with problems of continuing or structural poverty and low incomes, and transitory food
insecurity, which occurs in periods of intensified pressure caused by natural disasters,
economic collapse, or conflict (World Bank 1986).
Controlling iodine deficiency got a boost when the UNSCN developed a 10-year plan (in
1985) for the International Coordinating Committee on Iodine Deficiency Disorders
(ICCIDD), which was formed in 1986 and brought iodine deficiency disorders (IDDs) to
international attention, developing support for wide-scale salt iodization and promoting
laws to enforce the participation of salt manufacturers. In the early 1990s, the subject of
micronutrients pushed protein–energy malnutrition (PEM) to the background, as nutri-
tionists, international agencies, and universities attempted quick fixes to control vitamin
A deficiency, anemia, and IDD (Latham 1997).
1990s: From General Populations to Maternal and Child Malnutrition—
Role of the United Nations Children’s Fund
Much like the FAO framework, UNICEF’s work (1990) on the causes of malnutrition has
made a pivotal contribution to the understanding of food insecurity issues, and since 1990,
has been an important foundation and voice in today’s food security framework, albeit with
some major differences from FAO. At the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, UNICEF
landmark framework, described in Adjustment with a Human Face (Cornia, Jolly, and
Stewart 1987), was based on evidence from the ground in Tanzania, as part of the Joint
World Health Organization/UNICEF Iringa Nutrition Programme that was launched in
1986. UNICEF’s focus is on the issues of women and children, a focus that FAO’s general
and largely macroeconomic work had lacked since the 1970s. UNICEF also has had greater
focus on the establishment of the enabling environment and the causal chain that could lead
to exploration of inputs, processes, and outcomes. UNICEF’s framework (Figure 4.7), in an
alternative approach, distinguishes between the immediate or proximate causes of malnu-
trition, and more remote, ultimate, or underlying, and basic causes. UNICEF’s work has
spawned a large number of variations on that framework, as well as its extension that
combines FAO’s macroeconomic framework with UNICEF’s micro framework (Gillespie,
Harris, and Kadiyala 2012). A UNICEF/WHO Joint Nutrition Support Programme (JNSP)
and the WHO/UNICEF Strategy for Improved Nutrition of Mothers and Children in the
Developing World were both endorsed by the UNICEF/WHO Joint Committee on Health
Policy at its 27th session in Geneva in January 1989, with the recommendation that it be
further elaborated. The importance of nutrition for women was recognized not just in terms
of their role as mothers, or even as economic producers, but in their own right. This
framework was the basis for the Lancet (2013a) Maternal and Child Nutrition Series and
The Lancet Nutrition Series, in its “Framework for actions to achieve optimum fetal and
child nutrition and development” (Lancet 2013b, 2, figure 1). An adaptation of the UNICEF
framework is shown here (Figure 4.7).
In 1991, the first joint WHO–UNICEF conference “Ending Hidden Hunger” helped to
strengthen micronutrient programming, and in 1993, the Micronutrient Initiative was
formed. Overall, micronutrient control programs achieved considerable success during
the 1990s. FAO and WHO co-convened the International Conference on Nutrition (ICN)
in Rome in 1992 (FAO and WHO 1992a, 1992b).
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The meeting at the World Bank on “Actions to Reduce Hunger Worldwide” in 1993
made a further distinction between direct nutrition interventions to address micronutrient
deficiencies and nutrition-sensitive agriculture to address issues of nutritious supply of food,
announcing a major commitment by the World Bank to the eradication of hunger
(Serageldin and Landell-Mills 1994; Binswanger and Landell-Mills 1995). Notwithstanding
the rhetorical commitment, there was relatively little lending to nutrition in the 1990s, as we
discuss in Chapter 8 on the World Bank.
Food Security and Nutrition Were on a Parallel Track
from the Mid-1990s
The concept of food security adopted by 186 countries at the 1996 World Food Summit was
modified only slightly in 2009 by adding the phrase “social” to the 1996 definition:
Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access
to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for
an active and healthy life. The four pillars of food security are availability, access,
utilization and stability. The nutritional dimension is integral to the concept of food
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Figure 4.7 The UNICEF framework of causality in malnutrition
Source: Adapted from UNICEF (1990).
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The definition and pillars of food security approved by member governments in FAO’s 1996
World Food Conference, and refined in 2009, reflect the ongoing historical evolution of
policymakers’ concerns. FAO’s World Food Summits in 1996, 2002, and 2009 reinforced
the 1974 importance of food supply, while modifying the food security definition adopted in
1996 over time. In 1996, the United States argued that too many such meetings and
resolutions of FAO had led to little progress, but then contributed to the definition by
stressing the importance of access (Shaw 2007). In the 2002 World Food Summit, member
nations adopted the “Declaration of the World Food Summit: Five Years Later,” calling for
the establishment of an intergovernmental working group to prepare Right to Food Guide-
lines (FAO 2002). In 2009, at the World Summit in Rome, 60 heads of states and govern-
ments unanimously adopted a declaration that pledged renewed commitment to eradicate
global hunger at the earliest possible date (FAO 2009).
Increasingly, the rapidly growing, massive body of literature on food security recognizes
the physiological, social, psychological, biological, and cultural aspects of food security.
Some note that it is a concept inherently unobservable and difficult to define (Maxwell 1996;
Gross et al. 2000; Clay 2002; Barrett and Lentz 2010; Simon 2012). Macro and micro
concerns diverged in the 1960s and 1970s, when developing countries came into focus
and food shortages were a major concern. FAO took the lead on availability and stability of
the food supply with a series of World Food Summits starting in 1974, and nutritionists
moved to push nutritional planning as a way to influence development policy.
The macro and micro frameworks have been coming together analytically over the years.
However, policy advocacy and financing do not always offer a balanced comprehensive
picture. Advocacy goes through cycles between macro and micro concerns, depending on
the external environment, as we outline in this chapter. These analytical issues have been
articulated over the years by Maxwell and Frankenberger (1992); Maxwell (1996); Barrett
(2010); and Barrett and Lentz (2010); and influenced in recent years by various reports in
The Lancet journal (2008, 2011, 2013a)—for example, Kadiyala et al. (2014); Gillespie et al.
(2016); and policy advocacy on nutrition through The Lancet series (2008, 2011, 2013a,
2015); formation of SUN (SUN 2010); Second International Conference on Nutrition
(ICN2) in 2014 (FAO 2019a); the various Global Nutrition Reports (IFPRI 2014, 2015,
2016b; Development Initiatives 2017, 2018); and other publications, such as WBG (2014);
GLOPAN (2016); World Bank (2017); Global Food Policy Reports (IFPRI 2016a, 2017, 2018,
2019b); and Shekar et al. (2017). FAO, WFP and IFAD, increasingly joining hands with
UNICEF andWHO, have continued to highlight issues of food and nutrition in The State of
Food Security and Nutrition in the World (FAO et al. 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). These
publications build on that large body of work.
The various dimensions of the magnitude of the FSN challenge are in the center of the
diagram of our framework (Figure 4.8): 1. Triple burden of malnutrition (see, also,
Table 4.3), 1.1. Undernutrition—energy and protein inadequacy, undernourishment,
stunting (low height-for-age), wasting (low weight-for-height), low birthweight, and under-
weight; 1.2. Micronutrient deficiencies—vitamin A, iron (anemia), iodine, zinc, and folic
acid below healthy thresholds; 1.3. Overnutrition—overweight and obesity, and associated
diet-related NCDs (diabetes, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, heart disease, and some
cancers); 2. Unsafe drinking water, poor sanitation, and hygiene related diseases; and 3.
Child mortality, maternal mortality, disability, and premature death because of unhealthy
diet. The global scenario for the numerical magnitudes of the challenges in these major
areas are described here briefly.
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Further Conceptual Development of Food Security and Nutrition
Various authors have recognized the hierarchical nature of FSN (see, for example, Webb
et al. [2006]). For example, availability is necessary to determine access, and access is
necessary to determine utilization. Stability undergirds all three other dimensions. The
different initiatives have led to hundreds of definitions of food security. The four pillars
approach reflects a sequence of historical concerns from the 1970s (availability and
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Figure 4.8 Toward a consolidated theory of change for food and nutrition security
Source: Authors’ construction.
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Over time, however, analysts have also begun to focus on synergies among the four pillars
and, particularly, on the issues of causality (Burchi, Fanzo, and Frison 2011). This has been
further developed by the discussion and analysis of the Global Panel on Agriculture and
Food Systems for Nutrition (GLOPAN 2016), “Food Systems and Diets” and the report of
the Committee on World Food Security (CFS)–High Level Panel of Experts on Food
Security and Nutrition (HLPE), “Nutrition and Food Systems” (HLPE 2017), and will be
yet further elaborated in both the preparations for, and during, the 2021 Food Systems
Summit (UN 2020b).
Treatment of “Nutrition Security” in Food Security
The element of nutrition in food security has become increasingly important since the
mid-1990s. Both undernutrition and diet-related diseases, including obesity, have at-
tracted increased attention. The number of indicators to measure FSN status, which
had already proliferated prior to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015, has expanded beyond
nutrition, to include nonfood influences on food and nutrition security, such as sanitation
and disease.
Many have thought that nutrition was marginalized in the FAO’s various definitions,
even though the term “nutritious” was included. The CFS Reform Document adopted by
the FAO Conference in 2009 added an explicit reference to nutrition in the interpretation
of the official definition of food security: “The four pillars of food security are availability,
access, utilization and stability. The nutritional dimension is integral to the concept of
food security and to the work of CFS” (CFS 2009, 1). What comes first? Does nutrition
include food security or vice versa? This has depended on the disciplinary perspective of
the definers.
The World Bank’s report “Repositioning Nutrition as Central to Development” offered
an even broader definition of nutrition security: “Nutrition security is achieved for a
household when secure access to food is coupled with a sanitary environment, adequate
health services, and knowledgeable care to ensure a healthy life for all household members”
(World Bank 2006, 66). This same definition of nutrition security is also used byWHO in its
review of global nutrition policy (WHO 2013b).
Dietary intake has been changing remarkably rapidly since the Second World War, first
in the Western world, following the growth of the agro-processing industry, particularly
canning and freezing, and more recently, in developing countries. In the decades since the
Second World War, the US food industry has successfully advertised the convenient labor-
saving quality of its processed food for women increasingly entering the labor market.
Women in developing countries, where the food industry and value chains are less devel-
oped, spend very long hours carrying out household responsibilities. As labor markets are
changing rapidly, including women’s increasing roles outside the households, reliance on
purchased, ready-made foods, too, is increasing with profound impacts on public health, as
well as implications for public policy around the emerging consumption patterns and the
roles value chains play.
The growing interest among development professionals in nutrition has been strength-
ened by the strong advocacy of the nutrition community and articles in The Lancet, the
launching of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement, merged with the UNSCN in 2020
(UNSCN 2020), and IFPRI’s four GNRs, together with other initiatives.
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2010 to 2016: Reinforcing Nutrition Advocacy
The SUNMovement, founded on the principle that all people have a right to food and good
nutrition, was launched in 2010. It had a membership of 57 countries worldwide (SUN
2010). The Lancet’s first series on “Obesity” was published in 2011, and the second series
was published in 2015 (Lancet 2011, 2015). The UN released a political declaration on
NCDs as the outcome of a High Level Meeting on the Prevention and Control of NCDs in
2011 (UN 2011). In 2014, the UN held a follow-up meeting to the 2011 High Level Meeting
to review progress. By 2015, countries made clear commitments to set national NCD targets
for 2025 and established process indicators, taking into consideration nine NCD targets
(IFPRI 2016b).
The WHA, consisting of 193 member countries, unanimously agreed to a set of six global
nutrition targets to achieve by 2025, as part of the Comprehensive Implementation Plan on
Maternal, Infant, and Young Child Nutrition (Table 4.5) in 2012.¹⁰ In 2015, LICs and
LMICs were off course by a substantial margin for meeting the six WHA global nutrition
targets on maternal and child health by 2025 (WHO 2012, 2020c). In 2011, the member
countries also agreed on global mechanisms to reduce the avoidable NCD burden, including
a Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of NCDs 2013–20 (WHO 2013a). The
plan aims to reduce the number of premature deaths from NCDs by 25 percent by 2025
through nine voluntary global targets, one of which is “Halt the rise in diabetes and obesity”
(see Box 4.3). The biggest challenges for child and material nutrition are in SA and SSA.
In 2013, the second LancetMaternal and Child Nutrition Series built on the 2008 series to
review evidence and experience with “nutrition-sensitive” interventions from a range of
sectors, including agriculture, social protection, education, and early childhood develop-
ment (Gillespie et al. 2016). The same year, the governments of the United Kingdom and
Brazil, together with the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF), co-hosted the
Nutrition for Growth (N4G) Summit in London, endorsed by 90 stakeholders to beat
hunger and improve nutrition and designed to raise commitments to action to achieve
the global targets on Maternal, Infant, and Young Child Nutrition (WFP 2013; see nutri-
tionforgrowth.org). Donors pledged US$4.15 billion for nutrition-specific and US$19
billion for nutrition-sensitive programs. Governments came together at the ICN2 in
2014 and agreed on a set of 10 commitments in the “Rome Declaration on Nutrition,”
with plans to launch an annual series of Global Nutrition Reports (FAO 2019a; globalnu-
tritionreport.org).
The GNRs have reinforced the need for attention to nutrition as well as to establish an
accountability mechanism. GNRs report progress toward meeting nutrition goals and
¹⁰ As noted in SOFI 2018:
Subsequently, in 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals established a global agenda for substantial
improvement in nutrition by the year 2030, setting a specific objective of ending all forms of malnu-
trition by 2030, including achieving the 2025 targets and addressing the nutritional needs of adolescent
girls, pregnant and lactating women, and older persons.
The 2030 nutrition targets have been calculated based on a similar approach to that used for the 2025
targets. . . . For two of the indicators (low birthweight and anaemia in women of reproductive age), the
past rate of improvement has been too slow to achieve the WHA target, even by 2030. Thus, for these
indicators, the revised 2030 target is the same as the 2025 target, since the level of ambition for 2030
should not be less than that agreed upon for 2025.
For the other indicators, more ambitious targets for 2030 are proposed. (FAO et al. 2018, 15)
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describe innovative approaches to addressing malnutrition and country experiences, as well
as track the follow-up to the many pledges made at the 2013 N4G summit. Some GNR
stories are discussed later in this chapter. A new fund, the “Power of Nutrition,” launched in
2015, aims to unlock US$1 billion to help millions of children get proper nutrition and
reach their full potential.
The United Nations named 2016–25 the “Decade of Action on Nutrition.” In 2015, the
UN member countries adopted the SDGs to end all forms of malnutrition by 2030, and in
2016 the UN General Assembly’s “Decade of Action on Nutrition from 2016 to 2025” led to
Table 4.5 Global World Health Assembly nutrition targets





1. Stunting:a 40% reduction in the




50% reduction in the number of
children under five who are stunted.
[150.8 million in 2017]
2. Anemia:b 50% reduction of
anemia in women of reproductive
age
2012 30.3% 50% reduction in anemia in women
of reproductive age. [32.8% in 2016]
3. Low birthweight:c 30% reduction
in low birthweight
2012 15% 30% reduction in low birthweight.*
4. Overweight:d No increase in
childhood overweight for children
under 5
2012 5.4% Reduce and maintain childhood
overweight to less than 3%.(5.6% in
2017)
5. Exclusive breastfeeding:e Increase
the rate of exclusive breastfeeding in
the first 6 months to at least 50%
2012 38% Increase the rate of exclusive
breastfeeding in the first six months
up to at least 70%. (40% in 2016)
6. Wasting:f Reduce and maintain
childhood wasting to less than 5%
2012 8% Reduce and maintain childhood
wasting to less than 3%. (7.5% in
2017)
Note: Collaboration between UNICEF, WHO, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and Johns
Hopkins University is working on developing country estimates based on survey and routine data. These estimates
were undergoing the country consultation process when this draft was being finalized. Based on these preliminary
estimates for 148 countries with data, 69 had low birthweight rates higher or equal to 10 percent in 2000. Among
those, countries with the 20 percent highest rate of progress had an Annual Average Rate of Reduction of 0.935 or
higher between 2000 and 2015. This rate applied over 18 years between 2012 and 2030 results in a 15 percent
reduction, much lower than the 2025 target of 30 percent reduction for 2025.
a Children aged 0–59 months who are more than 2 standard deviations (SD) below the median height-for-age of
the WHO Child Growth Standards.
b Prevalence of anemia is (1) percentage of pregnant women whose hemoglobin level is less than 110 g/l at sea level
or (2) percentage of non-pregnant women whose hemoglobin
level is less than 120g/l at sea level.
c Infants born in each population and over a given period who weigh less than 2,500 g.
d Children aged 0–59 months who are more than 2 SD above the median weight-for-height of the WHO Child
Growth Standards.
e Infants 0–5 months of age who are fed exclusively with breast milk.
f Children aged 0–59 months who are more than 2 SD below the median weight-for-height of the WHO Child
Growth Standards.
Source: http://www.who.int/nutrition/indicator_progress.pdf; https://www.who.int/nutrition/global-target-2025/dis
cussion-paper-extension-targets-2030.pdf; IFPRI (2016b; FAO et al. 2018).
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translation of the ICN2 commitments into coherent and coordinated actions and initiatives
by all national governments, both low- and high-income countries. With these initiatives,
more and more people have begun to recognize the importance of addressing malnutrition
in all its forms (IFPRI 2016b). These worthy efforts do not nearly address the challenges
faced in achieving improved nutrition. The N4G event, hosted by the governments of Brazil,
the United Kingdom, and Japan in 2016, called for world leaders to increase financial
investments in nutrition and scale up successful strategies. Japan’s leadership on nutrition
increased in advance of the 2016 G7 meeting and the lead-up to the 2020 Tokyo Olympics
and Paralympics (IFPRI 2016b).
The nutrition community has justifiably expressed a concern, in GNRs 2014, 2015, 2016,
2017, and 2018 (IFPRI 2014, 2015, 2016b; Development Initiatives 2017, 2018), that the
nutrition agenda should not be a flash in the pan. After increasing for a few years,
international aid to nutrition peaked in 2015–16, which could lead to a dilution of national
commitment. If food and nutrition are to reach the ambitious 2030 targets, clear steps are
needed to sustain interest and commitment to the nutrition agenda and its implementation.
History has important lessons in this regard on several fronts and on two parallel tracks—
conceptually and empirically, on how nutrition was viewed in food and nutritional policy by
IOs, and operationally, in lending for nutrition interventions. Here, we discuss operational
issues: (1) leadership, (2) impacts of external shocks on development agendas, and (3)
management of complex multisectoral issues. All are relevant to contemporary challenges
that the nutrition agenda faces.
Box 4.3 Nine Voluntary Global Targets: Global Action Plan for the
Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases, 2013–2020
Target 1: A 25 percent relative reduction in premature mortality from cardiovascular
diseases, cancer, diabetes, or chronic respiratory diseases.
Target 2: At least 10 percent relative reduction in the harmful use of alcohol, as
appropriate, within the national context.
Target 3: A 10 percent relative reduction in the prevalence of insufficient physical
activity.
Target 4: A 30 percent relative reduction in the mean population intake of salt/
sodium.
Target 5: A 30 percent relative reduction in the prevalence of current tobacco use in
persons aged 15+ years.
Target 6: A 25 percent relative reduction in the prevalence of elevated blood pressure,
or contain the prevalence of raised blood pressure, according to national circumstances.
Target 7: Halt the rise in diabetes and obesity.
Target 8: At least 50 percent of eligible people receive drug therapy and counseling
(including glycemic control) to prevent heart attacks and strokes.
Target 9: An 80 percent availability of the affordable basic technologies and essential
medicines, including generics, required to treat major NCDs in both public and private
facilities.
Source: (WHO 2013a, 5).
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Nutritionists’ and Economists’ Views
Nutritionists have viewed the problem in terms of direct nutrition-specific and nutrition-
sensitive interventions (Figure 4.9). Nutrition-specific interventions are delivered to reduce
individual micronutrient deficiencies, such as vitamin A or iron deficiencies, and to address
women’s anemia. The latest crop map from HarvestPlus shows their efforts to end the
deficiencies or “hidden hunger” by enhancing nutrition content of crops. A part of the
CGIAR Research Program on Agriculture for Nutrition and Health, HarvestPlus reports
that, to date, 290 biofortified varieties of 12 staple crops have been released or are being
tested in 60 countries, with more than 30 million people worldwide growing and eating at
least one of the 12 crops that have been biofortified with Vitamin A, iron, or zinc (Meyer
2018). Alan Berg has been a strong champion of fortified salt as the best way to alleviate
micronutrient deficiencies among the poor (A Full Bowl 2020).
Nutrition-sensitive interventions include treatment of all the relevant issues in all sectors
of the economy, which potentially influence FSN outcomes, including agriculture, educa-
tion, health, and infrastructure. SSNs have been on the increase and come in many forms,
such as food and cash transfers and employment guarantee schemes (WBG 2018).
Economists, on the other hand, have viewed FSN issues in terms of supply and demand,
relative prices, and access (see Figure 4.8). FAO’s definition addresses many issues of supply,
such as food availability, stability, and access, and those related to demand, including
income, effective demand, and the factors that influence them—women’s empowerment,
decision-making abilities, market access, and factors that determine household decision-
making. The supply side is influenced by production, net imports, transport, and storage
losses; stability of supply by climate, extent of irrigated land, domestic storage, import
capacity, and prices; composition of supply by diversification of domestic production or
import value chains; and is comprised of crop agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and livestock
sectors (FAO 2019b).
Literature has shown high rates of return to investments in food and nutrition (Hoddi-
nott et al. 2013; Copenhagen Consensus Center 2015; Alderman, Behrman, and Puett 2017;
Shekar et al. 2017). Nutrition improvement is argued to lead to poverty reduction and
considerable health and educational benefits over a person’s life cycle, particularly from
boosting the nutritional status of pregnant mothers and infants in the first 1,000 days. These
benefits are realized, in terms of better development of fetuses, development of brains and
resistance to infections among infants, improved learning abilities of infants and children,
educational achievements, labor productivity, and lifetime earnings (Bhutta et al. 2013;
Hoddinott et al. 2013). An unintended consequence of the economic approach to food
security has been the focus on low food prices as a success of food policy. The declining
share of food in the consumer expenditures has had welfare benefits, allowing consumers to
enjoy a higher standard of living by being able to incorporate other items in their household
budget, such as education and consumer durables. However, this growth is at the cost of
environment—since environmental degradation is not included in production costs—and
impacts on human health, since low food prices are often accompanied by consumption of
poor quality food.
Public sector interventions—prices and price variability, and roads and rail connections—
all matter. Storage and handling losses received relatively little attention until recently, but
now literature on this issue is growing. There are, however, inherent difficulties in measuring
the losses (Chand and Jumrani 2013). Sheahan and Barrett (2017) reviewed the literature in
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Food Policy concerning postharvest losses (PHL) in SSA and confirmed the difficulties in
defining and measuring the losses, and new papers have been commissioned.
Demand, in turn, is influenced by income, access to employment and safety nets, food
prices and, most importantly, knowledge and access to healthy food. Many sources of
income for people are determined by access to employment (for example, India’s Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act [MGNREGA] and Ethiopia’s large
public works program), nonagricultural income that often constitutes half the rural income,
remittances, and SSNs.
Also shown previously in Figure 4.8, external shocks, such as climate change and ad hoc
steps by member countries (for example, trade restrictions, biofuel policies, and conflicts)
also matter. Underlying causes underpinning the whole set of intervening variables and
outcomes include population growth, political commitment, domestic priorities, sociocul-
tural factors, information and knowledge, and global, national, and local governance.
Figure 4.8 outlines our “consolidated theory of change” in outcomes of FSN, based on the
literature. We adopted such a framework, because we found the myriad existing frameworks
to be piecemeal. Our framework will also evolve, as the many knowledge gaps identified in
this chapter are filled: for example, about the role of gender or climate change.
The Impact of the Food Industry
Diets are determined by a combination of factors: resource endowments determine
production possibilities. Increasingly, trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the
food industry have been shifting consumption patterns in developing countries from
traditional diets toward a Western style of diet (Fiedler and Iafrate 2016). Foods are
closely related to culture, history, social mores, and increasingly, with science and
technical change in agriculture and agro-processing, with transport and refrigeration,
incomes, and the cost of time. Not the least important, the cost of new processed and
purchased food is influenced by the growth of the modern food industry, particularly in
the context of globalization.
The Nutritional Basis for a Food Systems Approach
As Lawrence Haddad observed, the EAT–Lancet Report (Willett et al. 2019) addressed two
questions simultaneously:
First, how do we have to eat differently to significantly reduce malnutrition? Second, what
food production systems do we have to put in place to use natural resources sustainably
and live within climate change targets? . . . In other words, this diet satisfies two key
objectives: were it consumed it would prevent approximately 20% of all premature adult
deaths and it would operate within safe planetary boundaries for climate change, biodi-
versity loss, land system change, freshwater use and Nitrogen and Phosphorous cycling.
(Haddad 2019)
This is a necessary initiative to look at diets holistically. We show in this chapter that in
some regions of the world, individuals are consuming well above the minimum required
nutrients required for healthy active lives, and in other parts of the world, a lot less. This
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provides the contextual basis for some of the analysis underpinning the ongoing food
systems discussion.
Even before the EAT report (Willett et al. 2019), it was widely recognized that poor
nutrition has widespread life-cycle health effects, including in its contribution to the growth
of NCDs, such as diabetes, cancer, and heart disease. The skyrocketing fiscal costs of NCDs in
OECD countries, are also increasingly noted in developing countries, as the incidence of
obesity increases. Advocates of good nutrition argue that the cost can be contained by
addressing nutrition improvements in the entire population and, in particular, by addressing
hunger and hidden hunger: that is, energy and nutrient deficiencies among young women,
pregnant women, and children. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation funded research on
GBD, leading to a much greater understanding of the role of diet and nutrition in all forms of
malnutrition. In fact, a recent study showed the two leading causes of GBD are maternal and
child malnutrition, followed by poor diets (GBD 2016 Risk Factor Collaborators 2017).
The economic consequences represent losses of 11 percent of GDP each year in Africa
and Asia, whereas preventing malnutrition delivers US$16 in returns on investment for
every US$1 spent (IFPRI 2016b). Similarly, the neglect of nutrition is often reflected in high
rates of stunting, wasting, underweight, and infant and child mortality, as we cited earlier.
The correlation between reduction of the incidence of stunting and earnings later in life has
been shown to have high development benefits (Bhutta et al. 2013; Hoddinott et al. 2013).
Turning causality on its head—that is, viewing nutritional indicators as the cause rather
than the consequence of economic development and asserting that economic development,
even when it is inclusive, does not always result in improved nutrition—the evidence calls
for a special emphasis on nutrition to improve development outcomes.
With increases in food supply in recent decades, the world produces more than enough
food to satisfy the dietary needs of the entire global population. The average intake per
person per day in LICs and MICs is around 2,750 kcal, and in high-income countries, it is
around 3,350 kcal. Both of these figures exceed the minimum requirement of around 1,950
kcal per person per day (FAO, IFAD and WFP 2015, 6, Table 1; see, also, FAO 2008).
A similar situation exists with respect to protein requirements.¹¹
Adequate food availability does not necessarily imply adequate food intake by all, because
(1) inequality in incomes and other means of subsistence influence access; (2) impediments
to adequate utilization of food are related to lack of access to facilities, such as food storage,
cooking equipment, and clean water, and to services such as health care and basic nutrition
education; and (3) there exists an imbalance exists in the dietary transition, discussed later
in this chapter, in terms of in improved access to more nutritious foods. Trends seen in the
FAO FBSs suggest accelerated growth in consumption of meat and slower growth in
consumption of fruits and vegetables (Del Gobbo et al. 2015).¹² With rapidly growing
consumption of processed foods, often with excessive quantities of salt, sugar, and pre-
servatives, concerns have increased over the shift toward less healthy diets and the increas-
ing prevalence of micronutrient deficiencies and overweight individuals in the population.
¹¹ Mean protein requirements, in kg per day per kg of body weight, range between 0.66 for adults to 1.12 for
infants. An average adult weighing 70kg would therefore require around 46g of protein per day. See the Report of
a Joint FAO/WHO/UNU Expert Consultation, “Protein and Amino Acid Requirements in Human Nutrition”
(FAO, WHO, and UNU 2007, 88, table 4).
¹² The comparison between results from FBSs and household-level data requires some caution. FBSs may tend
to overestimate actual availability of food (Del Gobbo et al. 2015). FBSs do not consider food losses and waste at
retail and household levels. However, to reconcile results, based on the two data sources, dramatic corrections of
the overconsumption patterns resulting from FBSs are required (see Grünberger [2014]).
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Although food production must keep the pace with increasing demand, equitable food
access and adequate food utilization have to be ensured. In addition, consumer education is
needed to promote healthier food consumption patterns and to ensure that the experience
of developed countries is not repeated: namely, food abundance is not accompanied by poor
nutritional outcomes, as we show. To achieve this, there is a need for reforms in the food
industry, with a focus on the quality of processed food, to be produced with less sugar, salt,
and fats, and to keep to a minimum the marketing of harmful foods to children. We need
more drastic reforms, which return our diets to more legumes, fruits and vegetables, and
healthy fats and oils, to address the burden of malnutrition, as well as critical climate and
water constraints that the world faces. And progress on influencing food systems has only
now begun, with recent shift in focus to food systems.
Dietary patterns not only have impacts on health, but also on the environment, particularly
via their link to climate change. Diets rich in meat, especially that from ruminants such as
cattle, are associatedwith higher environmental costs and higher emissions ofGHGs:methane,
resulting from enteric fermentation; carbon dioxide, released from the clearing of forests for
pasture; and nitrous oxide, which is generated in feed production (Gerber et al. 2013; FAO
2016,Willett et al. 2019). The rapidly growing changes in food systems offer standardized food
for urban areas and formal employment opportunities (FAO 2017a). The producers of the
meats, along with added processed foods, are major users of water with enormous impacts on
global water use (see, for example, Ercin, Aldaya, andHoekstra [2011]). These changes have by
no means led to healthy food consumption, as we show in this chapter. At the same time, the
conundrum of poverty and the poverty–food security nexus continues.
Evolution from the Unfinished Millennium Development Goals to
Sustainable Development Goals
The scope of FSN has expanded considerably with the adoption of SDGs (Box 4.4).
As Box 4.4 indicates, the number of nutrition-related indicators has increased, too, and
the focus has incorporated—beyond lack of calorie intake—infant, young child, and mater-
nal nutrition; overweight and obesity; and NCDs. The MDG Target 1.C was to halve the
proportion of people who suffer from hunger (PoU) between 1990 and 2015, and is included
in SDG2 as Target 2.1 and includes one more additional indicator, the prevalence of
moderate or severe food insecurity in the population, based on the FIES. Malnutrition in
all its forms includes: (1) undernutrition (deficiencies in energy, protein, and/or micronu-
trients deficiencies known as hidden hunger); (2) overweight and obesity; and (3) NCDs.
Undernutrition in infant, young children, and women of reproductive age was added in the
WHA, establishing six targets on maternal, infant, and young child nutrition in 2012 to
achieve by 2025 (see Table 4.5 on Global World Health Assembly Nutrition Targets). Only
the prevalence of child stunting and wasting are included from MDGs in SDGs as Target
2.2. Those goals are also part of the WHA targets. Adult overweight and obesity are not
included in SDGs, although child overweight is reported (UN 2020a). As noted in Box 4.4,
for SG2, Target 2.2, Indicator 2.2.2 is aimed at the prevalence of malnutrition (weight-for-
height >+2 or <–2 SD from the median of the WHO Child Growth Standards) among
children under 5 years of age, by type (wasting and overweight).
The member countries under the leadership of WHO also agreed in 2011 on global
mechanisms to reduce the avoidable NCD burden, including a Global Action Plan for the
Prevention and Control of NCDs 2013–2020. NCDs were not addressed in the MDGs,
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Box 4.4 Sustainable Development Goal 2: Targets and Indicators
SDG Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote
sustainable agriculture.
Target 2.1. By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular, the poor
and people in vulnerable situations including infants, to safe, nutritious, and sufficient
food all year round.
Indicator 2.1.1. Prevalence of undernourishment.
Indicator 2.1.2. Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the population,
based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES).
Target 2.2. By 2030, end all forms of malnutrition, including achieving by 2025, the
internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting in children under 5 years of age,
and address the nutritional needs of adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women, and
older persons.
Indicator 2.2.1. Prevalence of stunting (height-for-age <–2 standard deviations from
the median of the WHO Child Growth Standards) among children under 5 years of age.
Indicator 2.2.2. Prevalence of malnutrition (weight-for-height >+2 or <–2 standard
deviations from the median of the WHO Child Growth Standards) among children
under 5 years of age, by type (overweight and wasting).
Target 2.3. By 2030, double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale
food producers, in particular women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists,
and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive re-
sources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets and opportunities for value
addition, and nonfarm employment.
Indicator 2.3.1. Volume of production per labor unit by classes of farming/pastoral/
forestry enterprise size (no data for this indicator is currently available, and its meth-
odology is still under development; see https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/tierIII-indicators).
Indicator 2.3.2. Average income of small-scale food producers, by sex and indigenous
status (no data for this indicator is currently available, and its methodology is still under
development; see https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/tierIII-indicators).
Target 2.4. By 2030, ensure sustainable food production systems and implement
resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and production; that help
maintain ecosystems; that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme
weather, drought, flooding, and other disasters; and that progressively improve land and
soil quality.
Indicator 2.4.1. Proportion of agricultural area under productive and sustainable
agriculture (no data for this indicator is currently available and its methodology is still
under development; see https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/tierIII-indicators).
Target 2.5. By 2020, maintain the genetic diversity of seeds, cultivated plants, and
farmed and domesticated animals and their related wild species, including through
soundly managed and diversified seed and plant banks at the national, regional, and
international levels, and promote access to and fair and equitable sharing of benefits
arising from the utilization of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, as
internationally agreed.
Indicator 2.5.1. Number of plant and animal genetic resources for food and agriculture
secured in either medium- or long-term conservation facilities.
Continued
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whereas SDGs recognized NCDs as a major challenge for sustainable development (Box
4.4). SDG Goal 3 includes the following targets related to NCDs: (1) reducing by one-
third, premature mortality from NCDs (Target 3.4); (2) strengthening responses to reduce
the harmful use of alcohol (Target 3.5); (3) achieving universal health coverage (UHC)
(Target 3.7); (4) strengthening the implementation of the WHO Framework Convention
onTobaccoControl (FCTC) (Target 3.a); and (5) supporting the research and development of
vaccines and medicines for NCDs that primarily affect developing countries and providing
access to affordable essential medicines and vaccines for NCDs (Target 3.b) (UN 2020a).
On safe drinking water, improved sanitation and safely managed hygiene, SDGs include
Target 6.1 and Target 6.2 shifting from MDG Target 7.C (Halve the proportion of the
population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015)
(UN 2016, 2020a). According to an IFPRI study by Suman Chakrabarti, reduction of open
defecation in villages, increased age at pregnancy, and education are three key sociodemo-
graphic factors in reducing anemia among pregnant women in India (Chakrabarti et al. 2018).
Global Nutrition Report 2015 (IFPRI 2015) and others have argued that nutrition has
been shortchanged in the SDGs. The architectural changes in nutrition announced and
underway in Rome, with the UNSCN having moved from Geneva to Rome in January 2016,
are a response to increasing focus and coordination among often myriad uncoordinated and
competing organizations, with the UNSCN providing a coordinating role in achieving
coherence across UN agencies¹³ As Haddad (2015) noted about the Global Nutrition Report
Box 4.4 Continued
Indicator 2.5.2. Proportion of local breeds classified as being at risk, not-at-risk, or at
unknown level of risk of extinction.
Target 2.a. Increase investment, including through enhanced international coopera-
tion in rural infrastructure, agricultural research, extension services, technology devel-
opment, and plant and livestock gene banks, in order to enhance agricultural productive
capacity in developing countries, in particular, least developed countries.
Indicator 2.a.1. The agriculture orientation index for government expenditures.
Indicator 2.a.2. Total official flows (official development assistance plus other official
flows) to the agriculture sector.
Target 2.b. Correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural
markets, including through the parallel elimination of all forms of agricultural export
subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect, in accordance with the mandate
of the Doha Development Round.
Indicator 2.b.1 Agricultural export subsidies.
Target 2.c. Adopt measures to ensure the proper functioning of food commodity
markets and their derivatives and facilitate timely access to market information, includ-
ing on food reserves, in order to help limit extreme food price volatility.
Indicator 2.c.1. Indicator of food price anomalies.
Source: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/
¹³ The UNSCN reports: “Since 1 January 2016, the UN System Standing Committee on Nutrition (UNSCN)
has [been hosted] in the FAO premises in Rome [to implement the] strategic plan (2016–2020) and a new focus
for UNSCN in light of the . . . developments in the global nutrition architecture” (www.unscn.org/en/news-events/
recent-news?idnews=1227).
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2015 (IFPRI 2015): “Unfortunately, nutrition is scarcely mentioned in the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs).”
SDG2 is specifically about FSN, but the targets specified under the other 16 SDGs are also
indispensable for the success of SDG2, as we illustrate in this chapter, in the cases of income
poverty, MDP, and gender-related SDGs, which profoundly affect SDG2 outcomes.
Missing are indicators on food availability and quality; political commitment; and
capacity, such as the existence of the “right to food” movement, share of public budget
spent on nutrition and allied programs, early warning systems, food and nutritional impact
indicators (except for prevalence of stunting and wasting among children included in the
targets), direct micronutrient interventions indicators, and diagnostic indicators of inade-
quate food and nutritional outcomes. These indicators were assessed by Technical Working
Group (TWG) in the FSIN 2016 report (for detail, see Lele et al. 2016). There are many
more significant ways in which the international community has attempted to increase food
security and the nutritional status of populations. Foremost among those is advocacy, using
a variety of means, but its impact is often difficult to assess or attribute to the interventions.
What Is Missing in the Sustainable Development Goals? Obesity
The growing epidemic of obesity is not part of SDGs, although the number of obese adults is
already larger than the number of undernourished, and the number is growing rapidly.¹⁴
More than 1.9 billion adults were overweight, of which over 650 million were obese; 39
percent (39 percent of men and 40 percent of women) of adults aged 18 years and over were
overweight in 2016, and 13 percent (11 percent of men and 15 percent of women) were
obese. The worldwide prevalence of obesity nearly tripled between 1975 and 2016. Both
adult obesity (18+ years) and obesity among children and adolescents (aged 5–19 years) is
highest in North America, and the rate of increase is also high there (Figures 4.9A and 4.9B).
While Africa and Asia continue to have the lowest rates of obesity, an increasing trend can
also be observed. More than 1 in 8 adults in the world is obese. Forty-one million children
under the age of 5 were overweight or obese, and over 340 million children and adolescents,
aged 5–19, were overweight or obese in 2016. Once considered a problem of high-income
countries, overweight and obesity are now on the rise in LICs and MICs, particularly in
urban settings. In Africa, the number of overweight children under 5 has increased by nearly
50 percent since 2000. Almost half of all overweight children under 5 lived in Asia and one-
quarter lived in Africa. Globally, the prevalence of overweight and obesity among children
and adolescents, aged 5–19, has risen dramatically from just 4 percent in 1975 to just over
18 percent in 2016. The rise has occurred similarly among both boys and girls: in 2016, 18
percent of girls and 19 percent of boys were overweight. Although just under 1 percent of
children and adolescents, aged 5–19, were obese in 1975, more 124 million children and
adolescents (6 percent of girls and 8 percent of boys) were obese in 2016 (WHO 2018a).
The incidence of obesity has increased with economic growth throughout the world, but
more than half of the world’s obese people live in just 10 countries: the United States, China,
¹⁴ WHO defines overweight and obesity as follows:
For adults: Overweight is a BMI  25 and obesity is a BMI  30.
For children under 5 years: Overweight is weight-for-height  2 SD above the WHO Child Growth Standards
median, and obesity is weight-for-height  3 SD above the WHO Child Growth Standards median.
For children between 15–19 years: Overweight is BMI for age  1 standard deviation above the WHO Growth
Reference median, and obesity is BMI for age 2 standard deviations above theWHOGrowth Reference median.
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India, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, Germany, Pakistan, and Indonesia. The highest percent
of the world’s obese people (13 percent) live in the United States. The United Kingdom and
Australia are among the high-income countries with large gains in obesity among men and
women (Ng et al. 2014). An international panel described the growing obesity as “a
deepening nutrition crisis” (GLOPAN 2017, 3). An Indian nutritionist characterized it as
a country “sitting on a volcano” (Anand 2017). While these observations reflect a recent
phenomenon, there is also a concern that growing obesity and the associated NCDs, which
are accompanying income growth and new food consumption patterns, are not being
addressed through established international mechanisms such as the SDGs.
The Growing Epidemic of Obesity
Across the world, more people are now obese than underweight. At the same time, scientists
say, the growing availability of high-calorie, nutrient-poor food is generating a new type of
malnutrition, one in which a growing number of people are both overweight and under-
nourished, with rising fiscal costs associated with malnutrition. “Obesity is “conventionally
associated with food excess, but it is also associated with micronutrient deficiencies [zinc,









































Figure 4.9A Prevalence of obesity among adults (18+ years), BMI  30kg/m², crude estimates
by World Health Organization region, 2010–2016 (%)
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IOs acknowledge (privately, if not publicly) that they have been timid and unclear in dealing
with the private sector. The New York Times ran a series of well-researched stories on Brazil,
Chile, India, Malaysia, and Ghana, among others, in 2017, on how processed food, soda, and
the fast food industries’ increasing focus on markets in the developing world—and the
accompanying rise in obesity rates and weight-related illnesses—is playing out around the
globe (personal communication, Celia Dugger and Barry Popkin, June 10, 2018; New York
Times 2017–18). Popkin designed the series. Matt Richtel was the keyNew York Times contact.
They spent over a year organizing and implementing the publications. Richtel recruited six
senior reporters to help with the articles from various countries. The series was much more
focused on the marketing by the companies, their politics, their ways of buying off academics
[Malaysia], and fighting industry and losing [Chile, Mexico]. The series was six months in the
design before they obtained all approvals and then went to the various countries.
The Times was able to draw on the expertise of multidisciplinary teams to research and
consult a wide variety of stakeholders for each case, citing evidence from respected institu-
tions, such as the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation in Washington, academics,
national policymakers, activists, and consumers as stakeholders. The writers were careful to
stress “that a story of this scale, driven largely by an economic and cultural transformation











































Figure 4.9B Prevalence of obesity among children and adolescents (aged 5–19 years), BMI > +2
SD, crude estimates by World Health Organization region, 2010–2016 (%)
Source: Based on Global Health Observatory Data Repository, WHO, http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.
REGION2480A?lang=en
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2017). The stories document the extraordinary power of the food and beverage industries
and the political economy of stakeholders with very different power and access to infor-
mation. Only a handful of economists, particularly Popkin, Nestle (a nutritionist), and
Hawkes, have told these stories, and recent international reports, referred to earlier in the
chapter, have described the obesity challenges, but journalists, aided by academics, inter-
national and domestic research institutions, activists, and private companies, have brought
more of the flavor of the reality in each country on the ground. That reality consists of the
growth of food processing, wholesale and retail industry, restaurants, and particularly fast
food chains in a globalized world. It illustrates how formidable the governance challenge is
to regulate this industry, given the powerful and growing role of multinationals in devel-
oping countries and their impacts on health. According to the New England Journal of
Medicine (Afshin et al. 2017), the prevalence of obesity has doubled in 73 countries since
1980, contributing to 4 million premature deaths, A study published in 2015 found that
Mexicans bought, on average, 1,928 calories of packaged food and beverages a day, 380
more calories than in the United States and more than people in any other country, as
tracked by Euromonitor International, a market research firm (Euromonitor International
2015). It is clearly not possible, nor realistic, to turn back the clock on the extent of
purchased foods. Their growth could be slowed in countries that are behind Mexico on
the transformation of value chains, however. Can the quality of calories be improved
throughout the world by more public debate—outside of academic journals, more con-
sumer awareness, and greater action by governments, IOs, and civil society?
Food systems are going through extraordinary changes with trade liberalization, growth
in food imports, and FDI, which is accelerating the role of processed, ready-to-eat foods.
Often, they are combining forces with the domestic food industry in resisting government
pressure for regulation, as noted in Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Malaysia, and India.
Mexico began lifting tariffs and allowing more foreign investment in the 1980s, a transition
to free trade in 1994, when Mexico, the United States, and Canada enacted the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Opponents in Mexico warned that the country
would lose its cultural and economic independence (Jacobs and Richtel 2017b).
NAFTA led to billions of dollars in FDI flowing into Mexico, fueling the growth of
American fast food restaurants and convenience stores, and opening the floodgates to cheap
corn, meat, high-fructose corn syrup, and processed foods. Mexicans, on the other hand,
have exported fruit and vegetables to contribute to healthier diets in the United States
(Jacobs and Richtel 2017b). These developments have been associated with more changes.
The first change is consumers’ increased access to soft drinks and processed foods (as
Corinna Hawkes’ study “Exporting Obesity” found, resulting from increased investments by
the US manufacturers of soft drinks and processed foods (Clark et al. 2012). Observers note
that NAFTA’s impact has been pervasive. Direct investment by the United States in
Mexico’s food and beverage companies soared to US$10.2 billion in 2012, from US$2.3
billion before NAFTA, and the link to the trade agreement is undisputed. USDA states:
“Many of these investments were initiated following implementation of NAFTA in 1994”
(USDA 2019b). A related piece by Popkin and Hawkes (2015) documents the rapid growth
in LICs andMICs of the consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages at a time when sales are
stagnant or declining in higher-income countries.
The second change is the aggressive tactics of the food industry, including the deep
penetration of sales forces in rural areas, such as by Nestlé in the Brazilian Amazon (Taylor
and Jacobson 2016; Jacobs and Richtel 2017a). In Mexico, convenience store chains, with
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hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign investment, have grown to 16,000 stores, from 400
in 1990 (Jacobs and Richtel 2017b; Searcey 2017; Searcey and Richtel 2017).
The third change is a brutal battle among academics for and against receiving funding
from food companies, as noted in Malaysia (Fuller, O’Connor, and Richtel 2017), and
likewise, the strong intimidation, often threatening violence, as in Colombia, or the use of
malware, as in Mexico (Jacobs and Richter 2017b, 2017c; Perlroth 2017).
The fourth change is a new front—the food industry trying to use trade policies in
NAFTA (also the Central America Free Trade Agreement [CAFTA]) to block the types of
programs that Chile has instituted (Ahmed, Richtel, and Jacobs 2018).
Finally, not the least is important contributions of the food industry to elections in
support of political parties, which can help soften the regulations that governments put in
place, as has been demonstrated in the case of Brazil (Jacobs and Richtel 2017a). A more
extreme example is the almost complete control of a political party in Colombia, as the
major beverage company Postobón owns the major newspaper and TV station in the
country (Jacobs and Richtel 2017c).
We must understand that this surge in ultra-processed food and beverages is not only
reaching children and adults but also infants, as a number of Gates Foundation-funded
studies have shown 25–40 percent of infants are fed sugary beverages or junk food daily in
many countries (Huffman et al. 2014; Pries et al. 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; Vitta et al. 2016).
Also, these changes occur after a period when rapid introduction of modern technology
into the market production, home production, transport, and leisure sectors have shifted
the physical activity in lower MICs to much lower levels among the bulk of the population,
making them ever more susceptible to modest increases in energy intake. Then, the shift
toward increased intake of the ultra-processed foods means even greater caloric intakes (Ng
and Popkin 2012). A sizeable array of studies from Asia and Latin America have docu-
mented these shifts in activity and their impact on large increases in the risk of obesity and
many NCDs. However, we cannot go backward and remove these technologies, so it is
within the food system that countries are focused on how to address obesity and most of the
nutrition-related NCDs.
Soaring obesity rates are forcing governments around the world to confront one of the
more serious threats to public health in a generation. New regulations, which corporate
interests delayed for almost a decade, require explicit labeling and limit the marketing of
sugary foods to children have been implemented in both Chile and Mexico, setting
important precedents for food labeling (Jacobs 2018).
Nutrition experts say such measures are the world’s most ambitious attempt to remake a
country’s food culture and could be a model for how to turn the tide on a global obesity
epidemic, which researchers say contributes to four million premature deaths a year (Jacobs
2018).
Geeta Anand, in “One Man’s Stand Against Junk Food as Diabetes Climbs Across India,”
notes:
Since 1990, the percent of children and adults in India who are overweight or obese has
almost tripled to 18.8 percent from 6.4 percent, according to data from the Institute for
Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of Washington.
The International Diabetes Federation projects that the number of Indians with diabetes
will soar to 123 million by 2040 as diets rich in carbohydrates and fat spread to less
affluent rural areas. (Anand 2017)
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India should put into place stricter regulations before it is too late. However, “ferocious
opposition from the All India Food Processors Association, which counts Coca-Cola India,
PepsiCo India and Nestlé India as members, as well as hundreds of other companies” has
stalled such regulatory efforts (Anand 2017). Chile imposed a 12 percent value-added tax
(VAT) on all packaged processed foods and beverages and 28 percent extra levy on aerated
beverages. Evaluations are underway in Chile and India to assess the impacts of taxes on
prices and consumption (personal communication, Barry M. Popkin, June 10, 2018).
According to Anand, India has “ . . . partially implemented a tax on sugar sweetened
beverages, instituting a 40 percent tax on such drinks that are carbonated, though not on
juices made with added sugars that many children drink. But so far, the regulations to ban
sales near schools sought by the court . . . have led to naught” (Anand 2017).
India is also proposing a Chilean-style warning label on foods high in sugar, saturated fat,
and sodium.
In addition to improved public policy, civil society needs to foster women’s organiza-
tions, such as the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in India, that both promote
both healthier foods and their production and delivery (see www.sewa.org). This will lead to
a triple win, more income and employment for women, better environmental management,
and healthier populations.
Nutrition Transition and Food Systems
Barry M. Popkin, who first identified the phenomenon of the “nutrition transition” in the
early 1990s and has written extensively on this subject, notes that IOs were slow to take the
impending obesity trends and their policy implications on board (Popkin 1993, 1994, 1998,
2001, 2009; Popkin, Adair, and Ng 2012). (See Box 4.5.) Popkin teamed up with Thomas
Reardon, a leading advocate of value chains, to produce a paper that explored dietary changes:
The shifts in diet are profound: major shifts in intake of less-healthful low-nutrient-
density foods and sugary beverages, changes in away-from-home eating and snacking
and rapid shifts towards very high levels of overweight and obesity among all ages along
with, in some countries, high burdens of stunting. Diet changes have occurred in parallel
to, and in two-way causality with, changes in the broad food system—the set of supply
chains from farms, through midstream segments of processing, wholesale and logistics, to
downstream segments of retail and food service (restaurants and fast food chains).
(Popkin and Reardon 2018, 1028)
The conventional view of transformation has not materialized for many late developing
countries, as we showed in Chapter 2 on structural transformation. Their demographic
transition, agricultural productivity growth, and industrialization have each been slower
than that of their predecessors, particularly the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan,
and South Korea, and more recently, China), and the late developers contain a large share of
the world’s undernourished and malnourished populations concurrently with growing num-
bers of obese. This suggests a tremendous need and an opportunity to create employment in
sustainable food systems for women and youth in the food service industry, in work
environments that are more youth-oriented and gender friendly. Later in this chapter, we
discuss the implications of this opportunity for policy, institutional development, and infor-
mation and knowledge sharing among citizens through education going forward.
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Box 4.5 What Is Nutrition and Nutrition Transition?
WHO defines nutrition at an individual level as: “the intake of food, considered in
relation to the body’s dietary needs. Good nutrition—an adequate, well balanced diet
combined with regular physical activity—is a cornerstone of good health. Poor nutrition
can lead to reduced immunity, increased susceptibility to disease, impaired physical and
mental development, and reduced productivity” (WHO 2018b).
As the World Bank Group noted in their report, “Learning fromWorld Bank History:
Agriculture and Food-Based Approaches for Addressing Malnutrition”:
The nutrients in food include carbohydrates, proteins, and fats (the “macronutri-
ents”—which contain dietary energy), and vitamins and minerals (the “micronutri-
ents”—which do not contain dietary energy). Other components of food that are not
technically “nutrients” also contribute to nutrition and health, such as fiber, probiotic
bacteria, and phytonutrients. . . .
. . . [T]he focus of the international nutrition community regarding dietary intake
has shifted from proteins (in the 1960s) to dietary energy (1970s–80s) to micro-
nutrients (primarily provided via nutrient supplements) (1990s–2000s). Now
(2010s), the focus is moving toward dietary diversity and dietary quality more
broadly. (WBG 2014, 3)
To protect against malnutrition in all of its forms, as well as NCDs, including diabetes,
heart disease, stroke, and cancer, WHO advocates healthy dietary practices starting early
in life with breastfeeding (WHO 2018b). For a healthy diet, energy intake (kcal) needs to
be balanced with energy expenditure. A healthy diet includes fruits, vegetables, legumes
(for example, lentils and beans), nuts, and whole grains (such as unprocessed maize,
millet, oats, wheat, and brown rice).
The overall dietary shift linked with extremely rapid reduction in activity in all
domains of movement—market and home production, transportation and leisure—
have combined to create new challenges. Further recommendations byWHO for healthy
diets include a shift in fat consumption away from saturated to unsaturated fats and
toward the elimination of industrial trans fats. Healthy unsaturated or monosaturated
fats (from fish, avocado, nuts, and sunflower, canola, and olive oils) are preferable to
saturated fats, particularly from unhealthy sources (palm and coconut oil, lard, fatty
meats, cream, cheese, ghee, and butter). Saturated fats should not exceed 10 percent of
total energy intake to avoid much greater risk of NCDs. WHO recommends limiting the
intake of free sugars to less than 10 percent of total energy intake for a healthy diet.
A further reduction to less than 5 percent of total energy intake is suggested for
additional health benefits. Keeping salt intake to less than 5 g per day (approximately
one teaspoon) may help prevent hypertension and reduce the risk of heart disease and
stroke in the adult population (WHO 2018b).
During the long history of food and nutrition in modern times, there has been the rise,
fall, and rise again of nutrition and its advocacy. How sustained the focus on nutrition
remains is not known, and we need to understand the history of dietary changes in
industrial countries. We now realize that to address malnutrition in all its forms a
healthy diet is essential and the agriculture sector will have to make profound changes
up and down the entire food supply chain.
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Overall, the share of agricultural production going through supermarkets is low in LICs
but in some large cities (for example, in Africa), it is now already more than 30 percent
(Figure 4.10). Supermarkets also differ from traditional retailers in terms of the food
varieties offered, the prices charged, and the shopping atmosphere (Hawkes 2008). Nutri-
tional implications of the rapid rise of supermarkets are not yet sufficiently understood.
A few studies have shown that supermarkets contribute to the consumption of more
calories and higher levels of processed foods, even after controlling for household income,
education, and other confounding factors (Asfaw 2008; Rischke et al. 2015; Khonje and
Qaim 2019). Studies also suggest that buying food in supermarkets is associated with higher
BMI, a higher likelihood of overweight and obesity, and a higher risk of suffering from
chronic diseases (Kimenju et al. 2015; Demmler et al. 2017; Demmler, Ecker, and Qaim
2018). Ultra-processed foods with high fat, sugar, and salt contents are known to contribute
to overweight and obesity (Asfaw 2011; Popkin 2017; Law et al. 2019). The effects on
children are less studied, however, and recent research in Kenya suggests that supermarkets
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Figure 4.10 Relationship between average per capita income in a country and the share of
supermarkets in food retailing
Source: Data provided by Martin Qaim, 2019, compiled from Planet Retail Country Reports at EDGE Retail
Insight (https://rnetailinsight.ascentialedge.com/login) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2020d);
see, also, Qaim (2017).
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generalizable, is good news, “because child stunting (low height-for-age) remains a major
nutritional problem that is declining more slowly than child underweight. Supermarkets do
not seem to be a driver of childhood obesity in this setting. The positive effects of super-
markets on child nutrition are channeled through improvements in food variety and dietary
diversity” (Debela et al. 2020).
According to William Masters et al. (2016, 97): “The nutrition transition, a term coined
in the early 1990s by Popkin (1993, 1994) refers to systematic changes in nutritional intake,
body size, and health associated with economic development.” It relates very directly to how
we eat, drink, and move, and how shifts in these patterns over time have profoundly affected
our health (see Figure 4.11). Masters et al. explain further:
The term focuses particularly on the rising rates of obesity and diet-related diseases that
were increasingly observed since the 1980s, alongside the improvements in height and
mortality that had occurred slowly over many decades in now-industrialized countries
and then spread rapidly to lower income countries as documented by Fogel (2004),
Deaton (2007), and others. (Masters et al. 2016, 97)
Increased consumption of calorically dense diets, full of salt, fats, and sugary beverages



























































Figure 4.11 Percentage of energy from nonstaple foods and total dietary energy per capita by
region, 1961–2013
Source: Based on the data from FAO Food Balance Sheet, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FBS
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nutrition transition. Now those consumption patterns have spread widely to countries that
are experiencing rapid economic growth, as well as to others in which income growth has
not occurred to the same extent but where purchased food and drinks have become
available and led to alarming rates of growth in obesity and NCDs (Gortmaker et al.
2011; Popkin, Adair, and Ng 2012; Ng et al. 2014; Hawkes et al. 2015; Huang, Yang, and
Rozelle 2015; Jaacks, Slining, and Popkin 2015; Lele 2015; Swinburn et al. 2015). An old
adage among agricultural experts for well over 40 years was that Coca-Cola was more easily
available in distant places than fertilizers, so agricultural service providers needed to learn
lessons on how to get their services to farmers. In recent years, there is a frequent
comparison in the literature of the behavior of the food industry to that of the tobacco
industry, with the food industry being to diabetes what tobacco has been to cancer (Taylor
and Jacobson 2016). Debate has also been renewed on individual response versus corporate
response, going beyond the normal expectations for corporate social responsibility (Runge
et al. 2012). By and large, IOs have been timid about dealing with the corporate sector, and
they acknowledge it. This shift in dietary patterns from diets low in calories and nutrients to
diets high in calories still entails inadequate intake of beneficial foods and nutrients,
associated with consumption of more processed foods and more meals away from home,
leading to changes in dietary composition, as well as food quantities that Paarlberg (2012)
and Smith and Haddad (2015) identified. The food industry has argued that personal
responsibility is more important than the food environment. We argue public policy
needs to address both through far more active consumer education and through regulation
of the food industry. The latter is an uphill battle, however, given the unequal power of
multinationals relative to consumer advocates, and the governance issues in developing
countries. Later in the chapter, we discuss the challenges that Brazil and Colombia have
faced in pursuing progressive nutrition policies. In the interim, it is useful to see contem-
porary nutrition policies in a historical context.
Müller and Sukhdev (2018, 10), in their argument for a systems perspective to achieving
food security, present as an example the complexity of the obesity epidemic, in terms of the
evolution of food systems, in that obesity is not merely the result of consumption of foods of
high sugar/carbohydrate content. The authors point also to the consumption of refined
wheat and sugars in ultra-processed foods can trigger glycemic peaks, and to “ ‘obesogens’
released in the environment by certain endocrine-disrupting chemicals” that may also be
contributing to weight gain, following exposures during early development.¹⁵ Swinburn
et al. (2015) asserted in their article in Lancet, that for the prevention of NCDS, the achieve-
ment of WHO targets will not occur: “without improvements in food environments at local,
national, and transnational levels because obesogenic food environments are the underlying
drivers of the obesity epidemic. Food environments encompass the collective physical,
economic, policy, and sociocultural surroundings, opportunities, and conditions that affect
people’s food and beverage choices and nutritional status” (Swinburn et al. 2015, 2534).
Evidence amassed by IFPRI in its Advancing Research on Nutrition and Agriculture
Phase II (ARENA-II) project suggests that the cost of nutritious food, such as fish, meat,
eggs, and milk, is more expensive in rural areas relative to the cost of carbohydrates and
varies greatly across commodities and locations, depending on the physical and economic
¹⁵ The National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences identifies possible obesogens as cigarette smoke, air
pollution, some pesticides, flame retardants, and other chemicals (see https://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/topics/
conditions/obesity/obesogens/index.cfm).
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access of households to those commodities. Africa’s import dependence has increased, and
that, too, keeps the costs of imported foods high (IFPRI 2019a).
Differential Distribution of International Aid
to Multidimensionally Poor Poverty
Twenty-eight percent of poor people (identified by using the MPI, hereafter referred to as
“MPI poor”) live in LICs. These LICs received 42 percent of donor flows to priority social
sectors. However, 66 percent of MPI poor people live in lower MICs. Aid flows to these
countries amount to 49 percent of the flows. With very low allocations to India, each poor
person is allocated US$1.35 of aid. A small percentage of the MPI poor live in upper middle-
income countries (UMICs) (6 percent). These poor receive 9 percent of aid flows. The
distribution of multilateral flows from IOs, compared to the OECD’s Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC) bilateral flows, better reflect the distribution of MPI poor (Alkire
and Robles 2017).
OPHI, in their Briefing Note on the “Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2017,”
describe aid flows with respect to MPI:
Analysis of aid flows to individual countries is also important. If we consider ODA from
DAC donors, which is thought to represent the bulk of development aid, the countries
that receive very low aid flows in priority social sectors may not be those who need it
least. . . . [E]ight lower middle income countries, including the most populous in terms of
MPI poor such as Pakistan ($2.30), Nigeria ($1.40) and India ($0.64), receive very low
allocations in priority social sector aid from DAC countries. . . .
To understand whether and when aid is catalyzing action and further public expenditure
to fight poverty in multiple dimensions requires in-depth analysis. What is clear is that the
distribution of ODA flows differs significantly from the distribution of multidimensionally
poor people. (Alkire and Robles 2017, 6–7)
Aid and Domestic Budgetary Expenditures in Support of Nutrition
Aid has not been commensurate with needs, but countries are spending more. Howmuch in
relation to the need is unclear. GNR 2017 reviewed various forms of commitments, such as
policy, financial, and capacity building, which should be assessed relative to the needs of the
sector. According to the World Bank (Shekar et al. 2017), “US$70 billion is needed over the
next 10 years to maximise the contribution nutrition-specific interventions make towards
achieving the four MIYCN [maternal, infant and young child nutrition] targets for 2025 for
stunting, wasting, anaemia and exclusive breastfeeding, with a ‘priority package’ of inter-
ventions costing US$23 billion” (Development Initiatives 2017, 70). This does not include
the cost of nutrition-sensitive interventions. In 2015, global ODA was US$867 million,
which was an increase of 2 percent over 2014, when US$851 million was spent. However,
the 2015 spending was less than the US$870 million spent in 2013.
GNR 2017 also reported increased budgetary allocations in several sectors, but huge
differences were found among countries in their national spending on nutrition. Chad,
Comoros, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, and Nepal have allocated over 10 percent
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of their government spending for nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive interventions.
The amounts of the allocations varied according to context and in terms of types of
investments, depending on underlying causes of malnutrition. Despite the lack of “a
common pattern across all countries, the highest share of nutrition-sensitive allocations is
found in the social protection sector (34%) followed by health (22%), agriculture (17%),
WASH (15%) and education (11%)” (Development Initiatives 2017, 68).
The World Bank report, “Investment Framework for Nutrition,” provided the estimate
that an additional US$7 billion is needed annually to invest in nutrition-specific interven-
tions to reach MIYCN targets for 2025. According to Shekar et al. (2017):
The investment can yield tremendous returns: 3.7 million child lives saved, at least
65 million fewer stunted children, 265 million fewer women suffering from anemia in
2025, 105 million more infants exclusively breastfed up to six months of age as compared
to the 2015 baseline, and 91 million children treated for wasting, in addition to other
health and poverty reduction efforts. (Shekar et al. 2017, 139)
What Do Success Stories in the Global Nutrition Reports Tell Us?
The GNRs listed successful cases of nutritional improvements that have one factor in
common. Collectively, they suggest that there is no single factor that explains improvement
in nutritional outcomes in any one country, but even the poorest countries such as
Bangladesh have shown improvement, by acting on multiple fronts. Hence, they illustrate
the importance of both a multisectoral approach and the recognition of country context.
There are also vast differences in nutritional status and changes among different regions
within each country. That is the key message of 17 case studies, including 12 Caribbean
countries contained in the GNRs from 2014 to 2017—from SA (2), East Asia (1), Southeast
Asia (1); SSA (7); and Latin America (6). They contain rich material from well-informed
authors. They use very diverse criteria of nutritional improvement, only some of which are
explicit. Some are stories of changes in public policy, whereas others describe changes in
outcomes. For example, some contain references to changes in the stunting of children less
than five years of age. Statistical evidence is not provided in the case studies, which does not
mean it does not exist. Where available, the cases indicate they relied on household surveys
and other evidence. The coverage of the issues is not comparable across studies (IFPRI 2014,
2015, 2016b, 2017).
Maharashtra, India: One of the richest Indian states, Maharashtra experienced a decline
in stunting of children under 5 over a decade, from 36.5 percent to 24 percent from 2004–5
to 2012. This was due to a variety of factors, including a generally more favorable underlying
environment—rapid economic growth, relatively more progressive tradition of women’s
roles in decision-making, reasonably well-working Public Distribution System (PDS) of
food with fewer leakages than elsewhere, increased spending on nutrition, fewer vacancies
in the Integrated Child Development Service, higher age of mothers at first birth, improved
birthweight, growth in maternal literacy, and assistance to birthing mothers at birth
(Lawrence Haddad, panel 2.3 [IFPRI 2014, 13]).
Bangladesh: Bangladesh’s decline in child stunting was almost twice as fast as India’s
over the same period. (“For India between 1999 and 2006 the decline in under-five stunting
prevalence was 5 percentage points, from 51 percent to 46 percent or 0.85 percentage points
a year.” (India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2009, quoted in IFPRI 2014, 93). For
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Bangladesh between 1997 and 2007, the decline was from 59 percent to 43 percent, or 1.6
percentage points a year and is explained by improvement in household assets, parental
education, and sanitation coverage (Derek Headey, panel 6.2 [IFPRI 2014, 43]).
Webb et al. (2018, 2) describe Bangladesh as “a modern nutrition superstar,” in which
successive governments, acting with nongovernmental organizations, have conducted tar-
geted interventions, with nutritional measures, to address economic growth policies to
reduce poverty, improve sanitation and girls’ education. The “turnaround” of the agricul-
tural sector has resulted in Bangladesh changing from being a net importer to an exporter of
food. The success of efforts is reflected in the decrease in child stunting from nearly 57
percent in 1997 to 36 percent in 2014.
Colombia: Colombia’s impressive nutritional performance was due to decline in conflict
and a peace accord with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, also known as FARC, as
well as rapid, broad-based growth, decline in poverty, and improved social protection.
Intersectoral coordination and monitoring and evaluation are weak, however, as is the
approach to obesity (Diana Parra and Lawrence Haddad, panel 4.2 [IFPRI 2015, 44]).
Ethiopia: In Ethiopia, Africa’s largest public works program, the Productive Safety
Net Program (PSNP), which reaches well over 8 million people, was made more
nutrition-sensitive by working in tandem with the country’s National Nutrition Pro-
gram. It is building strong accountability, monitoring and evaluation, and capacity
supported by donors (Andrea Warren, panel 4.3 [IFPRI 2015, 46]). Working with the
private sector, Ethiopia also has an initiative to promote iodized salt. In 2014, 83 percent
of children were iodine-deficient, and 40 percent had goiter (EHNRI, FMoH, and
UNICEF 2005). The government provided incentives to cooperatives to produce salt,
and when salt glut led to collapse of prices, it helped to form producer cooperative
organizations, established cost recovery and quality assurance mechanisms with a tri-
partite partnership among government, private sector, and cooperatives working
together to improve iodine intake in the population (Corey L. Luthringer, Alem Abay,
and Greg S. Garrett, panel 5.4 [IFPRI 2016b, 56]).
Burkina Faso: In Burkina Faso, major advances have included industrial fortification of
cooking oil with vitamin A and wheat flour with folic acid, supported by the Helen Keller
Institute and Government of Taiwan. This support is combined with the promotion of
homestead production and nutrition awareness, with positive impacts on maternal and child
health (Deanna K. Olney, Andrew Dillon, Abdoulaye Pedehombga, Marcellin Ouédraogo, and
Marie Ruel, panel 6.3 [IFPRI 2014, 45] and Victoria Quinn, panel 5.5 [IFPRI 2016b, 57]).
Ghana: Ghana’s substantial improvement in stunting indicators is attributed to a tran-
sition to democracy, steady growth, improved attendance of girls’ education, improved
coverage of cash transfers to 80,000 families, and SSNs. What is needed is more budgetary
support for nutrition and attention to agriculture (Richmond Aryeetey, Esi Colecraft, and
Anna Lartey, panel 6.1 [IFPRI 2016b, 63]).
Guatemala and Peru: Guatemala’s Integrated Government Accounting System is
expenditure tracking that helps to monitor attention to FSN to achieve Zero Hunger
goals. Guatemala’s actual expenditures are lower than allocated. Peru, with a similar system,
has exceeded its allocated budgets. Transparent and regular release of budgetary informa-
tion at all levels allows various stakeholders to track use of resources and relate them to
outcomes (Paola Victoria, Ariela Luna, José Velásquez, Rommy Ríos, Germán González,
William Knechtel, Vagn Mikkelsen, and Patrizia Fracassi, panel 7.1 [IFPRI 2016b, 83]).
Cambodia: The government of Cambodia has undertaken integrated multisectoral
planning, including water and sanitation, agriculture, and rural development, involving a
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variety of organizations, including UNICEF, WHO, Helen Keller International, and the
World Bank, and has appointed focal people promoting cross-sectoral approaches (Dan
Jones and Megan Wilson-Jones, spotlight 3.1 [Development Initiatives 2017, 56]).
Victoria, Australia: In Victoria, Australia, the Healthy Together program, which reaches
1.3 million of its 6 million population, is attempting to provide a systems approach with a
complete package of policies and promotion of healthy foods in easily accessible areas, such
as vending machines, schools with supportive networks, and training and guidelines to
reduce obesity. It has mobilized a large number of actors from the public, private, and
community sectors. Trying to promote healthy food as a social norm and not as an
exception is a good approach. One would like to know how successful this has been in
actually reducing obesity, or its growth. Information was not contained in the story (Shelley
Bowen, panel 4.5 [IFPRI 2015, 56] and Anna Peeters, Kirstan Corben, and Tara Boelsen-
Robinson, spotlight 3.2 [Development Initiatives 2017, 59]).
Kenya: In Kenya, the government is beginning to tackle the problem of the growing
incidence of obesity in women, young girls, and children in urban and rural areas, resulting
in a growing incidence of NCDs. The Ministry of Health and Sanitation has announced a
number of specific steps to address the problem, including increased awareness and training of
public health workers, but a lack of data and too few resources constrain the program (Lindsay
Jaacks, Justine Kavle, Albertha Nyaku, and Abigail Perry, panel 3.2 [IFPRI 2016b, 28]).
Caribbean: Twelve of the 20 Caribbean countries have formed “whole government,
whole society” nutrition and national NCD commissions to contain the problem of obesity
and undernourishment following multisectoral approaches and have made useful contribu-
tions to greater awareness of NCDs and pursuit of multisectoral approaches. The efforts still
need a truly multisectoral approach, however, to increase the role of non-health ministries,
more funding, and more coordination (Maisha Hutton and Sir Trevor Hassell, panel 5.1
[IFPRI 2016b, 46]).
Tanzania: Poverty halved during a decade from 85 to 43 percent, but changes in
undernourishment were more modest. Thinness in women of reproductive age and stunting
declined. GNR 2015 attributes this to a strong commitment by governments and donors,
leading to increased funding. Even then, funding was only a quarter of the estimated needed
budget. GNR 2015 suggests ring fencing of the budget for nutrition and the need for
better targeting, more data, and better capacity (Lawrence Haddad, Panel 4.4 and 5.1
[IFPRI 2015, 55, 59]).
South Korea: It is a remarkable story. Obesity rates are low despite a dramatic increase in
per capita incomes, with South Korea joining the ranks of developed countries. GNR 2015
attributes the success to Korea adhering to the traditional plant-based diet, with some
increase in consumption in animal products, which helped reduce anemia. This was partly
linked with a systematic push to retain a traditional diet, along with actual training of
women prior to marriage in preparation of traditional South Korean vegetable dishes (Lee,
Duffey, and Popkin 2012). That is an important message for modernizing countries, and a
message that needs greater emphasis (Hee Young Paik, panel 7.2 [IFPRI 2015, 88]). Many of
these programs in South Korea ended with its entry into the WTO and a marked shift in
younger cohorts toward greater overweight status, linked with an increasingly Westernized
diet and lifestyle (Lee, Duffey, and Popkin 2012).
Argentina: Argentina’s dietary salt reduction campaign, “Less salt, more life,” to 5g per
person is SMART (Specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time bound). The average
daily salt intake declined from 11.2g to 9.2g from 2011 to 2015, so that 2,000 annual deaths
from cardiovascular disease could be avoided per gram of salt intake reduction (Chessa
Lutter, panel 5.2 [IFPRI 2016b, 51]).
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Chile: The Chilean government has passed a series of measures to reduce obesity and
NCDs, including introduction of an 8 percent tax on sugary drinks in 2014, restrictions on
display of food and labeling of food rich in salt, sugars and fats in 2016, and requirement to
prohibit advertising of harmful foods to children—the most comprehensive legislation, with
appeals to stakeholders to help implement the legislation. Implementation is still at an early
stage, and an evaluation is underway (Camila Corvalan and Marcela Reyes, panel 5.3 [IFPRI
2016b, 53]).
Brazil: In GNR 2016, Brazil’s example includes the most comprehensive list of steps taken
to improve nutrition. Brazil’s case dramatically shows the important role of leadership, as
well as the larger case of governance failure. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his party
came to power in 2002 (Cecilia Rocha, Patricia Constante Jaime, Marina Ferreira Rea, panel
1.5 [IFPRI 2016b, 11] and Daniel Balaban andMariana Rocha, panel 6.2 [IFPRI 2016b, 68]).
The GNR case for Brazil lists the following initiatives, but does not mention that Brazil
has become a powerhouse in agricultural growth, leading to a decline in real domestic
prices of food, and now is one of the world’s largest food exporters (Lele, Agarwal, and
Goswami 2018).
In Brazil, the National Breastfeeding Programme was approved in 1981. The National
Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes was approved in 1988; maternity leave
increased to 4 months. The National Food Strategy had already been passed in 1999, but
the Zero Hunger strategy and food acquisition program was distinctly the Lula Govern-
ment strategy and was approved in 2003. The government introduced the program Bolsa
Familia for conditional cash transfers in 2004, based on strong evidence and rigorous
monitoring and evaluation. The National Food Security Law was passed in 2005. The
National Law on Food and Nutrition Security (LOSAN), establishing the National System
for Food and Nutrition Security (SISAN), was passed in 2006. In 2009 the school meal
program (PNAE) was revised. In 2010, the human right to adequate and healthy food was
incorporated into the Brazilian constitution, which also passed National Food and
Nutritional Security Policy (PNSAN). In 2014, the Brazilian Food Guide was published,
including an Intersectoral Strategy for the Prevention and Control of Obesity. In 2015, the
Decree to enable implementation of the National Code of Marketing of Breast-milk
Substitutes was issued (Cecilia Rocha, Patricia Constante Jaime, and Marina Ferreira
Rea, panel 1.5 [IFPRI 2016b, 11]).
How did it affect outcomes? In the early 1990s, 21 percent of the population earned less
than US$2 a day, and only 2 percent of the national income went to the lowest 20 percent of
the population. Open defecation was practiced by17 percent; stunting was 19 percent. With
the introduction of the social protection program by 2006–8, the share of population with
US$2 a day had already declined from 19 percent to 7 percent, although 30 percent of the
population was food insecure. By 2011–15, income distribution had improved. The share of
income accruing to the lowest 20 percent had increased from 2.2 to 3.4 percent; the share of
population with less than US$2 a day had declined to 5 percent. Civil society had played a
very active role, working with government (Cecilia Rocha, Patricia Constante Jaime, and
Marina Ferreira Rea, Panel 1.5, [IFPRI 2016b, 11]).
Where the government failed was in making any progress is in the area of obesity. Adult
obesity was 43 percent and overweight was 12 percent by 2006–8, and by 2011–15,
overweight was 54 percent and obesity was 20 percent (Cecilia Rocha, Patricia Constante
Jaime, and Marina Ferreira Rea, panel 1.5 [IFPRI 2016b, 11]). The baby food industry had
fought hard to resist the regulation against breast-milk substitutes, and even when the
legislation was passed, it failed to be ratified and was never implemented. The precise
institutional and legal details are in GNR 2016. Immensely popular, President Luiz Inácio
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Lula da Silva has since been convicted and imprisoned for corruption. His successor Dilma
Rousseff was also impeached.
From Food Security to Nutrition: Conclusions
and Implications for the Future
There has been a clear shift in international discourse from food security to improved
nutrition. Obesity is now a larger and growing problem in the world relative to
undernourishment and micronutrient deficiencies, and it is not being adequately ad-
dressed by SDGs. Indeed, IOs have been slow to catch up to the challenge (including the
costs imposed on national health care systems), and even today, their efforts, carried out
mostly through WHO in the context of impacts on NCDs, are weaker than they should
be. History tells us this trend will likely continue, unless there is another major global
food crisis prompted by a combination of bad crops in major exporting countries, or an
energy or financial crisis—factors that plunge developing countries into balance of
payments and debt crises and reduce their access to international food supplies, wiping
away gains being made in nutrition and reported in this chapter. This happened at the
end of the 1970s, followed by the food crisis in 2006–7. Each had different effects on
access of importing countries to food supplies. In the latter period, developing countries
were better prepared for a macroeconomic crisis, but their agricultural sectors had been
neglected for nearly two decades, and food aid had dried up, creating different stresses
on food and nutrition.
In many Latin America countries and others around the globe, there are pushes for fiscal
policies, such as sugar-sweetened beverage taxes and many other policies, including Chile’s
front-of-the-package warning logos against ultra-processed foods high in sugar, fat, and
sodium, as well as marketing bans. The high health and economic costs of treating diabetes,
hypertension, and all the related disabilities are pushing many countries to adopt such
policies, but the resistance from the food industry, often subtle, is considerable.
Complexity of the Nutrition Challenge
Nutrition is a life-cycle phenomenon and calls for attention to an individual’s nutrition
from cradle to the grave, or more correctly from the conception of a fetus in a mother’s
womb. A highly complex, multisectoral, and multilevel subject, an individual’s nutritional
status and health are affected by a combination of factors, operating at several levels and
over several time periods across many sectors, including agriculture, water, gender, energy
(cooking fuel), sanitation, value chains, international trade, and FDI. This holistic view of
nutrition has profound implications for how nutrition policies and strategies are formed,
implemented, and assessed.
Policymakers’ Limited Understanding and Commitment
How many policymakers truly understand the full significance of the complexity of nutri-
tion for policymaking? Despite the strong international advocacy that nutrition has enjoyed
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in the last decade, the exploding recent literature on nutrition suggests that experts have
been more effective in communicating with their peers than with policymakers. Their job of
effectively communicating with policymakers outside the nutrition community is cut out
for them, particularly for getting messages across to finance ministries that determine
budgetary allocations and can form policies with respect to taxes, subsidies, and regulation
of the food industry to promote healthy production and consumption systems; to the
food and beverage industry leaders to play to their better angels; and to consumers who,
when better armed with information, can demand better quality food. This is where
international approaches will have to be strengthened holistically from their current
nutrition-centric focus.
It was easy to turn back the gains made in nutrition by the end of the 1970s, however
small, in the wake of a global economic crisis, because there was no strong constituency for
nutrition among either finance ministries or consumers. Indeed, even IOs turned away from
their focus on food and nutrition, which they had championed in the previous decade, with
the impending debt crisis at the end of the 1970s. The ongoing work at CFS to develop
Voluntary Guidelines on Food Systems and Nutrition, following the HLPE report on
“Nutrition and Food Systems,” offers an example of the way forward (HLPE 2017).
Nutrition Strategies
Well over 50 countries have taken steps to establish nutrition strategies and allocate
resources to nutrition programs. Some of these efforts are beginning to show results, but
evidence on cause and effect is still weak, and evaluation of nutrition programs is complex
and challenging. In terms of regulatory regimes, taxes, and subsidies to change incentives to
curtail the supply of harmful foods, reforms are relatively new and still weak, in part because
of the power of the food and beverage industry. Critical data are often missing in countries
with the highest incidence of malnutrition, and a consumer information strategy is often
lacking in most countries.
The implementation of the Africa Nutritional Strategy 2015–25 is aimed at improving
nutrition across the African continent. With “six clear and achievable targets to be attained
by 2025,” the strategy seeks to (1) reduce stunting among children under 5 years by 40
percent; (2) reduce incidence of anemia among women of reproductive age by 50 percent;
(3) reduce the incidence of low birthweight by 30 percent; (4) maintain weights so that there
is no increase of overweight in women and in children under five; (5) promote exclusive
breastfeeding for infants in the first six months of life, with a goal to increase the practice by
50 percent; and (6) reduce, or maintain at less than 5 percent, the incidence wasting among
children under five. The Strategy recognizes that “the risk factors of malnutrition in Africa
are multidimensional and can only be addressed in a comprehensive way with active
contributions from all sectors, both government and non-government, including the private
sector” (African Union 2015, iv). The challenge is to translate these intentions into action.
Relationship between Poverty, Gender Inequality, and Food Security
We explored the relationship between poverty and food security in several ways. The
analysis of Kakwani and Son (2016) suggests that the gap between poverty reduction and
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undernourishment reduction may not be as large as the World Bank and FAO numbers
suggest. These issues need further analysis. This is also true of gender inequality. Our
analysis suggests that it is strongly associated with child food insecurity indicators, but
issues of gender remain one of the neglected areas of public policy, particularly in countries
lagging in good nutrition. A full range of steps needed to achieve nutritional outcomes are
lacking in most countries, as the case studies we have presented showed. Lower cost of
energy-dense food and its widespread availability has meant poor people are more adversely
affected by the “junk food revolution.”
Improved Governance and Increasing Accountability of Stakeholders
Accountability for results is still a nebulous area. GNRs do a good job of identifying the
performance of various stakeholders in delivering on commitments. Journalists do an even
better job in documenting how the enormous power of the food and beverage industry has
been deployed over the years to stymie reforms attempting to contain the availability of
foods rich in fats, sugars, and salts, and to improve food quality. By and large, OECD donors
have delivered on their financial commitments, but those appear to have peaked in 2016,
with a slight decline in 2017. Also, most donor resources go to LICs, but LMICs and MICs
contain most of the malnutrition problems that result from the rapidly changing food
environment. Governments of countries where most of the malnutrition exists must finance
their own programs. Only a third of governments who have made commitments have
delivered on them.
Limited Private Sector Engagement by Public Bodies
Multinational food and beverage industries have moved to global markets with, in some
instances, active corporate resistance to their regulation or to efforts to limit their imple-
mentation at both the national and international levels. However, although GNR 2017
reports confirm that the large-scale private sector has been lukewarm in its support of
nutrition and has followed through with only a few of the commitments it has made
(Development Initiatives 2017), there is no evidence of serious engagement with small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) at the local and national level. Political will to both
engage with and regulate the private sector and enforce rules has been weak, despite
mounting evidence of the relationship between diets and obesity.
Role of Regulation and Development of National Programs
Several MICs, including Chile and Mexico in Latin America, have imposed taxes and
enacted regulations against sugary drinks and the sale of harmful food to children
(Nakhimovsky et al. 2016). Brazil’s example shows, however, that resistance of the private
sector against regulation has been strong. It is too early to know the impact of regulation on
food consumption. Nutritionists note that there is a dichotomy between the fast food
industry and traditional consumption patterns. Countries, such as India, have lagged
behind in FDI and development of domestic value chains, supermarkets, and restaurants.
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These countries have much to learn about regulating the private sector and promoting the
domestic food industry, which in turn promotes indigenous, plant-based diets that are low
in fats, salts, and sugar, as South Korea did successfully.
FSN is a multisectoral issue. A narrow focus on calorie consumption misses the point
about what is needed to improve the state of the world’s FSN. Neither PoU nor FIES
give us actual food consumption. With rapid dietary transition, advances in data
collection and its reduced cost, it is time that the global community begins to collect
data on actual food consumption. Currently, there are only a few cases where such data
are available:
1. Global Dietary Database at Tufts University (Boston): They collect and connect
consumption surveys from around the world, but because these data sets are not
interoperable, they must do a lot of extrapolation. Tufts University has substantially
expanded its work on the cost of food.
2. Global Burden of Disease at the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME)
in Seattle. Here, too, they use different methods and data sets.
3. Global Individual Food Consumption Data Tool (GIFT)—World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO)/FAO website—data available and in detail but for fewer countries.
(See SDG2 Advocacy Hub, http://sdg2advocacyhub.org/index.php/)
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5
Changing Global Governance Context for Food
Security and Nutrition
Uma Lele, Brian C. Baldwin, and Sambuddha Goswami
Summary
Why do we need global governance? Through collective action, global governance helps
identify, understand, and address problems that spill over national boundaries. Those
problems include maintaining peace and security; developing and implementing rules
with regard to trade in commodities and services, capital flows, and migration; containing
transboundary pests and diseases; containing global warming; and providing aid for needy
countries and peoples. Global governance complements regional, national, and local gov-
ernance in an important way and is the sum total of the informal and formal ideas, values,
rules, norms, procedures, practices, policies, and institutions that govern all actors—states,
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), civil society, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs), and the general public. The number of actors
on the global governance scene has proliferated, as have the sheer number of international
initiatives in support of food security and nutrition (FSN) since the 2007 food crisis. Many
of these are reviewed in this chapter. These efforts have lacked coherence, and the resources
in support of food and agriculture at the disposal of countries lagging in reaching the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are not nearly enough to tackle the ambition. Often
the dynamics of climate change, population growth, and rural–urban migration compound
the already stretched financial, human capital, and institutional challenges that the coun-
tries lagging in SDGs are facing.
We show in this chapter that, despite flurry of activity after the 2007 food crisis, few
financial flows resulted beyond the traditional sources, such as the support for CGIAR by
the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, the Agricultural
Market Information System (AMIS), and Global Agriculture and Food Security Program
(GAFSP). This situation appears to have changed slightly for the better since the COVID-19
pandemic. According to a 2021 OECD report:
In April 2020, DAC [Development Assistance Committee] members issued a statement
that recognised ODA [official development assistance] as “an important means of sup-
porting national responses to the COVID-19 crisis,” and that they would “strive to protect
ODA budgets.” ODA has long been a stable source of development financing and has
cushioned the immediate impact of previous financial crises (e.g. after the Mexican debt
crisis in the early 1980s, the recession of the early 1990s and the financial crisis in 2008)
[although we argue in this chapter that the financial assistance from OECD countries in
the aftermath of the 2008 crisis was not as significant as seemed to be the case initially]. In
2020, ODA rose in a year that saw all other major external resource flows for developing
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countries—trade, foreign direct investment, tax and remittances—decline due to the
pandemic. Total external private finance to developing countries fell by 13% in 2020
and trade declined by 8.5%. (OECD 2021, 5)
The emerging narrative over the last decade has been one of the important roles that private
sector flows need to play. However, without good national governance, there can be little
possible sustained active, often collective action, through multilateral institutions, to reduce
risks and assure returns. The private sector will not fill the gap in global financing on a scale
needed to meet the gap between the combined national and ODA resources to make a dent
on reducing poverty and hunger where progress has been slow, the very raison d’être for
establishing the international organizations (IOs) reviewed in this book.
Issues of governance at the national and subnational level, therefore, are immensely
important, but they are relatively under-researched, particularly in a comparative context
and over time.
We used what data are available and explored relationships between per capita income
and control of corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality, and government effectiveness. All
show stronger relationships with per capita income than do voice and accountability,
political stability, and absence of violence/terrorism. The relationship between local partic-
ipation and elite capture is similarly complex, and we need to understand it better if we are
concerned about reaching the poor.
Scope and Outline of This Chapter and the Next Chapter
We address issues of governance, at multiple levels in these two chapters, with a particular
focus on FSN from four separate, but interacting, vantage points:
1. The concept of global governance, and how the governance of FSN can be seen as a
subsystem that fits into the larger global governance system, while also distinguishing
the concept of governance from the more limited concepts of international financial
or international aid architecture, although these concepts are intertwined (IDA 2007;
Lele 2009);
2. The numerous international, regional, and national initiatives related to FSN, under-
taken since the 2007–8 food and financial crises, to achieve global consensus on a
complex agenda, among a growing number of actors, operating in a fractured
environment;
3. Governance of the five IOs, which provide examples of the “operating arms” of global
governance: namely, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), the World Bank, the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Fund
for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and CGIAR, and how they are responding to
the changing global environment. We refer to them as the “Big Five” and as “tradi-
tional” IOs, because they were some of the earliest ones to be established. Their roles,
still large in the public goods sphere, have shrunk and become more complex, as the
world around them has grown faster than their ability to keep pace. Their governance
is discussed in Chapter 6;
4. Governance at the national and subnational levels: This is where the conceptual
becomes the practical. Effectiveness of governance within national borders helps
explain the extent to which countries can formulate and implement national policies
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and investments, effectively supply public goods and safety nets, carry out regulatory
functions, and maintain law and order.
The four-way breakdown enables us to analyze governance questions at each level of the
system empirically and separately from—but interacting with—the other levels, as a
dynamic coordination mechanism, with horizontal and vertical interrelationships at
multiple levels. Understanding the sprawling concept of global governance is necessary
to appreciate its ever-expanding scope, in the context of the huge opportunities presented
by the entry of numerous new actors on the global scene and in the context of the fourth
industrial revolution (see Schwab [2016]; and Lele and Goswami [2017] for its application
in India).
This chapter first describes the changed context for global governance in a historical
context. The historical perspective helps in understanding the various concepts of global
governance to be discussed next. This section is followed by the discussion of the variety of
international initiatives, which have proliferated since the 2007–8 financial crisis. We argue
that the lack of coherence of these initiatives has limited their contribution to reducing
poverty and hunger.
Governance of the Big Five IOs concerned with food and agriculture is discussed separately
in Chapter 6. Issues of national governance are discussed at the end of this chapter.
What Is Governance and How Is It Defined?
There are countless definitions and ways of looking at the developments in global govern-
ance discussed here (Bovaird and Löffler 2003). ThomasWeiss defines global governance as:
“ . . . the sum of the informal and formal ideas, values, rules, norms, procedures, practices,
policies, and institutions that help all actors—states, IGOs, civil society, and NGOs, TNCs,
and individuals—identify, understand, and address transboundary challenges that go be-
yond the problem-solving capacities of individual states.” (Weiss 2014, 4).
Weiss (2013) and others (see, also, Birdsall, Meyer, and Sowa [2013]) identified some of
the key weaknesses in global governance and argued that the world is undergoverned, a
theme echoed in a great deal of the literature.
Weiss’s view of global governance, in turn, has a great deal in common with Nobel
Laureate economist Douglass North’s concept of institutions (North 1990). North defined
institutions as formal and informal rules of the game, which evolve in response to changing
norms, standards, and values. He considered institutions to be umpires, “the humanly
devised constraints that shape the human interaction,” in which organizations and indivi-
duals operate as players. “Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to
everyday life” (North 1990, 3). This distinction between institutions as formal and informal
rules, and organizations and individuals as players that follow those rules, has been
frequently applied in recent years in social science literature (Levy 2014; Birner and
Anderson 2015; von Braun and Birner 2017). In North’s conception, institutions are shaped
by factors that include culture, power, and events; for example, he notes slavery was an
institution whose end fundamentally transformed economic and social relations in the
United States (North 1990). Women’s empowerment changes the structure of family,
economy, society, and polity, while also changing women’s access to resources and their
role in decision-making. This view of governance extends beyond the rights-based approach
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that has proliferated in the United Nations (UN),¹ and explains how values and norms
affect governance. They change faster in some cultural milieux than in others. For example,
the fall of the Berlin Wall had a profound impact on IOs and global governance. European
donors pushed bilateral and multilateral organizations in the 1990s to support democracy,
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Boughton 2012). And similarly, Brexit and
the US presidential election of 2016 led to a reassessment of rules with regard to immigra-
tion, trade, and investment among all trading partners in Europe and globally (Bartels
2016a, 2016b).
North (1990) argued that the behavior of actors is critical as to who sets the rules and
what rules are set. Rules typically evolve through well-established, transparent processes
among groups of actors, particularly those with power and voice in rule setting. We describe
what power and voice mean in different contexts and the ways in which they interact. When
orderly processes fail, rules are shaped through disruptive action, including exit, a phenom-
enon which Hirschman articulated in his book, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Hirschman 1970).
Small groups of actors, at times, take actions, through momentous changes. The establish-
ment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) in 2002, the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015, the New Development Bank (NDB,
formerly referred to as the BRICS Development Bank) in 2014, the realignment of the G19
in Hamburg (2017), and indeed, even the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), as well as the international migration crisis and the backlash in rich countries to these
events, can all be explained by Hirschman’s rich analysis in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, as we
discuss later in this chapter.
A Changed Context for Global Governance
These are tumultuous times for global governance. Emerging from the 2007–8 global food
and financial crises, the world’s nearly 200 countries, in 2015, unanimously arrived at two
clear goals for the planet at the UN: the SDGs and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change
(UN 2020a, 2020b). By August 2017, reflecting the sense of urgency, 160 of the 195 parties
to the convention had ratified the Paris Agreement (member countries and regional
organizations, such as the European Union [EU]), in record time for any major UN
agreement to become effective, whereas it had already entered into force on November 4,
2016 (UN 2020b; UNFCCC 2014): that is, “the date on which at least 55 Parties to the
Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 percent of the total global
greenhouse gas emissions had deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession” (UN 2020b).
Growth has been unequal across and within countries, and despite the huge potential of
the fourth industrial revolution to benefit those not reached by development, political will
has often been missing (Schwab 2016; Lele and Goswami 2017). Western democracies have
been, to date, the leaders of the global architecture, but they and their alliances have been
weakening, and the general faith in their own institutions of governance has been declining
(Luce 2018), accentuated by a lack of US leadership during the Trump era. The big challenge
¹ The UN is founded on the principles of peace, justice, freedom, and human rights. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights recognizes human rights as the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace. The unanimously
adopted Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action states that democracy, development, and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing (UN 2003).
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after the 2020 US elections is how to make governance more effective at all levels and for all
stakeholders, since governing institutions have been adjusting to the new reality at all levels,
and the world is not the same as it was before Trump’s 2016 election. For example, the
Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was
intended to isolate China, has now had the opposite effect. After eight years of talks, China
and 14 other nations, from Japan to New Zealand to Myanmar, formally signed one of the
world’s largest regional free trade agreements (FTAs) on November 15, 2020, a pact shaped
by Beijing, partly as a counterweight to American influence in the region. The agreement,
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is limited in scope relative to
the TPP. Still, it carries considerable heft. The pact covers 2.2 billion people, more than any
previous regional free trade agreement and could help further cement China’s image as the
dominant economic power in its neighborhood. It is widely seen as China’s growing sway in
the Asia–Pacific region. US President Biden has been noncommittal on whether the United
States would join the successor to TPP. India did not join the RCEP—it wanted more
flexibility on trade restrictions on Chinese imports into India, which already had a US$60
billion balance of trade surplus increase. China was reluctant to make the concession.
Governance challenges are also increasing and often interact across borders, as in the case
of water (see, for example, Lele, Klousia-Marquis, and Goswami [2013]; Lele, Plusquellec,
and Reidinger [2015]). Political will and political capacity interact with governance in a
complex way, and they pose a “chicken-and-egg” problem. Which comes first, governance
or political will? IOs have tended to deal with governance issues at the national and
subnational levels as technocratic issues, when, in reality, governance at all levels—
international, regional, national, and local—is an outcome of how power and voice are
exercised, how they change and how they interact at different levels and over time. We
demonstrate this phenomenon in Chapter 6 on the governance of the “Big Five.” Power and
voice and their exercise are contextual and dynamic, as we show in this chapter. Devising
interventions and delivering results on SDGs and climate change by 2030 calls for a
systematic analysis of governance, with its many moving parts in the real world. Improving
governance at multiple levels is, thus, no mean feat.
A high-level side-event launched the Global Hub on the Governance for the SDGs at the
UN General Assembly on September 25, 2019, bringing together about 200 participants,
including the Secretary General of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Adminis-
trator, several prime ministers and cabinet ministers, and other high-level representatives
from governments and IOs. Participants discussed how to advance the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development by fostering collaboration internationally, strengthening political
leadership, and reinforcing key governance mechanisms. The group declared:
Reaching our collective international commitments under the 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development will require political leadership and scalable multistakeholder action.
Governments will need to coordinate, consult and work across policy areas in an unprec-
edented way to dramatically accelerate progress. Achieving the 2030 Agenda will also
demand the effective use of planning, budget, procurement, monitoring and evaluation
processes, to better align priorities and to enhance transparency and accountability.
(OECD 2019a)
UN Secretary-General António Guterres will also convene a Food Systems Summit (FSS) in
2021, “to raise global awareness and land global commitments and actions that transform
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
288   
food systems to resolve not only hunger, but to reduce diet-related disease and heal the
planet. The Secretary-General is calling for collective action of all citizens to radically
change the way we produce, process, and consume food” (UN 2020c).
The Summit comes against the background of Brexit and the 2020 US presidential election.
The 2016 US election led to change in the existing liberal, rules-based world order, with the
United States’ withdrawal from several international initiatives and organizations, Similarly,
Trump encouraged British withdrawal from the EU, unlike his predecessor Obama, who
encouraged the British to remain in the EU. It is too early to know how Brexit could change
the EU, and if, whether and how, even with a Biden victory, Trumpism will continue to exert
influence on protectionism and erosion of democratization, and the United States’ ability to
deliver on a variety of fronts, such as climate change and trade. The rise of the Right is not
confined to the United States. Chancellor Merkel’s admission of over a million refugees has
also contributed to the rise of right-wing ideology in Germany, but it has not affected
Germany’s foreign policy in the way it did in the United States, where the US leadership
subscribed to it. In reality, these developments were reinforcing the already shifting global
balance of power from the North and West to the East and South, including, particularly, the
growing role of China, while the BRICS alliance (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa) has been in disarray in 2020, with the COVID-19 pandemic slowing global growth,
problems of governance in Brazil and Russia, and the China–India border dispute.
The shake-up of the traditional liberal world order downplays the pivotal role that the
United States has played in global governance since the Second World War and, indeed,
since the First World War, if the strong US support of the establishment of the unsuccessful
League of Nations by President Woodrow Wilson is considered (see Box 5.1).
The EU, too, is facing challenges beyond Brexit, including high youth unemployment, the
influx of refugees and migrants, and the rise of the Right—even in Germany, the pillar of
stability. Both the United States and Europe have been important in leading democratic
liberalism, and while the vacuum created by the United States has given Europe an oppor-
tunity to reassess its own global role, it is unclear what will take its place. No one knows what
the future will hold for global governance against this background, but multilateral interac-
tion, mutual respect, and leadership remain key, even as bilateralism and regionalism are
growing. Countries, such as China and Germany, are now filling the void left by the United
States in their respective neighborhoods and globally. China has become an avid champion of
climate action and a multilateral trading system, emerging as the largest donor in Africa,
funding nearly 2,650 development projects worth a total of approximately US$95 billion in 51
African countries (Parks 2015). The G20, hosted by Germany in 2017, and the G19 (the G20
minus the United States) resolved to proceed with trade agreements, climate change accord,
and an active aid policy to stem the tide of refugees (G20 2017).
The Global South has taken a different approach to international cooperation than the
Global North. Western aid, at least in principle, is provided conditionally on progress on
liberal values, such as support for democracy, good governance, respect for human rights,
and poverty reduction. In reality, this support is often hard to find. Perhaps, because of their
different histories of colonialism and different views about colonialism, emerging countries,
in principle, do not impose their political views, ideals, or principles onto countries with
which they engage in South–South cooperation, in what has come to be known as a “non-
interference policy” (Agarwal 2015; Whalley, Agarwal, and Pan 2015). Skeptics of this
argument, however, are quick to point out that China’s expansionary external assistance
is driven by its geopolitical ambitions and interest in access to resources, much as were the
old colonial masters and, in addition, unlike in the case of the US Marshall Plan, which was
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Box 5.1 The United States and the Evolving Global Governance
Using its near total hegemonic power and building on the lessons of the interwar years,
the United States, in the aftermath of the Second World War, designed a world order to
benefit the United States and its allies, and slowly but surely paved the way for a rules-
based, multipolar world. It remains the largest contributor to the global governance
system, despite the diminishing share of these contributions with respect to the US gross
national product (GNP), compared to other rich countries’ contributions. The UN,
Bretton Woods institutions, and FAO were all established in 1945, with the United
States taking the lead in the establishment of the rules of cooperation and financing.a
With the help of the Marshall Plan (officially, the European Recovery Program,
1948–52), and other economic and military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO, 1949); the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO, 1954);
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1949); and through financial aid,
the United States helped war-ravaged Europe and Japan to regain their economic
strength. The establishment of the International Development Association (IDA,
1960) as the concessional arm of the World Bank; the World Food Programme (WFP,
1961) to internationalize bilateral food aid; and CGIAR (1971, formerly the Consultative
Group for International Agricultural Research) to promote international public goods
research were followed by many other international cooperative arrangements and
organizations. While US bilateral food and financial assistance to developing countries
and contributions to IOs continued, Germany and France were able to establish the
European Commission (EC) in 1958. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the EC,
as the politically independent executive arm of the EU, expanded its economic
influence regionally and globally, by formally including the countries of the former
Soviet Union in the EU, and economically, through trade and aid. In 1972, President
Nixon’s visit to China paved the way for China’s integration in the global economy,
and with its admission into the Bretton Woods institutions in 1979–80, its integration
contributed to China’s extraordinary economic growth. The emergence of the Asian
Tigers in the 1980s, a phenomenon supported by Western aid and trade, also paved
the way for the rise of China and other Asian countries. Singapore, an Asian Tiger
(one of four Asian high-growth economies, also including Hong Kong, South Korea,
and Taiwan), provided a model for China’s reforms (Lee 1998). Asian growth brought
large populations into the global growth process, leading to the emergence of BRICS
(the association of the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa, with the establishment of its multilateral bank—the BRICS Development Bank,
now the NDB) and the Group of Twenty (G20). The 11 emerging developing members
of the G20 contribute 40 percent of the global GDP (gross domestic product) in
purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, contain half the world’s population, and have
supplanted the G7, acquiring significant roles during and after the 2007–8 global
financial crises.
a Unknown to historians, a transcript existed of the meeting of Allied nations during the heat of the
Second World War, and three versions were in Washington-area libraries and archives. See Lowrey (2012).
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based on grant money, China’s aid is loans that are adding to the indebtedness. Western
countries argue that they cannot agree to debt forgiveness unless China and other countries
also agree to forgo their debts. With divided voters, expectations from global governance
also differ within individual countries.
In a recent survey, the US public considered containment of terrorism and climate
change to be among its top priorities for engagement abroad (KFF 2016). While each
objective can be pursued nationally, without concerted regional and global collective action,
neither can be addressed sustainably. The same is true for tackling the problem of the
estimated 65.3 million displaced people—the largest number displaced since the Second
World War—but global collective action is weak, with a proliferation of uncoordinated
initiatives. The resources needed to fulfill the Paris Agreement, particularly for adaptation to
climate change, and to achieve the SDGs are not yet there; both have been criticized as being
too ambitious, without clear priorities (Economist 2015).
Experts from military and humanitarian sectors see the need for an agreed upon
framework of commitments and responsibilities for UN member states and concerned
IOs to invest in limiting the international spread of famine, hunger, epidemics, and other
public health emergencies, which will ensue in ungoverned states, while minimizing
disruption to travel, trade, and economies (WHO 2007). Against this background, the
goals of global governance could be conceived as achieving the SDGs; focusing on outcomes
in the regions lagging in SDGs; and addressing issues of peace and security, environmental
sustainability, human nutrition, health, and impending climate-related and other crises,
such as conflict, human displacement, and pandemics (Furusawa 2017).
Old and New Actors in Global Governance
The numerous actors in global governance bring to bear a different set of assets with which
to “play,” ranging from the financial wealth of the world’s richest individuals to emerging
countries, legitimacy, goodwill, trust, convening power, and access to knowledge and
information. This broad definition enables us to accommodate the evolving nature of global
governance. For example, after the 2008 financial crisis, the United States lost some of its
luster, among the Bretton Woods member countries, for its good economic and financial
housekeeping, as it faced growing demands for financial regulation via Basel III—a global,
voluntary regulatory framework on bank capital adequacy, stress testing, and market
liquidity risk. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and the Consumer Protection Act
(Amadeo 2019) was signed into law in the United States in 2010. A law that regulates the
US financial markets and protects consumers, it was a critical piece of the international
regulation to help prevent a repetition of the 2008 financial crisis (Amadeo 2020c). It
provided the most comprehensive financial reform since the Glass–Steagall Act, which
regulated US banks after the 1929 stock market crash (Amadeo 2020a, 2020b). Hundreds of
Dodd–Frank rules became part of international banking agreements. The Trump adminis-
tration weakened the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act (Klein 2018; Onaran 2018).
The previous example and others noted in the preceding section illustrate that actors and
their behavior within national boundaries constitute part of the formal and informal global
governance at the global level. Those actors include UN organizations, international
financial institutions, civil society organizations, philanthropic organizations, the G7 and
G20, the private sector, trade associations, producers, and consumers, among others. In
addition, new actors and partnerships continue to emerge. Much of the growth of civil
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society occurred in the 1980 and 1990s. The growth of private actors as major players
ensued in the 1990s, following liberalization of commodity and capital markets. The private
sector role, in particular, increased rapidly in the new millennium (see Chapter 7 on
financing, Figure 7.1).
With the larger evolutionary view, we can see the roles of old entities being reformed and
re-energized and new organizations entering the arena. We call our “Big Five” the tradi-
tional intergovernmental IOs concerned with food and agriculture. They were established
well before the growth of organizations in the 1990s and the new millennium, which
increasingly has accommodated non-state actors in governance, albeit informally. The Big
Five all focus on poverty reduction and food security. Their missions and goals, shown in
Table A.1.2 in Chapter 1, are quite complementary, and their very different governance
structures, shown in Table A.6.1 in Chapter 6, provide us with a window on global govern-
ance from the viewpoint of the “operating arms” of the system. Their evolution and reforms
are discussed in Chapter 6. In the meantime, new, emerging, and old retrofitted actors have
resurfaced. The United Nations High Level Task Force on Global Food Security and
Nutrition (UN HLTF) was established in 2008 to deal with the food crisis. The Committee
on World Food Security (CFS), established in 1974, was reformed in 2009, as a multi-
stakeholder platform to reach consensus on global food issues, giving CFS a new set of
functions of global policy coordination. Around the same time, a dizzying number of other
initiatives were launched and will be discussed here.
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
The new actors on the scene include philanthropic organizations; among them, the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), established in 2000, is the most preeminent of the
private actors. Although only sovereign governments are members of the governing bodies
of UN organizations and the Bretton Woods institutions, BMGF’s outlays are larger than
the gross national products (GNPs) of several small countries, and its influence has
increased with its tremendous proactive role during the COVID-19 pandemic. Much as
the Rockefeller Foundation had an extraordinary influence on generating the Green Rev-
olution and in the health sector in an earlier era, BMGF has considerable influence on
international policies and technologies, such as new vaccines and vaccine prices (particu-
larly in the context of the pandemic), genetically modified (GM) crops, the role of the
private sector, and the allocation of public sector resources. With an endowment of US$40.3
billion, BMGF’s total 2016 direct grantee support amounted to US$4.6 billion, and, since its
inception until the end of 2016, grant payments totaled US$41.3 billion (BMGF 2020).
While many bilateral donors, such as the United States Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID) and multilateral donors like the EU are large, too, they are traditional
donors. BMGF’s operations, the so-called philanthrocapitalism it practices and promotes,
has come under scrutiny (see, for example, McGoey [2015]). The belief that doing good
through being good is sometimes viewed with skepticism in terms of its unintended
consequences. As a new actor, BMGF has made larger commitments than FAO’s biannual
assessed contributions of US$1 billion in 2018–19 (FAO 2020), IFAD’s annual commit-
ments to developing countries of US$823 million in 2016 (IFAD 2017), and CGIAR’s
annual research outlays of US$919 million in 2016 (CGIAR 2017). Unlike BMGF, activities
of other philanthropists are not reported in OECD data (OECD 2019b).
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As a thought leader with substantial financial power, BMGF has been influential in the
mobilization of the IDA resources and to their sectoral allocations by persuading govern-
ments of rich countries and developing countries. BMGF has also supported GAFSP and, in
terms of its governance, is a member of the Steering Committee. Most notable is BMGF’s
influence on health expenditures, including the treatment and prevention of communicable
diseases, such as polio, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, as well as vaccine develop-
ment and delivery (Lele, Ridker, and Upadhyay 2005); and increasingly, on smallholder
agriculture (McGoey 2015). BMGF increased its allocations to communicable diseases
around the same time that the bilateral donors did, including, in particular, the United
States and the United Kingdom, changing the balance of health spending to communicable
diseases (Lele, Ridker, and Upadhyay 2005). Communicable disease investment was more
attractive than NCDs in the first decade of the new millennium, perhaps because of the
obvious spillovers across national borders; but these increased investments were not sufficient
to anticipate the pandemic national priorities in the context of COVID-19. This balance began
to change slightly in the face of the growing evidence of NCDs, but COVID-19 has high-
lighted the strong interactions between communicable and noncommunicable diseases.
Vulnerability to COVID-19 is greater among those with adverse preexisting conditions.
In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia (SA), BMGF is promoting private entre-
preneurship, improved seed and fertilizer use, and market access. Unlike public donors, a
private foundation like BMGF, much like the Rockefeller or the Ford Foundations earlier, is
accountable only to a small set of individuals. In the case of BMGF, trustees Bill Gates,
Melinda Gates, Bill Gates, Sr., and Warren Buffett guide the annual investment of more
than US$4 billion. While the Foundation performs a number of good, and indeed, admi-
rable deeds, it also can have an undue impact on public policy and public resource
allocation, given the sheer size of its resources. One interesting difference between BMGF
and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations is that BMGF has a declared process to conclude
its operations within 20 years after Bill’s and Melinda’s deaths (BMGF 2020).
With increased evidence of inequality in income and wealth (Piketty 2014), and with
little prospect of progressive tax reforms—the US Senate passed the largest tax cuts for
corporations on December 2, 2017—wealth in the hands of billionaires has continued to
grow, and wealthy private individuals continue to influence global agendas in the way that
BMGF has done since the Foundation started its philanthropy, albeit possibly less trans-
parently. Unlike BMGF, few of these wealthy philanthropists report their international
expenditures in OECD databases.
Following its own good practice, BMGF supports more independent evaluations of its
funded programs and makes them available to the public, as it demands also of IOs. BMGF
is different from some other foundations who have governing boards. Given the size of its
resource allocation, BMGF has a very large, and some would argue an undue, impact on
policy and public resources. Their website describes what they believe is the right approach
of focusing the work of BMGF in the 21st century, declaring, “We will spend all of our
resources within 20 years after Bill’s and Melinda’s deaths. In addition, Warren has
stipulated that the proceeds from the Berkshire Hathaway shares he still owns upon his
death are to be used for philanthropic purposes within 10 years after his estate has been
settled.”² Interestingly, amortizing Warren’s almost US$82 billion net worth over 10 years
would require a payout nearly twice what the Foundation is currently spending.
² See https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/General-Information/Financials/Foundation-Trust
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Global governance could also demand more public accountability of the activities of
philanthropists. Oxfam noted, in 2017, that eight men own as much wealth as the poorest
half (3.6 billion people) of the world, and most of them are US nationals, including Bill
Gates and Warren Buffett. Well over 100 billionaires are active in international develop-
ment work to varying degrees. Oxfam (2017a, 2017b) is critical of this trend. Income
inequality raises important policy issues. Is income, in the hands of private individuals,
even when spent on aid, better spent than ODA?
Other Private Sector Interventions
Some private financiers are interested in the provision of global public goods. Examples
include Facebook’s interest in financing satellites for increasing their coverage in SSA, and
Bill Gates’ and a consortium of donors’ interest in financing energy research. The larger-
than-life influence of the Big Five private corporations in the information technology (IT)
industry (Facebook, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and Apple) through social media, use of
personal data and information, and political discourse has become clearer in recent years.
Their influence in collecting, using, and disseminating information, including “fake news,”
has come under increasing scrutiny and skepticism (King and Gabriel 2019). There is more
appetite in Europe to regulate tech companies than in the United States. So, the future
of governments, multinational corporations, and their interactions is less clear than in
the past.
The food and beverage industry plays a growing role in a world that is facing an obesity
epidemic. Some have noted that Google, Coke, and Pepsi hire academics with the potential
to influence policies favorable to them (Popkin 2009; Haddad 2017). Popkin has compared
the behavior of beverage companies to the early years of tobacco companies, in muting
opposition to their practices. These are important questions of global public policy, which
deserve more attention.
The role of big corporations poses numerous issues in global governance. The formerly
“Big Six” agricultural input corporations are now five—BASF, Bayer, DowDuPont (a
merger of the two corporate giants was finalized on August 31, 2017), Monsanto, and
Syngenta—and are undergoing changes of their own (DowDuPont 2017). China’s purchase
of Syngenta added a new dimension to the story of a Northern-controlled agribusiness
acquired by a Southern country. The growth of private sector agrochemical and seed
industries has increased their role in research and development. How their role may be
harnessed for poverty reduction through public–private partnerships is explored further in
Chapter 10 on CGIAR.
It is clear that private sector and multinational corporations have acquired increased
importance. Gabaix (2016) explained why, in all likelihood, economies of scale and scope
lead to continued concentration of economic activity. The lack of coordination to correct
the imbalance is an example of global governance failure. Bill Gates and Melinda Gates and
Warren Buffett created the Giving Pledge in 2010, to invite the world’s billionaires to
commit more than half their wealth to philanthropy.³ The multilateral development bank
report for the Addis Ababa meeting on “Financing for Development” stressed the need to
shift thinking on financing needs of developing countries from billions to trillions, and
³ See “About the Giving Pledge,” https://givingpledge.org/About.aspx
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argued that a better environment for private sector flows will meet the gap (Development
Committee 2015). The report did not address the need to mobilize resources to meet the
global public goods gap, as a recent Center for Global Development (CGD) report did
(Ahluwalia et al. 2016).
A difference among countries in terms of the size of their economies and contributions to
global governance also explains differences in power structure. Despite contributing a far
smaller share of the GDP to global institutions, relative to its GNP or relative to the shares
contributed by other countries, the US contributions tend to be the largest in absolute
amounts and, hence, the largest shares in the budgets of the UN and most IOs. As we detail
later in Chapter 6 on the governance of the Big Five of the Bretton Woods institutions, voice
in the running of an organization—one of the many examples of the way voice is
exercised—is formally related to the size of a country’s shareholdings. Emerging countries
traditionally have had a small share of the subscribed capital and, hence, a small voice in the
governance of Bretton Woods institutions. Big borrower countries, such as China, India,
and Brazil, however, have wielded more influence on lending policies and practices of the
multilateral banks: for example, in policies concerning safeguards. In doing business, of
course, developing countries have little influence on the activities of philanthropies like
BMGF, except for the operations in their own countries.
BMGF often works in collaboration with the United States and other OECD countries.
The rule of “one country, one vote,” which prevails in some UN organizations, is contro-
versial. On the other hand, in the Security Council, with the exception of China, none of the
world’s populous developing countries—India, Brazil, or Nigeria—are represented, except
on a short-term, rotating basis. In reality, the actual decision-making is more complex.⁴ As
the share of emerging countries in global GDP has increased, so has their financial influence
and political power. They have not been able to exercise it in the formal governance
arrangement of the Bretton Woods institutions, which has evolved slowly to reflect these
realities, as discussed in Chapter 6. The response of the emerging countries to this disjunc-
ture in formal voice and effective clout led to the establishment of new financial institutions,
such as the AIIB and NDB. The US government opposed this move, despite the importance
of capital for the capital-hungry developing countries, and despite the fact that most OECD
countries joined the new banks quickly.
South–South cooperation and bilateral capital transfers from emerging countries have
increased and will remain an important source of soft power. Private capital flows to
developing countries have similarly exploded relative to ODA, much of it going to infra-
structure, but still not nearly enough to meet all of the infrastructure needs (see Chapter 7,
Figure 7.1). More importantly, South–South flows of private capital have increased, partic-
ularly Chinese investments in infrastructure throughout much of Asia and SSA, but South–
North flows have also increased, with emerging countries investing their savings in the stock
and bond markets in New York and London and financing of their budget deficits. A World
Bank (2013) report, Capital for the Future predicted, in the coming decades, that the Global
South will become the largest supplier of capital to the rest of the world. China has both high
⁴ IFAD and WFP are parts of the UN and choose differently. In all three cases, their boards attempt to follow
consensus decisions, rather than votes on most issues. For FAO, outside of the director-general election (and
independent chair of the Council and Committee chairs), the only time decisions are voted on are budget
resolutions. This consensus style of decision-making is more characteristic, perhaps, and important than the
various ways that different parts of the UN System select leaders. In the case of the Secretary-General, even the
Security Council decides and expects the General Assembly to endorse. It is true, of course, that for FAO, WHO,
and others, the spirit of “one country, one vote” is central to their institutional personalities and ways of working.
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savings and high GDP growth rates, but in other countries, such capital transfers from the
South to the North can be seen as perverse—since with large incidences of poverty, they
should be investing resources in their own countries. Because of the failure of Bretton
Woods institutions to “recycle” savings of emerging countries through capital increases, or
to check tax evasion and capital flight from developing countries to the developed, orders of
magnitude of these “untapped flows” for productive investments in developing countries
are large and far greater than the aid flows.
Notwithstanding these trends, with slower growth in some big emerging countries, such
as Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey, and India, and with their deteriorating governance, the
initial shine about alternatives to Bretton Woods institutions, such as the NDB, may have
faded in the short run. The presidents of Brazil and South Korea, Dilma Rousseff and Park
Geun-hye, were impeached in 2016 and 2017, respectively; another Brazilian ex-president
(Lula) was convicted on charges of corruption in 2017, and Russia and South Africa each
have had their own experiences of deteriorating governance. A positive view of these
developments is that some governments are becoming more accountable to their constitu-
encies, following these failures in governance.
The numbers of think tanks, public policy research and policy analysis institutions, and
consulting firms have also increased, with an estimated 7,000 think tanks located not just in
the West, but also in emerging countries. Their rise coincides with the end of national
governments’ monopolies on information, the increasing complexity and technical nature
of policy problems, increasing size of governments, crisis of confidence in governments and
elected officials, globalization, the growth of state and non-state actors, the need for timely
information and analysis, and the growth of information and communication technology.
Nearly 1,800 of the think tanks are US-based, and 400 of them are in Washington, DC,
illustrating the considerable imbalance yet in their growth around the world (McGann 2007,
2016). The ability of think tanks to mobilize resources from domestic and international
sources and their lobbying efforts in the US Congress have raised questions about their
independence. Their growth has slowed with increased competition from consulting firms
and civil society organizations.
Finally, the financial role of remittances and the intellectual and entrepreneurial capital
of migrants cannot be underrated. Personal remittances amounted to US$537 billion in
2016, of which US$407 billion went to developing countries (World Bank 2020b), as
compared to ODA of US$177 billion (OECD.Stat 2020) (see Chapter 7 on financing for
more about remittances). The remittances are a significant share of the macroeconomic
story, using a variety of indicators. For example, remittances are three times the size of
ODA, several times the earnings of developing countries from agricultural exports, and they
have been growing rapidly.
Governance as Cosmology: Challenges in Drawing
Boundaries in a Universe
In an earlier publication, Lele (2009) described global governance as cosmology—the
scientific study of the origin, evolution, and structure of the universe of actors, including
the phenomenon of rising and declining stars—how they are organized or organize them-
selves, and perform the function of governance: that is, the provision of strategic guidance
and an ability to steer the global system toward rational decision-making. Economists
typically argue for clarity of objectives, appropriate choice of instruments, evaluation of
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results, and adaptation on the basis of experience gained. Such a system is probably una-
chievable, but it would be very useful to have some clear criteria on which we could base a
judgment as to how to improve the current situation. This task becomes more complex with a
broadened agenda and the larger number of relevant organizations and actors in the universe
of global governance (IDA 2007). Further, governance in many individual organizations has
becomemore inclusive, both in terms of the scope of the subject matter—that is, in addressing
the issues of climate change, the environment, and nutrition and health consequences of food
insecurity—as well as in terms of the number and types of stakeholders, from sovereign
entities to civil society and the private sector, if not formally, then as observers and partici-
pants whose voice is heard, for example, in the CFS and FAO meetings.
Yet, questions of representation and voice remain vexing. Whereas civil society organiza-
tions question the extent to which governments represent the voices of all of their people,
particularly the marginalized populations, the governments of developing countries ask
whose voice the NGOs, and particularly international NGOs, represent in the discussion of
public policy issues such as safeguards.⁵
Not surprisingly, governance of IOs has become far more complex, with stakeholders,
within individual countries and internationally, exercising competing interests: for example,
in the forest sector between indigenous people and agricultural expansionists. Broad
stakeholder participation certainly has increased the breadth of perspectives and legitimacy
of IOs, but it has also increased the cost of doing business—an issue debated frequently, for
example, in the context of the World Bank’s safeguards, at the meetings of the board of
directors who represent sovereign governments. There have also been long-standing differ-
ences in the areas of safeguards between developed and developing countries, as the 2016
revision of safeguards illustrates (World Bank 2017). In the discussion of the governance of
the Big Five in Chapter 6, we show how the increasing complexity of governance has been
accompanied by mission creep, multiplicity of objectives, overlapping mandates, and a lack
of clarity in their pursuit. Even if the objectives are well defined, the overlapping objectives
of multiple organizations (see Table A.1.2 in Chapter 1) increase competition, spreading a
few limited resources thinly and confusing clients.
Drawing boundaries around the concept of global governance of FSN within the global
governance system, thus, has become increasingly difficult. Boundaries vary depending on
the problem at hand. Climate-smart agriculture requires the inclusion of different skill sets
and stakeholders than does health and nutrition, which increasingly have been main-
streamed into the food security agenda. In an earlier publication, we provided an approach
to looking at global environmental governance (Lele, Zazueta, and Singer 2010); and in
Figure 5.1, we offer a stylized example of the 20 UN agencies and IOs that the UN Secretary
General mobilized in 2008, following the world food crisis, to address the food security
challenge, the High Level Task Force (HLTF). The task force did not formally include
bilateral donors and philanthropic organizations, whose financing makes the work of IOs
possible, nor did it formally include civil society, which provides legitimacy to such efforts—
perhaps, to contain the challenge of collective action. Nevertheless, the HLTF supported
these global processes with particular emphasis on the options for linkages between civil
society, NGOs, private sector, donor agencies, regional bodies, development banks, and the
⁵ The World Bank considers safeguards to be “a cornerstone of our work on investment projects” to ensure
protections for people and for the environment. “Policies—often called ‘safeguards’—serve to identify, avoid, and
minimize harm to people and the environment. These policies require borrowing governments to address certain
environmental and social risks in order to receive Bank support for investment projects” (World Bank 2016).
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UN System at both national and regional levels.⁶ It has important lessons for the 2021
UN Summit.
Figure 5.1 includes the many other actors that interact and partner with the 20 IOs
included in the UN Secretary General’s Task Force.
The HLTF, and the need to broaden and formalize the broad range of stakeholders
involved addressing the food crisis, led to the reform of the Committee of World Food
Security in 2009. The CFS Reform defined its functions in the first phase as coordination at
the global level, policy coherence, support and advice at the country and regional levels; and
in the second phase, coordination at the regional and country levels, promotion of account-
ability and sharing of best practices at all levels, and development of a global strategic
framework for food security. An important appeal of CFS for donors is that it included
“Mechanisms” for civil society and private sector stakeholders. The CFS, as it name
suggests, does not have a mandate itself or resources for implementation but operates
through the member states, the “operating arms” of the three Rome-based institutions
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Figure 5.1 Fragmented global governance and multiple actors in food and agriculture in the
immediate aftermath of the crisis: UN High Level Task Force on Global Food Security and
Nutrition in 2008
Notes: AGRA = Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa; DFID = Department for International Development
(UK); GAFSP = Global Agriculture and Food Security Program; GAIN = Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition;
IFC = International Finance Corporation; MIGA = Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency; NEPAD = New
Partnership for Africa’s Development; SAFANSI = South Asia Food and Nutrition Security Initiative; UNCTAD =
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNEP = United Nations Environment Programme;
UNICEF = United Nations Children’s Fund; WHO = World Health Organization; WTO = World Trade
Organization.
Source: Authors’ construction (Lele and Goswami).
⁶ The HLTF worked with the EC to establish a €1 billion European Union Food Facility (EUFF) to support
urgent action by countries in need in response to consequences of the food security crisis. HLTF entities also
worked together in contributing to the L’Aquila Initiative on Food Security, launched at the G8 L’Aquila Summit
(July 2009), where US$20 billion were pledged for food security, leading to the creation of GAFSP.
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their establishment; the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM); and the Private Sector Mechanism
(PSM). The CFS’s think tank, the High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE), produces annual
reports on topics selected by the CFS members as a basis for policy convergence and specific
sets of recommendations or guidelines. Most of the resources of CFS come from the Rome-
based agencies and 4–5 individual bilateral donors, which are already strapped for re-
sources. The EU-led evaluation of CFS (CFS 2017) highlighted the need for regular funding
but also the need for more efficiency in operating modalities and the output of products.
With strong support from several European donors, the CFS is finalizing the Voluntary
Guidelines on Food Systems on Nutrition, which should be approved in 2021. Such guide-
lines would be an important input to the forthcoming FSS; the CFS Chair is part of the FSS
Advisory Group and both the CSM and PSM have been invited to be part of the work of the
FSS Action Tracks.⁷
How can governance be managed in this new, rapidly evolving situation, and how do we
know when we are succeeding? Is coherence possible in the age of the Internet and social
media, which offer immense, albeit unmanaged competition: that is, without sufficient
public accountability? For example, in the past, G77 countries had shared interests, but
differentiation among upper-income and low-income developing countries has increased.
Sometimes, middle-income countries (MICs) share interests with some developed coun-
tries, joining them at times, but at other times, engaging in fierce competition, particularly
when advancing national interests in the pursuit of spheres of influence. Developed and
emerging countries share interest in access to Africa’s natural resources and compete with
each other. IOs are relatively less political, although there are examples when superpowers
have interfered with their policies and operations. Nevertheless, they are better able to pursue
collective interests, provided their resources are not tied by donors through trust funds to
issues and countries or regions of political interest to donors, and objective transparent
criteria are established by which resources are allocated—this is one reason why the World
Bank gets higher marks than others (see Chapter 6 on the governance of the Big Five).
Collective Action among Large and Small Groups of State
and Non-State Actors
Olson (1965) stated in The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
that large groups are less likely to organize themselves effectively, compared to small groups,
because the cost of organizing is greater than the expected benefits. Large groups are also
less likely to be as homogeneous, with a diversity of interests. Economic and political power,
as well as information and knowledge within the large groups, are also likely to be
asymmetric. Yet, notwithstanding the cost and the complexity of collective action, a
powerful motivation for establishing effective global governance is to take advantage of
the economies of scale and scope in developing solutions to common challenges—on such
issues as trade, climate change, and control of communicable diseases—to maximize the
positive spillovers of transboundary phenomena and to minimize negative spillovers.
Following Brexit, in 2016, a strong defense for countries remaining in the EU was provided
by the outgoing president of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, noting the small size
and poor bargaining power of many individual EU member countries acting alone in
negotiations (European Parliament 2016).
⁷ See “Action Tracks,” https://www.un.org/en/food-systems-summit/action-tracks
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
 :   &  299
On the other hand, without the bilateral agreement between the United States and China in
advance of the Paris Accord, the climate change agreement would not have materialized.
Previous Conferences of the Parties (COPs) illustrate the point. The expected benefits of the
agreement finally reached are smaller than the 57 small island developing countries had
originally hoped for. The United States, the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases, had
agreed to reduce its emissions by 2025 to 26–8 percent of 2005 levels, or about 1.6 billion
tonnes. There are concerns that the failure of the world’s second biggest polluter to honor its
commitments will make it harder for the world to curb temperature rises. The US withdrawal
also sets a precedent and raises fears that other countries may renege on their commitments.
On August 4, 2017, the United States announced it would still take part in international
climate change negotiations in order to protect its interests, despite its planned withdrawal
from the Paris Accord on global warming (Friedman 2017). The remaining parties to the
agreement have resolved, however, to proceed, even if the United States does not play its
role. Similarly, following the US withdrawal from the TPP, others have resolved to proceed
as “12 minus 1” (ICTSD 2017a). The Biden administration is already reversing many of
these policies, but their sustainability will depend on future US administrations.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, a number of global outcomes, including control of
communicable diseases and increased food production that has outpaced population
growth, can be attributed to globalization and international cooperation in science, tech-
nology, and medicine. Yet, some of the achievements are fragile. For example, in the case of
polio eradication, there have been small recurrences in Nigeria, Pakistan, and India—a
result of waning political will, the high marginal cost of reaching those not yet treated,
competing priorities for scarce resources, worker fatigue among those providing last-mile
support, and a lack of trust among communities about Western governments (Rasmussen
2017; WHO 2019). For instance, suspicion exists among Muslim communities that view
immunization as a conspiracy of the West, reinforced by the use of health workers as
informants in the raid on Bin Laden, or of a belief in parts of India that the Hindu majority
seeks to sterilize Muslim children in Northern Indian States. These issues are viewed as
sensitive and have often been ignored in largely reporting of “success.” Far too often,
glossing over the complex sociocultural phenomena that determine outcomes have led to
“surprising” outcomes, as outlined in Box 5.2.
COVID-19 provides by far the most dramatic example of the consequences of nonco-
operation of populations in following “rules” of wearing masks, maintaining distance,
testing, and tracing based on medical advice, and its politicization, of all the places in a
most scientifically advanced country, namely, the United States. It is clear that multidisci-
plinary research on human behavior is needed.
The proliferation of small group collective action in trade through bilateral or regional
FTAs has occurred, in part, as a consequence of the failure of multilateral action through the
World Trade Organization (WTO). There is an active debate about whether the outcome of
bilateral and regional trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), now being replaced by the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement
(USMCA), or the US abandonment of TPP, are constructive for those not included in the
agreements (ICTSD 2017a). Some have argued that they have contributed to standard
setting (Valdés and McCann 2014). Yet, the support for club governance arrangements as
a complementary approach to international cooperation has grown in recent years, not the
least due to the difficulty of reaching agreements in large groups, but also with the
recognition that climate clubs, for instance, may help bring about faster and deeper progress
than the full UN membership (Hawkins 2016). Indeed, working together, the United States
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and China did accelerate the Paris Agreement, which has provided a multilateral hook for
the formation of climate clubs, including in the area of carbon markets. In 2017, China
announced the formation of the largest carbon market, which will be effective in a few years.
Such cooperation can help increase the ambition and impact of carbon markets in the global
mitigation effort by addressing the constraints that result from concerns about competi-
tiveness and carbon leakage under unilateral efforts. The clubs can provide a model for
deeper carbon market cooperation (Hawkins 2016). Others have explored the role of “club
goods,” to help incentivize participation, ensure compliance, deter free riding, and scale up
ambition (Victor 2015); still others have explored the potential of carbon markets as “club
goods” (Petsonk and Keohane 2015).
Issues of Global Governance
Global governance, unlike national governance, is challenged by the absence of a global
government and the inability to form and enforce rules, tax global citizens to finance global
public goods, or to mitigate transboundary externalities, such as those associated with
climate change. There is an important distinction to be made between public goods and
externalities, particularly in terms of how these should be addressed and who should bear
the costs of addressing them (Box 5.3). The issues have frequently been overlooked in
Box 5.2 Who Sets Global Priorities and How?
Rich countries set global priorities. In health, they were driven, in the late 1990s and the
first half of the new decade, by the donors’ desires, reinforced by humanitarian appeals
by celebrities like Bono, to control the spread of communicable diseases, particularly in
SSA and were largely funded by OECD donors (see Figure 9.3 on the World Health
Organization’s budget in Chapter 9). Within the World Bank, which is less amenable to
external lobbying, a debate raged in the late 1990s and early 2000s over the Bank’s
responsibility to strengthen health system capacities of developing countries as a pre-
ventive measure to control the spread of communicable diseases, as distinct from its role
in drug delivery. Given the significant spillover effects of communicable diseases, such as
AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome), tuberculosis, and malaria—and that of
other emerging pandemics, like Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), avian flu,
Ebola, and Zika viral infections—they have attracted greater support fromWestern donors
for their control, much more than the endemic NCDs, such as diarrhea or diabetes. The
donor interest favoring the financing of climate change mitigation, rather than adaptation,
could similarly be explained by the spillover benefits or costs of inaction.
The more recent interest among the donor community in financing treatment and
prevention of noncommunicable diseases has arisen after a clear link between malnourish-
ment (both undernutrition and overnutrition) and NCDs was established scientifically,
followed by intense advocacy by a well-organized group of committed international nutri-
tion advocates, with a critical mass of evidence published in Lancet (2008, 2011, 2013).
These choices and priorities, in turn, are a result of the nature of collective action at the
global level, this time with the role of the scientific community. To understand it, we need to
understand the role of the principal actors. These issues are discussed further in Chapter 9.
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Box 5.3 Public Goods and Externalities
Public goods are goods that are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Their benefits and/or
costs potentially extend to multiple actors, depending on their scope. Traffic lights are
examples of local public goods that benefit all drivers and pedestrians. Defense and
financial stability are examples of national public goods. Global public goods are, in a
dual sense, public—they are public as opposed to private—and global, as opposed to
international or national. Rules that generate international norms and standards (for
example, with regard to food or cross-border control of pests or diseases) are global
public goods. They can be formal or informal rules, and member countries are expected
to adhere to them.
An externality is the cost or the benefit that affects those parties who did not choose to
incur the cost (for example, farmers in tropical countries suffering from extreme events
prompted by climate change) or benefits of warming temperatures in temperate coun-
tries (Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962). Economists often urge governments to adopt
policies that “internalize” an externality (for example, tax emissions) and compensate
losers, so that costs and benefits will affect mainly parties who choose to incur them.
Such issues need to be addressed at multiple levels, but are underprovided and under-
funded.
Hence, the key to global governance has been the willingness of sovereign govern-
ments and their citizens to cooperate and to voluntarily contribute financial and
institutional resources to conduct activities in support of global governance. According
to Article 17 of the UN charter, the UN General Assembly determines assessments of the
193 members, every three years, based on per capita income, external debt, and some
other minor adjustments. Assessments are hopelessly out of line with needs. The total
regular UN budget for the year 2016–17 is a mere US$5.6 billion (Dubbudu 2016; UN
2016). The UN approved a US$286 million cut in its annual budget for the next
biennium 2018–19, “a 5 percent ‘historic reduction in spending’ that the US said it
had negotiated” (Live Mint 2017). As a result of the low levels of assessed contributions,
late transfer of funds, and constant pressure to reduce budgets, the UN relies heavily on
non-assessed voluntary contributions (UN 2017a). There’s no doubt that the needs of all
UN agencies go beyond the level of “assessed contribution,” but the concept of assess-
ments is a good one, although the method may require assessment—a subject beyond the
scope of this inquiry. The method has stood the test of time. Should there be a greater
increase built into the formula? The answer would seem to be positive or those who
believe in global governance. UN member states will likely not agree, without excep-
tional leadership—hence, the growth and influence on program strategy and design, and
of parallel voluntary contributions.
The United States contributes the largest amount, with a share of 22 percent of the UN
assessed contributions. Its GNP is 27 percent of the global GNP of all UN member
countries, thus its highest share of contribution is justified. The US Congress passed a
measure to freeze some UN contributions.
Other major contributors include: China, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, Brazil, Russian Federation, and Canada, with the scale of assessment
expected to be 10.808 percent, 8.718 percent, 6.157 percent, 4.564 percent, 4.538 percent,
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discussions of how to mitigate transboundary externalities, such as the control of climate
change, communicable diseases, or transboundary financial instability. The resultant under-
provision of global public goods prevails, both in terms of their quantity and quality, while
trying to maintain global peace and security, to facilitate and regulate international trade
and commerce, and to minimize “public bads”—activities which damage the environmental
commons, cause conflict, contribute to climate change, turn the Earth’s natural resources
into club goods for the benefit of the few, or lead to the tragedy of the commons: for
example, with the erosion of fisheries and loss of other marine resources.
Over the years, with few exceptions, the world’s richest governments have made, but not
met, repeated pledges to commit 0.7 percent of their GNP to ODA (Figure 5.3). The club of
countries has grown, with emerging countries joining their ranks, although in terms of per
capita income in China and India, these commitments are not high. Nevertheless, from the
viewpoint of rebalancing global governance and financing, it is important to consider the
relationship between them in the global system, such that increased contributions of
member countries, through regular and predictable, multiyear commitments, would be
the best option. Some rich governments, such as the United States, however, have been
reluctant to provide national public goods, such as universal health care and, therefore, are
understandably reluctant to finance IGOs. It will be interesting to see if COVID-19 is likely
to change those views and increase financial support for public health. Other ideas for
financing global governance include a carbon tax, financial transactions tax, and airlines
tax—some of these have been piloted but, again, a lack of political support in key rich
member countries, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom, have pre-
vented their being scaled up. It is unclear if philanthropists can and will provide resources
3.4 percent, 3.234 percent, 2.884 percent, and 2.815 percent, respectively, in the period
from 2019 to 2021, according to the Report of the Committee on Contributions: Seventy-
seventh Session in June 2017 (UN 2017b) (Figure 5.2).a China is expected to overtake
Japan as the second largest contributor to the general UN budget, beginning in 2019. For
the period from 2016 to 2018, the scale of assessments adopted for China was 7.921
percent, while Japan is paying almost 2 percentage points more at 9.680 percent. The
report also estimated that China had nearly a 14 percent share of the world’s gross
national income (GNI), roughly double Japan’s share during the three-year period
beginning in 2016 (Strait Times 2017).
Another seven countries contribute more than 1 percent each to the UN regular
budget, and 135 countries contribute less than 0.1 percent each (see Figure 5.2) (UN
2017b). The nature of burden sharing is clear. Of the 193 member countries of the UN,
the top 25 countries contribute 87.681 percent, while the other 168 countries contribute
12.319 percent (Figure 5.2). The top 10 countries account for 69.118 percent of the total
UN contributions. The pattern of financing varies among the Big Five international
organizations, along similar lines, and the relationship to the governance of these five
organizations is discussed in the next chapter.
Notes: a The Committee made new recommendations so that the scale of assessments is “based on the most
current, comprehensive, and comparable data available for gross national income” (UN 2017b, 3). This “2017
update” refers to the update of the 2016–18 scale, using data available in December 2016 for the period
2010–15. Each country’s share of the UN general budget is reviewed every three years, based on factors such
as GNI, economic strength, and the ability to contribute. The breakdown for the UN budget over the
2019–21 period was adopted December 2018 (UN 2019).
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on a scale needed for the provision of global public goods, and if their priorities would be the
same as those of IGOs, based on some transparent objective criteria.
The 0.7 percent target was first pledged in a 1970 General Assembly Resolution and has
been affirmed in many subsequent international agreements, including in the March 18–22,
2002 International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, and at
the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (August 26–September 4,
2002). The 0.7 percent target has been recognized as a vital step toward promoting
international and national security and stability. The Report of the UN Secretary-General’s
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (UN 2004) recommended that
countries aspiring to global leadership, through permanent membership on the UN Security
Council, be required to fulfill international commitments to ODA, including the 0.7 percent
target: “The many donor countries which currently fall short of the United Nations 0.7
percent gross national product (GNP) for ODA should establish a timetable for reaching it”










































































































Figure 5.2 Contribution to the UN regular budget by top 25 member states, 2019–21 (%)
Source: Based on data from UN (2017b).
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Governance Issues at the National Level
SDG2, and indeed any other SDGs or climate change goals, cannot be achieved without
national political will, strategy, policy, and capacity to plan and implement and achieve
results on the ground. Private sector funding cannot be attracted without good governance.
Thus, governance is at the center of achievements and has been receiving increasing
attention since the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the emphasis was on service delivery (World
Bank 2003, 2004), with a reduced role of government and increased role of the private
sector. Then, these piecemeal approaches gave way to a more systemic approach to
addressing issues of governance. The World Bank’s emphasis on community-driven devel-
opment (CDD) also engendered evaluations of CDDs and social funds (World Bank 2005),
and development research on local participation grew (most notably, within the World
Bank, by Mansuri and Rao 2013). The World Bank has committed substantial resources to
governance reforms and to CDDs. Both have had mixed results. In the area of governance,
the Bank’s focus was on narrow project-level governance rather than on the overarching



















Figure 5.3 Ethics, fairness, and participation: ODA shares in GNI by DAC countries, 2016 (%)
Note: Preliminary data for 2016. The computer program used to produce the figure selectively labeled some of the
countries’ data. From the top, the complete list is Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Greece, Korea, Czech
Republic, Portugal, United States, Slovenia, Japan, Iceland, New Zealand, Australia, Italy, Canada, Ireland, Spain,
France, Austria, Finland, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, Sweden,
Luxembourg, and Norway.
Source: Adapted from OECD (2017).
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enabling environment (IEG 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2011). Interest in
measuring governance at all levels has increased. On CDDs, too, the results have been
mixed, but many new insights were obtained from the World Bank’s analytical and
evaluation work.
Measuring Quality of National Governance: Using Global Data Sets
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011) have been at the forefront of measuring govern-
ance. Their work has also invited criticism and work by others. They considered Douglass
North’s definition (1990) as insightful but too broad, whereas others, such as Blandford
have considered it too narrow, and defined country-level governance as the traditions and
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised (David Blandford, personal
communication August 12, 2017). This includes political, economic, and institutional
dimensions of governance: that is, how governments are selected, monitored, and replaced;
the governments’ capacity to effectively formulate and implement sound policies and
provide public services; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that
govern economic and social interactions among them. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
(2011) have put into place one the largest efforts at measurement, although it is by no means
free of controversy. Their six dimensions, which we use to construct the Worldwide
Governance Index (WGI), include: (1) Voice and Accountability; (2) Political Stability
and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; (3) Government Effectiveness; (4) Regulatory Quality;
(5) Rule of Law; and (6) Control of Corruption (see World Bank 2020a). Other scholars
have addressed some of the elements contained in the index of Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi (2011) in their theoretical, empirical, and historical research, which we turn to, as
necessary for our overview of governance at the national level. These scholars include Olson
(1965); Hirschman (1970); Sen (1984, 1985, 1999); Ostrom (1990); Dasgupta and Mäler
(1997); Bardhan andMookherjee (2007); Acemoglu and Robinson (2012); and Mansuri and
Rao (2013) on the issues of decentralization, participation, and capability, including the
issues of interest groups and elite capture.
An Asian Development Bank report (ADB 2013) used the work of Kaufmann, Kray, and
Mastruzzi (2011) carefully, discussing each of the six components of the index, in the light
of the criticisms and comparing the WGI indicators with other efforts at measurement.⁸ It
pointed out the pros and cons of each indicator and the disparities in results obtained,
depending on the indicator used.⁹
The ADB report (2013) noted that the correlation between governance and development
is weaker in lower income economies than in higher income economies. In addition,
⁸ Criticisms of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) include: (1) the usefulness of comparisons of
governance over time and across countries; (2) potential biases in the individual indicators underlying aggregate
governance indicators, in terms of who is surveyed; (3) independence of the assessments of governance provided
by different data sources; and (4) the consequences for the aggregate governance indicators. Some critiques have
said that the WGI are an “elaborate untested hypothesis,” because they fail to provide evidence of “construct
validity” (Kaufmann, Kraay, andMastruzzi 2007, 2). There has been criticism of the limited access to the data used
in theWGI and for the causality between governance and growth, using data from theWGI. The reader is directed
to these criticisms from Arndt and Oman (2006); Knack (2006); Thomas (2010); and Kurtz and Schrank (2007), in
the responses to Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi (2007). One of the important ones, among others, has been the
extent to which perceptions of governance compare with the reality of governance and comparability across time
and countries.
⁹ For example, the International Country Risk Guide, collected since 1980 (PRS Group 2016) and “Enterprise
Surveys” (https://www.enterprisesurveys.org).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
306   
progress on governance has not matched economic progress in Asia. Government effec-
tiveness, the rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption are more closely and
positively related to development performance than is voice and accountability or political
stability (ADB 2013). Data are far more widely scattered along the fitted line for voice and
political stability than for other indicators.
We used WGI indicators for six dimensions of governance using data over a 16-year
period, covering 205 countries.¹⁰ First, constructing a single index using the methodology
suggested by Nagar and Basu (2002), we ranked countries from the top to the bottom. The
usual suspects—Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and other OECD
countries—rank at the top, MICs typically stand in the middle, and low-income and African
countries typically rank at the bottom, with some notable exceptions. For example, in
Africa, Mauritius and Botswana rate higher on governance than many other nations; they
are also highlighted by Acemoglu and Robinson for their good governance (2012). The
results presented in Figure 5.4 provide several insights.
Our results are consistent with the ADB Report’s (2013) result. Cross-country, time-
series regressions show positive relationships between the six indicators and per capita
income. Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, and Government Effec-
tiveness all show stronger relationships with per capita income than do Voice and Ac-
countability, Political Stability, and Absence of Violence/Terrorism. The strong
relationships with the four variables, noted here, suggest the important role of these four
factors, perhaps, in improving economic performance. Voice and accountability, political
stability, and absence of violence/terrorism show a weaker relationship to economic per-
formance, but the direction of causality is much less clear. We believe the strong correlation
between these mechanisms and GDP per capita does not tell us enough about the direction
of causality. Does increased income and the growth of middle class lead to demand for
better governance or vice versa?
In a similar vein, Sen has argued that a free press prevents famines (Sen 1980, 1981).
Research by Besley et al. (2004, 2005) has also supported this hypothesis. Yet, the free press
in India has not helped eradicate chronic hunger among its 250+ million people. Further-
more, even with increased income, food consumption does not always increase, even among
households with low initial levels of food consumption, leading to the so-called Indian–
South Asian enigma (Deaton and Drèze 2009). And there are important debates about how
much nutrition has improved in recent years, as shown by recent UNICEF data, and what
explains the improvement. We return to more micro-level, case study-based evidence on
voice and accountability later.
Quality of Governance in Africa
Africa has much larger governance challenges than countries in Latin America and Asia,
and this is evident from the Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011) data. Governance is of
critical importance in the African continent, because it has the lowest agricultural produc-
tivity growth among regions, high incidence of food insecurity, and highest population
growth rate, with a youth bulge.
¹⁰ The data were from 1996 to 2014; data are not available for the years 1997, 1999, and 2001.
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Figure 5.4 Per capita GDP and Governance Indicators
Note: Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately –2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance)

























The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) (MIF 2020) provides the most
comprehensive collection of data on African governance. Viewing governance differently
than Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011), IIAG defines it as the provision of political,
social, and economic goods that citizens have the right to expect from their state, and that a
state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens. Its annual assessment of the quality of
governance in 54 African countries consists of more than 90 indicators built into 14
subcategories, four categories, and one overall measurement of governance performance.
Adding more indicators create difficulties on weights, if not evenly available.
Governance across Africa saw minimal improvement over 2006–15, due to widespread
deterioration in Safety and Rule of Law (MIF 2016). Since 2006, 37 out of 54 African
nations—home to 70 percent of African citizens—saw an overall improvement of just 1
point, measured against four categories (1) Safety and Rule of Law, (2) Participation and
Human Rights, (3) Sustainable Economic Opportunity, and (4) Human Development. The
index identified a worrying downward trend in the Safety and Rule of Law category: 33 out
of the 54 nations experienced a decline over the decade, almost half of them (15 countries)
experienced substantial decline. Two-thirds of the countries on the continent, representing
67 percent of the African population, showed deterioration in Freedom of Expression in the
past 10 years.
According to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation report, “A Decade of African Governance,
2006–2015,” among the top 10 overall rated countries, 6 had deteriorated in the Freedom of
Expression category, with South Africa rated the worst. South Africa had been on the edge
of a recession, with chronic power shortages and high unemployment. Mauritius came in at
the top, followed by Botswana, Cape Verde, the Seychelles, and Namibia. Three of the top 10
countries, however, saw their scores fall in this period, including South Africa, the con-
tinent’s most industrialized country, and Ghana, which registered some of the largest drops.
Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, nations in which records on human rights and freedom
of expression have continued to give cause for concern internationally, were ranked among
the top 10 most improving African countries in terms of overall governance since 2006,
mainly due to advances in the rural sector. However, despite gains, Zimbabwe (showing a
9.7 point increase) still ranked in the bottom half for overall governance, coming in 39th out
of 54 countries. Rwanda (with an 8.4 point increase) was the only country to feature among
the 10 most improved and the 10 highest scoring. Ivory Coast showed the most progress in
overall governance since 2006, recording a 13-point improvement over the last decade,
followed by Togo (9.7) and Zimbabwe (also 9.7). Liberia, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Niger, Moroc-
co, Kenya, and Angola made up the remaining among the top 10 most improved.
These governance findings should be seen in the context of the latest ODA flows:
Preliminary data in 2020 show that net bilateral ODA flows from DACmembers to Africa
were USD39 bn, representing an increase of 4.1% in real terms compared to 2019. By
contrast, net ODA to sub-Saharan Africa amounting to USD31 bn, fell by 1% in real
terms.
By income group, net bilateral ODA flows from all DAC members to low-income
countries were USD 25 bn, a decrease of 3.5% in real terms compared to 2019. By contrast,
net bilateral ODA to lower-middle income was USD33 bn representing an increase of
6.9% in real terms. Net ODA to upper-middle countries also increased by 36.1% to USD18
bn. Net ODA flows to high-income countries more than tripled and stood at USD372 m.
These trends, along with the increase in the share of loans in ODA would imply that part
of the increase in ODA in 2020 is due to loans to middle-income countries.
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Preliminary data showed that net bilateral aid flows from DAC members to the group of
least developed countries were USD34 bn, and increased by 1.8% in real terms compared
to 2019. (OECD 2021, 5)
Exit, Voice, and Accountability
Many of Hirschman’s (1970) ideas on exit, voice, and accountability are relevant to the
discussion of global governance. Hirschman argued that actors have two potential responses
when confronted with a deleterious change in their environment—exit or voice—and that
loyalty is a psychological characteristic that increases an actor’s propensity to choose voice
over exit. Others have modified some of Hirschman’s original argument, treating loyalty as
a potential behavioral response in its own right, on par with exit and voice. In other words,
some models do not offer two different conceptualizations of the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
(Hirschman 1970).
Economists assume exit, similar to that from a market, to result from dissatisfaction with
an organization’s product or service, leading to a decline in demand for it. The United States
reduced its contribution to the UN System in 2000 from 25 percent to 22 percent, promising
to pay long-standing debts to the UN in exchange for the lower assessment (GPF 2020).
During the Reagan administration, when the US had a number of reservations about the
support for the UN, there were calls to reduce the then 25 percent cap, but the UN’s active
role in negotiating cease-fires and peace talks in the Persian Gulf eased the pressure to
reduce payments in 1988 and led Reagan to promise to pay overdue dues (Shannon 1988).
Political winds have again shifted, and President Trump’s 2018 budget proposal called for
major US cuts to UN peacekeeping operations and international aid—cuts that the UN said
would make maintenance of essential operations impossible (Gladstone 2017). Similarly,
the United States made a complete (albeit temporary) exit from the International Labour
Organization (ILO) in 1977; and withdrew funding in 1984 from the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), rejoined in 2003, and then
again stopped funding in 2011, when UNESCO granted Palestinians full membership (US
Department of State 2011; Rubin 2013).¹¹ On January 1, 2019, the United States officially
withdrew from UNESCO. Notably, however, “officials estimate that the U.S. . . . has accrued
$600 million in unpaid dues, which was one of the reasons for President Donald Trump’s
decision to withdraw” (PBS News Hour 2019).
The value of exit for large countries like the United States lies in the certainty that it
provides in terms of the relationship between the customer or member and the firm (or
organization) from which it exits. Political scientists think of how an actor/person/firm
handles its response to customer dissatisfaction as the exercise of voice by stakeholders. The
value of voice (which may take different forms, either in the form of lobbying or voting, or
direct action as in Brexit) is that it can lead to changes that ultimately can bring about the
¹¹ The different attitude adopted by the United States toward ILO on the one hand, and UNESCO and WHO
on the other, could be explained by a lack of a concerted and coordinated policy of the various US departments
concerned with “their” UN agency; alternatively, this divergence may be explained by reasons widely reported in
the international press, additional to those given by then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1975, who cited
criticisms of politicization of ILO, disregard for due process, selective concern for human rights, and “the lack of
autonomy of employers’ and workers’ representatives with respect to their own governments.” Some press reports
suggested that President Carter’s decision to withdraw were political appeasements to labor and business in
exchange for support of his energy legislation and Panama Canal treaties (Beigbeder 1979, 232).
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firm’s revival, or not, an idea also advanced by scholar Clayton Christensen (1997) in his
book The Innovator’s Dilemma. An understanding of the conditions under which exit and
voice are exercised requires incorporation of the concept of loyalty. Loyalty makes voice
more probable and exit less likely, but loyalty does not by itself make the exercise of voice
more effective. Effectiveness of voice depends on the extent to which customers or members
are willing to trade the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of improvement in the
(deteriorating) product, and their ability to influence the organization—for example,
through the use of trust funds to drive their own agenda, as we show in the cases of FAO
and CGIAR in the next chapter. Recent global developments have brought these issues into
sharper focus, lending renewed relevance to Hirschman’s brilliant book (1970). It is an
opportune time to examine issues of voice, contributions, and accountability in global
governance.
The rule of “one country, one vote” in the UN, regardless of a country’s GDP, population,
or financial contribution to the system, means that large and rich countries have less voice
in the General Assembly than they do in the Security Council, where, except for China, none
of the world’s populous developing and emerging countries have continuous representation.
In the Bretton Woods institutions, discussed in the next chapter, changing shares of
member countries also has been contentious, as voting rights of emerging countries,
particularly China, have not increased relative to their economic power, as compared to
that of European countries, despite the emerging countries’ growing shares of global GDP
or global population.
Changes in assessed contributions to the general budgets of the UN are marginal, even
after the recent revisions in the assessed contributions of countries. So, some countries
provide “trust funds” in support of activities of interest to their domestic constituencies, an
issue explored more fully in Chapter 6 on the governance of the Big Five and in Chapter 7
on financing. The phenomenon of donor trust funds, and their increased role in global
agenda setting since the mid-1990s, has fundamentally changed the voice and accountabil-
ity of member governments and, hence, the governance of individual IOs and of global
governance.¹² Various new ideas for leveraging public funds to raise private finance also are
being proposed—for example, under IDA18—and in IFAD through public–private partner-
ships, other options are being exercised that will change the governance of these organiza-
tions, moving into an uncharted territory. IDA support for private sector development in
IDA-eligible countries amounted to US$70 billion in the past four replenishments, and
IDA18 participants endorsed the creation of an International Finance Corporation–
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (IFC–MIGA) Private Sector Window pilot in
IDA18 to support direct private investment in IDA—only as additional to existing WBG
programs. In December 12–13, 2019, in an IDA19 replenishment meeting in Stockholm,
Sweden, global coalition of development partners agreed on a historic US$82 billion
financing package for IDA countries for fiscal years 2021–3, representing a 3 percent
increase in real terms, compared to IDA18 (IDA 2020a).
In light of opposition to Tobin tax, or tax on airlines, in the United States and the United
Kingdom, several European countries have decided to introduce the tax, and it may be
extended to all EU member countries. If imposed globally, it would raise billions of dollars.
In addition to financing gaps, many other gaps in global governance have been identified
by champions of global public goods, notably by Inge Kaul et al. (2003) and various UN
¹² Although BMGF is not a member of IDA, it has contributed important ideas to the IDA18 Replenishment
and, as noted earlier, is a member of GAFSP (IDA 2020b).
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commissions that have examined provision of global public goods, including the Pearson
Commission on International Development (Pearson 1969) and the World Commission on
Environment and Development (WCED 1987; UN 2009; Zedillo 2009).
The theory gap arises when a case for the provision of global public goods is made
without the benefit of a relevant, up-to-date theory in the rapidly evolving political and
economic realities of globalization with new entrants and unexpected exits. Prevailing
governance and decision-making are marked by a state-centric and nationally focused
view, at a time when the globalized world entails a number of externalities and cross-
border spillovers, such as climate change, risk of pandemics, and international financial
instability. Some philanthropists are willing to contribute and help raise funds for the
provision of some of these global public goods (Harvey 2011; Watson 2011). Bill and
Melinda Gates, Warren Buffett, and others have been willing to finance health and climate
change-related research; many have made commitments to the Giving Pledge, noted earlier
in this chapter, with one report suggesting the Pledge could account for US$600 billion in
donations by 2022 (Kotechi 2018a). Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon and often cited as the
wealthiest individual in the world, notably had not joined the Giving Pledge as of 2018 and
was criticized for his focus on short-term solutions¹³; CNBC, however, reports that Bezos
was ranked at the top of the Philanthropy 50 in 2018, after announcing, among other
philanthropy in the past year, the launch of a US$2 billion fund (the Bezos Day One Fund)
in support of homeless families and education programs in underserved communities
(Kotechi 2018b; Berger 2019; see also, https://www.bezosdayonefund.org). Should there
be more concerted effort by the international community to raise funds from the new rich?
So, what should be the appropriate division of public and private sector funding and
partnerships between them? It is a question that, of course, needs a context-specific
discussion (Kaul et al. 2003). The CGD sponsored a report on multilateral development
banks (MDBs) that addressed these concerns (Ahluwalia et al. 2016). While declaring
MDBs a tremendous success of the 20th century, the report noted that new challenges
call for global collective action and financing of the sort that MDBs are well suited to
provide, but have been handicapped in addressing large global public goods issues.
The list of global challenges that the MDB report identified include major financial
shocks, climate change, pandemic risk, resistance to antibiotics, poor management of
international migration flows, and the welfare of displaced and refugee populations.
Other areas include cross-border security and spillovers associated with growing competi-
tion for water and other renewable natural resources, and with climate change—an increase
in the frequency and human cost of weather and other shocks in low-income countries, for
which multilateral banks are poorly equipped to respond. There are direct or indirect food
security dimensions. The report provided recommendations for a provision of a US$10
billion window to finance global public goods; additional financing of sustainable infra-
structure at about US$200 billion annually; concessional lending of at least US$25 billion
annually; crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction for rapid response and short-
run humanitarian needs; and a shareholder-led MDB agenda (Ahluwalia et al. 2016). These
recommendations, however, are not easy to implement in the face of other gaps of global
governance, including a leadership gap, legitimacy gap, efficiency gap, policy coherence gap,
and lack of representativeness, transparency, and political legitimacy (Thakur 2003). We
demonstrate, in the case of the Big Five IOs, how these gaps play out in the next chapter.
¹³ MacKenzie Bezos, the ex-wife of Jeff Bezos, signed the Giving Pledge in 2019, less than two months after
finalizing her divorce (Schleifer 2019).
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Unlike many democratically elected heads of national governments, leaders of IOs are
not directly elected by their members, sometimes not elected at all but rather nominated: for
example, in the case of the World Bank and WFP. The United States nominated three
candidates for WFP to be endorsed by their boards; therefore, such organizations do not
possess primary legitimacy. Representation of governments in IOs is too distant from the
citizenry to effectively transform local rights into international rights and responsibilities, as
in the case of common but differentiated responsibilities in multilateral environmental
agreements, or adherence to the commitments made by the citizens’ governments on trade
rules. Global governance needs to be both more representative and more efficient to address
issues of the legitimacy deficit and decision traps (Lamy 2012).
Challenges of Fairness in Global Governance
Two significant items on the WTO agenda illustrate the point of fairness, particularly
affecting poor countries dependent on food imports. Tackling trade restrictions and remov-
ing distortions in agricultural markets would benefit least developed countries (LDCs) in
achieving the 2030 Sustainable Goal of ending hunger and achieving food security. The US
government provided US$14 billion in trade-distorting agricultural domestic support in
2014; China provided US$18 billion in equivalent support in 2010, and reported US$14
billion in 2012 (ICTSD 2017b). For well over a decade, reform of cotton subsidies in
wealthier nations has been a central negotiating demand of LDCs from four West African
countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali—known collectively as the Cotton 4
(ICTSD 2016). Three dozen of the 48 LDCs are WTO members, with another 8 negotiating
to join the organization. The Ministerial Meeting of WTO in Argentina in December 2018
did not make much progress, as we discussed in Chapter 3.
Building Consensus: Formal and Informal Governance—International
Responses since the 2007 Crisis and Their Rationale
Governance takes place through consensus building, reaching agreements, and taking
concerted action to tackle identified problems. The 2007–8 food and financial crises,
discussed in Chapter 3, provoked the concern that price volatility was here to stay, leading
to a dizzying number of initiatives to address issues of food security and vulnerability of the
poor to food shortages and price spikes (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.3). The sheer number of
initiatives, which ensued after the 2007–8 food and financial crises, are shown in Box 5.4.
What Were the Outcomes of These Initiatives?
Food security returned to the front burner while price instability remained an issue: that is,
from 2008 to 2012 (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3 in Chapter 3 of this volume). There were some
important investment commitments: for example, the G8 (L’Aquila) investment of US$22
billion over three years (IIF 2009); the multilateral food security program (Global Food
Security Program) (GAFSP 2018); and bilateral initiatives (Elliott and Dunning 2016; Feed
the Future 2020); as well as the near doubling of funding for CGIAR, but only until 2014—
funding stagnated again; establishment of an Agricultural Market Information System in
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Box 5.4 International Initiatives in Response to the Food and
Financial Crises
In chronological order, these initiatives fall into three phases: (1) the immediate post-
crisis period; (2) 2010–14, when volatility appeared to return; and (3) 2015 and the post-
2015 period. The initiatives fall into several different categories, for example:
(I) 30 initiatives related to global food security:
(A) 17 in the immediate post-crisis period, including the:
(1) UN Secretary General’s High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis,
2008;
(2–3) Two G8 summits (Japan, 2008; and L’Aquila Food Security Initiative [AFSI],
2009);
(4–6) Three G20 Conferences (Washington, 2008; London, 2009; and Pittsburgh,
2009);
(7) Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP);
(8) Reform of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), 2009;
(9) World Food Summit (Rome, 2009);
(10) Renewed Efforts against Child Hunger and Undernutrition (REACH), 2008;
(11) World Economic Forum’s (WEF’s) New Vision for Agriculture (NVA);
(12–13) Two sessions of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)
(New York, CSD-16, 2008, and CSD-17, 2009);
(14) Special Meeting of UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on Global Food
Crisis (New York, 2008);
(15–16) Two FAO conferences (2008): a. High-Level Conference on “World Food
Security: The Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy,” and b. Thirty-fifth (Special)
Session (Rome); and
(17) Madrid High-Level Meeting on Food Security for All (2009)
(B) 9 initiatives in 2010–14, involving the:
(1) Food Security Cluster (2010);
(2) Save Food (2011);
(3) Global Food Safety Partnership (GFSP) (2011);
(4) Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) (2011);
(5) G20 Agriculture Ministers on Action Declaration entitled “Food Price Volatility
and Agriculture” (Paris, 2011);
(6) Two G20 Presidencies (Cannes, 2011; Cabos, 2012) after the global food shortage
and price spikes, with concerns that price instability was here to stay;
(7) AgResults (2012);
(8) Zero Hunger Challenge (2012); and
(9) Think.Eat.Save (2013).
(C) 4 initiatives in the 2015 and the post-2015 period, involving the:
(1–2) Two G20 Agriculture Ministers (China, 2016; Germany, 2017);
(3) United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development
(Habitat III) (Quito, Ecuador, 2016); and
(4) Milan Urban Food Policy Pact (2016).
(II) 6 initiatives related to global nutrition-related initiatives:
(A) 3 initiatives in the 2010 to 2014 period, involving the:
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(1) Scaling Up Nutrition Movement (SUN) (2010);
(2) Nutrition for Growth (N4G) Summit (London, 2013);
(3) Second International Conference on Nutrition (ICN2) (Rome, 2014).
(B) 3 initiatives in the 2015 and the post-2015 period, involving the:
(1) “Power of Nutrition” (2015), a new fund;
(2) Global Financing Facility (GFF) (2015) in support of “EveryWoman Every Child”;
and
(3) G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration (2015) restated as the 2015 Schloss Elmau G7
commitment to “lift 500 million people in developing countries out of hunger and
malnutrition by 2030.”
(III) 7 environmental initiatives related to climate change, and to reducing defor-
estation and degradation:
(A) 2 initiatives in the immediate post-crisis period:
(1) Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) (2007);
REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing
Countries) (2010); and
(2) The Green Economy Initiative (GEI) (2008).
(B) 3 initiatives in 2010–14:
(1) FAO coined the concept of Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) (Hague, 2010);
(2) CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security
(CCAFS) (2010); and
(3) The Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture (GACSA) (2014).
(C) 2 initiatives in the 2015 and the post-2015 period:
(1) UN Climate Change Conference (COP21)/The Paris Accord (2015); and
(2) UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) COP22 (Bab Ighli,
Marrakech, Morocco 2016).
(IV) 3 bilateral aid initiatives:
(A) 1 initiative in the immediate post-crisis period:
(1) The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) agreement (2008)
(B) 2 initiatives in 2010–14:
(1) Feed the Future (2010); and
(2) 1,000 Days (2010).
(V) 3 financial sector reforms and reform of the agricultural derivatives markets to
curtail excessive speculation in the financial and commodity markets in the 2010–14
period:
(A) Basel III (2011);
(B) Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010); and
(C) Understanding and coping with food markets volatility towards more stable world
and EU food systems (ULYSSES Project) (2013).
(VI) Global initiatives in the 2015 and the post 2015 period, include:
(A) Sustainable Development Goals (2015);
(B) Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2015);
(C) Paris Accord on Climate change in December 2015;
(D)World Humanitarian Summit (Istanbul 2016) brought some of these to culmination;
(E) More than 60 governments of developed and developing countries, committed to
a record US$75 billion replenishment for the International Development Association
Continued
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FAO (AMIS 2015), and zero hunger being etched into SDGs (UN 2020d; UN News 2012).
(See a list of international initiatives since 2007 in Table A.5.1.) Nutrition came to the center
stage on a global agenda through a concerted effort by the international nutrition commu-
nity, via publications in Lancet (2008, 2011, 2013, 2015) and advocacy. In Africa, too, food
and nutrition arrived at the center stage in Africa’s Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP) program with a commitment to invest 10 percent of
government expenditures on agriculture (OSAA 2020).
Since then, quite separately, IDA’s capital was replenished by IDA donors in 2018 with a
US$75 billion capital increase (IDA 2020b). This was followed by the capital increase of the
World Bank Group, endorsed by its shareholders in April 2018, an ambitious package of
measures that include a US$13 billion paid-in capital increase, a series of internal reforms,
and a set of policy measures that could potentially strengthen the Bank Group’s ability to
scale up resources and deliver on its mission in areas of the world that need assistance the
most (World Bank 2018).
The package agreed to by the Development Committee of the Board of Governors
consists of US$7.5 billion paid-in capital for the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD) and US$5.5 billion paid-in capital for IFC, through both general
and selective capital increases, as well as a US$52.6 billion callable capital increase for IBRD.
Potentially, the capital available to the World Bank Group can greatly increase the overall
investment of international institutions in food and agriculture both directly and indirectly,
by leveraging private capital in a way that did not occur much through the various interna-
tional initiatives beyond the 2007 food crisis, as discussed previously. The opportunities
offered by the Bank group’s capital increase are discussed in Chapter 6 on the governance
of the five IOs. In the meantime, however, the President of theWorld Bank Group, Jim Yong
Kim resigned, and he was replaced unanimously by David Malpass on April 9, 2019. Devesh
Kapur (2019), notes a “growing clamor . . . to eliminate the traditional arrangement in which
the US picks the World Bank president and Europeans choose the managing director of the
IMF.” He further notes, “there was almost no opposition . . . to Trump’s selection of David
Malpass to lead the World Bank, nor to Kristalina Georgieva’s nomination to succeed
Christine Lagarde at the IMF. This lack of pushback does not necessarily bode well for either
institution. It signals resignation, foreshadowing the rise of other institutions.”
Local Participation
Local participation is promoted to achieve a variety of goals, including better poverty
targeting, improved service delivery, expansion of livelihood opportunities, and
Box 5.4 Continued
(IDA18), for the poorest countries in 2016, and followed it up with US$82 billion IDA19
replenishment in 2019.
Various regional and national initiatives, and numerous web-based initiatives on
“how-to” in each of these areas have proliferated. They are too numerous to list, but
are included as an illustration of the emergent tools of the digital revolution.
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strengthening demand for good governance. In a quite different methodological approach
to that pursued by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011), Mansuri and Rao (2013) have
explored the issues of decentralization and community participation, perhaps the most
thoroughly over a number of years, basing their research on World Bank projects of
CDD. By 2004, when they published their first paper, the World Bank had committed US
$7 billion to community-based development (CBD) or CDD, or to social funds. In a
systematic review of this early portfolio, they noted a dearth of well-designed evaluations
of CDD projects (Mansuri and Rao 2004). The quantitative and qualitative evidence from
studies published in peer-reviewed publications or conducted by independent researchers,
however, showed that projects that rely on community participation have not been partic-
ularly effective at targeting the poor. Some CBD/CDD projects created effective community
infrastructure, but not a single study established a causal relationship between any outcome
and participatory elements of a CBD project. Most CBD projects are dominated by elites
and, in general, the targeting of poor communities, as well as project quality, tend to be
markedly worse in more unequal communities. A number of studies found a U-shaped
relationship between inequality and project outcomes, highlighting a distinction between
potentially “benevolent” forms of elite domination and the more pernicious types of
“capture,” important for understanding project dynamics and outcomes. Lele found a
similar phenomenon in her study of Cooperatives and the Poor (Lele 1981). Whereas elite
capture was pervasive, several examples could be found of a paternalistic approach to
assisting the poor: for example, in Dr. Verghese Kurien’s dairy development in India.
Mansuri and Rao (2013, 1) emphasized the need for a well-designed monitoring and
evaluation systems, a question discussed later in Chapter 8 on theWorld Bank. Mansuri and
Rao (2013), at a time when the World Bank had committed US$75 billion to community-
based projects, noted the process was “still driven more by ideology and optimism than by
systematic analysis, either theoretical or empirical” (Mansuri and Rao, 2013, 3). The
researchers provided a theoretical framework of the factors underlying social failure.
Mansuri and Rao (2013) argued that whereas government and market failure are now
widely recognized, there is less recognition of civil society failure at the local level, in which
villages and municipal townships, drawing on a common, pooled resource, are unable to act
collectively to reach feasible and preferable outcomes. Their findings help explain why the
results of governance and performance, as presented here, suggest that East Asian countries
perform better on economic growth and social indicators, as compared to SA countries.
Voice and accountability is more present in SA, but government effectiveness is weaker. Lele
observed a similar phenomenon in the case of performance in water management between
China and India (GWP 2013).
Effective collective action is usually conditioned by a “cooperative infrastructure.” It
presupposes functional state institutions and is likely to be far more challenging in the
absence of such institutions. Furthermore, while empowering civic groups may often lead to
good outcomes, it is not clear that inducing civic empowerment is always superior to a pure
market-based strategy, or a state-based strategy that strengthens the role of central bureau-
crats. Participants in civic activities tend be wealthier, more educated, of higher social status
(by class and ethnicity), male, and more politically connected than nonparticipants. Other
World Bank projects have noted a similar phenomenon: for example, the projects in
Andhra Pradesh (IEG 2008). This may reflect, to a degree, the higher opportunity cost of
participation for the poor. However, it also appears that regardless of incentives to partic-
ipate, the poor often benefit less from participatory processes absolutely, even though they
may benefit more proportionately.
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Democratic decentralization reduces the scope for capture, and community participation
improves the quality of infrastructure. Much depends on the nature of electoral incentives,
however, and the capacity of higher levels of government to provide oversight and to ensure
downward accountability. Capacity also matters. As with participatory projects, more
remote, more isolated, and less literate localities tend to do worse. Donors or NGOs alone
cannot substitute for a nonfunctional state as a higher-level accountability agent. Induced
participatory interventions work best when they are supported by a responsive state.
Appendix
Table A.5.1 International responses since the 2007 crisis
Initiatives Established/launched Web link
Food security-related initiatives
1 UN Secretary-General’s HLTF on
the Global Food and Nutrition
Security Crisis: 23 members,
including UN specialized agencies,
FAO, OECD, WFP, WHO, and the
World Bank; leadership by UN
Secretary-General and FAO
Director General




2 Zero Hunger Challenge: Led by UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon
and supported by UN System
participants, non-UN participants,
and UN departmental participants,
including WHO, WTO, World
Bank, DPI (Investment Centre
Division, FAO), UN Department of
Economic and Social Affairs
(DESA), and Think.Eat.Save and
supported by FAO, IFAD, WFP,




Moon at Rio+20 on June 21,
2012
https://www.un.org/zerohunger/




May 5–16, 2008, New York
https://sustainabledevelopment.
un.org/intergovernmental/csd16




May 4–15, 2009, New York
https://sustainabledevelopment.
un.org/intergovernmental/csd17
5 Special Meeting of ECOSOC on
Global Food Crisis





6 High Level Conference on World
Food Security: The Challenges of
Climate Change and Bioenergy
June 3–5, 2008, Rome http://www.fao.org/foodclimate/
conference/en/
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8 Madrid High Level Meeting on
Food Security for All











10 G8 Summit, L’Aquila Food Security
Initiative (AFSI), Italy: US$22
billion pledged over 3 years.
Endorsed by leaders of 26 countries
and 15 organizations, including the
HLTF, CFS, FAO, WFP, World
Bank, and CGIAR.
July 8–10, 2009 http://iif.un.org/content/laquila-
food-security-initiative
11 GAFSP: Supervised by the World
Bank and resource allocation
managed by an external Steering
Committee. Works in partnership
with AfDB, ADB, FAO, Inter-
American Development Bank,
IFAD, World Bank, and
WFP. Allocated approximately US
$1.4 billion to 30 LICs since its
establishment in 2010.
September 2009, emerged as
a multilateral mechanism to
assist in the implementation
of pledges made by G20 in
Pittsburgh
http://www.gafspfund.org/
12 Reform of the CFS: Advisory
group—FAO, WFP, IFAD, BMGF,
HLTF, HLPE, and other private,
research, philanthropic, and
financial institutions.
October 2009, High Level
Panel of Experts on Food
Security and Security
(HLPE), created as essential
part of CFS
http://www.fao.org/cfs/en/
13 The World Food Summit: “Five
Rome Principles for Sustainable
Global Food Security” adopted
November 16–18, 2009 http://www.fao.org/wsfs/wsfs-
list-documents/en/
14 REACH: established by FAO,
UNICEF, WFP, and WHO to assist
governments of countries with a
high burden of child and maternal
undernutrition, to accelerate the
scale-up of food and nutrition
actions. IFAD later joined REACH,
extending an advisory role at the
global level.
2008, with memorandum of
understanding signed




15 WEF’s New Vision for Agriculture:
Led by a Project Board selected
from the World Economic Forum’s
Consumer Industries’ Community;
Advisory support from WEF’s
Global Agenda Council on Food
Security, as well as high-level
leaders of industry, government,




16 G20 conferences in Washington November 14–15, 2008 http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/
summits/2008washington.html
Continued
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Table A.5.1 Continued
Initiatives Established/launched Web link
17 G20 conferences in London April 1–2, 2009 http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/
summits/2009london.html
18 G20 conferences in Pittsburgh September 24–5, 2009 http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/
summits/2009pittsburgh.html













21 G20 Agriculture Ministers, France:
Action Declaration entitled “Food
Price Volatility and Agriculture”
June 22–3, 2011, Paris http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/
2011/2011-agriculture-plan-en.
pdf
22 G20 Agriculture Ministers, China:
discussed how G20 members can
promote food security, nutrition,
sustainable agricultural growth,
and rural development worldwide
and contribute to building an
innovative, invigorated,
interconnected, and inclusive world
economy to fully achieve the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable
Development, including
eradicating hunger and extreme
poverty
June 2016, Xi’an http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/
2016/160603-agriculture.html
23 G20 Agriculture Ministers,
Germany: Action Declaration
entitled “Towards Food and Water
Security: Fostering Sustainability,
Advancing Innovation”
January 22, 2017, Berlin http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/
2017/170122-agriculture-en.html
24 Agricultural Market Information
System (AMIS): G20 initiative
emerged out of the food crisis
June 2011 http://www.amis-outlook.org/




promote global food security,
health, and nutrition through the
design and implementation of pull
mechanism pilots. The
governments of Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom, and the
United States, in partnership with
BMGF pledged US$118 million to
establish AgResults through a
Financial Intermediary Fund
operated by the World Bank
Formerly known as the
“Agriculture Pull
Mechanism Initiative,”
mandate for this work
originated at the June 2010
G20 Summit in Toronto.
Renamed as AgResults,
initiative, officially launched
at the G20 Summit in Los
Cabos, Mexico, June 18,
2012.
http://agresults.org/
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Environmental initiatives
26 Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD) and REDD+
REDD was formalized as an
idea at 13th Session of the
Conference of the Parties
(COP13) to UNFCCC in
Bali, 2007, and in 2010, at









28 CGIAR Research Program on
Climate Change, Agriculture and
Food Security (CCAFS): CGIAR
Alliance Centers (Lead:
International Center for Tropical
Agriculture [CIAT]) and the Earth
System Science Partnership (ESSP).
Budget proposal US$63.2 million in
2011 (US$41.4 million from
CGIAR Fund). Partnerships
include government, civil society,
and private sector, such as FAO,
Forum for Agricultural Research in
Africa (FARA), and WFP. Funded




the EU and IFAD.
Officially launched during
the UN climate negotiations
at COP16 in Cancun,
Mexico, on December 4,
2010, and scheduled to run
through 2020
https://ccafs.cgiar.org/
29 The Global Alliance for Climate-
Smart Agriculture (GACSA)
Launched in 2014




30 Scaling Up Nutrition Movement
(SUN): appointed by the UN
Secretary-General in April 2012,
the SUN Lead Group comprises 27
members from government, civil
society, international organizations,
donor agencies, business, and
foundations. Current members
include the executive director of
UNICEF, the Chair of the Board of
Directors, and the Partnership
Council.
September 2010 http://scalingupnutrition.org/
31 Food Security Cluster (FSC): Based
at WFP in Rome and co-led by
FAO and WFP. The Global
Support Team includes FAO, WFP,
international NGOs, Red Cross,
and Red Crescent members.
Funding by Civil Protection and
Humanitarian Aid Operations of
the European Commission
The FSC was formally
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(ECHO), the Protection Standby
Capacity Project (ProCap), the
Gender Capacity Project (GenCap),
UKAid, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Finland, and other donors.
32 Save Food: Introduced by partners
Messe Düsseldorf and FAO
January 27, 2011, Berlin https://www.save-food.org
33 Global Food Safety Partnership
(GFSP): World Bank is facilitating
the establishment of a multi-
stakeholder GFSP to build capacity
in emerging and development
markets, via an open community of
practice and online knowledge-
sharing platform. The GFSP builds
on earlier efforts within the Asia–
Pacific Economic Cooperation






34 Think.Eat.Save: A partnership
between the UNEP, FAO, and
Messe Düsseldorf to eliminate food
waste by promoting action and a
global vision, through an online
knowledge portal, highlighting
initiatives, technical resources, and
encouraging public commitments.




35 Nutrition for Growth (N4G)
Summit was endorsed by 90
stakeholders, including
development partners, businesses,
scientific, and civil society groups,
to beat hunger and improve
nutrition, with a US$4.15 billion
financial commitment.




36 The Second International
Conference on Nutrition (ICN2):
UN endorsement of “Framework
for Action” and launching of UN
Decade of Action on Nutrition
(2016–25) and first Global
Nutrition Report (GNR).
November 19–21, 2014 http://www.fao.org/about/
meetings/icn2/en/
Financial sector reforms and
reform of the agricultural
derivatives markets
37 Basel III June 2011 http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.
htm
38 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection
Act
July 21, 2010 https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-
111publ203.pdf
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39 Understanding and coping with
food markets volatility towards




Recent global initiatives (2015–
present day)
40 Power of Nutrition: A new fund,
aims to unlock US$1 billion to help
millions of children get proper
nutrition and reach their full
potential. The independent fund is
supported by Children’s
Investment Fund Foundation, UBS
Optimus Foundation, the UK’s
DFID, UNICEF, and the World




41 Global Financing Facility (GFF) in
support of “Every Woman Every
Child”: UN, WBG, and
governments of Canada, Norway,
and the United States joined
country and global health leaders to
launch it, announced US$12
billion.
Formally launched at the
Financing for Development
conference in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, July 13–16, 2015.
https://www.
globalfinancingfacility.org/
42 Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs)
September 25, 2015 http://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/






44 Addis Ababa Action Agenda July 13–16, 2015, Ethiopia http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/
ffd3/press-release/countries-
reach-historic-agreement.html
45 World Humanitarian Summit:
Summit generated more than 3,000
commitments to action, launched
more than a dozen new
partnerships and initiatives to turn
the Agenda for Humanity into
meaningful change for the world’s
most vulnerable people.
May 23–4, 2016, Istanbul https://www.agendaforhumanity.
org/summit
46 UN Conference on Housing and
Sustainable Urban Development
(Habitat III)





47 UNFCCC COP22, Marrakech
Climate Change Conference







48 G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration:
The Leaders’ Declaration
highlighted important role that
hunger and malnutrition play
within the Global Goals for
Sustainable Development and
explicitly restated the 2015 Schloss
Elmau G7 commitment to “lift 500
May 26–7, 2016 https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/
000160266.pdf
Continued
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million people in developing
countries out of hunger and
malnutrition by 2030.”
49 IDA18 Replenishment Meeting:
More than 60 governments of
developed and developing
countries, committed to a record
US$75 billion replenishment for







Latin America and Caribbean
50 Hunger-Free Latin America and
the Caribbean (HFLAC):
Secretariat based at FAO and
supported by all countries in the
region. Funded by AECID (Spanish
Agency for International
Development Cooperation)
First launched in 2005 by
Brazil and Guatemala, later
endorsed by all countries in






Cooperation) (APEC Food Safety
Cooperation Forum: co-chaired by
Australia (Food Standards
Australia New Zealand) and China
(General Administration of Quality
Supervision, Inspection and





Conformance in the Hunter




52 Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Integrated Food
Security Framework (AIFS) and
Strategic Plan of Action for Food
Security (SPA–FS): ASEAN
Secretariat and ASEAN Ministers
on Agriculture and Forestry,
potential donor support from FAO,
World Bank, the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI), IFAD,
and Asian Development Bank
(ADB). Support also provided by
ASEAN Development Fund and
ASEAN Foundation.
ASEAN Summit 2009 https://www.asean-agrifood.org/?
wpfb_dl=58
53 Cereal Systems Initiative for South
Asia (CSISA): Led by the
International Maize and Wheat
Improvement Center (CIMMYT)
and implemented jointly with the
International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) and IRRI and
funded by BMGF and USAID.
2009 http://csisa.org/
54 South Asia Food and Nutrition
Security Initiative (SAFANSI)
established as a multi-donor trust
fund by a joint undertaking of the
World Bank, DFID, and AusAID
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55 The King Abdullah Initiative for
Saudi Agricultural Investment
Abroad: joint initiative by the
Government of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and the Saudi private
sector. Saudi private sector is the










56 Food Security through Rural
Development (AUSAID):
partnership led by AusAID works
with Australian agricultural
research organizations,
governments, and civil society, and
CGIAR. A US$464 million global
food security initiative to assist
countries in Asia, Pacific, and
Africa.





57 €1 billion EUFF: the European
Parliament and the Council
adopted a Regulation establishing
the €1 billion “Food Facility,”
which constitutes the main EU
response to the worsening global
food security situation in 2007–8.
Funding channeled through FAO,
the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA), UNICEF, IFAD,
UNDP, the World Bank, and other
country-specific UN agencies.
December 18, 2008 http://www.eubusiness.com/
topics/food/food-facility.01/
58 EU Joint Programming Initiative
on Agriculture, Food Security and
Climate Change (FACCE–JPI):
FACCE–JPI brings together 22
countries committed to building an
integrated European Research Area
addressing interconnected
challenges of sustainable
agriculture, food security, and
impacts of climate change
Permanent governance was
adopted at the Governing




59 Grow Africa: Partnership was
founded jointly by the African




60 Feed Africa: Strategy for
Agricultural Transformation in
Africa (2016–25) by African
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61 The 6th Annual African Green
Revolution Forum, Kenya: Pledged
more than US$30 billion in
investments to increase production,
income, and employment for
smallholder farmers and local
African agriculture businesses over





62 The Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) and the UK’s
DFID signed a first-of-its-kind
Memorandum of Understanding
between the two organizations to
increase coordination and make
their poverty reduction efforts
more effective in Africa and
throughout the world
February 19, 2008 https://www.mcc.gov/news-and-
events/release/release-021908-
dfidmou
63 Feed the Future: US Government’s
initiative
May 2010 https://www.feedthefuture.gov
64 1,000 Days: Launched by US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
then Irish Minister for Foreign
Affairs Micheál Martin, and a
community of global leaders
September 2010 http://thousanddays.org/
National-level initiatives (along with global and regional policy developments, individual countries
initiated significant FSN policy changes in 2016)
France enacted anti-food waste actions and passed a law requiring supermarkets to donate unsold
food.
China announced investments in agriculture of about US$450 billion to increase farm productivity
and improve rural incomes, and outlined plans to reduce its citizens’meat consumption by 50 percent
by 2030.
Malawi launched a new National Agricultural Policy to improve incomes, food security, and nutrition.
The Philippines finalized long-term development plans that include efforts to reduce poverty and to
reach self-sufficiency in rice—the latter, a policy with potential drawbacks.
India continued to expand implementation of its 2013 National Food Security Act, aiming to allocate
subsidized food grains to 800 million people across India’s 36 states.
Web-based initiatives
Global Forum on Food Security
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6
Governance of the “Big Five”
Uma Lele, Brian C. Baldwin, and Sambuddha Goswami
Summary
In this chapter, we outline key issues facing governance of international organizations (IOs)
in the larger context of global governance of food and agriculture, as discussed in Chapter 5,
and specifically, in the context of United Nations (UN) financing. We then discuss issues of
governance of each of the Big Five IOs. We argue that underfinancing of food and
agriculture can be addressed by using World Bank/International Development Association
(IDA) resources differently, which are now exclusively country-directed, despite much
rhetoric about the importance of global and regional public goods as complements to
country assistance. This change will also require a different vision for the organizations
that is more attuned to today’s challenges, with stronger partnerships among them and with
others around this new vision. To understand organizational governance and possibilities of
changes within the organizations, we first need to understand how the organizations were
originally structured and financed; how financing relates to their structure and governance;
and how the formal and informal voices of members are exercised—for example, in the
choice of leadership and the substantive content of what organizations do and how. We also
selectively explore some issues of coordination among the organizations, for instance,
among the Rome-based agencies (RBAs), the World Bank, and CGIAR. We review the
myriad evaluations of IOs, but note that they rarely address the larger strategic issues
concerning the individual organizations or collectively. In Chapter 5, we argued that the
world is undergoverned in relation to the challenges of meeting the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs) confronting climate change, conflict, natural resource degradation,
income inequality, persistent poverty, and growing hunger. Solutions are increasingly
intersectoral and not just agricultural. Important questions going forward are: how have
the Big Five institutions, which we call the operating arms of global governance, responded
to the challenges? Can they be more effective, or is there need to create new institutions and
new funding mechanisms to improve global governance? With greater long-term support,
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) can translate its
guidelines into operations to combat climate change and promote conservation agriculture
and its Codex Alimentarius into food safety. With collaboration with the World Food
Programme (WFP), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the
World Bank, FAO can help move fragile countries into rehabilitation, reconstruction, and
development. CGIAR can use long-term funding, while the World Bank and IFAD can
support the building of delivery systems.
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Governance of the Big Five Organizations
The Big Five—the World Bank Group (WBG), FAO, WFP, CGIAR, and IFAD—have been
key players, the “operating arms” of the global governance of food and agriculture. They are
a subset of a larger, dynamic system of global governance within which they operate, as we
outlined in Chapter 5. They, therefore, provide a glimpse of how global governance works in
practice. An FAO report (2017c, 119–21) spells out the six “salient” characteristics of the
two recent global compacts on SDGs and the Paris Climate Change Accord, with respect to
the governance of food and agriculture:
1. Universal and inclusive nature, involving developing and developed countries, not just
initiatives directed at developing countries, as in the case of the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs). In this new spirit, in October 2017, the World Bank started
publishing numbers on poverty for the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) countries (Silver and Gharib 2017). Angus Deaton (2018)
made a case for direct assistance to the poor population in the United States, much
as the developing countries’ poor have received attention.
2. Bottom-up approach, as countries choose their own indicators to achieve SDGs from
among 232 indicators.¹
3. Greater reliance on domestic resource mobilization, with little or no expectation of new
or additional official development assistance (ODA), except in the case of low-income
countries (LICs). This has important implications for theWorld Bank and IFAD, each
of which have already been moving in the direction of giving their concessional
assistance to LICs.
4. Policy coherence, laterally and vertically: this area has been increasingly challenged,
particularly since President Trump’s election and the Brexit vote. As we have pointed
out earlier, the United States either withdrew explicitly from many international
agreements on trade, climate change, and aid, or effectively shown lukewarm support
for them. Restoring global confidence in the US leadership under the Biden admin-
istration, and particularly its sustainability, is a challenge, given that Trumpism is alive
and well.
5. The “grand bargain”—a term used in two different ways, the first calling for the
increased role of the private sector in financing development (for example, from
billions to trillions) and civil society (through impact financing by those interested
in using financing to achieve social good), and the second arising out of the World
Humanitarian Summit 2016²—namely, more efficiency from implementers of aid in
return for more money from donors.
6. Mutual accountability: the past approach of donor-imposed conditionality is being
replaced bymutual responsibility of recipient countries and donors, each following the
rules for performance. As we have argued elsewhere in this book, donors have
expected developing countries to change their behavior more than they have changed
their own, often explaining their (non)actions in terms of their domestic parliaments
and constituencies.
¹ The revised list of SDG indicators can be found at https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/indicators-list/. The
list includes 232 indicators on which general agreement has been reached. The total number of indicators listed
here is 244, but nine indicators repeat under more than one target.
² See World Humanitarian Summit, Istanbul, Turkey, May 23–4, 2016: http://whsturkey.org
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With the global community’s adoption of the 2030 SDGs and the Climate Change Accord in
2015, the financial resources needed to achieve global development goals have been
recognized to far exceed current official international financial flows. In April 2015, the
World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF) Development Committee published a
report titled “From Billions to Trillions” about the dollars of financing needed to meet the
challenge of promoting inclusive and sustainable growth, reducing poverty and inequality,
and protecting the planet (Development Committee 2015). Multilateral development banks
have proposed to leverage their capital base by borrowing from capital markets to increase
their ability to finance development and catalyze greater private investment in several
different ways: (1) promoting high-quality investment projects; (2) helping mitigate risk
associated with investments; (3) mobilizing resources from and co-investing with tradition-
al investors and through new sources of commercial financing for development; and (4)
developing new financial products to help unlock additional flows (World Bank 2017). The
World Bank is moving to fulfill this promise by courting Wall Street investors, including the
recognition of the trillion-dollar infrastructure financing gap arrived at by consensus
estimates from OECD by the Boston Consulting Group (Maier 2015; Thomas 2018). And
IDA has the mandate to borrow on the capital market against its pledges, but progress has
been slow.
As we have emphasized in previous chapters, investment in agriculture and rural
development is critical to achieving structural transformation. Developing agriculture,
however, increasingly calls for multisectoral investments in education, human and envi-
ronmental health, energy, physical infrastructure, and communications. Underinvestment
is a major impediment to structural transformation, and development is, first and foremost,
the responsibility of the countries themselves, although international assistance can con-
tribute in important ways, as we illustrate later in the book. Policies are often ineffective,
institutions are weak, and appropriate technologies and financing are not easily accessible.
More importantly, there is often underinvestment in research and development (R&D) and
no consensus on key policy and institutional issues among donors and between donors and
recipients. So, it is unclear if weak lending and technical assistance to agriculture and the
rural sectors are a result of weak client country demand and capacity to utilize aid effectively
and expeditiously, or if they are a result of weak supply of donor funds and expertise? How
can the resources be increased and strengthened while also strengthening domestic resource
mobilization, particularly in low-middle-income countries where funding must increasingly
come from domestic resources, and how can aid coordination be increased among donors?
Aid recipients have considered coordination to be “ganging up,” in part, because they have
seen the Bretton Woods institutions as Western-dominated in their governance and
approaches. Where they have more voice, such as in FAO, the institutions have not elicited
strong confidence in donor countries.
So, should such capital be delivered through existing multilateral channels or bilaterally,
or through the creation of new global programs, as has often been done in the health sector?
What should be the balance of assistance between providing global and regional public
goods, as some argue for?³ Clearly, there is scope to achieve both. IOs have the capacity to
address these issues, but the recent trend has been toward a growing share of bilateral aid in
total ODA, with a declining share of multilateral organizations, as we show in Chapter 7 on
³ See, for example, Ahluwalia et al. (2016) and Kanbur (2017), whose argument for more support for global and
regional goods, in part, is owing to their concerns about the growing irrelevance of IOs in providing country
assistance.
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financing. Multilateral banks have followed the principles of the Paris, Accra, Busan, and
Rome Declarations more closely than have bilateral donors (OECD 2019a, 2019b, 2019c,
2019d). Bilateral aid has been described by some as “Trojan multilateralism” (Sridhar and
Woods 2013). By appearing to pay allegiance to country ownership and country priorities,
some argue, bilateral aid “creates ‘the illusion of multilateral intent’ while ‘covertly introdu-
cing bilateral goals’ ”—using multilateral institutions as vehicles for their agendas (Browne
and Cordon [2015, 1], quoting Sridhar and Woods [2013]). This raises the question of how
priorities are determined among sectors, countries, and activities, and whose priorities do
and should external assistance support. This is a particularly tricky issue in the case of
assistance to low-income developing countries, which are eligible for concessional assis-
tance. Typically, they display weak political will to support agriculture and weak capacity to
set their own priorities, and particularly to carry them out, as a comparative study of
Chinese and African development by a group of Chinese scholars documented (Xiaoyun
et al. 2012). This situation implies the need for long-term development assistance to build
capacity; but with some exceptions such as in the development of agricultural research and
education in Asia during the Green Revolution, donors have been less effective in building
capacity and have had increasingly shorter time horizons (Lele and Goldsmith 1989).
This chapter makes the case for multilateralism and continued country assistance,
together with support for global public goods (GPGs). The argument here should also be
seen as complementary to Chapter 7 on financing, wherein we provide evidence that, by and
large, multilateral assistance is more transparent and more effective than bilateral assistance
by several criteria, including: (1) the usefulness of advice (7 of the top 10 ranked by this
criterion are multilateral donors); (2) agenda-setting influence (all of the top 10 are
multilateral donors); (3) that more of their assistance actually is getting transferred to
developing countries; (4) helpfulness, which earns IOs higher ratings in implementation;
and (5) IOs tending to be more selective in terms of countries’ assistance needs. More
multilateral aid goes to low- and lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) than does
bilateral aid. In addition, many of the GPGs cannot be realized without strong national
and subnational capacities to deliver them. One cannot achieve GPGs of peace and security,
contain transboundary spread of diseases, or respond to financial contagion or climate
change, without also achieving those outcomes at the national and subnational levels.
That calls for strong political will and domestic capacity, which many developing countries
still lack.
Yet, the roles of multilateral assistance and the “Big Five” organizations have shrunk, not
just in total capital flows, but as other financial flows have increased, including private
finance, remittances, philanthropy, and South–South cooperation. Even in “official” flows,
the share of multilateral aid has shrunk noticeably, with respect to food and agriculture—
perhaps with the exception of WFP’s share. This is because the need for humanitarian
assistance has been growing more rapidly, in part, because of growing internal conflicts and
climate change, compared to the demand for investment lending in food and agriculture.
This is understandable in countries that are well advanced in structural transformation, but
not in the case of countries at early stages of development.
In this chapter, we focus on the governance of each of the Big Five organizations: how
these operating arms are governed, and how their governance and leadership matter for
their continued relevance and coherence in the areas of food and agriculture, with each
playing to their comparative advantage, as well as collectively. Furthermore, because
governance and finance are closely related in a complex way, we provide an overview of
the financing of the Big Five IOs, as it determines the supply of financial resources available
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to the organizations. Financing also affects the selection of leadership, as well as the abilities
of their top leaders to mobilize resources. Regional banks are not discussed here, because, so
far, they have not been significant players in lending to the agricultural sector, compared to
their global counterparts such as theWorld Bank.⁴However, many of the issues discussed in
this chapter would apply to regional banks, as they expand their development capacity
generally and respond to the needs of agriculture and rural development, particularly some
like the African Development Bank, which has traditionally focused on infrastructure, but
has begun to gear up for expanded lending to agriculture.
Chapter 1 described the activities of the Big Five in general terms. Table A.1.2 in Chapter 1,
and Table A.6.1 in this chapter present their missions, goals, strategic objectives, governance
structures, business models, and funding cycles in greater detail. Chapters 8 through 12
describe their activities as organizations. In reality, there is considerable overlap among
their declared objectives and activities, from their focus on eradication of poverty and hunger
to new technologies and knowledge for farmers to increase productivity, from climate change
mitigation to minimize impacts on food and agriculture to facilitating adaptation and
resilience to climate change, and in addressing gender issues. The World Bank’s focus on
poverty and hunger came in the 1970s under its president, Robert McNamara, well before the
MDGs were initiated in 1990, and the Bank expanded its objective to shared prosperity in
2013. As a multisectoral organization, it is able to address multiple SDGs in food, health, and,
education. Nobel laureate Ronald Coase (in 1991) argued that companies establish their
boundaries on the basis of transaction costs. When the cost of transacting for a product or
service on the open market exceeds the cost of managing and coordinating the incremental
activity needed to create that product or service internally, the company will perform the
activity in-house. Coase also asked when should a firm (in this case, an international
organization) “make” and when should it “buy” services? (Economist 2017). Venkat Atluri,
Miklós Dietz, and Nicolaus Henke (2017), in their paper “Competing in a World of Sectors
without Borders,” noted, as digitization reduces transaction costs, it becomes economically
desirable for companies to contract out more activities, and a richer set of more specialized
ecosystems is facilitated. This should ideally occur across IOs, as it has in the private sector, but
it has not yet happened. There ismuch scope for a new vision to emerge for global architecture,
which enables faster evolution of IOs, so they become stronger complements to each other.
As documented in Chapter 5, as the number of actors has increased and development
agendas have expanded, concerns have grown among development practitioners about
mission creep within each organization: that is, taking on more functions and spreading
activities too thinly, instead of relying on other organizations at the same time that partner-
ships have become an important part of the new lexicon. Proponents of expanding scope
dismiss these concerns and argue that organizations have provided a legitimate response to
the growing complexity of the development processes and interactions among different
aspects of development: for example, climate change and resilience of food systems or food
systems and nutrition. At the same time, with budget cuts, staff retirements, and attrition,
capacity within individual organizations has declined. The overlapping nature of SDGs,
documented in earlier chapters, further illustrates this problem. Cooperation among the five
organizations and with other actors has waxed and waned, in part, because donors have
helped spawn many different aid entities through the use of their trust funds, fostering
⁴ The African Development Bank (AfDB); the Asian Development Bank (ADB); the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) are examples of
regional banks.
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competition rather than cooperation (see McCalla [2007] for the impacts of such prolifer-
ation on FAO). It is also true that effective “supply chains” have not materialized. Organiza-
tions are not turning to each other for services, particularly to those with clearly
demonstrated comparative advantages and efficiency. We cite some examples in this
chapter, to the extent that they involve strategic choices at the level of governance and
financing: for example, whether to give more resources to a multilateral organization or to
rely on bilateral food aid; whether to rely on FAO for technical assistance in the provision of
GPGs, such as statistics, food safety, and control of animal diseases and pests; and whether
to rely on CGIAR for research, and if so, whether CGIAR should be focusing on global and
regional public goods research while expecting national systems to build their own capacity
to be stronger, more effective partners with CGIAR.
Key Financiers of the United Nations System
and International Organizations
Governance and financing of IOs are interrelated in a complex way. IOs depend on their
regular budget, based on assessed contributions in some organizations and trust funds, also
known as voluntary contributions from donors, to supplement their operational activities.
As budgets become increasingly more constrained, reliance on voluntary contributions has
increased. When there are assessed contributions, voluntary contributions supplement
them—in other cases, such as for WFP and CGIAR, their operations depend entirely on
voluntary organizations. Table 6.1 provides information on voting power and financing
shares of the top 10 assessed contributions (excluding trust funds) to the five organizations,
plus the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN System, as a whole. Together,
17 countries plus the European Union, the World Bank, and the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation (BMGF)—in the case of CGIAR—play key roles. If trust funds and voluntary
contributions are included, which constitute 61 percent of FAO’s operational activity, then
the picture changes substantially. FAO’s financing is based on assessed contributions and
voluntary contributions to carry out its program of work. Trust funds are, as their name
suggests, given to FAO to use “in trust” for broad goals. The United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) once was an important contributor to FAO’s trust funds in the 1960s
and 1970s. As we indicate elsewhere, UNDP trust funds to FAO have now declined but
other bilateral funding has increased and is now larger than FAO’s assessed contributions.
In assessed contributions, the United States ranks first among donors for all organiza-
tions, and Japan, second, except for IFAD with lower assessed contributions (and to which
the United States did not formally contribute to in 2018), and for WFP and CGIAR, which
depend entirely on voluntary contributions. In both cases, the United States has been a
major player. In terms of importance of donors, China’s ranking has risen in assessed
contributions to third in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD), WHO, and the UN, ahead of Germany; Germany’s rank is either third or fourth
for all except CGIAR. France ranks either fourth or fifth for all organizations, except WFP
and CGIAR, and particularly, ranks tenth for IFAD. China’s financing has, of course,
expanded substantially outside of these institutions, as shown in chapter 7, dwarfing their
role. The United Kingdom ranks between second and eighth for all organizations. The
European Union is among the top 10 only for WFP (ranking second) and CGIAR (ranking
seventh) (CGIAR 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016b; Wadsworth 2016; CGIAR 2017b; FAO
2017e; UN 2017a; IFAD 2019; WFP 2020a; WHO 2020; World Bank 2020).
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Table 6.1 Ranking of top 10 member countries/donors in (assessed) contributions by their voting powers and voluntary contributions
Member countries/donors By voting power By assessed contributions





IBRD IDA IFC MIGA IFAD FAO WHO UN WFP CGIAR FAO World Bank
Group Trust Fund
United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1
Japan 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 3 6 7 3
China 3 10 10 6 3 3 2
Germany 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 8 4
France 5 5 4 4 10 5 5 6 6
United Kingdom 6 3 5 5 8 6 6 5 4 2 3 2
India 7 7 6 9
Russian Federation 8 7 7 9 9 9
Saudi Arabia 9 6 8 6 9
Italy 10 9 9 2 8 8 7
Canada 8 8 10 7 10 10 10 5 5
Spain
Brazil 7 7 8
European Union 2 7 1 8
United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
(CERF)
7
Sweden 9 8 9
UN Other Funds and Agencies (excl. CERF) 10
Netherlands 5 4 7
World Bank n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 1
Australia 6 10
Switzerland 8 10
Norway 10 9 9
FAO Direct Access to Global Environment Facility
(GEF) Funding
4
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UN–OCHA)
5
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Administered Donor Joint Trust Fund
6
Notes: n.a. means not applicable. The World Bank Group is comprised of IBRD, which lends to governments of middle-income and creditworthy LICs; IDA, which provides interest-free
loans (“credits”) and grants to governments in the poorest countries; the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which promotes foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing
countries and offers political risk insurance (“guarantees”) to investors and lenders; and IFC, which is focused on the private sector, mobilizing capital and providing advisory services (see
“About the World Bank,” http://www.worldbank.org/en/about).


























When voluntary contributions are considered, however, in the case of the World Bank and
FAO, then the European Union is important. The European Union ranked first for FAO and
eighth for the World Bank Group Trust Fund in 2013, the latest year for which data were
available (Toma et al. 2013). From FY09 through FY13, the United States and the United
Kingdom made the largest contributions to WBG trust funds. Over that period, the United
Kingdom was the largest development funder to the IBRD/IDA trust funds, followed by the
United States, the European Union, Australia, and the Netherlands. Together, these five
development funders accounted for almost half of the total cash contributions to IBRD/IDA
trust funds since FY09. The United States remains the largest development funder to financial
intermediary funds (FIFs), both cumulatively over five years and in FY13 (Toma et al. 2013).
Among developing countries other than China, based on assessments, Brazil, India, and
Saudi Arabia are important contributors. CGIAR’s donors are different. CGIAR’s top 10
principal funders in 2017 are BMGF, United Kingdom, United States, the Netherlands, the
World Bank, Australia, European Commission, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway (CGIAR
2017a, 52).
Data provide important insights into the financing of the UN System. The entire UN
System’s and individual organizations’ assessed contributions are provided by a handful of
countries (Figure 5.2), even though their ODA shares in their own gross national income
(GNI) range vary widely, as shown in Figure 5.3 in Chapter 5. With 1.4 percent of its GNI,
Sweden ranks at the top, and with 0.17 percent of its GNI, the United States ranks 22nd. As
we discussed in the preceding chapter on global governance, collective action in a smaller
group of countries has typically been easier, if there are shared objectives, leadership, and
political will. The Group of Twenty (G20), which includes most of the large financiers of the
UN, is another alternative, among others, to achieving long-term reforms and financing of
the UN System and of individual organizations, as discussed later in this chapter. Even
within this smaller group, however, collective action is a challenge. Germany has raised its
aid levels, which may well reach 1 percent of GNI (Cheney 2017). The United States has
been increasingly wary of aid (with a misperception in the public about how much larger a
share of US GNI goes to aid, compared to the reality of 0.18 percent), as well as of nation
building, even in countries in conflict, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where the United
States has engaged in the conflict, contributing to a hornet’s nest of secondary collateral
damage with global spillovers in refugees and terrorism. Given this larger context of global
governance, how can the Big Five remain relevant and increase their effectiveness for an
increasingly more complex agenda, where humanitarian assistance interacts with develop-
ment needs and where sectoral silos are breaking down, as discussed in the previous chapter
on governance? Or will they witness a slow decline, owing to the failure of their members
and governance to respond to changing needs? With the level of instability and uncertainty
in the world in 2020, it seems that IOs are needed more than ever. Yet, whether and how the
Biden–Harris victory will report to multilateral institutions remains unclear.
In the pursuit of global poverty reduction, a Brookings study noted that a minority of
about 30 countries risk being left behind, both in terms of their levels of deprivation and in
the way that global progress is accounted for.⁵ This risk suggests that the “leave-no-one-
behind” principle on which the SDGs are built, originally intended to draw attention to
⁵ Countries at most risk for being left behind include: Afghanistan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central
African Republic, DR Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, DPR Korea,
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, South
Sudan, St. Lucia, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Yemen, and Zambia (Chandy 2017, table 1, 7).
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marginalized groups—ethnic, tribal, or religious minorities, or the disabled—might equally
be applied to countries. It calls for new efforts to ensure these countries are not ignored and
for further policy and implementation research that could help raise their performance.
With this background, we now turn to the issues of governance faced in each of the five IOs.
The World Bank Group
WBG is the largest public lender to developing countries and to agriculture and the rural
sector. Lending to the rural sector has been larger than to agriculture. With the multidi-
mensional nature of rural poverty, it makes sense to support other complementary sectors
to agriculture, including health, education, social safety nets, and infrastructure, to increase
returns to agriculture.
Two opposite points of view prevailing on the future role of the World Bank have been
resolved for the time being with the approval of a long-awaited general and selective capital
increase (SCI) by the Development Committee, the ministerial platform which effectively
constitutes the governance of the Bretton Woods institutions. A financial package of a US
$13 billion paid-in capital increase, consisting of US$7.5 billion for the International Bank
for IBRD and US$5.5 billion for the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of WBG, was
agreed to at the April 2018 Spring Meetings of IMF and WBG (World Bank 2018).
A pleasantly surprising development, given the reluctance of the Trump administration
to approve a capital increase, the “transformative package” consists of capital measures as
well as fundamental institutional and financial reforms for IBRD and IFC (Development
Committee 2018, 1). A conservative Meltzer Commission, with whose views the Trump
administration was aligned, had argued that the Bank should phase out of countries that
have access to international capital markets. Rather, the Bank should (1) supply global
goods, such as the elimination of tropical diseases or improvements in tropical agriculture;
(2) promote economic and social development, using an incentive-based system that
subsidizes institutional reform and gives incentives for maintaining reforms; and (3) use
grants instead of loans to improve the quality of life in the poorest countries by inoculating
children, providing sanitary sewers, bringing potable water to the villages, and in other
ways.⁶ The Commission proposed that the grants would be paid directly to contractors, on
evidence of completion furnished by independent auditors. Grants would bypass corrupt
governments; auditing results would improve performance (Meltzer 2000).
With the phasing out of development bank loans to middle-income countries (MICs)
that have access to private international capital markets, the focus on grants and highly
subsidized loans to poor countries implied that, within a few years, the vast bulk of the
development banks’ assistance would take the form of nonrepayable disbursements, essen-
tially closing the operations of IBRD (Mikesell 2001).
More expansive views of the World Bank’s continued roles were proposed by Ahluwalia
et al. (2016) and Zedillo (2009) and are discussed later in this chapter. Before we turn to
specific organizations, however, we first describe the financing of the UN System for a larger
context in which the five IOs operate. We note the precarious financial role of the UN
System as a whole and the towering role of the United States in it.
From a structural transformation perspective, the unique strength of WBG among
development banks is its ability to provide the full menu of services and support, ranging
⁶ See Scott Morris (2018a) on US National Security Advisor John Bolton’s view of the multilateral system.
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from customized global knowledge, analytics, and technical assistance to financing and
implementation support, to convening of partnerships and crowding in contributions from
diverse partners from the public and private sectors.
The establishment of the World Bank has been one of the important innovations of the
20th century (Ahluwalia et al. 2016). The final IDA19 replenishment of US$82 billion for
fiscal years 2021–3, in December 2019, in Stockholm; the IDA19 replenishment represents a
3 percent increase in real terms compared to IDA18 (IDA 2020). Among the Bank’s recent
achievements was the largest replenishment ever approved for July 1, 2017 to June 30, 2020
in December 2016 (World Bank 2016; IDA 2017). Scott Morris (2018b) of the Center for
Global Development (CGD) made five observations about the Development Committee’s
approval of the 2018 capital increase:
(1) It will enable the Bank Group to be a leader on climate finance, and more broadly,
support GPGs, which CGD’s 2016 High Level Panel on the Future of Multilateral
Development Banking also recommended (Ahluwalia et al. 2016). Climate-related
shares of IBRD’s and IFC’s portfolios will rise, and all bank projects will be screened
for climate risks. For GPGs, more generally, the agreement will modestly increase
IBRD’s annual income to GPGs.
(2) It will introduce “the principle of price differentiation based on country income
status, with higher income countries paying more than the bank’s other borrowers,”
enabling additional revenues to be generated for the Bank. This approach will help
the Bank to ask more from countries that have less financing need.
(3) The package will enable “IBRD’s overall lending portfolio to channel 70 percent
of the bank’s resources to countries with per capita incomes below $6,895 and
30 percent to countries above this so-called ‘graduation threshold.’ ” An additional
good feature of this new package is that these targets would not affect crisis lending.
China’s access to World Bank loans will not be affected in the short run, “though
over time, as more countries join the higher income category, the 30 percent share
will be allocated across more borrowers.”
(4) The package also identifies “a new financial framework that requires greater disci-
pline when it comes to tradeoffs between lending volumes, loan pricing, and the
bank’s administrative budget.”
(5) Finally, even while encouraging “greater differentiation [in the treatment] among
countries, it reaffirms the World Bank’s commitments to stay engaged with all its
client countries, including China.” There are no new proposals for graduation of
MICs of the sort the United States has made before. Among current borrowers, the
decision to graduate from assistance is expected to be theirs to make (Morris 2018b).
(6) A global coalition of development partners agreed on a historic US$82 billion
financing package for IDA (IDA 2020).
The “graduation,” particularly of India, the largest recipient of IDA, together with
Vietnam and Sri Lanka, has freed large sums of resources for IDA to lend to other LICs,
which are far smaller and/or have far less absorptive capacity than India did in its
heyday of receipt of IDA assistance. IDA graduation has also created new opportunities
for assistance outside IDA-eligible countries—for example, in support of migrants
in Middle Eastern countries, such as Jordan and Lebanon in support of refugees—as
the number of IDA-eligible countries has shrunk (Lele, Goswami, and Nico 2017;
Manning 2017).
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When IDA resources in the 1980s could not meet demand, based on the threshold for
IDA eligibility established in 1964, IDA ceased to lend to countries at the upper end of
the income scale, creating a second lower operational cutoff. The IDA cutoff in 1989 was
18 percent of the global GNI and 13 percent in 2013. Without this cutoff, its nominal value
would have been 44 percent higher. More countries would have been eligible for IDA had
the cutoff not been lowered over time to reduce IDA eligibility and graduate countries out of
IDA to IBRD more rapidly (Lele, Goswami, and Nico 2017). Under IDA18, the Bank
proposes to borrow against IDA, a step which Kapur and Raychaudhuri (2014) and
Morris (2014) have argued has the potential not only to expand capital available to IDA-
eligible developing countries, but also to transform the Bank from its historical dependence
on the United States, with its virtual veto power, as described subsequently in this chapter.
Most of the World Bank capital for the loans to developing countries on near
commercial terms and to other development banks is obtained from the sale of the
bonds on world capital markets, while capital subscribed by member governments to
the development banks constitutes a guarantee provided against default to the private
holders of the bonds. As Keynes anticipated in 1944, this is a convenient way for
member/developed countries to provide economic assistance to developing countries
and share risk broadly (see Kanbur [2017] for the history of the Bank). Furthermore,
their capital subscriptions are not disbursed or recorded in national budgets. The
development banks currently rely on the interest and principal repayments of existing
loans for financing new loans.
Concessional assistance, such as through IDA, comes from periodic replenishments of
sovereign governments, an approach which provides stability and predictability to assis-
tance, unlike the case of WFP and CGIAR, which depend entirely on voluntary contribu-
tions; FAO, which depends on voluntary contributions for a more than half of its resources;
or most recently, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), established
in 2010 in response to the 2007 food crisis as a self-standing program to minimize
competition from other sectors for the limited IDA allocations, thereby, making more
resources available to agriculture. Unlike IDA, the size and predictability of GAFSP
replenishments has been a challenge. Demand for GAFSP resources exceeds supply, but
unlike IDA, GAFSP is accessible to only a limited number of countries. A combination of
the IDA18 replenishment, graduation of IDA countries, and GAFSP’s financial challenges
raise questions about whether the GAFSP model is scalable going forward or whether the
well-established IDA should be reformed and made more flexible to introduce some of the
features that GAFSP has adopted, such as greater inclusion of civil society and the private
sector. IFC addresses these latter issues. (GAFSP 2009, 2015, 2018).
Three-year replenishments to IDA and GAFSP provide the stability and predictability to
their operations, and yet, there are plenty of opportunities for the contributing donors to
review their performance and suggest refinements. We argue that similar funding arrange-
ments need to be adopted in the cases of CGIAR, FAO, and WFP.
Evolution of the World Bank
Not only has the World Bank’s relative role in financing declined, compared to the past,
three important changes in multilateral assistance have also taken place: (1) a change in
the tone and interaction with client countries from being supply driven (during the
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McNamara era)⁷ to being demand driven, with client countries savvier than in the past, and
in many cases, more experienced in the business of development than the Bank staff,
particularly in high-income and middle-income countries—with an emphasis on country
assistance strategies based on country dialogue and ownership, both on levels and allocation
among sectors; (2) greater focus on results, relative to the past; and (3) increased reliance on
trust funds to supplement stagnant or declining regular administrative budgets. In reality,
the demand-driven concept is complicated. Typically, finance ministries negotiate country
assistance with the World Bank’s country directors. Sector ministries have weak voice vis-à-
vis ministries of finance and are not always consulted in determining the allocation of
resources. The same applied to project staff located in Global Practices, since changed, in the
World Bank. Project staff and countries’ sectoral ministries have considerable freedom in
designing projects, working with their counterparts in developing countries, once the
lending program is agreed upon, but not in the allocation of Bank resources among sectors.
Given the limited IDA allocations per country, even after adjusting IDA eligibility criteria,
as mentioned previously, demand for investment lending for food and agriculture from
client countries has been weak, relative to the demand for infrastructure, education, or
health, and unlike when the World Bank established targets for lending to the agricultural
and rural sectors during McNamara’s leadership. This poses a dilemma. Agricultural
development is increasingly recognized to be a result of investments in other related sectors:
for example, infrastructure, which determines market access education, and which influ-
ences the ability to adopt complex technologies and health resources, which in turn affect
the quantity and quality of the labor supply. Resources committed by the World Bank,
details of which are found in Chapters 7 and 8, provide evidence of the revealed preferences
of client countries. Furthermore, as countries have more domestic resources to invest, the
transaction costs of borrowing from the Bank may not seem worth the return. That was
certainly the concern of China, leading to a call for addressing the high cost of doing
business with the World Bank. Often these costs have been in the form of addressing the
Bank’s multiple safeguards and inspection panels, independent complaint mechanisms for
people and communities who believe they have been, or are likely to be, adversely affected
by World Bank-funded projects. Thus, the increased voice of developing countries does not
seem to have led to increased demand for World Bank lending to agriculture and rural
development. Taken together, factors determining commitments to a sector include overall
country allocations, policy environment, competing demands from other sectors, the rate of
disbursements (agriculture tends to be a slower disbursing sector compared to infrastruc-
ture), and the ability to implement projects that together determine commitments to a
sector. This situation could well change for the better in the future, based on what was
agreed to at the 2018 Spring Meetings:
• The Development Committee, the ministerial forum of WBG and IMF, approved a
capital increase of US$13 billion for IBRD of US$7.5 billion and IFC of US$7.5 billion
“to deliver development results more effectively while becoming more financially
sustainable and efficient” (World Bank 2018).
• An additional innovation of IDA18 replenishment of US$75 billion, the World Bank’s
IDA fund for the poorest countries, was to leverage those resources in the capital
market. It issued an inaugural bond that raised US$1.5 billion from investors around
⁷ See Chapter 8 for the World Bank during the presidency of Robert McNamara.
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the world in mid-April 2018. At the Spring Meetings, WBG President Jim Yong Kim
stated, “IDA’s entry to the global capital markets is historic—the latest transforma-
tional shift in how we approach development finance,” adding that “IDA will be able to
dramatically scale up financing to help countries meet the 2030 development goals,
and deliver greater value to shareholders” (World Bank 2018).
• The power of the World Bank Board may be overestimated. The Board rarely blocks
anything. The Board has little influence ex ante over strategic or tactical decisions
made by staff—and not much influence ex post either.
• Funding allocations are made consultatively with countries, but in rather superficial
ways, dominated by countries’ Ministries of Finance and World Bank Country Man-
agement Units (CMUs). Both sector staff in the Bank and Ministries in countries
complain that there is often no clear vetting of priorities among sectors and examina-
tion of trade-offs. One explanation often offered for the establishment of GAFSP after
the 2007 financial crisis, as discussed in Chapter 5, was that the agricultural sector
often could not compete with other sectors for IDA monies. Power resides with the
CMUs, so holistic perspective is possible in principle, but technical depth is often not
deep in allocation decisions (and the bias is toward country level, not GPGs or
continental levels).
• In view of intersectoral competition, the World Bank sectoral units have relatively little
power over allocations, but the Task Team Leaders (TTLs) typically have almost total
control over project design, working with client counterparts. This is why the TTL’s
role in the Bank has traditionally been the most creative and satisfying, particularly
when borrowers are interested and committed.
• World Bank instruments make it hard for the World Bank to lead on GPGs, or on
continental or regional public goods (although, where there is funding or initiative
from the World Bank, many partners are still willing to be convened by the World
Bank and to follow and rely on its technical leadership). The very limited nature of
grant-making instruments makes it very difficult for the World Bank to lead on global
or regional public good issues for which it would otherwise have a lot to offer. Grants
are preferable in this respect to loans or IDA credits, as governments who are part of a
regional project have to agree to pay back their portion.
• World Bank technical depth is rapidly deteriorating and needs to be strengthened if its
role in GPGs is to be sustained or strengthened; sectors need to be given more power
within the World Bank.
• Collaboration with other agencies is possible and encouraged (at least in rhetoric from
management). It requires individual initiative, however, as scarce resource envelopes
and time constraints do not facilitate such collaborative efforts.
Would Greater Voice for Developing Countries Increase Demand for
Resources for Rural Transformation? External Independent Assessments
The World Bank’s governance reforms since the financial crisis of 2007–8 have marginally
increased the voice and shares of developing countries and have been influenced by the
external independent assessment of the World Bank’s governance by Ernesto Zedillo,
former President of Mexico, who was commissioned by WBG President Zoellick, with a
panel of international experts (2007–12) (Linn 2009; Zedillo 2009). The reforms have
helped the United States agree to increase the IBRD’s capital base. More reforms are
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anticipated, but some of them could also be counterproductive and increase politicization of
the Bank. For example, the United States is opposed to lending to China and other MICs,
and under Trump, did not support the Bank’s climate action. With Biden’s 2020 election,
the new administration has already announced a Climate Czar and are likely to be very
proactive on climate change. With single borrower limits on large borrowers, both in the
case of IBRD for maintaining the Bank’s creditworthiness and of IDA for increasing access
to all eligible countries, client countries are hesitant to borrow loans for sectors like
agriculture, which tend to be small in size, slow in disbursing, and without many visible
impacts to show in the short run—unlike in the cases of infrastructure, education, or health
investment. The growth of development lending (what was once called program lending or
balance of payments support, albeit for reforms already adopted rather than for conditioned
lending), relative to investment lending, is getting around some of these constraints. The
Zedillo reforms had focused on five issues: (1) the need to change voting shares to accord
greater “voice” for developing countries, as “voice” in governance in the Bretton Woods
institutions is in part determined by the member countries’ share according to their
subscribed capital;⁸ (2) the need for increased capitalization of the Bank; (3) the high cost
of safeguards to developing countries (China, India, and other emerging countries have
stressed the high cost of doing business with the Bank and suggested national safeguards
should be used and improved to come closer to international standards); (4) the need for
shifting the Bank lending to GPGs, to respond to climate change and pandemics and to
promote financial stability; and (5) the recommendation for doing away with the resident
Executive Board, which approves every project, to instead using the finance ministers of
member countries to address longer term strategic issues that the World Bank faces.
The underlying theme of the WBG reforms has been rooted in the discussions of
shareholding structure and voting power, along with the conceptually separate but linked
issue of the size of its capital base, in a shared vision of the role of WBG in the context of the
complex and evolving development landscape. Under SCI, the size, allocation rules, and
other adjustments related to one another will likely change. In 2008 following the financial
crisis, a two-phase package of reforms was initiated by the Bank. Termed “The Voice
Reform,” it had three pillars: (1) voice as shareholding, (2) voice as responsiveness, and
(3) voice as effective representation on the Board, with goals of increasing developing and
transition countries’ (DTCs) share in IBRD to 45.8 percent (and beyond that in IDA)
(Figure 6.1); increasing basic votes marginally, by expanding field presence in sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA); and expanding the Board from 24 to 25 seats, allocating the additional seat
to the SSA region.⁹,¹⁰ From a historical perspective, the Bank’s Board had consisted of
12 members in earlier times, but Bank membership increased from the original 43 to 189
countries in 2017. The expansion reflects both a growing differentiation among member
states, as well as greater importance attached to inclusiveness. Reforms also increased IFC
capital by US$200 million, while also increasing the IFC voting power of DTC members
from 33.41 percent to 39.41 percent, assuring a greater role of diversity in management and
staff for women and developing country nationals.
⁸ For example, in the case of IBRD, each member receives votes consisting of share votes (one vote for each
share of the Bank’s capital stock held by the member), plus basic votes (World Bank 2020).
⁹ The total shift to DTCs in both phases is to 4.59 percentage points, when the current SCI is fully subscribed.
¹⁰ How can a balance be struck between representation and efficiency in decision-making, including the
relationship between the size of the Board and its constituency structure?
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In 2011, the Bank broadened its corporate goal from ending extreme poverty to include
shared prosperity in a sustainable way. Concurrently, a far-reaching reorganization has
brought the World Bank (IBRD and IDA), the IFC, MIGA, and the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under a single umbrella. It is slowly paving the
way for increased public–private partnerships in policy analysis, advice, and lending beyond
IFC’s traditional “deal-making” approach. Due to the breadth of its business, WBG has
more active partnerships with the UN agencies than the agencies often do among them-
selves, including the RBAs, as we discuss at the end of this chapter.
Internal Reforms
Internal reforms brought all technical staff under 13 Global Practices in August 2014, in an
effort to better leverage global knowledge while still maintaining a system of matrix
management—a two-headed animal in which the technical staff reported to their Global
Practice management, as well as to regional management. With the Global Practices, a
different, eternal challenge of silos emerged. For example, the Agriculture Global Practice
had a narrower scope, while irrigation and water, rural development, forestry, biodiversity,
and rural infrastructure were housed in other Global Practices. Beginning in 2019, the Bank,
under President Malpass, abandoned these reforms, with technical staff (and respective
budgets) solely under Regional Management. Global Practices are continuing to ensure
quality in technical expertise, but with greatly reduced staff directly reporting to their
management and severely reduced budgets. It is too early to know if the more fragmented
organization is better suited to the intersectoral/interdisciplinary and multilevel needs: for
example, in effecting productivity growth, while also achieving improved nutrition and
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Figure 6.1 Voting shares
A. IBRD: Voting share by developed and developing and transition countries (as of March 29, 2017) (total number
of votes by 189 countries = 2,350,174)
Source: Based on data from World Bank (2020).
B. IDA: Voting share by developed and developing and transition countries (as of January 31, 2017) (total number
of votes by 173 countries = 26,862,188)
Source: Based on World Bank (2020).
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The proposed periodic Shareholding Reviews are a way to address issues of voice, a way
for the World Bank to maintain legitimacy and dynamism, and to reflect global economic
changes in IBRD and IFC shareholding, as occurred in the context of the SCI.
Voice and Shareholder Influence
The US voting shares stood at 15.4 percent in 2017, still the largest in the Bank after the
latest reforms, compared to 35 percent at the Bank’s inception in 1945. The United States
has an effective veto power on all policies of importance to the institution, including the
Bank’s capitalization (Gwin 1997; Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997). According to the
Bretton Woods Project (2016): “Votes on substantive issues need 85 percent approval,
granting the US (with its 16.46 percent quota) effective veto power over any major
decisions.” Most decisions are made by consensus, and formal votes are rarely taken,
but through bilateral consultations between the shareholders and Bank management,
the wishes of major shareholders are often accounted for before matters come to the
Executive Board for consideration. Substantial literature exists that suggests, since
the World Bank’s establishment, the US government has used the World Bank to serve
its strategic interests in variety of ways, including with membership and in the way veto
power has been exercised formally, barring countries, such as Nicaragua, Vietnam, Iran,
and Zimbabwe, from receiving World Bank assistance (Toussaint 2014). The United
States’ Executive Director is one of five appointed by major shareholders: that is,
individual member countries (in line with the Articles). The remaining shareholders are
elected by countries, after forming constituencies. While initially opposed to the idea of
trust funds, the United States has become the largest contributor to the Afghanistan Trust
Fund and other trust funds, as multilateral organizations can achieve certain bilateral
objectives more effectively than bilaterals (Kharas 2007, 2008, 2009; Birdsall and Kharas
2010; Isenman and Shakow 2010; DFID and UK Aid 2011; Isenman 2011, 2012; Kanbur
and Sumner 2012; DFID and UK Aid 2013; Custer et al. 2015; DFID and UK Aid 2016;
Gulrajani 2016).
The concentration of economic power makes such influence inevitable but also strength-
ens ownership of those who have power. The top 25 member states in IBRD contribute
73.5 percent of the total subscriptions, and the remaining 164 countries contribute only
26.5 percent (Figure 6.2). In IFC, the top 25 member states contribute 78.4 percent. IDA
voting power is less unequal: the top 25 member countries contribute 66.6 percent, and
another 148 contribute 33.4 percent. Several developing countries, some of the largest
recipients of IDA like India and China, now contribute to IDA and CGIAR. Keenly aware
of the risk of exit of MICs, IBRD imposes less conditionality than IDA expects from its
recipients on such issues as gender and governance. Since IDA recipients include many
conflict-affected countries, more conditionality is understandable. This “pushing-on-the-
string” approach, however necessary, is not sufficient. Empowerment of key groups in IDA
countries in support of more robust participatory development is necessary, but may not
yield quick visible results (World Bank 2011).
Will the World Bank’s resident board be dissolved? It has been a matter of much debate,
but it is not very likely. The Zedillo report (2009) noted the prohibitive cost of a resident
board—US$70 million in 2009—and suggested that instead of approving individual pro-
jects, the Board should move upstream, involving finance ministers to address strategic
issues facing the Bank. The issue of resident boards also applies to some of the RBAs. The
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effectiveness of the boards in taking on and tackling strategic challenges is mixed and has
rarely been evaluated.
Organizational Leadership, Influence, and Financial Contributions
The United States nominates a single American candidate for the Bank’s president after
informal consultations with other shareholders. Not all appointments have been illustrious
in the World Bank and the IMF. Despite considerable debate on merit-based selections of
World Bank presidents (reserved for the United States) and IMF Managing Directors
(reserved for Europeans, regardless of nationality), and some flawed appointments in
both organizations, competitive selection did not materialize in the World Bank in 2012,
nor in 2019.¹¹ Even in the renewal of President Kim’s second term, which occurred amid the
2016 US election fever, in advance of the July 2017 official reappointment, there was no
competition. And his successor, David Malpass, was appointed unanimously in April 29
without any contest. In the “America First” argument, if the Bank were to be headed by a
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Figure 6.2 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Number of votes and
percentage share in total by top 25 member states (as of March 29, 2017) (total number of
votes = 2,350,174)
Note: The number may differ from the sum of individual percentages shown because of rounding.
Source: Based on data from World Bank (2020).
¹¹ See Ottenhoff (2011); Weiss (2011); Wheeler (2007, 2011); and Beattie (2012) for discussions concerning the
selection of World Bank presidents and IMF Managing Directors.
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non-US national, the US Congress might lose interest in financing the World Bank, located
a block away from the White House and the US Treasury. Expanding the capital base is also
related to power sharing, however. Emerging countries, such as China, in particular, have
expressed a strong interest in expanding the World Bank’s capital base, and emerging
countries are willing and able to contribute to it. Expanding the subscribed capital will open
the issue of raising the share of emerging countries, like China, further in the Bank’s
governance, and the European donors are reluctant to lose their shares. Having their
representation by a single EU representative, much like the United States, does not appeal
to them (Zedillo 2013). China’s voting share would increase by 1 percentage point under the
new capitalization, a relatively minor adjustment. However, the Development Committee
has accepted the need to correct the distribution of votes from the currently very unequal
situation.
In a rapidly changing world, the Bank’s strengths have been underutilized in expanding
its capital base to provide more capital to countries for the badly needed investments in
physical infrastructure. The World Bank–IMF report on financing “From Billions to
Trillions,” estimated infrastructural needs to be nearly a trillion dollars each for South
Asia (SA) and SSA (Development Committee 2015). Needs of the rural sector and for
capacity building are similarly large for small LICS to escape the vicious circle of poverty. As
we will show in the chapters on the five organizations, however, the challenge is not simply
one of mobilizing finance. Indeed, large amounts of funding committed to countries lacking
internal capacity can be counterproductive. And donors’ records on capacity building have
been mixed when client countries have lacked political will or enabling environments.
Yet, the Bank’s approved capital increase of US$13 billion must be applauded. In the past,
major shareholders—the United States and European members—have been reluctant to
make the transition to increasing overall subscriptions and including emerging countries in
return for their increased access to the much needed capital and their increased voice in the
governance of the WBG. The IDA graduation process has demonstrated the success of IDA,
although it was achieved over more than half a century. Are SDGs too ambitious and
unrealistic in terms of time, effort, preconditions, and patience?
The Obama administration’s opposition to the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB), even in the face of huge unmet infrastructure needs of developing
countries, was difficult to understand in this context, except as a way to delay acknowl-
edging the decline in the US (soft) power. Europeans rushed to join AIIB, even while Europe
was cool to the idea of a capital increase for theWorld Bank. It is a choice to be a big fish in a
small pond or a small fish in a large, globalized pond.
IFAD and WFP are examples of modified shareholder models, and FAO is a stakeholder
model. Shareholder models have smaller governance, although are larger than in the private
sector.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAO is a unique global knowledge organization, a provider of global and regional public
goods, serving as a platform for arriving at international agreements on norms and
standards; developing and promoting voluntary guidelines and agreements; generating
knowledge and providing statistics; maintaining efficient market monitoring and early
warning systems (Global Information and Early Warning System [GIEWS], Emergency
Prevention System [EMPRES], etc.); and providing capacity development across a wide area
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of knowledge products and information activities. FAO monitors cross-border pests and
diseases and has a demonstrated record in helping to eradicate or contain them (for
example, rinderpest virus, peste des petits ruminants, or avian influenza).¹² It is also a
global platform for establishing norms and standards for different aspects of food and
agriculture, including food safety. Importantly, it hosts, together withWHO, the secretariats
of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme and the Codex Alimentarius Com-
mission, which provides internationally binding standards to protect the health of con-
sumers and to ensure fair practices in the food trade.¹³ The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) relies on FAO’s estimates of land use and land use changes; FAO’s
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission estimates have been used in IPCC assessment reports.
Even the harshest critics of FAO would like to see FAO as a valuable provider of GPGs and
related capacity development functions. In tandem with its traditional GPG function, which
is funded chiefly by assessed contributions, FAO has developed an increasingly important
development function. The development functions have seen a steady expansion and by
2019, have exceed the assessed contributions by about 60 percent. As a result of frozen
nominal “regular” budget, FAO’s GPG functions are underfunded. The disjuncture between
FAO’s GPG functions, performed by using its very modest assessed contributions, and its
technical assistance function, provided entirely by stitching together robustly growing
voluntary contributions, has continued to be a fault line.
Since the adoption of the SDGs, FAO has become a “custodian,” responsible for mon-
itoring 21 of the total 232 unique SDG indicators,¹⁴—for example, indicators for SDG2
(zero hunger), SDG5 (gender equality), SDG6 (clean water and sanitation), SDG12 (re-
sponsible consumption and production), SDG14 (life below water), and SDG15 (life on
land), and as a contributing agency, for four more indicators (FAO 2017b). FAO has
adopted SDG targets and indicators as the targets and indicators of its own five Strategic
Objectives, as has IFAD for its own Strategic Framework. As a result, FAO is harmonizing
its work with the SDGs and has declared it will contribute to 40 targets, measured through
53 unique SDG indicators of the 15 out of 17 SDGs, as part of the proposed Strategic
Objective Results Framework for 2018–21 (FAO 2017a).
FAO will continue to provide data and statistical support to some 200 countries (FAO
2017d).
It is unclear how FAO’s governance manages these demanding strategic objectives on a
small budget. With a membership of 194 countries, two associate members, and the EU,
FAO’s Governing Bodies consist of the Conference of member countries, the Council, and
supporting committees. Within their respective mandates, they contribute to the definition
of the overall policies and regulatory frameworks of FAO and the establishment of the
Strategic Framework, Medium-Term Plan, and Programme of Work and Budget. They also
exercise or contribute to oversight of the administration of FAO. The Conference, the
sovereign governing body of 194 member nations, the European Union, and two associate
¹² See FAO pages on peste des petits ruminants (http://www.fao.org/ppr/en/) and rinderpest (http://www.fao.
org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/rinderpest/home).
¹³ The General Principles of the Codex Alimentarius state: “The publication of the Codex Alimentarius is
intended to guide and promote the elaboration and establishment of definitions and requirements for foods to
assist in their harmonization and in doing so to facilitate international trade.” Codex standards are the basis for
adjudicating food safety-related questions under the SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) and TBT
(Technical Barriers to Trade) agreements of the World Trade Organization (see http://www.fao.org/3/y7867e/
y7867e08.htm).
¹⁴ See the Revised List of Global Sustainable Development Goal indicators: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/in
dicators/indicators-list/
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members (Faroe Islands and Tokelau) is chaired by an elected member state representative
and meets once per biennium. The Council acts as the executive organ of the Conference
between sessions and usually meets at least five times per biennium. The Council consists of
representatives of 49 member nations elected by the Conference for staggered three-year
terms. It is chaired by an Independent Chairperson who is appointed by the Conference for
a two-year renewable term.
Members meet every two years to elect a Council of 49 members, one of the largest
governance bodies, particularly when considered in relation to its small, assessed contribu-
tions, of which the governing bodies have any control, chaired by a person other than the
director-general (DG) (see http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/gsb-definition/en/).
As noted earlier, FAO’s overall program of work is funded by assessed and voluntary
contributions. The assessed contributions are set at the biennial FAO Conference. The total
FAO Budget for 2018–19 was US$2.6 billion, most (US$1.6 billion) of which came from.
voluntary contributions and the rest (US$1.006 billion) from assessed contributions. Both
parts of the budget are integrated under the Organization’s results framework prepared by
FAO management and submitted by the FAO Council to the biannual FAO Conference for
approval.
The FAO Conference does not allocate funding for trust funds/voluntary contributions.
Given the large share of voluntary contributions, an important question for FAO is the
appropriate balance between voice, efficiency, relevance, and clarity in accountability: for
example, to the individual donors who provide voluntary funds and enter into agreements
with management versus the executive councils of the organization. Here, there has been
even a difference among donors as to the extent to which the large current structure should
manage only the small, assessed contributions, or be accountable for FAO’s total work
program. Some wonder if a modified shareholder model, weighted by contributions—such
as that in IFAD, which manages its affairs almost entirely using its administrative budget
without any trust funds, and WFP, which depends entirely on trust funds—should be
adopted in FAO. CGD’s work on FAO raised these thorny issues of the balance between
FAO’s GPG function versus its technical assistance/emergency work and the extent to
which FAO’s GPG function was being undermined by its technical assistance/emergency
functions.
Having a long-standing mandate to provide all agriculture-related technical expertise
under one roof, and having been given a large responsibility under the SDGs since 2015,
FAO needs to be the true center of scientific and technical excellence for food and
agriculture under climate change. It is not yet clear if FAO has sufficiently well positioned
itself for this role. Indeed, within FAO, there is no consensus on the need for FAO to
become a center of excellence, though, it is clear that the new management at FAO sees this
as a significant and immediate challenge. This may reflect the current funding reality and
the risk of making the gap between aspiration and reality explicit, or the funding reality
reflecting a low level of aspiration.
Over the years, FAO has provided organizational leadership with a signature role in
setting global goals for hunger reduction at the national and global levels, while tradition-
ally, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) andWHO have been the champions of
the issues of maternal and child care and food security at the household level. Despite the
progress achieved for the SDGs, some statistics concerned with health are still appallingly
high: infant and child mortality rates; wasting and stunting indicators; and incidence of
anemia among young girls and women. The Rome Declaration, the outcome of the World
Food Summit in 1996, organized by the FAO and attended by 112 heads or deputy heads of
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state and government, formed the basis of MDG1 and SDG2 (FAO 1996). FAO has
increased its work at the household level, working with UNICEF and WHO, and expanded
its partnerships overtly, including the issuance of a joint report, The State of Food Security
and Nutrition in the World 2017, with IFAD, UNICEF, WHO, and WFP (FAO et al. 2017).
The SDGs’ focus on results on the ground poses a tension between FAO’s GPG functions
in improving delivery of just-in-time, high quality statistics, ensuring food safety, and
preventing pandemics. FAO’s management challenges the widely shared internal and
external views that its skills base is eroded, and a tension continues to haunt FAO—
between the provision of GPGs and country assistance, both of which are needed with
resources that are limited, fractionated, and unpredictable. In Chapter 9 on FAO, we further
review this evidence, based on a CGD study that criticizes FAO on similar grounds. Again,
within FAO there is no consensus about FAO’s eroded skills base or the tension between the
need to focus on FAO’s mandated GPG function versus its technical assistance role at the
country level, in the face of its very limited core budget.
2007 Independent External Evaluation
The Independent External Evaluation (IEE), for which Uma Lele served as a panel member,
called for reform with growth. It noted that if FAO did not exist, it would have had to be
invented. The panel also made well over 100 recommendations for reforms. The IEE kick-
started reforms, which formally ended in 2013, but there has been no significant increase in
resources for FAO to achieve growth. The first of its kind in the organization’s history, the
evaluation concluded that FAO’s financial and programmatic crisis was rooted in its
conservative and slow-to-adapt, bureaucratic leadership, with declining organizational
capacity and many imperiled core competencies. It recommended a new Strategic Frame-
work, an institutional culture change, and reform of administrative and management
systems (FAO 2007a). A background paper on FAO’s governance, written for the IEE,
noted that FAO’s overall budget was spread too thinly over a wide range of topics and many
program entities had lost the critical mass necessary to be effective.¹⁵ Decentralization of
staff and resources risked reducing certain technical programs at headquarters below critical
mass. The Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) activities underwent real budget cuts,
and other activities had to shrink even more, further aggravating the underfunding in
normative activities. The programs implemented by the technical departments at head-
quarters reached a disproportionately low share in FAO’s overall resources, while admin-
istration, communication, representation, and liaison received a high share. We present the
trends and breakdowns of these resources in Chapter 9. As a result of these budgetary
constraints, FAO was not using its full technical potential to participate actively and visibly,
or take the lead in newly emerging initiatives. Extra-budgetary funds accounted for a
growing share of the organizations’ overall resources. However, at that time, there was no
formal institutional mechanism that would help coordinate the use of these funds, bundle
them, and seek synergies with the regular program.
The FAO management adopted IEE’s advice to undertake “reform with the growth” in
resources so as to have an FAO “fit for this century” in its official response (FAO 2007a,
2, 11; 2007b). The staff also supported “a radical shift in management culture and spirit,
¹⁵ For the chapter on “Governance” in the IEE report, a note indicates: background “working papers were
prepared by Abdelaziz Megzari, Sholto Cross and Martin Piñeiro” (FAO 2007a, 169).
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depoliticization of appointments, restoration of trust between staff and management, [and]
setting strategic priorities of the organization.”¹⁶ With a one-time injection of US$42.6
million (€38.6 million) and a three-year Immediate Plan of Action for “reform with
growth,” FAO spent US$21.8 million overhauling its financial procedures, hierarchies,
and human resources management (Economic Times 2008). In January 2012, FAO DG
José Graziano da Silva acted upon the commitment made during his campaign to bring the
reform to completion, but FAO’s critics have argued it is far from complete. The DG shifted
the focus of the reform process to realization of its benefits and mainstreaming the reform
into the work of the organization (FAO 2011).
The DG improved appointments in country offices, which in earlier times were riddled
with political appointments. A number of highly qualified staff were moved to the fields.
The shortage of staff at headquarters in critical areas, however, such as in water and in
AQUASTAT¹⁷ management, are obvious. Additionally, when high-quality staff members
retire, or are moved to country offices, while it bolsters FAO in the field in the latter case, its
headquarters staffing is thinned.
The creation of a matrix management structure took an additional toll on FAO’s already
thinned-out technical capacity. More than 50 critically important technical staff were
absorbed by the new horizontal layer of the matrix, the so-called Strategic Programmes
(SPs), without providing the technical divisions with the necessary replacements or com-
pensatory funding. Worse, most of the staff seconded to the SPs continue to be financed
through the budgets of the technical divisions, which made the critics of this matrix move
refer to it as adding “insult to injury” to FAO’s technical work. A recent internal audit report
took stock of a hiring spree that started in December 2016. The findings of the report are not
in the public domain; even FAO country missions can only view it on dedicated computers,
with no files, not even screenshots, taken. Some of the salient findings of the audit report
corroborate the idea that appointments were increasingly undertaken on a political rather
than a meritorious basis, further undermining FAO’s technical capacity.
Issues of Leadership
At FAO, the DG is elected democratically, although regional rotation does enter into
consideration: that is, the turn of a region, as others have had their turn. Yet, the DG’s
position was occupied for 36 years by only two autocratic leaders (Edouard Saouma, 1976–93,
and Jacques Diouf, 1994–2011), with complaints that the elections entailed political horse
trading, senior-level appointments, and other benefits for countries’ officials in return for
votes—a phenomenon for which the UN is also criticized, more so than the World Bank or
the IMF. The IEE recommended no more than two 6-year terms. FAO’s main governing
body, the Conference, reduced the term of office to two 4-year terms for FAO’s DG.
Historically, FAO’s culture has been one of top down governance, in contrast to the
World Bank’s, but this culture has changed for the better under the current DG. The
shortage of resources, outlined in this chapter, has led to a tension between the provision
of GPGs and country assistance. The loss of retiring staff, combined with recruitment of
¹⁶ “For a Renewal of FAO,” online petition, November 2007.
¹⁷ AQUASTAT is the global water information system of FAO, which collects, analyzes, and disseminates data
and information by country on water resources, water uses, and agricultural water management (see “About
AQUASTAT”: http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/About_us/index.stm).
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new staff on contracts, has led to a loss of institutional memory and lack of trust between
staff and management, potentially risking FAO’s professional reputation (FAO 2017e). This
challenge, however, is not unique to FAO. The spate of “express” appointments in 140
professional posts boosted the statistics in the face of criticism from members about the
high rate of vacancies, but increased the possibility of detrimental effects on the organiza-
tion’s technical capacity in the long term (FAO 2016). The fact that FAO needs in-house
skills and access to state-of-the-art measurement tools, including GIS and other wide-
ranging tools, as well as a good knowledge of its clients, is indisputable. Therefore, the
review of FAO’s technical capacity was much anticipated. Although carried out by three
veterans of IOs (Cleaver, Golan, and Sood 2017), the FAO’s Council and management lost a
major opportunity to do a thorough review of the quality and not just the quantity of staff in
relation to demand or need for skills in rapidly changing technical areas. The debate on the
quantity vs. the quality of staff, in relation to needs of FAO’s functions, came perilously
close to the old North–South debates, with the Northern side being in favor of seniority and
quality of staff. Some in FAO argue that such old North–South tension has disappeared in
the context of the SDGs, since donor resources are small and increasingly fractionated,
relative to government expenditures of developing countries. The need for help is still great
in least developing countries, however, and expectations MICs for international staff
knowledge have increased, given that their own internal capacity is now much higher
than it was 50 years ago. IOs are not able to keep up with this reality, in the face of their
shrinking core budgets and changing needs.
The World Bank faces a similar challenge. One-third of its staff is long-term, regular
employees. Another third has fixed-term contracts, and still another third are short-term
consultants. Mentoring has declined. Both institutions need to be centers of excellence, but
reputational risk is greater for FAO than the World Bank. FAO is exclusively a knowledge
organization, and its services are not accompanied by millions of dollars of loans and grants.
Donors’ Role in Governance
FAO’s total assessment is small in relation to its vast public goods agenda and the
stewardship of the largest number of SDG indicators. FAO assessments are concentrated
among donors, as indeed they are in other organizations we review: for example, WFP,
for which 88 percent of its funding comes from 15 donors, as we discuss here. As much as
79.24 percent of FAO’s assessed contributions come from 15 member countries, and as
much as 88.35 percent is from 25 member countries. The remaining 154 countries con-
tribute only 11.65 percent of the assessed contributions (Figure 6.3). With its heavy reliance
on voluntary contributions, donors understandably want to drive the agenda, but their own
fragmentation has led them to move to bargaining in the retail business of aid, largely at the
country level, rather than on the larger global or regional levels. Many member countries,
including several developed countries and some developing countries, continue to prefer for
FAO to focus on its GPG functions, whereas other member countries prefer technical
assistance and emergency assistance. However, unlike the World Bank in which the
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) is used to allocate resources among
countries using transparent, relatively more objective criteria (IEG 2009), FAO’s allocations
of technical assistance and emergency resources and their actual use appear to be less
subject to clear rules, rather achieved on a country-by-country, project-by-project, donor by
donor basis, leading to much debate and criticism among member countries. Demand-driven
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
   “ ” 359
technical assistance is often cited as an example of a potential for matching supply with needs.
The Africa Solidarity Trust Fund, funded by African governments with a steering committee
with clear roles and responsibilities, and the lightly earmarked FAOMultipartner Programme
Support Mechanism (FMM), supported by the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden, could
benefit from such a perspective.¹⁸
The demand-driven focus of FAO on results on the ground to meet SDGs also raises
another important issue, with a parallel to CGIAR’s downward orientation, and may be
diverting attention from achieving excellence in FAO’s GPG function, much as we have
argued it does in the case of CGIAR. Can a GPG function, whether in FAO or in CGIAR, be
addressed in a purely demand-driven, results-on-the-ground approach? To date, FAO’s
statistics work is largely supported by donors, including BMGF, and in the 2018–19 budget,
the Codex Initiative has had to rely on reallocations of unspent funds from the budget rather
than a predetermined allocation from the administrative budget supported by assessed
contributions.
To summarize, it is unclear if FAO’s member states and management have the commit-
ment and consensus to address both its GPG function and technical assistance/emergency
function at the country level at its best. Chapter 9 on FAO, in which we review a number of
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Figure 6.3 Assessment rate (%) to the FAO Regular Programme by largest 25 contributors and
percentage share in total, 2016–2017
Source: Authors’ construction. Data from “Regular Programme Contributions of Largest 25 Contributors,” http://
www.fao.org/about/strategic-planning/country-contributions/en/
¹⁸ “FAO uses unearmarked funding strategically . . . The FMM is a funding mechanism for partners willing to
contribute unearmarked funds or slightly earmarked funds. Created in 2010, the FMM is currently supported by
the Kingdoms of Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden” (http://www.fao.org/partnerships/resource-partners/
news/news-article/en/c/451561/).
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headquarters and country offices, with a proposal for the establishment of a center of
excellence and with necessary resources, if FAO is to assist countries effectively.
The World Food Programme
Our compassion is boundless . . . But our budgets, unfortunately, are limited.
Matching our funding to our vision remains our long-term objective.
(WFP 2016b)
WFP received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2020 for its extraordinary effort to match funding to
its vision in the context of the growing refugee population.
Matching demand with supply of resources, however, is also one of WFP’s biggest
challenges, particularly as the funding is totally voluntary, and 88 percent of it comes
from 15 countries (WFP 2016a). The number of people affected by humanitarian crises
has more than doubled over the past decade (Development Initiatives 2016).
WFP in its report, “World Food Assistance 2017: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead,”
noted, “Crises are growing in complexity and duration. Funding needs are climbing sharply.
Humanitarian principles are under threat, with humanitarian response constantly at risk of
being co-opted by political objectives. These challenges apply in full to food assistance
agencies. As is the case for all areas of humanitarian action, food assistance agencies face
significant challenges linked to funding levels and conditions, access to beneficiaries,
protection of beneficiaries and security of staff” (WFP 2017b, 106).
WFP is the brainchild of the former US President Eisenhower, who established the Food
for Peace program to use massive food surpluses for emergency and development programs.
Senator George McGovern played a key role in 1961, in establishing an emergency response
program within FAO, using US surpluses. WFP, as an entity in its own right, became
operational in 1963, and soon evolved into a program of repute, addressing emergencies in
Iran, Sudan, Thailand, and Ethiopia (Glauber, Nabil, and Smith 2017).
As the need for agility and flexibility of emergency response challenged FAO’s more
deliberate administrative procedures, WFP obtained more autonomy in 1978. Like other
heads of UN funds and programs, the WFP executive director is appointed by the UN
secretary-general, but in WFP’s case, jointly with the FAO DG, a historical legacy.
Through food assistance, WFP seeks to address the causes for hunger, ranging from lack
of resilience to climate change to gender inequality and market failures, using “the full range
of instruments, activities, and platforms that empower vulnerable and food-insecure people
and communities so they can regularly have access to nutritious food” (WFP 2017b, 8).
WFP has begun to take a broader view of food assistance, going beyond the short term,
through in-kind food transfers, cash-based transfers, local and regional procurement of
food and food system services, technical assistance measures, and numerous support
activities. It also seeks to combat the root causes of hunger (climate change, conflict, gender
inequality, urbanization) in the medium term and long term. Further, the frequency, scale,
and severity of humanitarian crises are increasing (OCHA 2016). WFP’s direct food
assistance expenditures increased from US$2.2 billion in 2009 to US$5.3 billion in 2015
(WFP 2017b, 11). And, although WFP has been innovative in deploying a range of tools to
address the varied challenges it has faced, it was able to serve a smaller number of needy
during this period than previously. In 2017, WFP helped 91.4 million people in 83 countries,
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about 11 percent of the 815 million hungry estimated by FAO, compared to 109 million in
75 countries in 2010 (WFP 2010; FAO 2017f).
The declining number serviced, despite more than doubling of WFP’s expenditures
during this period, as well as the declining share of in-kind food transfers from 54 percent
to a less than 40 percent, is noteworthy. The share of cash-based transfers saw the most
increase from less than 1 percent to 20 percent, the fastest in Latin America and the
Caribbean and slowest in Central Africa. The increased share and role of cash-based
transfers reduced the cost of delivery, relative to in-kind food transfers. The share devoted
to logistics also fell from 32 percent to 20 percent, reflecting the contraction in the share of
in-kind food transfers (WFP 2017b).
WFP has been innovative in its approach to food assistance, more so than the US bilateral
food aid. It has been adopting a blend of approaches, ranging from in-kind food aid to cash-
based transfers and triangular purchases in countries closer to places of action. In contrast,
US bilateral food aid is procured domestically, shipped in US ships, and every tax dollar spent
on US food aid yields only 35–40 cents of food commodities available to hungry or disaster-
affected people. Canada has no such restrictions andmakes far more extensive use of local and
regional purchases, cash, and vouchers. As a result, its taxpayers see roughly twice as much—
almost 70 cents’ worth of food—from every food aid dollar spent (Barrett 2017).
Many facing emergencies are in MICs, such as Nigeria and Syria. This assistance involved
the handling of six Level 3 emergencies (the most severe of large-scale humanitarian
disasters), including a famine in South Sudan and emergencies in northern Nigeria,
Somalia, and Yemen.¹⁹ Level 3 emergencies, the highest classification for the most severe
and large-scale humanitarian crises, require mobilization of global-, regional-, and country-
level response capabilities—dominated by food assistance funding and expenditures, most
of which is earmarked. This earmarking diverts attention from other protracted, but lower-
level emergencies. This reflects broader trends in humanitarian funding.²⁰
WFP’s voluntary funding tends to be uncertain, insufficient, delayed, restricted, and
unpredictable. Over the past five years, 88 percent of voluntary contributions to WFP have
come from just 15 countries (see Figure 6.4). There is an urgent need to expand and diversify
the funding base for internationally facilitated food assistance (IASC 2013) or to reallocate
existing funding differently: for example, from bilateral to multilateral organizations.
This diversification or reallocation is needed because WFP has been more agile and more
efficient than the US bilateral assistance, due in large part to absence of lobbying pressure of
domestic interests, such as the shipping industry, the community of nongovernmental
organization (NGOs), or members of Congress with agricultural interests.
WFP has responded well to the growing criticism of in-kind food aid as being a
disincentive to food production and to the reality of declining food surpluses—changing
its strategy from food aid to food assistance beginning around 2005. It has positioned itself
well by, first, linking its activities toMDGs, and later, to the SDGs and climate change. Finally,
WFP has been better able to deal with different kinds of emergencies and to participate in the
continuum from emergencies and humanitarian assistance to development, although there is
¹⁹ To declare a Phase 5 Famine, the UN Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, or IPC scale, must
indicate that, “Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs [households] in the area has an
extreme lack of food and other basic needs where starvation, death, and destitution are evident.” A famine is
declared when 1 in 10,000 people are dying every day (see “IPC and Famine”: http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-
website/resources/resources-details/en/c/1129202/).
²⁰ For more information on humanitarian system-wide emergency activation (L3 activation), see IASC (2012).
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scope for improvement in WFP playing to its comparative advantage in emergency assistance
and partnering more actively with development actors.
Governance
A 36-member executive board oversees WFP’s humanitarian and development food aid
activities. Board seats are determined by election, divided equally between the UN Eco-
nomic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and FAO. Of the 36 total seats, 21 are from devel-
oping countries, the majority selected by FAO, and 15 are from developed country donors,
the majority selected by ECOSOC (WFP 2014a). This partial shareholder model differs
from than the “one country, one vote”model of FAO. It gives donors considerable voice and
power. The composition of the executive board ensures that developing nation members
have a stake in decision-making (see Table 6.2). In 2014, all but two developing countries on
the board were contributing governments or had contributed in the preceding five-year
period (with the exceptions being Ghana and Equatorial Guinea; see Table A.6.1). The WFP
Board, like the boards of other multilateral organizations, strives to make all decisions by
consensus, and the board is expected to work to achieve such consensus before a matter is
put to a vote.
In 2016, WFP adopted a new corporate architecture to support national governments in
their efforts to achieve their goals for food security. This “Integrated Road Map” was
adopted to change the way WFP plans, manages, and reports on programs, with a view to
improving operational effectiveness, so as to maximize impact for beneficiaries and to align
more closely with countries’ priorities. It will take a lot of internal capacity to achieve the
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Figure 6.4 Total contributions to the World Food Programme by top 10 donors, 2013–2017*
(total = US$22.1 billion)
Note: *As of March 19, 2017. Contribution data may be subject to change, as a result of retroactive adjustments.
CERF = Central Emergency Response Fund (UN).
Source: World Food Programme, Funding and Donors (WFP 2020a).
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RBAs to cooperate with FAO, which is often lacking in funding to provide technical
assistance that can serve WFP’s needs. IFAD and the World Bank can fund the programs
in their effort to develop a joint path from disasters to humanitarian aid to rehabilitation
and development, as discussed later in this chapter, in the context of RBA collaboration.
A large share of WFP funding has come from the United States (Figure 6.4), and as its
largest donor, with a few exceptions, US nationals have led the organization, for the most
part, since the 1990s. Internationalizing food aid has made its distribution more efficient
and less political. As the world ran out of food surpluses around 2005, WFP made its
strategic transition from supplying food aid to providing food assistance and cash transfers.
There was also a growing consensus at that time of the distortionary effects of in-kind food aid
on local and regional markets and the disturbance of local dietary traditions, with unintended
negative consequences. Hence, receiving cash from donors, local purchase of food for
distribution, and cash transfers to recipients have become the preferred instruments.
Governance Reforms
The WFP Executive Board approved a new, considerably strengthened Evaluation Policy in
November 2015, to increase its accountability and to be comprehensively incorporated into
all WFP’s policies and programs (WFP 2020b). The work under the accountability frame-
work started as early as 2000, and has expanded and evolved beyond the original recom-
mendations accepted by the Board, as a result of a dialogue between the Board, the
Secretariat, and the External Auditor. As a major step forward in governance reforms,
with the Executive Board, WFP’s working group’s lengthy deliberations culminated in a
report in 2005 on developing tools to support the four frameworks: strategy, policy,
oversight, and accountability of WFP, as well as delineating the roles of the Board and
Table 6.2 World Food Programme governance
Countries FAO selection ECOSOC selection Totals
Developing countrya lists A 4 4 8
B 3 4 7
C 3 2 5
Rotatingb 1 1
Developing country members 11 10 21
Developed country lists D 6 6 12
E 1 2 3
Developed country members 7 8 15
Total members 18 18 36
Notes: a For a definition of developing countries, see https://executiveboard.wfp.org/state-members-and-distribution-
seats
b “One additional member rotating among the states included in lists A, B, and C to be elected by the Council
of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; the pattern of rotation shall be as follows: (i)
A State from list A to be elected to occupy the additional seat every other term, starting from 1 January 2012;
(ii) A State from list B to be elected to occupy the additional seat every fourth term, starting from 1 January 2015;
(iii) A State from list C to be elected to occupy the additional seat every fourth term, starting from 1 January 2021”
(WFP 2014a, appendix B(f), 30).
Source: Table by authors, derived from “WFP Governance and Leadership” (https://www.wfp.org/governance-
and-leadership) and WFP (2014a).
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the Executive Director (WFP 2005). With regard to information sharing, dialogue, consen-
sus building, and decision-making, the assessment measures up well against best practices
elsewhere in the international and public sectors. The tools have provided an effective basis
for further evolution. The Executive Board and Management work together: for example,
for swift implementation of emergency responses; unanimous decision-making, with grow-
ing delegation of responsibility to management; and increased transparency.
WFP’s 2016 annual evaluation report, the first under the new policy, addressed WFP’s
performance at all three levels—global, country, and project. It reaffirmedWFP’s capacity to
quickly move to providing large-scale emergency assistance. The 2016 evaluation provided
insights into the evolution of WFP’s ability to move fluidly between implementing and
enabling, using a range of activities and transfer modalities to respond to shocks in
countries where development and humanitarian needs are constantly shifting. The dis-
placement of 10 million refugees from Iraq in 2016 and the Ebola crisis in 2014 affirmed
WFP’s strategic reorientation under the Strategic Plan (2017–21). Evaluations make clear
that highly demanding emergency responses take precedence over all other work. WFP’s
activities have stretched their capacity for addressing emergencies and building the Inte-
grated Road Map. The Annual Report of the Inspector General in Rome, in June 2017,
addressed these issues (WFP 2017a).
Key challenges going forward for WFP include the stretched capacity for emergencies, in
addition to implementation of the Integrated RoadMap. WFP’s potential inability to handle
several emergencies simultaneously presents major risks. Other important areas of work
may not receive the attention or resources needed, given the high number of emergencies
and transformation processes underway. “Gaps in workforce planning and talent manage-
ment” also could prove problematic (WFP 2017a, 7), which is why WFP’s collaboration
with other RBAs and other IOs, including the World Bank, will be critical going forward.
These collaborations are discussed in Chapter 12 on WFP.
The International Fund for Agricultural Development
One of the major responses to the food crises of the early 1970s, and a significant outcome
of the 1974 World Food Conference, was the establishment in 1977 of IFAD, the
13th specialized agency of the UN.²¹ The purpose in establishing IFAD was not only to
increase investments in the poor, but also to recycle petrodollars, from the first oil shock, for
development purposes. This initial commitment by the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) led to an agreement that gave OPEC countries a role in the
governance of IFAD, including equal voting power (on the basis of “one country, one vote”)
among the three categories of members: OECD, OPEC, and developing countries (IFAD
and the OPEC Fund 2005). However, as IFAD’s funding base has evolved, so, too, has its
voting structure. Voting rights are distributed according to paid contributions, and as of
July 2017, the List A category (primarily OECD members) has 48.7 percent of votes; List B
(primarily OPEC members) has 12.5 percent; and List C (developing countries) member
countries has 38.8 percent (Figure 6.5). Except for two, all presidents of IFAD have come
from OPEC countries. In recent elections, the presidential election has been become an
²¹ See IFAD, Governance, https://www.ifad.org/en/governance.
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increasingly competitive process, and Gilbert Fossoun Houngbo, former Prime Minister of
Togo, took office as the sixth president of IFAD on April 1, 2017.
The big question for IFAD going forward is whether it will continue to assist poor in
MICs or concentrate its resources in LICs. IFAD lending to MICs, at higher interest rates,
has provided increased reflows to IFAD’s capital base, ensuring longer term financial
sustainability, and in addition, these countries are providing increased levels of contribu-
tions during the replenishment process, with both India and China increasing their con-
tributions. Second, there can be cross-country learning, but transferring lessons across
countries has been harder than typically argued. Third, lending to MICs gives IFAD a
global status and ensures those countries’ participation in broader governance decisions,
whereas lending to poor countries only makes it more of a regional institution.
IFAD’s funding history, ostensibly reflecting an OPEC–OECD funding accord, is dis-
cussed in Chapter 11 on IFAD. There have been no changes in IFAD’s governance, apart
from voting rights reform in 1995. Three major external evaluations led to some marginal
improvements in IFAD’s management. IFAD has been financed predominantly by OECD
members, with a growing share, albeit small, from recipient members themselves. The
perceived weakness in the original funding model led to the only major reform in govern-
ance in 1995, the switch from a “one country, one vote” to voting shares based on
membership and levels of contribution. In 2001, the first president was elected from a
non-OPEC country. Apart from the continued emphasis on co-financing, the concerns over
the funding model has also initiated limited sovereign borrowing (in 2014), and a discussion
(in 2017) at the ongoing 11th IFAD Replenishment of how IFAD could access capital
markets to develop a larger capital base to source financing to facilitate the demand for and
growth in lending to MICs for rural development (see https://webapps.ifad.org/members/
repl/sessions). These discussions reflect some of the aspects of the Zedillo evaluation of the
World Bank in 2009: changing voting shares to reflect membership’s voice; reducing MIC
lending from donor-sourced replenishment funds; and in the future, increased capitaliza-
tion (Zedillo 2009). The Governing Council and Executive Board, with the exception of
voting shares, retain the same membership categories, representation, functions, and




List A (25 member states)
List B (12 member states)
List C (139 member states)
Figure 6.5 Voting rights of IFAD member states: Percentage share in total votes by List
A (primarily OECD members); List B (primarily OPEC members); and List C (developing
member states), as of March 10, 2017
Source: IFAD (2019).
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The reforms that have taken place since 2007–8, therefore, have been largely focused on
operational and administrative activities, both internal and external, with an emphasis on
effectiveness and efficiency in the business model and driven by the recommendations of
the external evaluations and reviews. The development of a country presence strategy, a
reform initiated and led by IFAD in 2011, had initially been conceived to support program
implementation, but is now augmented with broader representational roles, so that with a
zero-growth budget, the strategy means a trade-off with operational work. Further expan-
sion of country presence, now underway, will require a substantive budget transfer to
outpost operations (that is, not just staff costs, and as of December 2017, agreed to by the
Executive Board), together with real decision-making at the country level, as highlighted by
the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). Retaining
senior staff and decision-making at headquarters, together with many support and ancillary
departments, like FAO, can perpetuate the bureaucratic imperative of centralized head-
quarters management. UN reforms may address this issue of consolidation of country
offices of RBA institutions (UN 2017b).
Within its focus on small-scale agriculture and mandate of rural poverty alleviation,
IFAD, like others, has developed a broad menu of services to complement its investment
functions. This includes knowledge management, technical assistance, partnerships, and in
the case of farmer organizations and land tenure, advocacy work and the development of
financial models to elicit financing from foundations and the private sector—including for
the Adaptation for Smallholder Agricultural Programme (ASAP), a key climate change
adaptation program for smallholder farmers, launched in 2012. Given both the comple-
mentarity of this menu and the specificity of IFAD’s approach, there is scope for better
development of synergies with the other four of the Big Five organizations, especially with
CGIAR. Obviously, the proximity of the other RBAs provides a potential starting point, and
FAO’s technical services offer the most immediate potential, but WBG still remains key for
both the financial services currently offered and the future growth in private sector finan-
cing. In IFAD’s specific case, accessing financial markets to broaden financial products to
meet the diverse financing needs of its membership, including MICs, reflects the role of
IFAD as a mobilizer of funds for rural development and is in line with its founding charter.
The IFAD Eleventh Replenishment of its core financing for the 2019–21 period was
concluded on February 12, 2018, prior to its meeting of the Governing Council but
following a postponement of the final pledging session at the December 2017 replenishment
meeting. Provisionally, total pledges made totaled US$845 million (compared to US$1,030
million for IFAD10), with some countries, particularly Germany, still to pledge. For
the first time in IFAD’s history, the United States did not pledge (IFAD10 pledge was
US$90 million). This was partially offset by increased pledges from China (US$60–81
million) and the Netherlands (US$75–86 million).
The Replenishment target was US$1.2 billion to provide for a lending and grant program
of up US$3.5 billion. IFAD will continue to use its Sovereign Borrowing Framework to
borrow up to 50 percent of the replenishment target (from lenders such as the KfW
Development Bank) and will consider concessional partner loan frameworks, similar to
those introduced by IDA and the AfDB. Finally, as noted, IFAD will continue to explore
possible market funding.
Following changes to its allocation framework, IFAD will allocate 90 percent of its core
finance to LICs and LMICs, with 10 percent going to upper-middle-income countries
(UMICs), such as China, Mexico, and Brazil, which will mean a decrease in levels of
funding to UMICs. These strategic changes reflect the underlying financial constraints of
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the current IFAD model where, unlike the World Bank, IFAD cannot graduate highly
concessional (IDA) members into IBRD resources, because IFAD, as a Fund, has no
market-based lending facilities. In line with the Addis Ababa Financing for Development
meeting, IFAD will try to further develop partnerships (and co-financing) with the private
sector but recognizes that it will be challenging to increase private sector collaboration and
co-financing (IFAD 2018). These critical issues are expected to be central in the discussions
of the ongoing IFAD12 Replenishment.
CGIAR
Often described as the best investment that donors have made to increase food produc-
tivity and reduce hunger, and directly relevant to SDG2, CGIAR has contributed sub-
stantially to increasing world food production in food deficit countries since its inception
in 1971. Its original business model was to provide global and regional public goods and
to promote investment in building capacity of national agricultural research systems
(NARS) in developing countries, so as to make them stronger partners to undertake
essential downstream activities of applied and adaptive research and extension to achieve
impacts at scale.
Among the five organizations, CGIAR is by far the most complex, and Chapter 10 on
CGIAR discusses the three major and many minor reforms that it has undertaken to
address issues of governance, management, financing, research priorities, and conduct
during the 2001–3, 2008–15, and post-2015 periods. Funding of CGIAR had stagnated
until 2005–6, then more than doubled from US$426 million (in 2006) to US$960 million (in
2016) in response to the food crisis. Since 2014 (US$1,057 million), its funding has declined
again and has remained fragmented, short-term, and unpredictable. Accountability for the
system-level performance is less clear.
The organization grew in response to donors’ desires to expand the scope of research and
the number of Centers, such as for agroforestry and forestry, livestock, water, and natural
resource management. However, without the system being able to generate predictable
funding—particularly unrestricted funding—funding increased only temporarily in re-
sponse to the 2008 food crisis, and the degree of tying of the use of funding, subtly to the
donor’s own institutions, has increased again.
The CGIAR governance structure is distributed and layered with (1) System-wide
governance at the top, (2) inter-Center governance, (3) governance at the level of Centers,
and (4) governance at the level of CGIAR Research Programs (CRPs). The System Council
and System Board have unclear lines of responsibility and accountability, a problem
compounded by the continued fragmented funding.
Successive reforms over the history of CGIAR have, among other aims, been intended to
increase accountability for results, set clearer priorities, and increase long-term, unrestricted
funding. The reforms, as discussed in Chapter 10, have not yet been successful in increasing
long-term, unrestricted funding. Increased restricted funding has moved research down-
stream to demonstrate greater evidence of impacts on poverty and hunger. There is no
consensus among donors on the nature of long-term payoffs of CGIAR. Resources to
maintain and utilize its vast germplasm collection is stretched. Because of their own
weaknesses, NARS have been unable to perform some of the downstream work that still
falls to CGIAR, and without their strong role scaled up, impacts cannot be achieved
(McCalla 2017).
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In 2016, the rapidly evolving organizational structure of CGIAR consisted of 15 research
Centers and 16 System-wide CRPs. Consolidation has been a challenge historically, but with
funding shortages by 2019, voluntary mergers of Centers were occurring: for example, the
International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) and Bioversity, who in their first joint
Board of Trustees meeting on November 27–8, 2018, signed a Memorandum of Under-
standing (MoU) in support of their plans to create an Alliance (Bioversity 2018). The two
forestry Centers—the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) and the Center for International
Forestry Research (CIFOR)—merged on January 1, 2019, with the establishment of a
common Board, but with CIFOR and ICRAF continuing to maintain their headquarters
in Indonesia and Kenya, respectively (ICRAF 2019). With the number of Centers declining
to 14, inter-Center programs were achieving more cooperation. With the founding princi-
ples of Center autonomy and donor sovereignty intact, the complex superstructures of
Center Boards and CRP Advisory Committees continued. The System Council and System
Board were each reconstituted as part of the latest reforms in 2016, replacing the two-
pillared governance of “funders” and “doers,” which were not working, as described in the
chapter on CGIAR. The new reforms have moved the system in the right direction.
Together, the new System-level entities are moving toward 3-to-4-year replenishment
funding, much like that of IDA and IFAD, which will increase stability of research funding
and release scientists’ time to focus more on research.
The chairman of CGIAR has a four-year term. Traditionally held by the World Bank,
which has been a major donor to the CGIAR, CGIAR members urged the Bank to
nominate a senior Bank official as chair. The possible loss of the Bank as chair of the
CGIAR in the future could mean a loss of an internal champion with clout to plead for
Bank contributions to CGIAR. Bank funding, in turn, signals confidence among other
donors to fund the system, and indeed, having the Bank chair has fulfilled an important
function, providing stability to CGIAR, even when the Bank funding has been reduced
annually from US$50 to US$30 million. The 9th Systems Council (November 2019)
approved, by far, the most radical institutional innovation of a unified and integrated
One CGIAR, to adapt to the rapidly changing global conditions, while also making the
CGIAR System itself more relevant and effective. The move to One CGIAR, as agreed on
at the Extraordinary General Assembly of the Centers (Rome, December 2019) includes a
unified governance and management through a reconstituted System Management Board
and new Executive Management Team. This should assist CGIAR in better prioritizing its
research agenda; increasing ownership among emerging countries, such as Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), to take more responsibility for financing; and for
building capacity of the weaker NARS in Africa. Whether reforms will bring new and
additional sources of funding remains to be seen. CGIAR constituted 2 percent of global
research funding in 2020, compared to 4 percent of funding that it once was in the early
2000s (Beintema and Echeverría 2020). Besides BMGF, the sources of funding have not
changed.
Collaboration among Rome-Based Agencies
Collaboration among the three RBAs has been an issue of perennial interest to donors, with
periodic reports prepared by the three organizations, individually and collectively, on how
the collaboration is working or should work (WFP 2009a, 2009b; Tutwiler 2012; FAO,
IFAD, and WFP 2014; Global Landscapes Forum 2014; Shaw 2014; WFP 2014b;
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FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2015; IFAD 2015; FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2016; FAO 2020).²² In the
Informal Joint Meeting of the Executive Boards of the RBA held on September 15, 2017, a
number of members suggested the preparation of a Joint RBA “Rome Vision for Agenda
2030,” in order to increase the visibility of the RBA’s work for the implementation of the
Agenda 2030 in the UN (especially in New York). The final version of the meeting report is
available online (UN 2017b).
Bill Gates’ speech in 2012 to the IFAD Governing Council received much attention, albeit
with a widespread reaction among RBAs that it was overly simplistic and did not show an
understanding of the mandates, financing, management, or accountability of the three
organizations: He noted, “WFP runs nearly every aspect of the program, with a little
guidance from FAO and a little funding from IFAD. But in an ideal world, you would
collaborate to make a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. WFP would focus on
what it does best: logistics and procurement. IFAD would handle the financing. FAO would
provide advice to the farmers, standards to make sure they produce high-quality food, and
market information to facilitate negotiations” (Gates 2012).
Veterans of IOs thought Gates’ remarks simplistic. They showed little understanding of
how the three organizations are funded or what they do. Does it mean, for example, that
IFAD should fund WFP? The target for contributions for IFAD’s 11th Replenishment
(2019–21) is US$1.2 billion, whereas WFP’s annual budget is at least four times that
large. Would FAO give up its small, assessed contributions and deviate from its many
GPG functions for which it has few resources?
Why such an interest in RBA collaboration? First, in principle, their missions (conces-
sional financing for rural development, emergency relief, agricultural technical skills, and
global goods) are complementary. WFP was an internal program in FAO until tensions
grew between FAO and WFP, so WFP increasingly obtained greater autonomy (Ingram
2006). There have been proposals to integrate the three RBAs from time to time, including
from the Aspen Institute (Axworthy 2015), but in our view, a formal merger is not a
workable solution. The organizations have very different financing, governance, organiza-
tional arrangements, and modus operandi, as discussed earlier in the chapter. In the case of
WBG, collaboration between the World Bank, IFC, and MIGA is still a work in progress.
A statement on RBA collaboration was based on the mandates, related comparative
advantages, and distinctive strengths of each partner (FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2016).
However, each organization is accountable to the constituency that established it and
governs it. Even though, in several cases, the same members serve on the governing councils
of more than one Rome-based organization, the member countries have not demanded
such consolidation and/or integration.
The experience in Niger identifies issues that need to be addressed, more generally
(Box 6.1).
The joint statement from FAO, IFAD, and WPF on collaboration between the RBAs to
deliver the 2030 Agenda stated:
RBA collaboration should lead to a clear and mutually recognized added value in terms of
results relevant to the goals and objectives set by the RBAs’ Membership. Within this
²² See, also, IFAD: “Partners,” https://operations.ifad.org/web/ifad/partners/rome-based-un-agencies; WFP:
“Rome-Based Agencies,” https://www.wfp.org/news/rome-based-agencies-rbas-5013; FAO: “Resilience—
Strengthening Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition in Contexts Facing Recurrent Shocks and Stressors,”
http://www.fao.org/resilience/news-events/detail/en/c/335041/
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context, RBA collaboration should serve as a means for greater effectiveness in supporting
international governance of agriculture, agricultural development, food security and
nutrition, including through results-based monitoring and incorporating lessons learned.
(FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2016, 6)
It remains unclear as to the extent this has been delivered. In its report on WFP and global
food security, the International Development Committee (IDC) of Great Britain asserted:
There is a desperate need for a one-UN approach to meeting food security challenges.
Roughly speaking, the model devised 30 years ago, assigns agriculture-for-food-
production to FAO, agriculture-for-poverty-reduction-and-empowerment to IFAD,
food access-for-children to UNICEF and food provision-in-emergencies to WFP . . .While
there are exceptions, very few truly joint initiatives manage to transcend the institutional
fights for resources and media limelight. (IDC 2008, 61)
Summarizing this discussion of RBA collaboration, MOPAN (2013, x) reported: “Donors,
in particular, appear concerned that WFP’s recent shift to food assistance may extend the
organisation further into development programming and result in a duplication of roles and
responsibilities with other United Nations agencies.” That expansion impinges on FAO’s
Box 6.1 SWOT Analysis for Collaboration in Niger
SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis for an RBA collaboration
with synergy toward resilience in Niger stressed as its strengths the credibility and good
reputation of RBAs among Nigerien government partners, their complementary man-
dates, activities, and tools. Expertise and experience with collaboration could provide
positive and promising results with multilevel, diverse partnerships.
Its weaknesses include different programming processes and cycles, leading to fund-
ing delays, lack of resources for resilience, lack of staff to focus on resilience, and a weak
RBA coordination mechanism with different geographical targeting priorities.
Opportunities include strong support from the Government of Niger, UN agencies,
and other financial and technical partners, fostering joint targeting and complementary
interventions to operationalize resilience and measure impact in Communes de Con-
vergence (C2Cs). Interest of financial partners toward integrated, multisectoral inter-
ventions to build resilience could offer opportunities (for example, the World Bank on
social protection, USAID and EU on food security).
Threats include insufficient and lack of long-term, predictable funding for resilience
activities, lack of government resources at the national and subnational levels (for
example, for technical services), and recurrent shocks and insecurity in the subregion,
North, and border areas.
The Nigerien review made a number of recommendations and discussed next steps for
a strengthened RBA collaboration on resilience, including policy dialogue, analysis and
planning, joint/complementary programming and implementation, and monitoring
impacts and measuring resilience.
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traditional responsibilities more than most. Being an emergency organization, WFP has had
a strong comparative advantage and well-recognized expertise in logistics, and due to the
nature of its mission, it is an agile organization. It is well connected with key donors, with
the United States as its foremost champion. FAO has more staff on long-term basis, whereas
most of WFP hires tend to be on short-term contracts. Over the years, donors and critics of
FAO have expressed concerns about FAO providing small TCP projects to governments,
rather than confining its efforts to the provision of GPGs (FAO 2007a; CGD 2015). FAO’s
assessed contributions are increasingly ring-fenced for its GPG functions, with voluntary
contributions carrying on donors’ preferred activities: for example, in transition from
emergencies to rehabilitation of land rights, seed supply, and reconstruction. Consequently,
there has been increasing overlap betweenWFP’s and FAO’s activities in the field, and while
FAO has much of the technical expertise in these fields, WFP commands more financial
resources. FAO’s annual extra-budgetary resources of about US$800 million pale before
WFP’s US$5–6 billion voluntary contributions annually, although some of WFP’s contribu-
tions are in-kind, voluntary, and never certain. Some commentators on this chapter have
argued that this dichotomy between GPGs and projects is outdated, superseded by, among
other things, the SDGs and Agenda 2030.
It is clear from the preceding discussion that organizations have grown in response to
their own needs to be able to achieve expeditious responses and not necessarily based on
their comparative advantages. In theory, FAO may have a strong comparative advantage,
through its technical expertise, to work with WFP, but may have been unable to exercise its
advantage, owing to its limited fragmented voluntary contributions rather than long-term
funding that would enable FAO to build on it—a challenge compounded by FAO’s slow
bureaucratic approach, in part to conserve its limited resources, compared to the agility and
speed of WFP’s operations. This state of affairs can change only if there is assured long-term
funding from donors for FAO and an agreement in principle that expertise matters.
The short answer to the RBA collaborative experience, thus far, is that it works better at
the global level than at the country level—for example, (1) in publishing reports on food
security, which are largely initiated by FAO but co-prepared and signed by WFP and IFAD;
(2) in providing joint support for organizing the Committee on World Food Security (CFS)
conferences, mostly driven by member countries; (3) for administrative collaboration in
travel and security management; or (4) in meetings such as the Second International
Conference on Nutrition (ICN2). Collaborations at the regional and country levels remain
weak, even though each of the organizations has country operations and sometimes share
offices or office compounds. The other ICN2-related initiatives, such as Scaling Up Nutri-
tion (SUN), have begun to have more traction in countries.
The question in need of more systematic, independent evidence is at what level does
collaboration work better and why. IFAD’s regional presence is limited to a small number of
regional grants, with the majority of IFAD’s concessional financing being focused at the
country level. Cooperation at the country level will improve if member countries, while
recognizing the different operational modalities of RBAs, both support and demand their
collaboration for specific initiatives, and if dedicated programs do not compete with the
already stretched budgets and current programming of the RBAs, or be met with strong
expectations from donors that they each show results on the ground for their own brands.
The extent to which the “One UN” idea works in practice at the field level is unclear. We
hesitate to suggest another evaluation, because far too often, evaluation findings are not
implemented, though the parameters of the forthcoming Food Systems Summit 2021 may
offer the broad terms of reference for such a study.
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Partnerships between the World Bank Group
and United Nations Agencies
The UN agencies and WBG have a long history of partnerships on all matters related to
the SDGs and climate change, ranging from formal, long-term legal arrangements to
more informal and ad hoc forms of engagement and exchange in the areas of research,
policy development, and knowledge sharing, as well as operational cooperation at regional
and country levels through programs, projects, and technical assistance. Between 2006
and 2016, WBG provided US$3.4 billion in direct and indirect financing to UN funds,
programs, and agencies with the largest share going to UNICEF (US$1.5 billion), followed
by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), the United Nations Popula-
tion Fund (UNFPA), WHO, WFP, FAO, and the UNDP.²³ World Bank’s borrowers
engage UN agencies for implementation of project-specific activities at the country
level, using standard financial and fiduciary agreements. FAO’s Cooperative Programme
with the World Bank, since 1964, provides technical services to member countries. In
partnership with the World Bank, it provides policy, advisory, analytical investment
project formulation and implementation support, and capacity development, involving
between 55–65 percent of World Bank projects in the areas of agriculture, environment,
water, and land.
The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, the
International Fund for Agricultural Development, the World Bank,
and the International Labour Organization
FAO, IFAD, and the World Bank are partnering on GAFSP, which illustrates what can be
achieved in terms of programmatic collaboration and are actively engaged at the regional
and country levels in 145 investment projects, with IDA and IBRD cofinancing, for a total
amount of US$3.8 billion. IFAD also has participated, since 1996, in the Heavily Indebted
Poor Country Debt Initiative (HIPC–DI). It has provided US$445.1 million, in nominal
terms, in debt relief to the 35 completion-point countries and collaborated closely with the
World Bank and regional development banks in the implementation of the program.
To improve the design of public works programs, the Bank has contributed US$45.5 mil-
lion over six years to support the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) technical
assistance through grants and loans to Afghanistan, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali,
Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Yemen, and Paraguay.
The World Food Programme and the World Bank
WFP and the World Bank have collaborated on national social protection systems in 25
countries for well over a decade. WFP has received over US$360 million from the Bank for
technical cooperation on school feeding, as well as shock-responsive social protection
systems in food security and agriculture, national social protection and safety net systems,
²³ See https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/partners#3
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future pandemic preparedness, and on issues related to the humanitarian development–
peace nexus in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.
The World Health Organization and the World Bank
WHO and the World Bank co-lead the group of UN organizations and major donors’
development agencies that work in global health, including an agreement for the provision
of WHO technical assistance in Bank-financed projects and output delivery on health-
related issues. They also provide joint secretariat support to the International Health
Partnership of Universal Health Coverage 2030.
The United Nations Children’s Fund and the World Bank
The World Bank and UNICEF partner on issues related to early childhood development;
service delivery for children; social protection; youth and adolescents; and fragility-
affected refugee, and migrant children. Through an alliance to advance early childhood
development, WBG and UNICEF invite governments, development partners, civil society,
foundations, and the private sector to make early childhood development a global and
national development priority, including on childcare and nutrition in the “early years”
in nutrition.
The Bank is also a founding cosponsor of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/
AIDS (UNAIDS) and supports the development of strategic, prioritized, and costed multi-
sectoral national AIDS plans, undertaking investment research to underpin resource allo-
cation. The institutions are working together to integrate HIV sensitivity in the Bank’s new
billion-dollar loan portfolios on social protection and education.
The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the Ministry for Economic Cooperation
and Development (BMZ) of Germany, and the World Bank are working together to
strengthen advisory capacities for land governance in Africa with special attention to the
rights of marginalized groups, such as small-scale farmers, pastoralists, and women
through the Network of Excellence on Land Governance in Africa (NELGA). The World
Bank is also a key partner of the Global Land Tool Network, which aims to promote
development and use of pro-poor and gender-sensitive land tools, including the Social
Tenure Domain Model, widely used by diverse stakeholders. As part of this partnership, the
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) is actively involved in the
organization of the annual World Bank Global Land and Poverty Reduction Conference,
which is held in Washington, DC, every year for researchers, practitioners, and policy-
makers in the land sector.
The Bank is also a member of the Global Migration Group (GMG), a forum of 22 UN
System entities that promotes the wider application of all international and regional
instruments and norms relating to migration, developing the adoption of coordinated
approaches to the issue of international migration.
These are some of the examples of cooperation among IOs. Given the overlap in some
specific functions that IOs carry out and with limited resources at their disposal, how should
they specialize, bring the best knowledge, and cooperate further to improve their individual
and collective effectiveness, and where should they collaborate?
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A Fractionated Record of Donor Evaluations of International
Organizations: The Need to Separate the Forest from the Trees
The evidence base to improve governance and management of individual organizations
remains less than satisfactory. Donor-led assessments of IOs have proliferated
(Achamkulangare and Bartsiotas 2017). Some 205 bilateral assessments in the sense of
evaluations by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members of the OECD were
conducted during 2012–14 alone, with the UN having to create a response apparatus just to
introduce some order and discipline. Given that 70 percent of the UN financing comes from
voluntary contributions (Jenks and Topping 2017), with funds and programs such as WFP
and UNICEF almost totally financed by voluntary contributions, increased taxpayer aware-
ness and concerns about aid effectiveness and accountability of IOs in OECD donor
countries explains this growth in donor-led assessments, despite increases in transparency
and accountability in the IOs over time. The treatment of organizations is uneven. Three
Paris Declaration surveys provided evidence of how the five Paris Declaration principles
were being implemented and gave good marks to the World Bank, IFAD, and regional
banks (and these surveys were, in turn, used by MOPAN; see Box 6.2 for more about
MOPAN). Assessments are typically short-term snapshots, occasionally helping with re-
forms within individual organizations, but overall, to us, the benefits of individual bilateral
assessments do not seem commensurate with the resources that donors spend on them.
Most importantly, they do not address larger, strategic questions—huge funding challenges
in the face of ambitious agendas of work, the need for renewal of skill sets and incentives,
and the growing competition for funds—the sorts of issues that we explore here.
Evaluating the Governance Processes of the Big Five
It is next to impossible to collapse the assessments of IOs into something manageable,
because each bilateral donor looks at the IOs in terms of fulfilling the expectations of their
taxpayers, which vary among donors. The bilateral assessments offer donors a view of the
complex world of IOs to make more informed decisions about levels and allocations of aid,
but taken together, they make huge demands on IOs to respond to the information needs of
individual donor countries (Government of Australia 2012), entailing staff and manage-
ment costs and with duplication of efforts across evaluations. Since IOs are more effective,
transparent, and accountable, in terms of use of resources and outcomes, than their bilateral
aid counterparts, this chapter issues a call for action to bilateral donors to place greater trust
in the collective assessment process: consolidate resources; focus on critical questions of
global importance; abandon a “one-size-fits-all” approach to evaluation methodologies;
devote resources to a few, high quality evaluations; reduce the transaction costs of external
evaluations to IOs; and help mobilize increased funding for them to be more effective in
filling the huge gap between need and supply (Birdsall and Kharas 2010).
Lindoso and Hall (2016) have also argued that the academic literature on the evalu-
ation of IOs has been carried out in parallel with donor assessments, with little interac-
tion among them. They pointed to the need for further research and coordination. We
argue, on the other hand, that assessments of IOs need to address larger strategic issues
of the type that we address in this chapter from the available evidence, extensive inter-
views, and our own experience. The two governance issues we focus on are financing and
effectiveness.
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Box 6.2 Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment
Network
MOPANa is a network of 18 bilateral donor countries,b which contribute 95 percent of
ODA to and through the multilateral system and share concerns about the effectiveness
of multilateral organizations and the organizations’ accountability to donor countries’
taxpayers. The 2013 independent evaluation of MOPAN by the Swedish Institute of
Public Administration noted that MOPAN’s common approach across organizations
was supply-led and not very useful to IOs in improving their performance (Balogun et al.
2013). MOPAN 3.0 has since improved its methodology and coverage of organizations,
adding four dimensions of organizational effectiveness—strategic management, opera-
tional management, relationship management, and knowledge management—to also
cover development effectiveness (MOPAN n.d.). Due to the diversity of the organiza-
tions’ mandates and structures, MOPAN does not compare or rank them. Because
MOPAN’s assessments do not coincide with aid cycles of individual donors and do
not meet their home constituencies’ specific needs, AusAID, like other bilateral donors,
continue to conduct their own assessments. MOPAN’s focus on field- or country-level
results and information (and the efforts taken to ask questions at that level) is said to
have focused agency attention on having those decision-making and reporting structures
in place at the country level. Donors argue that their assessments are usually linked to
parliamentary approval processes for budgets and are “supplements” to MOPAN.
MOPAN assessments of FAO, in 2011 and 2014, noted improvement in virtually every
performance indicator. In four important areas linked to delivery—corporate strategy based
on clear mandate, country focus on results, support of national plans, and contributing to
policy dialogue—the rating was raised from “inadequate or below” to “strong or above”
(MOPAN 2011, 2014). MOPAN (2014), which referred to the Jacques Diouf era
(1994–2011), prior to José Graziano da Silva taking over FAO leadership in 2010, cited
two areas of continued concern: results-based budgeting and management of human
resources. The 2016 Multilateral Development Review (MDR) of the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) confirmed MOPAN’s findings, noting that FAO has
turned its performance around, crediting the leadership, modernized management struc-
ture, and efficiency savings for the positive outcome. The MDR rated FAO as “good,” on a
four-step scale of weak, adequate, good, or very good (DFID and UK Aid 2016). The
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, on the other hand, decided to reduce
their funding of FAO in 2012, based on outdated evidence. FAO convinced MOPAN to use
more up-to-date evidence for evaluation (personal communication, Daniel Gustafson,
Deputy Director- General, FAO, August 21, 2017). FAO’s MOPAN (2018, 9) was even
stronger on its positive performance, as a “highly effective” organization, but noted its
growing reliance on voluntary contributions and concluded, “FAO may need to engage
member nations in identifying options for new, more sustainable forms of funding for
activities that have traditionally relied on core funding” (MOPAN 2018, 43).
Notes:
a MOPAN has assessed 27 organizations since 2003, and has done so multiple times, using three different
approaches (Annual Survey, Common Approach, and MOPAN 3.0). Their selection follows a dual-track
process of (1) identification of member preferences through a process orchestrated by the MOPAN
Secretariat; and (2) a sampling process, based on clear criteria, conducted by International Organisation
Development Ltd (IOD PARC), as part of its inception work for assessments. MOPAN members select when
and what organizations to assess on a consensus basis (see “MOPAN assessments: who do we assess?” http://
www.mopanonline.org/ourwork/whodoweassess)
b The countries include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, and the
United Kingdom.
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Table A.6.1 Governance of international organizations in 2016





Shareholder Modified shareholder Hybrid shareholder/stakeholder Stakeholder Modified shareholder
Head of the
organization
Governors Governing Council System Council (governed by the
CGIAR System Framework [see
CGIAR (2016a)]) and System
Management Board of the CGIAR
System Organization (governed by




Delegated to board Yes Yes; to Executive
Board
Yes Yes; to Council Yes




20 voting members + observers 49 36
Elected 5 large shareholders nominated by
their governments, the rest by
forming constituencies of countries.
Voice reforms in 2010 increased the
voting power of developing countries
in IBRD to 47.19 percent, bringing
the total shift to DTCs in both Phases
to 4.59 percentage points once the
current Selective Capital Increase is
fully subscribed. Also, Governors
agreed to conduct periodic IBRD and
IFC Shareholding Reviews, every five
years, beginning in 2015, as a way to
maintain legitimacy and dynamism
and to reflect global economic
List A: 8 Members; 8
Alternates (OECD)
List B: 4 Members; 4
Alternates (OPEC)
List C1: 2 Members;
2 Alternates (Africa)
List C2: 2 Members;
2 Alternates (Europe,
Asia, and the Pacific)




1. System Council consists of:(a) Up
to 20 voting members as follows:i. Up
to 15 representatives of Fundersii.
Five developing country
representatives that are either
Funders, or countries hosting a
Center, or countries with significant
national agricultural systems(b) Ex-
officio non-voting members as
follows:i. Chair of the System
Council, so far by consensus from
WB, but nominated by WBii. Co-
Chair of the System Council, to be
elected at each meetingiii. Chair of
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and Social Council




























World Bank IFAD CGIAR FAO WFP
changes in IBRD and IFC
shareholding according to the weight
of all members in the world
economy; to review contributions to
the WBG development mission; and
to make progress toward equitable
voting power between developed and
developing members. On
responsiveness to increase diversity
in management and staff,
accelerating decentralization of
operations and field presence, as well
as internal governance reforms
undertaken.
Executive Director of the System
Organizationv. Two Center
representatives to be appointed by
the Centersvi. One representative
from each of the following entities,
provided that if any such entity is a
voting member or an alternate of the
System Council such entity may not
also participate as an ex-officio:FAO,
IFAD, World Bank.Each voting
member, non-voting member, and
active observer may appoint an
alternate that may attend System
Council meetings and, if necessary,
serve in their stead.2. System
Management Board comprise the
following nine (9) voting members,
as follows:(a) Seven Center Board
members or Directors General, as
appointed by the Centers(b) Two
independent members, one of which
should, whenever possible, be the
Chairi. System Management Board
shall appoint a Chair from among its
members.ii. Executive Director of the
System Organization will serve on
the System Management Board as an
ex-officio non-voting member.iii.
The process and criteria for the
selection and appointment of voting
members of the System Management

























The System Management Board will
include at least one expert in
organizational management and one
expert in financial management.
Name of leader President President Chairman (and Rotating Co-chair) of
the System
Director-General Executive Director









The System Council appoints a
Chair. The World Bank has a
standing invitation to nominate a
System Chair. The System Council
appoints a Co-Chair for each meeting
from among its voting members.
Executive Director of the System
Office, as chief executive officer,
appointed by the System
Management Board, selected on basis
of merit, in an open and competitive
manner. The Executive Director may
be appointed to a term of four years,












by the UN Secretary-
General and FAO
Director General




Six years Four years Four years Four years Five years
Financial
contributions





minimum contribution to be funders
member and higher contribution to
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State members 188 countries 176 countries 64 members worldwide (25
developing and 22 industrialized
countries, 4 private foundations, and
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conducted in more than 60 countries,
collaboratively with academia,
NGOs, and the private sector

































14,700, 90 percent of





































































Achamkulangare, Gopinathan, and George A. Bartsiotas. 2017. “Donor-Led Assessments of
The United Nations System Organizations.” JIU/REP/2017/2, Joint Inspection Unit, United
Nations, Geneva.
Ahluwalia, Montek Singh, Lawrence Summers, Andrés Velasco (co-chairs); Nancy Birdsall, and
Scott Morris (co-directors). 2016. “Multilateral Development Banking for this Century’s
Development Challenges: Five Recommendations to Shareholders of the Old and New
Multilateral Development Banks.” Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.
Atluri, Venkat, Miklós Dietz, and Nicolaus Henke. 2017. “Competing in a World of Sectors
without Borders.” McKinsey Quarterly, July. https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/
mckinsey-analytics/our-insights/competing-in-a-world-of-sectors-without-borders
Axworthy, Lloyd. 2015. “Reforming International Governance of Food Security.” The Aspen
Institute, November 9. https://www.aspeninstitute.org/aspen-journal-of-ideas/reforming-
international-governance-food-security/
Balogun, Paul, Paul Isenman, Derek Poate, and Viktoria Hildenwall. 2013. “Evaluation of
MOPAN.” Swedish Institute for Public Administration (SIPA), Stockholm. http://www.
mopanonline.org/otherproducts/items/EVALUATION%20OF%20MOPAN%20Final%
20vol.%201.pdf
Barrett, Christopher B. 2017. Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations Hearing on “Modernizing the Food for Peace Program.” Room 419, Dirksen Senate
Office Building, October 19. http://barrett.dyson.cornell.edu/presentations/Senate%20For
eign%20Relations%20Oct%202017%20Barrett%20testimony%20final.pdf
Beattie, Alan. 2012. “World Bank: An Exercise of Influence.” Financial Times, April 2. https://
www.ft.com/content/15b9d4d8-7ca6-11e1-8a27-00144feab49a
Beintema, Nienke M., and Ruben G. Echeverría. 2020. “Evolution of CGIAR Funding.” ASTI
Program Note, September, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washing-
ton, DC. https://www.ifpri.org/publication/evolution-cgiar-funding
Bioversity. 2018. “Bioversity International and CIAT Sign Memorandum of Understanding that
Establishes the Alliance Foundations.”News, December 11. https://www.bioversityinternational.
org/news/detail/bioversity-international-and-ciat-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-that-
establishes-the-alliance/
Birdsall, Nancy, and Homi Kharas, with Ayad Mahgoub and Rita Perakis. 2010. “Quality of
Official Development Assistance Assessment.” QuODA Report, Brookings Institution and
Center for Global Development (CGD), Washington, DC.
Bretton Woods Project. 2016. “IMF & World Bank Decision-making and Governance.” IFI
Governance, Inside the Institutions, March 31. http://bwp.handsupdev.com/2016/03/imf-
world-bank-decision-making-and-governance-existing-structures-and-reform-processes/
Browne, Stephen, and Roberto Cordon. 2015. “Vertical Funds: Lessons for Multilateralism and
the UN.” Briefing 25, January, Future United Nations Development System, Ralph Bunche
Institute for International Studies, CUNY Graduate Center, New York.
CGD (Center for Global Development). 2015. “Time for the FAO to Shift to a Higher Gear.”
A Report of the CGDWorking Group on Food Security (originally published October 2013 and
updated January 2015), CGD, Washington, DC. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/time-fao-
shift-higher-gear
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
384   
CGIAR. 2012. “CGIAR Financial Report for Year 2011.” A joint collaborative effort between the
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), the CGIAR Consortium Office, and the Fund
Office. CGIAR Consortium Office, Montpellier, France. https://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/
handle/10947/2707/2011_CGIAR_Financial_Report.pdf
CGIAR. 2013. “CGIAR Financial Report for Year 2012.” September 20. CGIAR Consortium
Office, Montpellier, France. https://library.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10947/2869/2012_
CGIAR_Financial_Report.pdf
CGIAR. 2014. “CGIAR Financial Report for Year 2013.” June 18. Prepared by the CGIAR
Consortium Office, Montpellier, France. https://library.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10947/
3069/CGIAR%20Finance%20Report%202013.pdf
CGIAR. 2015. “CGIAR Financial Report for Year 2014.” October 1. Prepared by the CGIAR
Consortium Office and the CGIAR Fund Office, Montpellier, France. https://library.cgiar.
org/bitstream/handle/10947/4018/2014%20CGIAR%20Financial%20Report.pdf
CGIAR. 2016a. “CGIAR System Framework.” Approved by System’s Funders and Centers June
17. http://library.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10947/4371/CGIAR%20System%20Framework
%20-%20WEB.pdf?sequence=4
CGIAR. 2016b. “2015 CGIAR Financial Report.” June 2016, CGIAR Consortium Office and
CGIAR Fund Office, Montpellier, France, and Washington, DC. https://library.cgiar.org/
bitstream/handle/10947/4452/2015%20CGIAR%20Financial%20Report.pdf
CGIAR. 2017a. “CGIAR System Annual Performance Report 2017.” https://www.cgiar.org/
wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/CGIAR-Annual-Performance-Report-2017.pdf
CGIAR. 2017b. “2016 CGIAR Financial Report.” July, CGIAR System Management Office,
Montpellier, France. https://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10947/4666/2016-CGIAR-
Financial-Report.pdf
Chandy, Laurence. 2017. “No Country Left Behind: The Case for Focusing Greater Attention on
the World’s Poorest Countries.” Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC.
Cheney, Catherine. 2017. “German Foreign Aid Is at a Record High and Rising. Here Is How It
Works.” Devex, February. https://www.devex.com/news/german-foreign-aid-is-at-a-record-
high-and-rising-here-is-how-it-works-89366
Cleaver, Kevin, Amnon Golan, and Anil Sood. 2017. “An Independent Assessment of FAO’s
Technical Capacity.” FAO, Rome. http://www.fao.org/3/a-ms760e.pdf
Custer, Samantha, Zachary Rice, Takaaki Masaki, Rebecca Latourell, and Bradley Parks. 2015.
“Listening to Leaders: Which Development Partners Do They Prefer and Why?” AidData,
Williamsburg, VA. http://aiddata.org/sites/default/files/execsummary_2.pdf
Deaton, Angus. 2018. “The U.S. Can No Longer Hide from Its Deep Poverty Problem.”
Opinion, New York Times, January 24. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/op
inion/poverty-united-states.html
Development Committee (Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank
and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries). 2015. “From
Billions to Trillions: Transforming Development Finance Post-2015 Financing for Develop-
ment: Multilateral Development Finance.” Development Committee Discussion Note. Pre-
pared jointly by African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank Group, April 18.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
   “ ” 385
Development Committee (Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank
and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries). 2018. “Sustainable
Financing for Sustainable Development.” DC2018-0002/P, April 21, Report to the Governors
at the 2018 Spring Meetings, World Bank Group, Washington, DC.
Development Initiatives. 2016. “Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2016.” Development
Initiatives Ltd, Bristol, UK. http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Global-
Humanitarian-Assistance-Report-2016.pdf
DFID (Department for International Development) and UK Aid. 2011.Multilateral Aid Review:
Ensuring Maximum Value for Money for UK Aid through Multilateral Organisations.
London: DFID. http://www.who.int/country-cooperation/what-who-does/DFID_multi
lateral_aid_review.pdf?ua=1
DFID (Department for International Development) and UK Aid. 2013.Multilateral Aid Review:
Driving Reform to Achieve Multilateral Effectiveness. London: DFID. https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/297523/MAR-review-dec13.pdf
DFID (Department for International Development) and UK Aid. 2016. Raising the Standard:
The Multilateral Aid Review 2016. London: DFID. https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/
publication/evaluation-dfid-multilateral-development-review-2016.pdf
Economic Times. 2008. “UN Food Agency Approves US$42.6 Million Reform Plan.” India
Times, November 22. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/un-food-
agency-approves-42-6-million-reform-plan/articleshow/3745635.cms
The Economist. 2017. “Six Big Ideas: Coase’s Theory of the Firm.” Economics brief, July 27.
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 1996. “Rome Declaration on
World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action.” World Food Summit,
November 13–17, Rome. http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.htm
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2007a. “The Challenge of
Renewal.” Report of the Independent External Evaluation of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), submitted to the Council Committee for the
Independent External Evaluation of FAO (CC–IEE), September 2007.
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2007b. “Official FAO
Response to Evaluation Report.” FAO Newsroom, Rome, October 29. http://www.fao.org/
newsroom/en/news/2007/1000692/
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2011. “FAO Reform: Looking
Forward.” FAO, Rome. http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/mg881e/mg881e.pdf
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2016. “2015 Annual Report of
the Inspector General.” FC 161/10, Finance Committee, FAO, Rome, May 16–20.
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2017a. “The Director-General’s
Medium Term Plan 2018–21 and Programme of Work and Budget 2018–19.” FAO, Rome.
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2017b. “FAO and the SDGs
Indicators: Measuring up to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” FAO, Rome.
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6919e.pdf
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2017c. “The Future of Food
and Agriculture. Trends and Challenges.” FAO, Rome. http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6583e.pdf
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2017d. “Informal Seminar on
SDG Indicators.” A statement by FAO Director-General José Graziano da Silva, FAO, Rome,
March 1. http://www.fao.org/about/who-we-are/director-gen/faodg-statements/detail/en/c/
472444/
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
386   
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2017e “Regular Programme
Contributions as at 31 October 2017.” About FAO/Strategic Planning. http://www.fao.org/
about/strategic-planning/country-contributions/en/
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2017f. Verbatim Records of
Plenary Meetings of the FAO Council, 156th Session, Rome, April 24–8. http://www.fao.org/
about/meetings/council/cl156/en/
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2020. “Rome Based Agencies
Work Together to Ensure Food Security in Mozambique.” FAOProjects. http://www.fao.org/in-
action/rome-based-agencies-work-together-to-ensure-food-security-in-mozambique/en/
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), IFAD (International Fund for
Agricultural Development), UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), WFP (World Food
Programme), and WHO (World Health Organization). 2017. The State of Food Security and
Nutrition in the World 2017. Building Resilience for Peace and Food Security. Rome: FAO.
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), IFAD (International Fund for
Agricultural Development), and WFP (World Food Programme). 2014. “Food Security,
Nutrition and Sustainable Agriculture in the Post-2015 Agenda: Priority Targets and In-
dicators Identified by FAO, IFAD and WFP.” March 27, Rome. http://www.fao.org/
fileadmin/user_upload/post-2015/Targets_and_indicators_RBA_joint_proposal.pdf and
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/post-2015/RBA_Target_indicator_box.pdf
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), IFAD (International Fund for
Agricultural Development), and WFP (World Food Programme). 2015. “Strengthening
Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition.” A Conceptual Framework for Collaboration
and Partnership among the Rome-based Agencies, April. https://www.wfp.org/rba-joint-
resilience-framework
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), IFAD (International Fund for
Agricultural Development), and WFP (World Food Programme). 2016. “Collaboration
among the United Nations Rome-based Agencies: Delivering on the 2030 Agenda.” CL
155/12 Rev.2, November, Rome. http://www.fao.org/3/a-mr918rev1e.pdf
GAFSP (Global Agriculture and Food Security Program). 2009. “Framework Document for a
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP).” Sustainable Development Net-
work, December 7.
GAFSP (Global Agriculture and Food Security Program). 2015. “Executive Minutes: Joint
GAFSP Steering Committee/Private Sector Window Donor Committee Meeting.” https://
www.gafspfund.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/SC%20Meeting%20Apr%202018%20Execu
tive%20Minutes_0.pdf
GAFSP (Global Agriculture and Food Security Program). 2018. “Ending Poverty and Hunger.”
Who We Are. https://www.gafspfund.org
Gates, Bill. 2012. Prepared Remarks to International Fund for Agricultural Development
Governing Council, February 23. https://www.gatesfoundation.org/media-center/speeches/
2012/02/bill-gates-ifad
Glauber, Joseph W., Ryan Nabil, and Vincent H. Smith. 2017. “Food for Peace Reform Act.”
Inside Sources/Politics, May 17. http://www.insidesources.com/food-peace-reform-act/
Global Landscapes Forum. 2014. “A Paradigm Shift in Agriculture: Rome Based Agencies Push
for SDGs that Target Whole Food Systems, Consumption and Waste Reduction.” http://
www.landscapes.org/paradigm-shift-agriculture-rome-based-agencies-push-sdgs-target-
whole-food-systems-consumption-waste-reduction/
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
   “ ” 387
Government of Australia. 2012. Australian Multilateral Assessment. March. Canberra: Com-
monwealth of Australia. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/ama-full-re
port-2.pdf
Gulrajani, Nillma. 2016. “Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid Channels: Strategic Choices for
Donors.” ODI Report, Overseas Development Institute, London.
Gwin, Catherine. 1997. “U.S. Relations with the World Bank, 1945–1992.” In The World Bank,
Its First Half Century, Volume 2, edited by Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb,
Richard, 195–274. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee). 2012. “Humanitarian System-Wide Emergency
Activation: Definition and Procedures—IASC Transformative Agenda Reference Docu-
ment.” PR/1204/4078/7, April 13. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/humanitarian-system-
wide-emergency-activation-definition-and-procedures-iasc
IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee). 2013. “Common Framework for Preparedness.”
October 18, UN, New York. https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/com
mon_framework_for_preparedness.pdf
ICRAF (World Agroforestry Centre). 2019. “ICRAF & CIFOR Merger: Accelerating Impact for
a Sustainable World.” About Us. http://www.worldagroforestry.org/about/icraf-cifor
IDA (International Development Association). 2017. “Towards 2030: Investing in Growth,
Resilience and Opportunity.” Report from the Executive Directors of the International
Development Association to the Board of Governors, Additions to IDA Resources: Eight-
eenth Replenishment, IDA, Washington, DC.
IDA (International Development Association). 2020. “IDA19: Ten Years to 2030: Growth,
People, Resilience.” Additions to IDA Resources: Nineteenth Replenishment. Report from
the Executive Directors of the International Development Association to the Board of
Governors, February 11. http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/459531582153485508/
pdf/Additions-to-IDA-Resources-Nineteenth-Replenishment-Ten-Years-to-2030-Growth-
People-Resilience.pdf
IDC (International Development Committee). 2008. The World Food Programme and Global
Food Security: Tenth Report of Session 2007–2008, Vol. II: Oral and Written Evidence.
Ordered by The House of Commons. London: The Stationery Office Ltd.
IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). 2009. “Governance and Anticorruption in Lending
Operations: A Benchmarking and Learning Review.” World Bank, Washington, DC. http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/GAC_review_2009.pdf
IFAD (International Fund for Agriculture). 2015. “Collaboration of the United Nations Rome-
based Agencies.” EB 2015/115/R.23, IFAD Perspective Position Paper, August 18, IFAD,
Rome. https://webapps.ifad.org/members/eb/115/docs/EB-2015-115-R-23.pdf
IFAD (International Fund for Agriculture). 2018. “Report of the Consultation on the Eleventh
Replenishment of IFAD’s Resources. Leaving No One Behind: IFAD’s Role in the 2030
Agenda.” IFAD/11/5/INF.2, Governing Council, Forty-first Session, Rome, February 13–14.
https://webapps.ifad.org/members/repl/11/05
IFAD (International Fund for Agriculture). 2019. “Voting Rights of IFAD Member States 06/
11/2017.” https://webapps.ifad.org/members/static/Countries-Voting-Rights.pdf
IFAD (International Fund for Agriculture) and OPEC Fund. 2005. “A Partnership to Eradicate
Rural Poverty.” September, Rome. https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/4ad78b11-9a35-
4d97-9af7-28eba6127c94
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
388   
Ingram, James. 2006. Bread and Stones: Leadership and the Struggle to Reform the United
Nations World Food Programme. North Charleston, SC: BookSurge.
Isenman, Paul. 2011. “Architecture, Allocations, Effectiveness and Governance: Lessons from
Global Funds.” ODI Meeting on Climate Change, May 5, Overseas Development Institute,
London.
Isenman, Paul. 2012. “Learning from Assessments of Overall Effectiveness of Multilateral
Organisations.” Paper submitted to the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation
(SADEV), Stockholm.
Isenman, Paul, and Alexander Shakow. 2010. “Donor Schizophrenia and Aid Effectiveness: The
Role of Global Funds.” IDS Practice Paper No. 5, Institute of Development Studies (IDS),
University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.
Jenks, Bruce, and Jennifer Topping. 2017. “Financing the UN Development System: Pathways
to Reposition for Agenda 2030.” September, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and United
Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, Uppsala, Sweden. http://www.daghammarskjold.
se/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Financing-UNDS-2017_2oct.pdf
Kanbur, Ravi. 2017. “What is the World Bank Good For? Global Public Goods and Global
Institutions.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12090, Center for Economic Policy Research,
London.
Kanbur, Ravi, and Andy Sumner. 2012. “Poor Countries or Poor People? Development Assis-
tance and the New Geography of Global Poverty.” Journal of International Development 24
(6): 686–95.
Kapur, Devish, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb, eds. 1997. The World Bank: Its First Half
Century, Vol. 1:History and Vol. 2: Perspectives. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Kapur, Devesh, and Arjun Raychaudhuri. 2014. “Rethinking the Financial Design of the World
Bank.” Working Paper 352, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.
Kharas, Homi. 2007. “Trends and Issues in Development Aid.” Working Paper 1, Wolfensohn
Center for Development, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
Kharas, Homi. 2008. “Measuring the Cost of Aid Volatility.” Working Paper 3, Wolfensohn
Center for Development, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
Kharas, Homi 2009. “Action on Aid: Steps toward Making Aid More Effective.” Report,
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
Lele, Uma, and Arthur A. Goldsmith. 1989. “The Development of National Agricultural
Research Capacity: India’s Experience with the Rockefeller Foundation and Its Significance
for Africa.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 37 (2): 305–43.
Lele, Uma, Sambuddha Goswami, and Gianluigi Nico. 2017. “Structural Transformation and
the Transition from Concessional Assistance to Commercial Flows: The Past and Possible
Future Contributions of the World Bank.” In Agriculture and Rural Development in a
Globalizing World: Challenges and Opportunities, edited by Prabhu Pingali and Gershon
Feder, 325–52. London and New York: Routledge.
Lindoso, Vinicius, and Nina Hall. 2016. “Assessing the Effectiveness of Multilateral Organiza-
tions.” BSG Working Paper 2016/013, April, Blavatnik School of Government, University of
Oxford. https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/files/documents/2016-04_Hall_
Lindoso-Multilateral_Effectiveness.pdf
Linn, Johannes F. 2009. “The Zedillo Commission Report on World Bank Reform: A Stepping
Stone for the G-20 Summits in 2010.” Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, November 18.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
   “ ” 389
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-zedillo-commission-report-on-world-bank-reform-
a-stepping-stone-for-the-g-20-summits-in-2010/
Maier, Thomas. 2015. “Toward an Effective PPP Business Model: An Eight-Point Plan for
Closing the Infrastructure Gap.” World Bank blog, September 15. http://blogs.worldbank.
org/ppps/toward-effective-ppp-business-model-eight-point-plan-closing-infrastructure-gap
Manning, Richard. 2017. “Multilateral Development Aid. Assessing the Major Replenishments
of 2016.” WIDER Working Paper 2017/172, United Nations University World Institute for
Development Economics Research (UNU–WIDER), Helsinki.
McCalla, Alex F. 2007. “FAO in the Changing Global Landscape.” Working Paper No. 07–006,
University of California Davis. http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/190919/2/WP07-006.
pdf
McCalla, Alex F. 2017. “The Relevance of the CGIAR in a Modernizing World. Or Has It Been
Reformed ad infinitum into Dysfunctionality?” In Agriculture and Rural Development in a
Globalizing World: Challenges and Opportunities, edited by Prabhu Pingali and Gershon
Feder, 353–69. London and New York: Routledge.
Meltzer, Allan H. 2000. “The Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory
Commission: Comments on the Crisis.” Research Showcase at CMU, Tepper School of
Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA. http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=tepper
Mikesell, Raymond F. 2001. “Review Article: The Meltzer Commission Report on International
Institutions.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 49 (4): 883–94.
MOPAN (Multilateral Organisation Performance Network). n.d. “MOPAN 3.0: A Reshaped
Assessment Approach.” http://www.mopanonline.org/ourwork/ourapproachmopan30/
MOPAN (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network). 2011. “Organisational
Effectiveness Assessment: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations.”
http://www.mopanonline.org/assessments/fao2011/index.htm
MOPAN (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network). 2013. “Institutional
Report, World Food Programme, 2013.” http://www.mopanonline.org/assessments/
wfp2013/index.htm
MOPAN (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network). 2014. “Synthesis Re-
port: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2014.” https://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/244675.pdf
MOPAN (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network). 2018. “MOPAN
2017–18 Assessments: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).” http://www.
mopanonline.org/assessments/fao2017-18/index.htm
Morris, Scott. 2014. “Shaking Up the Donor Shakedown at the World Bank.” Center for Global
Development, Washington, DC.
Morris, Scott. 2018a. “John Bolton Wants to Shut Down the World Bank.” Center for Global
Development, Washington, DC.
Morris, Scott. 2018b. “Trump’s Treasury Delivers at the World Bank: More Capital for Climate,
Solid Policy Framework.” Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.
OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2016. “World
Humanitarian Data and Trends 2016.” OCHA. http://interactive.unocha.org/publication/
2016_datatrends/
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2019a. Fourth High Level
Forum on Aid Effectiveness. http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/fourthhighlevelforumon
aideffectiveness.htm
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
390   
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2019b. HLF1: The First
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Rome. http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/hlf-
1thefirsthighlevelforumonaideffectivenessrome.htm
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2019c. Second High Level
Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-2), 28 February to 2 March 2005, Paris, France. http://
www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/secondhighlevelforumonjointprogresstowardenhancedaid-
effectivenessharmonisationalignmentandresults.htm
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2019d. Third High
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/theaccrahighlevel
forumhlf3andtheaccraagendaforaction.htm
Ottenhoff, Jenny. 2011. “Leadership Selection at the International Financial Institutions.” CGD
Brief, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.
Shaw, D. John. 2014. “A Global Partnership Program to End World Hunger.” Briefing 18,
Future United Nations Development System, Ralph Bunche Institute for International
Studies, CUNY Graduate Center, New York. https://www.futureun.org/media/archive1/
briefings/FUNDSBriefing18-FoodSecurity-Shaw.pdf
Silver, Marc, and Malaka Gharib. 2017. “What’s the Meaning of the World Bank’s New Poverty
Lines?” Goats and Soda: Stories of Life in a Changing World/Poverty, National Public Radio,
October 25. https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/10/25/558068646/whats-the-
meaning-of-the-world-banks-new-poverty-lines
Sridhar, Devi, and Ngaire Woods. 2013. “Trojan Multilateralism: Global Cooperation in
Health.” Global Policy 4 (4): 325–35.
Thomas, Jr., Landon. 2018. “The World Bank Is Remaking Itself as a Creature of Wall Street.”
Business Day, New York Times, January 25. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/
business/world-bank-jim-yong-kim.html
Toma, Valentina (team leader), Amreeta Regmi, David Gray, Tingting Guo, Deborah Scher-
merhorn, Carina Pernia, Tatiana Nikolskaya, Luzviminda Tatlonghari, Natalia Antsilevich,
Fernando J. Machado, Galina Menchikova, Aleksandre Revia, and Milagros Reyes. 2013.
“2013 Trust Fund Annual Report.” Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships Vice
Presidency, World Ban Group, Washington, DC. http://documents1.worldbank.org/cur
ated/en/618651468159591695/pdf/897860AR0P14680Box0385294B00PUBLIC0.pdf
Toussaint, Eric. 2014. “Domination of the United States on the World Bank.” September 1,
Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt (CADTM), Liege, Belgium.
Tutwiler, Ann. 2012. “Joint Statement by the Rome-based Agencies (FAO, IFAD, and WFP) on
CSW 56 Priority Theme: Empowering Rural Women to Reduce Poverty and Eradicate
Hunger.” Presentation, Opening Meeting, February 27, Rome. http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/csw/csw56/statements/statement-Tutwiler.pdf
UN (United Nations). 2017a. “Report of the Committee on Contributions.” A/72/11, Seventy-
seventh session, June 5–23. UN, New York.
UN (United Nations). 2017b. “Repositioning the United Nations Development System to
Deliver on the 2030 Agenda: Ensuring a Better Future for All.” Report of the Secretary-
General. General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, United Nations, New York. http://
undocs.org/A/72/124
Wadsworth, Jonathan. 2016. “Brief History of the CGIAR Fund.” Discussion Paper, April,
CGIAR, Washington, DC. http://www.cgiar.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Brief-history-
of-the-CGIAR-Fund.pdf
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
   “ ” 391
Weiss, Martin A. 2011. “International Monetary Fund: Selecting a Managing Director.” CRS
Report, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
a0e1/7c10c2f408e590271d4585d18e25a5f222dc.pdf
WFP (World Food Programme). 2005. “Final Report on the Governance Project.” WFP/EB.2/
2005/4-C/Rev.1, November 9, WFP, Rome. http://one.wfp.org/eb/docs/2005/wfp076984~2.
pdf
WFP (World Food Programme). 2009a. “Directions for Collaborations among the Rome-based
Agencies.” CL 137/INF/10, August, WFP, Rome. ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/017/
k5809e.pdf
WFP (World Food Programme). 2009b. “Three Rome-based UN Agencies Launch Food
Security Strategy On Eve of World Food Summit.” News, November 16, WFP, Rome.
https://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/three-rome-based-un-agencies-launch-food-security-
strategy-eve-world-food-summit
WFP (World Food Programme). 2010. “Fighting Hunger Worldwide.” Annual Report 2010,
WFP, Rome. http://ja.wfp.org/sites/default/files/ja/file/2010_ann_rep_english.pdf
WFP (World Food Programme). 2014a. “General Rules, Financial Regulations Rules of Proce-
dure of the Executive Board.” January. WFP, Rome.
WFP (World Food Programme). 2014b. “Update on Collaboration among the Rome-based
Agencies.” WFP/EB.2/2014/4-C, October 16, WFP, Rome.
WFP (World Food Programme). 2016a. “Key Extracts of the Draft Management Plan
2016–2018.” WFP, Rome.
WFP (World Food Programme). 2016b. “The Year in Review 2016.”WFP, Rome. https://www.
wfp.org/content/wfp-year-review-2016
WFP (World Food Programme). 2017a. “Annual Report of the Inspector General.”WFP/EB.A/
2017/6-F/1, Executive Board Annual Session, WFP, Rome, June 12–16. http://www.fao.org/
3/a-mt088e.pdf
WFP (World Food Programme). 2017b. “World Food Assistance 2017: Taking Stock and
Looking Ahead.” July, WFP, Rome. https://www.wfp.org/content/2017-world-food-
assistance-taking-stock-and-looking-ahead
WFP (World Food Programme). 2020a. “Funding and Donors.” http://www1.wfp.org/funding-
and-donors
WFP (World Food Programme). 2020b “Independent Evaluation.” http://www1.wfp.or
g/independent-evaluation
Wheeler, David. 2007. “It’s One World Out There: The Global Consensus on Selecting the
World Bank’s Next President.” CGD Working Paper No. 123, June, Center for Global
Development, Washington, DC. https://www.cgdev.org/files/13861_file_World_Bank_Presi
dent_Survey.pdf
Wheeler, David. 2011. “Unity in Diversity: A Global Consensus on Choosing the IMF’s
Managing Director—Evidence from CGD’s Online Survey.” CGD Working Paper No. 267,
September 15, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC. https://www.cgdev.org/
publication/unity-diversity-global-consensus-choosing-imf ’s-managing-director—evidence-
cgd’s-online
WHO (World Health Organization). 2020. “Assessed Contributions.” About WHO. http://
www.who.int/about/finances-accountability/funding/assessed-contributions/en/
World Bank. 2011. World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
392   
World Bank. 2016. “Global Community Makes Record US$75 Billion Commitment to End
Extreme Poverty.” Press Release, December 15, World Bank, Washington, DC. http://www.
worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/12/15/global-community-commitment-end-poverty-
ida18
World Bank. 2017. “Mobilization of Private Finance by Multilateral Development Banks.” 2016
Joint Report, WBG, Washington, DC.
World Bank. 2018. “A Strong Foundation for Greater Impact.” News. Feature story, April 21.
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/04/21/a-strong-foundation-for-greater-impact
World Bank. 2020. “Voting Powers.” World Bank/Who We Are/About/Organization. http://
www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/votingpowers
Xiaoyun, Li, Qi Gubo, Tang Lixia, Zhao Lixia, Jin Leshan, Guo Zhanfeng, and Wu Jin. 2012.
Agricultural Development in China and Africa: A Comparative Analysis. London and
New York: Routledge.
Zedillo, Ernesto, Chair. 2009. “Repowering the World Bank for the 21st Century.” Report of the
High Level Commission on Modernization of World Bank Group Governance, World Bank
Group, Washington, DC.
Zedillo, Ernesto. 2013. Interview, July 30, 2013, by Jeffrey E. Garten, Yale School of Manage-
ment, International Center for Finance. http://som.yale.edu/interview-ernesto-zedillo
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
   “ ” 393
7
Financing for Sustainable Structural
Transformation
Uma Lele and Sambuddha Goswami
Summary
Unlike developed countries, developing countries tend to spend a small share of public
expenditures on agriculture, and as their per capita income increases, they have been known
to spend a larger share on agricultural support (that is, “Amber Box”), and yet, as docu-
mented in Chapter 2, overall evidence suggests they spend a lower share of total expendi-
tures on agriculture, unlike their industrial counterparts. This means that once “Amber
Box” support to agriculture, largely in the form of input subsidies, is excluded, their support
for public goods, particularly to research, extension education, and transportation that
would link farms to markets, is limited indeed (WTO 2020b).
Official development assistance (ODA) volumes and multilateral shares of them, as well
as domestic expenditures of developing countries on food and agriculture, are often too
small, even though ODA has increased in 2020, relative to needs or for stimulating private
investment, and they are suboptimally allocated, in terms of choice of activities, including,
in particular, too little to agricultural education, research, and extension. Learning and
evaluation of impacts, while advancing, also need to improve and expand to keep up with
the complexity of the challenges facing farming households.
In earlier chapters, we emphasized two issues: (1) the need to balance the priority to
agriculture in a development strategy, relative to other sectors, to achieve equitable and
sustainable structural transformation from agriculture to nonagriculture—for example,
through infrastructure, education, and the ability to adapt to climate change; and (2) the
need to promote the development of agriculture, particularly smallholder agriculture. We
demonstrated that the concept of agriculture itself has become multisectoral: for example, to
include concerns about nutrition and environmental management. This means financing of
agriculture must also be seen in a multisectoral context. Nutritional status is determined by
an individual’s dietary intake, but it also interacts with the individual’s health status, and
these variables are determined by underlying household- and community-level drivers
(including access to healthy foods, health services, water and sanitation, education, and
child caring capacity and practices); and additional structural drivers relating to the
amount, control, and the use of various types of resources. We discussed these multidi-
mensional aspects of poverty in Chapter 2 (on structural transformation) and Chapter 4
(on food security to nutrition security) and showed how they determine the extent of
favorable social, economic, and political conditions, broadly termed the “enabling environ-
ment.” They are important for food security and nutrition, as well as for structural
transformation. Agriculture is both a contributor to adverse environmental impacts—
for example, to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and loss of biodiversity through land
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use changes, as well as agricultural practices leading to soil degradation, water pollution, and
emissions—and yet, conversely, the protector of the environment. Through improved
policies and practices of the landscape as a whole, agriculture can protect the environment
in each of these respects. This multisectoral nature of agriculture means that financing for
agriculture and rural spaces must be viewed, in the broad context, as consisting of multiple
components for each of these three dimensions of financing: not just domestic or interna-
tional, but in each case consisting of resources that are (1) public, (2) private (household),
and (3) private (external to household), coming from multiple channels in each of the six
categories: public—domestic and international; private—domestic and international; and
household—savings and remittances.
Information on the “traditional” ODA sources of financing for agriculture is much better
than for nontraditional ODA: for example, from emerging countries, including particularly
China’s growing involvement in Southern countries, private investments in value chains,
land purchases, and private philanthropy. In 2011, leading donors committed in Busan to
make their aid transparent by the end of 2015. Only 10 donors, accounting for 25 percent of
total aid, have met this commitment to aid transparency. Outside the notable exception of
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), there is hardly any philanthropist report-
ing aid to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development
Assistance Committee (OECD DAC). However, even in the case of BMGF, its rating,
according to the Aid Transparency Index (ATI), improved from a “very poor” rating of
18.1 percent out of 100 in 2013 to 47.3 percent in 2018 (“fair”). Although this indicates an
improvement, there was very little improvement in its rating since 2014 to 2018, as we will
see later. The 2020 ATI, however, reported significant improvement in aid donors’ overall
transparency compared to 2018, but while revealing an improvement in overall transpar-
ency among the major aid agencies, there is less transparency on the impact of aid projects
(ATI 2014, 2018, 2020).
The new themes, including nutrition and the environment, also pose challenges to
estimating sources of resource flows in support of adaptation of agriculture to these new
concerns. We will show in this chapter that available aid resources are very small indeed,
relative to needs and the extent of advocacy.
With rapid economic growth, direct public expenditures of developing countries are of
increasing importance in developing agriculture, relative to external aid, but once again
there are several challenges. First, information is spotty. Second, there are conceptual issues
in determining which expenditures are supportive for creating an enabling environment,
and third, productive investments in agriculture by developing countries are very limited.
Trade economists define support for agriculture as consisting of two categories of domestic
support—support with no, or minimal, distortive effects on trade (often referred to as
“Green Box” measures), and trade-distorting support (often referred to as “Amber Box”
measures). For example, government-provided agricultural research or training is consid-
ered to be of the “Green Box” type, while government buying-in at a guaranteed price
(“market price support”) falls into the latter category. Under the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement on Agriculture, all domestic support in favor of agricultural producers is
subject to rules, and the maximum levels of such support are bound in the WTO. In
addition, the aggregate monetary value of “Amber Box” measures is, with certain excep-
tions, subject to reduction commitments as specified in the schedule of each WTO member
providing such support (WTO 2016, 2020b).
Twenty-eight members (including the European Union [EU]) “had non-exempt domes-
tic support during the base period and hence reduction commitments specified in their
schedules. The reduction commitments are expressed in terms of a ‘Total Aggregate
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Measurement of Support’ (Total AMS) which includes all product-specific support and
non-product-specific support in one single figure” (WTO 2020a). Developed country
members “with a Total AMS have to reduce base period support by 20 percent over
6 years,” and developing country members have to reduce it by “13 percent over
10 years” (WTO 2020a). Beyond a few emerging countries, which the OECD DAC includes
in its estimates of agricultural support, such as China and Indonesia, little such information
is available for developing countries at large.
Similarly, information on private investments tends to be weak and anecdotal. Notwith-
standing these limitations, we attempt to provide orders of magnitude for each category.
Introduction: Why Give Aid, and Particularly, Multilateral Aid?
There is much skepticism about aid and its effectiveness. This has led to widespread aid
fatigue. Additionally, OECD countries that have been the principal donors of ODA have
faced slow growth, increasing fiscal woes, and a perception of uncontrolled immigration
among voters, a phenomenon compounded since 2020 by the COVID-19 pandemic. All of
these factors explain Brexit, the fateful British referendum on June 23, 2016, in support of
exiting from the EU (Lele 2016). While threatening the integrity of the EU, in a way that
even the 2007–8 global food and the financial crises had not done, Brexit has also triggered
ascendant politics of division, xenophobia, anti-trade, and anti-open border rhetoric in
Europe and North America, exemplified in the 2016 US presidential election. Some have
worried that under the Trump administration the international order established after the
Second World War is under threat of unraveling. It is too early to know what the impact of
Brexit will be on the EU and Britain. Although the COVID-19 pandemic has led to an
increase in ODA in 2020 over 2019, the increase also included support of refugees in donor
countries. So net flows to developing countries were not larger. Politics have implications for
international capital flows as well as for the support of the “Big Five” international
organizations generally, including those concerned with food and agriculture: namely, the
World Bank Group (WBG) (1945); the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) (1945); the World Food Programme (WFP) (1961); the Consultative Group
for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)¹ (1971); and the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD) (1976).² Paradoxically, they were established in the post-
Second World War period, by seizing the various crises as opportunities to avoid mistakes
of the years following the First World War. By enhancing international cooperation, they
have contributed to the longest period of economic expansion.
Such continued economic cooperation is needed because, as documented in previous
chapters, growth has not lifted all boats despite rapid progress in developing countries. Most
of the poverty in the world now is found in lower middle-income countries (LMICs) and
low-income countries (LICs). Poor households and poor countries have low savings and
investment capacity. Substantially greater investment is needed, targeted at poor countries
and the poor populations in the middle-income countries (MICs) (Kanbur and Sumner
2012). Also, the world has seen the largest displacement of population since the Second
¹ CGIAR, originally known as the Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers, was established
in April 2010 to coordinate and support the work of the 15 international agricultural research centers supported
by the CGIAR.
² Year of founding for each international organization shown in parentheses after organizational acronym.
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World War, so that the need for humanitarian and development assistance exceeds the
supply of aid. If the World Health Assembly (WHA) targets (outlined in Chapter 4) are to
be achieved by 2025, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (outlined in
Chapter 4) by 2030, not only do domestic policies need to improve, but substantially greater
investment is needed and targeted at poor countries and the poor populations in the MICs.
Additional problems on the horizon include the growing incidence of obesity throughout
the world that is associated with income growth, urbanization, and unhealthy dietary
changes. To contain obesity, investments in improved information, and an improved
regulatory environment and its implementation are needed to contain the fiscal burden of
poor health on countries.
Even after 70 years of work of the Bretton Woods institutions, capital markets today still
face problems of uninsured risk and risk of another crisis (Ravallion 2016). Despite
substantial accumulated savings in the world, with perceived risks, the private sector
tends to be reluctant to lend to poor countries (World Bank 2013a) and to poor populations
in MICs. Multilateral lending helps directly to fill this gap and thereby assists in creating the
enabling conditions for private sector investments (Ravallion 2016). Multilateral lending
also directly provides positive signals to the private sector and generates the necessary
macroeconomic and sectoral information on an objective basis that can help private actors
to make informed decisions.
Furthermore, there is growing consensus that international assistance should provide
global public goods (GPGs), such as climate mitigation and adaptation, the control of
communicable diseases, financial stability, and an open and fair trading system. Such
assistance can slow climate change, control communicable diseases, and contain conflicts
(Birdsall and Kharas 2010; Deaton 2013). All three are priorities of WBG’s International
Development Association (IDA)18 replenishments approved in 2016. Developing countries
have argued, however, that GPG financing should not come at the cost of development
assistance, but should be additional to it at the country level.
There are other reasons to support multilateral lending. It is less politicized, it is more
efficient per dollar disbursed, and more equitable. Typically, going to poorer countries and
populations, it is more transparent in terms of the amounts delivered and the purposes for
which they are spent, and it is usually more selective than bilateral assistance. Multilateral
agencies generally give, on average, 55 percent of their aid to LICs, whereas non-DAC and
DAC bilateral agencies give only about 19 percent (Gulrajani 2016).
Developing countries prefer multilateral aid to bilateral aid. Gulrajani (2016, 11) noted:
“There has long been an assertion that aid-receiving countries view multilateral institutions as
more legitimate and trustworthy partners than their bilateral brethren. In the postwar period,
the multilateral system seemed to guard against the coercive interests of Western powers
overwhelming newly independent states (Andreopoulos et al. 2011; Mills 1964).” Multilateral
aid is less fragmented and delivered on a larger scale, and more of the reported aid resources
are actually transferred to developing countries because of less tying and lower costs of delivery
(Rondinelli 1993; Kharas 2007, 2008, 2009; Birdsall and Kharas 2010; Custer et al. 2015).
Multilateral institutions are able to develop knowledge, which is a public good. Suppor-
ters of aid have argued that the World Bank, for example, is a source of the “soft power” of
knowledge, citing examples in the areas of agriculture, education, health, social safety nets,
trade, and fiscal policies in which the Bank’s analytical capacity has made a difference
(Rodrik 1996; Kanbur 2004; Radelet 2006; Kharas 2007, 2008, 2009; Birdsall and Kharas
2010; Isenman and Shakow 2010; Isenman 2011, 2012; Clemens et al. 2012; Kanbur and
Sumner 2012; Clemens and Kremer 2016). The World Bank and, increasingly, the regional
banks contain the world’s largest collection of expertise in development economics. There
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are economies of scale in generating large-scale information. It requires substantial initial
capital, which international organizations have invested over the years, establishing decades
of record, trust, and experience. Their near universal membership gives them legitimacy and
access to global expertise, in addition to access to governments. Except for the largest
multinationals, the private sector, on the other hand, has little interest, breadth, or depth of
reach, and most importantly, little incentive to collect, analyze, and share information with
the public. Not only can multilateral institutions play a more effective role in providing
GPGs of information and knowledge, norms, and standards, as well as achieve international
consensus and agreements, but they also can help contain regional public “bads,” such as
pandemics, involuntary migration, and climate change—which have cross-border spillovers
and contribute to poverty.
There are also many critics of aid, however (Lal 2006; Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Easterly
and Williamson 2011; Deaton 2013; Easterly and Pfutze 2013). Easterly (2006), by far the
most vocal critic of aid, has argued that billions of dollars spent on aid in developing
countries have had very little impact. Deaton (2013), too, asserted that aid has had little
impact in Africa, because governments receive too large a share of their expenditures as aid,
which makes them more accountable to donors and less accountable to their poor con-
stituents. In contrast, he argued, aid to China and India has been successful: that is, poverty
has declined and social indicators have improved. This is because aid has been a small share
of gross domestic product (GDP), and governments have not spent most of their time being
accountable to donors rather than to their own people (Easterly 2006). We also provide
further evidence in the chapters on the World Bank, IFAD, and CGIAR that aid to China
has been even more effective than that to India, and project performance in LICs has
typically been lower than in MICs.
Bilateral aid politicizes aid giving. Although tying has diminished, some bilateral donors
tie aid to the procurement of goods and services of their own country. and aid can be
unstable, depending on the bilateral political relationships, which distort aid in the direction
of interests of the domestic constituencies. Allocation of aid by bilaterals differs greatly from
that which would maximize poverty impacts (Collier and Dollar 2002).
Most of the top 10 donors, with high rankings on transparency and who are meeting
Busan commitments, are multilateral organizations. The exceptions are the US’s Millen-
nium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the UK’s Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID), but the MCC gives aid to a relatively small number of countries, as compared,
for example, to the World Bank’s lending to countries.
These positive observations do not mean international organizations are free of political
influence. In Chapter 5 (on global governance), we noted that the nationality of the leaders
of Bretton Woods Institutions is determined by historical agreements. Even where the
leadership is not so formally determined, contributions have a heavy influence on the choice
of leaders, such as in WFP. Reinhart and Trebesch (2015) and Eichengreen and Woods
(2016) cited several examples of the influence of the United States and Europe on the
activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF): for example, US pressure to privatize
industry during the Asian Crisis, the European influence on the standby arrangements in
Greece, and, more generally, the influence of the larger shareholders on IMF and World
Bank policies. The World Bank’s safeguard policies have been heavily influenced by
international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) directly and through the influence
of the executive directors of the larger shareholders. Yet, there is considerable evidence that
multilaterals typically delivers multilateral aid based on a relatively more transparent, well
laid out criteria, and perform better than bilaterals across three dimensions: usefulness of
advice (seven of the top 10 donors here being multilateral); agenda-setting influence (all of
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the top 10 are multilateral); and helpfulness in implementation (eight of the top 10 are
multilateral) (Custer et al. 2015), based on an extensive survey conducted by Aid Data of
6,750 development policymakers and practitioners in 126 LICs and MICs. Bilaterals are
more selective in giving aid to countries which meet their political objectives such as the US
aid to Israel and Egypt; however, multilaterals give aid in terms of country needs—for
example, based on per capita income or level of poverty—but not always necessarily in
terms of the quality of governance.
Key Messages
This chapter presents the financial commitments of the Big Five international organizations
in the context of the overall financial flows to developing countries. It outlines the declining
role of multilateral assistance, and the rise of multi-bi funding in international organiza-
tions, which has fundamentally transformed OECD’s external assistance and has been
accompanied by the rise of the Global South in funding.³ The chapter also situates the
very small financial flows going directly to agriculture and the need to increase both the
quantity and quality of international and national public investment in agriculture. This is
done for several reasons (UNCTAD 2019b):
(1) traditional sources of OECD ODA are shrinking relative to other sources, for
example, private finance, remittances, philanthropy, South–South cooperation;
(2) competition from other sectors, in need of large-scale capital and promising quick
disbursements, is crowding out investment in agriculture, with the result that public
goods in agriculture have been, and continue to be, underfunded by donors and
governments alike;
(3) rapid growth in the domestic revenues of developing countries has not necessarily
resulted in more resources to agricultural development;
(4) until recently, there was a substantial increase in private sector funding, South–South
cooperation, and remittances, but private sector funding and remittances have
declined, and information is limited on how they benefit agriculture; and
(5) innovative sources of financing, such as taxes on transactions, airlines, and auctions,
have not been explored much in areas such as climate change, biodiversity conser-
vation, and water management.
Agriculture and Intersectoral Priorities
Financing needs of developing countries amount to trillions of dollars. Infrastructure
investments tend to be large, capital intensive, and relatively rapidly disbursing, as com-
pared to agricultural investments. There is strong demand for infrastructure development.
In theory, international public and private sectors can help finance. Also, many of these
³ The OECD publication, “Multilateral Development Finance” defines non-core/earmarked/multi-bi contribu-
tions as “resources to ODA-eligible multilateral agencies over which the donor retains some degree of control on
decisions regarding disposal of the funds. Such flows may be earmarked for a specific country, project, region,
sector, or theme. They are bilateral resources channelled through a multilateral agency, and therefore technically
qualify as part of bilateral ODA. These resources can be administered through trust funds, either as single or
multi-donor trust funds” (OECD 2015, 255).
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investments are complementary: for example, availability of infrastructure being critical for
value chains. When considered individually, these investments often have high rates of
return, similar to or higher than in agricultural research and extension, even though, as
shown in Chapter 10 (on CGIAR), hundreds of studies produced by CGIAR and others
show high rates of return to the adoption of improved crop varieties.
There is also the more complex challenge of developing “softer” infrastructure, in terms
of institutions and human capital. This latter development poses very different challenges
than the establishment of physical capital, and human and institutional capital is often a
prerequisite to achieving high rates of return on infrastructure, agriculture, water and
sanitation, or nutrition. Hence, policymakers face a tension between complementarity of
investments among sectors—the old Rosenstein–Rodan argument of the “Big Push” (Hoff
2001; see, also, Akber and Paltasingh 2019). Hoff famously argued that, at an early stage of
development, the investments of industrializing firms in one sector could increase the
profitability of other sectors throughout the economy. Simultaneous industrialization of
many sectors could be profitable for all of them, but no sector would be profitable
industrializing alone. As a result, an underdevelopment equilibrium was possible: even
the market may not succeed in coordinating the activities needed to ensure development.
She explained the big push argument in modern, theoretical terms as a “coordination”
challenge (Hoff 2001). Hoff asserted that modern economic theory has broadened our view
of the sources of spillovers that could lead to underdevelopment as an equilibrium. She
argued for an “ecological perspective” (Hoff 2001, 147) on development, which also applies
to rural development, where the influences from others in one’s environment are a critical
determinant of outcomes, and many interaction effects are not mediated by markets. She
thus distinguished between deep interventions that change underlying forces and shallow
interventions, which do not, but may actually make things worse.
With globalization and interconnectedness, the need for public goods in a range of areas
has increased. Global food and financial crises, and pandemics like the Ebola outbreak,
spread rapidly, whereas, existing international and domestic institutions that could help
contain the crises tend to be weak, and rigid in making the adjustments needed to respond
to the speed of transmission of challenges. This has implications for investments in public
goods, capacity building, and institutional adjustments at all levels. The Center for Global
Development’s (CGD) multilateral development banking report (Ahluwalia et al. 2016),
referred to in Chapter 5 (on global governance), makes a strong case for investment in
GPGs based on this reason.
Not all the reported aid goes to developing countries, but rather to the ecosystem of
organizations, which, in addition to nation states, include UN agencies, multilateral orga-
nizations, INGOs, and think tanks seeking to use those same limited resources to advance
their agendas. Those agendas range from short-term humanitarian assistance to long-term
development, policy advice, technical assistance, and advocacy.
As shown in Chapter 5 (on global governance), the production or generation of global,
regional, national, and local public goods is often closely intertwined vertically from the
local to the global levels and, horizontally, across sectors. Furthermore, although in prin-
ciple, and often, even in practice, production or generation of public goods and their
delivery tends to be independent of financing, with financing closely related to the level at
which the public goods are provided.
The supply of development finance to agriculture and to overall development should
focus on the sorts of public goods listed in Box 7.1 at all levels: global, regional, and national.
A GPGs agenda of direct relevance to food and agriculture should be contrasted with the
gaps that currently exist.
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Box 7.1 International, Transboundary, and National Public Goods
of Relevance to Food and Agriculture
Here we list only the very direct public goods—activities of relevance to agriculture that
should receive high priority in funding. Global Platforms are useful in exchanging
information and points of view, but they should be seen as complementary to building
the capacity of countries to generate and use information. Most of these latter capacity-
building activities are underfunded: clean air, clean water, landscape, green transport
infrastructure (such as footpaths, cycleways, greenways, etc.), public parks, urban parks,
rivers, mountains, forests, and beaches are a subcategory of nonmarket public goods.
1. Information and Knowledge: Generation of quality information for users at local,
subnational, national, regional, and global level tends to be of highest priority.
Policymakers at the subregional and national levels need information, which
would likely overlap with the data for global monitoring, for example, of SDGs.
International organizations provide far too little technical assistance, training,
capacity-building, and oversight to assure quality and comparability of data
collected at the national level with both that at the sectoral and subsectoral level
and, as appropriate, at the household and local levels on agricultural production
systems, forests, fisheries, water, land, diseases and pests, and genetic resources;
nor do they monitor adherence to global agreements. Beyond countries’ own
systems, international organizations collect household and other microeconomic
and macro data to conduct research and report on key emerging issues.
2. Early Warning Systems: These are needed to address potential emergencies and to
avoid cross-border spillover of “global public bads,” such as hunger, disease, and
pests.a Here, too, together with national organizations, international organizations
need the funding and partnerships to help build such systems and the necessary
capacities at the national and subnational levels on a consistent, long-term, cross-
country basis.
3. Neutral Forum for Policy and Scientific Dialogue and Exchange: Food security and
agriculture issues require platforms to discuss policy and strategy issues with and
across countries and regions. The international organizations of FAO and CGIAR
provide networked organizations. The Committee on World Food Security (CFS),
discussed in Chapter 9 on FAO, provides one such important platform since it was
reformed in 2009. At present, however, CFS does not have the mandate and the
resources to translate its resolutions, or the recommendations of technical working
papers and other material to put into practice, monitor the adopted practices on
the ground, and report back progress on implementation to member countries.
Still, there is considerable potential for the CFS to work with FAO, including to
follow up on a variety of nonbinding agreements, such as the following:
a. Nonbinding international instruments and guidelines;
b. The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries;
c. Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to
Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security;
d. Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fish-
eries, and Forests in the Context of National Food Security;
e. The Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems.
Continued
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Box 7.1 Continued
f. FAO’s EU-funded Pilot Monitoring Program: This program needs to be refined
and institutionalized, with the World Bank, IFAD, regional banks, and CGIAR
supporting it and building their operational work and lending operations
around it. CGIAR and the National and Regional Research and Development
Systems need effective partnerships to lift millions of out of poverty, which is
CGIAR’s declared mission. A Global Conference on Agricultural Research for
Development (GCARD) is meant to provide a global platform for concerned
stakeholders and promote partnerships.
4. Food Safety Standards: WTO recommends countries adhere to standards for
regional and international trade. As private food standards have proliferated,
countries must adhere to meeting import requirements in advanced countries,
and reconciling requirements of Codex Alimentarius and private standards has
become an increasing challenge (Clarke 2010). Countries need assistance to
implement these. The World Bank is leading multisectoral global partnership on
food safety. An international reporting system is also needed to assess progress and
what further help the countries need (WBG 2015).
5. Management of Genetic Resources: FAO, together with CGIAR, have had respon-
sibility for the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources, which is now an
independent trust.b A recent independent evaluation notes that the agreement has
had a positive impact on making the CGIAR centers’ genetic resources available
and suggests that more research is needed to see how the CGIAR collection could
be made more accessible in view of climate change, political instability, and the
need for adaptation to climate change adaptation (Gotor, Caracciolo, and Watts
2010). There is also need to conserve ex-situ biodiversity in tropical countries,
which is being lost at a rapid rate. SDG2 includes biodiversity conservation with
very limited specification of how it would be motivated or monitored.
6. Generation and Mobilization of Agricultural Technologies: New challenges require
new technologies with global and regional public goods characteristics, such as
high-yielding varieties attuned to production systems and to new climate change
challenges of higher temperatures, variable rainfall, floods and droughts, pests and
diseases. The private sector now produces technologies for major, internationally
traded crops and livestock, such as maize, wheat, soybeans, and edible oils; and
four or five multinationals now control most of the intellectual property rights on
improved genetic material. CGIAR cannot replicate their resources, science, or
market instinct. In the health sector, intellectual property rights in vaccines have
been negotiated to produce vaccines that can be delivered to poor people. Agri-
culture has greater complexities and will require effective partnerships between
CGIAR and the private sector to provide a huge jump in the availability of
technologies to 500 million small farmers in developing countries in the face of
climate change. Norman Borlaug’s message “take it to the farmer” requires a new
and different strategy in 2016 than in 1966, a strategy that involves the private
sector, national systems, civil society, and value chains, as well as extension systems
that exist. This issue is discussed in Chapter 10 on CGIAR.
Notes: a The PREDICT Consortium (2014) report, produced for the United States Agency for International
Development, “Pandemic Risk and Promoting Global Health,” cited Murray and Aviso (2011): “Despite
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Most GPGs in Box 7.1 call for capacity at the national and subnational levels. There has
not only been increased emphasis in the traditional country assistance literature on the need
to enhance the provision of GPGs at the national and subnational level, but increasingly,
there is tendency to promote the use of traditional country assistance to enhance the
capacity of developing countries to generate the supply of global and regional public
goods. Many developing countries have resisted, arguing instead that financing for the
provision of GPGs should involve additional resources and different mechanisms outside
country assistance financing and instruments to finance GPGs (see, for example, discussion
starting IDA13 to 17) (IDA 2020a). Again, the CGD report on the multilateral development
banks makes a case for why the World Bank should become a major source of financing, to
the tune of US$10 billion annually, approved by the Bank’s shareholders, together with
reforms in the governance of the Bank (Ahluwalia et al. 2016). The prospect of such
financing from the World Bank, however, does not seem likely.
Financing Needs for Food and Agriculture
Although not immediately obvious, the activities of the Big Five international organizations
span all three areas of the UN System: Peace and Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and
Development. All five are working at the edges of all three of these larger-than-life issues
confronting humanity. Most recently, the largest number and growth of human displace-
ment since the Second War has occurred, showing us that without peace and security, and
law and order for the 60 million people directly affected by displacement and for others in
whose countries they have had to take shelter, there can be no food security, environmental
or social safety, and no development. The largest growth in the UN budget in recent years
has been for humanitarian assistance, the size of which has grown due to emergencies that
had not been anticipated only a few years ago. All humanitarian funding raised is from
voluntary contributions. A combination of underfunding and short-term appeals deter-
mines the effectiveness of the Big Five organizations.
As the Development Committee Discussion Note (prepared jointly by the African
Development Bank [AfDB], Asian Development Bank [ADB], European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development [EBRD], European Investment Bank [EIB], Inter-American
Development Bank [IDB], IMF, and World Bank) on financing needs of developing
countries for the Addis Ababa Financing meeting in June 2015 stressed, the financing
needs to fill the infrastructure and energy deficits in South Asia (SA) and sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) alone amount to well over a trillion dollars each (Development Committee
increasing endorsement of One Health by agency officials and policy makers globally, the lack of cross-sectoral
and transboundary collaboration coupled with siloed resources have limited widespread implementation of
the approach” (PREDICT Consortium 2014, 79). The report also mentioned the partnership between FAO,
the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) under One
Health. The Independent Evaluation Group report on avian influenza (containing “global bads”), however,
saw no prospect of support for it in Bank operations unless there was another emergency (IEG 2013b). For
more information on PREDICT’s shutdown, see KFF (2019); Carlson (2020); Global Biodefense (2020).
b In 1994, an agreement between CGIAR, FAO, and the UN established the “In-Trust Agreements”
(ITAs) that formalized the legal status of ex-situ germplasm collections held by the CGIAR gene banks.
These agreements facilitated germplasm flows and institutionalized open access to germplasm from CGIAR
Centers under the auspices of the ITAs, contributing to policymaking and the exchange of the germplasm.
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2015). Infrastructure investments are critical and, indeed, overdue for transforming agri-
culture and overall economies. Similarly, for the billion poor who lack access to energy,
water, and sanitation, energy investments are critical to promote agriculture and education.
The report of the Development Committee (a joint ministerial committee of the World
Bank and IMF), entitled “From Billions to Trillions: Transforming Development Finance,”
emphasized that most of the financing will have to come from the private sector, but public
policies and regulatory frameworks can help. The Bretton Woods Institutions can assist in
creating an enabling environment, in the same way that peace and security can be estab-
lished under the UN umbrella to create an enabling environment for development (Devel-
opment Committee 2015). Financing issues are far less settled, however. A separate World
Bank report (2013b) stressed that future financing for these sectors is likely to come from
East Asia and, particularly China, indicative of the growing role of China. (See also Bussalo,
Lim, and Maliszewska 2013.)
South–South Cooperation
Growth in developing countries, as a group, since the 1990s, has changed the donor–
recipient relationship in a significant way. Rapid growth in demand for raw materials in
large developing economies has led to a commodity boom that has benefited exporters
in Latin America and SSA. The role of external aid has declined. Developing country
governments have more revenues to spend from increased growth. Many enjoy
investment-level credit ratings and increased access to international private capital. Emer-
ging economies have also been offering large government-to-government aid, most notably
China (Agarwal 2015).
The rise of China as a global donor and investor serves, perhaps, as the most powerful
illustration of the changed landscape for the World Bank and other international institu-
tions. Citing McKinsey & Company, Runde (2015) noted that “while the total level of
loans outstanding from the world’s five biggest multilateral development banks stood at
US$500 billion in 2013, total Chinese outstanding foreign loans and deposits were a
staggering US$838 billion at the end of 2011. Foreign direct investment totaled US$1.45
trillion in 2013, with US$778 billion of that total heading to developing countries.”
Separately, Brazil’s National Development Bank (BNDS) alone disbursed US$60 billion in
2013, compared to the World Bank’s annual disbursements of US$27 billion. Runde (2015)
concluded, “Clearly organizations like the World Bank which previously were juggernauts
in an empty playing field are now minority shareholders in a system that is much larger
than them.”
Emerging Countries Are Becoming Big Players in
Other Respects as Well
In agriculture, China is now priming itself to supply the US$16 billion seed market, hoping
to surpass traditional multinational seed companies, such as Monsanto, Syngenta, and
Pioneer. It is already a big investor in Africa and in other developing countries.
We present recent evidence on China’s involvement and impacts in SSA and Latin
America later in the chapter.
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Recent Trends in Financial Flows to Developing Countries
Many of the GPGs have a strong national and subnational public goods dimension. One
cannot achieve peace and security, a free and fair trading system, financial stability or food
security, or contain climate change, without also achieving those outcomes at the national
and subnational levels, and further, with countries have systems in place, which maximize
good cross-border spillovers and minimize bad ones. Some countries’ mismanagement can
have disproportionate adverse spillovers across borders: for example, in the case of the
financial crisis or avian influenza. Therefore, achieving GPGs requires all countries to
participate; it is more than a sum of its parts, whether a weighted sum or not. Formal or
informal rules and regulations, their implementation, and modes of human behavior
determine outcomes as well as the capacity of the countries and institutions to generate
them and to benefit from them, including particularly those of the weakest among them.
Sources of Trillion Dollar Flows to Developing Countries: Shrinking
Roles of Official Development Assistance
Financing sources have grown and diversified in recent years, with multiple channels of
financing into agriculture; for example, support for nutrition comes through direct nutri-
tion programs, as well as through cash transfers; and for the environment, through finan-
cing for biodiversity conservation, climate mitigation and adaptation, forest and landscape
management. The role of ODA has declined in relative, and in some cases, absolute terms.
Increased financing has come from: (1) domestic sources of financing of developing
countries from their own economic growth; (2) growth of private (legal and illegal) capital
flows from developed to developing countries; (3) philanthropic organizations; (4) growing
South–South cooperation; and (5) the extraordinary growth of remittances.
Figure 7.1 shows overall financial flows, including remittances to developing countries
from 2002 to 2017, which reached a trillion dollars in 2010, 3.6 times greater than 2002, and
peaked in 2016 at US$1.5 trillion (in 2016 constant prices). Over recent years, growth has
been driven by rapid increases in remittances, growing almost 4.4 times since 2002, and in
private resource flows, predominantly foreign direct investment (FDI). The slowdown in
the world economy, followed by the COVID-19 pandemic, led to decline in all resource
flows except ODA. According to the January 2021 “Investment Trends Monitor” of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “Global foreign
direct investment (FDI) collapsed in 2020, falling by 42% to an estimated US$859 bn,
from US$1.5 trillion in 2019” (UNCTAD 2021). Such a low level was last seen in the 1990s
and is more than 30 percent below the investment trough that followed the 2008–9 global
financial crisis (UNCTAD 2021).
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ODA increased by 3.5 percent over 2019, and stood
at 3.2 percent combined gross national income (GNI) of OECD countries, compared to
3 percent in 2015. Over the past two decades, developing countries steadily increased their
share of global FDI receipts. FDI now represents one of the largest sources of developing
countries’ external financing. The decline in FDI in 2020 was concentrated in developed
countries, where flows plummeted by 69 percent to an estimated US$229 bn. Flows to
North America declined by 46 percent to US$166 bn, with cross-border mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) dropping by 43 percent. Announced greenfield investment projects
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also fell by 29 percent and project finance deals tumbled by 2%. The United States recorded
a 49 percent drop in FDI, falling to an estimated US$134 bn. The decline took place in
wholesale trade, financial services, and manufacturing. Cross-border M&A sales of US
assets to foreign investors fell by 41 percent, mostly in the primary sector. On the
other side of the Atlantic Ocean, investment to Europe dried up. Flows fell by two-thirds
to –US$4 bn. In the United Kingdom, FDI fell to zero, and declines were recorded in other
major recipients (UNCTAD 2021).
FDI flows to developing economies decreased by 12 percent in 2020 to an estimated US
$616 bn, but they accounted for 72 percent of global FDI—the highest share on record. The
fall was highly uneven across developing regions: –37 percent in Latin America and the
Caribbean, –18 percent in Africa and –4 percent in developing countries in Asia. FDI to
transition economies declined by 77 percent to US$13 bn. While developing countries in
Asia weathered the storm well as a group, attracting an estimated US$476 bn in FDI in 2020,
flows to members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) contracted by
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Figure 7.1 Shrinking roles of ODA financing in trillion-dollar flows to developing countries:
Total dollar receipts, 2002–2017 (ODA + non-ODA + remittances, US$bn, constant 2016
prices)
Note: ODA: Official development assistance in the figure includes bilateral ODA and multilateral concessional
flows. Other non-ODA flows include: other official developmental flows (OOF) and multilateral concessional
flows, officially supported export credits, private grants, FDI, and portfolio investment. Official flows, officially
supported export credits and private grants are adjusted gross disbursements. Personal remittances, FDI, and
portfolio investments are net flows. All flows are in 2016 prices.
Source: Based on data from http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/beyond-oda.htm
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subregion. China was the world’s largest FDI recipient, with flows to the Asian giant rising
by 4 percent to US$163 bn (UNCTAD 2021).
High-tech industries saw an increase of 11 percent in 2020, and cross-border M&As rose
by 54 percent, mostly in ICT and pharmaceutical industries (UNCTAD 2021).
“A return to positive GDP growth (+2.3 percent) and the government’s targeted invest-
ment facilitation programme helped stabilize investment after the early lockdown,” the
UNCTAD report says.
India, another major emerging economy, also recorded positive growth (13percent),
boosted by investments in the digital sector. (UNCTAD 2021)
Although one of the largest sources of developing countries’ external financing, FDI to
developing countries has already dropped by about a third over 2016–17, following a
12 percent drop in overall external finance from 2013–16, as well as project finance down
30 percent in the first quarter of 2018. External finance to poor countries is also declining,
despite a promise by the international community three years ago to increase development
finance flows, in particular through private investment (OECD 2018b). It is interesting to
see how the picture changes from year to year.
A 2019 OECD report noted that ODA from advanced economies was below target and
had fallen as a share of total resources received by many developing countries, while other
flows such as remittances and philanthropy were increasing but comparatively small in
recent years (OECD 2019i).⁴
In overall financial flows, over 46 percent was from private flows,⁵ nearly one-third as
personal remittances, only 15 percent from ODA and remaining 6 percent as other official
flows (OOF),⁶ including export credits in 2017. Total official and private flows (in constant
⁴ ODA includes bilateral ODA and multilateral concessional flows. ODA is defined as those “flows to countries
and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions that are: (i)
provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executing agencies; and (ii)
concessional (i.e., grants and soft loans) and administered with the promotion of the economic development and
welfare of developing countries as the main objective” (OECD 2019i).
⁵ From the “DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts” (https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/dac-glossary.htm):
Private flows consist of flows at market terms, financed out of private sector resources (i.e. changes in
holdings of private, long-term assets held by residents of the reporting country) and private grants (i.e.
grants by non-governmental organizations and other private bodies, net of subsidies received from the
official sector). In data presentations which focus on the outflow of funds from donors, private flows
other than foreign direct investment are restricted to credits with a maturity of greater than one year
and are usually divided into:
• Foreign direct investment: Investment made to acquire or add to a lasting interest in an enterprise in a
country on the DAC List of ODA Recipients;
• Private export credits: Loans for the purpose of trade and which are not represented by a negotiable
instrument;
• Securities of multilateral agencies: The transactions of private non-bank and bank sector in bonds,
debentures, etc., issued by multilateral institutions; and
• Bilateral portfolio investment and other: Includes bank lending and the purchase of shares, bonds and
real estate.
⁶ From the “Other Official Flows (OOF)” (https://data.oecd.org/drf/other-official-flows-oof.htm):
Other official flows (OOF) are defined as official sector transactions that do not meet official
development assistance (ODA) criteria, . . . [include] grants to developing countries for representa-
tional or essentially commercial purposes; . . . official bilateral transactions intended to promote devel-
opment, but having a grant element of less than 25%; . . . [or are] export credits; the acquisition . . . of
securities issued by multilateral development banks at market terms; subsidies (grants) to the private
sector to soften its credits to developing countries; and funds in support of private investment.
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2016 US dollars) were US$878.2 billion in 2017,⁷ of which total official flows (ODA + OOF,
including export credits) was US$265.3 billion and total private flows to developing
countries reached US$612.9 billion (OECD.Stat 2020b). Grants from philanthropic orga-
nizations like BMGF amounted to US$5 billion in 2018, of which 8 percent went to
agricultural development.⁸ Today, remittances represent the largest source of external
finance for many developing countries and also an important contributor to resilience in
the face of economic or humanitarian crises. Both the estimates of remittances and their
uses have been a matter of considerable debate, we discuss further in this chapter.
Role of International Organizations Concerned with Food,
Agriculture, and Nutrition
The latest available statistics on the total flows to developing countries from the public and
the private sector, and those going into agriculture from OECD countries, make three facts
clear. First, the role of “traditional OECD ODA” has been shrinking with respect to the
overall flows to developing countries from all sources to all sectors (Figure 7.1). Second, the
2007–8 food and agriculture crisis has had little positive effect on increasing ODA going
to agriculture (see Figure 3.4, Chapter 3). On the contrary the share of all ODA going to
agriculture has shrunk in total ODA, as compared to the peaks reached in the 1980s. Third,
the role of international organizations’ financing with respect to total ODA going to
agriculture has been shrinking, the Rome 2003, Paris 2005, Accra 2008, and Busan 2011
Declarations produced at High Level Forums (HLF), notwithstanding (HLF-1 2003; HLF-2
2005; HLF-3 2008; and HLF-4 2011) (OECD 2019h).
Together, the Big Five organizations spent or committed only about US$21.3 billion
annually on food and agriculture (of which about one-third is humanitarian or emergency
assistance assistance) in 2018–19, which is miniscule, but potentially catalytic annual
activity focused mainly on agriculture production and livelihood, as compared to annual
investment of developing countries in agriculture, excluding investment needed in other
sectors (OECD 2019h). According to the World Bank (2014a), developing countries spent
about US$1 trillion a year on infrastructure. A more recent World Bank report found that
investments of 4.5 percent of GDP will allow developing countries to achieve their
infrastructure-related SDGs and stay on track to limit to meet the goal of limiting climate
change to up to 2°C (Rozenberg and Fay 2019). These expenditure numbers provide orders
of magnitude and are not strictly comparable.
WBG and IFAD are financing institutions whose funds go directly to developing
countries in the form of loans, credit, and grants, but they operate at different scales.
WBG’s annual commitments, including the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC), to
⁷ Official and Private or Concessional and Non-Concessional flows in OECD DAC statistics. [Non-ODA flows
mean (Other Official Flows + Private Grants + Private Flows at Market Terms)]:
Concessional Non-Concessional
Official ODA Other Official Flows
Private Net Private Grants Private Flows at Market Terms (FDI + Other Securities)
Source: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/beyond-oda.htm#understanding
⁸ DAC statistics include activity-level data from BMGF on aid grants, loans, and equities by recipient and by
sector since 2009. These activities are classified as financial flows from the private sector (that is, private grants and
private flows at market terms) and should be excluded from analyses of Official Development Finance.
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food and agriculture amounted to about US$9.9 billion in 2019, with US$5.4 billion in (only
8.5 percent of the total) commitments to the public sector made by the World Bank
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD]/International Develop-
ment Association [IDA]) and US$4.5 billion in commitments to food and agriculture by the
private sector development arm, the IFC, mostly to agribusiness value chains.⁹
IFAD’s total loan and grant operations was nearly US$1.2 billion in 2018 (last year of the
IFAD10 replenishment period. In 2019, new approvals for IFAD projects and programs
increased to a record US$1.67 billion, to do more in improving the lives of rural people, as
well as building a sustainable future for their families and communities (IFAD 2018a,
2018b, 2019).
CGIAR committed about US$836 million in 2019 to its long-term research program in
its 15 international research centers (CGIAR 2019).
FAO’s biannual budget was US$2.6 billion. This means its annual budget was only about
US$1.3 billion in 2018–19, about the same as IFAD. Of this amount, 39 percent comes from
assessed contributions paid by member countries, which is available on a long-term
predictable basis, while 61 percent is mobilized through voluntary contributions, through
the phenomenon of donor trust funds, from members and other partners. The FAO regular
biennium budget for the 2018–19 is US$1,005.6 million, which means an annual budget of
about US$503 million. The voluntary contributions provided by members and other
partners support technical and emergency (including rehabilitation) assistance to govern-
ments for clearly defined purposes linked to the results framework, as well as directly
support FAO’s core work. The voluntary contributions are expected to reach approximately
US$1.6 billion in 2018–19.¹⁰
The largest amount, outside WBG, was WFP’s humanitarian and emergency assistance.
Unlike in the case of other four organizations that either provide development assistance or
GPGs, WFP’s humanitarian and emergency assistance amounted to around US$8.1 billion in
2019. It was funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions, unlike the assessed contributions
that fund FAO andWHO. The data on humanitarian needs have been highly fragmented.¹¹
It is in this broader context that the trends in the World Bank, IFC, and IFAD lending in
support of investment in food and agriculture, and the activities of FAO in providing GPGs
of norms and standards, and statistics, as well as CGIAR’s investments in R&D and WFP’s
humanitarian and emergency assistance and their impacts should be seen.
The World Bank’s focus on the objectives of poverty reduction and increased prosperity
has incorporated increased IFC lending to agribusinesses since 2000, addressing a wide
range of private sector activities in land and water, nutrition, and value chains. Whereas
WFP has been traditionally known for its food-for-work and school-feeding programs,
increasingly, it has had to focus on emergencies to save lives in fragile and conflict areas. It is
⁹ See World Bank, “Agriculture and Food.” https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/agriculture/overview#2
¹⁰ See “Strategic Planning”: http://www.fao.org/about/strategic-planning/en/
¹¹ A paper on the financing of humanitarian assistance notes:
Better reporting would improve transparency in terms of:
1) the totality of funding, including resources beyond humanitarian assistance;
2) traceability beyond the first-level recipient to see the transaction chain from donor to crisis-affected
person and the time it takes for the money to work its way through the system 3) timeliness to allow real-
time data on available resources in fast-moving humanitarian settings. . . . Improvements to the IATI
[International Aid Transparency Initiative] standard currently in progress mean that by the end of
2015 it will be fully compatible and interoperable with the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS) and other aid coordination platforms.
(Lattimer 2015, 2)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
    409
the leading humanitarian organization delivering food and assistance, with two-thirds of
WFP’s work occurring in conflict-affected countries. FAO’s five objectives focus on erad-
ication of hunger and food insecurity, while managing natural resources; CGIAR’s research
focuses on connections between food and health, and between food and the environment.
CGIAR’s declared objective is to contribute to the SDGs, by achieving 150 million fewer
hungry people by 2030, and restoring 190 million degraded lands. Measurement of these
achievements and, particularly, attribution of the results to international organizations is a
challenge. IFAD, too, increasingly presents its activities as addressing SDGs and mentions a
range of objectives with a focus on enhancing poor people’s assets to help them address
issues of resilience to climate change, gender, natural resource management and microfi-
nance as a way to move them out of poverty.
Official Development Assistance from Development Assistance
Committee Member Countries
According to preliminary data, in 2018, net ODA flows from member countries of the DAC
fell 2.7 percent from 2017, with a declining share going to the neediest countries. The drop
was attributed largely to less aid spent on hosting refugees, as arrivals slowed and rules were
tightened on which refugee costs could come from official aid budgets. ODA from the
30 members of OECD’s DAC totaled US$153 billion in 2018 and US$161 billion in 2020,
representing 0.31 and 0.32 percent of the DAC donors’ combined GNI, respectively, as
calculated using a “grant-equivalent” methodology, to obtain a more accurate count of the
donor effort in development loans. We discuss the methodology later in this section (OECD
2019d, 2021).
The ODA was comprised of US$150.4 billion in the form of grants, official aid loans, or
contributions to multilateral institutions; US$1.5 billion to development-oriented private
sector instrument (PSI) vehicles, US$1.0 billion in the form of net loans and equities to
private companies operating in ODA-eligible countries and US$0.2 billion of debt relief.
According to an OECD report:
In 2020, official development assistance (ODA) by member countries of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) amounted to US$161.2 bn, representing 0.32% of their
combined GNI . . . This total included US$158.0 bn in the form of grants, loans to
sovereign entities, debt relief and contributions to multilateral institutions (calculated
on a grant-equivalent basis); US$1.3 bn to development-oriented private sector instru-
ment (PSI) vehicles and US$1.9 bn in the form of net loans and equities to private
companies operating in ODA-eligible countries.
Total ODA in 2020 rose by 3.5% in real terms compared to 2019 . . . .
The United States continued to be the largest DAC donor of ODA (US$35 bn), followed
by Germany (US$28.4 bn), the United Kingdom (US$18.6 bn), Japan (US$16.3 bn), and
France (US$14.1 bn). The following countries met or exceeded the United Nations’ ODA
as a percentage of GNI target of 0.7%: Denmark (0.73%) Germany (0.73%), Luxembourg
(1.02%), Norway (1.11%), Sweden (1.14%) and the United Kingdom (0.70%). (OECD
2021, 1, 2)
OECD countries provided $11.0 billion of COVID-19-related aid. Previously, the October
2019 news release from OECD had noted a similar pattern, although with slightly lower
aid commitments:
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The grant-equivalent ODA figure for 2018 is equivalent to 0.31% of the DAC donors’
combined gross national income, well below the target ratio of 0.7 percent ODA to
GNI. Five DAC members—Sweden [1.04%], Luxembourg [0.98%], Norway [0.94%],
Denmark [0.72%], and the United Kingdom [0.7%]—met or exceeded the 0.7% target.
Non-DAC donors Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, whose ODA is not counted in
the DAC total, provided 1.10% and 0.95% respectively of their GNI in development aid.
(OECD 2019d)¹²
On the grant-equivalent basis, G7 countries provided three-quarters of total ODA; and
DAC–EU countries provided 56.5 percent of the total, representing 0.47 percent of their
combined GNI (OECD 2019e).
The grant-equivalent methodology, which the DAC agreed upon 2014, was first adopted
with the 2018 ODA release. The methodology provides a more realistic comparison
between grants (83 percent of bilateral ODA in 2018), and loans (17 percent). ODA
comprises over two-thirds of external finance for least-developed countries (LDCs). The
DAC is pushing for ODA to be leveraged to generate more private investment and domestic
tax revenue in poor countries to help them to achieve the UN SDGs (OECD 2019d).
As noted previously, “the ‘grant equivalent’ headline figures are not comparable with the
historical series on a ‘cash basis.’ For the sake of transparency and analysis of trends over
time, the OECD will continue to publish ODA data on a cash basis” (OECD 2019e, 2). The
data in this chapter all refer to net ODA flows on a cash basis.
Using the “cash-flow basis” methodology, net ODA flows by DAC member countries of
US$161 billion were higher in 2020 compared to US$149.3 billion in 2018, representing a
fall of 2.7 percent in real terms, as compared to 2017. This drop reflected a reduction of in-
donor refugee costs for many DAC members, but in 2020, the costs were US$8.98 billion. If
these costs were excluded, net ODA levels amounted to US$152.19 billion in 2020, higher by
less than US$3 billion, whereas they were stable in 2018, compared to 2017. The number of
refugees entering Europe peaked in 2015–16 and has dropped since. In-donor refugee costs
of US$10.6 billion were reported by DAC countries in 2018, a fall of 28.4 percent in real
terms compared to 2017. These costs represented 5.6 percent in 2020, compared to
7.1 percent of total net ODA in 2018, 9.6 percent in 2017, and 11.0 percent in 2016,
when in-donor refugee costs were highest. These costs represented more than 10 percent
of the total ODA for seven of the DAC countries; for two countries, the costs were over
20 percent (OECD 2019e, 2021).
The OECD brief of April 10, 2021 stated:
Net ODA flows for bilateral projects, programmes and technical assistance, which repre-
sent just over half of total net ODA, rose by 8 percent in real terms in 2020 compared to
2019. Contributions to multilateral organisations, which represent about a third of total
ODA, increased by 9%. Humanitarian aid amounted to US$18 bn and rose by 6% in real
terms compared to 2019. Debt relief grants also rose to US$554 m.
In 2020, 22% of gross bilateral ODA by DAC members was provided in the form of non-
grants (loans and equity investments), up from a level which hovered around 17% in
previous years. The remaining bilateral ODA is provided in the form of grants.
¹² Bracketed percentages in the indented quote are found in OECD (2019e).
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Preliminary data in 2020 show that net bilateral ODA flows from DACmembers to Africa
were US$39 bn, representing an increase of 4.1% in real terms compared to 2019 . . . .
By income group, net bilateral ODA flows from all DAC members to low-income
countries were US$25 bn, a decrease of 3.5 percent in real terms compared to 2019. By
contrast, net bilateral ODA to lower-middle income was US$33 bn representing an
increase of 6.9% in real terms. Net ODA to upper-middle countries also increased by
36.1% to US$18 n. Net ODA flows to high-income countries more than tripled and stood
at US$372 m. These trends, along with the increase in the share of loans in ODA would
imply that part of the increase in ODA in 2020 is due to loans to middle-income countries.
Preliminary data showed that net bilateral aid flows from DAC members to the group
of least developed countries were US$34 bn, and increased by 1.8% in real terms compared
to 2019 (Emphasis added). (OECD 2021, 5)
As performance by bilateral donors, 2018 ODA outflows rose in 17 donor countries, with
the largest increases recorded in Hungary, Iceland, and New Zealand. In contrast, ODA fell
in 12 countries, with the largest drops in Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy, Japan, and Portugal.
Most of these falls were due to lower in-donor refugee costs. Net ODA flows from DAC-EU
countries were US$87.4 billion, representing a decrease of 1.2 percent in real terms, as
compared to 2017. Excluding in-donor refugee costs, ODA flows increased by 3.9 percent in
real terms (OECD 2019e).
Country programmable aid (CPA), also known as “core” aid, is the portion of an aid
donor’s program for individual countries, and over which partner countries could have a
significant say. CPA is much closer than ODA to capturing the flows of aid that go to a
partner country, and in several studies, has been proven to be a good proxy of aid recorded
at the country level (OECD 2019i). DAC countries’ total CPA was US$57 billion in 2014,
a 4 percent decrease in real terms from 2013. This volume represents 53 percent of DAC
countries’ gross bilateral ODA. CPA as a share of total bilateral ODA has been fairly stable
since 2004, apart from a temporary drop in 2005 and 2006 due to exceptional debt relief to
Iraq and Nigeria (OECD 2019c).
Within the renewed global partnership, it is vital that the role of ODA is reexamined so
that this unique resource can be used effectively within the post-2015 development agenda.
There is need for both more and better ODA—for commitments to be met, including for
ODA equivalent to 0.7 percent of DAC donors’ GNI and the 0.15–0.20 percent of GNI as
ODA to least developed countries’ (LDCs) target and allocations improved for better
development results.¹³
Donors Unlikely to Meet 0.7 Percent Aid Target
ODA levels have been a long-standing source of contention between developed and devel-
oping countries. While the debate continues in the context of SDGs and the financing of
GPGs, including, especially, climate change (see CGD’s 2016 report on multilateral devel-
opment banks [Ahluwalia et al. 2016]), the debate on country-level assistance has become
mute, particularly as the distinction between aid recipients and donors has blurred with
¹³ UN definition of LDC: Per capita income < US$1,035; Human Asset Index (HAI) < 60 and Economic
Vulnerability Index (EVI) < 36.
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emerging countries such as China, Brazil, and India becoming aid donors. Nobel Prize-
winning economist, Jan Tinbergen, as Chairman of the United Nations Committee on
Development Planning in 1964, developed guidelines that suggested transfer of 0.75 percent
of gross national product (GNP) of rich countries annually to developing countries to
finance development, an idea championed by every major head of a commission concerned
with global affairs.¹⁴ However, in view of the unlikely changes in OECD ODA levels,
increased allocation of ODA to agriculture is a zero-sum game—what goes to agriculture
comes from other priorities. Therefore, the catalytic role of the current ODA to priorities for
expenditures, as well for enhancing the quality of expenditures and influencing resource
allocation in developing countries, is of critical importance. Like everything else, discussion
of financing, in the context of these different categories, has tended to become mixed due to
the interconnectedness of the issues. One’s perception of ODA depends on whether it is
viewed in nominal or real terms, absolute amounts or shares of OECD GNI of developing
countries’ GNI, or total investment or as shares of government expenditures—how it is
allocated and whether it is used effectively.
Net ODA disbursement by DAC member countries, as a percentage of GNI in 2018, was
0.31 percent. This looks good when compared to the all-time low of 0.21 percent in 2001,
before rising to 0.32 percent in 2005, and then settling down to 0.3 percent in the most
recent period. However, ODA was 0.54 percent in 1961, and declined steadily to 0.21,
reaching an all-time low share of GNI in 2001 before rising again (Figure 7.2).
A handful of OECD countries have consistently exceeded the 0.7 percent of GNI. Five of
DAC’s 29 member countries—Sweden, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, and the United
Kingdom—met or exceeded the United Nations (UN) ODA target of 0.7 percent of GNI
(OECD 2019d).
Yet, ODA has become highly fragmented. There are 29 bilateral donor members within
the OECD’s DAC, and a growing group of non-DAC donors consists of at least 28 states,
with this aid channeled through over 210 major organizations and funds, with numerous
smaller trust funds providing aid (OECD 2012).¹⁵
More Aid for the Least Developed Countries: 0.15 to 0.2 Percent of Gross
National Income in Official Development Assistance
There are 47 LDCs (as of December 2018), home to over 1 billion people (13.2 percent of
world’s population), a quarter living in extreme poverty (38 percent of the world’s poor).¹⁶
More than 75 percent of the population in LDCs still live in poverty. LDCs account for less
¹⁴ This was echoed by Lester Pearson, prime minister of Canada in 1968, in the Pearson Commission report
(Pearson 1969), and was an idea that was actively promoted by Robert McNamara, president of the World Bank.
Developing countries adopted the target in the meeting of the G77 in Algiers in 1967, and later, in the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) meeting in New Delhi in 1968, but with pushback
from developed countries, they accepted the concessional ODA target level of 0.7 percent of GNP, adopted by the
UN General Assembly in 1970. In 1980s, Willy Brandt, the German chancellor, reinforced the need for ODA at
such a level, as did the Brundtland Report (WCED 1987).
¹⁵ The EU is also a full member of the Committee, bringing the total membership to 30. Among nonmembers,
18 currently report their financial flows to the OECD, while 10 conduct their own statistical reporting, which is
then used by the OECD to estimate development spending (see http://www.oecd.org/development/stats/non-dac-
reporting.htm).
¹⁶ Extreme poverty is defined here as the proportion of people living on less than US$1.90 per day.
See the United Nations’ Committee for Development Policy (CDP) List of Least Developed Countries: https://
www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf
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than 2 percent of world’s GDP and around 1 percent of world trade. LDCs are comprised of
more than 31 countries in SSA, small island states, Haiti (the only such country in the
Americas), fragile states such as Yemen and Afghanistan, and 6 other countries in Asia
(including Nepal and Bangladesh). Since the LDC category was defined, only five countries
have “graduated”—Botswana in 1994, Cape Verde in 2007, the Maldives in 2011, Samoa in
2014, and Equatorial Guinea in 2017 (UNCTAD 2019a).
Since the beginning of the 21st century, external finance to LDCs has increased signif-
icantly, from US$24 billion in 2000, to US$163 billion in 2017, largely due to the rising
weight of remittances, FDI, and external debt. Following the global upward trend, remit-
tances have surged to become the second largest source of external finance for LDCs, rising
to a record high of US$42.4 billion in 2017, behind ODA at US$49 billion. FDI inflows to
LDCs also recorded a sharp increase, from US$3.9 billion in 2000, to US$37.6 billion in
2015, then receding somewhat to US$20.7 billion and US$23.8 billion, respectively, in 2017
and 2018. Despite the recent decline, the amount of FDI inflows, although six times higher
than in 2000, is now the third largest source of external finance for LDCs (UNCTAD
2019a).
Unlike for other developing countries, LDCs remain heavily reliant on ODA, “under-
scoring the challenges in attracting market-based external financial resources” (UNCTAD
2019a, 17). Concessional finance continues to represent the bulk of external development
financial resources for LDCs—one-third of total external finance supplied by OECD
economies in 2014–17, compared to merely 4.5 percent for other developing countries.

















































































































Figure 7.2 Overall aid trends: Net ODA (US$bn, constant 2017 prices) and as a percentage
share of GNI, 1960–2018
Note: (a) Total ODA excludes debt forgiveness of non-ODA claims in 1990, 1991 and 1992; (p) Preliminary data.
Source: Based on OECD International Development Statistics (database) (OECD.Stat 2020a) http://stats.oecd.org/
viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE1&lang=en
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these two groups of countries. While in LDCs it accounted for one fifth of the total, in
other developing countries, it contributed almost half of total external finance. Interest-
ingly, personal remittances had a broadly similar weight for both country groups: approx-
imately one third of total external finance. (UNCTAD 2019a, 17)
“Among LDCs, the significance of ODA relative to other sources of foreign finance is even
starker when assessed at an individual country level” (UNCTAD 2019a, 18). LDCs received
approximately 22 percent of the total official support (UNCTAD 2019a, 32). In 2018, net
ODA to LCDs increased from US$48.9 billion in 2017 to US$51.6 billion in 2018 (constant
2015 US dollars), showing a mildly upward trend, recorded since 2014. The share of total
net ODA for LDCs decreased from 34 percent, at its peak in 2010, to a low of 32.2 percent in
2018 (Figure 7.3). Their share of global OOF has slightly risen but remains marginal by
global standards, accounting for roughly 4.4 percent of gross disbursements to LDCs.
According to UNCTAD’s “The Least Developed Countries Report 2019”:
ODA flows have continued to be distributed more evenly across individual LDCs than
other official flows or other sources of external finance, such as FDI and remittances. This
holds true, despite the fact that donors’ aid allocation is not only affected by country needs,
but also by additional factors ranging from geopolitical considerations to historical and
cultural links, especially in the case of bilateral flows (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Anderson
2008; Bermeo 2017). (UNCTAD 2019a, 32)
At the third International Conference on Financing for Development held in Addis Ababa
in 2015, and the Development and Programme of Action for the Least Developed












































































































Net ODA to LDCs Share in total ODA
Figure 7.3 Total net ODA going to least developed countries, 1960–2018 (US$bn, constant
2015 prices)
Source: Based on World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank 2020b).
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community reaffirmed the UN target, set in 1990, of providing between 0.15 percent and
0.2 percent of their GNI of ODA to LCDs (in parallel to a commitment to provide the
equivalent of 0.7 percent of GNI inODA to developing countries) (WFP 2011; UN 2015). In
2017, only seven of the 29 DAC member countries fulfilled this commitment: . . . namely,
Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom—have
met the Sustainable Development Goal 17.2 target related to LDCs. (With the exception of
Switzerland, these very countries are also the ones that provided aid equivalent to at least 0.7
percent of their GNI to all developing countries.) Others, including some of the world’s
largest donors, remain far from the internationally agreed targets. (UNCTAD 2019a, 35)
In total, DAC countries provided 0.09 percent of their GNI as ODA to least developed
countries in 2017, down from 0.10 percent in 2013 (OECD.Stat 2020a). To meet the SDG
target 17.2, there is need for an additional US$33–58 billion assistance (UNCTAD 2019a).¹⁷
Some multilaterals tend to spend too little aid in the poorest countries. For example, the
EU spends only 27 percent of its aid in LICs (the biggest recipients of EU aid are Turkey,
Serbia, Morocco, Tunisia, and Ukraine). The World Bank/IDA, by contrast, does well on
this measure, spending 55 percent of its ODA in LICs. The UK’s bilateral aid program is
somewhere in between, with 38 percent spent in LICs (Barder and Juden 2016).
As a share of GNI, ODA has been declining steadily in all regions except SSA, where it
reached a peak in 1994, mainly because of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)
settlement and has declined since 2003 (Figure 7.4).
¹⁷ The SDG target 17.2 specifies: “Developed countries to implement fully their official development assistance
commitments, including the commitment by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 percent of
ODA/GNI to developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20 percent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries; ODA
providers are encouraged to consider setting a target to provide at least 0.20 percent of ODA/GNI to least



































































East Asia and Pacific (excluding high income)
Europe and Central Asia (excluding high income)
Middle East and North Africa (excluding high income)
Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high income)
South Asia
Latin America and Caribbean (excluding high income)
Figure 7.4 Declining ODA share as percentage of GNI by region, 1960–2018
Source: Based on World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank 2020b).
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Untying Aid
Untied aid is defined by the DAC as loans and grants whose proceeds are fully and freely
available to finance procurement from all OECD countries and substantially all developing
countries. All other loans and grants are classified either as tied aid (procurement open only
to suppliers in the provider country) or as partially untied aid (procurement open to a
restricted number of countries, which must include substantially all developing countries
and can include the provider country). These definitions apply whether aid is tied formally
or through informal arrangements.
Aid has traditionally been tied by source of procurement or source of delivery. Tied aid
is inefficient. The most long-standing case is that of food aid. Studies show that, in most
circumstances, financial aid rather than food aid in-kind is the preferable option, not only
for providing project assistance or budgetary support for general development, but also
for the distribution of food. Context-specific rationale, however, is always required for
relying on food aid in-kind, in preference to financial aid. Furthermore, for the donor,
food aid is often relatively expensive if the aid is tied. The costs to the donor of providing
tied food aid, instead of financing commercial imports, tends to be at least 30 percent.
The actual cost of tied direct food aid transfers was, on average, approximately 50 percent
more than local food purchases, and 33 percent costlier than procurement of food in
developing countries. For the recipients, too, food aid can be a disincentive to domestic
production and a real loss of opportunity to develop local production and agro-
processing, compared to financial aid (Barrett and Maxwell 2005; OECD 2006; Lentz
and Barrett 2013). Thus, there is scope for considerable efficiency gains in switching to
less restricted sourcing, and this has been shown again and again the case of development
aid—hence, the push for untying.
The DAC has focused on the issue of the tying status of aid since its inception in
1961. The purpose of reporting tying status items is to show how much of members’
aid is open for procurement through international competition. Internationally com-
petitive procurement promotes cost-effective sourcing of aid inputs, promotes free and
open trade, and facilitates the implementation of commitments under the Paris Dec-
laration on Aid Effectiveness in areas such as coordination and alignment (OECD
2008b). DAC, reporting on tying status, does not include multilateral ODA (core
contributions to multilateral agencies), as this is treated as untied by convention. In
this field, as in others, the DAC has for many years given special consideration to the
needs of least developed countries. In 2001, the DAC agreed to the Recommendation
on Untying ODA to the Least Developed Countries. In 2008, it expanded this Recom-
mendation to include those HIPCs that were not included as least developed countries
(OECD 2020a).
The Paris Declaration committed OECD–DAC providers “to continue making progress
to untie aid as encouraged by the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA to the
Least Developed Countries” (OECD 2016, 156; 2019j), while the Accra Agenda for Action
encouraged cooperation providers to “elaborate plans to further untie aid to the maximum
extent” (OECD 2016, 156; 2019k). The Busan Partnership agreement urges providers to
“accelerate efforts to untie aid” and to “improve the quality, consistency and transparency of
reporting on the tying status of aid” (OECD 2016, 156; 2019g).
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OECD summarized the progress in untying aid:
DACMembers have made considerable progress in untying aid. From 1999–2001 to 2018,
the proportion of ODA covered by the Recommendation that was untied rose progres-
sively from 47% to 88%.
The adherence to transparency provisions, aimed at providing transparency that de jure
untied aid is also de facto untied, has also significantly improved. The percentage of
Members who reported on ex post contract awards has increased from 55% in 2013 to
80% in 2016 which is the highest level recorded historically. (OECD 2020b)
Bilateral Official Development Assistance Allocations
to and through Civil Society Organizations
Civil society organizations (CSOs) are playing a major role in the framework of sustainable
development: namely, for improving economic, social, and political conditions in develop-
ing countries. In 2017, DAC countries channeled about US$20 billion (disbursements,
constant 2016 prices) in ODA to and through CSOs (Figure 7.5). This accounted for a little
over 17 percent of total bilateral aid. While the share of bilateral aid allocated to and through
CSOs differs widely among DAC members, the average share of total bilateral aid for all
DAC countries over the last three years has been 16.7 percent (OECD 2019a).
• The total number of INGOs operating in the sector is too numerous to count. Only data



























ODA channelled through CSOs ODA to CSOs
Figure 7.5 Bilateral ODA to and through CSO gross disbursements, 2010–2017 (US$bn,
constant 2016 prices)
Note: CSOs: civil society organizations; ODA: official development assistance.
Source: Based on data from OECD (2019a).
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• Most INGOs rely on traditional donors for a large share of their in-country expendi-
tures. Barrett and Maxwell (2005) noted that INGOs are hardly a progressive force in
the delivery of food aid, since many depend on the delivery of food aid as a source of
revenue. Budgetary dependence on food aid tempers their willingness to publicly
challenge a system that many privately acknowledge underperforms its potential.
• Limited, shared characteristics exist across this clustering of organizations but LICs,
except for the Philippines, India, and Nicaragua, are popular destinations for work.
• Eighty-two organizations in the United States were operating 2,373 projects during
2007–14.
Official Development Assistance to and through the Multilateral Aid
System: The Rise of Multi-Bi Aid
A growing number of aid recipients compete for this fragmented aid, including nation
states, UN agencies, multilateral organizations, INGOs, and think tanks wishing to use
those same limited resources to advance their agendas.¹⁸
Total use of the multilateral aid system means all funds channeled to and through
multilateral organizations, or the sum of “core” and “non-core” resources. It, therefore,
encompasses multilateral ODA/core contributions (that is, official contributions to multi-
lateral agencies, whether negotiated, assessed, or voluntary, for which the governing boards
have the unqualified right to allocate as they see fit within organizations’ charters) and non-
core/earmarked/multi-bi contributions, discussed previously (see Note #3) (OECD 2015).
The trend to provide voluntary funding to complement “core” budgets originated with
the creation of several of the large UN development funds and programs in the 1960s,
allowing donors to assert influence “through the backdoor” (Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and
Eichenauer 2015). Non-core/earmarked/multi-bi, by contrast, began in the early 1990s, and
has grown over time, in response to several developments in the external environment,
leading to the fragmentation of aid, with allocation of resources largely in response to the
priorities of aid donors. It is a result of a combination of the emergence of civil society in
donor countries as a significant force, combined with the decline of bilateral aid-giving
agencies. Parking funds with multilateral agencies allowed stakeholders in developed
countries to exercise an influential voice in aid priorities through the multiplicity of
donor-funded programs outside multilateral aid agencies; to have a seat at the table of
trust-funded programs; and gain access—while also creating new challenges for global
governance, including diminished transparency and accountability—than international
agencies have provided. Most of these funds have gone to the health and environmental
sectors, but in agriculture, CGIAR is also a large recipient of donor trust funds.
Contributions to multilateral organizations by DAC countries represented about one-
third of total ODA in 2020. an increase of 9 percent. This compared, on average, for 2015
and 2016, of 39.3 percent of their ODA to and through the multilateral aid system (core +
multi-bi/non-core/earmarked), a slight increase from the 2009–10 average of 36.8 percent,
from only 24.6 percent in 2004–5 (OECD 2021).
¹⁸ Core resources are unearmarked contributions to multilateral organizations, known as multilateral ODA
(OECD 2012). Non-core resources are contributions to multilateral organizations that are earmarked for specific
purposes, sectors, regions or countries, which include contributions to trust funds and joint programming, also
referred to as “multi-bi” aid (OECD 2012).
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This increase was mainly due to larger ODA shares tied to projects for specific regions,
countries, themes, or sectors (multi-bi/non-core/earmarked). OECD data suggest multi-bi
assistance rose from 10.3 percent in 2009–10 to 12.9 percent in 2015–16, and from only
1.5 percent of total DAC ODA in 2004–5. Share of multi-bi assistance in total multilateral
(core + multi-bi/non-core/earmarked) spending rose from 27.9 percent in 2009–10 to
32.9 percent in 2015–16, and from only 5.6 percent in 2004–5. The share of core contribu-
tions in gross ODA disbursements increased only marginally, from 26.5 percent in 2009–10
to 26.4 percent in 2015–16 (peaking in 2013–14 at 27.2 percent and then showing
a downward trend), down from a high of 29.4 percent in 2000–1 (OECD 2019a)
(Figure 7.6). Nevertheless, a new data set suggests that these figures may be gross under-
estimates, with multi-bi aid standing at over 20 percent of total ODA and almost 60 percent
of total multilateral contributions (Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer 2015).
Investment Flow Methodology in the Agriculture Sector
Investing in agriculture is essential for reducing hunger and promoting sustainable agri-












































































































Bilateral ODA, excl. multi-bi
Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system (core + multi-bi/non-core) (%)
Share of multilateral  ODA (%)
Figure 7.6 The rise of multi-bi aid: Gross ODA disbursements to and through the bilateral and
multilateral aid system, 2000–1 to 2015–16 (US$bn, constant 2016 prices)
Note: Data collection on multi-bi/non-core funding started in 2004.
Source: Based on OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data and OECD (2018a).
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public investments in agriculture have stagnated are the epicenters of poverty and hunger,
as FAO rightly noted in 2012 (FAO 2012). There are five indicators typically mentioned in
the literature for measuring investment in agriculture and assessing attention to or priority
to agriculture using OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database, the Interna-
tional Food Policy Research Institute’s Statistics of Public Expenditure for Economic
Development (IFPRI’s SPEED database), and FAO’s Government Expenditure on Agricul-
ture (GEA) database:
1. ODA to Agriculture as a Share of Total ODA;
2. Per capita government expenditure in agriculture;
3. Government agricultural expenditure as a share of agricultural value-added;
4. Government agricultural expenditure as a share of total government expenditure; and
5. Agriculture Orientation Index (AOI), as the share of government expenditure to
agriculture in total government expenditure divided by the share of agricultural
value-added in total GDP.
Most of the analysis focuses on the public financing in agriculture—that is, either domestic
official financing or international official financing—not on private financing, which has
significant and increasingly more important role in agricultural financing. The multisectoral
nature of agriculture means that financing for agriculture must be viewed in the broad
context, consisting of multiple components for each of the following dimensions of finan-
cing: public and private and their domestic and foreign flows. Financing in agriculture is
captured in the following framework (Figure 7.7), along with the associated indicators for
measurement with their data sources; it is based on the “FAOSTAT’s Agricultural Invest-
ment Data Framework,” the most complete framework (see FAO–OEA/CIE–IICAWorking
Group [2013]). It uses all the financing sources to agriculture, but it’s one main limitation is
the absence of data on the largest components of private investment financing: private
equity or savings of agricultural producers; foreign remittances received; and informal
borrowing, which includes borrowing from family, friends, local moneylenders, land-
owners, and input suppliers. Such information is likely best collected through agricultural
surveys, and may require significant financial investments (marked in italics in the frame-
work; see Figure 7.7).
Findings from Different Indicators
We next show the performances of the different economies/regions based on the different
measurements: that is, indicators on investment in agriculture.
Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Agriculture, 1991–2014
Over the period 2005–14, global annual physical investment flows in agriculture—as
measured by gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in agriculture—rose by almost 50 percent
from US$259 to US$378 billion in constant 2005 US dollars (FAO 2020b). LICs and MICs,
as a group, invest almost as much in agriculture, in absolute terms, as high-income
countries—around US$190 billion in both country groups.
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According to FAO’s 2017 publication, “The Future of Food and Agriculture. Trends and
Challenges”:
In the period 1991–2014, agricultural investment levels increased in all country groupings,
although at different rates. In high-income countries, investment increased from around
US$120 billion to US$190 billion. . . . In China, it grew from less than US$10 billion to US
$75 billion, . . . while investment in agriculture in the remaining low- and middle-income
countries grew from US$45 billion to US$115 billion. (FAO 2017, 23)
1. Credit to agriculture [Source: FAOSTAT]
2. AOI for credit (the ratio of the credit to agriculture over 
the share of agricultural value added in total GDP) 
[Source: FAOSTAT]
1. National government per capita agricultural expenditure 
[Source: IFPRI SPEED database] 
2. National government agricultural expenditure as a share of 
agricultural value added [Source: IFPRI SPEED database]
3. National government agricultural expenditure as a share of total 
national government expenditure [Source: IFPRI SPEED 
database]
4. Central government expenditure to agriculture as a share of 
total central government expenditure [Source: FAOSTAT]
5. Agriculture Orientation Index (AOI) for central government 
expenditure (the ratio of the share of central government 
expenditure to agriculture in total central government 
expenditure over the share of agricultural value added in total 
GDP) [Source: FAOSTAT]
1. Total official development 
assistance (ODA) to agriculture 
[Source: OECD-CRS]
2. ODA to agriculture as a share of 
total ODA [Source: OECD-CRS]
3. Development flows to agriculture 
(DFA) [Source: FAOSTAT, OECD-
CRS as the primary data source]
4. AOI for DFA (the ratio of the share 
of DFA in total development flows over 
the share of agricultural value added in 
total GDP) [Source: FAOSTAT, 
OECD-CRS as the primary data 
source]
FDI [Source: 
FAOSTAT, UNCTAD as 
the primary data source]















orientation ratio (the ratio of the
share of GFCF in agriculture in total 
GFCF over the share of agricultural 
value added in total GDP)  
[Source: FAOSTAT] 
Gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF)
[Source: FAOSTAT]
Agricultural capital–output ratio 
(net fixed capital
formation in agriculture as a 
share of agricultural value 
added)  
[Source: FAOSTAT]
Investment flows in agriculture
Figure 7.7 Agricultural investment framework
Source: Authors’ construction. Based FAOSTAT’s Agricultural Investment Data Framework, FAO–OEA/CIE–
IICA Working Group (2013).
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Among the low- and middle-income regions, SA’s growth has been highest, followed by
East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) (excluding China). GFCF in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) is lowest, behind SSA and Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) (FAO
2017). Over the period 2005–14, annual flows of physical investment in the agriculture
sector doubled in Asia and Pacific region; it remained stagnant in Europe and in the other
developed regions, but increased by around 62 percent in North America. For the remaining
regions, agricultural physical investment flows increased by around 54 percent in LAC and
34 percent in Africa. These diverging regional trends in investment directly translated into
the agricultural capital stock, because the investment flows add up to build capital stocks
after adjustment for depreciation (FAO 2020b).
Significantly, similar interregional diverging patterns on investment in physical capital
are present when the overall economy is considered (all sectors together). GFCF was a key
driver of GDP growth, as it rose from US$3.6 trillion (2005 US$) to US$13.8 trillion
between 1970 and 2014. The investment ratio—GFCF as a proportion of GDP—remained
relatively stable at around 22 percent throughout the period globally. At the regional level,
the investment ratios for Africa (from 0.25 in 1970–9 to 0.22 in 2010–14); Europe (from
0.25 in 1970–9 to 0.20 in 2010–14); and LAC (from 0.24 in 1970–9 to 0.22 in 2010–14)
present downward trends, while Asia and Pacific and North America, to the contrary, saw
investment ratios increasing from 0.2 in 1970s to 0.35 in 2010–14, and 0.18 in the 1970s to
0.20 in 2010–14, respectively (FAO 2020b).
Agricultural Investment Orientation Ratio, 1991–2014
The agricultural investment orientation ratio is the ratio of the share of GFCF in agriculture
in total GFCF over the share of agricultural value-added in total GDP. It provides a measure
of how the investment intensity in agriculture compares to that of the total economy. From
this definition, it appears that countries with a higher investment intensity in agriculture,
compared to overall economy, will have a value greater than 1, indicating that on average a
larger share of each unit of value-added is spent on GFCF in agriculture, as compared to the
other sectors of the economy (FAO 2020b).
According to FAO:
In the last two decades, high-income countries have always devoted a larger share of
investment to agriculture than the share of the sector in GDP. This is reflected in the fact
that the “agricultural investment orientation ratio” has remained consistently above 1. In
low- and middle-income countries, in contrast, this ratio is much lower, at around
0.4. . . .While the investment orientation ratio is increasing in East Asia and the Pacific
(including China), South Asia, Europe and Central Asia, it is decreasing in the Middle
East, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and, to some extent, Latin America and the
Caribbean. (FAO 2017, 24–5)
Agricultural Capital–Output Ratio, 1991–2014
The agricultural capital–output ratio is the net fixed capital formation in agriculture as a
share of agricultural value-added. The FAO notes:
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Degrees of capital intensity in agriculture sectors also vary. . . . [A]griculture in
high-income countries is significantly more capital intensive than in low- and middle
income countries—it requires 4 units of capital to generate one unit of value added,
compared to around 1.5 in low- and middle-income countries. However, in East Asia and
the Pacific (including China), South Asia, Europe and Central Asia, [where surface
irrigation has been the primary source of water, capital intensity has been high, compared
to when groundwater is used, and whereas China’s area under irrigation is about the same
as India’s, China’s irrigation is substantially more capital intensive, as described in the
forthcoming paper on water scarcities in China and India (Lele 2021)]. Overall, the
capital-intensity of agricultural production is increasing [in Asia] . . . in the Middle East
and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, capital-
intensity has fallen. (FAO 2017, 25)
Notably, the Green Revolution was capital intensive if one took account of the need for
fertilizer and water. Surface irrigation is quite capital intensive—groundwater is not so
capital intensive.
Public Domestic Financing to the Agriculture Sector
Next, we discuss the public domestic financing to the agriculture sector based on the
different measurements.
National Government per capita Agricultural Expenditure and National Government
Agricultural Expenditure as a Share of Agricultural Value-Added, 1995–2016
Trends differ in different parts of the world and between developing and developed
countries. For developed countries, despite their large volume of investments, agriculture
represents only a marginal portion of the economy. Per capita agricultural expenditure
(2011 PPP dollars) for high-income European countries and other high-income countries
(US$83.5 to US$69.5) declined from 1995 to 2016 (US$199.7 to US$94.2 in high-income
European countries and US$83.5 to US$69.5 in other high-income countries). The ratio of
agricultural expenditure to agricultural GDP also declined in both countries, 25.9 percent to
17.9 percent in high-income European countries and 18 percent to 12.1 percent in other
high-income countries from 1995 to 2016, respectively (IFPRI 2019). In developing coun-
tries, on the other hand, although agriculture accounts for a larger share of the economy, per
capita agricultural expenditure is considerably lower. In addition, per capita agricultural
expenditure in developing countries remained flat until the early 1990s, and showed a
recovery after that (IFPRI 2017).
Comparing performance across the world’s developing regions, per capita agricultural
public spending has increased most rapidly in EAP, especially following the 2008/09 food
crisis (US$38.8 in 1995 to US$66.6 in 2005 to US$ 318.2 in 2016), largely driven by rapid
growth in agricultural spending in China since 2005 (IFPRI 2018, 2019). EAP increased
spending relative to the size of their agricultural economies (6.4 percent in 1995 to
9.2 percent in 2005 to 26 percent in 2016). MENA as well as Europe and Central Asia
(ECA) regions have spent large amounts on agriculture and showed increasing trend both
per capita (US$73.6 to US$212.6 in MENA and US$26.2 to US$105 in ECA from 1995 to
2016) and as a share of agricultural GDP (5.9 percent to 16.7 percent in MENA and
2.9 percent to 10.7 percent in ECA from 1995 to 2016). SA and SSA lag behind in terms
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of both per capita agricultural expenditure and ratio of agricultural expenditure to agricul-
tural GDP, while LAC showed a declining trend. Among developing regions, agricultural
public spending per capita and as a share of agricultural GDP in 2016 was lowest in SSA
followed by SA. In SSA, agricultural public spending per capita and as a share of agricultural
GDP increased very little, from US$16.3 to US$25.9, and from 3.2 percent to 3.9 percent
from 1995 to 2016. Performance was slightly better in SA than SSA: agricultural public
spending per capita and as a share of agricultural GDP increased from US$15 to US$48, and
from 2.9 percent to 5.2 percent from 1995 to 2016. In LAC, agricultural public spending
per capita and as a share of agricultural GDP, decreased from US$69.6 to US$52.5, and from
10.2 percent to 6.8 percent from 1995 to 2016 (IFPRI 2019).
The 2017 Global Food Policy report noted that:
By two measures, developing regions spend less than developed regions on agriculture.
Both per capita spending and the ratio of public expenditure to agricultural GDP are lower
across all developing regions. But the gap has shrunk over time. . . . Structural adjustment
programs implemented in the 1980s and 1990s in developing countries curtailed govern-
ment spending on agriculture, but since the early 2000s, many developing country
governments have increased allocations to the sector.
Several regions showed a strong recovery in the most recent period (1995–2014), while
others experienced further declines in spending. This disparity reflects differences in levels
of resources, economic performance, demographic shifts, and development priorities. For
example, South Asia and Africa south of the Sahara, which have the lowest level of
resources and overall economic performance in terms of GDP per capita, have lagged
behind other developing regions in both per capita spending and the ratio of public
expenditure to agricultural GDP. (IFPRI 2017)
National Government Agricultural Expenditure as a Share of Total National
Government Expenditure, 1995–2016
The SPEED database on public expenditures indicates that expenditures in productive
sectors, such as infrastructure and agriculture, lagged behind social sectors in most regions.
On average, developing countries channeled more funds to education and defense; defense
spending has been high in the Middle East, SA, and Africa. It is unclear if it is directed
toward containing terrorism and conflict or simply for buying weapons from arms-
exporting countries, and therefore, is a diversion from development expenditures, of
which social protection dominates public resources in developed countries. The growth of
social protection spending in developed countries is much more pronounced than devel-
oping countries. ECA and Latin America and LAC were the top two developing regions
followed by MENA in social protection expenditure share. The share was the lowest in EAP,
SSA, and SA, among the six sectors. Education attracted the largest share in EAP, LAC, and
SSA and was in second position after defense in MENA and SA. On average, except for
ECA, developing regions spent 10–17 percent of their total expenditures on education, with
EAP at the top and SA at the bottom. The share of health sector spending was highest in
LAC followed by EAP, SSA, MENA, ECA, and SA (IFPRI 2015b).
Globally, agriculture and infrastructure (transportation and communication) received
the least amount of attention among the six sectors, with social protection at the top,
followed by education, defense, and health. Public resources allocated to agriculture have
increased alongside total spending, but agricultural spending has not kept pace with the
total increases in budgets (IFPRI 2015b).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
    425
The share of agriculture in total public spending performed the worst and declined over
time in all regions for the period from 1980. Since 1995, as the share of total spending,
agricultural spending showed the largest drop in LAC (dropping from 4.1 percent in 1995 to
1.6 percent in 2016), followed by SSA (dropping from 2.7 percent in 1995 to 2.2 percent in
2016) (IFPRI 2018). Agricultural spending in EAP appears to be rising with overall public
spending, though not as fast as aggregate spending. In EAP the ratio increased from
8.1 percent in 1995 to 9.3 percent in 2016; in SA the ratio increased from 4.4 percent to
5.4 percent; in ECA the ratio increased from 0.5 percent to 1.4 percent, and in MENA,
from 2.4 percent to 2.7 percent. In developed countries, the ratio was decreasing, in high-
income European countries, it dropped from 1.4 percent in 1995 to 0.5 percent in 2016, and
in other high-income countries, from 1.3 percent to 0.6 percent, respectively (IFPRI 2019).
In SA and SSA, infrastructure and agriculture ranked third and fourth, above health and
social protection, below education and defense expenditures. In 2014, agricultural spending,
as a share of overall public spending, Africa, as a whole, has underperformed. Notably, the
heads of state and government in Africa adopted the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP) in 2003 and committed to spend at least 10 percent
of their national budgets on agriculture. Almost all African countries fell short of the
10 percent target of public spending, with the region reaching an average of 2.9 percent
per year between 2003 and 2014. The average share was higher (3.3 percent) prior to the
2009 global financial crisis. Only Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe had
barely met or surpassed the 10 percent target (Malawi and Mozambique consistently
surpassed it). Three countries—Niger, Rwanda, and Zambia were close behind at 9 percent
(Goyal and Nash 2017).
Central Government Expenditure to Agriculture as a Share of Total Central
Government Expenditure, 2001–2017
FAO’s GEA Statistics website noted:
From 2001 onwards, governments allocated less than 2% of their central government
expenditure to agriculture. The agriculture share of total expenditure fluctuated around
1.6%, with a peak of 1.85% in 2008 during the food price crisis, remaining, on average,
under almost one-third of the sector’s contribution to GDP, which increased in the same
period [2001–17] from 4.13% to 6.15%.
The public underinvestment in agriculture, and the sector’s importance to economic
growth and poverty alleviation, particularly in Africa, was acknowledged in the African
Union’s Maputo Declaration of 2003, under which signatory nations committed to
allocate 10% of government expenditures to agriculture and rural development. Though
several countries were unable to attain this goal, the importance of public expenditures in
agriculture was recognized in the Malabo Declaration of 2014, in which signatory nations
re-committed to the 10% goal. Increasing investments in agriculture is also crucial at
attainment of Goal 2 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which is mon-
itored through Agriculture Orientation Index (AOI) for Government Expenditures. . . .
Asia & the Pacific has been the region providing the highest percentage of central
government spending to agriculture between 2001 (3.85%) and 2017 (3.03%), followed
by Africa, where the share has progressively declined from 3.66% (2001) to 2.30% (2017).
The developed regions (Europe and other developed, which refers to Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and United States) allocated the lowest share of central government expend-
iture to agriculture, both series fluctuating around 1%.
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In 2008, during the food price crisis, all the regions (except Europe) experienced an
increase in the agriculture share of central government expenditure. In particular, Asia &
the Pacific and Latin America & the Caribbean registered the highest value of their whole
series (respectively, 4.38% and 2.51%). (FAO 2019)
Asian and African countries lead GEA share of government expenditures. Overall, Asia and
the Pacific (A&P) and Africa had the highest GEA share of central government spending,
and included 9 of the top 10 countries between 2012 to 2016—Malawi (16.4 percent),
Bhutan (13.0 percent), Uzbekistan (11.9 percent), Ethiopia (9.0 percent), Bangladesh
(8.7 percent), Nepal (8.7 percent), Zambia (7.6 percent), Belarus (7.1 percent), Thailand
(7.0 percent) and Togo (6.3 percent) (FAO 2019).
Agriculture Orientation Index for Government Expenditure, 2001–2017
The FAO GEA database website notes further:
SDG Indicator 2.a.1—Agriculture Orientation Index (AOI) for Government Expendi-
tures, compares the central government contribution to agriculture with the sector’s
contribution to GDP [that is, a ratio of the agriculture share of central government
spending to agriculture’s contribution to GDP]. An AOI less than 1 indicates a lower
orientation of the central government towards the agriculture sector relative to the sector’s
contribution to the economy, while an AOI greater than 1 indicates a higher orientation of
the central government towards the agriculture sector relative to the sector’s contribution
to the economy.
At global level, the AOI consistently declined from 0.42 (2001) to 0.26 (2017). During this
period, most of the regions remained stably under 0.5, in particular, sub-Saharan Africa
and Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand) registered the lowest values, with
time series never exceeding 0.35. The regions that experienced the highest values are
Eastern & South-eastern Asia, Northern America & Europe, and Western Asia & North-
ern Africa. Even though, in the most recent years, the trends in these regions decreased,
and their values are more in line with the other regions. (FAO 2019)
Private Domestic Financing to the Agriculture Sector
We next discuss the private domestic financing to the agriculture sector based on the
different measurements.
Credit to Agriculture, 1991–2017
In its notes to readers, FAO’s Credit to Agriculture database describes this data set as:
Credit to Agriculture measures loans to agriculture producers provided by commercial
bank credit. This dataset is built by compiling official country data published on-line by
national central banks in their monetary and financial statistics publications, either
through annual or quarterly reports. As a new series, the data begins from 1991 to 2017,
inclusive. (FAO 2020c)
Globally, the total credit to agriculture disbursed by commercial banks operating in the
countries, increased from 2.4 percent in 2016 to 2.9 percent in 2017, while the agriculture
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sector contributed over 4 percent of GDP. This means that agricultural producers received a
lower share of credit than producers in other sectors. Access to credit enables farmers to
purchase inputs, such as feed, seed, and machinery without using personal savings, bor-
rowing from relatives or friends, or paying high interest loans from informal lenders. The
lack of access to reasonable credit presents a particular problem for farmers who face a time
lag between income spent in sowing crops and raising livestock, and realizing income from
postharvest and livestock sales. During the last decade, the share of agriculture in total credit
supply has slightly increased from 2.2 percent in 2006 to 2.9 percent in 2017.
During the 1990s, Latin America provided the highest percentage of credit to agriculture
among the regions, but it declined from over 10 percent in 1991 to little over 4 percent
during 2011 and little over 2 percent in 2017. This sharp decline was also visible in Asia
(nearly 8 percent in 1991 to nearly 5 percent in 2017) and Africa (nearly 9 percent in 1991 to
above 4 percent in 2017) during this period.
FAO’s Credit to Agriculture database website noted:
Traditionally, the share of credit supply to agriculture has been relatively low, 3–4% of
total credit, in European and other developed countries. Since these countries account for
bulk of the global credit flows, the global percentage of credit to agriculture is quite low
despite higher shares of agriculture in Latin America, Asia and Africa.
From 2003 onwards, the agriculture sector in most regions received between 2 to 4% of
total credit. Following the food price crisis of 2007–08 and the increased policy attention
to food security and agriculture, most regions witnessed a slow revival of credit to
agriculture, with higher growths observed in Asia and the Pacific and Africa regions.
(FAO 2020c)
In the most recent five-year period, 2013–17, the top 10 countries in terms of highest share
of agriculture in total credit included three Asian, three African, three Latin American and
one Oceania country: of total credit, the countries were Malawi (21 percent); Kyrgyzstan
(19 percent), Zambia (18 percent), Sudan (16 percent), Uruguay (15 percent), New Zealand
(15 percent), Nicaragua (13 percent), India (13 percent), Tajikistan (12 percent), and
Belize (12 percent) (FAO 2020c).
Agriculture Orientation Index for Credit, 2012–2016
The AOI is the ratio of the credit to agriculture (C2A share) over the share of agricultural
value-added in total GDP. As the Credit for Agriculture database website notes:
The Agriculture Orientation Index (AOI) for credit normalizes the share of credit to
agriculture (C2A share) by taking into account the economic contribution of the sector
(ratio of the C2A share over the Agriculture share in GDP). As such, it can provide a more
accurate measure of the relative importance commercial banks place on financing this
sector. An AOI less than 1 indicates that the agriculture sector receives a credit share less
than its economic contribution, while an AOI greater than 1 indicates a credit share to the
agriculture sector greater than its economic contribution. (FAO 2020c)
The AOI for Credit of developed countries is generally higher than that of developing
countries, perhaps due to large organized farming in developed countries compared to the
preponderance of smallholder farms in developing countries.
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The Credit for Agriculture database reported in 2018:
In general, developed countries tend to have a higher AOI than developing countries. This
may be due to the fact that agriculture is dominated by large producers; more commercial
production; existence of agribusinesses; higher degrees of mechanization and greater
capacity to provide collateral. . . .
Among developing countries, the AOI was particularly low for many sub-Saharan African
countries, starting with Togo (0.01%), Niger (0.02%) and Guinea-Bissau (0.02%). This
may be explained by a larger prevalence of small agricultural producers with little or no
capacity to provide collateral to access loans from formal financial sector. (FAO 2020c)
Public Foreign Financial Flows to the Agriculture Sector
Next, we discuss the public foreign financing to the agriculture sector based on the different
measurements.
Overall Development Flows to Agriculture, 2001–2017
In 2017, US$18 billion was committed globally as development flows to agriculture (DFA),
accounting for 5.3 percent of total development flows.¹⁹ Donors disbursed US$11 billion to
agriculture, in the same period, 4.4 percent of the total disbursed flows. While commitments
to agriculture increased by US$4 billion from 2016, disbursements to agriculture only
increased by US$0.6 billion. “The share of commitments and disbursements to agriculture
increased from in 2016 by 4.8 percent to 5.3 percent and from 4.2 percent to 4.4 percent,
respectively” (FAO 2020d).
While total development assistance increased over time, the share to agriculture fell, with
a slight rise following the food price crisis of 2007–8. “Between 2002 and 2017, donors
disbursed to Africa and the Asia & Pacific together more than 70 percent of the total
DFA. Asia and Pacific received relatively more than Africa until 2010, but Africa saw a
continuous increase of its portion, which reached 42 percent of total DFA in 2017,” while
Asia & the Pacific received 37 percent (FAO 2020d). For 2002–17, IDA, the United States
and the EU, IBRD, Japan, and Germany were among the most important donors. BMGF
ranked 8th in 2015 and 10th in 2017 among donors (Table 7.1).
Agriculture Orientation Index for Development Flows to Agriculture, 2001–2017
The AOI for DFA measures the share of flows to agriculture relative to the sector’s
contribution to the GDP. An AOI greater than 1 indicates a donor preference for the
agriculture sector, keeping in view the contribution of various sectors of economy, while an
AOI less than 1 indicates less emphasis on agriculture.
Global development assistance has been less oriented to agriculture over time. According
to the FAO’s DFA database website:
Globally, between 2002 and 2017, the share of development flows received by agriculture
was lower compared to the contribution of the sector to GDP. . . .
¹⁹ The DFA data published in FAOSTAT are composed of ODA flows, OOFs, and Private Grant/Flows
reported by donor countries, multinational organizations, and private entities to the OECD DAC Directorate.
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Only few countries reported an average 2013–17 AOI larger than 1, indicating that in
most cases the share of assistance devoted to agriculture is smaller than the contribution of
the sector to GDP. . . . There are seventeen countries showing an average AOI larger than 1
in the 2013–17 period: Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Lucia, Botswana, Seychelles, Mont-
serrat, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Cuba, Palau, Zambia, Peru, Argentina, Swazi-
land, Belize, Uruguay, Djibouti, Timor-Leste and Republic of Moldova. Most of these are
countries in which the Value Added of agriculture is small, both relative to GDP and in
absolute terms. (FAO 2020d)
Official Development Assistance to Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, 1995–2018
In 2018, total aid commitments to Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (AFF) amounted to US
$11.2 billion (constant 2017 US dollars) (Figure 7.8), of which bilateral ODA from DAC
countries amounted to US$6.1 billion, slightly more than half, 54.8 percent.²⁰ Multilaterals
contributed nearly US$5 billion, or 44.2 percent, and non-DAC contributed only US$0.1
billion, or nearly 1 percent, assuming that this reporting on non-DAC is complete. The
share of multilaterals declined from 50.4 percent in 1995 to 44.2 percent in 2018.²¹
Among DAC members, the largest donors to the AFF sector in 2018 were the United
States (US$1.2 billion, 19.6 percent of the total DAC contribution to AFF); Japan
(US$1.1 billion, 17.9 percent); United Kingdom (US$780 million, 12.7 percent); Germany
(US$706 million, 11.5 percent); France (US$393 million, 6.4 percent); and Canada
(US$209 million, 3.4 percent). On the multilateral side, IDA was the predominant agency,
accounting for 35.4 percent of total multilateral aid to AFF in the last three years, with EU
institutions accounting for 29.1 percent, followed by IFAD (12 percent).
Table 7.1 Development flows to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector by top 10 donors
and recipients*
Rank Top 10 donors (2017) Top 10 recipients (2017)
1 IDA Indonesia
2 United States India




7 United Kingdom Malawi
8 Asian Development Bank Kenya
9 France Uzbekistan
10 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Vietnam
Note: *Development assistance provided by a multilateral agency includes only those expenditures from its core
budget, while country contributions exclude contributions to core budgets of multilateral agencies. This is done to
avoid double counting of total expenditure flows.
Source: FAO (2020d).
²⁰ The DAC definition of aid to agriculture excludes rural development (classified as multisector aid),
developmental food aid (general program assistance), and emergency food aid (humanitarian assistance). The
DAC definition of aid to agriculture includes “agriculture,” “forestry,” and “fishing.” The definition of aid to
agriculture excludes aid to other sectors, which may have a direct or indirect effect on food security: for example,
rural development, developmental food aid, and emergency food aid.
²¹ Since 1995, the OECDCreditor Reporting System (CRS) has published the ODA to Agriculture data by DAC
and multilateral donors.
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Declining Share of Official Development Assistance to Agriculture, Forestry and
Fishing, 1967–2018
Since the mid-1980s, aid to agriculture has fallen to US$11.4 billion (constant 2017 US
dollars) from US$20.8 billion (constant 2017 US dollars), but post-2007–8 crisis data
indicate a slowdown in the decline, and in 2017, the aid to agriculture reached a peak
among recent years of US$2.8 billion (constant 2017 US dollars). The share of aid to
agriculture in total ODA has declined sharply from 20.2 percent in 1983, to 5.7 percent in
2018 (see Figure 3.4, Chapter 3). Over the period 2009–18, aid flows to agriculture primarily
targeted SSA (39.3 percent) and South and Central Asia (19 percent).
Official Development Assistance (Total Commitments) to Agricultural Research,
Extension, and Education/Training, 1995–2018
Returns to R&D have consistently been shown to be high, and yet, investments in R&D both
by donor and developing countries have been lackluster and fragmented. Total commit-
ment to agricultural research, extension, and education/training reached US$1.07 billion (in
constant 2017 US dollars) in 2017, but declined to US$0.9 billion (in constant 2017 US
dollars) in the next year. Share in total AFF ODA gradually increased until 2006, reaching a
peak at 17.6 percent, from only 4.1 percent in 1995, but the trend has been declining since,
dropping to only 6.8 percent in 2014, increasing to nearly 8 percent in 2018 (Figure 7.9).
Over the period 1995–2018, total commitment to agricultural research, extension, and
education/training was 14.9 billion (in constant 2017 US dollars), of which 10.3 billion














































































































DAC countries’ commitments Multilaterals’ commitments
Non-DAC countries’ commitments Share of DAC countries
Share of multilaterals
Figure 7.8 Total ODA to Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (commitments in US$bn, constant
2017 prices) and changing nature of the bilateral and multilateral aid (%), 1995–2017
Source: Based on http://stats.oecd.org/, Creditor Reporting System (CRS).
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Official Development Assistance to Other (Rural Development, Developmental Food
Aid/Food Security Assistance, and Emergency Food Aid) Related Sectors by
Development Assistance Committee Countries and Multilaterals
The DAC definition of aid to AFF excludes rural development (classified as multisector aid),
developmental food assistance (classified as general program assistance), and emergency
food aid (classified as humanitarian assistance). Table 7.2 shows data including these
sectors, but such data are available only from 1995 for all donors. Using this broader
measure, aid to agriculture and rural development (ARD) and food security amounted to
US$18.8 billion (constant 2017 US dollars) per year, on average, in 2016–19, from US$8.3
billion per year in 1995–2000 (constant 2017 US dollars). Bilateral ODA typically focuses on
countries and sectors of strategic importance to their own countries. International agencies
tend to have more clearly defined rules for allocation of resources, and a larger share of their
resources reach developing country governments than is often the case with bilateral
assistance, unless the latter is completely untied. Bilateral aid to ARD and food security
rose from US$5.2 billion per year in 1995–2000 to US$12.1 billion per year in 2016–18, and
multilateral aid rose from US$3.2 billion per year in 1995–2000 to US$6.7 billion per year in
2006–18 (Figure 7.11).
Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian action saves lives, alleviates suffering, and maintains human dignity follow-













































































































Total ODA commitments to agricultural research, extension, and education/training
% share of agricultural research, extension and education/training in total ODA
commitments to AFF sector
Figure 7.9 Total ODA to agricultural research, extension, and education/training
(commitments in US$bn, constant 2017 prices) and share in total Agriculture, Forestry and
Fishing sector (%), 1995–2018
Source: Based on http://stats.oecd.org/, Creditor Reporting System (CRS).
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Figure 7.10 Share in total ODA to agricultural research, extension, and education/training by
major donors, 1995–2018 (%)
Source: Based on http://stats.oecd.org/, Creditor Reporting System (CRS).
Table 7.2 ODA to agriculture and other (rural development, developmental food aid/food
security assistance and emergency food aid) related sectors, 1995–2018 (annual average
commitments in US$bn, constant 2017 prices)
1995–2000 2001–2007 2008–2015 2016–2018
DAC countries
Agriculture/forestry/fishing 3.0 3.3 5.2 5.8
Rural development 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8
Developmental food assistance 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.4
Emergency food assistance 0.4 1.8 2.9 4.2
Total aid to ARD and food security-
related sectors
5.2 7.2 10.1 12.1
Multilaterals
Agriculture/forestry/fishing 1.9 1.9 4.3 5.3
Rural development 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.7
Developmental food assistance 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.4
Emergency food assistance 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3
Total aid to ARD and food security-
related sectors
3.2 3.2 5.9 6.7
Total
Agriculture/forestry/fishing 4.9 5.1 9.5 11.0
Rural development 1.2 1.3 1.8 1.5
Developmental food assistance 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.8
Emergency food assistance 0.5 2.0 3.2 4.4
Total aid to ARD and food security-
related sectors
8.3 10.4 16.0 18.8
Source: Based on http://stats.oecd.org/, CRS.
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Humanitarian aid amounted to US$18.2 billion in 2018 (constant 2017 US dollars), up from
US$2.7 billion in 1995 (constant 2017 US dollars), but declined 12.9 percent from 2017.²²
Humanitarian aid by DAC donors rose from US$1.6 billion in 1995 to US$14.2 billion in
2018 (but declined from US$16.9 billion in 2017), and by multilaterals from US$1.1 billion
in 1995 to nearly US$4 billion in 2017.²³ Share of multilaterals declined from 40.2 percent in
1995 to only 22 percent in 2017 (Figure 7.12). Net debt relief grants was US$801 million in
2018 and represented about 0.5 percent of total net ODA by DAC countries in 2018,
compared to about 20 percent in 2005 and 2006, when debt relief was at its highest level
due to exceptional measures for Iraq and Nigeria (FAO 2020a).
Private Foreign Financing to the Agriculture Sector
































































































Figure 7.11 ODA to agriculture and other (rural development, developmental food aid/food
security assistance, and emergency food aid) by DAC countries and multilaterals, 1995–2018
(total commitments in US$bn, constant 2017 prices)
Source: Based on http://stats.oecd.org/, Creditor Reporting System (CRS).
²² Humanitarian aid includes emergency and distress relief in cash or in-kind, including emergency response,
relief food aid, short-term reconstruction relief and rehabilitation, and disaster prevention and preparedness; and
excludes aid to refugees in donor countries.
²³ WFP is not included in the OECD CRS database.
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Foreign Direct Investment to Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
From 1991 to 2011, FDI inflows to AFF increased from US$0.33 billion in 1991 to US$1.8
billion in 2017, with significant year-to-year volatility.²⁴ FDI inflows to AFF peaked in 2007,
when they reached a record high of US$11.6 billion (all prices are in constant 2010 US
dollars) (Figure 7.13) (FAO 2020e).
The AFF share of total FDI inflows remained below 0.45 percent throughout the period,
except in 2007, with a peak of 0.56 percent. By contrast, the food, beverages, and tobacco
(FBT) share of global FDI inflows averaged 2 percent. In the AFF industry, FDI inflows are
largely aimed at resource control, mostly land (Hallam 2009). In Africa, FDI focuses largely
on rice, wheat, oilseed, and floriculture production; in Asia, the focus is on rice, wheat, meat,
and poultry productions; and in South America, the focus is on sugarcane, fruits, flowers,
and soybeans (UNCTAD 2009). Other investors are engaged in producing agricultural
inputs such as equipment, fertilizer, and seeds.
Developing regions were the main destinations for AFF FDI inflows, accounting for
almost 85 percent of all inflows between 1991 and 2017, or a total of US$61 billion.






























































































Share of DAC countries (%) Share of multilaterals (%)
Figure 7.12 Humanitarian-related ODA by DAC countries and multilaterals, 1995–2018 (total
commitments in US$bn, constant 2017 prices)
Source: Based on http://stats.oecd.org/, Creditor Reporting System (CRS).
²⁴ FDI is defined as an investment that aims to acquire a lasting management influence (10 percent or more of
voting stock) in an enterprise operating in a foreign economy (IMF 1993; OECD 1996). FDI can be decomposed
into two types of investments: M&A and greenfield investments. The latter results in the creation of new entities
and setting up of offices, buildings, plants, or factories in a foreign economy. FDI is the sum of equity capital,
reinvested earnings, and other FDI capital, whereas other FDI capital includes the borrowing and lending of funds.
The FAOSTAT FDI database (obtained from UNCTAD, the International Trade Centre [ITC], the World Bank,
and OECD, with UNCTAD as the primary data source) likely underestimates actual levels of FDI and inflows to
agriculture because of country undercoverage. Country undercoverage is a key challenge facing the Agriculture
FDI database, as there is limited access by FAO and other users to the global FDI database compiled by UNCTAD.
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AFF. Inflows to Africa also grew rapidly during the period 2001 to 2011, rising from
2.1 percent to 23.7 percent of total FDI inflows to AFF, but declined sharply afterward.
In 2007, all regions experienced an increase in FDI inflows to AFF, rising to a record high
of US$11.6 billion. Increases were highest in A&P, where they increased more than five
times over the previous year to a record high of US$7.3 billion (Figure 7.14). After 2007–8,
FDI inflows to AFF began to decline in all regions, and despite increases in some years,
remained below the 2007 highs. The 2007 highs can be explained by the food price crisis,
during which food price increases attracted transnational corporations and institutional
investors looking to acquire land and a larger share of the agro-food export market
(McNellis 2009). Part of the large 2007 growth in A&P can be attributed to large domestic
consumer markets and a productive agricultural sector, and the trend reversal after 2007, to
food export restrictions and currency appreciation (Sharma 2011).
Between 2007 and 2017, the top 10 recipients of FDI inflows to AFF included China
(US$522 million annually), followed by Indonesia (US$379 million), Argentina (US$328
million), Brazil (US$293 million), and Malaysia (US$232 million). The top five source
countries for FDI outflows to AFF included Japan (US$307 million), Malaysia
(US$257 million), the United States (US$200 million), China (US$195 million), and
Spain (US$58 million).
FDI outflows to AFF from developing countries may be motivated by increasing domes-
tic agro-food prices and lower agricultural production costs elsewhere, as in the case of
China and the Republic of Korea, who invested in foreign agricultural production to help



































































































Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing share in total FDI
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco share in total FDI
Figure 7.13 Total foreign direct investment inflows (US$bn, constant 2010 prices) and
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, and Food, Beverages and Tobacco shares in total FDI (%),
1991–2017
Source: FAO (2020e). Statistics. Foreign Direct Investment to Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, http://www.fao.
org/economic/ess/investment/fdi/en/
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Underinvestment in Food and Agriculture Relative to Needs
Estimates of amounts required to end hunger vary widely, ranging from as little as US$7
billion to as much as US$265 billion per year, depending on the assumptions made.
According to estimations in FAO, IFAD, and WFP’s “Achieving Zero Hunger,” 0.3 percent
of global GDP is needed annually to bring global hunger near (but not actually to) zero
(Box 7.2) (FAO, IFAD, and WFP [2015]).
Laborde et al. (2016) provided an alternative approach to estimating the cost of reducing
hunger, using a representative sample of seven countries in Africa south of the Sahara:
Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia and identifying five
spending categories that are critical to ending hunger (social safety nets, support for farmers
to expand production and boost incomes, rural development to reduce inefficiencies along
agricultural value chains and spur productivity, enabling policies, and nutrition). In their
analysis, they focused only on the first three of those categories, because “there is a clear and
measurable link to between these expenditures and increased calorie consumption” and
excluded the last two factors, though they are important, because of the lack of data and the
complexities of estimating their costs (Laborde et al. 2016, 4). The analysis, based on the
MIRAGRODEP economic model (Laborde 2013) (to simulate national and international
markets and key economic, biophysical, and socioeconomic trends that impact agriculture),
combined with household surveys (to identify changes in the consumption and production
of major food items, and in nonfarm sources of income) and satellite accounts (to identify
the costs of different development interventions). Laborde et al. (2016) identified 74 coun-
tries that would still have hunger levels above 5 percent of the population in 2030, of which
18 would be expected to have sufficient domestic funds to address hunger without addi-





























































































Figure 7.14 Foreign direct investment inflows to Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing by region,
1991–2017 (US$bn, constant 2010 prices)
Source: FAO (2020e). Statistics. Foreign Direct Investment to Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, http://www.fao.
org/economic/ess/investment/fdi/en/
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of public spending from now until 2030 to end hunger (defined in this study as reducing the
undernourished population in each country to 5 percent or lower), and of that total, US$4
billion would need to come from international donors each year, while the remaining US$7
billion would come from the affected countries.
Both of these studies (“Achieving Zero Hunger” by FAO, IFAD, and WFP [2015] and
Laborde et al. [2016]) consider investments in and outside of agriculture and do not include
the impacts of climate change. Mason-D’Croz et al. (2019, 49), “instead of costing the
eradication of hunger, attempt[ed] to estimate the potential hunger reduction from invest-
ments only in the agriculture sector and includes the potential impacts of climate change on
hunger eradication efforts.”
In their paper, the researchers noted:
Under baseline productivity scenarios, direct investments in agriculture (excluding infra-
structure) across developing countries average US$20 billion annually from 2010 to 2030.
Including infrastructure, the total baseline investments across developing countries is
about US$45.5 billion. . . . [A]dditional investments [needed] are US$52 billion annually
from 2015 to 2030 and are allocated to agricultural R&D, expanding irrigation, improved
water use efficiency and soil management, and improved transportation and energy
infrastructure. Most of the additional investments needed in agricultural R&D takes
place in SSA while investments in some other sectors are more evenly spread among
regions. (D’Mason-Croz et al. 2019, 49)
In short, efforts are underway to construct theories of change and to estimate the cost of
eradicating hunger by 2030, exploring implications for domestic investment strategies and
aid modalities. There are vast differences in estimates, however, of the cost of eradicating
hunger that need to be reconciled. Also, whether such investments would need to be funded
on a long-term, consistent basis either by countries or donors remains to be seen.
Box 7.2 FAO Estimates of the Cost of Abolishing Hunger by 2030
FAO recently estimated incremental investment requirements to achieve zero hunger
during 2016 and 2030 (FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2015). Based on current trends, FAO
estimates that around 650 million people would still suffer from hunger, or will have
chronically inadequate dietary energy in 2030 beyond such investments. That is a very
small decline from the 795 million estimated to be hungry in 2015. Indeed, as we have
noted in earlier chapters, FAO’s estimates suggest hunger has declined more slowly than
poverty. To achieve zero hunger through social protection and targeted investments to
the poor, FAO estimates an average of US$267 billion per year, 0.3 percent of the gross
world product, will be required each year from 2016 to 2030, compared to the 0.3 percent
of OECD GNI as ODA. This means just to address a single SDG will call for investments
twice the size of today’s ODA. Of this investment, rural areas would need US$181 billion
a year. Even with this level of funding, an estimated 338 million people would still be
unable to earn enough to overcome hunger or chronic (dietary energy) undernourish-
ment after 2030. Meeting the Minimum Dietary Energy Requirement (MDER) of those
“left behind” would cost US$14 billion.
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There continues to be considerable underinvestment in food, agriculture, and the rural
sector generally, not just to transform agriculture but to transform economies out of
agriculture, particularly in SA and SSA, even as the available government revenues and
private sector resources in these countries exceed those of the past. In a passionate open
letter to African leaders just before the 23rd African Union Summit in June 2014, Kanayo
Nwanze, President of the IFAD, conjured the image of two Africas, in a way only an African
could do: “the new land of opportunity . . . offering limitless possibilities to investors. . . .
[and] a starving and hopeless continent, hungry and poor, corrupt and prey to foreign
exploiters” (Nwanze 2014). He added:
More than 10 years have passed since the Maputo Declaration, in which you, as African
leaders, committed to allocating at least 10 percent of national budgets to agriculture and
rural development—key sectors in the drive to cut poverty, build inclusive growth and
strengthen food security and nutrition.
Today, just seven countries [out of 54] have fulfilled the Maputo commitment consist-
ently, while some others have made steps in the right direction. Ten years is a long time to
wait . . .
Don’t just promise development, deliver it, and make it happen now. Make real, concrete
progress toward investment that reaches all Africans. Investments that prioritize rural
people. (Nwanze 2014)
In a way, he was also speaking for South Asian and other fellow citizens of the developing
world, where cities exist side by side with the poor and the wretched living in slums.
The challenge for donors is to leverage national government interventions to increase the
quantity and improve the quality of government expenditures, to promote well-coordinated
expenditures across multiple sectors that are germane to agricultural productivity growth
and the reduction of poverty and hunger—for example, addressing constraints of energy
supply, transport, and information to agriculture. Agriculture was neglected for nearly
three decades. The increase in donor commitments in the aftermath of the food crisis
and the types of those commitments do not match the magnitude of the accumulated
investment deficit.
Nutrition Financing
Advocacy in support of nutrition has increased considerably in the last decade as
we discussed in earlier chapters. In 2017, led by the World Bank and supported by
1,000 Days, the Investment Framework for Nutrition was created, as a roadmap toward
achieving the WHA nutrition targets by 2025, with financial investments needed from
domestic governments, donors, and other sources. The World Bank’s “Investment Frame-
work for Nutrition” report estimated that an additional US$7 billion would be needed
annually to scale up a core package of nutrition-specific interventions in order to achieve
four (decreasing stunting, anemia, and wasting, and encouraging breastfeeding) of the six
WHA targets (outlined in Chapter 4) by 2025, in addition to the world’s current spending
on nutrition annually (Shekar et al. 2017). Closing this additional resource gap will result in
3.7 million children’s lives saved, with at least 65 million fewer stunted children, and
265 million fewer women suffering from anemia, as compared to the 2015 baseline
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(Shekar et al. 2017). Alongside this scale-up of nutrition-specific interventions, achieving
the WHA targets would also require improvements in the underlying determinants of
undernutrition through nutrition-sensitive programs in sectors such as water, sanitation,
and hygiene (WASH); agriculture; and education. Only about US$3.9 billion is currently
being spent annually on the costed package of interventions by governments in LMICs and
donors, of which about US$1 billion is provided by ODA for nutrition interventions. Of the
ODA, 53 percent or US$531 million is allocated to treat severe and acute malnutrition.
Another US$358 million (36 percent) is allocated to the interventions costed for the target
to reduce stunting. Much lower amounts are directed to interventions to increase exclusive
breastfeeding (US$85 million or 8.5 percent) and to reduce anemia in women of reproduc-
tive age (US$78 million or 7.8 percent).²⁵
According to a Save the Children report (2018), a shift could increase global funding
goals from US$7 billion annually to as much as US$23 billion. It concluded that “an
additional US$23.25 billion is required per year to meet the challenge of SDG2—more
than three times the US$7 billion that the World Bank Investment Framework suggests”
(Save the Children 2018). While these calculations are rudimentary (as mentioned, the
nutrition-sensitive data here are almost nonexistent), the underlying message is clear and
unequivocal: the current nutrition financing paradigm cannot provide that sort of
financing—we need a step change in how we fund the fight against malnutrition. The
report sets out what needs to be done to address the financing gap. The first element is a
diversification and refocusing of nutrition finance, including:
• uplifting the primary standing of domestic resource mobilization and the necessity for
progressive tax reform;
• scaling up innovative financing mechanisms, such as the Global Financing Facility and
Power of Nutrition;
• using ODA to fill the gaps, focusing on the most excluded and catalyzing new domestic
resources (Save the Children 2018).
The Global Nutrition Report (GNR) for 2018 noted:
Aid for basic nutrition reported by donors and multilateral agencies amounted to US$856
million in 2016—almost 0.5% of total ODA. Other estimates of nutrition-specific spend-
ing are higher, at US$1.12 billion [see D’Alimonte et al. 2018]. Even at the higher figure,
this amounts to less than 1% of global ODA.
. . . [B]asic nutrition disbursements from ODA donors for 2007 to 2016 [showed] a four-
fold rise from 2007 to 2013, [after which] spending has stalled. Moreover, as a percentage
of total ODA, basic nutrition ODA has declined annually since the spending peak in 2013.
²⁵ Note that the amounts across targets cannot be summed to the total owing to some intervention overlap
within targets.
The Global Nutrition Report 2016 notes:
Reporting on nutrition spending is patchy, at best. Government spending data on nutrition-related
NCDs [noncommunicable diseases] and obesity are fragmented across multiple departments and often
bundled in with non-nutrition items. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment’s Development Assistance Committee does not monitor donor nutrition-sensitive spending or
nutrition-related NCD spending. Governments and donors do not always take consistent approaches
to tracking their nutrition spending. (IFPRI 2016a, 77)
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Basic nutrition ODA now represents less than half of 1% of total ODA—a relatively small
share of all development assistance compared with other sectors: in 2016, 6.8% of
ODA was spent on education, 4.1% on agriculture and 1.0% on malaria control. (IFPRI
2018, 104–5)
In 2016, the United Kingdom, the United States, the EU, and Canada continued to be the
largest DAC donors, providing for 60 percent of global basic nutrition ODA. “Some donors
report significantly less spending in 2016 than 2015 on basic nutrition ODA. The US, for
example, cut spending through the basic nutrition code by 50 percent. Germany has also cut
spending via the basic nutrition code (by 65%) and Japan by 89%” (IFPRI 2018, 107).
The GNR 2018 also noted:
Some of these decreases may be partly due to the recent changes to the basic nutrition
purpose code. . . . Some may also be attributable to greater spending on nutrition-sensitive
approaches. . . .
Looking beyond the purpose code, . . . nutrition-specific spending is aligned with the
stunting and wasting targets. . . . An estimated US$1.12 billion was spent on nutrition-
specific interventions in support of the global nutrition targets in 2015. Most of those
funds were spent on stunting reduction (US$495 million) and wasting (US$224 million)
and were allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. The majority of funding was
allocated to micronutrient supplementation, treatment of acute malnutrition, nutrition
counselling and research. (IFPRI 2018, 107–8)
The United States has been the largest donor for nutrition-sensitive approaches by far over
the past few years; the EU, Canada, and the United Kingdom are also significant contribu-
tors. Nutrition-sensitive spending totaled US$6.08 million in 2016, an increase from US
$5.48 million spent in 2015 (IFPRI 2018).
Until 2018, it was not been possible for donors to report their ODA to combating obesity
and diet-related NCDs. The Global Nutrition Report developed methodology to track
spending, reporting results for the past three years. GNR (2018) showed very low levels of
spending. In 2016, “just 0.018% of ODA was allocated to obesity and diet-related NCDs.
Disbursements increased in 2016—from US$25.3 million to US$32.5 million but were still
lower than in 2014. . . . Commitments for future spending were at their highest level for
three years—albeit at just US$51.2 million” (IFPRI 2018, 116).
GNR 2018 notes that Australia, with a contribution of US$8.7 million, is among donors
investing the most in combating diet-related NCDs, which accounts for more than a quarter
of global spending. Other large donors include the EU, the United Kingdom, Switzerland,
Canada, Italy, and New Zealand. Furthermore, in tracking donor financing for obesity and
NCDs, the GNR found that just over half went to UMICs, 20 percent to LMICs, and less
than 3 percent to the LICs (IFPRI 2018).
The increased financing need among all sources is substantial—scaling up all nutrition-
specific interventions would require a 4.5-fold increase in total donor contributions by 2021
through ODA, and a 3.5-fold increase in total government contributions by 2025. About US
$13.5 billion in additional financing, on top of current investments, is expected to be
contributed over the next 10 years if “business as usual” (extrapolating current spending
growth trends for nutrition forward) continues. However, such a scenario would result in
falling far short of the global nutrition targets with a resource gap of US$56 billion
(D’Alimonte, Rogers, and de Ferranti 2017).
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The SUNMovement Strategy and Roadmap (2016–20) calls for improved access and use
of financial resources for nutrition. As a step toward the SUN Movement’s pursuit of this
objective, a mapping was undertaken in 2016 of multilateral external (non-domestic)
investments to improve awareness and understanding of nutrition funding sources and
how to access them. The work was overseen by the SUNDonor Network, with the assistance
of an independent consultant and the financial support of the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation (SUN 2015).
Scaling up nutrition investments is still a high-impact, high-return proposition, with a
benefit–cost ratio of 16:1 and a compound rate of return of more than 10 percent (IFPRI
2014, 2015a).
The GNR 2016 details financing gaps:
• Analysis of 24 low- and middle-income governments’ spending shows the mean
allocation to nutrition at 2.1 percent, compared with 33 percent to agriculture,
education, health, and social protection.
• NCDs, many of which are linked to nutrition, cause 49.8 percent of death and
disability in low- and middle-income countries. But less than 2 percent of donor
health spending goes to NCDs per year ($611 million in 2014). And nutrition-related
NCDs received only US$50 million of donor funding in 2014, compared with nearly
US$1 billion spent on nutrition-specific interventions.
• Donor allocations to all nutrition-specific interventions are stagnating at US$1 billion,
although their allocations to nutrition via other sectors are increasing (IFPRI 2016a, 77).
As Lawrence Haddad stated: “Where leaders in government, civil society, academia and
business are committed—and willing to be held accountable—anything is possible. Despite
the challenges, malnutrition is not inevitable—ultimately it is a political choice: one which
we need leaders across the world to make” (IFPRI 2016b).
The GNR 2015 noted:
Steps to create more enabling political environments, healthier food environments, and
nutrition-friendly food systems, as well as to promote nutrition in children’s first 1,000
days, all offer opportunities for addressing both kinds of malnutrition synergistically.
(IFPRI 2015a, xxiv)
So, although much has been accomplished in bringing nutrition to the center stage, clearly
much remains to be done if the history of trends in aid is not to be repeated.
Multilateral development banks have provided only US$38 billion annually in 2013, out
of well over a trillion dollars in flows to developing countries (World Bank and IMF 2015).
Again, the net flows were far smaller than gross, owing to repatriation and repayments on
past loans.
According to the GNR 2018:
1. Government spending on nutrition has increased in some developing countries, the
Nutrition for Growth (N4G) financial commitment of US$19.6 billion has been met
and there are initiatives with the potential to deliver finance at scale. However, official
development assistance (ODA) to address all forms of malnutrition remains unac-
ceptably low. . . .
2. Nutrition-specific spending is particularly low. . . . Donors need to prioritise investing
in nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive programmes equally.
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3. Domestic spending remains opaque and difficult to track and funding levels vary
widely from country to country. Clear targets need to be set . . .
4. New ways of tracking financial flows are being implemented . . .
5. . . . Innovative mechanisms and business investment are needed to supplement
government finance [such as the] Power of Nutrition initiative . . .
6. There is strong momentum to address malnutrition through commitments made
globally—Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the UN Decade of Action on
Nutrition 2016–2025 and the Milan Global Nutrition Summit in 2017. . . . (IFPRI
2018, 97)
Looking ahead to 2020, the GNR 2018 noted that new financial commitments were made in
2017: In Milan, at the Global Nutrition Summit, three of the largest original donors,
together with four new ones pledged “US$640 million to be disbursed along with other
commitments (both financial and non-financial) from countries, businesses and civil
society organisations” (IFPRI 2018, 119). In 2018, the High Level Meeting on NCDs in
September brought together 23 heads of government and state and 55 ministers of
health, who made 13 new commitments on NCDs. In December 2020, the N4G Summit
in Tokyo was planned to present a new opportunity for countries, donors, and other
organizations “to pledge new and SMART [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, time-
bound] commitments . . . ” (IFPRI 2018, 122).
The Dramatically Changed External Environment for Assistance
of International Institutions: The New Actors
We outlined the substantial changes in the global architecture with a proliferation of actors
in Chapter 5. We now outline these changes in the context of financing.
The Big Five within the Changed International Aid Architecture
A useful overview of the aid architecture and changes, within which to view the aid to food
and agriculture, is provided by the UN Secretary General’s Report (UN 2019). It shows a
significant increase from the low level of aid in 2002. The fastest increase has been in
humanitarian aid, a category to which WFP belongs. In 2017, 46 percent of the UN System’s
operational activities for development (UN–OAD) consisted of shorter-term humanitarian
assistance. Longer-term development objectives were addressed by 59 percent of total
UN–OAD in 2017. Expenditure on UN–OAD amounted to US$34.3 billion in 2017, which
represented about 71 percent of the US$48.3 billion in expenditure on all United Nations
system-wide activities. Peacekeeping operations accounted for just under a fifth of total
expenditures, while global norm- and standard-setting, policy, and advocacy, including the
activities of FAO and WHO, among other functions made up the remaining 10 percent.
Total Contributions for UN–OAD amounted to US$33.6 billion in 2017, which equals
23.3 percent of ODA.²⁶ The US$33.6 billion received in funding for UN–OAD in 2017
²⁶ OAD is operational activities for development. This amount of US$33.6 billion differs slightly from the US
$34.3 billion expended by the United Nations development system in 2017, since contributions are not necessarily
expended in the same calendar year as they are received.
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represents an increase of 12.6 percent, compared with the level in 2016. Core funding
increased by 3.4 percent and non-core funding by 15.3 percent from 2016 to 2017, resulting
in a decline in core funding as a share of the total, from 22.4 percent to an all-time low of
20.6 percent. The rate of growth in funding for operational activities for development
followed a track similar to that of overall global ODA since 2002. In the five years from
2013 to 2017, however, United Nations development system funding exceeded the ODA
growth rate.²⁷ Core funding for the development system grew at a significantly slower pace
than ODA over the 15-year period. Looking at the longer-term trends, growth in core
resources has been minimal compared to growth in non-core resources for both
development-related activities and humanitarian assistance activities.
The UN report noted:
Non-core funding for the United Nations development system nearly doubled from 2007
to 2016, while core funding grew at a rate of approximately one fifth of the non-core rate.
Non-core funding for humanitarian assistance activities was particularly robust, increas-
ing by 185 per cent, nearly tripling over the decade. Core funding for development-related
activities grew by 8 percent over the same period. (UN 2019, Funding Analysis, 4/29)
The UN report, in a discussion of the distribution of funding across entities, noted:
In 2016, the top eight (the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health
Organization, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)) accounted for 83 per cent of
all contributions. The other 35 development system entities account for the remaining 17
per cent of funding for operational activities for development. (UN 2019, Funding
Analysis, 7/29)
Core and non-core contributions received by the eight largest UN development system
entities in 2017 (relative to 2007) are described here. The UN report notes:
System-wide, only nine entities received over 30 per cent of their voluntary contributions
[excluding assessed contributions] in the form of non-earmarked core funding, which
creates challenges for many of them, as it limits their ability to reallocate funding to
underfunded areas in their strategic plans. That issue is at the heart of the funding
compact, particularly commitment 4 [in which Member States pledge to predictable
funding to specific requirements of SDG entities]. (UN 2019, Funding Analysis, 7/29)
The UN report further notes:
The growth in humanitarian disasters resulting from the impacts of climate change as well
as the increase in conflicts in recent years has accelerated the growing imbalance between
core and non-core resources (since humanitarian funding tends to be primarily non-core
²⁷ The designation “United Nations development system” refers to 43 UN entities that undertake operational
activities for development and are eligible for ODA.
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in nature). Apart from that, Member States have been increasingly earmarking their
funding for development-related activities for decades. The funding compact aims to
reverse that long-term trend and bring about a better balance between core and non-
core resources so that United Nations development system entities can effectively deliver
on their strategic objectives and provide the holistic development solutions required by
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. (UN 2019, Funding Analysis, 8/29)
For the five largest entities, the non-core component exceeded the core component by a
significant margin. In Chapter 5 (on global governance), we demonstrated the increased
reliance of FAO and WHO on voluntary contributions and why and how that is driven by
what donors wish to finance, rather than what might be needed. For example, until now in
the case of WHO, donors mostly financed investment in communicable diseases. The
challenges of FAO and the World Bank are better understood in the context of this overall
aid picture. One of the biggest challenges that the international architecture faces is the near
stagnation of assessed contributions.
On the subject of burden-sharing, the UN report notes:
Government contributors account for nearly three quarters of the funding [74 percent] for
operational activities for development. . . . Among government contributors to the United
Nations development system, there is heavy reliance on a few countries. In 2017, three
donors—the United States of America, the United Kingdom . . . and Germany—accounted
for half of all funding for operational activities for development received from Govern-
ments, and just seven contributors accounted for over two thirds of all government
contributions. (UN 2019, Funding Analysis, 8/29–9/29)
Finally, in terms of allocation of resources, with an overview of expenditures, the UN
report noted:
Spending on operational activities for development totaled US$34.3 billion in 2017. Some
US$25.2 billion, or 73 per cent, was spent at the country level, and another US$3.3 billion,
or 10 per cent, was spent at the regional level. Accordingly, 17 percent of total expendi-
tures concerned either global activities, programme support and management or activities
that could not be attributed to any other category. . . . Just over half, or 54 per cent, of
expenditures were for development-related activities, while the other 46 per cent was spent
on humanitarian activities. . . .
In terms of the regional distribution of country-level expenditures in 2017, US$11.9
billion, or 42 per cent, was spent in Africa. The largest change in terms of the regional
allocation of expenditures in recent years occurred in Western Asia. In 2011, that region
accounted for only 6 per cent of spending on country-level operational activities for
development. By 2017, the share had increased to 28 per cent, most of which was spent
on humanitarian activities. (UN 2019, Funding Analysis, 17/29–18/29)
Growth of Trust Funds from OECD Donors
The trend of issue-specific financing by donors, called vertical funds, shows no sign of
abating, in part, because donors are more inclined to give money to specific agendas they
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support. The Development Committee Communiqué of the 2015 Spring Meetings of IMF
and the World Bank encouraged the possible creation of a Pandemic Financing Facility to
mobilize and leverage public and private resources, including insurance mechanisms, to
help countries receive rapid funding in the face of an outbreak, based on strong prepared-
ness plans; the creation of the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust; the Global
Financing Facility in Support of Every Woman, Every Child to be launched in Addis
Ababa; and other initiatives for addressing hunger and malnutrition (World Bank and
IMF 2015). Bilateral donors are also allocating more of their funds through their own
programs, changing the share of bilateral and multilateral funding and modifying estab-
lished governance arrangements.
What the countries do themselves, with or without these funds, and whether and how the
donor demand for quicker and more demonstrable impacts contributes to the better, long-
term uses of national funds, human resources, and institutions is the central issue. Yet
short-term, unpredictable, and uncertain funding tied to issues of particular interest to the
donors, albeit without an overarching strategy, does not merely reduce the impact of
external aid, but can distract developing countries from the main business at hand and
often substitute for the functions that developing countries must perform to achieve
sustained impacts on poverty, as we will demonstrate in Chapter 10 in the case of
CGIAR. Aid fatigue and erosion of confidence in the ability of international institutions
to address rapidly evolving challenges have played a role in the way that donor funding is
tied to results, rather than through the old-style three-year replenishments, as in the case of
IDA, or to subscribed capital, and other long-term forms of contributions to multilateral
institutions. In view of how small development aid is, key questions are: (1) is it helping to
leverage domestic resources of developing countries; and (2) is it having scaled-up impacts?
Trust Funds in the Aid Architecture
While trust funds may at times fill gaps in the multilateral system, the strengths of the
multilateral system (vis-à-vis bilateral aid) play an important role in driving the establish-
ment of trust funds. For instance, donors’ limited presence in some developing countries, or
limited funds management and implementation capacity in certain sectors, may account for
the use of multilateral platforms (that is, in the role of trustee or implementing agency) to
achieve bilateral objectives. The use of trust funds gives donors more visibility and influ-
ence, reduces transaction costs, and allows them to target countries where their bilateral
presence is limited (IEG 2011a). Regular trust funds represent bilateral aid channeled
through non-core contributions to the multilateral system (so-called multi-bi aid). They
roughly account for 11 percent of ODA disbursements, financial intermediary funds’ (FIFs)
support programs, or funds that are typically recorded as multilateral aid (and which
account for an estimated 5 percent of ODA); their funding is more likely to compete with
that for other multilateral channels.
There is now increased reliance on multi-donor trust funds (MTDFs), greater alignment
of recipient-executed trust funds (RETFs) with WBG policies for IBRD/IDA lending,
improved data analysis and risk management, and increased cost recovery. While progress
has been made in reforming the management of trust funds (for example, enhanced multi-
year budget frameworks, foreign exchange risk management, board engagement and over-
sight of the Bank’s trust fund portfolio, and annual reporting), further changes are needed,
and reforms continue to evolve.
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World Bank management has noted that it would have liked to have seen a more
systematic treatment of the political economy factors (both internal and external) that
underlie the creation of trust funds. The creation of new global programs (and FIFs
supporting these) is often linked to G7/G20 initiatives. Bank management has acknowl-
edged that there are multiple interests at play at the level of donors—involving several
constituencies, from parliaments to executive powers, with a wide variety of decision-
making processes, from centralized to very decentralized.
Trust Funds’ Contribution to Aid Fragmentation
The huge growth of partnerships fueled by donor “trust funds” from traditional OECD
donors, non-core funds, or funds provided outside of the regular budgets of international
organizations has been the new norm, starting about the mid-1990s. Whereas much of the
discussion here is focused on the World Bank, trust fund issues are generic. In all but the
large, mostly MICs, such as China, India, or Brazil, this growth has eroded old-style
multilateralism and the earlier roles of international organizations in development finance
and development advice.
Donors’ seemingly ad hoc behavior in creating trust funds, often responding to the need for
visibility on issues of national interest, explains the swift action they expect from the Bank.
Although the Bank has been successful in meeting donor demands and trust funds are
basically aligned with the Bank’s broad strategy, trust funds are contributing to aid fragmen-
tation. These factors make improving the Bank’s trust fund framework very challenging.
Additionality and Effectiveness of Trust Funds
Determining additionality of trust funds is complex, and there is no agreement. The IEG
evaluation of Trust Funds (2011a) concluded that trust funds may not mobilize additional
ODA resources, but World Bank management argued that they could leverage funds from
non-ODA sources. In addition, trust funds channeled through multilaterals may be more
effective than funds provided bilaterally (which are sometimes tied or support political
agendas, and are less coordinated).
Consistency with Aid-Effectiveness Principles
There are other paradoxes. The majority of country-specific trust funds are better aligned
with country priorities than thematic or sector-focused trust funds. There have also been
assertions in the literature, however, that the value-added of trust funds is more evident in
the financing of GPGs than when they finance country priorities. Trust funds could benefit
from greater evaluation of impacts.
According to the IEG evaluation of trust funds:
[Programs that trust funds finance range] from huge global programs with their own
governance structures [such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) or CGIAR] to
conventional development projects; debt relief operations; and studies, technical assis-
tance, and project preparation carried out by the World Bank or recipients. . . .While the
channeling of aid resources through trust funds has grown in response to perceived
limitations of bilateral and multilateral aid mechanisms in meeting changing development
challenges, the use of the trust fund vehicle has raised strategic issues for the effectiveness,
efficiency, and coherence of the international aid system. (IEG 2011a, vii)
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WBG is trusted by OECD donors for its fiduciary management, proven by its being the
largest manager of trust funds. They fund a wide range of projects and activities, either
freestanding or programmatic, which can be country-specific, regional, or global in scope.
The Independent Evaluation Group noted:
To address limitations in bilateral aid, donors [also] use trust funds to pool funds
for particular programs, tap into the capacities and systems of the trustee organization,
and distance themselves from politically controversial activities. The choice is made
primarily for political reasons to direct aid to particular countries or issues, and
large global funds are created typically at the initiative of high-level government
officials. (IEG 2011a, vii)
The IEG assessed trust funds, noting trust funds “have enabled the Bank to enhance its
development role, [and] the Bank would continue to accept them. But changes are needed
to foster more effective, efficient, and accountable use of trust funds.” The IEG evaluations
have recommended over the years that “the World Bank adopt a more structured and
disciplined approach to the mobilization and deployment of these funds” (IEG 2011a, xi).
When partners select the option of global programs, the Bank should continue to participate
and require that each partnership program have a charter, a governing body, a management
unit, and terms of reference to guide the Bank’s participation.
WBG managed 984 trust funds (in FY2014), holding a total of US$30.09 billion, and
supported activities of particular interest to the domestic constituencies of donors, in part
due to the desire of bilateral donors to have a direct voice in these organizations. From FY09
through FY13, the United States and the United Kingdom made the largest contributions to
WBG trust funds. Over that period, the United Kingdom was the largest development
funder to the IBRD/IDA trust funds, followed by the United States, the EU, Australia, and
the Netherlands. Together, these five development funders accounted for almost half of the
total cash contributions to IBRD/IDA trust funds since FY09. The United States remains the
largest development funder to FIFs, both cumulatively over the five years and in FY13.
Sovereign development funders remain the major contributors to the WBG trust funds,
accounting for 80 percent of total cash contributions received in FY13 for IBRD/IDA trust
funds, 95 percent for FIFs, and 67 percent for IFC trust funds. In Chapter 10 on CGIAR,
we demonstrate that after the 2008 reforms, which were intended to provide funds in
Windows 1 and 2. Growth in those windows did not materialize as was intended, as
described in Chapter 10 in detail. Windows 1 and 2 are not tied to specific research agendas.
From the perspective of the Fund Council, Window 1 and 2 funds are restricted only in the
sense that money must be spent on CGIAR Research Programs (CRPs) as contracted.
Window 3 contributions consist of funds that donors wish to allocate to specific Centers
and bilateral funding that goes directly to the Centers. Several Centers contend that
Window 3 provides them more freedom than do Windows 1 and 2, and that they could
not deliver on the CRPs without Window 3 funding (Figure 10.2, Chapter 10). Reforms in
the funding of research has not accomplished the change the reformers intended. In the
meantime, new donor funds that use multilateral institutions as vehicles continue to
proliferate. The transaction costs to developing countries in accessing these funds relative
to their impact on development, unlike the past long-term roles of the Rockefeller or
the Ford Foundations, must be questioned. Bezanson and Isenman (2012) noted several
weaknesses in the new partnerships:
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1. Weakness or absence in strategic direction, accountability mechanisms, monitoring
and evaluation systems, and management of risk
2. Lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of trustees or host organizations
3. Confusion between the roles of management versus governance
4. Inadequate attention to resource mobilization and to the human resources required to
deliver programs and achieve objectives.
Multi-Donor Trust Funds
AnMDTF is a multi-entity funding mechanism designed to support a clearly defined, broad
programmatic scope and results framework, through contributions that are comingled, not
earmarked for a specific UN entity and held by a UN fund administrator.²⁸ In these UN
interagency funds, the organization also takes the lead in making fund allocation decisions,
as well as fund implementation, and thus, these types of funds are a more flexible and higher
quality form of noncore contributions. They include the One United Nations funds, which
were established to address underfunded areas of a program country’s One United Nations
country program, through unearmarked or loosely earmarked contributions.
Contributions to UN-administered MDTFs, including One United Nations funds, to-
taled US$2.3 billion in 2014, a significant increase over the US$1.4 billion in contributions
in 2013. More than half of this increase is attributable to the Saudi Humanitarian Fund for
Iraq and funds for the Ebola response. Commitments to One United Nations funds also
increased by 35 percent, surpassing US$87 million in 2014. Contributing to this increase
was the launch of the “Delivering Results Together” fund, which channeled more than US
$13 million to One United Nations country funds (OECD 2016).²⁹
During the first phase of the Economic and Social Council dialogue, it was suggested that
development-related MDTFs were not being used to their full potential to support UN
coherence and to reduce fragmentation, and that one option to make them more attractive
to donors could be to have fewer funds with broader scope.
Global Thematic and Vertical Funds
Single-donor and program- and project-specific funds include resources received through
global funds, sometimes referred to as vertical funds. They have become a significant
resource channel for the UN development system over the last decade. These funds focus
on specific issues or themes, just like global MDTFs, but they are not directly administered
by a UN entity and do not require the UN to play a leading role in the fund allocation
process. They usually have their own trustee, funding, governance, policy, and program-
ming arrangements. Thus, global funds are a form of pooled funding, from the perspective
of the organization, but the funds are often tightly earmarked for particular projects, with
the UN playing the role of the implementing organization. Examples are the GEF, the
²⁸ In September 2015, three entities reported administering MDTFs: the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund
Office, UNFPA, and the United Nations Office for Project Services.
²⁹ The “Delivering Results Together” fund, managed by the UN Development Group, is a global pooled
funding facility for delivering as one country, with funding flowing through the operational One United Nations
funds.
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Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Multilateral Fund for the
Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Immunization. In 2014, an estimated US$1.0 billion, or some 8.6 percent, of all non-core
contributions for development-related activities of the UN System came from global funds,
a 41 percent increase in volume since 2011 (OECD 2016).
World Bank Group Trust Funds
WBG identified five global issues as its institutional priorities: climate change, crisis
response, jobs, gender, and infrastructure. Trust funds play a vital role, complementing
IBRD, IDA, and IFC, for each of these areas of focus (World Bank 2019b). The Executive
Summary of the “2018–2019 Trust Fund Annual Report” highlights the role of trust funds
in WBG in working toward its goals of ending extreme poverty and promoting shared
prosperity:
WBG trust funds and financial intermediary funds (FIFs) are among the WBG’s main
channels of development assistance (along with IBRD and IDA), and the WBG holds a
substantial portfolio of such funds: the amount of WBG funds held in trust (FHIT) (for
World Bank, IFC, and MIGA [Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency] trust funds as
well as FIFs, FHIT comprises cash, investments, and promissory notes receivable) as of
end-FY19 is estimated at US$12.1 billion for trust funds and US$23.1 billion for FIFs.
These funds provide significant and predictable multiyear funding for the WBG to utilize
in support of flexible and customizable development solutions that serve client countries
[and] . . . finance about two-thirds of the World Bank’s advisory services. (World Bank
2019b, xiii)
With respect to FHIT (FY15–FY19), the Trust Fund report noted, “Among the trust funds
that had significant increases in FY19 were Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)
(US$264 million), Global Financing Facility (US$203 million), Carbon Finance (US$186
million), and Sint Maarten Recovery, Reconstruction, and Resilience Trust Fund (US$145
million)” (World Bank 2019b, 34).
Disbursements and cash transfers from trust funds and numbers of IBRD/IDA, IFC trust
funds, multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs), single-donor trust funds (SDTFs), and program-
matic freestanding IBRD/IDA trust funds were detailed by the 2018–19 Trust Fund Report,
with the key points being:
Total WBG disbursements and cash transfers fluctuated over the past five years between
US$4.2 billion in FY15 and US$3.7 billion in FY19 for IBRD/IDA trust funds, and between
US$300 million and US$260 million for IFC trust funds. . . .
The total number of IFC trust funds declined from 249 as of end-FY15 to 195 as of
end-FY19. (World Bank 2019b, 38, 40)
Contributions to IBRD/IDA trust funds by governments and by top ten trust fund donors
are included in the Trust Fund Report:
Sovereign governments remain the largest contributors to IBRD/IDA trust funds,
accounting for 78 percent of total cash contributions received in FY19 (US$3.0 billion),
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an increase of over US$800 million compared to FY18. Intergovernmental institutions
contributed 15 percent (US$572 million) in FY19, an increase of US$210 million from
FY18. . . . The European Union contributed 82 percent of total intergovernmental institu-
tion cash contributions in FY19, while the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation contributed
65 percent of total private nonprofit entity cash contributions.
. . . The top three donors for FY19 continued to be the United Kingdom, the United States,
and the European Union, with increased contributions from the United States (US$341
million, compared to US$308 million in FY18) and the European Union (US$467 million,
compared to US$331 million in FY18). (World Bank 2019b, 45–6)
RETFs were the other major chunk of funds:
Total disbursements from all RETFs, which include stand-alone RETFs, cofinancing
RETFs, and other RETFs, remained steady at around US$3.4 billion between FY15 and
FY16, and then started to decline, reaching US$2.6 billion in FY19. This decline was
primarily due to a decrease in disbursements by [several] programs. . . . On average, RETFs
accounted for 76 percent of total trust fund disbursements over the past five years.
In FY19, of total RETF disbursements (US$2.6 billion), 39 percent (US$1.0 billion) were
from stand-alone RETFs. Stand-alone RETF disbursements decreased from US$1.6 billion
in FY15 to US$1.5 billion in FY17 and to US$1.0 billion in FY19. Over the past five years,
37 percent of the stand-alone RETF disbursements were from ARTF (US$2.7 billion),
17 percent from IBRD as an IE for GPE, and 5 percent from IBRD as an IE for CIFs
(World Bank 2019b, 47–8).
The Trust Fund Report detailed RETF disbursements:
Cumulative total RETF disbursements were US$15.1 billion between FY15 and FY19, with
the highest annual level of US$3.4 billion in FY15, decreasing 24 percent to US$2.6 billion
in FY19. The IDA countries continue to receive the largest share of RETF disbursements
year after year—63 percent of total RETF disbursements in FY19. Over the past five years,
approximately US$1 out of every US$7 disbursed to IDA-only and blend countries was
from RETFs, whereas RETF disbursements to IBRD countries were equivalent to 2 percent
of IBRD disbursements.
. . . RETF disbursements in FCS [fragile and conflict-affected states] decreased from US
$1.5 billion in FY16 to US$1.2 billion in FY19. The share of RETF in FCS out of total RETF
disbursements also declined, from 50 percent in FY18 to 45 percent in FY19. Disburse-
ments to Afghanistan in FY19 continued to account for a significant portion—65
percent—of total RETF disbursements in FCS (US$0.8 billion). RETF disbursements to
FCS other than Afghanistan averaged around US$0.5 billion over the past five years. In
FY19, besides Afghanistan, the five FCS that received the highest RETF disbursements
were the West Bank and Gaza (US$96 million), Somalia (US$55 million) . . .
The majority of RETF disbursements went to the following three sectors: (a) public
administration (which includes the World Bank’s work on governance and anticorrup-
tion), 19 percent; (b) agriculture, fishing, and forestry, 16 percent; and (c) education, 14
percent. Together, the three sectors accounted for 49 percent of total RETF disbursements
in FY19. Even so, in FY19 disbursements in the public administration and education
sectors decreased significantly (US$156 million and US$222 million, respectively) as
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compared to FY18, primarily because of decreased disbursements in GPE (by US$177
million) and ARTF (by US$219 million). Disbursements in the social protection sector
increased by US$120 million in FY19 over FY18, and disbursements in the industry, trade,
and services sector increased by US$72 million because of increased disbursements in the
Global Concessional Financing Facility (by US$36 million) and ARTF (US$68 million).
(World Bank 2019b, 50–2)
In terms of regional shares of RETF disbursements (FY15–FY19), the Trust Fund Report stated:
Among the World Bank’s Regional units, South Asia (SAR) was the largest beneficiary of
RETFs in FY19 with US$1 billion, primarily because of [Afghanistan], the ARTF. The
Africa Region (AFR, US$840 million) was the second-largest beneficiary, followed by the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA, US$345 million). RETF disbursements in East
Asia and Pacific (EAP), Latin America and Caribbean (LCR), and Europe and Central
Asia (ECA) were US$126 million, US$187 million, and US$166 million, respectively.
Compared with FY18, RETF disbursements decreased in AFR; and in EAP, RETF
disbursements decreased by 39 percent from US$207 million in FY18 to US$126 million
in FY19, primarily because of the decrease in disbursement from the IBRD as an IE of
Clean Technology Fund (CTF) (US$37 million), the Indonesia Program for Community
Empowerment (US$18 million), and Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing
Initiative (US$12 million). (World Bank 2019b, 54)
The Trust Fund Report also detailed bank-executed trust fund (BETF) disbursements:
BETF disbursements increased by 38 percent (US$306 million), from US$770 million in
FY15 to US$1.1 billion in FY19. In FY19, 59 percent of BETFs were disbursed for country
engagement work and 16 percent for global engagement work, up from 58 percent and
14 percent, respectively, in FY15. More than half of BETF disbursements in FY19 went to
support regional work (such as the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction & Risk Trust
Fund for Africa) or global work (such as the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest
Trust Fund) and non-members such as the West Bank and Gaza. Out of approximately
US$4.8 billion in BETF disbursements over the last five years, about US$965 million were
for activities that support IDA countries. During FY15–FY19, BETF disbursements for
activities to support IDA countries grew by 40 percent to US$217 million in FY19; BETF
disbursements for activities to support blend countries grew by 22 percent to US$66
million in FY19; and BETF disbursements for activities to support IBRD countries grew by
67 percent to US$205 million in FY19.
During FY15–FY19, country engagement activities (largely ASA [advisory services and
analytics]) accounted for the largest share of total BETF disbursements (59% in FY19).
Global engagement activities (including global knowledge, research and development and
global advocacy) accounted for the second-largest share (16% in FY19). (World Bank
2019b, 55–6)
IFC Advisory Services program expenditures was described also in the Trust Fund Report:
IFC trust funds are the main instrument for financing IFC Advisory Services, with funding
coming from development partners, IFC, and clients. As of end-FY19, there were 195 IFC
active trust fund accounts. Through 783 active projects (as of end-FY19), IFC is providing
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advisory solutions for private sector clients in about 100 countries, focusing on fragile and
conflict-affected areas and on IDA countries.
IFC trust funds are the main instrument for financing IFC Advisory Services. Program
expenditures for IFC Advisory increased from US$273 million in FY18 to US$295 million
in FY19, the highest level in the five-year period. IDA countries accounted for 59 percent
of the Advisory Services program expenditures in FY19. (World Bank 2019b, 57, 62)
MIGA trust funds were also reviewed in the Trust Fund Report:
MIGA, one of the five WBG organizations, has a mission to promote foreign direct
investment in developing countries to help support economic growth, reduce poverty,
and improve people’s lives. MIGA provides political risk insurance to private sector
investors and lenders. Since its inception in 1988, MIGA has issued more than US$45.0
billion in guarantees in support of over 800 projects in 110 of its member countries. In
FY18, MIGA issued US$5.3 billion in guarantees for projects spanning four strategic
priority areas—IDA countries, FCS, climate change, and innovations.
. . .MIGA’s portfolio consisted of four trust funds . . . [that] offer support to fragile and
conflict-affected situations and promote the stability and growth of countries in FCS by
catalyzing private capital flows from investors and financial institutions to FCS through
mobilizing political risk insurance products to these countries, from both MIGA and the
global political risk insurance industry. (World Bank 2019b, 63)
FIFs are:
. . . financial arrangements that typically leverage a variety of public and private resources
in support of international initiatives, enabling the international community to provide a
direct and coordinated response to global priorities like agriculture and food security,
environment and climate change, and natural disasters. Through FIFs theWorld Bank can
support the international community in providing targeted and coordinated responses
that focus on the provision of global public goods, such as preventing communicable
diseases, responding to climate change, and improving food security. (World Bank
2019b, xiv)
The report notes that the World Bank has a large and growing portfolio of FIFs:
Since the establishment of the first FIF in 1971, total cumulative funding to FIFs as of end-
FY19 has amounted to US$104.4 billion, of which US$7 billion was contributed in FY19.
The number of active FIFs has more than doubled from 12 at end-FY08 to 27 at end-FY19.
The World Bank serves as limited trustee of all FIFs, providing a set of agreed financial
services that include receiving, holding, and investing contributed funds, and transferring
them when instructed by the FIF governing body. (World Bank 2019b, xvi–xvii)
FIFs play a significant role in international aid architecture, with transfers from FIFs to
implementing entities (IEs): “The average amount of annual transfers from FIFs over
FY15–FY19 was US$6.5 billion; annual transfers from FIFs to IEs declined from
US$7.1 billion to US$5.9 billion from FY18 to FY19, primarily because of a decline in
transfers from GFATM, which decreased by US$0.8 billion from FY18 to FY19” (World
Bank 2019b, 104).
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Notably, “the World Bank hosted 18 FIF secretariats in FY19, an increase from 14 in
FY15. The overall increase in the number of FIFs, each with its own independent govern-
ance structure and terms of access to funds, can contribute to aid fragmentation and
increased complexity for client countries and IEs” (World Bank 2019b, 106).
Remittances
The world’s migrants send huge amounts of money to their families through cross-border
money transfers, called remittances, and are of considerable interest from the perspective of
economic transformation of countries from agriculture to the service and the manufactur-
ing sector. Half of the agricultural labor force in the US consists of migrant labor of
11 million people, mostly from Mexico and Central America. According to the United
Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs, the worldwide number of interna-
tional migrants (including refugees) was 272 million in 2019, up from 153 million in 1990.
“Europe hosts the largest number of international migrants (82 million), followed by
Northern America (59 million) and Northern Africa and Western Asia (49 million). The
regional distribution of international migrants is changing, with migrant populations
growing faster in Northern Africa, Western Asia and sub-Saharan Africa than in other
regions” (UNDESA 2019, iv). In the coming decades, demographic forces, globalization,
and climate change will increase migration pressures both within and across borders
(World Bank 2014b, 2017).
The World Bank estimated that remittances inflows totaled US$706.6 billion in 2019, of
which US$550.5 billion went to LMICs (an increase of about 4.7 percent over the previous
year), and these flows are projected to reach US$574 billion in 2020 and US$597 billion by
2021, involving some 272 million migrants (Ratha et al. 2019). The remittances are a
significant share of the macroeconomic story by a variety of measures: three times the
size of ODA since the mid-1990s, several times the earnings of developing countries from
exports, and are growing rapidly. In 2019, they are on track to overtake FDI flows to LMICs
(Ratha et al. 2019). The April 2019 publication of WBG and the Global Knowledge
Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) on “Migration and Remittances”
noted, “Remittance flows grew in all six regions, particularly in South Asia (12.3 percent)
and Europe and Central Asia (11.2 percent)” (WBG and KNOMAD 2019, vii).
In 57 countries, remittances exceeded 5 percent of GDP last year in 2019. The money
went mostly to low-income households. Against the background of the current health crisis,
the need for that income is acute. In April, 2020, the World Bank estimated that remittances
would fall by 20 percent in LICs and MICs (World Bank 2020a). This is broadly consistent
with projections derived from applying the elasticity of remittances to growth—observed
during the 2008 global financial crisis—to the June 2020 forecasts of the IMF’s World
Economic Outlook (IMF 2020). However, growth remained reasonably strong in low-
income developing countries during the financial crisis, so the need for remittances in
recipient countries was not as urgent as it is now.
Despite the COVID-19 pandemic and its likely impact on remittances, the picture is not
unconditionally bleak. Remittances often hold up in response to adverse shocks in recipient
countries. This possibly explains why they were surprisingly resilient in many countries in
the first half of the year. Although there is a great deal of diversity, remittances largely fell
from March, then started to stabilize in May, before picking up. This pattern was broadly in
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line with the stringency of virus containment policies in advanced countries, where strict
measures were put in place in March and slowly relaxed, starting in May. The bounce back
in remittances could be driven by a greater need to send money back to families, as the
countries receiving remittances now struggle with the pandemic and collapse in external
demand (Gurara, Fabrizio, and Wiegand 2020). This illustrates the countercyclical role of
remittances.
However, if migrants are dipping into their meager savings to support families back
home, this may not be sustainable over time, especially if the recession in host economies
becomes protracted. A second outbreak of COVID-19 in the latter part of the year in
host economies, for example, could jeopardize remittance flows further (Quayyum and
Kpodar 2020).
The top recipients of remittances in 2019 were India (US$82.2 billion), with more than
US$77 billion earned from the country’s flagship software services exports. China (US$70.3
billion), Mexico (US$38.7 billion), the Philippines (US$35.1 billion), and Egypt (US$26.4
billion) follow among top recipients of remittances. Other large recipients included Nigeria,
Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Indonesia. However, as a share of GDP,
remittances were larger in smaller and lower income countries; top recipients, relative to
GDP, in 2019 were Tonga (38.5 percent), Haiti (34.3 percent), Nepal (29.9 percent),
Tajikistan (29.7 percent), and the Kyrgyz Republic (29.6 percent) (Ratha et al. 2019).
For many developing countries, remittances are an important source of foreign exchange,
surpassing earnings from major exports, and covering a substantial portion of imports. For
example, in Nepal, remittances are nearly double the country’s revenues from exports of
goods and services, while in Sri Lanka and the Philippines, remittances are over 50 percent
and 38 percent, respectively. In Uganda, remittances are double the country’s income from
its main export of coffee (World Bank 2014c).
Ratha et al. (2019) noted the sharpness of the slowdown in growth of remittances in 2019
for all regions, except LAC and SSA:
In 2019, Latin America and the Caribbean would see the fastest pace of remittance growth
at 7.8 percent due to the continued robustness of the US economy. Remittances would
increase moderately in South Asia (5.3 percent), sub-Saharan Africa (5.1 percent) and East
Asia and Pacific (3.8 percent) due to the buoyancy in inflows from the US being offset by
slower growth of receipts from the Euro area and the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council
countries]. (Ratha et al. 2019)
The global average cost of sending remittances (that is, US$200 to LMICs) was 6.8 percent
of each transaction in the second quarter of 2019, only slightly below previous quarters
(7 percent), according to the World Bank’s Remittance Prices Worldwide database.³⁰ The
WBG and KNOMAD brief on migration and remittances noted:
This is more than double the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target of 3 percent by
2030 (SDG target 10.c). The cost was the lowest in South Asia, at around 5 percent, while
sub-Saharan Africa continued to have the highest average cost, at about 9.3 percent. . . .
Remittance costs across many African corridors and small islands in the Pacific remain
above 10 percent. (WBG and KNOMAD 2019, 5)
³⁰ See Remittance Prices Worldwide, https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/en
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Banks were the costliest channel for transferring remittances, at an average cost of 10.9
percent. . . . Opening up national post offices, national banks, and telecommunications
companies to partnerships with other MTOs could remove entry barriers and increase
competition in remittance markets. (WBG and KNOMAD 2019, viii)
At the household level, an estimated 40 percent of Somalia’s population depends on
remittances and uses the cash to buy food and medicine. Dilip Ratha, Manager of the
Migration and Remittances Team at the Bank’s Development Prospects Group noted that
additionally, “migrants living in high income countries are estimated to hold savings in
excess of US$500 billion annually,” representing “a huge pool of funds developing countries
can do much more to tap into.” “Nigeria is readying a diaspora bond issue to mobilize
diaspora savings and boost financing for development” (World Bank 2014c).
Despite the hardships encountered by many migrants due to the policies of countries
receiving migrants, remittances are more stable, predictable, and the least controversial
aspect of international capital flows, both from the perspectives of recipients and senders.
Remittances are becoming an important part of the strategies of international organizations
to harness them for development. The World Bank, IMF, and the UN organizations
concerned with labor are actively working on the issues of migration and capital flows.
Two Views of the Impact of Remittances on Growth and Development
More research is urgently needed on the direct and systematic evidence of remittances on
impact on poverty of households. It comes from a cross-country regression based on
74 countries by Adams and Page (2005), who showed that a 10 percent increase in the
share of remittances in a country’s GDP can lead to an average 1.2 percent decline in the
poverty headcount. Household survey data, confirmed this result using Adam’s work on
Guatemala (Adams 2006), and Yang’s study on the Philippines (Yang 2005). Orozco (2006)
provided evidence on the mobilization of migrants’ (and their relatives’) savings and
investments at home (through the acquisition of land, property, or small businesses),
which can spur economic growth in areas neglected by the public and private sectors
(Maimbo and Ratha 2005). Kaushik Basu, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of
the World Bank, noted that these flows act as an antidote to poverty and promote
prosperity. Remittances “act as a major counter-balance when capital flows weaken as
happened in the wake of the US Fed announcing its intention to reign in its liquidity
injection program.” (Economist 2014). Money sent from abroad, Basu added, can also work
as an automatic stabilizer when a recipient nation’s currency weakens, which makes it more
expensive to import, but also cheaper for foreign workers to remit. So even if the effect on
economic growth may turn out to be negligible, helping migrants to remit could still
have a greater impact in developing countries than many other policies. “Remittances
and migration data are also barometers of global peace and turmoil and World Bank’s
KNOMAD initiative to organize, analyze, and make available these data is important”
(Economist 2014).
Basu’s view is not shared universally by all economists. Michael Clemens of CGD and
David McKenzie of the World Bank asked why such a rapid growth in remittances has not
led to any discernible growth in GDP and provided three possible answers (Clemens and
McKenzie 2014). First, the growth in remittances may actually be an illusion because of
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measurement error or reflect change in measurement error: for example, for Nigeria.
Clemens and McKenzie (2014) estimated that about 80 percent of the reported growth in
remittances received by developing countries between 1990 and 2010 simply reflects
changes in measurement. Irrespective of measurement errors and insufficient statistical
methods, the effect on growth may in fact be fairly small and can be negative. The cash may
flow back but the human capital has left. If those who emigrated were not working anyway,
then the flow of remittances will have a positive effect. The effect of remittances on GDP
growth depends upon how the money is spent by the recipients. Nevertheless, Clemens
argues remittances “have big effects—on things other than national GDP growth at the
home country. For example, remittances do have important and easily measurable effects
on poverty at the home country” (Clemens 2014).
There is by no means consensus on the role of remittances in economic development.
Adolfo Barajas of the IMF and his co-authors pointed out: . . . decades of private income
transfers—remittances—have contributed little to economic growth in remittance-
receiving economies . . . the most persuasive evidence in support of this finding is the
lack of a single example of a remittances success story: a country in which remittances-led
growth contributed significantly to its development. . . . [N]o nation can credibly claim
that remittances have funded or catalyzed significant economic development. (Barajas
et al. 2009, 16–17)
Foreign Direct Investment: Inflows and Outflows
In 2002, the Monterrey Consensus fundamentally transformed the development agenda by
explicitly recognizing that, rather than being part of the problem, FDI can play an important
role in financing development objectives.³¹ The global FDI slump continues. FDI fell slightly
fell slightly from US$1.41 trillion in 2018 to US$1.39 trillion in 2019. UNCTAD’s Invest-
ment Trends Monitor notes that this has occurred “against the backdrop of weaker
macroeconomic performance and policy uncertainty for investors, including trade ten-
sions” (UNCTAD 2020). The UNCTAD publication further noted:
FDI flows to developed countries remained at a historically low level, decreasing by
a further 6% to an estimated US$643 billion. FDI to the European Union (EU) fell
by 15% to US$305 billion, while flows to the United States remained stable at US$251
billion. . . . Flows to developing economies remained unchanged at an estimated US$695
billion. FDI increased by 16% in Latin America and the Caribbean and 3% in Africa.
Despite a decline of 6%, flows to developing Asia continued to account for one-third of
global FDI in 2019. Flows to transition economies rose by two thirds to US$57 billion.
(UNCTAD 2020, 1–2)
FDI inflows remaining at 28 percent below the levels reached in 2007—the decline due
mainly to “the fragility of the global economy, policy uncertainty for investors, and elevated
geopolitical risks. New investments were also offset by some large divestments. The decline
³¹ The Monterrey Consensus includes the final text of agreements and commitments adopted at the UN
International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, on March 18–22, 2002 (UN
2002).
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in FDI flows was in contrast to growth in GDP, trade, gross fixed capital formation, and
employment” (UNCTAD 2015, 2).
FDI Inflows
Trends in FDI inflows into the developing economies as a group have not generally followed
the global trends outlined above. At the peak of the FDI boom in 2007, OECD countries
received around 70 percent of all FDI inflows. In a span of only seven years, however, this
share dropped to around 40 percent, with inflows to non-OECD countries overtaking those
of the OECD country grouping for the first time, in 2012. According to UNCTAD’s
“Investment Trends Monitor”:
Global FDI flows remained flat in 2019, at an estimated US$1.39 trillion, down 1% from a
revised US$1.41 trillion in 2018. Flows declined in Europe and developing Asia, remained
unchanged in North America and increased in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean
and transition economies. The impact of the 2017 US tax reform which reduced US
outward FDI flows and global FDI in 2018 appear to have diminished in 2019.
Developing economies continue to absorb more than half of global FDI flows and half of
the top 10 largest recipients of FDI fall in this category. The United States remained the
largest recipient of FDI, attracting US$251 billion in inflows, followed by China with flows
of US$140 billion and Singapore with US$110 billion.
FDI flows to developed economies fell by 6% to an estimated US$643 billion from their
revised US$683 billion in 2018. FDI remained at a historically low-level, at half of their
peak in 2007. Equity investment flows exhibit sluggishness. . . .
FDI flows to developing economies remained stable at an estimated US$695 billion. Latin
America and the Caribbean saw an increase of 16%, with growth concentrated in South
America. Africa continued to register a modest rise (+3%) while flows to developing Asia
fell by 6%.
FDI flows into developing Asia reached an estimated US$473 billion in 2019. The overall
decline was driven mostly by a 21% drop in investment in East Asia. Investment to Hong
Kong, China almost halved to US$55 billion as divestments continued through the year.
Flows to the Republic of Korea also saw a decline of 46% to US$7.8 billion, attributed to
trade tensions and investment policy changes. Inflows to China remained stable at US$140
billion.
South-East Asia continued to be the region’s growth engine; FDI rose to an estimated US
$177 billion, a 19% increase from 2018. Singapore, the biggest FDI host country in the
region, continued to grow in 2019—by 42% to US$110 billion, driven by deals in the
information and communication sector. Investments into Indonesia rose 12% to US$24
billion with significant flows going into wholesale and retail trade (including the digital
economy) and manufacturing.
South Asia recorded a 10% increase in FDI to US$60 billion. The growth was driven by
India, with a 16% increase in inflows to an estimated US$49 billion. The majority went
into services industries, including information technology. Inflows into Bangladesh and
Pakistan declined by 6% and 20%, respectively, to US$3.4 billion and US$1.9 billion.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
458   
. . . FDI to Latin America and the Caribbean increased by 16% in 2019, reaching an
estimated US$170 billion. In South America, flows grew by 20% to an estimated US
$119 billion, with decreases in Argentina and Ecuador offset by growing flows to Brazil,
Chile, Peru and Colombia. . . .
Flows to Central America grew by 4% to an estimated US$46 billion. FDI to Mexico
increased by 3% to an estimated US$35 billion; the new trade agreement USMCA lifted
expectations for easier economic relations. . . .
In the Caribbean (excluding offshore financial centres), inflows grew by 49% to an
estimated US$4.2 billion led by growing investments in the Dominican Republic where
FDI reached an estimated US$2.7 billion and in Trinidad and Tobago where inflows
turned positive to an estimated US$600 million.
FDI flows to Africa amounted to an estimated US$49 billion—an increase of 3%.
Persistent global economic uncertainty and the slow pace of reforms seeking to address
structural productivity bottlenecks in many economies continue to hamper investment in
the continent. Egypt remained the largest FDI recipient in Africa with a 5% increase in
inflows to US$8.5 billion. . . .
FDI flows to East Africa remained steady totaling US$8.8 billion. Flows to Ethiopia,
Africa’s fastest growing economy, slowed down by a quarter to US$2.5 billion. China
was the largest investor in Ethiopia in 2019, accounting for 60% of newly approved FDI
projects. Inflows to Uganda increased by almost 50% to US$2 billion due to the contin-
uation of the development of major oil fields and an international oil pipeline. Flows to
West Africa increased by 17% to an estimated US$11 billion as investment surged in
Nigeria by 71% to US$3.4 billion. FDI to the continent’s largest economy was buoyed by
resource seeking inflows in the oil and gas sector. (UNCTAD 2020, 2–5)
FDI Outflows
Before the food and financial crises of 2007–8, as opposed to the pandemic-driven crisis
in 2020, OECD countries accounted for around 87 percent of global outflows, reaching
US$1.9 trillion in 2007. By 2018, OECD country outflows had declined by US$585 billion, to
66 percent. In contrast, non-OECD country outflows more than tripled between 2005 and
2014, from US$125 billion to US$302 billion. OECD’s “FDI in Figures” noted: “In the first
half of 2019, major sources of FDI worldwide were Japan, the United States, Germany, the
United Kingdom and China. The United States recorded negative outflows in Q1 2019 but
returned to its position as the major source of FDI worldwide in Q2” (OECD 2019f, 3–4).
As with inflows, China stands out as a special case, accounting for just under 20 percent
of all emerging market FDI outflows over the same period (OECD 2016). Investment by
MNEs [multinational enterprises] from developing and transition economies continued to
grow. Developing Asia became the world’s largest region for investment. In 2014, MNEs
from developing economies alone invested US$468 billion abroad, a 23 percent increase
from the previous year. Their share in global FDI reached a record 35 percent, up from
13 percent in 2007. Among developing economies, MNEs from Asia increased their
investment abroad, while outflows from LAC, and Africa fell. For the first time, MNEs
from developing Asia became the world’s largest investing group, accounting for almost
one-third of the total. Outward investments by MNEs based in developing Asia increased by
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29 percent to US$432 billion in 2014. Outward investments by MNEs in Africa decreased by
18 percent in 2014 to US$13 billion. South African MNEs invested in telecommunications,
mining, and retail, while those from Nigeria focused largely on financial services. These two
largest investors from Africa increased their investments abroad in 2014. Intra-African
investments rose significantly during the year.
Despite the broader involvement of developing countries in global investment, capital
flows have started to decelerate, and economic vulnerabilities seem to be growing (IMF
2015). As the inevitable tightening of quantitative easing programs in the advanced econo-
mies is expected to result in capital outflows from the emerging markets, it could likewise
result in some turnaround in the rebalancing trend of FDI described here (OECD 2016).
There has been a marked drop in project financing, too. Similarly, even as FDI inflows to
the emerging markets have been increasing, project financing has dropped by around
40 percent since 2009.³² After reaching a record high of US$240 billion in 2009, this
financing is expected to reach its lowest level since 2006 (US$142 billion). Over the past
two years, the equity component of project finance has also declined by 80 percent. While
the least developed countries account for a relatively small share of total developing country
project finance (consistently less than 5 percent), these flows are especially important to
them, given their small size (economically) and their considerable infrastructure needs. Yet,
the decline in project financing has been particularly severe in these countries: after reach-
ing a record high in 2008 (US$13 billion), it fell to US$2 billion in 2015, its lowest level in
over a decade. Furthermore, much as in developing countries in general, the equity
component of project financing for the least developed countries has fallen to insignificant
levels, meaning that infrastructure projects in the least developed countries are now
financed almost wholly via debt (OECD 2016).
Increased Role of Philanthropic Foundations
Philanthropy is often thought of as “the rich giving to the poor.” Modern philanthropy
emerged at the beginning of the 20th century in the United States when Rockefeller
and Carnegie set up the first large American foundations. As early as the First World
War, these foundations began to engage beyond national borders, indicating an interest
and willingness to invest in social progress overseas, particularly in developing countries
(OECD 2014).
Because foundations’ strategic priorities and activities vary greatly—ranging from advo-
cacy to implementing their own projects (OECD 2003)—it is difficult to formulate a global
definition that encompasses their diverse natures. Yet, they can be broadly described as
independent, nonprofit organizations with their own resources that work locally, regionally,
and internationally to improve the lives of citizens. They fund and run activities in
numerous areas, from youth empowerment and education to health and climate change
(EFC n.d.). Philanthropists have fundamentally altered the role of external assistance and
traditional international organizations, and, in many ways, they are influencing the global
agenda, raising issues of accountability.
It was only in 2011, in the Busan Partnership agreement, that philanthropic foundations
were recognized as significant contributors to development, although only from a financial
³² Although there is no precise definition for what constitutes “project financing,” usually this takes the form of
investments in either infrastructure or extractive industries.
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perspective: as providers of additional funding for development cooperation.³³ Today,
foundations’ broader role in global development efforts is increasingly acknowledged and
valued. The report of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Agenda
acknowledges that their role as central actors in development cooperation goes far beyond
the financial (HLP 2013). This recognition was confirmed at the First High Level Meeting of
the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC), which acknowl-
edged the “added value that philanthropic foundations bring to development co-operation”
(GPEDC 2014). This is reflected in the decision of the Steering Committee of the Global
Partnership to offer philanthropists full member seats, as of June 2014.³⁴ Philanthropists
increasingly recognize the power of involving governments and other development stake-
holders, such as the private sector, in partnerships to enable systemic change, ensure
increased sustainability, and scale up their efforts (OECD 2016).
Although the philanthropic contribution to development is hard to quantify, available
data suggest that it has nearly multiplied by 10 in less than a decade (OECD 2014). Outside
of the notable exception of BMGF, it is difficult to track. Concerns about nutrition and the
environment entail new sources of flows into agriculture: for example, through climate
funds and nutrition programs.
BMGF is by far the most significant player among philanthropists, in global advocacy
and financing of humanitarian and development causes, and the only philanthropist whose
assistance is listed in the OECD DAC database. To date, BMGF committed more than US$2
billion to agricultural development efforts, primarily in SSA and SA (BMGF 2020). In 2018,
of the total grants of US$5 billion made by BMGF, US$1.8 billion went to global develop-
ment, and US$1.4 billion to global health—with over 60 percent of it to communicable or
infectious diseases, US$646 million went to global growth and opportunity, US$501 million
went to global policy and advocacy, and only US$493 million went to United States
programs. Of the US$1.8 billion spent on global development, 6 percent was given nutri-
tional improvement, and out of the US$646 million to global growth and opportunity,
61 percent was allocated for agricultural development, including large support to CGIAR
and the Alliance for the Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) (BMGF 2018). BMGF was the
third largest provider in the health sector (including reproductive health) in 2014 (OECD
2017). Commitments to agriculture are smaller than for health, but nonetheless significant,
given the Foundation’s high profile and increasing influence in shaping international
organizations and the aid architecture as a whole. From 2007 to 2014, AGRA gave 673 grants
worth US$386 million to 16 countries with a mission to transform Africa’s agriculture.
Whereas BMGF has urged transparency and accountability of international organizations,
it have not applied the same standards for its own philanthropy. Independent evaluation of
AGRA is not available to the public.
With his US$40 billion endowment, Bill Gates has had a profound influence on global
expenditures on health and will continue to do so in a variety of other areas. Besides
managing Warren Buffet’s philanthropic grants, Gates has been working on convincing 100
³³ The Busan Partnership agreement was the outcome of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
held in Busan, Korea, in 2011 (OECD 2011). This new broad and inclusive partnership for development
cooperation sets out four common principles: (1) ownership of development priorities by developing countries;
(2) a focus on results; (3) inclusive development partnerships; and (4) transparency and accountability to each
other.
³⁴ GPEDCwas formed following the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (OECD 2019g) to
act as a forum for advice, shared accountability, and shared learning and experiences to support the implemen-
tation of the Busan Partnership agreement principles. See http://effectivecooperation.org.
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other billionaires to make philanthropic contributions to eradicate poverty and hunger. It is
hard to get a handle on the international activities and expenditures of philanthropists,
many of whom act alone and learn by making their own mistakes, and, unlike BMGF, their
expenditures are not included in the OECD database (Kotechi 2018).
If income and wealth inequalities continue to grow and if differential tax laws toward
dividends from capital investments and (wage) income remain in place, as they are likely to
do during the Trump administration in the United States, private philanthropy would
become even more significant, relative to the traditional ODA of OECD countries, which
will likely stagnate with slow growth in OECD countries. How much of the philanthropic
assistance will go to agriculture, compared to other competing activities, will depend on the
power of advocacy and potential for markets—for example, there is a huge market for
children’s vaccinations, drugs for AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, Ebola, and increasingly, to
contain NCDs. Philanthropists such as Bill Gates are creating a demand for drugs and
vaccines by supporting research for their development and also by cofunding programs
jointly with OECD donors to meet the needs of developing countries governments for the
drugs and vaccines, once developed. Since the poor cannot afford to pay market prices, how
sustainable these programs are will depend on the level of aid. Already there is evidence that
the World Bank experts in the health sector have expressed their concern about the cost and
the lack of sustainability of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI)
program, even though the World Bank helped raise funds in its support. Since then,
tensions between GAVI and the World Bank increased, and GAVI moved its headquarters
to Geneva (IEG 2015). Yet, the influence of BMGF has increased through:
• significant amounts of funding in support of specific development issues pertaining to
poverty, food and nutrition, women empowerment, and children’s health;
• contributing investments in global and regional, as well as national public and private
goods;
• fostering results orientation, measurement of impacts, promotion of “corporate score
cards” and other private sector “business” models to the operations of international
organizations;
• establishing partnerships that complement but also influence resource allocation of
official donors in certain directions.
Some of these contributions have been positive. In other cases, such as the focus on the
private sector business models for children’s vaccines, attention has been diverted from the
importance of public goods and the lack of sustainability of the model among poor
households.
Decisions to increase and allocate development assistance, largely from official sources,
still are vested in the hands of career professionals in countries giving aid. In our interviews,
some felt that the recent philanthropists, unlike their earlier counterparts, may be favoring
“feel-good” humanitarian assistance, which will have immediate, demonstrable impacts
rather than supporting long-term assistance, which will help transform policies and institu-
tions and create capacity in developing countries to address their own problems on a large
scale, whether in the public or the private sector. (See Box 7.3 on changes in demands for
and expectations from development assistance.)
Competition between multinationals of OECD countries and emerging countries will
likely accelerate to capture growing markets for agricultural inputs, food, and health-related
products in developing countries. The pharmaceutical industry in developing countries
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already plays a major role through partnerships, given their lower production costs of drugs,
vaccines, and equipment such as bed nets. India’s Serum Institute provides an example of
such a public–private partnership through GAVI, WHO, and the Program for Appropriate
Technology in Health (PATH). Serum institute’s partnership with external actors is an
important example of capacity-building of a developing country with private enterprise to
produce vaccines of interest to the poor. Serum and other Indian pharmaceuticals do not yet
have the resources to do fundamental research, but they are able to produce drugs once their
patents have expired. The Chinese have shown tremendous inclination for reverse engi-
neering of technology and have purchased Syngenta, one of the five big pharmaceutical
companies. Gates is similarly training scores of Africans under AGRA, but the human
capital deficit is so large, as we show in the case of national agricultural research systems
(NARS) in Africa, that substantially larger and long-term investment is needed. Whether
these small businesses can provide service without the dedication of the nationals and
some initial subsidies and support is too early to tell. Both are likely to be more lasting
contributions, particularly if BMGF also creates and supports centers of excellence, as
did the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations did earlier. However, US and European produ-
cers are also vying for these same markets; for example, the United Kingdom and United
States were both developing an Ebola vaccine, as they and others have raced to develop a
COVID-19 vaccine.
Individual Initiatives
Celebrities, like Bono, are not billionaires but command considerable persuasive power to
get the likes of Jesse Helms, former conservative US senator from North Carolina, to
increase American aid for HIVAIDS to Africa. Working with individual leaders, even
conservative leaders opposed to aid, and through his “One” campaign, Bono has addressed
specific issues, such as eradication of hunger, HIV/AIDS, trafficking of girls, and other
causes, and influenced ODA allocations of the US government. In 2000, Helms co-authored
a bill authorizing US$600 million for international AIDS relief efforts and became a
Box 7.3 Changes in Demands and Expectations from “Aid”
• Linking aid to delivery of outputs (such as Cash for School Attendance, Carbon
Sequestration, REDD [reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation]
readiness—fundamentally changing the character of aid)
• Increasing focus on outcomes and impacts as a condition for receiving aid
• Shifting focus from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness
• Shifting frommacro growth indicators to household outcomes and impacts, such as
nutrition and child survival
• Shifting from MDGs to SDGs
• Scorecards for (1) countries, (2) international organizations, and (3) donors
• Conditional cash transfers
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proponent of fighting the spread of AIDS, lending support to the efforts of African leaders
such as President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. Bono may also have dissuaded Helms from
working to disband the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and
convinced European leaders, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British prime
ministers to continue supporting poverty reduction.
Think Tanks and Consulting Firms
Internationalization of Western think tanks, with active support from bilateral donors, is an
important development since the early 2000. A variety of institutions in developed coun-
tries, such as the Brookings Institution, CGD, and McKinsey, have become major compe-
titors of traditional multilateral organizations like the World Bank in diagnosis and advice,
in such areas as the role of conditional cash transfers in safety nets, policies, and imple-
mentation of climate change programs. In food and agriculture, this development has
greatly increased competition, as well as collaboration in research and policy analysis,
between the think tanks and the World Bank. Like the World Bank and IMF, the think
tanks have become major suppliers of policy advisors to developing countries. Developing
countries appreciate these alternative sources of supply, which come without the loan
obligations that often go with the World Bank’s traditional analytical and advisory services.
The Impact of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda
In 2005, donor governments, a few recipient governments, and some INGOs, agreed to a set
of principles for how to make aid better support development. These came to be known as
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2008b). Five principles were agreed to—
ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability.
Global targets correspond to these principles, which are now a touchstone for effective
recipient–donor relations in any setting. They provide a common agenda for both global
and country dialogue on aid effectiveness and have inspired attempts to localize global
commitments through country-based action. Measurable targets were outlined, and a
deadline was set to meet them: 2010, supported by a series of surveys to monitor progress,
administered by the recipient countries themselves.
So how have donors performed? The general consensus and the evaluation of the Paris
Declaration suggest not very well, except for some aid untying and some better aid
coordination. While the Declaration has been generally applauded for enshrining the
Paris Principles in matters related to aid, there have been many criticisms. Among the
criticisms are that the principles focused on bureaucratic processes, rather than on political
decision-making in donor countries to change aid modalities, and they did not include new
emerging country donors. Although some criticism suggested that the indicators that were
difficult to measure and follow, they did form the basis for three successive surveys on
monitoring the Paris Declaration, covering 34 partner countries with data from 60 donors,
which the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) used as a
basis for their subsequent analyses.
The 2008 Accra Agenda for Action attempted to improve on the Paris Declaration
(OECD 2008a, 2008b), and the 2011 Busan Declaration reinforced the principles of
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ownership of development priorities by developing countries, including a focus on results,
inclusive development partnerships recognizing the different and complementary roles of
all actors, and transparency and accountability (OECD 2011). However, these would hardly
seem to be the principles that developing countries would demand, particularly, aid
coordination, where there are pros and cons from the perspective of the recipient. The
more it is done by the recipients, the more they have a sense of ownership, as aid
coordinated around a well-defined strategy by a government can put a country in the
driver’s seat and can potentially reduce transaction costs.
The aid effectiveness agenda has also highlighted accountability mechanisms, but gov-
ernments of many developing countries have mixed views about the civil society and media
in their countries, despite legislation, such as India’s “Right to Information Act of 2005,”
which has made a sea change in the way the civil society uses information to hold
government accountable. External aid needs to support such legislative and regulatory
reforms, working with the nationals of the countries, rather than the kind of governance
agenda of looking into the procurement of their own projects, which the donors typically
support. Such a narrow approach to governance and to safeguards has had very limited
success, according to IEG’s evaluation of the Bank’s involvement in improving governance
(IEG 2011b, 2014).
The importance of the aid effectiveness agenda, and particularly the principle of country
ownership, is now widely acknowledged. The country ownership principle is reflected in
virtually all donor initiatives to boost food security and support agriculture—including the
five Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security issued at the World Food Summit
of November 2009 (FAO 2009). More broadly, it is a principle that has become intrinsic to
the work of donor agencies and international financial institutions. It would be fair to note,
however, that developing countries, including even the less developed, are less inclined to
accept terms dictated by donors. In that sense, their self-assurance with respect to policy
reforms and lessons learned has increased. Yet, donors’ willingness to accommodate this
capacity in their own aid modalities is less clear.
Aid Effectiveness and Transparency in Development Cooperation
The basic principles of transparency, accountability, and citizen engagement are now
accepted as central to more effective development and are reflected in the current discus-
sions on the Post-2015 Development Agenda and calls for a data revolution. As the
development community looks to the future to define its goals over the coming years, it is
important to reflect on progress to date, particularly on the commitments made and the
lessons learned from delivering them.
Over the past decade, donors have repeatedly committed to improving aid effectiveness
and transparency in development cooperation. At the second HLF in Paris in 2005, donors
committed to “take far-reaching and monitorable actions and to reform the way we manage
and deliver aid,” including by improving predictability, ownership and integration, and
reducing duplication and fragmentation (OECD 2008b). This was followed by pledges at the
third HLF in Accra in 2008 to “make aid more transparent” and “to publicly disclose
regular, detailed and timely information on volume, allocation and, when available, results
of development expenditure to enable more accurate budget, accounting and audit by
developing countries” (OECD 2008a). The IATI was also launched in Accra, providing a
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practical approach for publishing aid information in a comparable, open format. Further-
more, one of the most significant and concrete commitments to come out of the fourth HLF,
in Busan in 2011, was for donors to “implement a common, open standard for electronic
publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on resources pro-
vided through development cooperation operation,” with endorsers undertaking to fully
implement this common standard, including IATI, by December 2015 (OECD 2011). The
international donor community needs to work together to provide a full picture of devel-
opment flows. All donors should ensure the inclusion of transparency and open data as an
integral part of the Post-2015 Agenda and share lessons learned from the development
effectiveness agenda. While reporting has improved, it still remains poor. Indeed, donors
are not practicing what they preach to developing countries and expect from multilateral
organizations where the record of transparency is much higher, particularly IDA. The 2014
Aid Transparency Index report noted, “Much of the information available is scattered
across websites and it is difficult to join the dots between the descriptive, financial and
performance information related to individual activities, making the data difficult to use.
This means that there is still a long way to go in obtaining a full picture of all development
flows, without which development effectiveness and improved donor coordination will be
difficult to achieve” (ATI 2014, 4).
At the first High Level Meeting of the GPEDC in Mexico in 2014, donors reaffirmed their
past commitments to publish information to a common, open standard, incorporating the
IATI, by the end of 2015 (GPEDC 2014).
Significant findings from the 2016 Index (ATI 2016) were as follows:
• The 2016 ATI results demonstrate that 10 donors (UNDP, MCC, UNICEF, DFID,
Global Fund, World Bank–IDA, IDB, ADB, Sweden’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs–
International Development Cooperation Agency [MFA–Sida], and AfDB), which
account for 25 percent of total aid, are included in the “very good” category. Each
scores above 80 percent and is publishing “timely, comprehensive, and forward-
looking” data in an open and comparable format, meeting the 2011 Busan commit-
ment to aid transparency (OECD 2011). UNDP “tops the Index for the second time
with an excellent score of 93.3%, the only organisation to score above 90% . . . UNICEF
enters the ‘very good’ category for the first time, jumping into third place” (ATI 2016, 1).
“Since 2013, UNICEF has made the most progress, jumping from ‘poor’ to ‘very good’ in
three years and performing well in each year” (ATI 2018, 10)
• “Information at the activity level on finances (such as budgets), on performance (such
as results) and on documents (such as evaluations and contracts), which is important
to both aid providers and recipient countries for planning purposes is not always
published. For example, thirty providers do not get points for results, meaning either
that the information is not published at all or that it is not published consistently” (ATI
2016, 8).
• “The provision of forward-looking budgets information is insufficient. . . . Over half of
the organisations [out of 46] included in this Index do not publish forward-looking
budgets in the IATI Standard, including a breakdown by countries. . . . ” (ATI 2016, 8).
• Multilaterals as a group continue to perform well, with 11 of the 18 placed in the “very
good” or “good” categories, whereas bilaterals as a group, only 7 are in these categories.
As a group, bilaterals continue to perform poorly; 9 out of 12 are placed in the “poor”
or “very poor” categories (ATC 2016).
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• As in 2016, international financial institutions (IFIs), as a subset of multilaterals,
placed 4 (World Bank IDA, IDB, ADB, and AfDB) out of 10 in “very good,” 2 (EIB
and EBRD) out of 18 in “fair” and 2 (IMF and World Bank IFC) out of 7 in “poor”
categories (ATC 2016).
According to the 2016 ATI Index: “Based on these findings, the report recommends that all
publishers should recognise the right to information enshrined in the SDGs. Publishers
should improve the quality and comprehensiveness of their data to provide a full picture of
all development flows” (ATI 2016, 1).
The 2020 Aid Transparency Index report made these recommendations:
• Donors should share comprehensive data about the results and impact of their
projects.
• Donors should publish project budget documents, project procurement information
(contracts and tenders), and sub-national locations.
• Regional development banks should publish their private sector portfolios.
• DFIs should publish financial and performance data about their private sector
portfolios.
• Donors remaining in the “fair” category should prioritise transparency—all donors
need to pull their weight.
• Donors should engage directly with stakeholders in partner countries to raise aware-
ness about the available data, build trust, and establish feedback loops for continuous
improvement (ATI 2020, 5).
IDA Graduation and Likely Implications
for Aid to Food and Agriculture
“IDA is one of the largest sources of assistance for the world’s 76 poorest countries,” 39 of
which are in Africa. IDA is also “the single largest source of donor funds for basic services in
these countries” (IDA 2020b). Among 59 IDA-only countries, 29 countries were in the low-
income category, 26 countries in the lower middle-income category, and 4 countries in
upper middle-income category but heavily indebted. An estimated 1.3 billion people lived in
IDA-only countries in 2015. Of the 77 countries eligible to receive IDA resources in 2016, 59
were IDA-only, and 18 were blend countries (eligible to receive IDA and IBRD). In
addition, India, the largest recipient of IDA since its establishment, is receiving transitional
support since having graduated from IDA in 2014. Since 1960, IDA has provided US$328
billion to 112 countries. Annual commitments have increased steadily and averaged about
US$19 billion over the last three years (2014, 2015 and 2016), with about 50 percent of that
going to Africa. In fiscal year 2016 (which ended June 30, 2016), IDA commitments totaled
US$16. billion (including IDA guarantees), of which 12 percent was provided on grant
terms. New commitments in FY16 comprised 161 new operations. Unlike bilateral funding,
which has grown in recent years, IDA is a transparent, non-politically driven, cost-effective
platform for achieving results. The financial viability and future supply of IDA is of
considerable importance to development assistance, including, particularly to ARD and
economic transformation.
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The World Bank has undergone several transitions of interest to transforming econo-
mies. One is the graduation of a number of LICs from being IDA recipients to IBRD
countries, as their per capita GNI has been rising and they are reaching the threshold of US
$1,215 in fiscal year 2016 (was initially set at US$250 in 1964—now known as the “historical
cutoff”), below which they qualified for concessional assistance. So, there is the so-called
“poor country”–“poor people debate” started by Kanbur and Sumner (2012), among others.
As shown in Chapters 1 and 2, the bottom billion people, in terms of poverty, are mostly in
MICs, and external analysts have raised a question as to whether countries with large
incidence of poverty should be excluded from receiving concessional assistance, simply
because they have crossed a predetermined income bar, or whether the lending criteria
should be modified. They have pleaded for concessional assistance on three grounds: first,
there are large pockets of poverty, even in the countries such as China and India where
incomes have risen, and second, there are spillover effects of poverty, such as pandemics,
food crises, and cross-border migration that need to be contained. Kanbur has shown that
with low per capita incomes, countries such as India are unable to raise enough domestic
resources to pay for the consequences of global public bads, such as climate change and
disaster relief and preparedness. Kanbur and Summer (2012) estimated an increase in the
marginal rates of taxation that would be needed in India. This is one important reason, they
argued, developing countries with large incidence of poverty need greater access to devel-
opment finance. They also noted that these countries need additional finance to undertake
GPGs, that provision of GPGs should not come at the cost of development expenditures.
Further, there is huge scope for knowledge transfers from MICs to LICs or subregions
within countries, with the issue of knowledge transfers. Finally, there is a moral obligation in
addressing poverty, and international assistance should play a role in that process. In the
chapters on the World Bank and IFAD, we will discuss the extent to which we can
demonstrate any impact of the World Bank–IDA and IFAD lending on food and nutrition
security and agriculture, poverty reduction, and sustainability. We will explore why the
70-year-old project model, embraced by all “Banks”—since the World Bank has been a
standard setter—is outmoded. And we explain why development banks need to drastically
change their approach to poverty reduction if they wish to remain relevant, whether they are
using IDA or IBRD as instruments of lending, an issue those writing on the IDA do not
consider.
Increasingly, discussions about IDA include considerations of financing for adaptation to
climate change, disaster preparedness, and disaster relief, all an outcome of global public
bads (for example, disaster preparedness as a consequence of climate change). In addition to
the direct impacts of climate change on crop losses, loss of coastal areas, increased risk and
uncertainty, developing countries incur the cost of disaster preparedness. The poor are the
most adversely affected. IDA17 financing already includes support for such activities, and
going forward, there is an active debate on including criteria for IDA lending beyond the
traditional GNI, to account for a broader set of criteria, such vulnerability to disasters or the
multidimensional nature of poverty. This is the so-called “poor countries” vs. “poor people”
(even within MICs) debate discussed earlier.
There is a fourth, related debate about the Bank’s capital base, and whether there is
enough headroom for the Bank to grow and lend money without a capital increase. Finally,
there is the issue of the voting rights of the new emerging shareholders. As discussed in
Chapter 6 on the governance of the five organizations, in the World Bank, shares were
determined historically by their contributions to the share capital, and they have been
adjusted too slowly since the Bank was established. Now emerging countries not only want
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to remain members of the World Bank, but would like to see the Bank changing from a
“lender’s bank” as one executive director described it, to a “borrower’s bank,” whereby
emerging countries (1) increase their own share capital in the Bank; (2) get higher voting
shares with greater voice in the Bank’s governance; (3) benefit from the leveraging of the
World Bank’s subscribed capital by going to the market with a safe gearing ratio, as the
World Bank already does; and (4) have access to international capital on IBRD terms. These
changes potentially have implications for demand from the IDA-graduating developing
countries, for borrowing for the “softer” sectors, including for agricultural and rural
development. The past record of IBRD–IDA borrowing suggests that this demand will
not be strong in IBRD countries. Changing from a lender’s bank to a borrower’s bank will
also mean adjustment of the European shares in the Bank to make room for the greater
share for emerging countries, something which Europeans are reluctant to do.
In the fourth IDA18 replenishment meetings (December 14–15, 2016, Indonesia), a
coalition of more than 60 donor and borrower governments agreed to ratchet up the fight
against extreme poverty with a record US$75 billion commitment for the IDA, the World
Bank’s fund for the poorest countries (World Bank 2016).
The World Bank also noted:
The IDA18 replenishment period, which runs from July 1, 2017 to June 30, 2020, is
expected to support:
• Essential health and nutrition services for up to 400 million people
• Access to improved water sources for up to 45 million people
• Financial services for 4–6 million people
• Safe childbirth for up to 16–20 million women through provision of skilled health
personnel
• Training for 9–10 million teachers to benefit 300+ million children
• Immunizations for 130–80 million children
• Better governance in 30 countries through improved statistical capacity
• An additional 5 GW of renewable energy generation capacity. (World Bank 2016)
The funds will also help governments strengthen institutions, mobilize resources needed to
deliver services, and promote accountability.
A total of 48 countries pledged resources to IDA; additional countries are expected to
pledge in the near-term. WBG is continuing the tradition of contributing its own resources
to IDA.
Proposals for Alternative Uses of IDA “Savings”
from Graduation of IDA Countries
There are several options for IDA savings:
1. Not to raise IDA funds as large as in the past, because countries have graduated—in
essence, returning them to the treasuries of rich countries;
2. Allocate “savings” to remaining (mostly, fragile and conflict-affected) IDA countries
who have limited absorptive capacity and less good performances;
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3. Allocate funds to all countries with large poor populations (including now graduating
countries), regardless of their incomes;
4. Use funds to produce GPGs, described in Box 7.1; and
5. Plough funds into IBRD to increase assistance to graduating emerging countries on
IBRD terms.
The following discussion should be seen in the context of the list of GPGs in Box 7.1
and related evidence in the rest of this book. Whereas there was a general consensus in
the literature in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the GPGs literature began to explode,
that financing of GPGs should come from “outside” ODA, Inge Kaul, among others, has
been a strongest protagonist and an early advocate of this point of view, increasingly
advancing arguments that development assistance should be used for such things as
adaption to climate change, disaster relief, and disaster preparedness (Kaul, Grunberg,
and Stern 1999).
At the same time, some have suggested that the World Bank should transform itself and
partially or fully become a provider of GPGs (Birdsall and Subramanian 2007), and indeed,
as we point out throughout this book, in several cases it is hard to distinguish between the
traditional development assistance provided by the World Bank and the provision of GPGs,
for example, in agricultural research—in avoiding pandemics, adaptation to climate change,
or replacing coal-based energy with renewable sources of energy to reduce emissions.
Donors have argued for a considerable time that there was no need for a separate adaptation
fund, since adaptation is development and development aid can finance it.
In practice, both financing the provision of GPGs through development aid and turning
development organizations into GPGs organizations has turned out to be challenging for
both conceptual and practical reasons. Development “aid,” including the case of the IBRD
and IDA, is country assistance. Provision of GPGs, as reflected in Box 7.1 or in the 117
World Bank partnerships, discussed in Chapter 8, have had to account for a variety of cross-
border GPGs features for which countries tend to be reluctant to borrow from the Bank.
Increasingly, country assistance strategies, more recently called “country partnership stra-
tegies” (country programmable aid, or CPA) have emphasized country ownership, and
IBRD allocations have been determined by countries’ finance ministries. Furthermore,
development-oriented staff tend not to be more equipped than their clients to provide the
kind of inputs needed in the provision of GPGs, as highlighted in Box 7.1.
Many of the global programs supply GPGs for which there is no realistic alternative
source. As we showed in Chapter 3, some of the major existing partnerships are not
achieving strategic objectives, have weak governance, lack ownership of all stakeholders,
and they have not shown impacts. They tend to be sustainable as long as donor support
lasts, but without an assurance that they are the right mix for the highest priority activities
in which international organizations should be engaged. IEG evaluations suggest, perhaps,
they are not.
The partnerships are not funded adequately at the global level either to generate the
global or the regional public goods, and in some cases, such as in the Global Agriculture
and Food Security Program (GAFSP), they are generally complementing the existing
mechanism that is working well in IDA, the governance structure of which is discussed in
Chapter 8 on the World Bank. GAFSP carries out functions that IDA already performs,
although it has different contributors, including BMGF. As an intergovernmental organi-
zation, IDA does not accept subscriptions from foundations. So, should one include NGOs,
such as BMGF, as part of the future for IDA? Among all the discussions we noted on the
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future of IDA, we did not see any discussion of the role of philanthropists like BMGF in
the future of IDA.
Poor Countries vs. Poor Populations in Aid Giving: Bretton Woods
Institutions Face a Cap on Growth
WBG, including IDA and IFC, have been the largest sources of external assistance to
developing countries by far, in support of food, agriculture, forestry, education, health,
and social safety nets among other sectors. IFC has provided advice and invested in private
sector projects, and its overall commitments to agriculture have increased considerably,
particularly since 2012 (World Bank 2015a). Through their own policies, investments, and
access to concessional IDA resources, low-income, “IDA-only” countries have typically
tended to transform themselves from agricultural to industrial economies and “graduate”
from low- to low-middle and middle-income countries. Once they have reached an income
threshold and other allocation criteria, they lose their eligibility for IDA and qualify for
IBRD loans.³⁵ Eventually, countries experiencing economic growth tend to become lenders
to the World Bank, thereby helping to retain and enhance the status of World Bank as a
truly international organization. China graduated in 1999. India, by far the largest borrower,
graduated from IDA in 2014, after benefiting from the largest amount of concessional
finance, knowledge, and expertise from the World Bank, albeit small in per capita terms,
given its size.
In a paper on “The World Bank at 75,” Morris and Gleave (2015) called IDA a
remarkably effective fundraising model over many decades. Using triennial replenishments
of the IDA, the Bank’s arm provides grants and highly concessional loans to the world’s
poorest countries. The World Bank has also been a model on methods and tools, such as
CPIA, to other multilateral banks.
As a result, the Bank is becoming increasingly more dependent on trust funds, a
phenomenon well documented in various OED/IEG reviews (OED 2003, 2004; IEG
2011a, 2011c). Morris and Gleave (2015) argued, that in a highly changed world, the
Bank’s traditional shareholders and emerging countries will be encouraged to embrace
alternatives. And, indeed, except for a handful of close US allies (the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, and Japan), countries are already doing just that. They have joined the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS’ New Development Bank
(NDB), despite resistance by the World Bank and the United States to the establishment
of those institutions—although Bank President Jim Yong Kim offered his hand of cooper-
ation to the AIIB in Singapore in 2015 (see Box 7.4). Certainly, developing countries have
welcomed the establishment of AIIB and to a lesser extent the NDB with enthusiasm, as a
possible new source of finance where it is much needed. The AIIB is also considering
investment in agriculture.
³⁵ World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) is a tool that measures the extent to
which a country’s policy and institutional framework supports sustainable growth and poverty reduction, and
consequently, the effective use of development assistance. The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria
grouped in four clusters: (1) economic management; (2) structural policies; (3) policies for social inclusion and
equity; and (4) public sector management and institutions, including Transparency, Accountability, and Corrup-
tion in the Public Sector. The World Bank’s IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) is based on the results of the
annual CPIA exercise (World Bank 2011, 2019a).
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China has not been reporting its aid to OECD-DAC, and therefore, the numbers are
difficult to obtain, and come with much speculation. We were fortunate to find the numbers
in a research paper by (2019), and they are presented here (see, also, Kitano and
Miyabayashi 2020). Net foreign aid increased steadily to US$6.1 billion, followed by another
increase in 2018 to US$6.4 billion (Figure 7.15), mainly due to the increase in grants and
interest-free loans.
Box 7.4 The BRICS New Development Bank and the Asian
Infrastructure Development Bank
The leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa met at the seventh annual
BRICS Summit held on July 8–9, 2015, in the Russian city of Ufa. The theme of the
summit was “BRICS Partnership: A Powerful Factor for Global Development.” The
members discussed two major initiatives that had been formalized at their previous
meeting in Fortaleza, Brazil, in July 2014: the creation of the New Development Bank
(NDB) and a Contingent Reserve Arrangement to compete with the IMF facility. The
development bank, headquartered in Shanghai, was expected to be operational by the
first quarter of 2016, with an initial capital base of US$50 billion to fund infrastructure
and other development projects in BRICS and other developing economies. The Con-
tingent Reserve Arrangement, a US$100 billion fund to help countries forestall short-
term liquidity pressures, was operational in 2015.
The World Bank and ADB estimate that developing countries will need trillions of
dollars in financing to develop infrastructure. The World Bank’s assumption that private
capital would flow to developing countries for this purpose has not occurred at the level
expected. The United States opposed the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB), however, on grounds that it will not meet environmental and
fiduciary standards, will lend to sectors that the United States considers undesirable,
such as investment in coal, and for other reasons. By not becoming a shareholder in the
AIIB, the United States is seen to be losing influence in setting the rules of the new bank,
and the US response is widely seen as petulant (The Economist 2015). That is one of
several reasons why the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement was being
watched with interest, but the Trump administration decided to drop support for it. In
the meantime, the World Bank established a Global Infrastructure Facility of its own.
The Development Committee Communiqué of the 2015 IMF World Bank Spring 2015
urged the Bank Group to enhance its support for sustainable infrastructure development
and financing, creating an enabling environment to mobilize private long-term finance
for commercially viable projects, and strengthening public and private partnerships,
including through the Global Infrastructure Facility (Development Committee 2015).
The United States had initially also opposed the establishment of the BRICs bank.
Informed critics wondered why it would oppose a BRICS bank, when there is AfDB,
ADB, EBRD, EIB, and IDB, which work in close cooperation with IMF and the World
Bank on the SDG agenda and its financing (Chhibber 2015). The impetus for the BRICS
bank came from the slow action on the decision reached in 2010 to change voting rights
in IMF to give more voice to developing countries.
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According to Kitano (2019, 2): “The grant equivalent system introduced by the DAC
assesses the level of concessionality of concessional loans based on discount rates differ-
entiated by income group (OECD 2019b). China’s foreign aid on a grant equivalent basis
was estimated at US$5.3 billion in 2017 and US$5.7 billion in 2018.”
The World Bank noted, “China Development Bank’s ‘full participation’ in the G-20
Africa’s debt relief effort . . . was important to make the initiative work, especially since it has
played such an important role in providing development assistance to Africa [emphasis
added]” (Brautigam 2020).
In her article, “China, the World Bank, and African Debt: A War of Words,” Deborah
Brautigam (2020) further notes:
With the important exception of Angola, however, CDB [China Development Bank] is not
a significant lender in the group of African countries that are participating in the DSSI
[Debt Service Suspension Initiative]. . . . China’s two largest overseas lenders are China
Export Import Bank (Exim Bank) and China Development Bank . . . China Exim Bank has
provided close to 75 percent of all Chinese loan commitments in the DSSI-eligible African
countries.
As a Southern country, China has had a policy of not interfering in the domestic policies of






























































Figure 7.15 Net ODA disbursements from DAC and other countries and China’s net
disbursement of foreign aid, 2001–2018 (US$bn)
Source: Adapted from Kitano (2019, 15, fig. 6).
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Chinese involvement in SSA and Latin America is summarized in Table 7.3. China largely
buys raw materials and exports manufactured goods to Africa and Latin America, but
Chinese goods have been much more a threat to the domestic industry in Latin America,
which is more industrialized, than in SSA, with the exception being South Africa, the most
industrialized country in SSA. So, the premature deindustrialization has been more a real
adverse impact on Latin America than in SSA. There has been a less favorable view of
Chinese imports among South American policymakers, some of which have led to WTO’s
disputes, and some have led toWTO decisions in favor of Latin America. It suggests that, by
and large, the international rule of law has been working.
Table 7.3 Summary of China’s major impacts on sub-Saharan Africa and on Latin America
and the Caribbean









Limited to a few garment-exporting
countries
Particularly affected are Mexico,





Mainly displacing imports from other
countries
Significant impacts on some industries
in more industrialized countries
Infrastructure Significant boost Limited up to 2015 but may increase in
future
Social impacts
Employment Some job creation by Chinese
companies but concerns exist over use
of Chinese workers
Job losses in manufacturing as a result
of Chinese competition; limited




Weak trade unions and enforcement of
labor rights by government permitting
low wages and poor conditions
Stronger trade unions and regulation
in the more industrialized countries,
providing more protection for workers
Local
communities
Little effective opposition to effects of
extractive industries and dams
Conflicts where civil society is




Accepted by all but one country Nine countries still recognize Taiwan
Type of regime No evidence that China has promoted
corruption or authoritarianism
No evidence that China has promoted
anti-US regimes
Policy space Increased resources not necessarily
used to promote development
Increased policy space for progressive






allowing firms to cause substantial
degradation
Mobilization around environmental
issues to counter worst aspects
Wind and solar
power
China playing a significant role Up to now, limited involvement apart
from in Chile
a Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement.
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India’s aid to SSA has been smaller than China’s and, in general, India has aided Africa
more on the basis of Africa’s need, although more recently India, too, has begun to look at
its domestic economic interest in aiding Africa (Agarwal and Kumar 2020).
Shared Governance Integrally Related to Legitimacy and Finance
Governance and finance of the Big Five organizations are closely related. The capital
increase of the World Bank in 2010 was accompanied by change in the voting power.
The US$86.2 billion for IBRD and US$200 million increase in capital for IFC were
accompanied by increased voting power for developing and transition countries. In IBRD
the power of those countries increased by 3.13 percentage points, bringing them to 47.19
percent; in IFC the increase in voting power was increased to 39.48 percent. This was
accompanied by an agreement to review IBRD and IFC shareholdings every five years and a
commitment to equitable voting power between developed countries and developing and
transition countries over time. WBG President Robert B. Zoellick stated, “The change in
voting-power helps reflect better the realities of a new multi-polar global economy where in
which developing countries are now key global players” (World Bank 2010).
How Is Financing Affecting the Transformation Underway
in the Other Four Institutions?
Since 2007’s Independent External Evaluation, FAO has undergone a major reorganization
and restructuring of its strategic framework after years of stagnation and decline. WFP has
been transformed from being a food aid agency to a food assistance agency, aiming to help
countries by merging short-term emergency and longer term development assistance—and
giving food assistance beneficiaries a voice, particularly with the use of cash-based transfers
(CBTs), in choosing what food they receive and how it is received. CGIAR has undergone a
major revamping since 2008 and began yet another change in its governance in 2015 and in
2019. IFAD, among other reforms, has embarked on borrowing from sovereign govern-
ments to increase its capital base.
Financing for the development of both physical and human capital are critical for
transformation and for linking small farmers to international markets. The strategies
needed to develop each tend, of course, to be quite different. Some have argued that building
human capital is more difficult than building physical infrastructure, since the latter
typically entails design of the infrastructure and large-scale contracts based on procurement
of contracting services and equipment. Yet, often issues of land acquisition, entailing
safeguards, tend to be intensively complex and often controversial in land-short countries.
Although we discuss issues in terms of financing and volumes, it is clearly insufficient.
Human capital is about developing capacities. It requires opening opportunities, mentoring,
training, and building links with other actors in the relevant networks and markets. We
discuss these issues in Chapter 9 on developing human capital for research and develop-
ment in Africa and SA. While physical capital may remain intact, human capital faces the
risk of obsolescence and needs to be upgraded continuously, or it deteriorates rapidly if not
used. Trade literature acknowledges that there is more to expanding trade than tariff and
non-tariff barriers and trade liberalization (World Bank 2015b). For example, it costs US
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$14,000 to move cargo 2km on a river in the Democratic Republic of Congo, compared to
US$1,000 to move cargo for well over 250km in the port of Kuala Lumpur. Investments
needed to improve domestic infrastructure and institutions to reduce internal costs of doing
business tend to run into trillions (Copley 2015).
New and Innovative Sources of Financing beyond Official
Development Assistance
It is clear from the preceding discussion that developing countries’ financial needs to
transform their economies are large. The sources of financing have grown and diversified
and the relative role of the World Bank has shrunk, and yet, the current sources of funding
are not sufficient to meet the needs. This was the conclusion even before the COVID-19
crisis, and now with COVID-19, financial needs have increased substantially.
The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs noted:
The need for additional and more predictable development financing has led to a search
for alternative, innovative sources. The Monterrey Consensus [2002] recognized “the
value of exploring innovative sources of finance provided that those sources do not unduly
burden developing countries,” and encouraged “exploring innovative mechanisms to
comprehensively address debt problems of developing countries, including middle-
income countries and countries with economies in transition.” (UN 2012)
The need for financing GPGs to contain climate change, cross-border pests and diseases,
financial contagion and trade rules have been repeatedly made by economists and docu-
mented throughout this book. ODA, currently the primary source of financing for GPGs at
the country level, remains very limited. With competing demands, it becomes a zero-sum
game. What is funded internationally comes at the cost of what, therefore, cannot be funded
in support of developmental or humanitarian needs. Furthermore, it forces us to ask
whether all possible sources of financing GPGs are currently being exploited. As Tobin,
Stiglitz, Sachs, Collier, and many others have argued, there are different ways of raising
additional resources while avoiding public bads and promoting public goods. Possibilities
include: (1) auctioning permits to exploit already overexploited ocean fisheries; (2) increas-
ing IMF’s Special Drawing Rights and using them to finance high priority national and
GPGs; (3) imposing airline or financial transaction taxes, as Europeans are doing by taxing
their airlines in the case of UNIT AID; (4) replacing fossil fuel subsidies with carbon taxes;
or (5) taxing international arms trade, among others. The Climate Finance Study Group
(CFSG) of G20, among others, have developed alternatives for financing climate-related
GPGs outside of ODA (CFSG 2014), but that process seems to be fraught with difficulties.
Several G20 members from developing countries have emphasized that, given the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) principles and provisions,
public finance from developed countries to developing countries should be a key issue
considered in the analysis. Other members (not identified in the report) “noted that the G20
had no legitimacy to intervene in UNFCCC discussions and thus cannot provide guidance
over commitments taken in such fora” (CFSG 2014). These alternatives for financing GPGs
have yet to attract attention in the places, such as the G20, where they might be taken
further.
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Private Sector Financing, Public–Private Partnerships,
and Cross-Border Trade
FAO is often considered a “producer” of national agricultural statistics and often blamed for
not undertaking quality assurance of these data and, therefore, for the poor quality of these
statistics (CGD 2015). Developing countries are responsible for generating food and
agriculture statistics at the national level. FAO assembles and reports the data it receives
from countries, devising comparable concepts and definitions, which allows for global
reporting and monitoring. International organizations use that information for global
monitoring, including for international discussions or agreements, or for helping to address
short- and long-term issues of food and financial crisis, food security-related resolutions,
and climate agreements. They typically provide guidelines on standards and norms, quality
assurance, timeliness, and international comparability. Their legitimacy needs to be com-
bined with the quality and accuracy of their reporting.
Data need to be collected at the national government level and used for policymaking. In
a study of early warning after the 2007–8 food crisis, Babu (2014) explored the policy-
making processes followed in developing responses to the food price crisis to draw lessons
for improving and strengthening these processes for the future. He developed a combined
framework that could be applied to food policymaking in developing countries across
countries, using empirical analysis of processes in selected countries. A key lesson is that:
“by strengthening the role of various players and actors, and empowering them by increas-
ing their capacity for research, analysis, communication, and advocacy, their capacity in
food policy-making processes can be enhanced (Babu 2014, 97). Their participation de-
pends, however, on the nature of the political institutions in the country. “A broader insight
from the review of the policy processes is that not one theory alone can fully explain the
food policy-making process” (Babu 2014, 97). Policy processes are affected by political,
socioeconomic, and cultural contexts of the countries. Babu concluded: “Understanding the
nature and magnitude of these factors will help in devising strategies that could help
development partners and policy makers to guide the development of open, transparent,
and effective policy processes that can result in better policies” (Babu 2014, 97). For
example, India not only had data and machinery in place for information gathering but
also a policymaking process, which was active (personal conversations with B. Ramaswami,
June 23, 2017). Bangladesh turned to India to learn lessons. Several African countries
including Malawi, Angola, and Mozambique not only lacked data but also the internal
processes. The gap in estimates between satellite data and on-the-ground estimates need to
be closed by bringing the best of science and technology to developing countries.
Financing to Support Global Public Goods
There is now considerably greater global consensus on: . . . the role of international public
goods in determining the well-being of the poor. . . .Whether couched in terms of cross-
border spillovers of environmental externalities or financial instability; or in terms of the
central role of basic research into tropical agriculture and tropical diseases, the recognition
was clearly abroad that public intervention is needed in these areas. The emerging
importance of this issue was instinctively grasped by most. It may well be that this
happy state of affairs is due precisely to the fact that this is a relatively new issue in the
policy arena, that once we get into the details, divisions will grow. (Kanbur 2005, 16)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
    477
The provision of GPGs requires cooperative action by all parties. Information, laws, rules,
institutions, and incentives are needed at appropriate levels to form policies and plans and
to ensure their sustainable use in pursuit of food security and nutrition. This requires
responsible stewardship of public goods management.
Future Sources of Financing
Next, we explore some recent efforts at mobilizing financing.
International Monetary Fund and World Bank Estimates:
From Billions to Trillions
The IMF–World Bank report on overall financing (Development Committee 2015) was a
major effort to identify financing needs for SDGs, although it does not include sectoral
breakdowns. It argues that public investment is important because the most substantial
development spending happens at the national level and below, in the form of public
resources. To achieve the transformative vision of the SDGs, the report contends, requires
achieving the trajectory from billions to trillions, which, each country and the global
community must support together to finance. The “From Billions to Trillions” report is
also a way to deflect from the 0.7 percent target. It “is shorthand for the realization that
achieving the SDGs will require more than money. It needs a global change of mindsets,
approaches and accountabilities to reflect and transform the new reality of a developing
world with highly varied country contexts” (Development Committee 2015, 1). The role of
IMF and the World Bank in mobilizing these trillions is seen as helping developing
countries to improve their own resource mobilization strategies. The largest potential for
further investment, argues the report, is from private sector business, finance, and invest-
ment. Kharas and McArthur (2019) have since criticized this global approach, arguing that
more disaggregated country-by-country estimates are needed, and LICs most in need of
finances receive the least.
The European Parliament Committee’s Report Seems More Realistic on
Its Assessment on Financing
The European Parliament’s Committee on Development report on “Financing for Devel-
opment Post-2015: Improving the Contribution of Private Finance” (European Parliament
2014) noted that while government spending is not sufficient, it is the largest domestic
resource in most developing countries and is growing rapidly; but in per capita terms, it is
very little. More than three billion people live in countries where government spending is
extremely low—less than purchasing power parity (PPP) US$1,000 per person each year.
The European Parliament report is also skeptical of private sector resource flows,
particularly to LICs:
Most [outflows of private financial resources] are not productive investments. . . . but
repayments on loans (over USD 500 billion in 2011), repatriated profits on foreign direct
investment (FDI) (USD 420 billion) or illicit financial flows (USD 620 billion).
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. . . FDI is the largest resource flowing to developing countries, but outflows of profits
made on FDI were equivalent to almost 90 % of new FDI in 2011.
. . . By contrast, 70 % of FDI in developing countries in 2011 went to just 10 countries, with
China alone accounting for over a quarter of total FDI. (European Parliament 2014, 4)
Hence, the European Parliament report argues that ODA is the largest flow to least
developed countries and those with the lowest levels of domestic resources. Both donor
aid and governments have been fickle in their investments in agriculture, much like the
private sector, slowing their investments in agriculture when real food prices showed a
steady decline, which encouraged complacency. Large and small aid-dependent countries
have behaved differently, but most have spent more resources on not-so-smart subsidies,
rather than on productive investments. The European Parliament report argued that aid
should be targeted at the poorest countries, where private investment flows are weak to
nonexistent, and that without public investment in education, health and infrastructure,
regulatory systems “for profit” sector will not thrive (European Parliament 2014).
Promotion of the use of public resources to leverage private finance suggests a belief that
the two are interchangeable, but, in reality, they are complementary. Similarly, the AGRA
Status Report 2016 acknowledges limited success in getting the private sector to invest more
in SSA, in the absence of public investment by the countries themselves (AGRA 2015). Bill
and Melinda Gates and Warren Buffet increasingly stress the importance of the govern-
ments scaling up their pilot efforts.
Will China Be the Main Financier of Future Global Development?
The World Bank study Capital for the Future noted that deficits in the balance of payments
in India and SSA, will be financed, not by the North, but by the newly industrialized East
Asian countries, most notably China (World Bank 2013a). China and the oil-exporting
Middle Eastern countries have already been financing investments in developed countries.
The household-level evidence they gather suggests that the poor save little, and these two
continents will need to pursue policies that will substantially increase investments in their
own countries and attract inflow from East Asia (Babu et al. 2015). By 2030, developing
countries’ share in global saving and investments will have increased from 20 percent to
50 percent, and developing countries will account for two-thirds of every dollar saved and
50 percent of the capital stock, compared to the 30 percent today (Bussolo, Lim, and
Maliszewska 2013). This emergence of developing countries in savings and investments is
a result of productivity catch-up, integration into global markets, and better macroeco-
nomic policies. COVID-19 has changed this situation as China’s economic growth declined
substantially, for the first time realizing negative growth rate in 2020, but China’s economy
has also been one of the first to recover from COVID-19-related recession.
Policy Issues Going Forward
Remittances, as we documented earlier, have amounted to about US$500 billion worth of
flows to developing countries, but have declined by 20 percent since the COVID-19
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pandemic in 2020.³⁶ Dilip Ratha, Manager of Migration and Remittances Team at the
Bank’s Development Prospects Group argued that in the context of SDGs, “Continued
efforts are required to lower the cost of sending money through official channels, although
inroads are being made. . . . The closure of bank accounts of money transfer operators
serving Somalia and other fragile countries is also worrying, . . . ‘particularly exorbitant
fees paid by low-skilled workers to recruitment agents to secure jobs overseas’ ” (World
Bank 2014c). Concerns over money laundering are keeping costs high by increasing
compliance costs for commercial banks and money transfer operators, and delaying the
entry of new players and the use of mobile technology. Thus, the World Bank and IMF are
focusing on increasing transparency, inclusion of migrants in the financial system, increased
use of core principles in financial transfers, and reducing the cost of transfers to the poor
migrants given the regulatory obstacles at the receiving end. Global deliberations on
financing the implementation of post-2015 development goals, migration, and remittances
can be leveraged to raise development financing via reducing remittance costs, lowering
recruitment costs for low-skilled migrant workers, and mobilizing diaspora savings and
diaspora philanthropic contributions. Remittances can also be used as collateral, through
future-flow securitization, to facilitate international borrowings with possibly lower costs
and longer maturities. And they can facilitate access to international capital markets by
improving sovereign ratings and debt sustainability of recipient countries. To improve
transparency in immigration policies, Bhagwati (2003) proposed a World Migration
Organization that would codify immigration policies and spread best practices. Rodrick
(2001) proposed “multilateralizing” immigration rules so that two countries participating in
a special arrangement to share workers would not generate adverse spillover effects on other
countries.
WFP and other humanitarian organizations are exploring how they might link with the
migrants’ remittances, benefiting from strong connections with families in countries need-
ing help. They can help in starting small enterprises or supporting existing enterprises with
know-how.
Recognizing the close links between migration and development, WBG is deepening its
engagement on the issue. Central to its involvement is its leading role in establishing and
advancing the KNOMAD program, which is envisaged as a hub of knowledge and policy
expertise on migration. KNOMAD’s work program is undertaken through 12 thematic
working groups: data; skilled labor; low-skilled labor; integration issues in host commu-
nities; policy and institutional coherence; security; migrant rights and social aspects of
migration; demography; remittances; diaspora resources; environmental change; and inter-
nal migration. It also covers four crosscutting themes: gender, monitoring and evaluation,
capacity-building, and public perceptions.
From Inputs to Outcomes and from Dependency
to Increased Accountability
There is considerable consensus on the principles of macroeconomic management. Con-
troversies surrounding the Washington Consensus in the era of structural adjustment have
given way to the need for better macroeconomic policies, open trade, and more receptivity
³⁶ See https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/labormarkets/brief/migration-and-remittances
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to foreign investment in developing countries. Donors generally accept the need for better
outcomes for the poor. IMF and the donors support and actively promote the use of safety
nets, particularly in SSA. The World Bank reports a sharp growth in social protection
programs throughout the developing world (IEG 2013c). The largest such programs are in
MICs, funded largely from the countries’ own resources. The growth is largest in SSA, and
most of it is funded by donors. Although attention to health and education has increased
since the HIPC initiative, agriculture has been neglected.
More generally rapid growth in large developing countries, such as China, India, and
Brazil has come to be seen by developing countries as offering a range of development
models, perhaps more than the former East Asian miracles. The growth in large countries
has increased markets for Africa’s primary commodities, raising their export earnings, and
increased and diversified the sources of aid to Africa. A departure from the dependency
syndrome and the “default” position of resistance to the traditional “northern” prescriptions
emanating from the Bretton Woods institutions, have given way to fresh thinking. An
important question is whether the increased domestic resources in SA and SSA are also
leading to better and more stable domestic policies toward their food and agricultural
sectors and to rural development, generally, for which there have not been the kind of
powerful champions as there have been for health and education.
Reflecting this new reality of a globalized multipolar world, the inclusion of SDGs for
both developing as well as developed countries is necessary in order to get better and fairer
agreements in the areas of international agricultural trade and aid, norms and standards,
climate change, international capital movements, conflict and emergencies, as well as more
broadly shared international rules, standards, and norms in which emerging countries have
a larger role.
The dramatically changed external environment means developing countries and inter-
national institutions have to manage multiple sources of information, knowledge, capital,
and competition.
OECD official financial resources need to increase significantly, unless alternative solu-
tions are embraced. Developing countries will be largely on their own, facing an increasingly
complex set of challenges. Currently, though, many countries lack the capacity to respond
so as to maximize these opportunities. They can learn from the examples of successful
developing countries.
The future role and relevance of the Big Five international institutions has been premised
on their strong legitimacy, in turn through their post-Second World War founding prin-
ciples of a liberal, globalist world order, which have determined their missions and
mandates, governance, and financing—and made the organizations themselves interna-
tional and increasingly evolving towards the provision of GPGs. Those in turn have
influenced their evolving practices and the choices each of them face going forward. With
much more autarkic, inward looking views of the world among the emerging governments
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Western Europe, the future missions and
financing defined decades ago, and modified only at the margins, is increasingly unclear.
The Big Five will still be needed and be of future relevance and value for providing policy
analytics and advice, which smaller think tanks, philanthropists, and bilateral governments
cannot do. How their key member countries come together to respond to the institution
specifically and the overall options and how they work together will determine their
individual and collective contributions.
In the chapters that follow, we explain the architecture of the Big Five international
organizations, starting with their founding principles, which have determined their
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membership, finance, models of shareholder or stakeholder governance. We examine how
these features have led to each organization’s operating principles, choice of leadership, the
standards by which they operate, their access to international finance and human capital,
and their flexibility to manage complexity in the context of the rapidity of technical change
and the emergence of developing countries.
A large majority of the poverty and food insecurity is now found in MICs (albeit lower-
middle income), with the rest in weak fragile states. The numbers of fragile states has grown
at an unexpected speed from just a decade ago, each with its own internal dynamics. In
neither stable emerging countries nor conflicted countries do donors and external actors
wield the kind of influence they once exercised and that led, for example, to the generation
of the Green Revolution.
In the next chapters, we illustrate the roles of the Big Five “traditional” international
organizations with the current global context. Dramatic changes in the global aid environ-
ment since the five organizations were established have led to several new models of
development assistance since the mid-1990s. A spate of new global and regional partner-
ships are competing with the traditional international organizations, resulting in their own
partnerships being overextended as they seek to be relevant the context of the changing
environment, to be more effective, but also to “capture” more resources as aid budgets
tighten.
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The World Bank
Uma Lele and Sambuddha Goswami
Background and Summary
In the 1960s and 1970s, a professional consensus emerged around a “package” approach to
agricultural development. The package consisted of improved seeds, fertilizers, irrigation,
research and extension, and farmers’ access to inputs, knowledge, and output markets. This
involved a combination of provision of public goods and service delivery. Because markets
did not exist for many of these services, governments were nudged to provide them. Over
time, however, trust in the ability of governments to deliver services dissipated. The World
Bank experimented with privatization, farmers’ organizations, and bottom-up participatory
approaches to each of these services, as well as “smart” subsidies. It also experimented with
rural development, going beyond agriculture.
Today’s reigning paradigms are sustainable agriculture and healthy diets. Effective ways
to address them is a challenge, and indeed, there is much debate about the meanings of the
terms sustainable agriculture and healthy diets. Moreover, differentiation among countries
is large today, as are their variations in agricultural technologies, institutional capabilities,
farm sizes, and productivities. So, other than a few exceptions, there is little consensus on
what works and how to assess their complex, multidimensional impacts. Concurrently,
there are growing environmental challenges affecting agriculture, including climate change,
depletion of water tables, and soil degradation, with few, easily scalable, universally appli-
cable solutions. In the meantime, the fourth industrial revolution is offering many possibi-
lities in the current and future developing environment, as well as disruptive technologies
and trends, such as the Internet of Things (IoT), robotics, virtual reality (VR), and artificial
intelligence (AI). They are changing the way we live and work, with huge scope for their
application but requiring massive investments. Does the Bank’s past experience offer
lessons on responding to the rapidly changing external environment, including increased
technological options?
The World Bank’s history volumes described the Bank in the mid-1990s as one of the
strongest of the multilateral banks, owned by governments but rooted in political realism.
Unlike the United Nations, the World Bank is described as a benign hegemon where all
nation states are not equal. A world’s premier multilateral with a broader agenda than the
IMF, the Bank chose to rely on the bond market for capital, with only minimum intrusion
on taxpayers for aid in the International Development Association (IDA). It was able to
bring other bilateral donors along at the least cost. It successfully transitioned from
reconstruction to development, covering all regions and most sectors (Kapur, Lewis, and
Webb 1997).
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and IDA, com-
monly and hereafter referred to as the World Bank, have together lent approximately US
$161 billion in real terms (Manufactures Unit Value [MUV] Index 2010 = 100), in 159
countries, since 1960 to 2018, to develop the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (AFF) sector,
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which we will refer to in the aggregate as agriculture. The agriculture sector share in total
lending has varied from a peak of 38.5 percent of total lending in FY1978 to a trough of
4.9 percent in FY2010, and up again to 8.5 percent in 2018, as we detail later in Figure 8.2.
The World Bank’s lending is the largest assistance to food, agriculture, and rural
development ever given by any international organization, even without including the
roles of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Increasingly, it is a small share of investments needed in
developing countries, and therefore, their catalytic and leveraging effect is of particular
importance going forward. Including IFC and MIGA with IBRD and IDA constitutes the
World Bank Group (WBG). The World Bank Group’s experience is of considerable
relevance, given the growing concern about underfunding of Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs), and particularly SDG2.¹ Many countries are already off-track in achieving
SDG2, and some, particularly small, low-income countries (LICs), mainly in sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA), are projected to remain off track in 2030 (Kharas, McArthur, and Rasmussen
2018). Additionally, food and nutrition security are increasingly seen as important, as the
world population is projected to reach 8 billion by 2030 and more than 9 billion by 2050.
Africa will exceed South Asia (SA) in total population, and Africa’s urban population will
exceed Asia’s by 2050 (UN 2016). Future production will need to be resilient to climate
change and natural resource degradation, with more balanced nutrition from a diverse diet,
which includes fruits, vegetables, meat, fish, poultry, in place of simply increased calories
from four major grains (rice, wheat, maize, and soybeans) to improve health linkages, as
outlined in previous chapters. Incorporation of environmental and nutritional concerns
makes this a multidimensional phenomenon, requiring multisectoral and multilevel
approaches. Vertically, the required approaches range from local to macroeconomic and
trade policies, and horizontally, across sectors, such as infrastructure, education, and
finance. Being a multisectoral international organization, unlike the four other organiza-
tions reviewed in this book, WBG has had a unique role in contributing to structural
transformation by promoting agricultural development in countries.² It provides multi-
sectoral assistance to education, infrastructure, and health, which is often critical to devel-
oping agriculture. WBG is the only international organization in a position to provide
multisectoral assistance with a holistic view of its clients’ economies. The paradigms of
climate-resilient agriculture and healthy food systems are relatively new.
Bank commitments are, however, a small share of overall official development assistance
(ODA) relative to the past and are an even smaller share of investments made in agriculture
by developing countries themselves, particularly considering the big, emerging developing
countries like India, the World Bank’s largest recipient of lending. Furthermore, World
Bank’s commitments are small when considered in terms of the amounts needed to achieve
sustained, faster, and equitable growth. IFC committed US$4.5 billion in support of
agribusiness, food companies, and banks in 2019, but leveraging effects of WBG on
investments by the public or private sector flows into agriculture are not known.³
¹ SDG2 is “End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.”
See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg2
² Although there are other multisectoral international organizations (IOs), most notably the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), it is not a lending organization, and it is not included in this book.
³ Notably, in 2019, 53 percent of the Bank’s agricultural investments were in directly financing climate
mitigation and adaptation measures. This is an increase of 28 percent over four years. See “World Bank: Food
and Agriculture Overview” (last updated September 23, 2019): https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/agriculture/
overview#2
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Given the growing importance of raising private finance, the experiences of IFC and
MIGA, too, are of considerable interest. This story, however, is focused primarily on the
IBRD and IDA, with a brief coverage of IFC and MIGA activities, due to the limited amount
of information on private sector activities in the public domain. The World Bank is often
seen as potentially in a strong position to scale up, leverage, or mobilize other sources of
funding to increase investments.
The lending experience contained in this chapter is reviewed, with specific focus on food
and agriculture, and with a view to the implicit or explicit theory of development that this
assistance entailed. The broad sweep and relationship of this chapter with the rest of the
book is described, to outline the ideas that drove World Bank lending and policy dialogue. It
identifies lessons the World Bank learned from its own experience, as well as those it could
have learned but did not, and the implications going forward for the development com-
munity as a whole, particularly in the areas of capacity building, human capital, and
institutions.
Assistance to India and the rest of Southeast Asia in the 1960s, and to Bangladesh,
starting in 1970, is a good example of support to LICs that have become emerging countries.
Assistance to Bangladesh, in particular, soon after its independence, seemed “humanitar-
ian” in nature at the time, with a concern in the Bank’s top management that it could hurt
the Bank’s reputation as a development bank. With the passage of time, that support
transformed the country into an emerging country. Admitting China into the Bretton
Woods system in 1980, similarly, was a decision of considerable importance, contributing to
a dramatic reduction in global poverty and to global growth (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, 1997).
Nearly 60 percent of the poverty now is in SSA. A question going forward is whether
project lending is a sufficient instrument, in view of low project performance ratings of
African projects for well over 40+ years, relative to other regions and given the challenges of
difficult agroecological conditions, environmental degradation, limited human and institu-
tional capital, and high aid dependence?
Introduction
The evidence for this chapter comes from the World Bank Group’s archives and oral
histories; evaluations of the Operations Evaluation Department/Independent Evaluation
Group (OED/IEG); the Bank’s databases and publications, including histories of the World
Bank (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997) and IDA in Retrospect (World Bank 1982a); the
World Development Reports (WDRs); the authors’ years of experience in research, opera-
tions, and evaluation in the World Bank; and conversations with former colleagues and
client country nationals who have dealt with the World Bank. Policy advice and lending is
reviewed, including the interplay of internal factors within the Bank and external factors
and shocks affecting member countries (for example, commodity prices, debt crises, and
climate disasters). The Bank’s diversified lending instruments are considered over time.
A chronology of the World Bank is included in Appendix A.
Did the Bank have an agricultural development strategy? We argue that at least initially
the strategy of an integrated agricultural development, with complementarity of seed,
fertilizer, irrigation, and market access to farmers was much clearer in Asia, particularly
in the 1960s with the start of the Green Revolution, than it was in Africa or Latin America.
The strategy vacillated over time between agricultural development and rural development.
The Bank experimented with privatization and farmers organizations, among other
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solutions. While the Bank decidedly embraced a community-driven development approach,
that strategy affected rural development more than agricultural development. Furthermore,
the Bank’s focus was on poverty reduction, and that on food security and nutrition was
spotty, changing from time to time, and impacts were not well monitored.
In view of the scope of the World Bank’s activity, described in this chapter, its content is
complementary to the content of virtually all other chapters: the broad agriculture and rural
development strategy framework needed to achieve structural transformation and the slow
progress needed to achieve it should be recalled in viewing the treatment of the World
Bank’s approach to food and agricultural policy advice and lending described in this
chapter. Chapter 3 contains an in-depth discussion of the nature of the global food crisis
during the 2007–12 period and the response of the global community to that crisis. This
chapter describes the Bank’s response to that crisis and its lessons. Chapter 4 on food
security and nutrition addresses a broad swath of issues, including changing food systems
and impacts of multidimensional poverty and gender on food security. There has been a
long history in the Bank on the merit of spending more on poorer areas (Beegle and
Christiansen 2019). Chapters 5 and 6 discuss global governance of food and agriculture,
in which the World Bank has been an important player, but again, the voting rights have
changed only marginally in the Bank’s governance, and the leadership selection process
remains unchanged. A US national heads the Bank, despite the debate that occurred on
leadership selection in 2012, when there was growing pressure from member countries,
particularly in the southern hemisphere, for selection of a candidate from an emerging
market country. This did not occur at all in the recent appointment of President Malpass in
April 2019.
The Bank’s role in total financial flows and in ODA to developing countries has been by
far the most significant, including particularly of the IDA, but has declined. Upper middle-
income countries (UMICs), including, most notably, China, are graduating faster than
occurred historically (Economist 2019), and demand from them for support for food and
agriculture has declined. The question going forward is whether the Bank will continue to
remain an important player, as it was in the past? Did it use its pivotal position to achieve
accelerated, equitable, and sustainable agricultural growth and mobilize more resources?
Chapter 7, on international and domestic financial flows to agriculture and related
sectors, shows that private flows (that is, foreign direct investment [FDI] and remittances)
now tower over public/concessional and non-concessional (for example, IBRD) official
flows. As also noted in Chapter 7, international financing of the SDGs probably fell in
nominal terms in 2018 to US$669 billion, compared to an estimate of US$748 billion in
2017, largely driven by a sharp reduction in private lending to developing country govern-
ments through banks and bond markets (Kharas 2020). In addition, there is considerable
uncertainty in the size of private and non-Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
official flows. Also, there is no formal international statistical system to record them.
Focus on Smallholder Agricultural Development
IOs, including the World Bank, have steadfastly accorded priority to the development of
smallholder agriculture for well over a half century, notwithstanding the academic debates
on the pros and cons of smallholder development in the last decade. Specifically, in Table
2.1 in Chapter 2, we outlined what transformation of agriculture needs and the frequent
political economy challenges in getting to the right mix of policies, institutions, investments,
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and human capacity at all levels, from the grassroots to subregional, national, and interna-
tional levels. Box 2.3 then outlined the stages of development at which different issues tend
to be addressed, and the rest of the chapter described how different countries have
performed in transformation.
Smallholder development is essentially a private sector activity involving millions of
small farmers to increase their productivity, improve food security, develop their capacity
to deal with the risks, and generally, increase agriculture’s resilience. Supply of public
goods are critical in the effective delivery of services to farmers, and they range widely
from transport and communication, technological packages, regulatory framework, poli-
cies, and institutions. As an institution that only lends to governments, the Bank has a
comparative advantage in the provision of public goods. For public sector investment,
regulation and implementation of essential services is critical to fostering private
investment.
The Bank has brought investment finance to agriculture and the rural space, often
accompanied by new technologies in the form of varietal improvements, seed, and fertili-
zers, agricultural finance, improved farmers’ market access, and the capacity of the public
sector to manage agricultural services, monitor progress, and learn from the experience of
planning and implementation.
Against this background, this chapter illustrates choices the Bank made to finance
specific activities in the public and private sector, such as seeds and mechanization, and
how these choices have differed across countries and over time, and the lessons they offer.
Overall, it is clear that governments have a clear role to play in policy, in the provision of
public goods, such as research and development, education and training, and the develop-
ment of human capital, generally, as well as helping to foster an investment climate that
encourages private sector investment.
The International Development Association in the
Context of Bank Instruments
WBG has four instruments at its direct disposal: IDA, IBRD, IFC, and MIGA. Founded in
1960, IDA has been the workhorse for support of agriculture and rural development in LICs
(World Bank 1982a) (see Appendix C on the Role of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency).
Since the articles of agreement of the IBRD were drawn up at the United Nations
Monetary and Financial Conference, at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944,
the founders, recognizing the scale of resources IBRD needed, had to demonstrate institu-
tional creditworthiness to private lenders in the financial community in New York, and to
persuade them that the Bank’s borrowers were pursuing sound policies. Projects were seen
as instruments. These were discrete, finite investments, which were distinct from sector
policies, designed by high-quality professional experts of “good professional pedigree,” to
reassure bond holders that both project lending and good policies were being pursued
(Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997, Vol. 1, 9). The pressure to fund “bankable projects” on
harder terms with IBRD funding would have made many countries and investment projects
ineligible for financing. The issue of fungibility was recognized early on by economists, such
as Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and Albert Hirschman, associated with the World Bank, but,
perhaps for reasons of simplicity and optics, those issues remained subordinate in selling
the Bank to investors (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997).
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No country quotas on staffing were necessary. Search for excellence meant technical
expertise could be recruited from around the world. Economics homogenized recruitment
from the best universities (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997).
Establishment of the IDA in 1960, as concessional window became necessary, as we
explain later, for the Bank to able to provide soft loans of long duration. IDA turned the
Bank into a premier development organization and leader, from a staid infrastructure Bank,
a role it could not have claimed without IDA. IDA remains the largest and most important
innovation for poorest countries, one which has had a large role in LICs and will continue to
in SSA going forward. Examples of India, China, and Bangladesh show that, with appro-
priate support, countries previously considered “basket cases” can become thriving emer-
ging economies, but it is long-term endeavor, requiring long-term presence that only the
Bank has been able to provide on a consistent basis. It does not mean however that the
Bank’s strategy has been consistent over the years (World Bank 1982a; IDA 2020).
Autonomy diminished with IDA in the 1980s, with more demands on the Bank from
IDA donors, particularly the United States, and to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom. The
key issue that Jiajun Xu (2017) argued in her book, Beyond US Hegemony in International
Development: The Contest for Influence—written from the Chinese perspective—is that the
policymaking power, which was in the hands of Executive Directors shifted to the IDA
Deputies, an informal group, when the group effectively argued that net income from IBRD
should be allocated to IDA. It overtook the powers of the Executive Board (since they were
the superiors of the Executive Directors) and with whom the Bank Management had to
negotiate policy and management issues. For China, this became problematic, not so much
because of substantive policy issues, of which there were a few, but because China was left
out of a process where the major donors had their say, and ultimately, the US Treasury and
Congress had the casting votes. China argued that the net income of the Bank could have
been used to reduce interests to middle-income countries (MICs), and similarly, later when
the income was used in support of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.
China first reacted by becoming an IDA donor, but then decided (after much interminis-
terial debate in Beijing), that they should set up multilateral development banks (MDBs) of
their own where they had a central position—the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB). The early presidents of the Bank and the
US-led (and other) executive directors—that is, the Bank management—preserved its
operational/policy-setting independence. Much later, IDA deputies moved into the space
carved out by the early presidents, and the IDA replenishment process became the key
strategic policy process in the Bank. Just what influence the IDA deputies have had on the
agriculture/rural development agenda, if any, is not clear, but it is recognized that IDA
deputies imposed more conditionalities on IDA borrowers over time and those condition-
alities typically applied to IBRD borrowers.
Also, with the push for structural adjustment, the Bank could no longer buy itself a “seat
at the policy table” in the old-fashioned way of borrower persuasion (Kapur, Lewis, and
Webb 1997, vol. 1, 217).
Since IDA’s establishment, 44 low-income IDA-recipient countries have “graduated” (are
no longer eligible for IDA’s concessional resources).⁴ Nine fell back due to various reasons,
such as external shocks, poor macroeconomic management, or conflict, but Egypt,
Indonesia, and the Philippines have climbed back.
⁴ For more information, see “IDA Graduates,” http://ida.worldbank.org/about/ida-graduates
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Although the terms of IDA credit are soft, over the years, the Bank has emphasized that
IDA projects are generally identical in scope and rigor to IBRD projects. Because IDA
countries are less developed, a larger proportion of IDA lending has financed agriculture
and rural development. IDA credits have also tended to finance a larger share of total
project costs than IBRD loans, with the share higher in the poorest countries. The remain-
ing share of total IDA project costs (56 percent), according to IDA in Retrospect (World
Bank 1982a), has been financed partly by the recipients and by other donors. In general,
IDA credits have financed a larger share of local costs than IBRD projects. This is, in part,
because IDA projects typically involve more local costs, as well as finance a higher share of
total project costs. IDA has also contributed to addressing balance of payments deficits to
investments; physical capital, most notably, in the form of irrigation and rural roads; and
technical assistance.
In 2019, 75 countries (59 IDA-only and 16 blend countries) remained IDA-eligible, with
populations of 1.6 billion (Box 8.1). Since half of the global poverty and hunger (under-
nutrition) is in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), those that have graduated from
IDA eligibility still need investments in meeting SDG2. Kanbur and Sumner (2012) have
argued that international assistance should go to poor people, rather than only to poor
countries. This means the eligibility closely tied to per capita income should be replaced by
other criteria. This would mean continued concessional aid to India, a LMIC, and to China,
a UMIC—the two countries with the largest incidence of global poverty, despite its rapid
decline, particularly in China (Lele, Agarwal, and Goswami 2018). Their argument was
based, first and foremost, on the spillover effects of benefits for the poor to others. Donors
may also gain knowledge, which they can transfer to other countries, and finally, they also
raised moral and ethical issues of exclusion of populations, using income criteria—issues
Box 8.1 World Bank Lending
Operational lending categories: Economies are divided into IDA, IBRD, and “blend”
countries, based on the operational policies of the World Bank. IDA countries are those
with low per capita incomes that lack the financial ability to borrow from IBRD. Blend
countries are eligible for IDA loans but are also eligible for IBRD loans, because they are
financially creditworthy.
Eligibility for IDA support depends on a country’s relative poverty, defined as gross
national income (GNI) per capita below an established threshold and updated annually
(US$1,145 in fiscal year 2019). IDA also supports some small island economies, which
are above the operational cutoff but lack the creditworthiness needed to borrow from
IBRD. Some countries, such as Nigeria and Pakistan, are IDA-eligible based on per capita
income levels and are also creditworthy for some IBRD borrowing. They are referred to
as “blend” countries. Seventy-five countries (59 IDA-only and 16 blend countries) are
eligible to receive IDA resources in 2019.
IDA countries are those that lack the financial ability to borrow from IBRD. IDA
credits are deeply concessional—interest-free loans and grants for programs aimed at
boosting economic growth and improving living conditions. IBRD loans are non-
concessional.
Source: http://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries
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which Angus Deaton (2018) has also raised in making a case for including poverty
alleviation in developed countries, as we discuss elsewhere in the book. Kanbur and
Sumner (2012) predicted that where the poor live will shape the debate. Under IDA18,
some aid has gone to MICs receiving large numbers of refugees, such as Jordan and
Lebanon, but overall this argument has been hard to sell, either to the donor shareholders
or to developing countries (IDA 2018). Some of the Bank’s shareholders, most notably the
United States, have objected to continuing lending to China, and other conservatives, such
as Meltzer, who argued against lending to MICs, as we have discussed in Chapter 6 (Meltzer
2000). Starting with similar initial conditions to India around 1960, China has reduced
poverty and hunger rapidly, more so than India, although it has received much less ODA,
including from IDA. China’s domestic policy reforms were more robust than India’s, and
reflected more of the Bank’s analysis of its economy in the 1980s, until its agricultural
subsidies increased to a level larger than all that of the Organisation of Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), as shown in Chapter 3. Their performance offers
important lessons to others. Their emerging country status is already leading to more
South–South cooperation. We explore these arguments later in this chapter, drawing
lessons for SDG2 financing and support going forward.
Another vexing issue is about fragile or conflict-affected states. About half the world’s
poor live in a fragile, conflict, and violence (FCV) group. In 2019, out of 36 “fragile
situations,” 29 countries are IDA-only, three are blend countries, and one territory and
three countries are IBRD-only, according to World Centre on Conflict, Security and
Development (CCSD).⁵ Fragility, conflict, and violence threaten efforts to end extreme
poverty, in both LICs and MICs, the share of the extreme poor who live in conflict-affected
situations is expected to rise by around half by 2030. Conflicts also drive 80 percent of all
humanitarian needs and reduce gross domestic product (GDP) growth by 2 percentage points
per year, on average (World Bank 2020b). Yet, on average, a country that experienced 20 years
of violence also experienced twice the volatility in aid of a country that did not experience
violence. Volatility of revenues has considerable costs for all governments, but particularly so
in fragile situations, in which it may derail reform efforts and disrupt institution-building
(World Bank 2011c). According to the IEG, the Bank’s comparative advantage is in long-term
development, but as of 2011, at least, its operational response (to conflict-affected countries)
was constrained by its limited menu of instrument choices. Moreover, institutional and staff
incentives to engage in conflict situations and to take risks lagged behind the spirit of its
strategic approach, as expressed in various Bank documents, including the 2011 WDR:
Conflict, Security, and Development (World Bank 2011c; IEG 2016c).
The Bank acknowledges:
Violent conflict has spiked dramatically since 2010, and the fragility landscape is becom-
ing more complex. Climate change, rising inequality, demographic change, new technol-
ogies, illicit financial flows and other global trends may also create fragility risks. The
World Bank Group is focused on addressing FCV, emphasizing prevention and acting
early . . . [and] remaining engaged during active conflict, and in countries going through
transitions to peace. Stronger collaboration with humanitarian, development, peace and
security partners is critical for delivery in challenging environments, such as in the Bank’s
response to famine. (World Bank 2020b)
⁵ See the “Harmonized List of Fragile Situations FY 19”: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/892921532529
834051/FCSList-FY19-Final.pdf
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Since 1991, the same 10 conflicts have accounted for the majority of the forcibly displaced
persons, who have been consistently hosted by about the same 15 countries. The host
countries are largely developing countries (WBG 2017b). How is today’s World Bank
addressing these issues? The policy has evolved since the tenure Robert McNamara,
president of the World Bank from 1968 to 1981, based on lessons of experience, but upon
reviewing extensive evidence, we conclude it has not evolved enough to fit future needs.
Early Strong Foundations
The Bank’s experience in food and agriculture illustrates how its approaches have reflected
personalities of its presidents, but have also been path dependent, responding to the changing
external environment and internal pressures in the Bank’s client countries, shaping Bank
policy analysis and advice. We start with an overview of the role of the Bank’s presidents.
World Bank Presidents and McNamara’s Defining Influence
After the Bretton Woods conference was held in July 1944, and signature of the Bank’s
articles of agreement were inked, the first two presidents, Eugene Meyer (1946) and John
McCloy (1946–9) had much to do with the Bank’s initial selection and organization of
personnel and operational procedures to establish the World Bank’s strong foundations.
The very short duration of President Meyer seemed curious to us. Archives suggested that it
was due to the US pressure exerted on him to expand the Bank more rapidly than Meyer felt
the Bank was ready for, and despite his early departure, his desire to maintain the Bank
president’s independence from the board left a strong legacy of separation of the board from
the executive, which has been only occasionally violated.⁶ In The World Bank Since Bretton
Woods, the authors described Meyer’s frustration and resignation:
Meyer was confronted by a strong board of directors, led by the young, well informed,
energetic, and ambitious U.S. executive director. Much of Meyer’s time and energy was
spent in battling with the board for leadership of the institution. . . . The principal frustra-
tion of the Bank’s first president was his feeling of having responsibility without authority,
of having to battle the U.S.-led executive directors for stewardship of the institution. His
explanation [for his abrupt resignation] was that he had accepted the presidency initially
on the understanding that he would remain only until the Bank had been
organized . . .Weariness, unwillingness to engage in bureaucratic infighting, and dissatis-
faction with his anomalous position as president appear to be more plausible explanations.
(Mason and Asher 1973)
Eugene Black (1949–62) was a much-admired CEO, and George Woods (1962–8) had
extensive knowledge of SA. Each paved the way for increased support to macroeconomic
⁶ In oral history, Richard Demuth, a highly respected veteran of the World Bank, explained that after careful
search for a top-notch President, Meyer resigned after six months, because of excessive pressure from the US
executive director, unbeknownst to the State Department, to expand World Bank operations too quickly.
President McCloy negotiated hard terms of noninterference by the board in Bank management, setting a high
standard for subsequent presidents about independence of management from the board (Demuth 1961).
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policy reforms and food and agriculture policy, going beyond looking at individual projects,
and this was well before the era of structural adjustment, a contribution that is often over-
looked, with the relatively greater credit given to McNamara for his dynamic leadership.⁷
The period of the 1960s offers insights into understanding the interactions between
external shocks, macroeconomic balances, and effectiveness of sector and project perfor-
mance. Those lessons also stress the importance of learning from history, which were not
always absorbed, as the later structural adjustment experience illustrates.
Eugene Black played a pivotal role in the Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960, between
India and Pakistan for sharing waters from five northern rivers.⁸ Water scarcity remains a
source of acute concern today with climate change, growing demand, and inefficient use.
The agreement was signed after 10 years of negotiations (Kraske 1996). The Bank’s
signature achievement is that the agreement still stands today, despite the fact that
Indians were reluctant to have the Bank involved, and despite three wars and recurrent
tensions between the two countries.
During President Black’s tenure, the Bank acquired AAA bond rating. This enabled the
Bank to borrow capital in bond markets at competitive interest rates. President Black also
played a pivotal role in the establishment of IDA, as a multi-donor concessional window
and as an integral part of the World Bank. India, the largest developing country, with its
strong commitment to development, was an important client, although India viewed the
Bank with suspicion, as a creature of Western powers (Kraske 1996). IDA arose out of the
need to pledge resources to India’s growing foreign exchange gaps annually, through a
consortium of donors, following India’s 1958 foreign exchange crisis and its growing capital
needs. In retrospect, the strategic success to host IDA, a multi-donor fund, expanded the
Bank’s role in the development community in a way that is qualitatively different than,
when in the 1990s, the Bank began to agree to host an assortment of multi-donor trust
funds. The latter contributed to the fragmentation of aid and fundamentally changed the aid
architecture (OED 2005b).⁹ Other achievements of Black’s tenure include the establishment
of IFC in 1956 to promote private enterprise. Today, it lends as much to agribusiness (about
US$4.5 billion annually) as do the World Bank and IDA combined. Under Eugene Black,
the Economic Development Institute (EDI) was established in 1956, and later restructured
as the World Bank Institute. EDI became the training ground for World Bank staff and
⁷ In a World Bank archives’ oral history interview of Stanley Please, on August 26, 1986, he noted:
George Woods’ contribution there has been grossly underrated, particularly against that of [Robert]
McNamara, who is known to have been greatly interested in development policy. But when you look
back, some of the major departures in the Bank were made under George Woods, including building
up the economic staff, moving into agriculture, into education, into industry as areas in which the
Bank had to move in a big way, the appointment of Irving Friedman as the Economic Adviser to the
President. Woods’ involvement in the Indian exercise is also of interest in this regard. After the period
of the 1950s when all the Western world thought India did everything right and could do nothing
wrong in terms of development policy, suddenly in the 1960s everybody felt that it was all going sour,
population was growing too rapidly, production was going down. Woods clearly recognized that he
had a major development problem on his hands in the next to the largest country in the world and he
set up the Bell Mission to try to provide guidance from the Western world to the Indians, and to the
Bank itself. . . . [I]n terms of how he saw the Bank evolving in its responsibilities, . . . he has to be given
credit for major steps forward in the 1960s, steps forward which McNamara was then able to build
upon. (Please 1986, 11)
⁸ See World Bank (2018a): “Fact Sheet: The Indus Waters Treaty 1960 and the Role of the World Bank.”
⁹ Donor pressure to create several different, independent trust funds, in the form of global programs, separated
them from the Bank’s primary mission, and the fragmented financing arrangement diluted the World Bank’s
influence, creating today’s aid scenario. Supporters of trust funds have argued that additional aid would not have
been mobilized had the Bank not played the role of a trustee.
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developing country policymakers in the techniques of project appraisal, which were the
bread and butter of the World Bank’s lending business. Indonesia became the 56th member
of the Bank, at the request of the government of the Netherlands to support the newly
independent country needing help. The Bank wrote an important economic report and lent
to a number of sectors, including agriculture. Black had been personally involved in
Indonesia before becoming World Bank president.
In its early years, under Black, the Bank was also increasingly invited to be part of
international financial diplomacy; for example, at the request of Governments of the United
Kingdom and Egypt, the Bank worked on the Suez Canal Compensation Agreement in
1958, related to the expropriation of property. This long track record helped the Bank to be
a credible international actor in matters related to international finance and negotiations.
George Woods followed Black. During his tenure, the Bank expanded further, as
18 African countries joined the World Bank in 1963, and although Indonesia withdrew
its membership in 1965, it rejoined the Bank in 1967, and in 1968, became one of the largest
recipients of IDA credits and World Bank loans.
President Wood initiated the Bell Mission to India in 1964 in response to India’s second
balance of payments crisis. The balance of payments crisis in 1958 had already led to the
establishment of IDA. India was the largest client. Having invested in its development,
stakes were as high for India’s success to the Bank, as they were to India, as discussed later.
More generally, Woods also initiated a concerted effort to identify bankable projects and
entered into an agreement with FAO to establish the cooperative program with the World
Bank, FAO–CP in 1964 to help augment the Bank’s capacity to respond to the growing
client demand. FAO–CP is different than FAO’s technical cooperation program, known as
TCP, for which support comes from FAO’s regular program budget and stood at 14 percent
of the budget share in recent years. FAO–CP serves the needs of a number of IOs and
support for it comes from IOs (see Chapter 9). The FAO–CP decision was not popular
among Bank staff and managers, who felt that the Bank was giving away some of its
prerogative to identify and appraise projects. The Bank retained the responsibility to
appraise projects, but turned to FAO for project identification and preparation, and
increasingly, to perform several other functions, including project supervision and project
completion reports. It was a way to address issues of growing demand for Bank services
from client countries, and FAO–CP has continued to play that role since. Bank attention to
mount the Green Revolution was well underway in the mid-1960s, during George Wood’s
presidency, when Robert McNamara became the next president in 1968.
The substantive issues related to the Green Revolution and its lessons are discussed later.
With the force of his personality, a strong intellect, adherence to modern management
principles, and dedication to poverty alleviation, McNamara played a defining role in shaping
the World Bank, as William Clark, the Bank’s Director of External Relations, described in a
1981 article in Foreign Affairs (Clark 1981). McNamara’s influences on the World Bank have
been many and varied: for example, putting poverty eradication at the center stage of the
Bank’s mission, asserting the link of small farm agriculture to poverty reduction, and
operationally, making use of IDA resources strategically to support a big push on the
generation of the Green Revolution in India and Asia. He brought in new members such as
Bangladesh (despite US opposition), expanded Bank activities in Indonesia and Egypt, and
played a key role in the entry of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into the World Bank in
1980, paving the way for China’s opening up of its economy and extraordinary growth.
Smallholder approaches, however, were underway well before McNamara under
President George Woods. Robert Ayres, in his 1985 book, Banking on the Poor: The
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World Bank and World Poverty, noted that, in reality, McNamara’s attack on poverty was
more an illusion than a reality. Ayres put it well: “While the Bank under McNamara was no
longer a bastion of developmental traditionalism, it was a long way from adopting the more
radical implications of attempting to mount an attack on poverty. The concern that the
Bank might desert the poor must depart from a realization that under McNamara it never
totally embraced them” (Ayres 1985, 235). McNamara was also early to note intersectoral
linkages and complexity—for example, in the relationship between health and development,
and nutrition and development—supporting WHO’s onchocerciasis program (commonly
known as “river blindness”).¹⁰McNamara opened up lending to rural development in SSA,
while greatly expanding the Bank’s assistance to population, health, and nutrition.
Methodologically, he popularized targeting aid to the lowest 40 percent of the income
distribution, although operationally, targeting by income groups has not been easy, as we
discuss later.
McNamara promoted research on growth and income distribution, and measurement of
income and multidimensional poverty. He opened a resident mission in Jakarta, headed by
Bernard Bell, to help Indonesia recover from the tattered Sukarno economy. Bell’s tenure
was more influential in Indonesia than in India, showing the importance of personal
chemistry and country specificity in achieving results (Bell 1990), but it could also be that
while the Bell mission was short-term, he was head of Indonesia’s resident mission for
several years, thus permitting the establishment of more enduring relations.
McNamara championed IDA replenishments and general capital increases for IBRD,
even when they were not popular. By actively supporting the Pearson Commission led by
the former Prime Minister of Canada, he drummed up support for aid in the broader
development community (Pearson 1969). Similarly, he supported the Brandt Commission,
the independent commission on international development issues, which released its report
in 1980 (World Bank 1980). McNamara established the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), and more generally, turned the World
Bank from a relatively obscure infrastructure bank into a central player and an intellectual
leader in the international development community.
The Bank shifted abruptly from project lending (excessive in relation to country capacity) in
the 1970s, particularly in Africa, to structural adjustment lending (SAL) in the 1980s during
President Alden “Tom” Clausen’s regime (1981–6). McNamara advocated this shift from
project lending to a macroeconomic perspective in his farewell speech. Although he had
been a banker of one of the largest banks, Clausen was not suited temperamentally to lead
the Bank at a complex time in the Bank’s history. With the benefit of hindsight, the Bank had
overlooked lessons of the 1950s and 1960s of interactions between India’s balance of payments
crisis inmanaging project lending and need to support it with program lending while operating
in Africa in the 1970s. At McNamara’s behest, the Bank had expanded lending to state
enterprises in Africa until commodity prices and poor project performance led to a debt crisis.
Adjustment lending followed the Berg Report, but the Bank was also slow to address the debt
crisis, which was crippling investments in agriculture and other social sectors (health and
education)—the beginning of the “lost decade” (World Bank 1981).
Barber Conable (1986–91), a former Republican US congressman, is, ironically, the one
known for the greening of the Bank, establishing the environment department and increas-
ing lending to environmental projects. Road building, which caused deforestation in the
¹⁰ See https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/onchocerciasis
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Amazon in Brazil, and other environmental impacts, such as the irrigation dams like the
one on the Narmada River in India, began to be viewed through the lens of environmental
and social safeguards. The Bank proactively participated in the Conference on Environment
and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and hosted the Global Environmental Facility
(GEF), which was born out of the conference.
Lewis Preston (1991–5), a brilliant banker, made the Bank client-oriented, helping to
shift the Bank’s approach from a supply-side to a demand-oriented approach—which,
perhaps, also explains why there is not more lending to agriculture, as client demand for
this sector is weak. He mounted the most ambitious review of Bank operations under
veteran Vice President Willi Wapenhans, as the World Bank celebrated its 50th anniversary
at the end of the 1980s, the “lost development decade,” in the wake of structural adjustment
and the debt crisis (World Bank 1992).
James Wolfensohn (1995–2005) brought renewed focus on poverty reduction and
actively promoted the much needed, bottom-up, inclusive community and social develop-
ment. He changed the Bank’s culture by expanding partnerships with civil society and the
private sector. The HIPC program was only approved in 1996, under Wolfensohn, even
though the debt problem was evident in the 1980s (World Bank 2018b).¹¹ President
Wolfensohn rightly considered it one of his crowning achievements.
Coming to the Bank on the heels of a failed presidency for President Paul Wolfowitz,
Robert Zoellick (2007–12) restored confidence in the Bank. He recapitalized the Bank,
introduced an open data policy—an important gift to the development community, includ-
ing the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) household surveys, now being
extended under the 50  2030 initiative (discussed in Chapter 9 on FAO)—while ramping
up the Bank’s crisis response during the 2007–8 food and financial crises, making the Bank
more agile and able to provide a speedier response in times of crisis. He also commissioned
the Zedillo report (Linn 2009; Zedillo 2009), discussed in Chapter 6.
Jim Yong Kim’s tenure (2012–19) brought record replenishments of IDA and with
recapitalization of the Bank, made sizable investment in climate funds, and promoted a
human capital index. Jim Yong Kim, a Korean-American physician and anthropologist,
served as the 12th President of the World Bank from 2012 to 2019. He resigned prematurely
February 1, 2019. During his first term, the Bank established the twin goals to end extreme
poverty by 2030, and to boost shared prosperity, focusing on the bottom 40 percent of the
population in developing countries. During his term, the Bank achieved record IDA
replenishments, while also launching several innovative financial instruments, including
facilities to address infrastructure needs, prevent pandemics, and help the millions of people
forcibly displaced from their homes by climate shocks, conflict, and violence. The Bank also
announced a human capital index.
President David Malpass took over as World Bank president in April 2019, from
Kristalina Georgieva, CEO of the World Bank since 2017 and the first woman Acting
President from February to April 2019; Georgieva became Managing Director of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2019 (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997; WBG 2014a).
¹¹ In oral history, Anne Krueger described the debt issue thusly: “the Bank was clearly in there for the
developing countries and was concerned about the long-term growth impacts and development impacts, but to
a first approximation the first part of the problem was simply getting immediate financing, and for that it was
either the U.S. or the G7 or the IMF, or some combination of those. The Bank would then contribute to it,
especially, with structural adjustment loans” (Krueger 2010, 7).
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Malpass’s appointment was the first in recent history when there were no serious
contenders outside the United States for the position. Nomination of a candidate with a
deep background in Treasury was pleasant surprise, although Malpass, like Jim Kim, had
been opposed to the World Bank. President Malpass outlined a number of challenges in his
address to the 2019 meeting of the Board of Governors, including, particularly, a proposed
increased lending to climate change issues (World Bank 2019b). He announced, in January
2020, the division of the Africa region consisting of 54 countries into two regions “Eastern &
Southern Africa” and “Western & Central Africa,” effective July 1, 2020, as well as greater
decentralization of Bank staff to field offices to increase country focus (Edwards 2019). Since
2000, Africa was subdivided at the World Bank into the “Middle East and North” and
another region called “Africa,” which included all of SSA. President Jim Kym’s leadership
changed the Bank from country to global practices, a step which has now been reversed
(Kumar 2020). The global pandemic and the need for country action means that in a
globalized world, the Bank cannot choose between country and global emphasis. It needs to
balance both.
Reorganizations are costly in terms of staff disruption, and in reality, their role in
achieving cost savings or development effectiveness is unclear. Furthermore, decentrali-
zation of the technical expertise from headquarters to the field increases staff costs and
raises questions of development effectiveness when the numbers of technical staff have
dwindled and their global knowledge is critical in country assistance. Later, we provide
evidence that operational budgets per dollar lent have declined, meaning efficiency per
dollar lent has increased, but whether it has increased development effectiveness using
outcome indicators is unclear. A larger share of economic and sector work now comes
from donor trust funds. And reorganizations have been like moving boxes around on an
organizational chart.
A big and positive difference in the World Bank (and IMF), compared to the 1980s and
1990s, is that in March 2020, the Bank already had emergency operations underway in
60 countries, and its Board was considering the first 25 projects, valued at nearly US$2 billion
under a US$14 billion fast-track facility to help fund immediate health care needs.
Country Performance
This long review makes clear that throughout the decades, a country’s own development
strategies, if well-defined and country-owned, have made a difference in outcomes in
terms of decline in poverty and hunger, agricultural productivity, and participation of
smallholders in the process, as has the quality of the Bank’s (and donors’) input.
Furthermore, country performance can vary from one decade to the next. This is
illustrated by South Korea and Thailand (both have graduated from the World Bank),
as well as China. India’s economic growth has increased steadily from one decade to the
next, although less spectacularly than China’s, to which the World Bank has contributed
fewer resources. Ethiopia has shown more variable performance over the decades, given
its changing political situation, but has shown promise in recent years. Commodity
exporters in Latin America and SSA have experienced much greater external shocks,
but they have managed those shocks less well, for example, than Indonesia, except during
the 1997 crisis. Agricultural productivity growth has been critical in economic transfor-
mation in each of these countries, albeit those achievements have entailed some early
wins, as in the case of India, followed by prolonged but slow growth until a dramatic
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turnaround in policy, in India in 1991, and more recently, also in Ethiopia. Absent
domestic political will and action, even the best and the brightest in development
economics, many of whom are employed by the Bank, have brought little in the way of
increased development effectiveness. We counted 60 such economists who contributed to
analysis of agriculture over the years. Attribution of impacts to any single event, project,
policy, or piece of analysis, however, is always a challenge. Given this context, what
contributions can an institution like the World Bank make going forward to the realiza-
tion of the SDG2 goals, based on its long experience? We believe, first and foremost, in
building human capital and institutional capacity of the countries to address their
complex challenges, but interpretation of history has also varied.
Montague Yudelman, the first Director of Rural Development appointed by McNamara,
noted that in the period prior to McNamara’s presidency, smallholder agriculture was not
seen as a problem area worthy of focus (but as we have indicated earlier in this chapter, the
reality does not bear out this thinking, at least not in Asia) (Yudelman 1986). The Green
Revolution was well underway in the 1960s, with active World Bank support. To continue
with the Yudelman narrative, the Bank provided foreign exchange loans for building large-
scale infrastructure, such as dams and railways, based on the Two Gap Model (the gap
between investment and savings and imports and exports, which Hollis Chenery, the Bank’s
chief economist had articulated; see Chenery and Strout [1966]). Few people coming from
developed countries, outside of those with colonial experience, knew much about tropical
agriculture, and McNamara wanted to change the Bank’s colonial image. As a member of
the Ford Foundation board of directors, McNamara had seen modern technology brought
to small farmers in Asia. He was fascinated by the idea of shaping theWorld Bank to deliver
technology to small farmers to address the growing food shortages, brought on by recurring
droughts, balance of payments difficulties, depletion of the US grain stocks with sales to
Russia, and the first oil shock in 1972. Gathering development experts from around the
world, including Mahbub ul-Haq from Pakistan, Paul Streeten from Britain, Chenery from
Harvard University, and Yudelman from South Africa, McNamara embarked on the pursuit
of a poverty eradication mission and reshaping the Bank to deliver on his program of action.
Throughout this period, the tension between opting for growth advocated by Chenery and
distribution advocated by Mahbub ul-Haq was clear (ul-Haq 1982). Ul-Haq contributed to
McNamara’s Nairobi speech, given on September 24, 1973, not long after the first global
energy crisis began:
Absolute poverty is a condition of life so degraded by disease, illiteracy, malnutrition, and
squalor as to deny its victims basic human necessities. It is a condition of life suffered . . . by
hundreds of millions of the citizens of the developing countries . . . And are not we who
tolerate such poverty, when it is within our power to reduce the number afflicted by it,
failing to fulfill the fundamental obligations accepted by civilized men since the beginning
of time?
Experience demonstrates that in the short run there is only a limited transfer of benefits
from the modern to the traditional sector. Disparities in income will simply widen unless
action is taken which will directly benefit the poorest. . . . [T]herefore, there is no viable
alternative to increasing the productivity of small-scale agriculture if any significant
advance is to be made in solving the problems of absolute poverty in the rural
areas. . . .Without rapid progress in smallholder agriculture throughout the developing
world, there is little hope either of achieving long-term stable economic growth or of
significantly reducing the levels of absolute poverty. (McNamara 1973)
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The Nairobi speech was a watershed in the history of the Bank. It shaped the Bank’s vision
and a mission of a world without poverty, making the Bank into an institution that
champions poverty eradication, proactively pursuing development interventions to achieve
impacts. The speech made a strong case for development assistance to reduce poverty,
admonishing donors, including McNamara’s own country, for not raising aid to 0.7 percent
of GDP, when the aid environment was not propitious.
Ahead of its time, the Nairobi speech was rich in content; it emphasized increasing
agricultural productivity of small farmers, and espoused views on the interconnectedness of
population, health, and nutrition among each other and with agriculture and rural devel-
opment. To achieve productivity growth among small farmers, it emphasized secure land
tenure, rural finance, and infrastructure—envisioning that, if productivity of poor people
and agriculture increased by 5 percent for 15 years, developing countries’ economies would
be transformed. Box 8.2 describes some of the solutions the Bank deployed.
Food Prices and Incentives to Invest in Food and Agriculture
We noted in previous chapters that donors and national governments often respond to
crises, albeit with a lag. Typically, the crisis is reflected in international food prices (although
recently, more direct measures of food insecurity have become available, such as FAO’s
Food Insecurity Experience Scale/Voices of the Hungry, discussed in Chapter 4). World
Bank responded to the crises strongly from the 1960s until the mid-1980s with a rise in
lending, followed by a sharp decline in lending from the mid-1980s, as shown in Figure 8.1.
This response has been less intense over time since then. Thus, the lagged value of the Grain
Price Index to IBRD lending to agriculture in a Granger causality test is only 0.04, which
confirms the direction of causality over the 59-year period, covering 1960 to 2018 and the
weakening strength of response. Food prices reached a peak in 1974, and the strongest
World Bank response followed, reaching the first lending peak in 1975 and soaring to higher
levels until 1986, before showing a precipitous decline in lending—in turn, a result of
declining food prices and disincentive to investment. Food prices reached the first bottom in
1996, and with it, a bottom in lending. Agricultural prices showed the first slight rise in
1996, followed by a lending increase that reached a peak in 1998, before prices declined once
again but then rose from 2007–8 to 2012, then again declining and remaining low until
2019. The lending response, as well as the overall role of the World Bank in global
agricultural investments, has been less important as the share of assistance over time, as
we show in this chapter.
Public and donor investments respond, often after farmers have responded to price rises
and markets have calmed down. They need to provide a steady rate of investments in public
goods, such as research and education, information, communications, and infrastructure,
regardless of prices.
The Start of Rural Development
Yudelman produced the first official policy paper on rural development (World Bank
1975b). He also delivered a series of “new-style” rural development projects. In an account
for the oral history project, Yudelman described it as a US$10 billion experiment
(Yudelman 1986). He noted the enormous pressure he felt to lend for agriculture and
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Box 8.2 McNamara’s Bank Reorganized to Deliver Solutions in
Agriculture and Rural Development
Although developing countries in Africa had asked for support for agriculture and rural
development, Bank’s presidents, prior to McNamara, had not responded to the call,
perhaps because Black and Woods had been addressing major issues in Asia. This
changed under McNamara. Based on advice from McKinsey, the Bank was reorganized.
An all-powerful director, James Evans, who had been effectively vested with the Bank’s
entire technical brain trust prior to the reorganization, was replaced by Montague
Yudelman, a South African economist dedicated to rural development. Regional vice-
presidencies were established, and a bulk of the technical staff was moved out of the
centralized Project Department to the newly formed regional vice-presidencies. This
organizational shift affected the focus of Bank activities, making it more attuned to the
demands of developing countries. The Bank succeeded beyond expectations, in South
and Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, by contributing to the Green Revolution and
establishing CGIAR in support of it. By all internal accounts of senior Bank managers
during this time, reported in oral histories,a the Bank, however, had limited success in its
efforts in Africa.
India contains the largest number of the world’s poor and hungry and remains a
continued battleground for SDG2. Although India received the largest amount of IDA
lending in support of poverty and hunger, the lending was small in per capita terms or
as share of domestic investment.b Politically, India was supported by Western coun-
tries as a bulwark against Communist China. It has remained a strong democracy, and
its economic growth has been higher in every successive decade than the preceding
one, but growth has not been accompanied by equity, and agricultural performance
has been mixed since the heyday of the Green Revolution, with more complex
challenges of groundwater exploitation and climate change in achieving sustainable
intensification. We explore the reasons and the limits of the Bank’s role in the sections
that follow.
Agricultural growth has picked up in Africa in the new millennium, mostly from area
expansion, but with slowest productivity growth among continents, and little or no
growth in per capita income, as shown in Chapter 2 on transformation. We explore the
reasons why, including their implications for future World Bank assistance.
Notes:
a See WBG (2019), the WBG Archives Oral History Program at https://oralhistory.worldbank.org, and
particularly, the transcripts of interviews with Stanley Please (Please 1986); Willi Wapenhans (Wapenhans
1993); and Montague Yudelman (Yudelman 1986).
b External aid constituted slightly less than one-third (28–25 percent of total investment outlays during
the third five-year plan [1961–2 to 1965–6]). By 1984–5, during the sixth plan, external aid had already
declined to 7.7 percent. The Bank ranked third in grant-in-aid to India in 2017. The top ranked donors
were the United Kingdom, followed by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(GFATM). The Bank, and specifically, IDA, ranked low for grants-in-aid, once India graduated from IDA
in 2017.
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rural development, given McNamara’s personal interest in agriculture (see World Bank
[1988b] for a review of World Bank experience with rural development from 1965 to 1986).
The Bank increased commitments; recruited a pool of technical staff; and put agriculture,
population, and nutrition at the center stage of human development, while also establishing




































































IBRD–IDA lending to AFF sector spike
Food Price Index (real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index 2010 = 100)
Fats and Oils Price Index (real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index 2010 = 100)
Grains Price Index (real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index 2010 = 100)
Other Food Price Index (real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index 2010 = 100)
IBRD–IDA total annual lending to Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing sector (real = nominal/MUV,
MUV Index 2010 = 100) (base year 2010 = 100)
Figure 8.1 World Bank Food Price Index (real 2010 US dollars, MUV Index 2010 = 100) and
IBRD–IDA total annual lending to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector (MUV Index
2010 = 100, base year 2010 = 100), FY1960–FY2018
Source: Based on data from https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets and http://data.
worldbank.org/data-catalog/projects-portfolio
¹² The review, “Learning from World Bank History” noted: “There has been no well-articulated vision about
what, operationally, agriculture can and should be accountable for regarding nutrition, and how such action is
integral to agriculture’s goals. This is strongly related to an absence of targets for success and accountability that
make sense for agriculture” (WBG 2014a, xii). Further:
Meerman (1997) reported that only 6 out of 50 Agriculture Sector Adjustment Loans (AGSECALs)
addressed food security issues (Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar [1986], Mauritania, Mexico [1992],
Morocco). . . . [T]hree other AGSECALs (Burkina Faso, Mexico [1988], and Somalia) also dealt with
issues of food security as loosely defined by OED as ‘the degree to which an individual or group has
adequate nutrition at all times.’ Therefore, we consider that out of 50 AGSECALs between 1979 and
1995, at least nine AGSECAL addressed food security in some way, and some also addressed nutrition
explicitly. (WBG 2014a, 20)
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dimension by recruiting its first rural sociologist. Since then, the number of sociologists at
the Bank has increased, following Wolfensohn’s push for bottom-up, community-driven
development in the mid-1990s. The “new-style” integrated rural development projects,
operating side-by-side with operations in regions of Latin America, Asia, and SSA, where
regional vice presidencies continued to expand conventional lending to agriculture and
rural development. This included transmigration projects in Indonesia and agricultural
credit projects in Brazil. Many of them were of questionable quality and quantity, approved
under the guideline from top management that at least 20 percent of the lending should go to
agriculture and rural development. As we showed in Chapter 4, nutrition was in ascendancy
in lending in the 1970s, but also subsequently experienced a spectacular fall, before rising
again after 2007. Support to population also declined, overtaken by support to health. The
PHN department was renamed Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) in 1997.
Although Bank lending recognized the multisectoral nature of poverty reduction and
interventions needed to achieve it, Yudelman acknowledged in an oral history interview that
the concept of rural development remained elusive well into the 1990s (Yudelman 1991).
There was also considerable skepticism among the frontline operational staff about the
merits of rapidly expanding lending and reporting data on all aspects of agriculture and
rural development, which McNamara demanded. This included the number of people
reached by Bank projects, increase in crop yields, and number of beneficiaries from new
water sources, among others. McNamara set a demanding tone for numbers to show
impacts, but often data did not exist. The demand for evidence of benefits first manifested
itself in a new push for social rates of return in place of the traditional economic rates of
return, and much later, in a big surge in impact analysis through randomized trials. The
ubiquitous nature of cell phones, the speed of remote sensing, the data revolution, AI, and
speed of broadband through 5G, and more are together bringing down the cost of data
collection and analysis. An important question going forward is whether more data are
improving our understanding of the development process.
As the Bank announced a policy toward rural development, a study, The Design of Rural
Development: Lessons from Africa (Lele 1975), was commissioned by the Africa region of the
Economics Research department. The impetus for the study came in response to a request
made by Tanzania’s Finance Minister Cleopa Msuya, at the Annual Meetings of the World
Bank in 1972, that the Bank should expand lending to African agriculture. After reviewing
13 donor-funded projects in depth in seven African countries, Lele concluded that, except
for a few well-conceived export crop schemes (such as smallholder tea and coffee projects in
Kenya), integrated rural development projects, as practiced by donors at the time in Africa,
had limited impacts and even bigger questions about their sustainability. They were too
costly and too complex in relation to the countries’ capacities to plan and implement them.
The implementation targets were too ambitious, and the projects’ sustainability was in
question because of their fiscal, institutional, and human capital requirements. The study
recommended a sequential approach to project design and implementation. Its message
was: identify the most critical constraints, establish priorities for interventions via active
local participation, and build capacity of indigenous institutions to deliver services that
people prioritized before expanding the project scope horizontally to other sectors or before
Nevertheless, during the 23 years (1972–95) of Alan Berg’s tenure (the World Bank’s former Senior Nutrition
Advisor), the size of nutrition operations generated by the Bank (freestanding nutrition projects and nutrition
components of health, education, agriculture, rural development, and social protection projects) totaled US$2.1
billion, significantly more than the spending of all other donors combined (WBG 2014a).
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scaling up vertically. The Bank publication of Design of Rural Development, with
McNamara’s foreword, became a bestseller on US and European campuses as a teaching
resource. It also reached African policymakers widely, giving its author a few months of
renown, but the study had little impact internally on the Bank’s thinking or lending. Local
participation did emerge as a popular tool in the World Bank in the 1990s, widely known as
social funds projects, community-based development (CBD), and community-driven devel-
opment (CDD), terms developed by the World Bank under President Wolfensohn’s
promotion of a global compact. According to the Operations Evaluation Department
(OED), now called the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), the concepts were being
applied to at least nine different types of sectors/interventions (OED 2005b). The rural
development sectors—roads, water, health, education, energy—received much attention on
a large scale, but agriculture received little.
McNamara’s Nairobi speech generated so much intellectual and bureaucratic energy that it
led to very rapid growth in both IBRD and IDA commitments to agriculture and “integrated
rural development” in the 1970s and 1980s (Figure 8.2). With IBRD lending in MICs and
regions (Latin America and the Caribbean [LAC], Middle East and North Africa [MENA],
and East Asia) and IDA lending in SA and SSA, Bank assistance was soon followed by an
increased share of the entire ODA going to agriculture during the decade of 1973–84. The 1973
Annual Meetings resulted in a pledge by the WBG of US$22 billion for nearly 1,000 projects
over the next five years to target the problems of the rural poor in developing countries.
The Bank’s research department, led by Hollis Chenery, the World Bank’s chief econo-
mist, initiated an ambitious research program on growth and income distribution, meas-
urement of poverty levels, and the causes of changes in them, many of which have been
mainstreamed now. McNamara was assiduous about programming and budgeting to
ensure that staff increases were accompanied by increased numbers of projects, which
assured real resource transfers. Figure 8.3 shows the long record of demonstrating the
relationship between administrative budget and number of operations to measure efficiency
of Bank operations. McNamara also established the Bank’s Operations Evaluation
Department, now the IEG.
Agriculture’s share in total lending increased from 3.9 percent (lowest) in 1964 to a peak
of 38.5 percent (highest) in 1978, before declining significantly (Figure 8.2). After reaching
second and third peaks of lending in 1981 and 1986, respectively, and after a decade of
disappointing performance, both the share of Bank lending going to agriculture and the
share of donor aid to agriculture declined precipitously (Figure 8.2). The Bank led in the
decline of donor aid to agriculture. The share of aid to agriculture did not recover again
until around 2005, but as we will show, IDA lending began to show green shoots in Africa in
2000 and rose sharply after 2008, as it did similarly in SA. Yet, overall Bank/IDA lending
never achieved the shares in total lending that it had reached in the 1970s and 1980s, and as
shown in Figures 8.5 and 8.6, IBRD lending to agriculture showed a precipitous decline,
whereas IDA has remained in business in agriculture.
IBRD–IDA total annual commitments to the AFF sector increased, from a low of US
$0.21 billion in 1964 to a peak of US$6.3 billion in 1986, before declining significantly
(Figure 8.2). By 2003, lending to agriculture sector had reached its lowest level. Attention
had moved to other related themes. IBRD–IDA annual commitment to the AFF sector was
above US$4 billion in 2018, for the first time since 1988.
Overall, the IBRD and IDA together lent US$1,077 billion in nominal terms and US$1,337
billion in real terms (MUV Index 2010 = 100) between 1960 and 2018, of which nearly US
$114 billion in nominal terms and US$161 billion in real terms (MUV Index 2010 = 100)
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went to the AFF sector in 159 countries located in six regions (East Asia and Pacific [EAP],
Europe and Central Asia [ECA], LAC, Africa, MENA, and SA).
SA ranked at the top, with shares of about 24 percent, and with 20 percent to EAP, 19
percent to LAC, 10 percent to ECA, and 8 percent to MENA, but with huge variations, of
course, between peak and trough periods across regions (Figure 8.4). The lending to the
agricultural sector was only 12 percent of the overall lending by IBRD and IDA together for
the whole period. The Bank (IBRD + IDA) annual commitments to the AFF sector since
1960 to 2018, by region, is shown in Figure 8.5.
The shares of IBRD and IDA were 56 percent and 44 percent, respectively, in total
commitments to AFF sector for the entire period (1960–2018) for all six regions, where the
share of IDA increased significantly from 40 percent (initial period 1960–80) to 56 percent
(2000–18), and the share was 38 percent for the period 1980–2000, which was lowest among
all periods. From Figures 8.6 and 8.7, it is clear that, since 2000, IDA’s role to the agricultural





















































































































IBRD–IDA total annual commitments to Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing sector
Share of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (% of IBRD–IDA total annual commitments to all sectors)
Share of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (% of total ODA commitments to all sectors)
Figure 8.2 World Bank (IBRD + IDA) total annual commitments to Agriculture, Forestry and
Fishing sector (US$bn, real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index 2010 = 100) and agriculture share in
total aid down: Share of ODA and World Bank (IBRD + IDA) commitments to Agriculture,
Forestry and Fishing as a percentage of total commitments to all sectors, 1960–2018
Note: ODA data is available up to 2017.
Source: Based on data from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-bank-projects-operations and
https://stats.oecd.org/
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Figure 8.4 Share of IBRD–IDA total commitments to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
sector by region, FY1960–FY2018 (total = US$161bn, real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index
2010 = 100)















Expenses (constant FY19 dollars) No. of new operations
Figure 8.3 World Bank (IBRD/IDA) number of operations and administrative expenses,
FY1946–FY2019 (constant FY2019 US dollars)
Note: For FY18 and FY19 the budget is applied for expenses. FY19 operations are notionally indicated
at the FY18 level.
Source: World Bank (2019c). Data provided by Bill Katzenstein on May 31.
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Africa East Asia and Pacific Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and Caribbean Middle East and North Africa South Asia
Figure 8.5 IBRD–IDA total annual commitments to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
sector by region, FY1960–FY2018 (US$bn, real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index 2010 = 100)




























































































































IDA Annual commitment to Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing sector
IDA commitment to Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing sector (% share of all sector)
Figure 8.6 IDA annual commitment to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector (US$bn)
and AFF sector share as a percentage of total commitment to all sectors, FY1960–FY2018 (real =
nominal/MUV, MUV Index 2010 = 100)
Source: Based on data from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-bank-projects-operations
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SA and India, in particular, received the largest share of IDA lending to the AFF sector
for the whole period 1960–2018—45 percent of total commitments. India is and has long
been the recipient of the largest share of World Bank loans and credits. IDA also dominated
in Africa, with an average share of 32 percent of total commitments to AFF for the period
1960–2018, whereas IBRD lending went mostly to LAC (33 percent), followed by EAP (24
percent), ECA (16 percent), MENA (11 percent), SA (9 percent), and Africa (7 percent)
(Figures 8.8 and 8.9).
As the overall ODA increased, World Bank (IBRD + IDA) lending remained almost
constant in real terms during the years 1983 to 2008, except for the brief period during the
1997 East Asian financial crisis, when lending to Indonesia increased. Then, in 2009–10,
once again, the financial crisis resulted in a substantial growth in lending and in the number
of investment operations (Figure 8.10). Since 2013–14, World Bank (IBRD + IDA) lending
trend has been increasing. Figure 8.10 also shows a big decline in WBG lending, relative to
ODA over time and to the extent that the Bank has more to contribute in terms of
development policy and institutions, it should try to get its share up in ODA. ODA is
also smaller relative to the overall financial flows to developing countries, which have grown





























































































































IBRD Annual commitment to Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing sector
IBRD commitment to Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing sector (% share of all sector)
Figure 8.7 IBRD annual commitment to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector (US$bn)
and AFF sector share as a percentage of total commitment to all sectors, FY1960–FY2018 (real =
nominal/MUV, MUV Index 2010 = 100)
Source: Based on data from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-bank-projects-operations
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financial flows (that is, the sum of gross private capital flows, ODA, and remittances to the
region) have not only grown rapidly since 1990, from US$20 billion in 1990 to above US
$120 billion in 2012, but their composition has changed significantly. Most of this increase
in external flows is due the increase in private capital flows and the growth of remittances,
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Figure 8.8 Share of IDA annual commitment to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector by
region, FY1960–FY2018 (%, total = US$74.4bn, MUV Index 2010 = 100)
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Figure 8.9 Share of IBRD annual commitment to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector
by region, FY1960–FY2018 (%, total = US$94.9bn, MUV Index 2010 = 100)
Source: Based on data from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-bank-projects-operations
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At a more micro level, in this chapter, we discuss the role of the World Bank illustratively
in fostering seed companies, IFC’s activity in agriculture, and foreign purchases of agricul-
tural land in Africa. In infrastructure, too, FDI is many times larger than ODA and has been
growing rapidly since 1990.
Asia Was the Place of Action, Drama, and Results
Agricultural strategies raise important, “stage appropriate” roles of markets and states, and
strategic investments in technology, infrastructure, institutions, and human capital—issues
which have been faced in lending to SSA. In Asia and, particularly, in India, by force of
circumstances—the Bank strategy in the 1960s emerged from India’s second balance of
payment crisis, which prompted the unpopular Bell Mission to India in 1964. India’s poor
agricultural performance, food shortages, and increased food aid dependence combined
with the poor macroeconomic performance during the Third Plan were leading concerns in
the World Bank about India’s slowing macroeconomic and agricultural performance.
Between 1962 and 1972, 40 percent of India’s aid flows were in the form of food aid. The
US administration was concerned about declining US food stocks and the United States’
inability to continue sending food aid on a large scale, straining India’s port capacity.





























































































































IBRD–IDA total annual lending (US$bn, real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index 2010 = 100)
Total ODA (US$bn, real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index 2010 = 100)
Figure 8.10 ODA and IBRD–IDA total annual commitments to all sectors, FY1960–FY2018
(US$bn, real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index 2010 = 100)
Note: ODA data are available up to 2017.
Source: Based on data from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-bank-projects-operations and
https://stats.oecd.org/
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turned out to be deeply unpopular in India.¹³ However, the Bell mission’s agricultural sector
strategy, headed by Sir John Crawford, was most impactful. It had been, with input from
W.David Hopper,Wolf Ladjinsky, and Louis Goreux, a model builder. The Bell Report noted:
Accelerated growth of agricultural output calls for policies substantially different from
those which prevailed during most of the Third Plan period. Strong and stable price
incentives to producers must be provided and sustained; much larger and genuinely
adequate supplies of the major physical inputs must be supplied. These include most
importantly fertilizers, irrigation water, improved seed and plant protection materials.
Industrial production and allocations of scarce domestically produced and imported
materials must be geared to provide these even if this should require alteration in the
pattern of industrial investment and foreign exchange allocation. Farm credit must be
made available in adequate amounts and to all classes of cultivators. We emphasize these
as the major factors which are likely to affect output in the immediate future. Proper
balance in policy must, however, give concurrent attention to better organized and
directed research, to reorganization and strengthening of extension work and of admin-
istration, to better gearing of irrigation planning and operation to agricultural production
requirements, to enforcement of security of tenure and fair rents, and to the speeding of
consolidation of fragmented holdings. (World Bank 1965a, 22–3)
The lasting value of this diagnosis of India, made in the 1960s, can be seen in a more recent
African context: for example, on the decision of Ethiopia to adopt seed and fertilizer
distribution, as interrelated for at least three reasons and with spectacular success in
transforming agriculture (Rashid et al. 2013; Bachewe et al. 2018). First, average yield
increases tend to be higher when the inputs are adopted simultaneously than when adopted
separately, due to complementarity effects (Feder 1982). Second, the combined use of two or
more inputs can be risk-reducing, since the synergistic use leads to better outcomes. Third,
agricultural input supply strategies in the last decade have encouraged African farmers to
adopt chemical fertilizers and improved seeds as a package, at times bundled with input
credit, making adoption of these two inputs an inherently simultaneous decision or one
made between sets of possible technology bundles.
For the same reason, the Bank sector strategy in India in the 1960s injected a technology-
driven package approach to the languishing Intensive Agricultural Development Program
(Herdt 2012). Its focus was on modern crop varieties and complementary external inputs of
seed, fertilizer, irrigation, credit, and assured minimum prices. The mission made a strong
case for more aid to India, and it was backed by wide-ranging interventions in the entire
agriculture sector, involving public sector delivery systems, promoted by the World Bank
¹³ Woods knew India intimately, admired its development effort, and recognized the need for the Bank to
exercise leadership by undertaking sound analysis of India’s economy at a time when India, the Bank’s largest
borrower, was facing difficulties. In 1962, India had lost a border war with China, and due to crop failures, was
importing massive amounts of food aid. The United States, the principal source of food aid, was running out of
food surpluses. India’s criticism of the Vietnam War was not well received by President Johnson, then deeply
escalating the United States’ role in the war. Prime Minister Nehru passed away in 1964. India was facing an acute
balance of payments crisis and the demand for a major devaluation (Lele and Agarwal 1991). India needed help.
The Bell Mission, sent by Woods to comprehensively review India’s economy, was interpreted by Indian policy-
makers as undue interference in its sovereignty at a time when India was vulnerable and sensitive to criticism, after
having been treated as a country that could do no wrong. Having invested a great deal of the World Bank and
donor funds in India, Woods considered it the Bank’s responsibility to enhance India’s performance through
policy advice, to be able to make a case for continued high levels of lending.
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and backed by the US government, with the personal involvement of US President Lyndon
Johnson and scientists from US foundations. Copying the US agricultural strategy, includ-
ing support prices that generated food surpluses and land grant universities, these actions
were followed by a significant and predictable infusion of World Bank financing in support
of agriculture for nearly a decade, while McNamara was Bank president. India was the
largest recipient of IDA and of lending for fertilizer imports, seed production, and irriga-
tion. Internally, India was better governed prior to the declaration of emergency by Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975 to 1977. Most importantly, despite opposition to the
strategy by Indian intellectuals (for example, T. N. Srinivasan [1991]), the strategy was
owned by the influential policymakers, the secretary of agriculture, and the scientists from
the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), who were in key positions in the
government and who ensured speedy implementation. Norman Borlaug actively supported
India’s powerful political commitment to achieve food security, by first contributing 18,000
tons of hybrid seed from Mexico, until India had developed its own seed production and
distribution system. The adoption of the strategy was driven by a national sovereignty
imperative, influenced by what is referred to, even today, as the then “ship-to-mouth”
existence in India, when President Johnson personally threatened to hold back shipments of
food aid, week by week, if India made a critical statement on the Vietnam War (Lele and
Goldsmith 1989; Lele and Bumb 1994).
Whether India could have pulled off the Green Revolution without public sector seed
companies remains debated.¹⁴ The Crawford team stressed that without the “all-hands-on-
deck” policy of the government, which the Crawford team promoted, the Green Revolution
would not have occurred (Raj Paroda, former Director General, ICAR, personal commu-
nication, August 15, 2019).
Now, despite these and subsequent achievements, such as that of genetically modified
(GM) cotton turning India into the second largest producer of cotton in the world, the
Indian seed sector faces enormous challenges of productivity gap, low replacement rates
under quality seeds of high-yielding varieties (HYVs)/hybrids, lack of effective public–
private partnership, poor access to genetic resources, declining R&D investments in plant
breeding, and above all, the uncertain policy environment for scaling innovations such as
GM technology. Paroda notes that these need to be addressed on a priority basis (Raj
Paroda, personal communication, August 15, 2019). Indian public policy is clearly critical to
¹⁴ Byerlee and Pray, in personal exchanges on August 13, 2019, suggested that India had an active private
sector, but the Bell Mission Report, Annex 3 (World Bank 1965b, paras. 53–4) indicates Rockefeller Foundation
scientists helped develop India’s joint government–private sector-controlled Seed Corporation, under the Seed
Act, to create a modern seed industry to produce foundation seed, which would go to the private seed producers.
The 4th Five Year Plan had a target of 274 million acres under improved seed by 1971. Assuming seed
replacement by farmers every five years, it would require 1.3 million acres under improved seed production
(Derek Byerlee and Carl Pray, personal communication, August 13, 2019).
There was considerable interest in foreign seed companies, according to Paroda: “In the sixties, there was hardly
a private seed industry. Thanks to the World Bank, under National Seed Project Phase 1, 2 and 3, a system of seed
production under public domain was established and required human resources created through SAUs [state
agricultural universities] in the seventies and eighties. The private sector came into it in a big way only in nineties
and after” (Raj Paroda, former Director General, ICAR, personal communication, August 15, 2019). Chauhan et
al. (2016, 578), in their paper on the seed industry in India, also stressed the need for a “strong and vibrant seed
production system” for India’s food security. Consistent decline through the years has reduced seed supply. The
authors suggest that timely availability of breeder seed is possible if the farmers place orders three years in advance
to ICAR and SAUs, allowing time for breeder seed to be converted to foundation and certified seed. The authors
conclude that in addition to increasing demand for quality seed among farmers, “policy support from government
such as tax exemption, credit on soft terms, duty free import of equipment and integrated approach towards seed
security through nationwide seed science research are the growth drivers for a vibrant seed sector [with] potential
to raise India from 6th to 3rd position in global seed trade” (Chauhan et al. 2016, 578).
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addressing these long overdue policy reforms, but it has not made much headway. Policy
uncertainty discourages investment.
Borlaug tried an approach, similar to that used in India, through the Sasakawa Africa
Association (SAA) in the 1980s, but there was no appetite among donors to create a policy
framework with a strong role for the public sector until the private sector could be
developed, a strategy that the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) has
followed. The tolerance of the public sector role, however, has increased, perhaps, in the
post-2000 period, as illustrated by continued donor support for Ethiopia, whose perfor-
mance has improved significantly with a strong role for the public sector in the delivery of
inputs, and one that the government has been slow to give up. Recent analytical findings
suggest that more competition between the public and private sector is now warranted to
reduce fiscal burden (Rashid et al. 2013). Thus, the dilemma remains: whether to scale up
rapidly, using public sector’s broad reach, albeit recognizing that it will build vested interests
and reforms will be difficult to achieve, or to build a private sector delivery system, which
will admittedly be slower, particularly if farmer demand does not increase with the lack of
access of the farming community to inputs.
The Bank invested heavily in irrigation and drainage—the largest investment in irrigation
in the world and once again, India was the largest beneficiary of this investment (see
Figures 8.11 and 8.12). In retrospect, the World Bank’s irrigation portfolio does not look as
good as it did at the time of the Green Revolution for reasons that we will discuss later in the
chapter.
US agricultural scientists, with the Rockefeller Foundation in India, encouraged the





































Figure 8.11 Share of IBRD–IDA total commitments to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
sector by subsector, FY1960–FY2018 (%, total = US$161bn, real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index
2010 = 100)
Source: Based on data from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-bank-projects-operations
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seed supply was critical for the generation of the Green Revolution (Lele and Goldsmith
1989). The World Bank financed and Rockefeller scientists helped with the Seed Law, seed
standards, regulations, and human resource development of the public sector seed corpora-
tions. TheWorld Bank’s financing of seed companies enabled delivery of quality seed on the
scale needed during the Green Revolution period, spawning a thriving seed industry.
Between 1965 and 1985, private seed, pesticide, and agricultural machinery industries
grew, stimulated mainly by public sector research and development. Pray and Nagarajan
(2014) documented that, since the end of the 1980s, a combination of general economic
liberalization and changes in the structure of Indian agriculture could explain the growth of
the private sector Indian input industry, including public sector research by ICAR and
CGIAR centers; increase in FDI of input industries; the demand pull from the growth of
high-value agricultural exports; improved intellectual property rights; consolidation of seed,
pesticides, and mechanical industries, with the larger size being associated with increased
research; and exports of pesticides, machinery, and seed, as well as output. Some of the
largest seed companies in India are private sector companies. Spielman et al. (2014) noted
that, without restrictive public policies toward the pricing of rice and wheat and an
interstate movement of seed, growth of the private sector input industry would be even
larger. An important take-home message from the work of Pray and Fuglie (2015) is that
both international and domestic public sector research, in all types of input industries—





























































































































IBRD–IDA total annual lending to irrigation and drainage
Share of IBRD–IDA total annual lending to irrigation and drainage in total Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fishing sector lending (%)
Figure 8.12 IBRD–IDA total annual commitments to irrigation and drainage and percentage
share in total lending to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector, FY1960–FY2018 (US$bn,
real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index 2010 = 100)
Source: Based on data from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-bank-projects-operations
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development, but now is the time for a sharper distinction to be made in the role of the
public sector in the provision of public goods, such as agricultural research, while engaging
in service delivery, as an infant industry, and then turning it over to the private sector once
developed, leaving service delivery then to the private sector. The fertilizer industry has not
seen such reform, and public sector research is faltering in many countries, as shown
elsewhere in this book, because fiscal resources are being frittered away in formal or
informal subsidies to input delivery.
In a study of 10 African governments, Jayne and Rashid (2013, 547) showed that
collectively, the 10 African governments “spent roughly US$1 billion annually on input
subsidy programs (ISPs), amounting to 28.6% of their public expenditures on agriculture,”
and using microlevel evidence since the mid-2000s, they showed:
The costs of the programs generally outweigh their benefits. Findings from other devel-
oping areas with a higher proportion of crop area under irrigation and with lower fertilizer
prices—factors that should provide higher returns to fertilizer subsidies than in Africa—
indicate that at least a partial reallocation of expenditures from fertilizer subsidies to R&D
and infrastructure would provide higher returns to agricultural growth and poverty
reduction. . . . [They noted, however, that because input subsidy programs] enable govern-
ments to demonstrate tangible support to constituents, they are likely to remain on the
African landscape for the foreseeable future. (Jayne and Rashid 2013, 547)
Among the most important efforts needed to minimize the adverse effects of subsidies are
“efforts to reduce the crowding out of commercial fertilizer distribution systems and
programs to improve soil fertility to enable farmers to use fertilizer more efficiently. The
challenges associated with achieving these gains are likely to be formidable” (Jayne and
Rashid, 2013, 547). In short, there is huge scope for growth of the input industry and value
chains (World Bank 2020d) in the private sector going forward. Countries, however, have
been less willing or able to shake off vested interests rapidly.
As a result of and despite a range of multinational and national private seed companies
operating in India (Pray and Nagarajan 2012), an estimated 70 percent of the seed supply in
recent years has come from the informal sector, including farmers’ own seed (Gulati,
Ferroni, and Zhou 2018).
What are the generalizable lessons from this evidence?
Value chains have been going through a revolution on a global scale. Despite much
literature on the supermarket revolution, their transformative role in increasing smallholder
agricultural productivity in developing countries is not clear. Yet, countries that have
limited value chains in their domestic food and agricultural production cannot be expected
to break through in developing global value chains (GVCs) (see Figure 4.8). According to
the 2020WDR: Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains: “A global value
chain breaks up the production process across countries. Firms specialize in a specific task
and do not produce the whole product” (World Bank 2020d). GVCs are more efficient than
manufacturers who produce whole products, and they create employment, increase income,
and contribute to the quality of production. As a result, GVCs are associated with structural
transformation in developing countries, drawing “people out of less productive activities
and into more productive manufacturing jobs” and service activities (World Bank 2020d,
78). “Firms in GVCs are unusual in another respect: across a wide range of countries, they
tend to employ more women than non-GVC firms. They contribute therefore to the
broader development benefits of higher female employment” (World Bank 2020d, 3).
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GVCs are not growing, however, at the same speed everywhere, as the Indian example of
the lagging seed sector, previously discussed, shows. Nearly 60 percent of the final price paid
by consumers in rice markets in Bangladesh and India is in off-farm value (Reardon et al.
2013). As urban demand is increasing for higher quality and more diversified food products,
whether for rice in Bangladesh, dairy in Kenya or injera (flat bread) in Ethiopia, for
example, with it the demand for quality produce, storage, transport, handling, processing,
and packaging is increasing, as well as demand for labor and capital off-farm. This growth
calls for more investment of capital: for example, to blend fertilizers in a more fine-tuned
way to meet farmer demand in Ethiopia.
Through five Bank-supported operations from 1974 to 1995, milk production quadrupled
in India between 1974 and 2006, while per capita milk availability more than doubled over the
same period, in part due to the Operation Flood programs implemented by the National
Dairy Development Board (NDDB) (World Bank 2011a). “To date, over 3.7 million milk
producers have benefited from overall NDP [National Dairy Plan-1] interventions in breed
improvement, animal nutrition, and bulk milk collection” (World Bank 2019a, 2).
The Bank has also supported NDDB’s 15-year, US$3.5 billion National Dairy Plan. The
first phase of 2012–19 entailed a total investment of US$290 million across 18 participating
states (responsible for nearly 95 percent of India’s milk production) for breed improvement,
feed optimization, nontraditional fodder production, and farmer mobilization through
dairy cooperative societies and dairy producer companies (World Bank 2019a).¹⁵
The World Bank can substantially expand its investments in value chains, increasing off-
farm employment for millions of rural and urban households.
Policy lending was in ascendancy in the 1980s, with policy distortions, such as overvalued
exchange rates and high implicit and explicit taxation of agricultural exports (Krueger,
Schiff, and Valdés 1988, 1991); the large role of government in agricultural input and output
markets; prices that deviated considerably from the free market; and subsidies on fertilizer,
credit, and other inputs. The distortions have declined in SSA, and there has been a return
to project/investment lending. Yet, we know more about how investment lending has
performed in specific terms than about policy-based lending. Impacts are known only by
looking at indicators—SDG outcomes and productivity growth-related indicators—to know
how the Bank may have contributed to them.
As we discussed in earlier chapters, agricultural reforms were relatively weak, even in the
face of macroeconomic reforms in Africa, starting in the 1980s, and in India, starting in the
1990s. Policy frameworks remain weak to date in many countries. In terms of thematic
issues, food security was a clear concern in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, leading to
substantial Bank lending. As Asia achieved a measure of national self-sufficiency, a sense
¹⁵ According to the Implementation Status & Results Report for the World Bank’s National Dairy Support
Project:
The Ration Balancing Program (RBP) . . . is reducing both feed cost and methane emissions by about
12% while increasing net daily income per animal by nearly 25 Rs. RBP coverage now reaches 2.8
million milch animals owned by two million farmers across 33,000 villages. . . . Some 43,000 villages
have been newly organized or strengthened for dairy under NDP-I, enrolling an additional 925,000
milk producers. Dairy Cooperative Societies have been strengthened by equipping them with capital
items such as Bulk Milk Chilling Units (BMCUs), Automated Milk Collection Units or Data Processor
Milk Collection Units. Such automation of the milk procurement process has substantially increased
transactional transparency and confidence, as dairy producers are able to view both weight and
fat content of their milk. Overall, more milk is being procured as a result of this technological
intervention. (World Bank 2019a)
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of complacency developed, particularly as food and agricultural prices remained low,
challenging returns to investments in agriculture in the 1980s and 1990s.
Concerns about issues of access to and utilization of food or the sustainability of natural
resources were relatively weak. It has taken a long time to begin addressing issues of
agricultural diversification. Commitment to food security was reflected largely in self-
standing nutrition projects and nutrition components, with shifting emphasis on nutrition
throughout the years, as shown in Chapter 4. The Bank’s objective in support of agriculture
was as a means of poverty reduction, with a focus on productivity growth. The pendulum
swung from time to time between agriculture and rural development, and more recently to
rural–urban linkages (the latter entailing multisectorality and complexity). When demand
grew for simplicity of projects, agricultural lending focused on productivity increase.
Demand for simplicity, in turn, was a reaction against project complexity, which integrated
rural development and multisectoral nutrition projects entailed. Demand was implicitly also
seeking clarity of objectives, which productivity growth entailed. On the other hand, rural
development had come into ascendancy when complexity and multisectorality of the
development process was recognized as inevitable. In practice, achieving multisectorality
has been difficult. It is a lesson for today’s SDG discourse, which, once again, extols the
virtues of multisectorality and multidisciplinary approaches.
Certain themes have risen and then fallen in popularity in Bank lending: agricultural
credit, integrated rural development, T&V extension (a training-and-visit agricultural
extension approach). These changes are most obviously noted in the changes in lending
codes used to maintain lending data, with certain codes having disappeared and others
emerged, suggesting that changing thoughts on development (or fashions, depending on
one’s point of view) played a role in the Bank’s lending, more than a vision of a strategy for
agricultural development.¹⁶ Furthermore, it takes time to see results on the ground, and
even in the face of evidence and after billions of dollars of commitments, sometimes there is
reluctance to acknowledge failures: for example, with agricultural credit (von Pischke 1992);
integrated rural development (World Bank 1988b); and T&V extension (Gautam and
Anderson 1999; Gautam 2000). A later study by three respected analysts confirmed these
same concerns on a much larger scale (Anderson, Feder, and Ganguly 2006). Extension and
research, as a share of lending, peaked at the end of the 1980s Figure 8.13), until T&V
projects reached a limit of unpopularity.
Community-based or community-driven participatory approaches came into ascendancy
in the 1990s, when Bank President Wolfensohn promoted a Comprehensive Development
Framework (CDF): a concept based on four mutually reinforcing principles—a long-term
holistic framework for development; country ownership; country-led partnership; and
results- orientation.
A number of developing countries and international cooperation agencies were simul-
taneously seeking to put it into practice these same principles through the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). CDF principles were meant to reverse the top-down nature of
the approaches in the 1970s and 1980s, which had disregarded empirical evidence that
¹⁶ Directed credit was considered desirable in the 1950s and 1960s. With lending pressures under McNamara
and subsequently, credit to agriculture was easy to push, but repayments turned out to be poor. Lending to
agricultural credit as self-standing projects disappeared, as did the practice as a lending code. It turned out to be
difficult to achieve consensus on the new financial sector policy. The Bank tried to promote saving mobilization,
but not very proactively. Developing countries and Japan, on the executive board, continued to support directed
credit (von Pischke 1992), and developing countries have continued to practice debt forgiveness, much to the
detriment of the financial sector. (See, for example, Kotwal and Sen 2019.)
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bottom-up, participatory approaches were necessary to design interventions relevant to
intended beneficiaries (Lele 1975). CDF had limited impact, however (Hanna 2000; McEuen
2003), and the 2000–2001 WDR, which contained the ideas of balancing voice [empower-
ment, based on the study, Voices of the Poor (Narayan 2000)], opportunity, and security led
to an internal debate in the Bank on whether to prioritize voice or opportunity (World Bank
2001). Opportunity won out over voice (Stern 2006).
The 2008 WDR on agriculture dispelled old ideas of government interventions and
subsidies and made a case for market-based investment in agriculture, based on three
worlds of agriculture (World Bank 2007). Developing countries in Asia, including China
and India, have continued with subsidies and government interventions. Did the 2008WDR
have impact on investment in agriculture? It is difficult to discern, since the its publication
coincided with the global food and financial crisis, but increase in donor funding turned out
to be temporary, as we discussed in previous chapters.
In view of the growing interest in diversified farming systems, it is noteworthy that crop
development has dominated in lending, relative to livestock, forestry, and fisheries.
Irrigation has been the largest recipient among subsectors, playing a key role in the Green
Revolution, but also implicitly seeking resilience of production systems. Yet, effectiveness of
irrigation has diminished over time, particularly where lending has been the highest, such as
in India. Groundwater development went virtually unnoticed for a long time, while surface
irrigation received most of the attention. A thorough analysis of the water sector—not just
World Bank projects but also the country environment, including water governance, is
needed. Past irrigation sector reviews appear to have had little impact on improving project




































































(H) Agricultural extension (H) Research
Agriculture extension and research
Figure 8.13 IBRD–IDA total annual lending to agricultural extension and research,
FY1960–FY2018 (US$bn, real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index 2010 = 100)
Note: The codes with an “(H)” are historical codes that were discontinued in 1990.
Source: Based on data from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-bank-projects-operations
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Back to Africa
After the rise of lending in the 1970s, the results in Agriculture and Rural Development
(ARD) projects in Africa were particularly disappointing, but they varied across regions (see
Figure 8.14). In SSA, project performance deteriorated sharply by the end of the 1970s. It
was a result of high oil prices, balance of payment difficulties, fiscal pressures, and overval-
ued exchange rates, more in in Tanzania than in Kenya (see Lele and Meyers [1989]). Even
where there were successes, as in Nigeria or Malawi, Yudelman noted that the collapse of the
economy changed that, but there is a more complex history behind these observations
(Yudelman 1986).
The 1975 “Tanzania Basic Economic Report” strongly endorsed integrated rural devel-
opment projects as a key strategy (World Bank 1977). A Bank report on Tanzania’s
agricultural sector in the 1980s noted that donors were part of the problem. Vice
President for Economic Research Anne Krueger created a program of research on aid and
development in 1982, and invited Lele to lead it; the study, “Managing Agricultural
Development in Africa” (MADIA) was a part. It examined the role of country policies,
external shocks, and behavior of eight donors (Lele 1989).
Analysis of the IEG-evaluated project ratings outcomes, by region and by sector board,
for the entire period is shown in Table 8.1. It shows that the percentage share of outcomes in
the satisfactory range is lowest in Africa for almost all the sector board, except Social
Protection (just above SA), Urban Development (just behind EAP), and Water (behind
EAP and ECA). SA’s performances are poor in Financial and Private Sector Development,
Public Sector Governance, Urban Development and Water sectors, compared to other
sector board performances. LAC showed poor performances in Agriculture and Rural
Development; Financial Sector; Health, Nutrition and Population; and Water sector boards.












1972–80 1981–90 1991–00 2001–17
Africa East Asia and Pacific
Europe and Central Asia Latin America and Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa South Asia
Figure 8.14 Share of outcomes in the satisfactory range (%) by region, exit FY1972–2017 (2,185
Agriculture and Rural Development projects evaluated by the Independent Evaluation Group)
Source: Based on the data from https://finances.worldbank.org/Other/IEG-World-Bank-Project-Performance-
Ratings/rq9d-pctf
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Table 8.1 Project rating outcomes evaluated by the Independent Evaluation Group by region by sector board, exit FY1972–2017


































































































Africa 672 255 272 270 81 136 85 53 174 44 6 181 21 93 381 117 125 2,973
EAP 404 75 162 238 38 39 59 35 76 7 2 53 18 18 240 92 80 1,637
ECA 237 150 72 218 70 120 42 9 59 1 2 81 15 87 141 46 65 1,423
LAC 343 122 192 246 117 104 66 25 108 8 6 149 14 81 237 126 123 2,069
MENA 175 27 101 118 28 37 36 18 38 1 1 37 6 38 89 80 81 913
SA 354 69 95 184 23 49 35 26 70 5 1 34 4 11 101 42 57 1,166
Grand total 2,185 698 894 1,274 357 485 323 166 525 66 18 535 78 328 1,189 503 531 10,181
Region Share of outcomes in the satisfactory range (%)
Africa 54 68 69 61 59 61 54 79 57 68 50 55 57 81 75 81 72
EAP 77 81 90 86 72 69 76 89 72 100 100 68 78 89 91 82 75
ECA 78 87 69 74 77 82 81 100 75 100 100 75 87 82 88 70 75
LAC 68 74 78 75 70 77 68 92 66 88 100 75 71 85 79 73 64
MENA 69 67 70 66 79 76 78 89 61 0 0 62 100 82 80 73 64
SA 77 86 83 70 91 61 80 100 73 80 100 65 100 73 76 67 68

























and Mining; Health, Nutrition and Population; Public Sector Governance; and Water
sectors, compared to other sector board performances.
Weaknesses of the McNamara Strategy
Its accomplishments notwithstanding, the McNamara approach had some notable weak-
nesses. Most prominent among them was the project approval culture that was created by
setting lending targets and focusing on disbursements, a culture which is understandably
alive and well in the institution, which is, after all, a bank. In addition, McNamara’s demand
for numbers, as a means of measuring results, led to an obsession with poverty headcounts,
and spurious and misleading indicators of accuracy in the social rates of return which were
then introduced to encourage poverty targeting. Even Little and Mirrlees (1991), the fathers
of the social cost–benefit analysis, acknowledged that the extent to which such analysis was
used and had real influence was not great (Devarajan, Squire, and Suthiwart-Narueput
1997). The two issues for which cost–benefit analysis was considered important—whether
public sector investment should be justified in a project and whether it should be funded by
foreign aid—became obsolete as the role of governments and foreign aid declined. A big
challenge remains today: how to devise quantitative and qualitative measures that enable us
to capture progress on outcomes that matter, without a huge cost in data collection. This
issue remains unanalyzed or is analyzed mostly by academics to prove to donors that aid
works or does not.
As Devarajan, Squire, and Suthiwart-Narueput (1997) and Stern and Ferreira (1997)
noted, the social funds and the CDD movement led by sociologists in the Bank in the late
1980s and 1990s was prompted by growing aversion to top-down, technocratic approaches
that used social rates of return. Technocrats in agriculture, on the other hand, continue to
argue that CDDs ignored technical sectoral issues of agriculture, health, and education,
creating a parallel universe of community structures adjacent to the local governments, and
mostly financed small infrastructure with few links to the sectoral ministries of agriculture,
education, or water—observations that we gathered as part of the IEG Indonesia Country
Assistance Evaluation (IEG 2006). Thus, critics argue that the CDDs were less a proactive
means of decentralized development through line ministries to reach the poor, than a new
development trend—although over time in Brazil, India, and Indonesia, among others,
there have been attempts to “absorb” CDD efforts into local governments with mixed
success (IEG 2015a, 2015b).
Had McNamara’s approach continued with investments in agriculture, infrastructure,
population, and health, putting a stronger focus on local institutions and taking a bottom-
up stance in the 1980s, one is left to wonder would it have helped the countries with the
greatest amount of poverty today, particularly those in Africa? We believe the prospects
could have been brighter. Would Africa have been better off had the mistakes been
corrected, rather than relinquishing investments in agriculture altogether? Sustainability
remains the real challenge. Many of the 13 projects reviewed in the Design of Rural
Development (Lele 1975) vanished by the 1980s, when field visits to some of the
same countries for the MADIA study found little memory among local people of the
existence of the previous projects. Lending to the agriculture and rural sector continued
in Asia at a brisk pace in the 1980s, but effectiveness of the irrigation sector, on which the
Green Revolution rested, had begun to deteriorate (Lele et al. 2011; Lele, Klousia-Marquis,
and Goswami 2013).
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Lending and Administrative Budget Pressures
Bank net administrative expenses since 1946 are meticulously maintained by Bill
Katzenstein, a retired budgeting veteran, and are shown in Figure 8.3 They relate only to
lending activity and that constitutes only 20 percent of the Bank’s total administrative
expenses. Lending expenses only slightly exceed the level of the early 1990s. The share of
Bank staff time and other expenses devoted to lending and supervision have decreased from
45 percent in 1980 to about 20 percent in this decade. Increases in nonlending activities,
deemed operational, made up the difference.
Katzenstein suggests lending activity has become more efficient over time, largely due
to technology benefits, due to repeat projects, and possibly to decentralization.
Concurrently, staff time and other resources for nonlending work considered as opera-
tional expenses have increased for activities, such as resource mobilization, knowledge
management, and institutional outreach. Katzenstein also notes that three out of four
reorganizations and attempted downsizings since 1987 have had mixed results in terms of
cost savings. This has occurred owing to a lack of institutional discipline in follow-
through. Staff morale has suffered because of the appearance of capricious management
(Katzenstein 2011).
These are sobering findings. Reorganization is rarely a solution to improve efficiency,
but the analysis also raises questions as to whether the Bank is devoting enough resources
to its operational activities, compared to other activities, in view of the portfolio issues
raised here.
In the past several years, the Bank has done more lending work overall and significantly
increased assistance to conflict-affected states (particularly costly with high security
expenses). Although cost-reduction measures introduced with the 2013 reorganization
did not result in significant bottom-line savings, the Bank has taken on challenging activities
while averting budget increases.
Project Performance through the Decades
In 1993, Will Wapenhans, while leading a portfolio review of 1,800 projects, including
interviews with developing country policymakers, and with 400 pages of notes, stated:
There is a declining trend in project performance, highly concentrated in IDA countries
and the Bank is contributing to it because of the presence of an approval culture. To
remain the leading and preeminent institution that it is, it needs to reverse, and it can
reverse to its earlier emphasis on performance. It should not resort to more bureaucracy,
to a further invitation to promote compliance. It should not invite its staff, including its
managers, to protect their rear. Such an emphasis would further foster risk aversion, not
only of staff but also of managers. If not contained, it could retard development.
(Wapenhans 1993, 39)
The IEG of WBG provides the independent evaluations and project ratings, which are
the only comprehensive source of World Bank project performance data with a long
time series. IEG is an independent unit within WBG, reporting directly to the Board of
Executive Directors, which oversees IEG’s work through its Committee on Development
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Effectiveness.¹⁷ IEG uses a six-point rating scale: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory,
Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, and Highly
Unsatisfactory. The ratings methodologies have been refined periodically, based on lessons
learned and have become a standard for other multilateral organizations. Simply put, they
rate projects on the extent to which the declared objectives of investment lending were
achieved, based on detailed implementation completion reports, prepared by operational
staff in the World Bank who are responsible for overseeing project implementation (IEG
2014b). Project ratings are carried out soon after projects are closed, and therefore, their
sustainability is unclear.
The lack of evidence of impact of IOs’ interventions is a relatively new, but growing
concern has led to the increased use of randomized control trials (RCTs) to assess impacts
of the investment portfolios in the international financial institutions, including the World
Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (CGD 2006).
Angus Deaton and Nancy Cartwright, in “Understanding and Misunderstanding
Randomized Controlled Trials,” argued that:
The lay public, and sometimes researchers, put too much trust in RCTs [randomized
controlled trials] over other methods of investigation. Contrary to frequent claims in the
applied literature, randomization does not equalize everything other than the treatment in
the treatment and control groups, it does not automatically deliver a precise estimate of
the average treatment effect (ATE), . . . At best, an RCT yields an unbiased estimate, but
this property is of limited practical value. Even then, estimates apply only to the sample
selected for the trial, often no more than a convenience sample, and justification is
required to extend the results to other groups, including any population to which the
trial sample belongs, or to any individual, including an individual in the trial. (Deaton and
Cartwright 2018, 2)
Impact evaluations are growing rapidly, and a vast literature is emerging, which shows the
popularity of RCTs. Awarding of the 2019 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences to
Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Michael Kremer will in all likelihood increase the
popularity of RCTs, but an equally significant literature questions how effective the RCT
is as a tool in helping to reduce global poverty. Nobel laureate Angus Deaton and Nancy
Cartwright also raised the issue of “external validity” (generalizability of the findings of an
RCT to other circumstances). They noted, “RCTs can play a role in building scientific
knowledge and useful predictions but they can only do so as part of a cumulative program,
combining with other methods, including conceptual and theoretical development, to
discover not ‘what works’, but ‘why things work’” (Deaton and Cartwright 2018, 2).
In a similar vein, Ravallion (2012, 104) also noted in his review of Banerjee and Duflo’s
(2012) book, Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty:
“Randomized experiments are not new to economic analysis and policy evaluation. What is
new is (first) the degree to which experiments are seen to be the only credible approach and
(second) their extensive application in developing countries.” RCTs are still a small share of
the total investment portfolio of IOs, and the findings of existing studies have not had much
operational impact. In a subsequent paper Ravallion (2018) argued, “The statistical case is
unclear on a priori grounds; a stronger ethical defense is often called for; and there is a risk
¹⁷ See the IEG website: http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org
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of distorting the evidence-base for informing policymaking. . . . [P]ressing knowledge gaps
should drive the questions asked and . . . answer[s], not the methodological preferences of
some researchers. The gold standard is the best method for the question at hand.”
The share of projects that IEG rated, using its methodology, as satisfactory or higher (in
the satisfactory range), summarized by regions and by decades, is shown in Figure 8.14.¹⁸
SA’s projects received the highest ratings in the 1970s around the time of the Green
Revolution. Project performance of all regions (except ECA) declined in the 1980s, as
macroeconomic difficulties and debt problems rocked the developing world, particularly
in SSA and Latin America. Ratings recovered somewhat in the 1990s, as economic perfor-
mance improved, but never really recovered fully in SA from the heights reached in the
1970s. Africa’s performance has remained consistently the lowest among all regions, even as
it improved; and lending to SSA, particularly IDA lending to agriculture, has increased
considerably since 2000 (see Figure 8.15). African indebtedness has also risen, as Africa’s







































































Figure 8.15 Africa: IDA annual commitment to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector,
FY1960–FY2018 (US$bn, real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index 2010 = 100)
Source: Based on data from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-bank-projects-operations
¹⁸ Inter-year comparisons are not without issues. The categories for ratings have been expanded from 4 to 6. Some
task managers whom we interviewed argued that the assessments of the criteria for ratings have become more
stringent, so that fewer projects get classified as marginally satisfactory or satisfactory. Others argued that project
ratings do not necessarily reflect improved project performance, but result in pressure from Bank management on
IEG to show that performance has improved. According to Indre Sud and Jane Olmstead-Rumsey:
The database contains assessments of project performance in various dimensions. The data from this
database were used to verify the published assessments of the World Bank. The analysis points to
significant doubt about the reported improvement in performance and suggests that the reported
improvement appears to have been mostly a result of pressures of management targets and less than
full independence of the World Bank’s evaluation function. (Sud and Olmstead-Rumsey 2012, 1)
The Bank established a Quality Assurance Group to oversee quality of design and implementation after the
Wapenhans Report, discussed in this chapter (World Bank 1992). The reasons for seemingly improved perfor-
mance may also be because nonperforming components of projects were often dropped during implementation.
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In addition to looking at the performance ratings by regions, as shown in Figure 8.14, we
considered the same ratings by categories of countries: low-income, low-middle-income,
and upper-middle-income, and by individual countries (Figure 8.16). Generally, LICs
performed less well than LMICs and UMICs. IFAD’s evaluation of the performance of
MICs, discussed in Chapter 11, on the other hand, found no significant difference in the
performance of LICs and MICs. IFAD explains this result based on the fact that, even in
MICs, IFAD projects are targeted to the poorest populations or poorest regions, perhaps,
more so than theWorld Bank’s projects. In countries, such as Brazil and China, World Bank
projects have consistently been targeted to the poorest regions, such as the southwestern
region in China and the northeastern region in Brazil, although this has not always been the
case, as in India. Ravallion argued, in the case of China, beyond targeting to the poor
regions, targeting specifically to low-income households is often not possible (Ravallion
2009). Findings of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) support Ravallion’s observations.
Between 2 and 3 percent of GDP in Asian countries is spent on targeting: that is, “the use of
policy instruments and interventions to channel resources to a target group identified below
an agreed national poverty line” (Weiss 2004, 2). So, the issue needs more than passing
mention. ADB undertook surveys of the experiences with poverty targeting in a number of
large Asian economies in SA (India), Southeast Asia (Thailand, the Philippines, and
Indonesia) and in PRC. According to John Weiss, in his paper on experiences from India,

















































































































Figure 8.16 Share of outcomes in the satisfactory range (%) of the Agriculture and Rural
Development projects in the top 20 recipient countries by IBRD–IDA commitments to the
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector, exit FY1972–2017 (1,005 Agriculture and Rural
Development projects evaluated by the Independent Evaluation Group in the top 20 recipient
countries)
Note: ( ) shows number of evaluated projects.
Source: Based on the data from https://finances.worldbank.org/Other/IEG-World-Bank-Project-Performance-
Ratings/rq9d-pctf
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Poverty targeting is used by all governments in Asia in one form or another, either to
‘protect’ the poor from adverse shocks or ‘promote’ their long-run move out of poverty.
Such measures typically include reaching the poor with credit, food, employment, access
to health and other social facilities and occasionally cash transfers. . . . In some of these
countries poverty targeting has a relatively lengthy history stemming from long-standing
social welfare concerns (India, the Philippines and PRC), whilst elsewhere it originated
principally in the late 1990s in response to the impact of the regional Financial Crisis
(Thailand and Indonesia). (Weiss 2004, 2)
Weiss provides examples of classifications of targeting:
Measures to reach the poor can be classified in different ways. For example:
• Targeting by activity, such as primary health care and primary education . . .
• Targeting by indicator, where alternatives to income . . . [are] correlated with poverty
[and] are used to identify the poor. These can include lack of, or size of, ownership of
land, form of dwelling, and type of household, for example number of children or
gender of the head of family.
• Targeting by location, where area of residence becomes the criteria for identifying the
target group, . . . a central element in poverty reduction initiatives in PRC
• Targeting by self-selection or self-targeting, where programs are designed to be attrac-
tive only to the poor. An example is employment creation or ‘workfare,’ where
payment is either in cash or in food, . . . and therefore only of interest to those with
no opportunity to work at the market wage. Another self-selection procedure is the
subsidization of low quality foodstuffs (like high-broken rice). (Weiss 2004, 2–3)
Experiences in the five countries suggested that “errors in targeting have been very signif-
icant, leakage rates have been high and many of the poor have not been covered, with the
implication that in some cases these programs have had only a minor impact on poverty
reduction” (Weiss 2004, 2).
The “consistent picture,” which the ADB study noted, based on the available evidence,
“is that while some schemes may have had a modest positive effect on the poor, . . . trends
in poverty reduction have been driven principally by macroeconomic developments—the
rate and pattern of economic growth—rather than by targeted interventions” (Weiss
2004, 10).
The ineffectiveness of public delivery systems has led Banerjee, Duflo, and Kremer to use
experimental economics, using RCTs as a “gold standard,” but Ravallion, Deaton, and
others caution against their external validity.
The fact that LICs perform poorly and projects targeted to the poor in MICs also do
poorly has implications, however, for the global community’s ambition and strategy to
eradicate poverty and hunger by 2030.
Among the 20 top recipients of World Bank (IBRD + IDA) assistance to agriculture, for
which the World Bank evaluated a total of 1,005 AFF projects, exiting during 1972 and
2017, China has consistently been one of the best performers in overall ratings, as well as the
country with the largest number (12 out of 84 rated projects) of highly satisfactory projects
(Figure 8.16). Brazil also has had a number of highly satisfactory projects (3 out of 85 rated
projects). The three African countries, all LICs (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania), had the
lowest ratings.
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Lele, Goswami, and Nico (2017), in their chapter in Agriculture and Rural Development
in a Globalizing World, noted:
There is a huge range in the performance of satisfactory projects over the entire period.
Armenia had 100 percent of the IEG-rated projects in the satisfactory range, albeit from a
small portfolio, followed by China and Azerbaijan at 92.6 percent each . . . In China,
however, as many as 94 projects were evaluated by the IEG, compared to 18 projects in
Albania and 13 in Azerbaijan. Brazil, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh each had large
portfolios and had ratings of satisfactory in the case of about 70 percent of the projects; the
least well performing projects were in African countries: Ethiopia, Tanzania, Cameroon,
Republic of Congo, and Côte d’Ivoire. . . . On the whole, agricultural projects [in Africa]
have performed less well than the World Bank’s overall project portfolio, but they have
also performed differently in different regions. East Asia was on top in overall project
performance, and Eastern Europe’s and South Asia’s agricultural performance was on par
with each region’s overall portfolio performance, although in each case, the performances
were less than East Asia’s. Upper income countries, classified by World Bank criteria, had
higher performance ratings of about 73 percent in agriculture, with lower-middle-income
countries having about 67 percent, followed by low-income countries of about 53 percent.
The same phenomenon is noted in the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) lending
performance of its agricultural portfolio. It performed least well in sub-Saharan Africa,
and performance was weaker in agriculture than in other sectors in Africa. Other sectors
(4 percent of total) had higher shares of “highly satisfactory” projects than did the ARD
sector (2 percent of total). (Lele, Goswami, and Nico 2017, 343–4)
Fragile Country Borrowers Perform Less Well than Others
Lele, Goswami, and Nico (2017) reported on the performance of fragile countries:
The IEG . . . rated 702 ARD sector projects in 44 of the 55 fragile countries containing
20 percent of the world’s population. Fifty-eight percent were rated satisfactory and above,
compared to the Bank-wide average for all countries of 67 percent satisfactory and above.
Yet, fragile countries are going to need much more and better quality investment on a
continuous, long-term basis by the international community as a whole, than accorded
thus far, while keeping expectations of good outcomes low, and a focus on institution and
capacity building. (Lele, Goswami, and Nico 2017, 344)
In the 2019 WBG Spring Meetings, humanitarian agencies urged the Bank to give more
authority to the field staff to make commitments on behalf of the Bank to expedite decision-
making, and develop genuine lasting partnerships with civil society organizations, rather
than just working with whomever happens to be at the table. Their argument is supported
by evidence generated in the Bank (Devex 2019).
In an econometric study, Fardoust and Flanagan (2011) argued that project performance
tends to be consistent with the quality of the World Bank’s economic and sector work.
Another econometric study by IEG concluded that project ratings improved as countries
liberalized their economies (Fardoust and Flanagan 2011; IEG 2013a). These are important
findings.
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The World Bank’s Contribution to Agricultural Sector Performance
IEG’s Country Assessment evaluation methodology has been careful not to attribute
country performance of the sector or the economy to Bank assistance. Furthermore,
although the methodology expects Bank assistance performance to be generally consistent
with overall country performance, in practice, the two can diverge significantly.¹⁹ In the
MADIA study, Lele and Meyers (1989) noted that although Kenya performed well in the
1970s, the World Bank funded project portfolio performed quite poorly. In Tanzania, both
Tanzanian agriculture and the World Bank project portfolio performed poorly in the 1970s.
In the India country assistance evaluation in the 1990s, IEG cited a case study of India by
Lele and Bumb (1994), which showed that the Bank contributed to sustaining agricultural
growth in India through the development of a holistic strategy during the Green Revolution,
as well as contributing to increased investments and policy dialogue in the 1980s. Both
India’s performance and that of Bank projects, however, have been more mixed; since the
1980s, project ratings have not regained their earlier level.²⁰ A World Bank study on India,
“Accelerating Agricultural Productivity Growth,” highlights India’s variable agricultural
performance over time and in the various states and explains the reasons why, including
India’s lagging behind in structural transformation relative to China and Indonesia (World
Bank 2014). Unlike in SSA, both India and the World Bank initially had a poverty reduction
strategy grounded in agriculture. Over time, India has become less engaged.
Lele, Goswami, and Nico (2017) addressed the contribution of the World Bank to
structural transformation:
Over the entire period, 1960–2015, during which the World Bank has been active in most
of these countries, excluding China, which joined in 1980, and Eastern Europe that joined
in 1990, smaller countries typically received a higher share of GDP as World Bank loans
and credits (1.4 percent in constant 2005 dollars in Honduras and Tanzania each),
compared to mega countries—0.14 percent in China, 0.25 percent in Brazil, and 0.54
percent in India. On a per capita basis, too, China, India, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and
Ethiopia ranked lower than middle-income countries, like Turkey and Mexico. Lending
to large countries was more stable than small countries—that is, the standard deviation of
year-to-year commitments as a share of GDP was only 0.2 in China, compared to 2.6 in
Tanzania. Armenia, and Republic of Congo at the high end of the variability in World
¹⁹ From “Appendix B: Guide to IEG’s Country Program Evaluation Methodology”:
If a Bank Group assistance program is large in relation to the country’s total development effort, the
program outcome should be similar to the country’s overall development progress. However, most
Bank Group assistance programs provide only a fraction of the total resources devoted to a country’s
development [that are provided] by development partners, stakeholders, and the government itself. In
CPEs [country program evaluations], IEG rates only the outcome of the Bank Group’s program, not
the country’s overall development outcome, although the latter is clearly relevant for judging the
program’s outcome. . . .
Subsequently, IEGmakes an assessment of the relative contribution to the results achieved by the Bank
Group, other development partners, the government and exogenous factors. (IEG 2014a, 101, 103)
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Bank assistance, compared to China, Brazil, Mexico, and India. . . . This variability was
even greater on a per capita basis in small countries than in large countries. Large
countries offer more investment opportunities than small countries, but it is also apparent
that many low-income and small countries, such as Tanzania, Republic of Congo,
Ethiopia, and Côte d’Ivoire, have also had much more unstable macroeconomic and/or
political environments over the last 50 years, as compared to countries like China and
India. Turkey, Brazil, and Mexico fall in the middle of the pack. And this shows up in the
absence of lending activity over long stretches in countries with macroeconomic or
political problems. (Lele, Goswami, and Nico 2017, 343).
The World Bank’s Contribution to Country Performance
How does one demonstrate the Bank’s contribution to country performance, except by
using independent observation, combined with statistical indicators, mixed methods, coun-
try- and Bank-specific knowledge and insights?
Country capacity to prepare and implement its own projects is a necessary condition for
the Bank’s contribution. Country proposals reflect their own priorities and ownership.
Because African countries lacked the capacity to develop “bankable” projects, the
Agricultural Development Service was established in Nairobi in the 1960s, largely staffed
by expatriates. Bank-funded projects in Nigeria and Malawi had especially large numbers of
expatriates to implement them. Although the Bank prepared agricultural sector reports in
Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, the reports were largely devices to identify bankable projects,
rather than strategies for developing agriculture, unlike in the case with the Bell Mission’s
Agricultural Annex on India, which provided a country strategy. The MADIA study and the
book, Aid to African Agriculture: Lessons from Two Decades of Donor Assistance, made a
strong case for countries preparing their own country agricultural development strategies
and the need for substantial investment in capacity building in Africa (Lele 1992). Clearly,
capacity has increased a great deal in Africa, but not nearly what is needed.
From Integrated Rural Development to Structural
Adjustment: China vs. Africa
Investment projects fell out of favor for Africa in the 1980s, and the Bank and bilateral
donors abandoned integrated rural development in favor of SAL. The concept of integrated
rural development became discredited, and little domestic capacity or institutions remained
when project lending resumed later in the 1990s, in the form of CBD and CDD. However,
the difference was not simply one of top-down or bottom-up approaches; there was a
difference in the way agriculture was (or more likely, was not) supported, including the
multisectoral nature of developing agriculture.
In China, on the other hand, both theWorld Bank and IFAD invested in Integrated Rural
Development Programs (IRDPs), and IRDP projects performed well in China. An IEG
report on China noted:
Bank lending [to China] accounts for only a small share of China’s resource flows—about
0.6 percent of GDP at its maximum in the early 1990s. The Bank has therefore not tried to
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achieve its objectives primarily through the direct impact of its lending or through
conditionality. Rather, the Bank has relied mostly on variants of persuasion and example.
These included a dual-track approach of (i) building trust through [project] lending while
promoting policy dialogue through sector work and (ii) relying on the demonstration
effect of successful project experience in introducing new technologies, management
methods, or policy reforms to leverage policy outcomes. (IEG 2005, ix–x)
China attributes its success in agriculture to a series of reforms in institutions, infrastruc-
ture, technology, market liberalization, and delivery systems, starting in 1979 (Huang 2014).
In contrast to China, an IEG country assistance evaluation of Rwanda, covering the years
1989–2001, noted, “The most notable shortcoming of the Bank’s program throughout the
1990s was the absence of a concerted effort to promote agricultural development. A
weakness of the IDA program was the scarcity of analytical work. . . . OED rates the outcome
of IDA assistance overall as unsatisfactory for the pre-genocide period” (IEG 2004, vi).
Long-term strategies can result in sustained provision of public goods in agriculture and
rural development, such as research and extension, agricultural education, finance, regula-
tory policies and institutions, seed production, and distribution capacity (Babu and Joshi
2019). This was the case in China where, like in India and unlike in Africa, the Bank did
not take an ideological stand. The two largest borrowers are quite capable of showing it
the door.
The absence of the countries’ own long-term strategies and a sense of ownership, and the
lack of institutions and internal capacity within the countries has led to an ebb and flow of
assistance.
The 1980s: Structural Adjustment and the Debt Crisis Legacy
In the words of Ravi Kanbur, there was a shift in the 1980s from “a situation where the state
could do no wrong to one where the state could do no right” (Kanbur 2005, 13).
The 1981 Berg Report, the 1982 World Development Report,
and Shift to Adjustment Lending
African agriculture came into focus with the publication of the Berg Report, named after for
its coordinator Elliot Berg of the African Strategy Review Group, titled Accelerated
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (World Bank 1981). This was
followed by the WDR (World Bank 1982b) on the theme of agriculture. The Berg Report
helped move African countries away from state-run economies and toward free market
systems at a time when Africa’s economies were drastically underperforming. It was the
Bank’s first study of development in SSA. The Berg Report argued that African governments
could increase exports and better develop rural economies through swift implementation of
better governance and market reforms in exchange rates, liberalization of domestic markets,
and cuts in subsidies. The report asserted that, in much of Africa, domestic policies were
biased against agriculture. Exchange rates and the high cost of domestically produced inputs
reduced competitiveness in world markets and were at the heart of the failure to provide
adequate incentives for increased agricultural production and exports (World Bank 1981).
These findings were later confirmed by the Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés (1988, 1991) study
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on agricultural price distortions. Their study was updated by Kym Anderson on the
changing extent of price distortions across countries and commodities globally.
Evaluating the degree of distortion reduction since 1984, compared with how much still
remained, Anderson’s study noted a huge reduction in distortions, using a global, economy-
wide model (Anderson 2010). At issue was not so much the policy ideas, but how the Bank
implemented them.
The Berg Report was critical of African governments for corruption and bloated bureau-
cracies. It recommended a significantly smaller role for governments in the national
economies and proposed more private sector involvement in key industries. A major
weakness of the Berg report was that it did not acknowledge the role the donor community
had played in reinforcing the worst tendencies of African policies in the 1970s under
McNamara’s leadership (World Bank 1981). A Tanzanian agricultural sector report, pre-
pared in the project department of the African region, in contrast, documented a number of
price and non-price factors that were inhibiting growth. The report argued that the “getting
prices right” mantra of the 1980s, via structural adjustment packages, including exchange
rates, was unlikely to get a response from the export sector. Tanzania needed substantial
injection of capital to increase agricultural input supply, in the short run, and in the medium
run, to shore up the development of the dilapidated physical infrastructure, as well as
massive investment in human capital. The report had a substantial following in IMF, which
was ready to mount a mission to Tanzania (World Bank 1983a). The World Bank approved
an export credit loan to Tanzania in 1980s, which was necessary, but not sufficient.²¹
The publication of the Berg Report also coincided with the adoption the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) of the Lagos Plan of
Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980–2000, at a conference of African Heads
of State and Government in Lagos, Nigeria, in April 1980 (OAU 1980). The “Adedeji
Report,” known for Adebayo Adedeji, the United Nations Under Secretary-General and
Executive Secretary of the ECA, was highly critical of the approach being adopted by the
Bank and its donors under structural adjustment programs (SAPs) (UNECA 1989).
So, there were pressures and arguments being placed on African governments in both
directions.
More generally, the World Bank embarked on placing conditions on aid packages
through SAPs, which emphasized liberalization of markets, exchange rates, and other
reforms. The demand for extensive reforms led many African governments to reduce
subsidies to public sector health and education programs and to agriculture, in return for
needed developmental assistance. In the absence of meaningful political and economic
reforms, however, efforts to modernize continued to flounder in Africa, while debt burden
increased. As we showed in Chapter 2, growth in Africa has not been rapid enough to
increase per capita income (Gill and Karakülah 2018). The Berg Report’s legacy remains
²¹ In a review of draft of this chapter, Stephen O’Brien, a veteran at the World Bank, noted:
Clearly, we overestimated government capacity, and even interest, in the reforms, and underestimated
the corruption/vested interest that delayed or defeated reforms. I agree that adjustment programs
neglected poverty and related issues, but I think that we thought this was a temporary fix, clearing the
decks of all the policy mistakes, which would be followed by a return to project lending that would be
much more productive. Of course, it was never a quick fix; we underestimated the time required for
such major policy adjustments, even in semi-willing countries, so the criticism grew. (Stephen O’Brien,
personal communication, email dated July 19, 2019)
In a conversation on July 22, 2019, this same sentiment was also supported by Jochen Kraske, who was country
director for Southern Africa at the time the Tanzania report was prepared.
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mixed—a story of a glass half full and half empty. Liberalization of economies accelerated
economic growth in Africa and helped to rein in government spending through “improved
governance, better policy management, and a new generation of skilled leaders in govern-
ment and business” (Radelet 2016, 6). The author argued that these “are likely to persist into
the future” (Radelet 2016, 6). Since 1995 to 2005:
GDP growth across the continent . . . averaged about 4.3 percent a year, 3 percentage
points higher than in the previous two decades. [Growth rates] varied widely, with
about half the countries in the region moving forward and others changing little. In the
20 fastest growing countries—excluding oil exporters—GDP growth averaged a robust
5.8 percent for two decades, and real incomes per person more than doubled. But in other
countries, growth was much slower, and in eight countries, income per person actually fell.
Some of the differences are stark: in Rwanda real income per person more than doubled;
in Zimbabwe it fell 30 percent. (Radelet 2016, 7)
The percentage of population living on less than US$1.90 declined from 60 percent to
40 percent, and child mortality declined substantially. At the same time, much needed
investment in agriculture and related sectors, particularly infrastructure to facilitate market
operation, did not occur, and absent a government role, the institutional vacuum in services
remained.
The 2016 African Development Bank report, “Feed Africa: Strategy for Agricultural
Transformation in Africa 2016–2025,” noted:
The total cost for agricultural transformation for the priority commodities and agroeco-
logical zones in the strategy is between US$315bn and US$400bn over 10 years, equivalent
to US$32bn–$40bn per year. Current sources of finance for agricultural development are
primarily from three areas: funds from sovereign and non-sovereign investments into
agriculture from the multi-lateral and bilateral development partners including the AfDB;
public sector spending; and private sector investments into agriculture. Overall these total
~ $9bn per year of investments into African agriculture (of the AfDB’s level of spend[ing]
is assumed to be $2.4bn per year, rather than the current $0.6bn per year), leaving a gap
of $23bn to $31bn per annum to be mobilized in order to drive transformation. (AfDB
2016, 31)
Africa needs a multi-stakeholder, public sector-enabled, but private sector-led
transformation that will allow it to realize the potential of agriculture as a business and
create a foundation for prosperity, nutrition, and quality of life for all Africans. (AfDB
2016, 40)
In most African countries, there was little private sector left in rural areas that could
respond, but over the past several decades, it has been in development. The Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation’s AGRA, established in 2006, has a program to support the
development of input distributors in 11 priority countries, but there is not yet an inde-
pendent evaluation of the program to know what has been achieved, whether it is sustain-
able without continued external support, and whether it is helping to establish national
policy frameworks that are clear and predictable.
A related question is how much has agricultural policy been liberalized and does it matter
whether the public or the private sector plays roles? Ethiopia is an example of impressive
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growth in total factor productivity (TFP) since 2005. Modern input distribution has almost
exclusively been in the hands of the public sector in Ethiopia. Use of chemical fertilizer in
Ethiopia has grown remarkably since the official elimination of subsidies in the 1990s, and
under a new set of policies adopted in 2008, which: (1) granted monopoly control over
fertilizer imports to the Agricultural Input Supplies Corporation (AISCO), the govern-
ment’s input marketing agency; and (2) carried out marketing and distribution of fertilizer,
exclusively through farmers’ organizations. Rashid et al. (2013) showed:
. . . (a) fertilizer use in major cereal is profitable; (b) while there is no official subsidy
program, fertilizer promotion has involved large fiscal costs—estimated at US$40 million
per year since 2008; and (c) . . . a mismatch between government’s policy targets and the
effective fertilizer demand, resulting in large carryover stock with estimated implicit costs
of US$30 million per year during 2008–2011. (Rashid et al. 2013, 595)
The Ethiopian government turned to the experience of Asian countries to set up its
Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA) and remains in charge of managing donor
aid. The expansion of the input use, increasing the adoption of chemical fertilizers and
improved seeds, “appears to have been driven by high government expenditures on the
agriculture sector, including agricultural extension, but also by an improved road network,
higher rural education levels, and favorable international and local price incentives”
(Bachewe et al. 2018, 286).
The agricultural growth over the 2004–14 period has been accompanied by poverty
reduction. In 2004, the International Food Price Research Institute (IFPRI) established the
Ethiopia Strategy Support Program (ESSP), to provide direct support to the Government
of Ethiopia. An independent impact assessment concluded that “relatively few of the wide
range of ESSP outputs appear to have produced tangible outcomes in Ethiopia . . . [and
had] languished without inspiring action, reflecting ideological barriers” (Renkow and
Slade 2013, xii). The assessment cited IFPRI’s most important influences in Ethiopia,
beyond ESSP, in the establishment of institutions, notably, the Productive Safety Net
Program (PSNP) and ATA (Renkow and Slade 2013, xii). In 2005, the government set up
the PSNP, covering 7 million people throughout the country, which included a Public
Works component, for creating employment to improve rural roads, irrigation systems,
and other needed infrastructure. Access to markets was significantly improved, as was
access to education, with a significant decrease in illiteracy among rural populations
(Bachewe et al. 2018).
The 1982 WDR contained extensive discussion of adjustment issues, finding the pro-
spects for many LICs to be of critical concern (World Bank 1982b). The low-income, sub-
Saharan countries were the least able to make structural adjustments rapidly, and Jayne
noted many of the proposed reforms were not implemented in Africa (Jayne, Chamberlin,
and Benfica 2018).
In India and China, with large, relatively self-sufficient economies and smaller debt
burdens, the effect of adverse external events was more than offset by rising domestic
investment and good agricultural performance. Vulnerability to balance of payments deficit,
however, continued in the case of India, requiring it to approach the IMF for a stabilization
program in 1991. China had embarked on agricultural reforms of its own since 1979, with
the introduction of its household responsibility system and continued reforms sequentially
with acceleration in the growth rate, which various studies have documented (Rozelle and
Swinnen 2004; Gulati and Fan 2007; Huang 2014; Gulati and Saini 2016; Huang 2017;
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Huang and Yang 2017). The Chinese state has played a critical role in the development of
Chinese agriculture, including investment in irrigation, transportation and communication,
human capital, and in R&D, several times that of India. Its support to agriculture was larger
than that of all OECD countries together, as shown in Chapter 3.
Stanley Please, the principal champion of structural adjustment and director of the
East Africa Department, argued that, in Africa, moving to macroeconomic lending,
which adjustment loans entailed, was not only the right approach for the developing
world to correct imbalances, but, also, as a general strategy for the World Bank. It was
the beginning of the primacy of macroeconomic and sector policy work and lending in
the Bank and the weakening of the project approach to lending. (World Bank 1981).
Please and Amoako said of the Berg Report in their “A Critique of Some of the
Criticism” in 1984:
Emphasis should be placed on the tradeables sectors in African economies, and particu-
larly to agriculture. This priority can only be achieved through a combination of, first, a
switch in the internal terms of trade in favor of the tradeable sectors and against the service
sectors (most obviously in African circumstances this means against government employ-
ment). Secondly, government expenditures should shift in favor of agricultural services
and against such other services as administration and defense. (Education, health, water
supply, etc., should, in this connection, be thought of as necessary inputs into agricultural
production . . . ) (Please and Amoako 1984, 49)
The World Bank spent considerable time, energy, and resources to develop acceptance and
legitimacy of structural adjustment among Africans and Europeans, given the resistance of
African policymakers.
Carole Lancaster reported Africans’ concerns in her chapter, “The World Bank since
1980: The Politics of Structural Adjustment Lending” as follows:²²
Adjustment programs were intrusive . . . Africans were sensitive to the appearance (and
reality) of having their policy choices dictated by outside powers or institutions. . . .
[including] complaints about the tendency of Bank staff to preach to Africans and at
times to appear to be giving instructions to them. (These criticisms were also echoed by
various officials of bilateral aid agencies based in African countries). . . .
Africans have argued that structural adjustment—however extensive—is unlikely to
contribute to a brighter economic future for their countries as long as their debt burdens
remain so great. (Lancaster 1997, 169–70)
The African Development Bank’s “Feed Africa” emphasized that without governments
taking the lead and inviting the private sector to invest more in Africa’s structural trans-
formation, the continent will continue to lag (AfDB 2016).
²² Carole Lancaster, former Deputy Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), who had served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (1980–81) and as a member of
the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State (1977–80), endorsed the Please view. The Berg Report called
for much needed attention to the deepening economic problems facing Africa—recommending a doubling in aid
to the region—but more importantly, it argued that economic policy reform was critical to any economic recovery
in Africa, because “state-led development had been a failure” (Lancaster 1997, 167).
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Debt Burden
Nicholas Stern, former Chief Economist of the Bank, noted: “There was . . . fairly universal
agreement that the Bank has been slow to respond to the debt issue” (Stern and Ferreira
1997, 600). An external evaluation of the World Bank’s research program, led by Abhijit
Banerjee, Angus Deaton, Nora Lustig, and Ken Rogoff (2006), also reiterated this finding of
the prolonged neglect of the debt issue.
Adjustment with a Human Face
Some of the most influential voices in support of reducing poverty as an ethical and
pragmatic good were Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Richard Jolly, and Frances Stewart, editors
of Adjustment with a Human Face, a 1987 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
study (Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart 1987). They have had a profound impact on the
approaches of IMF and the World Bank to development in the new millennium, including
with respect to safety nets, an important part of public policy. They called “for a more
people-sensitive approach to adjustment” (Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart 1987, 3) and criticized
the way that structural adjustment affected the social sectors, most notably, health and
education. The book argued that the social sectors often bore massive budget cuts, because
most structural adjustment projects involved balancing budgets and eliminating deficit
spending while requiring investment in a number of industrial and commercial sectors.
School programs, health programs, environmental programs, and various social safety
systems have all been eliminated or severely reduced. Using 10 country case studies, the
study outlined ideas for how to minimize the negative impacts of structural adjustment and
showed working models to improve the lives of everyday people in the nations being
adjusted. Ultimately, Adjustment with a Human Face led to a massive overhaul of adjust-
ment lending at both IMF and the World Bank, with more attention paid to social sectors
through Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart 1987).
World Bank Evaluation Findings on Structural Adjustment
The Bank undertook several evaluations of adjustment programs (Yagci, Kamin, and
Rosenbaum 1985; World Bank 1988a; Corbo and Rojas 1991; OED 1996). With growing
criticism of the Washington Consensus,²³ social safety nets became an important part of the
Bank’s support to countries, in response to the concerns about the social impacts of adjustment.²⁴
Lending to social sectors and to social safety nets increased (Figure 8.17), but agriculture did not
²³ See Chapter 2 for a definition of the Washington Consensus.
²⁴ In its publication, The State of Social Safety Nets 2018, WBG notes:
The global focus on social protection and jobs in general and on the role of SSN [social safety nets] in
particular has intensified. For the first time, social protection is part of a comprehensive agenda of the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDG1 calls to end (extreme) poverty in all its manifestations
by 2030, ensure social protection for the poor and vulnerable, increase access to basic services, and
support people harmed by climate-related extreme events and other economic, social, and environ-
mental shocks and disasters. Target 1.3 (Goal 1) seeks to implement nationally appropriate social
protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of
the poor and the vulnerable. (WBG 2018, xi)
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receivemuch attention in theWorld Bank until the early years of the newmillennium, and even
then, too weakly. Two major policy papers on agriculture, from “Vision to Action” in 1997 and
“Reaching the Rural Poor” in 2003 had little impact on increasing lending to agriculture (Ayres
and McCalla 1997; World Bank 2003b). Bank evaluations helped lead to the incorporation of
mechanisms to assist segments of society adversely affected by adjustment in the short run
(Jayarajah, Branson, and Sen 1996). In addition, the Bank devoted a larger share of lending and
advice to central government reform, based on the identification of governmental capability as a
central obstacle to successful development outcomes.
Institutional development began to gain recognition as a part of adjustment lending
between 1983 and 1989, notably, first appearing as a central development issue in the 1983
WDR, with Part II entitled “Management in Development” (World Bank 1983b). The
theme also occurred in OED evaluations and external analysis. The OED evaluation of
the Bank’s public sector reforms noted that there was little treatment of institutions in the
Bank’s work (Girishankar 2001). There are a few notable exceptions, including in the book,
The Design of Rural Development (Lele 1975). The OED evaluation noted:
Most of the CAEs [Country Assistance Evaluations] in the sample concluded that the
Bank lacked a coherent strategy on public sector reform or country-level ID [institutional
development], even when sectoral ID objectives were deemed relevant. In evaluating
relevance, the reports did not adequately differentiate between structural and capacity
constraints. Most CAEs, however, did go beyond the stated objectives of projects and
considered whether the relevance of country programs was preserved in the details of
operational design, and their “goodness of fit” to institutional setting. Some evaluations in
turn attributed flaws in both strategy and design to internal disincentives within the Bank
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Figure 8.17 World Bank (IBRD and IDA) lending to social protection and risk management,
2000–2018 (US$m)
Note: From FY2017, the World Bank theme was changed, so that FY2017 and FY2018 values are for Social
Development and Protection, instead of Social Protection and Risk Management.
Source: Based on World Bank Annual Reports data.
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John Staatz and Niama Nango Dembélé, in their background paper for the 2008 WDR
(World Bank 2008), discussed the “comprehensive approach” needed in SSA, citing Lele’s
findings in the Design of Rural Development:
In contrast to Asia during its Green Revolution (which had much of its infrastructure,
substantial human capital, administrative capacity and other institutions in place), SSA is
weaker in all these dimensions. Therefore, SSA needs a more comprehensive approach to
address many of the challenges that require coordinated actions by different actors to spur
productivity and rural income growth [Poulton et al. 2008]. Yet, top-down integrated rural
development approaches to address these multiple challenges all at once have not worked
well in SSA (Lele [1975], 1979 [3rd printing cited]). (Staatz and Dembélé 2008, 54)
Mosley and his colleagues (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1991) noted that structural adjust-
ment went through several stages and varied across regions. The first adjustment loans in
SSA were uncompromising on the speed of reforms that they expected, without regard to
the social impacts of the reforms. Asia and Latin America had very different experiences.
The big difference was that the Asian countries, such as South Korea and Thailand, had
already recognized the need to adjust and had the necessary capacity and sense of owner-
ship of the reforms. South Korea was the most adept in making use of different public and
private instruments flexibly (Kharas and Shishido 1991). They negotiated with the Bank on
their terms and adjusted, using balance of payment support from the Bank. In Latin
America, aid was unimportant, with each country having their own history and political
economy of macroeconomic management. In Mexico, Díaz noted that Mexico’s role in the
establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions and prior good record of borrowing from
IMF, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the World Bank led to a situation
in which the Bank “practically suspended (the institutional flows) in crisis years (1976–82),”
thinking Mexico had good macroeconomic capability, “only to play an important role later
in the adjustment process” (Gil Díaz 1991, 241). Mexico’s excessive borrowing from
commercial banks was solely the responsibility of the governments toward the population
they ruled. Carvalho (1991) discussed the history of Brazil’s historical swings between
export promotion and import substitution “at any cost” from the 1940s. In contrast, during
the period 1974–85, combined with a combination of oil price shocks and interest rate
shocks, Brazilian authorities began borrowing abroad, rather than accepting FDI for
nationalistic reasons, increasing its debts, with very high interest rates and shorter term
payment schedules. It was late to come on board with FDI and was done so only after a huge
debt crisis (in contrast to Africa’s public borrowing debt). The book, Transitions in
Development: The Role of Aid and Commercial Flows, edited by Uma Lele and Ijaz Nabi,
explored the cases of a number of countries in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East and
Africa (Lele and Nabi 1991).
OED/IEG evaluations of the Bank’s experience with SAL and sectoral adjustment lending
(SECAL) supported adjustment generally (IEG 1992; Jayarajah, Branson, and Sen 1996; IEG
2008).²⁵ The evaluations stressed the need for a long-term outlook regarding social impacts,
²⁵ The OED 1992 evaluation noted the primacy of economic growth as the most significant factor affecting
poverty alleviation, in both countries that received SAL and “non-adjuster” countries. A sound macroeconomic
policy framework was important in promoting growth and poverty reduction. In the agriculture sector, partic-
ularly, sector-specific adjustment operations (agriculture sector adjustment loans, or ASALs) did not perform
where there were no corresponding macroeconomic policies (IEG 1992; Jayarajah, Branson, and Sen 1996).
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noting that safety net instruments (cash transfers, consumer subsidies, employment gener-
ation) should not be thought of in terms of short-term compensatory measures, but rather
as longer-run goals of enhanced productivity and reduced poverty through the positive,
long-term impacts of safety nets (Jayarajah, Branson, and Sen 1996).²⁶
Commenting on the country-level experience with SALs and SECALs, Jayarajah,
Branson, and Sen (1996, 2) stated: “Countries that possessed a trained and highly mobile
labor force and supporting economic infrastructure were well positioned to exploit the new
market opportunities.” Middle-income and Asian “adjusters” were most successful. The
principal message from the OED study was that the social impact of adjustment was more
positive for countries that had favorable macroeconomic policy and supply-side reforms,
“good macroeconomic policies and measures—combined with relevant sectoral policies and
appropriate public expenditure allocation—provide a favorable environment for accelerat-
ing savings and investment, both necessary for sustained economic growth and poverty
reduction” (Jayarajah, Branson, and Sen 1996, 1).
Need for Stage-Appropriate Assistance and Nurturing
Development of Institutions
How to assess the role of the Bank’s advice and impact remains a thorny issue. The Berg
Report (World Bank 1981) blamed Africa’s and developing countries’ problems almost
exclusively on bad domestic policies, without acknowledging that many of those policies
had been put in place by the colonial governments and extended to include more African
farmers with the advice and funding of external donors and their advisors. In Kenya, many
of the state interventions—for example, a large farm strategy—were inherited from the
colonial past, condoned, and even promoted by external advisors (see, for example,
Hazelwood [1991]). The lack of functioning markets in many developing countries, partic-
ularly in SSA, led to state interventions. Parastatal marketing boards, inventions of colonial
governments originally created to support white farmers, were expanded by newly inde-
pendent countries with burgeoning aid to provide services to African farmers. Import-
substituting industrialization strategies, however, compounded the balance of payments
problems, because they came at the expense of exports and made countries vulnerable to
external shocks (Collier 1991). To the extent that foreign aid facilitated these poor policies,
it contributed to the problems (Carvalho 1991; Hazelwood 1991). Even after the structural
adjustment period, it took a long time internally in the World Bank to acknowledge that, in
Africa, ethnic issues also mattered: for example, with regard to the curtailment of the role of
Asian and Lebanese traders and discouragement of their activities by governments, which
were typically overlooked.
A 1989 MADIA study chronicled the role of aid in African agriculture, external shocks,
and domestic policies, many of which were overlooked in the Bank’s single-minded pursuit
of SALs and during Africa’s public sector growth (Lele 1989). Owning up to the role of the
donors and the World Bank was a challenging part of the MADIA study. Donors who
participated in carrying out parallel studies of their own assistance to African agriculture
²⁶ The “Social Dimensions” evaluation noted programs, including public works programs, which generate both
income for beneficiaries and contribute to infrastructure: food distribution through health centers/primary
schools that contribute to both nutrition and education (Jayarajah, Branson, and Sen 1996). We discuss this
further in Chapter 12.
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were concerned that acknowledging lack of impacts would either be considered disloyal to
their aid institutions, or worse, would imply liability for debt forgiveness, with the risk that
the problems would be seen as the fault of outsiders, with no need to pay back the borrowed
funds—the so-called moral hazard (Lele 1989).
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Bank also
initiated assistance to Eastern Europe. Karen Brooks, one of the few Russian-speaking
agricultural economists at the World Bank was in demand for designing assistance pro-
grams to Eastern Europe, as she noted in personal communication with Uma Lele:
The Bank was most effective in the initial advice on loosening the administrative pricing
system to avoid the feared catastrophic breakdown in food markets in the winter of 1991–
1992. This so-called “price liberalization” is unpopular with many people who lived
through it, but it was needed and effective, and not badly implemented. The other aid
organizations did not have any guidance on pricing when the shortages appeared in fall of
1991, and the Soviet Union asked the Bank formally for US$14.5 billion in food aid. The
Bank mission made the case for price liberalization in the food sector, and it was accepted
by the Russian government in January 1992, and subsequently by the other newly
independent republics to varying degrees.
The Bank also carried out a lot of work advising on land issues and farm restructuring, and
offered general agricultural policy advice in the form of sector reviews for each of the
newly independent countries. Acceptance of the advice was very mixed, and the agricul-
tural sector evolved in haphazard ways throughout the transition. In Russia, the sixfold
devaluation of the ruble in August 1998 was quite instrumental in adjusting the compet-
itiveness of agriculture, and spurred consolidation of assets in the hands of the old farm
managers and nomenklatura—that had already been under way, but it accelerated after
the devaluation. The Central Asian countries and Belarus were very slow to change.
(Karen Brooks, personal communication with Uma Lele, August 31, 2019)
For more details on the reforms in Eastern Europe, see Rozelle and Swinnen (2004).
Differences between Structural Adjustment in the 1980s
and in the New Millennium
Contrary to the early 1980s, the governments’ responses in 2008–9 were characterized by
the adoption of Keynesian fiscal stimulus packages, in which an increase in social spending
was one of the main components (Martorano, Cornia, and Stewart 2014). Nonetheless, in
2010–11, fear of debt default and continuous pressures from the financial markets pushed
many policymakers to introduce austerity packages and cut public social expenditure, thereby
offsetting part of the prior policy decisions, as was already noted in the early 1980s.
Econometric evidence shows that the factors explaining the difference in policy approaches
between the early 1980s and in 2008–9 include greater country autonomy compared to the
past, the spread of democracy, and greater attention paid to human development by policy-
makers designing fiscal adjustments (Martorano, Cornia, and Stewart 2014).
Martorano, Cornia, and Stewart (2014) also noted that the financial crisis of the 2000s
affected more regions of the world, but its effects on particular countries were more
heterogeneous, varying according to countries’ dependence on different sources of foreign
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capital. Southern and Eastern Europe and Latin America were affected the worst. Because of
heavy aid dependence and less integration with financial markets, SSA was less severely
affected. In contrast, in the 1980s, SSA and Latin America suffered most. In aggregate terms,
the fall in GDP was much greater in the 2000s than the 1980s. Yet, taken as a whole, the
impact on poverty appears to have been less in the later period. One major difference
between the 1980s and 2000s was the greater autonomy that countries had in policymaking,
with less dependence on IMF, allowing countries to follow more expansionary policies.
Government expenditure, as a proportion of GDP, was generally sustained in 2000s,
compared to the severe cuts in the 1980s. Moreover, there were more extensive social
support programs in the 2000s, which acted as mild protection against economic downturn.
The crisis of the 2000s was shorter than that of the 1980s, so that people and governments
could draw upon their savings to protect their livelihoods (Martorano, Cornia, and
Stewart 2014).
The 1990s: “The Lost Decade”—The Wapenhans
Report and Debt Relief
The 1990s were the “lost decade” for economic growth, in general, and for agriculture, in
particular. Developing countries experienced slow growth and mounting debt. The 1980s
had radically transformed the Bank’s relationship with developing countries, with far-
reaching impact on the Bank’s declining presence in overall resource transfers and even
more so in the agricultural sector, a decided shift from projects to macroeconomic and
sector lending—leading to the establishment of a Poverty Reduction and Economic
Management (PREM) vice-presidency in the Bank.
In 1992, World Bank President Lewis Preston appointed a senior vice-president, Willi
Wapenhans, to lead an ambitious Bank-wide Portfolio Management Task Force to address
issues of poor portfolio performance. Some 1,800 projects were reviewed in 113 countries,
with a total portfolio of US$138 billion for implementation performance. It was an
authoritative, thorough, and devastating critique of the Bank operations. Wapenhans
noted that 37.5 percent of the projects completed in 1991 were deemed unsatisfactory at
completion, up from 15 percent in 1981, and 30.5 percent in 1989. Bank staff also reported
that 30 percent of projects in their fourth or fifth year of implementation in 1991 had major
problems. The worst affected sectors were Water Supply and Sanitation, where 43 percent of
the projects were said to have major problems, and Agriculture, with 42 percent of those
problematic. Geographically, the African region had the most severe performance pro-
blems, and two countries in Latin America had 50 percent of the problems in that region.
The report noted that, far from being isolated sector phenomenon, the problems were
spreading: “traditionally strong performing sectors are now affected too: among them (in
FY91), telecommunications (18%), power (22%), industry (17%), and technical assistance
(27%). New areas of lending are also encountering major problems: poverty (28%), envi-
ronment (30%), and private and public sector reform (23%)” (World Bank 1992, 4).
The task force made 87 recommendations to improve effectiveness. The report recom-
mended linking country portfolio performance to the Bank’s core business practices,
reflecting portfolio performance in country assistance strategies (CASs), preparing an
annual report on portfolio performance, providing more active project and portfolio
restructuring, assuring country commitment and broad-based participation in project
preparation, performing a rigorous analysis of project risks, emphasizing the Bank’s role
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in improvement of management of project performance, and monitoring and more inde-
pendent evaluation by OED. It also urged decisiveness in portfolio management and a
review of procurement issues and guidelines (World Bank 1992). In 1993, the executive
directors approved “A Program of Actions,” based on management proposals of how to
implement the recommendations of the Wapenhans task force. The program’s main
objective was to ensure that the Bank obtained better results on the ground, thereby
increasing the development impact of its operations (World Bank 1993).
Lessons from the Wapenhans Report: Challenge of
Implementation and Desire for Greater Country
Ownership and Longer Time Horizon
The most critical lesson to emerge from the Wapenhans Report was that without borrower
commitment and capacity to design and implement reforms, Bank supervision of its
loans could not be effective. Borrower commitment can, of course, exist without the
necessary institutional capacity. In such cases, capacity building should be an integral part
of the adjustment process. This has implications for both the content and pace of reforms.
The gestation period will be much longer—a consideration not sufficiently recognized in the
design and supervision of policy-based loans. In the absence of borrower commitment,
the adjustment lending process should focus on developing commitment and ownership
through country economic and sector work and dialogue. Rushing a policy loan to the
Board may impose an unacceptably heavy burden of supervision and monitoring of the
program. It should be followed with greater rigor than had been evident in the recent past.
The report admonished borrowers to be involved in developing program content, supervi-
sion, and monitoring of the impact of policy loans to build capacity, increase ownership,
and provide information and analysis on the basis of which midterm corrections could be
made. It urged flexibility in design and for procedures; multiple tranches were considered
desirable since they provide opportunities for systematic discussion with the borrower and
within the Bank. There were detailed recommendations along these lines, including on the
management of dialogue on economic reform, macroeconomic monitoring by the Bank,
guidelines on public expenditure reviews, and, particularly, the link between expenditures
and social sectors, including compensatory measures to reduce social cost on the directly
affected and vulnerable in society that may require expenditures. Among the recommenda-
tions was the need to adopt at least a 10-year framework for policy lending, with active
involvement of borrowers and monitorable targets ensuring joint ownership and better
supervision (World Bank 1992).
Rising Debt and Debt Relief for Heavily Indebted Countries
In the early 1990s, concern about the rising debt of poor African countries further
reinforced focus on the social sectors and safety nets, but once again ignored the role of
the food and the agricultural sector. Wolfensohn, Bank president from 1995 to 2005,
considers debt relief one of his singular achievements. The concern prompted a few
international players, including UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, some OECD government
leaders, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to advocate for effective debt relief
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for LICs.²⁷ In 1996, with the World Bank and the IMF launching the Debt Initiative for
HIPC, a framework for all creditors was created, including multilateral creditors, to provide
debt relief to the world’s poorest and most heavily indebted countries—with the aim of
ensuring that no poor country faced a debt burden that it could not manage. Assistance was
conditional on national governments meeting a range of economic management and
performance targets, making a commitment to poverty reduction through policy changes,
and demonstrating a record of good economic management over time. The Fund and Bank
provided interim debt relief in the initial stage, and when a country met its commitments,
full debt relief was provided. The initiative was enhanced in three ways in 1999:
• Deeper and Broader Relief: External debt thresholds were lowered from the original
framework. As a result, more countries became eligible for debt relief and some
countries became eligible for more relief.
• Faster Relief: A number of creditors began to provide interim debt relief immediately at
the decision point. Also, the new framework permitted countries to reach the comple-
tion point faster.
• Stronger Link between Debt Relief and Poverty Reduction: Freed resources were to be
used to support poverty reduction strategies through Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers, which are developed by national governments in consultation with civil society.
(World Bank 2018b)
The modifications strengthened the HIPC initiative. However, the initiative is not a panacea
for all the problems of heavily indebted poor countries. Even without debt, most still depend
on significant levels of external development assistance. Most of the ODA now goes to low-
income developing countries. The Bank had focused more on agricultural productivity
growth and poverty reduction than on food security. In 1993, however, organized by Ismail
Serageldin, the World Bank held a conference on food security at the American University
entitled “Overcoming Global Hunger.” The proceedings were edited and published in 1994,
by Serageldin and Pierre Landell-Mills, as Overcoming Global Hunger: Proceedings of a
Conference on Actions to Reduce Hunger Worldwide, part of the World Bank’s
Environmentally Sustainable Development Series (Serageldin and Landell-Mills 1994). See
more in Chapter 4 on food security.
The 1997 Rural Development Policy: Getting Back
on the Agenda with “From Vision to Action”
After a long hiatus, the Bank formed a new rural development policy, directed by Alex
McCalla, then Director of Rural Development, with large active role played by Hans
Binswanger, two brilliant economists, highly respected internationally. After a few years,
²⁷ President Carter proposed debt forgiveness for Guyana in 1993 to IMF and theWorld Bank, when Uma Lele
served as the founding Director of the Global Development Initiative of the Carter Center and the Carnegie
Endowment (while on leave from the World Bank from 1991 to 1995). Lele had recruited Ravi Gulhati, former
Chief Economist of the Bank’s Africa Region to help develop a stabilization program for Guyana in 1993. The
United States, Germany, and Japan were opposed to debt rescheduling or debt forgiveness. When the British
Prime Minister Tony Blair came up with a debt initiative, the HIPC Debt Initiative began to gather momentum
and became a reality in 1997 (Copson 2005).
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the effort was frequently described as long on vision and short on action. It showed how
difficult it has been to motivate action on agriculture and rural development from the Bank,
with McNamara’s top-down period having been a singular exception. Key elements of
“Vision to Action” involved working with partner countries and the international commu-
nity to integrate rural development into Country Development Strategies, “addressing long-
ignored issues,” and “addressing old issues in new ways” (Ayres and McCalla 1997, viii).
Land reform, gender equality, and food and nutrition were highlighted as “ignored” (Ayres
and McCalla 1997, 18). The strategy suggested implementing new ways to deliver rural
financial services, promote sustainable resource use, and proposed involving the entire
WBG in promoting rural development, rather than only the Agricultural and Rural
Development Global Practice.
The strategy identified four major challenges: (1) poverty and hunger reduction; (2)
raising economic growth; (3) increasing global food production; and (4) halting natural
resource and environmental degradation. A “broad and complex” strategy called for growth
not only to expand food output, but also to be “widely shared and sustainable” (Ayres and
McCalla 1997, 3). Eliminating poverty had been the central tenet of McNamara’s 1973
speech to the World Bank’s Annual Meeting. The executive summary of “Vision to Action”
asked why these critical issues were not being addressed. It cited a lack of attention from
three sources—the country, international agencies, and WBG. The strategy noted weak
demand from countries (“agricultural underperformers or even dropouts”) (Ayres and
McCalla 1997, 3) and the international community’s complacency in the face of declining
food prices, as well as the significant decline in lending to agriculture by the World Bank.
The underperformers were characterized by the Bank as having institutional frameworks and
agricultural policies that discriminated against the rural sector and private sector initiatives;
underinvesting in technology development and in its dissemination, and in health and
education; having inappropriate agrarian structures; and showing a tendency to undervalue
natural resources and, therefore, to waste them (Ayres and McCalla 1997, 3). In developing
countries, agriculture was seen as a declining sector in the economy and, therefore, not worth
prioritization. This perception was coupled with a lack of voice for the poor dispersed in
rural areas, relative to a growing urban population with increased political power.
“Vision to Action” also acknowledged that the deterioration in project and program
performance in the Bank’s agricultural and rural development portfolio played a role. Only
52 percent of the completed projects in the 1980s were rated satisfactory. IFC was disor-
ganized, and the performance of its agribusiness portfolio was poor, too. It had reorganized
into a single department in 1992, thus bringing its performance in this area rapidly in line
with the rest of IFC work. Since 1997, performance of completed Bank projects improved,
according to the “Vision to Action” policy document. The policy document also outlined
lessons learned from failed approaches, such as in the case of integrated rural development
projects. For instance, “most decisions . . . were made by central government officials, and
communities were rarely involved in project design, implementation, or monitoring” (Ayres
and McCalla 1997, 5):²⁸
• Sector-specific projects, such as offering of agricultural credit through parastatals, had
not worked—they had poor repayments, benefited richer farmers, and distorted
financial markets through subsidies.
²⁸ In reality, in many cases, particularly in SSA and Latin America, Bank-funded projects were designed by
external actors, and many of those in Africa were implemented by expatriates.
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• Resettlement projects tended to be centralized, costly, and unsustainable.
• Large-scale irrigation was centrally driven, tending to experience delays in construc-
tion, cost overruns, and environmental problems, such as salinization and soil
degradation.
• Public sector involvement in seed production, supply, and marketing through para-
statals had caused problems—the private sector was thought to be able to perform
better and more efficiently.
There was little mention of support for agricultural technology in the “Vision to Action”
report, and the few references to it were made in the context of the work being done by
CGIAR or regional interventions. In terms of improved Bank business, “Vision to
Action” outlined: (1) research and extension through NGOs; (2) sector policy lending
in support of policy reforms that governments had undertaken; (3) sector investment
lending, which in some cases helped consolidate donor projects into public expenditure
support programs; (4) rural development through NGOs and CDD—for example, the
transfer of responsibilities for irrigation and drainage (as in northeast Brazil) to com-
munities at risk of reliance on overcentralized bureaucracies; (5) rural finance focused on
increased savings; and (6) increased use of microfinance, reduced subsidies, increased
competition, and land reform through market-assisted policies. It noted that these
innovations were yet to be monitored and introduced into problem projects. Except for
China and Brazil, progress in developing countries was mixed at best in these areas
(Ayres and McCalla 1997).
The strategic checklist was utopian, envisioned by an enlightened, well-informed
agricultural policymaker. “Vision to Action” set out to achieve 80 percent “satisfactory”
project ratings by 2002, through regular portfolio reviews. ECA achieved that level by
2000, while African rates still remained below all others in 2017. The report acknowl-
edged the perpetual tension between improved portfolio performance and innovation
and risk. To address this challenge, pilot experimental projects were proposed to learn
lessons before investments were scaled up. Qualitative outcomes were also proposed: (1)
perceived Bank leadership in the fight to reduce rural poverty and improve natural
resource management; (2) progress toward freer and fairer world trade; and (3) reversal
of the low-growth trends of underperforming countries through country ownership and
political will.
“Vision to Action” was launched in 1997 with considerable fanfare, following extensive
consultations, with support from the Bank’s top management and a complement of 470
staff in rural development, including 100 long-term consultants. It optimistically pro-
claimed, “This rural sector strategy is not business as usual!” (Ayres and McCalla 1997,
17). Yet, 2003 turned out to be the year with the lowest level of lending to agriculture by the
World Bank (Figures 8.2 and 8.5).
The 2000 OED evaluation of the “Vision to Action” strategy found that it failed to
provide an enabling framework for effective action. “Since From Vision to Action was
prepared, the Bank’s effectiveness at rural development is perceived to have increased—
but it is still less than satisfactory . . . Partners express skepticism about the scope for market-
based solutions and decentralization” (OED 2000, 1–2). The evaluation concluded that the
Bank’s rural work was not sufficiently focused on poverty reduction. The Bank has not been
effective at communicating its corporate rural strategy, and better articulation of the
strategy was required—including attention to cross-sectoral issues and the nexus between
urban and rural development—in CASs (OED 2000).
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The 2000s: Toward a Food and Financial Crisis
The new millennium saw the development of new strategies to address continuing
problems.
The 2003 Rural Development Strategy
The Bank’s new rural development strategy, described in its 2003 publication, “Reaching the
Rural Poor: A Renewed Strategy for Rural Development,” again attempted to refocus effort
on rural development, but again without much emphasis on agriculture, the sector most of
the rural poor continue to depend upon for their livelihoods. In his foreword, Bank
President James Wolfensohn declared the strategy as “our ‘battle-plan’ for such a renewed
focus, and our commitment to reverse the downward trend in rural lending” (World Bank
2003b, v). He noted in his foreword: “Over the last decade lending to rural development,
and especially to agriculture, has been in unprecedented decline—both at the World Bank
and among our development partners. This situation cannot continue. We must renew our
focus on agriculture and rural development” (World Bank 2003b, v).
Development of the strategy began with regional action plans and dialogue with Bank
clients, civil society organizations, the private sector, academia, and other IOs and policy
leaders—over 2,000 people in all. A series of regional and corporate strategy consultations
began in 2001 throughout Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America and continued through
2002. Early on, the Bank launched a website to solicit public comments. As with “Vision to
Action,” the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development presented an opportunity
for world leaders to pledge support for rural development; other international forums have
also provided platforms for stakeholder discussion (for example, theWorld Food Summit of
FAO and IFPRI’s program, 2020 Vision).²⁹
As with the previous strategy, the new strategy recognized past disappointments. In fact,
the fundamentals and context largely carried over from the previous “Vision to Action”—
compounded with five years of additional experience. “Reaching the Rural Poor” concluded
that “Vision to Action” had a decisive influence on global thinking, but produced little
results.³⁰ It reported, in 2001, that lending for agricultural projects was the lowest in the
World Bank’s history—for fiscal years 1999 to 2001, amounting to US$5 billion annually, or
25 percent of total Bank lending. Of the US$5 billion in rural lending in fiscal year 2002,
agricultural sector investment was only US$1.5 billion, or 7.9 percent of total Bank lending.
By comparison, it was at over 30 percent in the 1980s (World Bank 2003b, xiv).
The strategy rested its case on the connection between agricultural growth and poverty
reduction, citing the literature and evidence documenting and linking GDP and per capita
income changes to agricultural growth, presenting a number of illustrative examples,
²⁹ See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/milesstones/wssd for more information about theWorld Summit
for Sustainable Development, and see http://www.fao.org/WFS/for FAO’s World Food Summit and https://www.
ifpri.org/program/2020-vision to read more about the IFPRI 2020 Vision program.
³⁰ Annex I of “Reaching the Rural Poor” evaluated the three projected outcomes of “Vision to Action,”
concluding: (1) the Bank did not lead in reducing rural poverty due to a decline in lending and limited institutional
capacity; (2) the limited authorizing environment in dealing with OECD country subsidies limited progress in
trade liberalization; and (3) a focus on 15 countries led to variable results in promoting increased economic
growth (World Bank 2003b, 96–7).
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particularly from India and East Asia.³¹ It designated agriculture as the “leading sector
within the rural economy, with significant forward and backward linkages to the non-farm
sector” (World Bank 2003b, 43). The agenda of “Reaching the Rural Poor” pays specific
attention to agriculture, with proposed shifts from:
• Narrow agricultural focus to a global policy context for agriculture growth and poverty
reduction;
• A focus on yields to market demands and outcomes;
• Staples to high-value crops;
• Primary production to the food chain as a whole;
• A single-farm approach to heterogeneity (later, a core feature of the 2008WDR [World
Bank 2007]);
• Public to public–private partnerships and CDD;
• Avoidance of issues to a head-on approach to biotechnology, forestry, and water, and
other key issues (World Bank 2003b, 44).
Food security, which has become a major focus for the global community since 2007, was
included under the objective of improving social well-being and mitigating risk. The
approach suggested new types of insurance to navigate weather changes and commodity
prices and the use of more cost-effective, targeted programs over generalized subsidies. The
evidence on crop insurance in the United States suggests it is heavily subsidized (Smith
2017), and it is unlikely to operate differently in developing countries (Raju and Chand
2007; Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; Sahu 2018). The promotion of certain ideas, whether social
rates of return or crop insurance, tend to be driven by a momentum behind certain ideas of
economic entrepreneurs.
The strategy also notes the importance of comprehensive nutrition programs for women
and children, an area that has received, in particular, an international boost since 2007–8.
Chapter 4 describes the complexity of the nutrition challenge and why the efforts of the
Bank have had limited impacts (World Bank 2003b). The latest research on India shows
that the idea of a multisectoral platform, agreed to in principle in India’s nutrition policy to
address a multisectoral challenge, is not working (Menon et al. 2019).
In hindsight, the language, argumentation, and evidence in “Reaching the Rural Poor”
seemed familiar to authors and readers of previous reports. The new strategy sought to
distinguish itself from past approaches, in that it was results-oriented and stressed practice,
implementation of “attainable actions,”monitoring, and empowerment of the people who it
was designed to help (World Bank 2003b, xiv). In outlining strategic objectives, “Reaching
the Rural Poor” highlights essential elements of an appropriate macroeconomic policy
environment and supportive institutional framework, including agricultural trade liberali-
zation; good governance, including decentralization and transfer of responsibility for
services to the political and administrative level closest to (rural) users; and a better
understanding of the relation between financial services and poverty, as well as a shift
from supply-driven agricultural credit (World Bank 2003b).
Unlike “Vision to Action,” “Reaching the Rural Poor” did not set specific targets, noting
that the demand-driven nature of the strategy would result in differing regional benchmarks
and goals. It suggested a results-based management approach and tracking of country
³¹ The strategy document noted the average real income of small farmers in southern India rose by 90 percent
between 1973 and 1994, as a result of the Green Revolution (World Bank 2003b, xix).
560   
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/9/2021, SPi
indicators in rural development and poverty reduction to monitor and evaluate results over
a five-year period. The identified risks to successful strategy implementation were lack of
multisectoral adoption of the strategy, failure to address institutional arrangements and
staffing, failure of institutional learning and innovation to materialize, lack of country buy-
in, and long-term growth unrealized in client countries.
In 1998, the Bank’s Agriculture and Rural Development department established an
Agriculture and Knowledge Information System (AKIS), a Bank-wide network of practi-
tioners, also involving practitioners in other agencies and produced a number of knowledge
products. Noting that agricultural lending had declined precipitously from the peak of 1991
to a bottom in 2003, the Agriculture Investment Sourcebook identified the changing invest-
ment climate and assembled a collection of examples from Bank projects and country
policies, providing good practices from around the developing world in 11 different areas
(World Bank 2005a). In its Review ofWorld Bank activities, “Putting Social Development to
Work for the Poor,” OED noted:
Only after President Wolfensohn’s first annual meetings address, “New Directions and
New Partnerships,” did the Bank make rapid progress in mainstreaming attention to
social concerns. The culmination of this effort came in 1996, when President Wolfensohn
convened a Social Development Task Force to address the role of social assessment in
Bank lending instruments and Country Assistance Strategies. Then, through the 1997
Strategic Compact, the Bank provided additional resources for social development capac-
ity building, as well as funds to help execute the Regional Social Development Action
Plans. As a result of these initiatives, Bank social scientists began to provide social analysis
and to take steps to understand the social impacts of both traditional Bank projects and
the Bank’s growing portfolio of social service projects. (OED 2005b, ix)
See Box 8.3 for a discussion of CDD.
Approximately 105 IBRD and IDA countries had undertaken projects with a CDD
approach as of 2011. Between 2002 and 2011, IBRD and IDA approved 734 projects,
which used CDD approaches, either for the entire projects or in selected components.
Total Bank lending for CDD, managed and controlled directly by communities and local
governments, was US$22.5 billion over the period, with an average of US$2.2 billion per
year, and including several large projects approved in Africa and East and SA (World Bank
2013a).
As lending has increased, the big challenge, particularly in the second and third gener-
ation of projects, was to mainstream CDDs into the body politic of the local governments,
into specific sectors, and to make them sustainable.
“Agriculture” or “Agriculture and Rural Development”?
One of the vexing issues in the Bank, over the past 50 years, has been how best to achieve
agricultural development: that is, whether by lending to agriculture alone, through special-
ized activities, or to agriculture and rural development, using an integrated development
strategy. In certain circumstances, specialized loans or credits—for example, for agricultural
research and education or for agricultural finance—are essential and make sense. Overall,
however, it does not make sense to think of agriculture in a narrow sense, omitting the
critical importance of transport, irrigation, power, and communications in determining
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Box 8.3 Community-Driven Development
Community-driven development (CDD) is meant to support empowerment of the poor
to make interventions, which are more relevant to their needs, by giving communities
control of subproject resources and decisions. Community-based development (CBD)
“emphasizes collaboration, consultation, or sharing information” with communities on
project activities, while giving them less responsibility (OED 2005a, ix). Since the late
1990s, the Bank has favored CDD, though many CDD projects also include CBD
components. The share of projects that include a CBD or CDD component grew from
about 2 percent in fiscal 1989 to 25 percent in 2003 (OED 2005a, xiii).
Mansuri and Rao (2013) in a comprehensive review of 500 studies, “Localizing
Development,” noted the Bank had committed over US$85 billion to participatory
projects over the previous decade.
The OED study on “The Effectiveness of World Bank Support for Community-Based
and -Driven Development” noted:
Over the 1994–2003 period, the outcome ratings of CBD/CDD projects have been
better than those for non-CBD/CDD projects on quantitative goals such as construc-
tion of infrastructure than on qualitative goals, such as capacity enhancement.
Sustainability ratings for the projects have improved over time, but there is consider-
able room for improvement. Bank interventions have often failed to provide the
consistent, long-term support needed for an activity to become sustainable (for exam-
ple, in a forestry project, support should be provided until the forest starts yielding
adequate returns from timber and non-timber products). (OED 2005a, ix)
In his recent book, Why Counterinsurgency Fails: The US in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Dennis de Tray argues in favor of bottom-up, decentralized development in fragile and
conflict-affected countries, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, because fragile states’ govern-
ments do not or cannot serve their people, and people in fragile states neither believe in
nor support their government. The only government most people know is local govern-
ment. Local governors know more about what their people need than either the coalition
forces or Kabul would ever know, and they knew how to get things done in their local
environment (de Tray 2019). So, what happens if we give local governors resources,
accountability, and responsibility and insist only on transparency? It works better. De
Tray came to many of these conclusions, as did Mansuri and Rao (2013): leadership
matters. Programs worked best in districts with competent and engaged leadership. One
size does not fit all. Local conditions dictated different approaches to development and
the uses of development resources. Provinces and districts have weak capacity, but that is
not the same thing as zero capacity. Given a chance, provincial and district governments
were capable of making local development happen.
Mansuri and Rao (2013) documented how community participation is highly context-
specific, depending on history, geography, cultural, and political factors. Success depends
on careful, independent monitoring. Task managers, who were surveyed, highlighted
several problems, including:
. . . lack of management support, the lack of an adequate project supervision budget,
and the fact that most World Bank managers believe that governments see monitoring
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TFP and in the development of value chains in agriculture, or of clean water and sanitation
and gender empowerment in achieving household food security and nutrition. Effective
agriculture and rural development calls for holistic, intersectoral approaches, for which the
Bank has a unique advantage.
The 2007 and 2010 IEG evaluations of “World Bank Assistance to Agriculture in Sub-
Saharan Africa” argued that, from time to time, when the Bank has chosen to opt for
agriculture or rural development, it has neglected either agriculture while shifting to rural
development, or ignored complementarities with related sectors, such as rural roads, while
focusing on agriculture (IEG 2007). “The central finding of the study is that the agriculture
sector has been neglected both by governments and the donor community, including the
World Bank. The Bank’s strategy for agriculture has been increasingly subsumed within a
broader rural focus, in which its importance has suffered” (IEG 2007, xi). AFF sector
lending peaked in FY 2018, compared to FY1990, increasing from the low of only US
$1.8billion in FY2003 to US$4.2 billion in FY2018, all in real terms (nominal/MUV Index,
2010 = 100), while lending to rural development peaked in FY2010, since FY1990, at US$7.8
billion and has increased more significantly from US$1 billion in FY2002. Recently, lending
to rural development showed a declining trend while the trend of lending to the AFF sector
is increasing (Figure 8.18). The Agriculture versus Rural Development debate stresses the
importance of area development going forward, rather than narrowly conceived “agricul-
tural” projects, given the increasing interdependence of agriculture with water, energy/
power, transportation, and information. Also, it calls for a decentralized development
approach that increases the role of local governments. It is only through area development
approaches that the need for intersectoral coordination can be addressed: within the World
Bank and within governments, with a need to break down silos. Silos—sectoral staff and
project and program staff working in isolation of each other—have long been a long-
standing challenge within the Bank, which Stanley Please described well in his oral history
account, cited previously (Please 1986). It is unclear if the Bank has eliminated silos or
created new ones. Much will depend on how budgeting is done and what incentives will be
set up for cross-sectoral staff to collaborate in a solution mode. The 2019 “Realignment”
appears to have significantly weakened Global Practices, which were created in 2014 under
Jim Kim, increasing his unpopularity. The latest reorganization strengthened the regions
relative to Global Practices, as both budgets and work programs are under regional directors
(IEG 2019).
systems as a box to be checked off in order to qualify for a loan rather than as an
instrument to help improve the effectiveness of projects. Given their sense that country
counterparts have little incentive to implement good M&E [monitoring and evalua-
tion] systems, explicit support from theWorld Bank may be critical. (Mansuri and Rao,
2013, 303)
Additional concerns, including increased access to infrastructure, does not always
translate into effective service delivery. The poorest do not always benefit from these
projects. There is little evidence on the poverty-reducing and community capacity-
enhancing impacts of the projects.
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It is hard to say what these moving of boxes on an organizational chart means to the
Bank’s performance, as we noted earlier.
The Bank’s Gender Strategy and Implementation
In his speech to the Plenary Session of the 2019 Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors,
World Bank President Malpass stated: “We’re investing in human capital. More than half of
all 10-year-olds in low- and middle-income countries can’t read, which is unacceptable. In
this week’s education and learning announcements, we set a target of at least cutting
learning poverty in half,” and “We’re putting substantial resources into closing the gender
gap. In fiscal 2019, over 60 percent of combined IBRD and IDA operations helped address
gender gaps and encouraged full incorporation of women in economies” (World Bank
2019b).
The development community has realized for several decades that gender parity, empow-
ering women and improving women’s access to factors of production while giving them
voice in decision-making of matters that affect their lives and those of their households, and
indeed, of nation states, is critical to achieve development.
In an IMF Staff Discussion Note, “Women, Work and the Economy: Macroeconomic
Gains from Gender Equity,” it was asserted:
Women make up a little over half the world’s population, but their contribution to
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Figure 8.18 IDA and IBRD annual commitment to the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector
and Rural Development sector, FY1990–FY2018 (US$bn, real = nominal/MUV, MUV Index
2010 = 100)
Source: Based on data from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-bank-projects-operations
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macroeconomic consequences. Despite significant progress in recent decades, labor mar-
kets across the world remain divided along gender lines, and progress toward gender
equality seems to have stalled. Female labor force participation (FLFP) has remained lower
than male participation, women account for most unpaid work, and when women are
employed in paid work, they are overrepresented in the informal sector and among the
poor. They also face significant wage differentials vis-à-vis their male colleagues. In many
countries, distortions and discrimination in the labor market restrict women’s options for
paid work, and female representation in senior positions and entrepreneurship remains low.
The challenges of growth, job creation, and inclusion are closely intertwined . . . (Elborgh-
Woytek et al. 2013, 4)
Notably, IMF was headed by French economist Christine Lagarde, who served as the first
woman Managing Director and Chairman of the Executive Board of the IMF from 2011 to
September 2019. As noted earlier, Kristalina Georgieva, former CEO of the World Bank,
assumed this position on October 1, 2019. IMF’s research on gender makes a number of
recommendations to address the challenge: “the constraints preventing women from
developing their full economic potential, [and] implementing policies that remove labor
market distortions and create a level playing field for all will give women the opportunity to
develop their potential and to participate in economic life more visibly.” The Staff
Discussion Note was “based on research undertaken in academia and by other international
financial institutions, in addition to the IMF’s own surveillance and research work”
(Elborgh-Woytek et al. 2013, 4).
The World Bank’s approach has been slow to evolve with limited impact on outcomes.
The Bank appointed the first Women in Development Advisor as early as in 1977, but the
progress was slow. In 2001, the Bank produced an operational strategy on gender that
required CASs, later called country partnership strategies, to comment on the countries’
own policies and plans on gender and the Bank’s proposed response through assistance in
various sectors (World Bank 2002). Successive IDA replenishments and later MDGs
reinforced attention to gender. The Bank has also had an operational policy, OP 4.20 on
gender and development, since 2003, which was revised in March 2012, and is still in
effect.³² The IEG evaluation of the 2001 strategy noted that, after an initial spurt, imple-
mentation tapered off due to absence of monitoring and accountability. CASs did not have a
systematic treatment of gender, and there was frequently weak follow-up of the strategies in
Bank assistance to countries and unclear prioritization of assistance by sectors in which it
would have the biggest impact (IEG 2010). In 2007, the Bank prepared the Gender Action
Plan, with resources for analytical work and policy dialogue, which went beyond project
lending and provided an input into the Bank’s 2012 WDR: Gender Equality and
Development (World Bank 2012). The Bank has also become more active in other gender-
related platforms. Its latest strategy for 2016–23 proposes to move beyond mainstreaming
gender to outcomes based on enhanced, country-level diagnostics, building capacity of
countries’ statistical offices to improve “data collection in four priority areas: (1) physical
and financial asset ownership and control, (2) time use, (3) employment, and (4) welfare.
Each area has three components: methodological research, data production, and data
dissemination and usability” for assistance and monitoring of results (WBG 2015, 66).
The Gender Strategy FY2016–23 states that in SSA, “the Bank Group will focus on the
³² See OP 4.20 – Gender and Development. https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/
1680090224b08231c012.pdf and http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01541/WEB/0__-1909.HTM
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gender gap in agricultural productivity and agribusiness operations, whereas in South Asia
the focus will be on nutrition-sensitive and safe food systems and sustainable livelihoods, as
well as on linking smallholder farmers to value chains” (WBG 2015, 43). The Bank is also
working in partnership with IFC’s initiative, described in the section on IFC in Appendix B.
The World Bank Group’s Gender Strategy (FY16–23): Gender Equality, Poverty Reduction
and Inclusive Growth describes the IFC partnership, She Works (WBG 2015).
The World Bank’s Work on Land Policy
In Chapter 2, we discussed debates on agricultural productivity growth by farm size and the
role of factor markets, particularly labor market failures, in explaining the inverse relation-
ship between farm size and productivity at early stages of development. In that chapter, we
also provided some recent evidence that productivity growth may be showing a U-shaped
pattern of farm size and productivity, with respect to growth in per capita income (Muyanga
and Jayne 2019). Typically, as factor markets develop, labor finds alternative employment in
the nonagricultural sector at wages equal to or more than the marginal product of labor in
agriculture, and labor moves out of agriculture, causing labor shortages and leading to
increased capitalization of agriculture—that is, substitution of machines for labor—consol-
idation of land, and increase in farm size. This process is aided by the development of land
and capital markets in a synergetic way. Good public policy toward land and finance can
accelerate this process. Economists in the Bank have argued that secure property rights
enable access to capital, using land as collateral; promote land rental markets to facilitate
more intensive land use; or use underutilized land, thereby creating more employment and
increased efficiency.
Hans Binswanger was at the forefront of these issues and has had considerable influence
in placing the issue of property rights on the World Bank’s agenda of agriculture and rural
development. Klaus Deininger, his mentee, has helped spawn a huge program of work on
land, illustrating what a combination of intellectual leadership, entrepreneurship, and the
Bank’s convening power can do to mobilize research resources, attract other analysts, and
influence the Bank’s policy dialogue and operations. Since their first paper in 1993
(Binswanger and Deininger 1993), Deininger has organized 20 annual Land and Policy
conferences, attended by over 1,500 professionals, donors, and national policymakers, and
in 2019, with influence on more than US$1.8 billion of the Bank’s operating funds.
Together, Binswanger and Deininger documented the impact of institutions in governing
access to use of land and on socioeconomic development. They broke new ground by
demonstrating that benefits from secure land rights and good land governance can be large,
pro-poor, and multifaceted for many reasons. Clearly, their thinking evolved considerably,
based on reality on the ground, as can be seen from their papers. In their 1999 paper, Deininger
and Binswanger identified “three guiding principles: (1) the desirability of owner-operated
family farms; (2) the need for markets to permit land to be transferred to more productive
users; and (3) the importance of an egalitarian asset distribution. In the 25 years since that
paper [the World Bank’s (1975a) “Land Reform Policy Paper”] was published, these guiding
principles have remained the same . . . ” (Deininger and Binswanger 1999, 247).³³ In reality, the
policies did change quite a bit with experience. Whereas the World Bank had “recommended
³³ See Chapter 2: we note that the definition of what constitutes a family farm varies in the literature.
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communal tenure systems be abandoned in favor of freehold titles and the subdivision of the
commons,” in the 1975 paper, the researchers noted a growing recognition in the Bank that
some “communal tenure systems can be more cost-effective than formal [an Anglo-Saxon
concept of a land ownership] title, that titling programs should be judged on their equity as
well as their efficiency” (Deininger and Binswanger 1999, 247–8). In the same vein, they
argued:
The potential of land rental markets has often been severely underestimated, that land-sale
markets enhance efficiency only if they are integrated into a broader effort at developing
rural factor markets, and that land reform is more likely to result in a reduction of poverty
if it harnesses (rather than undermines) the operation of land markets and is implemented
in a decentralized fashion. Achieving land policies that incorporate these elements
requires a coherent legal and institutional framework together with greater reliance on
pilot programs to examine the applicability of interventions under local conditions.
(Deininger and Binswanger 1999, 247)
Realities on the ground, however, can be quite different.
In 2009, based on the review of the literature on the impact of land administration
interventions in specific contexts, Deininger and Feder (2009, 234) noted, outcomes
depend on “the governance environment, the effectiveness of the state apparatus, and the
distribution of socio-economic power.” The authors noted: “If property rights are secure,
well-defined, and publicly enforced, landowners need to spend less time and resources
guarding them” (Deininger and Feder 2009, 236). Enhanced tenure security through land
registration results in higher levels of investment and productivity and a reduced need to
defend land rights, but the evidence is not uniform. “Land registration has also been shown
to increase activity in land rental markets, leading to higher efficiency overall” (Deininger
and Feder 2009, 233). However, there is little “evidence of improved access to credit, due to
formalization of land rights . . . Even in situations where land registration had positive
benefits, the literature contains little rigorous analysis of cost-effectiveness and long-term
sustainability of impacts. . . . [F]ormalization of land rights should not be viewed as a
panacea” (Deininger and Feder 2009, 233), a major turn-around from the Bank’s position
in 1975, and perhaps even in 1999. They further noted that “interventions should be
decided only after a careful diagnosis of the policy, social, and governance environment”
(Deininger and Feder 2009, 233).
The Bank has conducted economic and sector work on Mexico, Colombia, Nicaragua,
India, Malawi, Zambia, Ethiopia, China, Philippines, Vietnam, and Ukraine, among others;
all of the work is in the Bank’s Image Bank.³⁴ Most of these have resulted in projects, but
increasingly this is shifting to development policy loans (in Malawi and Ukraine) and P4Rs
(Program-for-Results financing) (out of a recently approved US$200 million P4R for
Ukraine, US$160 million is for land, including (1) establishment of a farmer register (linked
to the land and animal registry) to target subsidies and provide information for private
sector (for example, banks and insurance); (2) land use planning by local governments; (3)
free legal aid and awareness campaigns and establishment of an ombudsman to allow land
owners, especially women, effectively enforce their rights.
³⁴ See https://archivesphotos.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/photo-gallery
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Beyond the Bank, Deininger and his colleagues are evaluating efforts undertaken by
governments without Bank assistance (Deininger et al. 2008), or funded by other donors (as
in Rwanda; Ali, Deininger, and Goldstein 2014), and pushed methodological innovations: in
particular, assessing gender-differentiated demand for land title (in Tanzania; Ali et al.
2016); linking to administrative data to assess land registry sustainability (in Rwanda; Ali,
Deininger, and Duponchel 2017; and Ali et al. forthcoming); assessing large farm invest-
ment (in Ethiopia; Ali, Deininger, and Harris 2017; and in Malawi; Deininger and Xia
2018); using freely available satellite imagery to assess effects of soil and water conservation
measures (in Ethiopia; Ali, Deininger, and Monchuk 2020); potential for tax revenue (in
Rwanda; Ali, Deininger, and Wild 2020); and urban expansion (in Vietnam; Goldblatt,
Deininger, and Hanson 2018).
If intervention is justified, the performance of land administration systems needs to be
benchmarked in terms of coverage, cost effectiveness, and quality of service provision. Some
country experiences of Bank interventions are worth noting.
In Brazil, a pilot project was undertaken to support market-based land reform for 15,000
farmers, initiated in 1997 and completed in 2001, with a US$90 million loan. The outcome
was rated satisfactory. The number of farmer beneficiaries was slightly more than targeted,
and their actual income was significantly higher than projected (World Bank 2003a).
Whether it has led to scaling up the program in a significant way to make a difference at
the macroeconomic level is unclear. The Brazilian economy has gone through considerable
gyrations, growing unemployment, changes of governments—including one impeachment,
and unrelatedly, since coming to power in 2017, the Bolsonaro government has opened up
the Amazon for slash and burn agriculture with considerable adverse environmental
impacts on greenhouse gas emissions (Canuto 2019a, 2019b; CFI 2019; IMF 2019a).
In South Africa, the World Bank intervention to introduce a land market to foster
smallholder agriculture had had limited success, if any. There was little buy-in from white
commercial farmers who took over massive areas of land from black farmers, pushing them
into their homelands. Essentially, there was no “surplus” land, as the project assumed. South
Africa’s underlying common law also had an influence on how property rights work.
Because all of Southern Africa works with Roman-Dutch law, and because South Africa’s
common law was heavily discriminatory against black people and women generally, it was
never going to be possible to merely transfer lessons from the global experience to South
Africa. “Unfortunately, government officials were (and still are) unaware of the importance
of this distinction, so no pressure has been put on South African courts to start using a
broader interpretation of what the Constitution allows (where our Constitution almost begs
them to do so!), and the result has been fewer and weaker property rights for South Africans
and a whole host of missed opportunities” (Nick Vink, personal communication with Uma
Lele, October 22, 2019).
John Heath, another former World Bank colleague, recently wrote a paper on the
challenge, in Colombia, posed by the skewed pattern of land ownership and the underuse
of land suitable for farming (Heath 2019), which was tackled by the famed Albert
Hirschman (1970) and later in the 1990s by the World Bank. In the early 1960s,
Hirschman backed an administrative approach to land reform, led by a state agency. In
the mid-1990s, the World Bank championed a new, market-assisted approach to land
reform, building on legislation introduced by the Colombian government (Aiyar, Parker,
and Van Zyl 1995). Both attempts failed. They neither reduced the level of concentration of
landholding, nor did they help to reduce rural poverty and create a new class of prosperous
small farmers.
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With rapid changes in technologies, such as remote sensing, 5G, and cell phones, and
with the World Bank and donors helping developing countries to address their own
challenges of class structure and policy capture, the countries will hopefully have brighter
futures than the examples related here, although Ethiopia has achieved much in giving land
titles to women. So, there is hope yet.
Agricultural Pricing, Subsidies, and Trade
Three issues have been of particular interest in Bank work: (1) pricing/subsidy and trade
policies of developing countries and changes in those policies; (2) the role the World Bank
has played through its bilateral discussions/analysis of individual client country policies,
and its impact on country policies; and (3) the Bank’s support to trade liberalization and
elimination of distortions, more generally.
Kym Anderson, writing about agricultural and trade policy reform historically, noted:
Governments in the past have tried to alter not only the trend level of farm prices but also
to reduce their year-to-year fluctuations. Typically, this was done by varying the restric-
tions on international trade according to seasonal conditions domestically and changes in
prices internationally. Effectively this involves exporting domestic instability and not
importing instability from abroad. When many countries indulge in such insulating
behavior it ‘thins’ international markets for farm products, making them more volatile
and thereby encouraging even more countries to insulate. (Anderson 2010, 19)
Distortions to agricultural incentives for developing countries have diminished since the
mid-1980s, with the important exceptions of rice and wheat—cereals in which India and
China are the largest producers and consumers. As we discussed in Chapter 3, in times of
price volatility, countries have imposed temporary trade restrictions to insulate domestic
prices from international markets. Virtually all Asian countries have imposed trade restric-
tions following increased price volatility, starting in 2007.
The World Bank has taken a very different approach to influencing policies and
investment strategies in China and India, its two biggest borrowers—mostly by persuasion
and demonstration, rather than by conditionality or a “sledge hammer” approach. For
understandable reasons, however, it has had very little, if any, influence on the issues of
agricultural pricing subsidies and trade, either in India or China. India’s Food Bill, which
passed in 2013, was a politically charged effort, based on a “rights” approach. Even though
the World Bank stayed out of this controversial issue, over the years, it has consistently
pointed out the direct cost of agricultural subsidies for growth and distribution: for example,
by causing distortions in food production in favor of cereals, and thereby, arresting
agricultural diversification. Also, the Bank noted indirect costs arising from the diversion
of funds from the much needed physical and institutional infrastructure to support agri-
cultural productivity growth, in which India has lagged behind other East and Southeast
Asian countries, as shown in Chapter 2.
The World Bank has frequently advocated agricultural trade liberalization. The outcome
of the Bali Ministerial Conference (9th WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2013)
was the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The TFA, as part of a wider “Bali Package,”
provides for faster and more efficient customs procedures, through effective cooperation
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between customs and other appropriate authorities on issues of trade facilitation and
customs compliance. It also contains provisions for technical assistance and capacity
building in this area: WTO members concluded negotiations on the landmark TFA,
effective February 22, 2017, following its ratification by two-thirds of the WTOmembership
at the Bali Conference (WTO 2020).
Bank support to WTO on the Doha Round is evident in various ways. Danny Leipziger,
the Bank’s Vice President for PREM, urged urgent action on the Doha Round of trade talks
to deliver on its promise for the world’s poor: “Only by giving the poorest people a chance to
get jobs and generate income will the world become more equitable and more stable”
(World Bank 2005d).
Bank research has also demonstrated global gains from trade reforms and the Doha
development agenda implemented after 2004: the abolition of tariffs, subsidies, and domes-
tic support programs could boost global welfare by nearly US$300 billion per year by 2015.
Productivity increases from the reforms could generate even more gains (Anderson and
Martin 2005, 11).
Since 2005, US and EU subsidies have declined but have not gone away, and have come
in different garbs. The United States still supports individual commodities. In Europe, there
are income subsidies. At a seminar at IFPRI on US and EU pricing and subsidies, the
conclusion of the speakers was that not only are subsidies extensive, but quite complex for
developing country policymakers to keep track of and untangle for negotiations (Zulauf and
Orden 2014).
World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development
It is interesting to look at the 2008WDR (World Bank 2007), in view of the implementation
record of World Bank assistance.WDRs are, of course, written for an external audience but
also receive considerable attention internally. The 2008 WDR was the first one with an
agriculture focus in 25 years (the previous one being 1982’s Agriculture and Economic
Development [World Bank 1982b]). The 2008 WDR arrived at the height of the 2007–08
global food price crisis and five years after “Reaching the Rural Poor” had laid out theWorld
Bank’s five-year rural and agricultural development strategy. As with “Vision to Action”
and “Reaching the Rural Poor,” the 2008 WDR sought to “place agriculture afresh at the
center of the development agenda,” but this time for a larger development community
(World Bank 2007, 1), and took stock of disappointments and failures since the last
agriculture-oriented WDR—primarily, in terms of political will.
The 2008 WDR pointed out two challenges to the agriculture-for-development agenda:
(1) managing the political economy of agriculture policies to overcome bias and under-
management or incorrect investment; and (2) strengthening governance for policy imple-
mentation. These observations directly followed the demand emphasis of the Bank’s two
rural and agricultural strategies for its lending that preceded it and served to further
underscore that successful implementation rests on the political will of client countries,
and potentially, the motivation and capacity of regional and country teams. The report
especially blamed “insufficient attention to these political economy and governance chal-
lenges” for slow progress on trade liberalization, lack of investment in African infrastructure
and research and development, and poor delivery of rural education and health services
since 1982. One need not look that far back, however, as the 1997 and 2003 agendas had
both failed to deliver in these areas (World Bank 2007, 22).
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The 2008 WDR highlighted achievements, governance reforms, and stronger roles of
rural civil society organizations and the private sector in agricultural value chains for
improved prospects for agricultural development outcomes, in comparison to the 1982
context. The report also outlined preconditions for success, including strengthened state
capacity to work with new stakeholders and coordinate across sectors; further “third sector”
empowerment to better represent the rural poor; a mix of centralized and decentralized
services to bring government services closer to rural populations; improved donor effec-
tiveness; and reformed global institutions (World Bank 2007, 23–4). The latter two recom-
mendations are particularly important. The 2008 WDR noted the influence of donors, who
at that time represented between 28 and 80 percent of agricultural development spending
in given sub-Saharan countries. CASs, poverty reduction strategies (PRSs), and the
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) provided priorities
for coordinated donor investment and alignment with governments’ expenditures, but
implementation was slow. Regarding the changing global architecture for agricultural
development, the 2008 WDR characterized global institutions as “inadequately prepared”
and of a “narrow sectoral focus” (World Bank 2007, 24).
Agriculture for Development defined agriculture as socially and economically heteroge-
neous in nature, outlining “three distinct development worlds,” which inform the relevant
agricultural and economic development agendas (Table 8.1) (World Bank 2007, 1). The
report addressed how agriculture can further develop in these distinct worlds—agriculture-
based, transforming, and urbanized countries—what the best instruments are to use
agriculture for development—particularly in terms of increasing smallholder farmer pro-
ductivity and raising households out of poverty—and how agricultural development agen-
das, policies, and decision-making should be designed and tailored to best govern
agricultural development (see Box 8.4). The 2008 WDR described how agriculture con-
tributes to development in various ways: “as an economic activity, as a livelihood, and as a
provider of environmental services, making the sector a unique instrument for development”
(World Bank 2007, 2–3). Hence, its contributions to development differ in the three rural
worlds: agricultural production is “particularly critical in a dozen countries of sub-Saharan
Africa,” critical for food security because it the primary source of income for the rural poor
(World Bank 2007, 3). For transforming countries in South and Southeast Asia, MENA, and
urbanized areas, mainly in Latin America, Europe, and Central Asia, “agriculture is no longer
a major source of economic growth . . . but poverty remains overwhelmingly rural (82 percent
of all poor)” (World Bank 2007, 4). Different agricultural worlds can also coexist within a
country, adding to the complexity of prescribing appropriate national policies and instru-
ments. The report recommended productivity gains and market access for agriculturally
based countries in SSA, diversification to high-value crops in South and Southeast Asia,
and the need to contain the environmental footprint for urbanized countries.
Setting and Implementing the 2008 World Development Report:
Agriculture for Development Agenda
According to the 2008WDR, agriculture agendas require policy frameworks anchored in an
understanding of agents within food chains, effective governance, political will (demand),
and implementation capacity. Using agriculture for economic growth also requires a sound
macroeconomic base. The 2008 WDR laid out a “policy diamond” for applying four policy
objectives to a given country type to create an agenda that has “established preconditions
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(social peace, adequate governance, and sound macro fundamentals)” and is “comprehen-
sive,” “differentiated,” “sustainable,” and “feasible.” (World Bank 2007, 19). The four policy
objectives of the “diamond” are:
1. Improve market access; establish efficient value chains.
2. Enhance smallholder competitiveness; facilitate market entry.
3. Improve livelihoods in subsistence agriculture and low-skill rural occupations.
4. Increase employment in agriculture and the rural nonfarm economy; enhance skills.
(World Bank 2007, 19, figure 9)
Investment in agriculture increased after 2007 until about 2017, in part, as a response to the
food and financial crises, in which the WDR’s plea for political will to invest in agriculture
also contributed, but the effect has not been lasting (Figure 8.18).
Achieving these objectives rests on the behavior of agents—of the state, producers and
their agents (civil society), the private sector, donors, and global institutions—that must also
adapt to new roles in a rapidly changing global context. The burgeoning food crisis provided
an immediate test for each stakeholder in the food and agriculture value chain.
Notwithstanding these many lofty reports, IEG’s two agricultural sector evaluations, on
SSA and on the Bank’s overall assistance to agriculture (IEG 2007), were critical of the
Bank’s engagement in agriculture. The IEG evaluation of the Bank’s response to the 2008
food crisis, on the other hand, was much more laudatory (IEG 2013b).
Crisis Response
We discussed the complex genesis of the 2007 food crisis, the domino effect of crop failures
and stock depletions on trade policies of developing countries, and the relatively weak
response of the international community to the crisis in Chapter 4. While the Bank
provided an extraordinary, short-term response, the long-term issues of capacity, infra-
structure, skills, and technology linger.
Box 8.4 Instruments for Agriculture for Development
The 2008 WDR identified several instruments in using agriculture for development:
• Increase access to assets—land, water, and human capital, including rural education
and health of rural populations.
• Make smallholder farming more productive and sustainable—improve price incen-
tives and increase public investment; improve the functioning of produce markets;
improve access to financial services and reduce exposure to risk; enhance producer
organization performance; promote innovation; and make agriculture more sus-
tainable and a provider of environmental services.
• Promote a dynamic rural economy—create agriculture and nonfarm sector rural
employment opportunities; and provide safety nets, such as targeted food aid or
cash transfers, or work programs.
Source: World Bank (2007, 8–10, 17).
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Although the 2008 price crisis response was believed to be something of an exceptional
event, a number of lessons that emerged from it have led to a faster, more coordinated and
more institutionalized response by the Bank to food price shortages in 2017, in some of the
same set of countries—for example, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Northern Nigeria—as we
show in this section.
The price spikes in 2008 were unexpected and large, and the impact on developing
countries was also large. They were estimated by the World Bank to have kept or pushed
105 million people into poverty in LICs. In mid-2008, the World Bank Food Price Index
(Figure 8.19) rose by 60 percent over just a few months, and international prices of maize,
rice, and wheat increased by 70 percent, 180 percent, and 120 percent, respectively,
compared to mid-2007 (World Bank 2013b).
From a forward-looking perspective, there is every expectation that such crises,
prompted by climate change or other unexpected disasters, will likely occur more fre-
quently. The experience from the 2008 crisis, perhaps, can help to keep in place the
machinery that can be activated more effectively, now that much learning by doing has
taken place.
International development partners marshaled a response to the global food crisis in
2008, to counter the immediate impact on the poor—who were said to be particularly hard
hit, due to the larger proportion of household earnings spent on food—and to address the
longer-term implications for human and economic development (Townsend et al. 2013). In
April 2008, the UN established a High Level Task Force on Global Food Security to
coordinate responses and guide the UN response (with the Bank as a member), sparking
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Figure 8.19 World Bank Food Price Index
Source: https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets
   573
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/9/2021, SPi
urgent policy advice to help them cope with the crisis; this led the World Bank to create the
Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP). Bank management endorsed the GFRP
Framework Document, providing a menu of interventions and outlining guidance to staff
on responding to client needs through budget support, social protection, and short-term
agricultural support (World Bank 2013b).
In 2012 and 2013, the IEG reviewed and evaluated the Bank Group’s Response to the
Food Crisis of 2007–8, paying special attention to developments from mid-2008 to 2013.
The resulting evaluation, The World Bank Group and the Global Food Crisis: An Evaluation
of the World Bank Group Response was released in June 2013, and aimed to inform
continued and future actions by the Bank Group and its global partners (IEG 2013b).
Although forecasters within the Bank, FAO, and other agencies raised concerns about
escalating food prices in 2007, countries and IOs had “no cause to expect” the severity of the
crisis, nor adjust staffing, budgets, and instruments to rapidly changing circumstances (IEG
2013b, xxvii). Lulled into complacency after a period of low and stable food prices,
governments were unprepared for the economic and political implications of the crisis
and ensuing domestic unrest—riots related to food price increases occurred in more than
60 countries in early 2008. Affected client countries made an urgent appeal for help at the
2008 Spring Meetings of the Bank, and the IMF and Bank management responded by
calling for “a New Deal for Global Food Policy, combining immediate assistance with
medium- and long-term efforts to boost agricultural productivity in developing countries . . . ”
(IEG 2013b, xi). Bank management encouraged WBG to strengthen its engagement in agricul-
ture and called on donors to support WFP to provide for immediate relief (IEG 2013b).
Many of the issues identified in the Bank’s evaluation of the crisis, now seen as a perfect
storm, were discussed in Chapter 3. On the demand side, rising population and incomes
leading to diverse demand; demand for biofuels and financial speculation and credit
tightening on the supply side; growing pressure on land and water; underinvestment in
agriculture, and rising energy prices leading to increased fertilizer prices; adverse weather;
and depletion of grain stocks were all contributing factors to the storm.
The Bank’s Extraordinary Emergency Response to the 2007 Food Crisis
In 2008, the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors endorsed the GFRP initially, as a US$1.2
billion, rapid-financing facility to provide financial assistance and policy and technical
advice to the poorest and most vulnerable countries. Included in this assistance, manage-
ment approved a US$200 million Food Price Crisis Trust Fund from the IBRD surplus. In
April 2009, the size of the facility was increased to US$2 billion, and the program was
extended until June 2012, to allow for a swift response to calls for assistance from countries
hard hit by price spikes. From July 2012 onward, the Bank’s emergency response was
channeled through the IDA Crisis Response Window,³⁵ and the IDA Immediate Response
Mechanism that will provide emergency assistance in the future (IEG 2013b, xii; World
Bank 2013b). It was a major story for the humanitarian community when the Bank became
involved.
The GFRP was designed with a short- to long-term view to accomplish three things. First,
it would reduce the impact of food price volatility on the poor. Second, it would support
³⁵ See IDA Crisis Response Window: http://ida.worldbank.org/financing/crisis-response-window
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governments in designing sustainable policies to mitigate the immediate impact of high
prices on poverty, while minimizing longer-term market distortions. Third, it would
support broad-based growth in productivity and market participation in agriculture for
future food security (a familiar refrain since “Vision to Action,” though made more acute by
crisis). The framework document laid out the Bank’s perceived comparative advantage in
meeting the challenges of the food crisis, citing its multisectoral expertise, presence in the
countries most affected, and expertise in providing integrated solutions, as well as its
capacities in policy analysis and program design. The framework also identified potential
risks, such as limited availability of resources, client capacity, oversight arrangements and
coordination between multiple partners, leakage in targeting beneficiaries, and inadequate
component design (IEG 2013b).
The Bank response consisted of support for operations to enhance a food supply
response, support for private sector activities and investments, scaled-up lending for
agriculture and social protection, as well as IFC’s increased access to liquidity for agribu-
sinesses and agricultural traders, and new incentive programs for agricultural market
participants. GFRP’s operations were to be processed as emergency projects with special
preparation, appraisal, and approval procedures, while expanded agricultural and social
protection coverage in country programs fell under normal processing requirements. “The
Bank’s short-term assistance to agriculture [included] input subsidy and distribution
operations to increase food supply. Short-term support for social safety nets mainly con-
sisted of in-kind transfers and public works programs. Existing public works and school
feeding programs were continued or expanded, often in partnership with the World Food
Programme (WFP)” (IEG 2013b, ix). More countries became eligible for IDA support,
although there was some question of whether this entailed additionality to their IDA
allocations (IEG 2013b).³⁶
A 2005 Agriculture and Rural Development Department report, entitled “Managing
Food Price Risks and Instability in an Environment of Market Liberalization,” anticipated
that there would be occasions that required short-term interventions, such as the use of
publicly held strategic reserves and adjustments in variable tariffs. It warned that such
short-term interventions should avoid undermining long-run market development (World
Bank 2005c).
IEG’s evaluation of the Global Food Crisis addressed social safety nets:
Extensive analyses and lessons relating to the social impacts of and policy responses to
previous economic crises indicated that, in the short term, the causes, transmission
channels, and main poverty impacts of a crisis need to be assessed at the country level.
They also indicated that the response needs to focus on protecting pro-poor social
expenditures and on expanding large and effective safety net programs to operate in a
“countercyclical” fashion as “automatic fiscal stabilizers.” The studies also found that
³⁶ According to the IEG evaluation of the World Bank’s trust fund portfolio, with respect to additionality:
There is no clear evidence that trust fund resources have added to global ODA, although a few have
helped introduce nontraditional ways of mobilizing finance. Typically, each donor country establishes
its overall aid envelope and channels some portion of it through trust funds. The growth in the use of
trust funds appears to be increasing, at the margin, the proportion of aid channeled multilaterally,
while contributing to fragmentation of the aid architecture where they support separate global
programs, and to an increase in earmarked (as distinct from core) funding, entrusted to multilateral
institutions. (IEG 2011c, viii)
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safety net programs, comprising cash transfers, public works programs, and human
development interventions, needed to be country-specific.
Overall, a lack of data at the country level for assessing the welfare impacts of the crisis and
hence for targeting specific interventions represented a significant constraint for the
development of crisis responses in most GFRP countries. (IEG 2013b, xv–xvi)
IEG argued “analytical work to underpin social safety net lending was limited due to
insufficient prior Bank engagement” (IEG 2013b, xvii). In many of these countries, the
Bank had little previous engagement or analytic work in social protection, which limited the
choice of interventions and their ability to target vulnerable groups. Yet, staff working on
social protection contend that the Bank had been very active in the area of social protection
in the 1990s, including in Africa, and there was, perhaps, a failure of communication and a
silo mentality, resulting in insufficient drawing on existing work. Before launching these
operations, there was limited use of rapid assessments; rather, the Bank used existing, more
general economic and sector work. “In the poorest countries, such as Liberia, Madagascar,
and Nepal, there was considerable fragmentation across donors and donor programs—
especially on safety net programs. According to partners interviewed by the evaluation
team, in these situations the Bank played a constructive role, adding muscle to country
authorities’ efforts to establish greater coherence across donor-supported programs” (IEG
2013b, xx). The IEG evaluation also noted:
The social protection safety net lending most frequently supported by the GFRP were in-
kind transfers and public works programs, while cash transfers and direct nutritional
support to young children and pregnant and breastfeeding women saw limited use. This
mix of interventions reflects the dominance in the program of sub-Saharan Africa, which
accounted for more than half of GFRP operations with social safety net activities and
almost a third of GFRP social safety net commitments. (IEG 2013b, xvii)
The social protection interventions are also discussed in the chapter onWFP, as a partner in
the GFRP. The IEG report discusses coordination further:
In agriculture, coordination with other donors worked relatively well. At the level of the
individual project or program, coordination was the norm for food and agricultural
activities, especially with the Rome-based agencies. For the most part, coordination with
FAO and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) covered the provision
of agricultural inputs—or in the case of WFP, school feeding programs—as the Bank and
others provided only limited support for policy reform in the agriculture sector, given the
very complex political economy of reform in the sector and country authorities’ reluctance
to tackle vested interests during the crisis.
In social protection, coordination was more challenging. The partnership situation was
different for social protection, for which there were far more donors and donor-supported
programs seeking to help the poor and the vulnerable. In low-income countries, a
common denominator was the school feeding programs pioneered by WFP and used by
a number of UN agencies and bilateral donors—and by the Bank in Sierra Leone and other
countries. The Bank approach in IDA-eligible countries also included food-for-work,
social action funding, and support for the beginnings of social protection programs.
(IEG 2013b, xx)
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Beyond GFRP, special programs to implement the Bank response included:
• Global Food Initiative: IFC short-term program to support the agribusiness value chain
in IDA and IDA/IBRD (blend) countries, consisting of investment lending (US$600
million) and advisory services (US$300 million).
• Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP): A multiple-donor, grant-
based partnership launched in April 2010, providing a multilateral mechanism to
support agricultural development and food security-enhancing activities by govern-
ments and national/regional organizations. On September 6, 2013, the GAFSP Steering
Committee allocated US$254 million in grant funds to 8 countries: Burkina Faso,
Honduras, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mali, Nicaragua, Uganda, Yemen, and Zambia. By
2019, GAFSP had lost funding support, however, in the United States. With support
from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Germany, GAFSP was working
toward replenishments in August 2019.
• Agricultural Price Risk Management: A US$4 billion, IFC-led program announced in
June 2011 to provide protection from volatile food prices to farmers, food producers,
and consumers in developing countries via hedging instruments.
• Horn of Africa Program: A US$500 million package, scaled up to US$1.9 billion in
2011, to assist drought victims via short- and long-term food security, social project,
and agricultural development activities—not a direct response to the food crisis, but
targeting the same countries. (IEG 2013b, 5–6; GAFSP 2018)
Via the GFRP, the Bank supported operations in 35 countries through 55 operations,
one-third of which focused on food supply and pricing, social protection, and a mix of
objectives. Sixty percent of total funding went to SSA, while the majority of the funding
supported just four countries—Bangladesh, Ethiopia, the Philippines, and Tanzania.³⁷
Twenty-seven operations were freestanding to support the food crisis response, and 28
were add-ons to ongoing Bank activities (IEG 2013b, ix, xiii; GAFSP 2018).
Evaluating the World Bank’s Response to the Crisis
It is a useful examination of how an institution involved in long-term assistance adapted to
shorter-term crisis response. The Bank adapted its internal procedures and relied on other
organizations to perform functions for which it was less equipped. Out of the crisis came new
ways to work together and a more tangible sense of how global partners could or should
collaborate—not to mention how this partnership should work in tandem with the needs and
demands of the countries they help. The task at hand for the Bank, post-crisis, as previewed in
the Action Plan 2013–15, is how to best use these lessons, as the Bank returns to a long-term
approach that will contribute to sustainable pathways out of poverty (World Bank 2013c).
The GFRP and other new instruments to mainstream the lessons learned, such as the
IDA Crisis Response Window and the IDA Immediate Response Mechanism, helped to
reposition the Bank as a key player in agriculture and food security matters. The IEG
concluded:
³⁷ For a bilateral perspective, the Chicago Council on Global Affair’s 2012 Progress Report on U.S. Leadership in
Global Agricultural Development examined US activities in Ethiopia and Bangladesh (Chicago Council on Global
Affairs 2012).
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The Bank Group’s short-term response program in May 2008 was unique among global
financial institutions in speedily articulating a comprehensive, concrete, and fast-disbur-
sing financial support program to provide hard-hit clients with a menu of options for
crisis mitigation. Along with the Bank Group’s longer-term regular agricultural and social
protection programs, and knowledge-based policy advice, the GFRP helped solidify the
Bank’s place as a key player in food security matters. The Bank’s constructive participation
in the UN High-Level Task Force and contribution to G-7 and G-20 meetings helped the
international community to initiate several food security programs. (IEG 2013b, xv)
Lessons
At the time of the IEG review, two-thirds of 21 closed GFRP operations were rated
“moderately satisfactory or higher on outcome”—in line with outcomes for projects in
Africa and LICs in the Bank-wide (non-GFRP) portfolio (IEG 2013b, xiv). With expedited
processing rules for emergency projects, the Bank was able to hasten project preparation by
70 percent, reducing the time required from 236 for all Bank projects over the same period
to 71 days (IEG 2013b, xxviii). GFRP strategy was informed by Bank cross-disciplinary skills
and policy capacity. However, resource constraints hampered design and implementation
of specific operations, resulting in varied outcomes. Perhaps unavoidably, resource (staff
and funding) constraints limited overall Bank impact. GFRP funding was effectively diluted,
averaging out to less than US$11 million for each of the 35 GFRP client beneficiaries (IEG
2013b, 19).
The IEG found that risks identified in the GFRP Framework Paper were relevant and
became a factor in GFRP implementation. Trade-offs between speed, flexibility, and quality
were evident (IEG 2013b, xiv). The IEG reports more emphasis on nonlending technical
assistance, to the detriment of analytical and advisory activities, with potential implications
for the Bank’s knowledge base. The IEG evaluation reveals crisis-related strains that
underscore issues predating the food crisis—namely, declines in the Bank’s technical
expertise—historically, a comparative advantage for the Bank (IEG 2013b, xix).
IEG identifies several findings with long-term impacts for the Bank, as it navigates
agricultural development support in the new global context (IEG 2013b):
• “The implementation of the short-term support program helped build experience for
broader institutional crisis response mechanisms within the World Bank Group” (IEG
2013b, xv). New instruments included the IDA Crisis Response Window and the IDA
Immediate Response Mechanism.
• “The GFRP helped to reposition the Bank as a key player in agriculture and food security
matters” (IEG 2013b, xv).
• “World Bank agricultural lending expanded significantly after the crisis and is now more
directly focused on support to productive agriculture” (IEG 2013b, xix). Building on
increases called for in the FY2010–12 and FY2013–15 Action Plans, the latest lending
figures indicate that the World Bank Group is increasing its support for agriculture to US
$8–10 billion annually in FY2013–15, from US$6.2–8.3 billion annually in FY2010–12.³⁸
³⁸ See the Agriculture: Sector Results Profile: http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/04/15/agriculture-
results-profile
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In its response to the IEG evaluation, Bank management also noted that the Bank has
increased its visibility and effectiveness in global discussions on food crisis issues since 2008,
and that the food crisis was a catalyst for a strategic assessment of IFC’s agricultural
engagement, resulting in the 2011 Agribusiness Strategic Action Plan (IEG 2013b, xxvi).
Findings on the Bank’s response to short-term effects of the crisis have pointed out the
Bank’s lack of experience or resources in some areas (debunking its own perception of its
comparative advantage). In the policy advice realm, the creation of the GFRP tacitly
acknowledged that crisis demanded quick and sometimes “second-best” solutions.
Although the Bank cited its country presence as an advantage, in most GFRP countries,
insufficient prior Bank engagement limited the analytical work available to inform social
safety net projects. Indeed, the Bank increased its engagement with LICs as a result of GFRP.
It relied onWFP for in-kind transfers, public works, and school feeding programs, and its
engagement with LICs increased as a result of GFRP. By doing so, and expanding existing
programs, the Bank and its global partners missed targeting some of the most vulnerable
people (particularly infants and pregnant women) with critical nutrition support. Only the
Kyrgyz Republic, Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, Liberia, Moldova, Nepal, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, and Tajikistan focused on infant and maternal nutrition in their GFRP social
safety net operations. This lack of attention appears to be driven both by Bank capacity
constraints and client demand (IEG 2013b, xviii). From its chapter on Bank support to
social safety nets, the IEG discusses the Bank’s response to the nutrition gap:
A startling gap in the response of governments and the Bank has been nutrition inter-
ventions for infants and mothers. Only a few countries appear to have emphasized
nutrition support to this population as part of their response to the food crisis . . . This
finding is the more startling as 22 of the 36 countries with 90 percent of the global burden
of stunted growth in children, and 21 of the 32 smaller countries with more than
20 percent child stunting or underweight are among the countries “most vulnerable” or
“vulnerable” to a food price crisis according to the index used by this evaluation. This
finding underscores the challenges the Bank and client countries face to address the
operational complexities arising from the multisectoral nature of both determinants of
malnutrition and nutrition interventions. It is also indicative of the low priority given to
nutrition by client countries as well as the institutional barriers to cross-sector collabora-
tion both inside the Bank and in client countries. Finally, the Bank also has traditionally
had few nutrition experts on its staff. (IEG 2013b, 78)
Throughout GFRP implementation, partnership with other donors and multilaterals and
promotion of country ownership was dynamic. The very nature of the crisis and the
heterogeneity of the countries meant differing levels of country capacity and donor cohe-
sion. In the poorest areas, donor programs were platforms for coordination and supple-
mented weak government direction. On the other hand, in Nicaragua and the Philippines,
strong government oversight led to friction between partners and donors over the govern-
ment-dictated division of labor between donors within the countries.³⁹ Partnership in the
social sector was reportedly most challenging, an effect of donor crowding and mission
creep. In the food and agricultural sector, however, the IEG evaluation stated that overall,
“coordination was the norm . . . especially with the Rome-based agencies” (IEG 2013b, xx).
³⁹ The example provided in the IEG report is the geographic division of labor between the Bank and WFP on
school-feeding programs (IEG 2013b, xx).
   579
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/9/2021, SPi
FAO and IFAD provided agricultural inputs or programs, and WFP provided school
feeding programs. Bank support for agricultural policy reform was limited by client
reluctance to counter vested interests during the crisis.
Comments from Bank management in response to the IEG evaluation indicate an
eagerness on the Bank’s part to reflect on the future of the organization in a changed global
context. While it “broadly agrees” with findings, management noted the failure of the
evaluation to take into account “less tangible” aspects of implementation that would inform
Bank knowledge and learning (IEG 2013b, xxx). While the IEG correctly reviews outcomes
of projects for beneficiaries, management had also begun to think about what GFRP did to
build trust and facilitate collaboration—issues at the heart of addressing agricultural
development and poverty alleviation in the 21st century.
Strategic crisis response framework is necessary but not sufficient to ensure effective
interventions. Administrative budgets are required to support emergency operations.
Increased lending depends on adequate staff capacity to conduct critical analytical work
and design interventions. Having social safety net systems in place before a crisis hits is
crucial to protecting vulnerable populations. The Bank support to safety nets increased
considerably during the 1990s, while lending to productivity-enhancing operations stag-
nated. As such, emergency responses may be needed more frequently, particularly if there is
not enough investment in agriculture. Countries should be prepared well in advance of
emergencies. For example, there is growing consensus that safety nets should be in place
and routinely functional, and emergency responses should enhance them. The poorest
countries typically have the weakest safety nets.
An important lesson learned by IOs, including theWorld Bank, are evident here. According
to the Fact Sheet, “The World Bank Group’s Response to the Famine Crisis” (WBG 2017a):
More than 20 million people in North-East Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen are
facing famine or the risk of famine over the coming six months, according to the United
Nations. Deteriorating conditions in parts of Kenya and Ethiopia were also of concern.
An estimated 1.4 million children were at imminent risk of death from severe acute
malnutrition. For others, especially children, famine can have lasting impacts—including
on health, ability to learn, and to earn a living, which can hinder development progress.
Resolving this crisis called for close collaboration across humanitarian–development–
peace partners, such as governments of the affected countries, UN agencies, and CSOs
[civil society organizations].
On March 8, 2017, President Jim Yong Kim announced that the World Bank Group is
mobilizing an immediate response to the devastating food insecurity for Ethiopia, Kenya,
North-East Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen.
The WBG implemented a US$1.8 billion famine response package consisting of 17
projects to build social protection systems, strengthen community resilience, and maintain
service delivery to the most vulnerable. More than US$870 million from existing projects
will be redirected to help communities threatened by famine. About US$930 million will
be used for emergency food security projects, safety net programs, and agriculture and
water programs in South Sudan, Yemen, North-East Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Total
disbursement as of August 2017 is US$632 million.
The International Development Association (IDA), the Bank’s fund for the poorest
countries, is currently funding four emergency and crisis response projects in Yemen
through grants totaling US$983 million. . . . (WBG 2017a)
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In Ethiopia, the Bank supported Ethiopia’s PSNP to provide assistance in Eastern Ethiopia
on an emergency basis that it was unable to do before.⁴⁰
The Bank’s Assessment of Its Performance in Agriculture
IEG Evaluations: The Challenges of African Agriculture
In 2019, Africa is at the third phase of development cooperation. The first phase was when
western donors had considerable influence through ideas and financial assistance.
Governments had weak capacity and weak commitment to agriculture. Donors tried
integrated rural development, T&V extension, and structural adjustment with mixed
results. The period of adjustment lending and the post-global financial crisis have led to
healthy skepticism about traditional external assistance and advice. African policymaking
has been exposed to information, advice, and finance from a far broader range of sources,
including emerging countries, Western think tanks and universities, philanthropists such as
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and international NGOs.
Governments have to sift through knowledge and experience of these wide variety of
actors to develop their own agricultural policies. Unlike in Asia, however, there are limited
irrigation possibilities, and climate change is at the doorstep (or already over the threshold,
according to some experts). Capacity and confidence have been bolstered considerably from
learning by doing, from the benefit of such hindsight.
In 2007, IEG conducted an evaluation of “World Bank Assistance to Agriculture in Sub-
Saharan Africa,” covering fiscal years 1991–2006. It found that governments and donors,
including the World Bank, had neglected the agriculture sector. “The Bank’s strategy for
agriculture has been increasingly subsumed within a broader rural focus, which has
diminished its importance. . . . [T]he technical skills needed to support agricultural devel-
opment have also declined over time” (IEG 2007, xxiii). By 2007, the number of Bank staff
engaged in agriculture had diminished precipitously, and it is lower still today.
IEG argued that the Bank’s limited and declining support (until 2009) for addressing the
constraints on agriculture “has not been used strategically to meet the diverse needs of a
sector that requires coordinated intervention across a range of activities” (IEG 2007, xxiii).
The lending support from the Bank has been spread across various agricultural activities,
including research, extension, credit, seeds, and policy reforms, but with little recognition of
the potential linkages among them to contribute effectively to agricultural development. “As
a result, though there have been areas of comparatively greater success—research, for
example—results have been limited because of weak linkage with extension and limited
availability of such complementary and critical inputs as fertilizers and water” (IEG 2007,
xxiii). Hence, the Bank has had limited success in contributing to the development of
African agriculture. The evaluation made 10 different recommendations to effectively focus
on agricultural development as a key priority, including: (1) focusing on expansion of
irrigation and productivity of rainfed agriculture through improvements in land quality, as
well as water and drought management; (2) public–private partnerships to improve service
delivery; (3) development of marketing infrastructure; (4) development of transport infra-
structure; (5) quantity and quality of analytical work so that policy advice and lending are
⁴⁰ For details, see https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/fact-sheet-the-world-
bank-groups-response-to-the-famine-crisis
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grounded in the findings; (6) public expenditure analyses to assess resource availability for
agriculture and to help set Bank priorities; (7) building technical skills; (8) improving data
systems; (9) improvement of monitoring and evaluation; and (10) increasing intersectoral
coordination (IEG 2007, xxviii). Indeed, the “to do” list was so long that one wonders
whether and how priorities were set, and what could be achieved.
A more optimistic view was envisioned when the World Bank released a report on
“Unlocking Africa’s Agricultural Potential” in early September 2013 (Box 8.5).
Box 8.5 Unlocking Africa’s Agricultural Potential
In the World Bank’s report, “Unlocking Africa’s Agricultural Potential,” economists,
policy analysts, and researchers detailed “a unique confluence of factors” positively
affecting agriculture in Africa (World Bank 2013e, Foreword). The report, one of the
first in the Africa Region Sustainable Development Series, explored how the World Bank
can help Africa take advantage of these factors to begin its own green revolution and
create an agricultural industry that is a powerful engine of development. It noted that a
number of factors have changed Africa’s farming environment for the better and set the
stage for the continent’s green revolution. These include a steady rise in the prices of
agricultural products, a booming urban food market that is projected to triple in size by
2030, and significant improvements in government policies directed at agriculture, such
as reduced or eliminated taxes and revised exchange rate policies. “Across Africa, south
of the Sahara, agriculture is the predominant sector in the economies of most countries,”
and provides jobs “for over two-thirds of Africa’s population,” according to Jamal Saghir,
the World Bank Director for Sustainable Development in the Africa Region. The Bank
wants “to galvanize action and forge new partnerships that can help Africa to achieve a
vibrant farm economy that contributes to more growth, more jobs, better food and an
overall improvement in the quality of livelihoods, particularly for poor people” (World
Bank 2013e, Foreword). The plan to help Africa achieve increased agriculture production
will require a long-term strategy that delivers “simultaneously on productivity growth
and market connections, while enhancing resilience to climate change” (World Bank
2013e, 17). Over the next 10 years, the plan includes scaling up Bank lending to about US
$3 billion per year, with ambitious targets in five areas (World Bank 2013e, 17–19):
• Irrigation: Double irrigated areas to 40 percent of arable land by 2030; the Bank and
Western donors have indeed started promoting small-scale, farmer-led irrigation in
Africa;
• Land administration: Move from small-scale projects to larger, systematic projects
and push to scale up best practices and improve tenure security;
• Technology and education: Improve access to technology, climate-smart agriculture,
and other yield-enhancing inputs such as fertilizers and insecticides; investment in
these activities has increased;
• Market competitiveness: Reduce trade barriers and improve market performance to
double trade in 10 years; Africa has adopted a policy of trade liberalization across
the entire continent, a huge policy advance; and
• Financial services: Unlock lending and long-term financing, diversify commercial
bank portfolios, and provide financial services through information and commu-
nication technology platforms.
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Overall Challenge of Agriculture through IEG’s 2011
Evaluation of Agriculture
IEG’s main recommendation, in its 2011 “Growth and Productivity in Agriculture and
Agribusiness. Evaluative Lessons from World Bank Group Experience,” echoed similar
sentiments as in its 2007 evaluation of African agriculture. Additional observations and
recommendations are highlighted below:
• “To increase the effectiveness of its support for agricultural growth and productivity in
agriculture-based economies, notably sub-Saharan Africa.” IEG argued that SSA’s
“needs are the greatest and success there is the most elusive” (IEG 2011b, xiv).
• The evaluation recommended that IFC’s engagement in SSA should be increased (IEG
2011b, 22–7).
• IEG considered setting up a knowledge network involving the entire Bank Group, as
both necessary, more possible, and more likely under the latest reorganization.
“Agriculture and agribusiness supply-chain specialists across the World Bank Group
can be linked to strengthen communication and collaboration among sector depart-
ments within the Bank and IFC, as well as across the World Bank Group” (IEG 2011b,
xiv). While collaboration between IFC and the World Bank has increased on a project-
by-project basis, such a Bank–IFC wide network appears not to have been established.
The evaluation strongly advocated the need for WBG to more effectively work with the
CGIAR system. These links still remain weak.
• IEG noted that Bank staff strength had dwindled and the Bank was under pressure
from key shareholders to reduce the budget by US$400 million in the next three years.
• Budget retrenchments in all IOs, including FAO, IFAD, CGIAR, call for pooling staff,
expertise, and resources more systematically, and regularly to do more with less,
reducing duplication and competition, and increasing areas of collaboration.
Progress has been slow.
According to John Nash, Lead Economist of Africa Region’s Sustainable Development
Department:
Increasing investments in the farm economy can deliver high-impact development
returns such as increasing rural incomes, boosting food security, making cheap and
more nutritious food available to Africa’s bustling cities and protecting the environ-
ment through innovations such as climate smart agriculture. Despite the many chal-
lenges, now is the time for Africa to realize the full potential of its agriculture sector.
(World Bank 2013d)
Saghir further stated, “A country’s economic, environmental and social well-being is
intricately linked to a healthy, well-performing agricultural sector. With this report, we
want to seed solutions that can help accelerate the fight to end poverty in Africa” (World
Bank 2013d).
Source: World Bank (2013d, 2013e).
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• Asked to “enhance IFC support to the development and application of internationally
accepted commodity certification systems” (IEG 2011b, xv). FAO has Voluntary
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and
Forests in the Context of National Food Security (FAO 2012). They outlined
principles and practices that governments can refer to when making laws and
administering land, fisheries, and forests rights. The World Bank, the Institute of
Development Studies (IDS), and many other institutions have been investigating the
role of FDI in land, but the information base is still poor (Deininger and Byerlee
2011). An article in the National Geographic noted that, with the rapid increase in
world prices of corn, soybeans, wheat, and rice, big corporations, such as Wanbao
and other Chinese and Japanese firms, are leasing or buying large tracts of land in
SSA, ignoring land rights in coordination with governments. Mozambique has leased
7 percent of its arable land; Ethiopia and Liberia have also been mentioned in the
context of land grabs (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Bourne 2014). It is
unclear if this is a widespread phenomenon or what would be the costs and benefits
of this approach to Africa. Will IFC’s guidelines be adopted? More importantly, will
they be implemented and monitored, and information on their adherence shared
with the public on a routine basis?
• IEG found overall World Bank agricultural project performance ratings to equal or
surpass portfolio averages in most regions, but they were well below average in SSA
throughout the 40-year period. IEG attributed it, in part, to inconsistent client com-
mitment and weak capacity, in addition to constraints on staffing and internal
coordination in the Bank (IEG 2011b, x) (see Appendix D).
The World Bank Group’s Agriculture Action Plans
2010–2012 and 2013–2015
Given the disappointing implementation of the “Vision to Action” and “Reaching the Rural
Poor” strategies, the “return” to agriculture in the new millennium was presented as an
action plan, rather than as a strategy. Action Plans 2010–12 and 2013–15 were devised,
because the tremendous energy that the Bank had expended to prepare the previous
strategies was not matched by follow-through in implementation (World Bank 2009,
2013c).
Agriculture Action Plan 2010–2012: Crisis Response
versus Long-Term Development
The FY2010–12 Agriculture Action Plan assumed a renewed World Bank Group commit-
ment to agriculture, based on the foundation of 2003’s “Reaching the Rural Poor” and the
2008 WDR (World Bank 2003b, 2007). The action plan, which operationalizes the three
worlds approach of the 2008 WDR, was based on cited client demand and a “new phase of
the World Bank Group’s commitment to support client countries [to] improve agriculture’s
contribution to food security, raising the incomes of the poor, facilitating economic
transformation, and providing environmental services” (World Bank 2009, xiii). It pledged
to increase collective Bank Group support (IDA, IBRD, and IFC) to agriculture and related
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sectors to between 13 and 17 percent of total projected commitments.⁴¹ Released in 2009
between the two food crises, the Action Plan followed the Bank’s 2008 launch of GFRP (see
World Bank [2013b]). The now common call to heed a “changing global context” was
underscored by a new urgency and a more immediate awareness of how exogenous
pressures linked to and affected the food and agriculture sector (World Bank 2009, xiii):
• High price volatility dampened supply price, affecting poor producers and consumers.
• The financial crisis slowed trade and growth.
• Declining government revenue impeded governments’ response to the crises.
• Exchange rate depreciations kept food prices high.
• Tighter commercial bank lending practices raised interest rates for farmers and
agribusiness.
• Lower remittances and migration to rural areas put pressure on poor households.
The FY2010–12 action plan outlined the Bank’s comparative advantage in responding to
these challenges in comparison to other donors and international donors. In addition to the
largest number of country-level programs, strong in-country representation, technical
expertise, links to country ministries, institutional memory, and analytical capacity—attri-
butes to which other organizations can also lay claim—the Bank noted that it retained a
larger share of support for agriculture relative to the social sectors, including health and
social science. IFAD seems to have a presence in many of these areas and, perhaps, presence
in a larger number of countries. However, compared to IFAD, theWorld Bank has, perhaps,
a stronger complement of economists. These strengths aside, claimed capacity is one thing
and past implementation failures of agricultural strategies, quite another. However, the
backdrop of the food crisis provided a real-time proving ground for multilaterals to adapt to
the crisis (World Bank 2009).
With no choice but to get involved, the Bank laid out its plan to pair short-term crisis
response with longer-term vision in addressing five “action areas”:
1. Raise agricultural productivity growth
2. Link farmers to markets and strengthen value chains.
3. Reduce risk and vulnerability
4. Facilitate agriculture entry and exit, and rural nonfarm income
5. Enhance environmental services and sustainability. (World Bank 2009, xv)
The Action Plan recommended a differentiated mix of support for these areas, consistent
with the three worlds of agriculture in the 2008 WDR (World Bank 2007). For agriculture-
based worlds of Africa and some parts of Asia, the Bank would focus on agricultural
productivity growth, particularly in food staples, including support for technology adop-
tion, improved extension services, water management and irrigation, strengthened property
rights and land rental markets, and development of standards on foreign investment.
Ongoing CGIAR reforms also fall under global actions for raising agricultural productivity
growth.
The Action Plan for 2010–12 reflected lessons learned from “Reaching the Rural Poor.” It
would keep the MDGs central to the development agenda and prioritize regions with the
⁴¹ The commitment was to start from the baseline average support in FY2006–8 of US$4.1 billion annually,
rising to between US$6.2 and US$8.3 billion annually over the next three years (World Bank 2009, xiii).
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largest number of rural poor (SSA, SA, and EAP). In addition, the Bank aimed to continue
its trade liberalization efforts, where it has had no success; strengthen donor alignment at
the country level, where success has been limited; and improve its own project modalities to
improve country assistance. The plan paid special attention to the latter two in its plan to
strengthen local ownership (through CAADP, PRSs, and CASs), and to leverage donor
partnerships. The plan recognized the existence of donor fragmentation and the
potential to worsen the situation, especially in countries that relied most on development
assistance—where donor support is the major share of public support for agricultural
development. The Bank pledged to integrate with government-led efforts, consistent with
the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda, and to leverage FAO and CGIAR synergies (World
Bank 2009).
Agriculture Action Plan 2013–2015
The World Bank Group Agriculture Plan for 2013–15 retained the focus on the five
action areas presented for 2010–12, but sought to return to longer term actions, in light
of the longer-term nature of agricultural price volatility. Going forward, the Bank would
emphasize support for climate-smart agriculture, long-term risk management, and
better nutritional outcomes, as a means to improving the resilience of agricultural
systems and rural livelihoods, with additional items on the agenda. Forced into an
emergency response in 2006, by the avian flu and food crises, the Bank is now
consciously moving back to a long-term view, cognizant of the need for a longer-term
approach for economic growth. In institutional terms, this means less work through
GFRP; larger project size (as dictated by resource constraints); and integrated projects
in lieu of freestanding crop or forest projects. This view also seems to acknowledge
challenges implicit in responding on too many fronts at once, with an aim to improving
portfolio quality by concentrating or consolidating available staff and budget resources.
On the heels of the food crisis response, the 2013 Action Plan calls for more strategic,
efficient, and effective global partnerships. Client demand will dictate targets for specific
action areas (World Bank 2013c).
In a positive development, the Action Plan 2013–15 reported delivering on the promise
of the previous plan to raise collective Bank support (IDA, IBRD, and IFC) to agriculture
and related sectors. By FY2010–12, aggregate support increased by 70 percent to US$7
billion from the US$4.1 billion annual average in FY2006–8 (World Bank 2013c, xvi).
Table 8.2 compares the two action plans.
Going Forward
What should be the role of the World Bank in agriculture going forward? To address the
multiple challenges that agriculture faces, the global food system requires an alternative
paradigm in which the main goal of policymakers would be to ensure better health, with all
being stakeholders (individuals, biodiversity). Macroeconomic problems may yet once
again scuttle agricultural and rural development, as they did in the 1980s with the build-
up of debt and the 2007 Great Recession.
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In his 2019 address to the Board of Governors, World Bank Group President David
Malpass stated:
A big obstacle to investment is the amount of a country’s sovereign and SOE [state-owned
enterprises] debt and the lack of transparency surrounding the debt. Public debt in
emerging markets and low-income countries has risen to levels not seen since the
1980s, and too much of that debt isn’t transparent. Some lenders, including Non-Paris
Club lenders and private creditors, have imposed strict non-disclosure clauses on govern-
ment borrowers; required liens and collateralization that violate the negative pledge
clauses in the Bank’s loan contracts; employed weaker procurement, environmental and
social standards; placed guaranteed debt in state-owned enterprises and special purpose
vehicles that undermine debt sustainability and paid insufficient attention to non-conces-
sional borrowing policies that are key to emerging from poverty.
. . . Fewer than half of the countries we’ve reviewed meet minimum requirements for debt
recording, monitoring and reporting. Lenders need to be more transparent, eliminating
confidentiality clauses in their lending to sovereign borrowers. (World Bank 2019b)
Malpass continued, noting that in addition to the Bank’s commitment to closing the gender
gap, as discussed previously in this chapter, WBG in Fiscal Year 2019 committed US$17.8
billion to climate-related investments. The WBG is now the largest funder of climate action
among MDBs and other IOs, providing almost half of such climate-related financing.
Malpass stated: “Over 30 percent of IBRD/IDA and IFC commitments included climate
co-benefits in fiscal 2019, surpassing our target. We’ve doubled its own climate commit-
ment targets for fiscal years 2021–2025 to US$200 billion” (World Bank 2019b).
The Bank Group launched PROGREEN and PROBLUE, umbrella trust funds “to boost
efforts to stop deforestation, restore degraded lands, and improve livelihoods in poor, rural
communities [and] to help countries sustainably develop their blue economies” (World
Bank 2019b).
Table 8.2 A comparison of action plans










Strengthen planning and investment
prioritization in poorest countries
Facilitate scale-up of irrigation and land
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at country level
Strengthen analytical work, including
impact evaluations to guide sector dialogue
and project identification
Improve project quality






















Source: World Bank (2009, 2013e).
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According to President Malpass:
We’re aggressively expanding our work on marine plastics and the prevention of marine
pollution, [to help] countries provide clean air and water, healthy oceans, resilient cities,
and sustainable food and agriculture systems. To scale up climate-related investments,
we’ve launched initiatives such as Scaling Solar, which is helping countries accelerate
development of utility-scale solar-energy plants. We’re one of the biggest financers of
renewable energy and energy-efficiency projects in developing countries. During IDA’s
current three-year funding cycle, we’ll contribute more than US$1billion annually to grid
and off-grid solutions for electricity access in countries with the high electricity deficits.
Advances in digital technologies are another critical development path. A decline in
transaction costs is particularly beneficial for new entrants to markets, women, small
businesses and the poor. We’re almost at the point of having systems that would allow the
poor to electronically receive remittances, foreign aid, and social safety net payments as
well as their earnings, and then be allowed to save and transact freely. Once more
countries enable these technologies, the innovation may turn out to be as big an advance
in development policy as the ones that allowed people to move from a barter economy to a
market economy. A key challenge is to make new systems compatible with the world’s
interest in anti-money laundering and counter terrorism efforts. We’re helping client
countries preserve correspondent banks and interact with FATF [Financial Action Task
Force], the financial action task force, and helping FATF-style regional bodies interact
with developing countries.
Financial inclusion and liberalization are core steps in development. We’re using
Program-for-Results financing in a host of countries to encourage concrete outcomes
and ensure accountability. We’re expanding our work to support to correspondent
banking relationships for developing countries, a key task in building stronger financial
systems as well as helping to leverage technology-based solutions to improve financial
inclusion. (World Bank 2019b)
The 2020 WDR explains how the expansion of global supply chains is helping countries to
reduce poverty and is boosting shared prosperity (World Bank 2020d).
A first policy priority would then be to reorient away from sector-specific goals and
toward integration of sectoral priorities into a more climate-sensitive food system and to
consider spillover impacts across sectors. A second policy priority would be changing the
focus of the scientific community from designing strategies to increase calories to strategies
that improve nutritious diets.
That will depend on global food supply and demand, in turn influencing world agricul-
tural prices, and the need for investments and knowledge. If the WTO’s Doha Round of
multilateral trade negotiations were to be concluded—if there were substantial cuts in
agricultural tariffs and subsidies, ending protectionism in agricultural markets—world
food prices would depend on global supply and demand as determined by the market.
Supply would depend in part on whether technological progress could keep pace with the
growth in global demand for farm products, as has occurred since the 1970s, and whether
investment in agricultural research, infrastructure, human capital, and irrigation will
continue and could be more effectively directed toward increasing the access of the poor
to food. Now, there is growing pressure on land and water. Irrigation efficiency has declined
considerably in India. The pace of climate change and the recent growth in demand for
biofuels will determine demand for infrastructure investments, if agricultural research does
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not generate new technologies and if resistance to GM food continues. China and India
would become more food import-dependent, as the countries continue to rapidly industri-
alize. There will be huge need for investments in SSA.
If the Doha Round does not succeed, developing countries like India will maintain
agricultural protection with suboptimal levels of production. In that case, fewer domestic
resources will be released for investments and will require more external investments.
How sustainable is the demand for Bank or IDA investments going forward, as distinct
from demand for knowledge? The past experience, when Bank lending to agriculture
reached its lowest level, suggests that both governments’ willingness to invest in agriculture
and donors’ willingness to supply aid to agriculture may be explained by the behavior of
food prices.
Until the 2007 food crisis, the decline in agriculture’s share in aid was closely related to
real international prices of food, and future demand for aid may be influenced by food
prices. Ironically, increased investment in irrigation in Asia resulted in a decline in the real
price of rice and a decline in demand for Bank involvement in agriculture. Increased food
prices and concerns about climate change have changed that to some extent.
Grant resources will be needed. It is unlikely that demand for Bank involvement will be
high on IBRD terms. The experience of GAFSP suggests that demand may be stronger than
implied by the World Bank experience—if funding is provided as grants, if project concept
and design is left entirely to countries and approved subject to a technical review, and if
there is no competition for funding from other sectors, a problem regular IDA or IBRD
funding faces.
Two good outcomes of the crisis with regard to partnerships are worth stressing. First, the
Bank had to revise its procedures for operating in an emergency. Second, it had to turn to
other organizations to perform functions that it could not or did not have the time or
capacity to do. The Bank relied upon partner organizations and gave credit to organizations,
such as WFP, for their comparative advantage in operations and field response. The food
crisis, in some respects, provided a model for how these institutions could optimally work
together. More such long-term, effective partnerships need to be fostered. For example, the
Bank could forge a stronger operational relationship with CGIAR in the projects its funds,
as well as with FAO. Throughout its institutional history, the Bank has produced high-
quality knowledge products, including on agriculture, but often these products are under-
utilized (IEG 2016b.) The Bank also needs to draw upon the work of other institutions.
How Should the Impacts of Bank Interventions Be Assessed?
Impacts of Bank lending have been difficult to discern beyond project ratings. Monitoring
and evaluation (M&E) has been weak, because borrowers have not taken M&E seriously,
certainly not as a means of managing projects, but rather as a tool for accountability in
donor countries (Székely 2014). M&E has now been made mandatory before projects go to
the World Bank’s board for approval.
Understanding the impacts of World Bank interventions remains a challenge. IEG
routinely rates 20 percent of World Bank completed projects in each sector and shares
those rating results individually and collectively with the regions and in the annual
performance reviews that IEG produces. It also conducts sector and regional assessments,
such as on the World Bank’s assistance to African agriculture, or to agriculture more
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generally, and in doing so, it conducts portfolio reviews and some in-depth case studies.
Findings of a few major OED/IEG evaluations are presented here.
IEG undertook an evaluation in 2016 on the self-evaluation systems of the Bank, “Behind
the Mirror,” which noted that although self-assessment “lies at the heart of the World Bank
Group’s results measurement system,” to assess outcomes. It found that knowledge gained
from self-evaluation “is rarely valued or used and there is little effort to extract and
synthesize evidence and lessons to inform operations” (IEG 2016a, xii).
The report further noted:
Learning has taken a backseat to accountability. The systems’ focus on accountability
drives the shape, scope, timing, and content of reporting and limit the usefulness of the
exercise for learning. If the self-evaluation systems had been set up to primarily serve
learning, they would have been more forward-looking (how can we do better?), more
selective (which projects offer the greatest learning opportunities?), more programmatic
(are there synergies across activities and countries?), attuned to unintended positive and
negative consequences, and more often done in real-time. (IEG 2016a, xii)
By and large, the Bank has avoided assessment of its own contributions to the country
sectors or subsectors, even when the amount of lending is large, as in the case of irrigation.
Twenty five percent of all irrigation lending by the World Bank (IBRD + IDA) went to
India, and while it made important contributions at the outset over time, irrigation
performance deteriorated in India in part due to declining governance. The Bank’s support
for maintenance and operations may have unwittingly encouraged government neglect.
Similarly, in the case of agricultural extension and nutrition, problems in projects become
visible only when projects are implemented, and also have become unpopular among
operational staff.
At times, assessment of the Bank’s own strategies—for example, in forests or water—
have led to questions posed by the Bank about whether it had the right strategy at the
outset. External stakeholders, when not convinced by World Bank’s evaluations—for
example, in the case of dam construction—have developed their own point of view,
such as with the establishment of the Commission on Dams (McCully 1997; World
Commission on Dams 2000). There is growing concern, however, that the real impacts
of Bank interventions on the lives of people are not known, and while there have been
repeated attempts to improve M&E, this remains a weak area. Most governments do not
use M&E in a way that they should. An interesting insight from IFAD’s attempt at impact
evaluations was that it led to the realization of the faulty design of projects in which
results chain in inputs and outcome and impacts were not clear, which helped to improve
project design.
Impact assessments, based on experimental design, counterfactual, and the use of
RCTs, have become increasingly popular, in application to individual investments but
their broad application to the portfolio as a whole has been limited due to the cost,
time, data intensity and issues of external validity, However, since 2013 IFAD has begun
to apply these methods to 15 percent of its portfolio to assess its overall effectiveness
(see Chapter 11). With the reduced cost of data collection and the awarding of the 2019
Nobel Prize in Economics to Banerjee, Duflo, and Kremer, as noted earlier in the
chapter, application of these methods to impact assessment will likely expand their
application.
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Knowledge Bank
The Bank once had a strong agricultural economic research base in the Development
Economics Department in the 1970s. This capacity was occasionally made available to
central project staff and regions to produce policy papers on agriculture and rural devel-
opment or to conduct operationally relevant research. Over the years, the agricultural
economic research division was decimated and from time to time came up in another
garb. For example, a new Agriculture Division was created in the Research Group in the
early 2000s but was later merged with the Energy and Environment Group to match the
merger in Operations in the mid-2000s.
After 2007, Agriculture took on a higher profile, and in 2009, teams were established of
Agriculture and Rural Development and Environment and Energy. There is a huge amount
of outstanding work on land, factor markets, and a range of other topics in a relatively
unstable environment.
Over the last decade, the World Bank has steadily allocated a larger share of its
administrative budget for core knowledge work. In 2011, this reached 31 percent of its
budget, compared with 24 percent in 2002 (World Bank 2011b, 2). The 2013 IEG evaluation
of the World Bank’s Knowledge-Based Country Programs found that Bank Group knowl-
edge activities have been relevant, especially in countries that do not rely much on its
financial services: “Clients value the Bank Group’s ability to convey international best
practice, act as a trusted knowledge broker, customize knowledge to the local context, and
take a sensible approach to important multisectoral development issues” (IEG 2013a, 64).
The World Bank’s “Knowledge for Development” report noted:
Knowledge products and services are creatively responding to a swiftly changing devel-
opment knowledge landscape . . . It is providing more technical assistance, a service highly
valued by clients. At the same time, it is producing fewer of the longer analytical pieces and
shorter just-in-time policy notes for clients.⁴² Trust funds and fee-based services are
becoming more important. Trust funds now support 40 percent of core knowledge, and
fee-based services are becoming the predominant practice for some countries. The Bank’s
knowledge services are becoming more open. The Open Data Initiative and the
Knowledge Platforms are just two examples.
Surveys show that clients cite knowledge services as the Bank’s most valuable contribu-
tion, more than twice as often as financial resources. Yet the Bank’s knowledge work is not
seen internally, or by independent evaluators, as having the impact it could. Managers and
staff see limited internal support for their knowledge work and some of them feel that such
work is undervalued. This gives rise to a knowledge paradox. Most staff feels, despite the
growing importance of knowledge work, that the Bank’s main internal incentives are
still . . . [loaded in favor of] lending. One reason for this apparent contradiction may be the
lack of robust and systematic evidence that knowledge work brings demonstrable and
measurable returns. By contrast, lending has built-in metrics. Lending volumes and
disbursement rates are easily understood and communicated (even though money spent
may not be a valid measure of impact). (World Bank 2011b, 2)
⁴² McKinsey has moved in the opposite direction to producing larger, more complex products. See, for
example, the McKinsey & Company report of Gupta et al. (2014).
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The Bank is working to “create better two-way connections inside and outside the Bank, so
that the best expertise and the most relevant experiences, wherever they may be, can be
brought to bear on specific challenges of development” (World Bank 2011b, 3).
The food crisis was a wake-up call to developing nations. They realized that they had
neglected agricultural development relative to macroeconomic development goals, tempo-
rarily igniting heightened demand for agricultural development. Whether this demand will
be sustained is unclear, but it is clear that if countries are not interested, an approach to
development based on SDG-type goals of the international community is not sufficient.
Success of World Bank lending, based on action plans such as in 2013–15, depend on
country involvement in ensuring that demand for agricultural development remains at or
above its current level. The food crisis effectively forced the Bank (and developing nations)
to focus anew on agriculture and, particularly, on long-term agricultural development and
economic growth. The price rise abated after 2012, however, and so did interest in
agriculture (Figures 8.1 and 8.19).
The use of impact evaluation using counterfactuals to assess causal effects of develop-
ment interventions and complement other evaluation approaches has expanded rapidly
over the past decade, as the development community has focused more sharply on measur-
ing results with and without interventions. At the IDA replenishment discussions, there
have been calls to institutionalize the use of such evaluations under a World Bank strategic
framework.
IEG noted limitations of impact evaluations recognized by others. They tend to be
expensive, compared to other types of evaluation (IEG 2012). Across WBG, funding, staff
capacity, and incentive issues still constrain the scope and coverage of impact evaluations.
They lack quality control and “appear to have had limited use and influence for various
reasons: poor timing, underdeveloped operational linkages, failure to engage project teams
and decision makers, or lack of dissemination” (IEG 2012, xii). On impact evaluations, and
particularly RCTs, a huge issue is the generalizability of results to other circumstances, the
so-called “external validity” challenge that Deaton, Ravallion, and others have pointed to, as
we discussed earlier in this chapter. If the institutional setting of the project/intervention
plays a role in the response to the intervention, generalizability is highly suspect unless the
institutional setting is explicitly included in a RCT. Additionally, most RCTs tend to be
single-country efforts, so generalizability to another country tends to be difficult.
The IEG assessment does not answer questions about the “impact” and cost-effectiveness
of impact evaluations, their contribution relative to other evaluation approaches, forms of
knowledge production, or the strategic scope of the Bank Group’s impact evaluation work.
The study also does not formally evaluate specific initiatives or models of impact evaluation
conducted at WBG, but with growing interest in accountability and establishment of
independent evaluation offices in developing countries, impact evaluation issues will con-
tinue to be debated—hopefully, with larger voice from policymakers in developing
countries.
President Malpass, in his 2019 to the Board of Governors identified important knowledge
products of the Bank: the 2020 WDR (World Bank 2020d), which explains how countries
can reduce poverty and have shared prosperity through global supply chains; a report on
“Women, Business, and the Law” (World Bank 2020c) that helps identify barriers women
experience in gaining full inclusion in societies and economies; IFC’s “Creating Impact”
report (IFC 2019) that surveys markets for impact investing; and the semi-annual Global
Economic Prospects report (World Bank 2020a) that tracks economic trends (World Bank
2019b).
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Solutions for Sustainable Agriculture and Food Systems
Given the huge diversity of agriculture and multiple starting points for change, there can be
no solution that fits all situations. Countries need to follow the most suitable path and
timelines for addressing their specific challenges. The world needs to concentrate its efforts
on science-based, actionable, socioculturally relevant solutions, tailored to local contexts. In
practice, workable options—actionable “solutions”—must address the existential threat of
climate change to agriculture and focus on raising the diversity, productivity, efficiency,
resilience, value, and therefore, the overall profitability of farming. This is the entry point for
moving from the vicious circles trapping rural people in poverty or creating environmental
problems toward virtuous circles of agriculture for sustainable development.
A variety of recent reports address challenges of sustainable, climate-smart agriculture.
The Bank Going Forward in a Changed Context
At the 2019 Annual Meetings of the World Bank Group, President Malpass noted “the weak
global economic outlook,” “trade and geopolitical uncertainty, sluggish investment rates
and frozen capital in low-yielding bonds” as grave challenges for development (World Bank
2019b). Poverty is increasingly more concentrated in fragile and conflict-affected states,
with falling medium incomes and many refugees fleeing to countries that already are
struggling to deliver basic services, security, and peace to their citizens.
Investment rates in developing countries are insufficient:
. . . to meet development needs; health systems, learning outcomes and technology are
falling further behind needs; climate changes and extreme weather are taking a heavy toll;
for some countries populations are expanding much faster than resources and capacity;
and many countries are facing fragility, conflict and violence, making development even
more urgent and difficult. . . . Globally, countries are losing US$160 trillion in wealth due
to differences in lifetime earnings between men and women. (World Bank 2019b)
Going forward, the Bank’s development tools and products, such as loans, credits, guaran-
tees, grants, equity investments, insurance, and advisory and risk-management services, will
need to work harder to help “broad-based growth, transparency, the rule of law, and private
sector expansion” (World Bank 2019b). How is the Bank responding?
Replenishment of IDA’s and IBRD’s Capital Increase Package
The Bank has doubled IDA allocations for countries affected by fragility, conflict, and
violence to more than US$14 billion under IDA18. “The Global Concessional Financing
Facility (GCFF) has provided around US$500 million in grants to unlock more than US$2.5
billion in concessional financing for Jordan and Lebanon to help address the influx of Syrian
refugees, as well as for Colombia to help address the needs of more than 1.4 million
displaced Venezuelans and their host communities” (World Bank 2019b).
The IDA19 replenishment process has progressed well. It is based on five themes:
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. . . jobs and economic transformation; fragility, conflict and violence; climate change;
gender and development; and governance and institutions. It will also incorporate four
cross-cutting issues: addressing debt vulnerabilities, exploiting opportunities from digital
technology, investing in people to build human capital, and promoting inclusion of people
with disabilities. The package includes a significant scale up of the regional program, as
well as a further increase in FCV resources. The Private Sector Window, introduced in
IDA18 together with IFC and MIGA, will help mobilize private capital and scale up
private sector development, particularly in fragile situations. (World Bank 2019b)
IDA19 will increase its support of the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and development goals
around the world. In addition to scaling up commitments to countries affected by fragility,
conflict and violence, the Bank is bolstering the Crisis Response Window. The Bank is
working closely with Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Rwanda, Egypt, South Sudan,
Eritrea, and Djibouti.
As to IBRD, the Bank is implementing the capital increase package, endorsed by share-
holders in 2018. It is working toward targeting IBRD loans more sharply to IBRD borrowers
who are below the graduation threshold, while accelerating IBRD graduation policy for
higher-income IBRD borrowers, such as China. It is addressing issues of net income by
adjusting loan pricing, and other financial measures to improve IBRD’s financial sustain-
ability. It has a board-approved crisis buffer amount, but also an annual limit on lending to
ensure that IBRD remains financially sustainable without additional capital increases. It is
cutting costs to increase efficiency, as well as anchoring administrative expenses to business
revenues with demanding goals. This will certainly have implications for lending to poorer
countries and weak sectors, such as agriculture with high transaction costs.
President Malpass noted:
IBRD, IDA, IFC and MIGA are working together to [be] more effective, efficient and
accountable [in] . . . coordinating country programs, co-locating offices, aligning staffing
with country programs, adjusting the global footprint of the WBG to increase [the Bank’s]
presence in lower income countries, providing employee benefits and developing country
platforms that will help governments work more effectively with the entire investor
community. [The Bank is] encouraging more staff exchanges between the WBG entities
and more joint teams working together on a problem to create better solutions for clients.
Successful implementation of these processes is critical [for the Bank’s] mission.
(World Bank 2019b)
Malpass further stressed the importance of:
Coordination with other MDBs, . . . encouraging better implementation of graduation and
price differentiation to avoid undercutting each other’s work, covenants and standards,
[including in launching] country platforms. They can help countries prioritize their key
development issues and encourage donors . . . to engage [programs] tailored to the coun-
tries and their needs, and increase the focus on private sector involvement and engage-
ment. The goal is for the World Bank Group and the broader development community to
be as effective as possible in helping countries achieve good development outcomes.
. . . Strong leadership [is critical] to choose a path that works economically, socially and
politically. (World Bank 2019b)
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As the Bank works close the gender gap, PresidentMalpass noted that some of the goals include
“preventable maternal and child mortality, ensuring that women and children can access
comprehensive health services, and reducing childhood stunting” (World Bank 2019b).
With rapid urbanization, WBG has proposed to help to build sustainable cities “by
investing directly in urban infrastructure and helping national and municipal governments
develop fiscal and financial systems to expand revenues and provide access to private
capital” (World Bank 2019b).
As we have noted previously in this chapter, WBG has made climate and environment
investments a key part of its work. In Fiscal 2019, the Bank committed US$17.8 billion to
climate-related investments, doubling climate commitment targets for fiscal years 2021–5 to
US$200 billion.
A New Service to Assess Public Policies and Interventions
Two areas specific to food and agriculture need clear attention going forward. First, project
outcomes are weakest in Africa and in LICs. Given the length of time that this state of affairs
has persisted, the Bank and the international community need to find ways to achieve better
outcomes—for example, to:
• Help with the development of and adherence by governments and donors alike of
strong, holistic, and long-term agricultural and rural development strategies;
• Achieve better aid coordination with the country in charge;
• Improve capacity of aid recipient countries’ own systems of technology generation and
delivery institutions, policies and infrastructure: that is, teaching to fish rather than
giving fish.
Second, developing countries have adopted a number of public policies and interventions
on their own (Dutta et al. 2012, 2014). Many need improvements to increase their
effectiveness. They entail large public sector outlays and a national commitment, such as
India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) and its National Food
Security Act.⁴³ Can the same policies be implemented more cost effectively and with better
results on the ground? Are there alternative ways of achieving the same objectives? The
Bank and the international community need to take up Prime Minister Modi’s challenge of
being an Ideas Bank, to help improve the quality of the implementation of these policies by
undertaking comparative analysis across countries (Economic Times 2014). This is impor-
tant because government commitment over the long haul is critical; election cycles, pla-
nning and implementation deficit, silos with fragmented approaches, and corruption all
⁴³ In total, data from the MGNREGA website shows that until July 13, approximately 227,233 households out
of the 47.8 million were provided jobs under the act and had completed their mandatory 100x days employment.
Also, around 55.5 million households have sought work under the act (until July 13, 2020), while 47.8 million
households have been provided work (86 percent). In 2019–20, 57.4 million people had sought work under the
scheme in the full year (Mukherjee 2020).
In May 2020, India’s Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced an increase in allocation of Rs 40,000
crores to the MGNREGA budget to ensure migrants do not face unemployment, as laborers move back to their
villages, during the national lockdown during the pandemic (India Today 2020). An increase in the minimum
wage under MNREGNA from Rs.182 to Rs.202 was announced by the Rural Development Ministry, but wages
need to increase further (National Herald 2020). An increase in the number of guaranteed days of work from 100
to either 150 or 200 days for MGREGNA was under consideration by the government in April 2020 (Sharma
2020).
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make a strong case for multisectoral, area-based, nationally owned rural development
strategies, based on the experience of the past 50 years. The Bank has wavered on
agricultural and rural development. The wholesale shift to social sectors has led to a lack
of attention to productive investments in agriculture, research and extension, and educa-
tion. Irrigation faces huge challenges. Constraints imposed by institutional weaknesses and
weaknesses in other sectors have also been largely ignored—for example, the role of
subsidies in the power sector in improving irrigation efficiency. The CDD approach has
had weak linkages with productive sectors. These weaknesses have been well documented.
Participatory approaches have not wrestled sufficiently with governments’ own decentral-
ization efforts. A long-term, 10-year approach should be adopted to deliver on clear goals/
destinations, a road map, and milestones along the way, the progress of which can be judged
with unambiguous indicators from well-defined baselines.
Where is there scope for improving clarity of policies, better public–private partnerships,
learning across countries from successful examples? How can new technology, such as
remote sensing, digital technology, and drones improve outcomes?
The current project-by-project approach needs to help mainstream effective policy and
institutional reforms in the operation of governments—the reason why structural adjust-
ment was justified in the start of 1980s.
Latest Readjustment for the World Bank
To meet challenges that we have identified in this chapter, including slowing global growth,
climate change, and the number of countries affected by fragility, conflict, and violence, the
World Bank initiated organizational adjustments in 2019 to increase its country focus and
its contribution to country outcomes—actions intended to strengthen the Bank’s develop-
ment impact and reinforce its delivery of global expertise (World Bank 2019b).
Beginning July 1, 2020, Regional Directors (RDs) will report directly to the Regional Vice
President, realigned with a dotted line to the Practice Group Vice President. Practice Group
Managers and their staff, who had been reporting to RDs, will be also realigned to report to
the Regional VP. Strengthening the link between the practice staff and the region will allow
the Bank to be more responsive to client needs, reduce cross-group silos, and enhance
delivery to the region and countries. Strong Global Practice Boards and Practice Councils
will ensure that regional staff maintain their group identities. Also, Global Directors will
continue to report to Practice Group VPs; they will be expected to play even greater roles in
delivering global expertise. The Accountability and Decision Making (ADM) framework
will be revised to ensure that Practice Group staff have a greater role in the corporate review
of operations (finance, analytical services, and advisory services) (World Bank 2019b).
Based on the Bank’s several reorganizations since 1972, it is unclear what they have achieved
in organizational effectiveness. This review has shown that the Bank has been, perhaps, the
largest source of development thinking including on agriculture and rural development, but
some of the more innovative thinking, including the adoption of MDGs and SDGs occurred
outside the Bank. The Bank’s project lending has increasingly proven to be a less effective
instrument to deal with the complex, rapid multisectoral changes taking place. They call for
building capacity in the formof human and institutional capital in the countries to address them
and to mobilize substantial resources. It is unclear if the Bank’s “project lending” model is
sufficient to deal with the new reality. It calls for longer term, consistent presence in countries,
effective partnerships, and genuine mutual trust between the Bank and countries.
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Appendix A: Chronology of the World Bank
For more information, see the World Bank Group Timeline: https://timeline.worldbank.org/#event-
bretton-woods-conference-begins
1940s In 1944, the Bretton Woods Conference, of 44 governments, held in Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire from July 1–22, gave birth to both the International Monetary Fund and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
In 1945, IBRD Articles of Agreement entered into force on December 27.
In March 1946, the first annual meeting of the World Bank and IMF held in Savannah,
Georgia, from March 1–18.
The first meeting of the World Bank executive directors addressed a number of
fundamental issues, including the nomination of a president on May 6, 1946.
Eugene Meyer became the first World Bank President on June 18, 1946. World Bank staff
started their first day of work and the World Bank opened for business on the 10th floor of
1818 H St. NW, Washington, DC, June 25.
The World Bank Governors held their first meeting from September 27 to October 3, 1946,
in Washington, DC.
In March 1947, the Working Party on the Polish Loan Application was released (March 27).
The report, authored by the Bank’s Research Department, focused much of its attention on
the country’s Four-Year Plan of Economic Reconstruction (1946–9).
The World Bank approved the first loan for reconstruction on May 9, 1947. The World
Bank’s first loan, to Credit National of France in the amount of US$250 million was for
general reconstruction purposes.
In July 1947, in response to demand for investment by client countries, the World Bank
entered the bond market with a US$250 million offering (July 15).
The World Bank instituted group health insurance for staff on September 1, 1947.
In 1947, London was the site of the Second Annual Board of Governors Meetings
(September 11). The Second Annual Board of Governors Meeting was attended by World
Bank governors and their alternates from 44 of the Bank’s 45 member countries.
The United Nations and the World Bank formalized their relationship. The agreement with
the United Nations was initially approved by the World Bank’s Board of Governors in
September, and then by the United Nations General Assembly on November 15, 1947. The
agreement, which named the Bank as a specialized agency of the United Nations, defined
the Bank as an independent organization and outlined its freedom in matters of lending and
financial management.
In April 1948, the World Bank established a liaison with the Organisation for European
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) (April 16).
In June 1949, theWorld Bank’s Annual Report discussed the impact of the Marshall Plan on
operations (June 30).
1950s In 1952, the World Bank implemented its first reorganization on October 1. Prior to the
1952 reorganization, operations staff were organized along functional lines, with loan
officers working separately from country and technical specialists. The new organization
arranged staff geographically; each new operational department maintained operational
relationships with a particular geographical group of the World Bank’s member countries.
A new Department of Technical Operations was responsible for assessing the economic,
financial, and technical merits of proposed projects and for following the progress of
approved projects.
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In March 1955, the World Bank established the Economic Development Institute (March
11), with the purpose of building country capacity by providing training for officials
concerned with programs and projects in developing countries. Initially, courses were
general in nature and offered exclusively in Washington, DC. Over time, more intensive
courses on, such as project preparation and sector planning were developed and offered
outside of the United States.
In 1956, the International Finance Corporation was founded on July 20. The IFC was created
as an affiliate of the World Bank and was designed to further economic development by
encouraging the growth of private enterprise. IFC was initially authorized to have a total
capital of US$100 million but was restricted from involvement in equity financing.
In November 1956, the World Bank Group increased activities with development banks.
Investment in Development Finance Corporations (DFCs), since 1949, allowed the World
Bank Group to invest in relatively small-scale private enterprise. As part of an expansion of
its activities in this sector, the Bank published a report on the topic in 1957 that assessed the
operating records of DFCs and discussed the establishment of new institutions. Subsequent
activity in the sector resulted in a significant increase in assistance to DFCs by 1960.
In 1957, IFC made its first investment on June 20.
In February 1958, Senator Mike Monroney proposed the creation of an International
Development Association (February 24).
In 1959, World Bank Governors asked, on October 1. that the IDA charter be drafted.
1960s The Bank functioned largely as a project lending organization for large-scale infrastructure.
Developing countries requested lending to agriculture and rural development.
In 1960, India and Pakistan signed Indus Waters Treaty on September 19.
IDA was created on September 24, 1960, launched in response to calls by those member
countries not deemed sufficiently creditworthy to borrow from the World Bank Group.
Eligible countries would receive loans, called “credits,” on terms more favorable than
conventional loans offered by the Bank. IDA does not raise its funds in the capital markets
like IBRD, but instead raises its funds through members’ subscriptions, loan repayments,
and periodic replenishments by the World Bank Group’s wealthier members.
In 1961, the first IDA credit was approved on May 12. During its first year of operations,
IDA extended credits totaling US$101 million to four countries: Sudan, Chile, India, and
Honduras. The US$9 million credit to Honduras was the first transportation sector funding
approved by IDA. The investment assisted a program of highway development and
maintenance, including a 62-mile extension of the Western Highway, the continuation for
two years of a highway maintenance program, and a highway planning survey.
Robert S. McNamara was appointed President of the Bank, IDA, and IFC in April 1968.
1970s First Global Public Goods Program.
CGIAR was established—described in World Bank archives as the “brainchild” of
McNamara (WBG 2014b, 174).
A 1972 “Agriculture” Sector Working Paper outlined the key role of agriculture in
development outcomes: greater production and exports, more employment, better
distribution of income, and highlights of policy issues facing developing countries and the
Bank Group’s past activities in agriculture, with projections of increased lending. For the
first time, lending for agriculture exceeded that of any other sector.
In 1972, the Bank underwent the largest structural change, since establishment, with
McKinsey’s advice. Regional Vice-Presidencies were established, with a shift from a
centralized, “technical brain trust” project department to regional entities with country
departments, macroeconomists, and loan officers.
In 1973, McNamara’s Nairobi speech coined the term “the absolute poor” and reshaped the
Bank’s vision to abolish absolute poverty, “a condition of life so degrading as to insult
human dignity” (McNamara 1973)
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In 1975, the World Bank, FAO, and UNDP began the Consultative Group on Food
Production and Investment in Developing Countries (CGFPI), as requested by the World
Food Conference of 1974 (WBG 2014b, 186).
In 1975, The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa, a World Bank Research
publication by Uma Lele, was published. According to World Bank archives, the book was
“the centerpiece in the Bank’s search for ways to counter food shortages and unequal
income distribution.”
In 1975, the Bank’s “Rural Development” Sector Policy Paper announced that the Bank
planned to greatly increase its assistance for agriculture and rural development, with US$7.2
billion committed for the five-year period fiscal 1975–9 (World Bank 1975b).
In 1976, the Bank approved the first nutrition loan, a US$19 million loan for Brazil.
In 1978, the “Rural Enterprise and Nonfarm Employment” and “Agricultural Land
Settlement” were published, with focus on poverty alleviation and distribution of the
benefits of growth to the poorest. McNamara, in the 1978 Annual Meetings, emphasized,
“the only feasible hope for reducing poverty is to assist the poor to become more
productive” (WBG 2014b, 1998).
Lending to agriculture increased rapidly in the 1970s, but two oil price shocks, in 1973 and
1979, hit developing countries of Latin America and Africa particularly hard, leading to the
beginning of a debt crisis, with profound impacts on domestic development.
By the late 1970s, Bank project performance deteriorated but with regional differences: SA
performed best, whereas Africa’s performance, already low, deteriorated.
In August 1978, the first World Development Report was issued with the theme of
accelerating growth and alleviating poverty and identified major policy issues affecting
those prospects.
On July 24, 1979, proposals to begin lending operations in health were approved by the
Executive Directors.
1980s Agricultural performance dropped, except in Asia. Overall, Bank lending remained flat, and
lending to agriculture declined, but administrative expenses increased. leading to what was
later called a “lost decade” for agriculture.
In May 1980, the People’s Republic of China joined the Bank, replacing Taiwan, becoming
one of the Bank’s largest borrowers, opening up and systematically learning from the Bank
in a way no other developing country has done.
In 1980, the era of Structural Adjustment Loans began with a shift in attention from project
lending to macroeconomic lending; the first SAL was approved in March for Turkey for US
$200 million, to increase “export orientation,” increase “mobilization of domestic
resources,” and foster “a self-reliant State Economic Enterprise sector” (WBG 2014b, 206).
According to Stanley Please, who called himself the “mother and the father of SALs,” the
lending led the Bank to face a barrage of criticism from all sections of the development
community inside and outside the Bank.
In 1981, Robert McNamara ended his tenure as President of the World Bank Group. His
final speech to Board of Governors radically departed from the Nairobi approach, making
the case for the pursuit of macroeconomic reform.
In July 1981, A. W. Clausen became the sixth World Bank Group President. President
Clausen summarized the fiscal year to staff: reduced budget contributions to IDA6meant an
austere budget for the World Bank with implications for lending.
In August 1981, Elliot Berg’s Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, the so-called
“Berg Report,” was published. It was the first in a series of Bank reports that focused on
development problems of SSA.
In May 1982, Anne Krueger became the first woman appointed Vice President, to replace
retiring Hollis B. Chenery, as VP of Economics and Research.
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In 1982, planning for IDA7 commenced. The front-end fee on IBRD loans was introduced;
changes in borrowing operations were approved, with continued lending toward the
poorest segments of society: agriculture and rural development, and energy constituted 50
percent of the lending program.
In 1984, an acute famine in Ethiopia led to worldwide efforts at fundraising for famine relief.
In 1984, the “Joint Program of Action for Sub-Saharan Africa,” released by the Bank
highlighted the need for domestic policy reforms to accelerate growth and placed emphasis
on donor assistance strategy as essential to supporting these reforms. In September, a
Special Office for African Affairs was established, and the report “Toward Sustained
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa” was released.
In 1985, the World Bank granted US$3 million to the World Food Programme for
emergency food supplies to drought-stricken SSA.
In 1986, Barber Conable became World Bank President and helped to nearly double US
Congressional appropriations for the Bank. In his inaugural address, he identified the
“central challenge” of the Bank as “to mobilize the will and the resources of the affluent and
of the afflicted alike in the global battle against poverty” (WBG 2014b, 229).
In 1986, the Special Program for African Agricultural Research (SPAAR) Secretariat was
established to improve the effectiveness of investments in agricultural research by
governments and multilateral and bilateral donors. SPAAR’s main tasks were to coordinate
donor activities, collect, assess and disseminate information on promising technologies, and
to develop national research strategies and regional research programs.
In 1986, the World Development Report: Trade and Pricing Policies in World Agriculture—
The Need to Reform Policies in Developed and Developed Countrieswas released; it examined
the potential for large gains from more liberal trade in agriculture and suggested that
liberalization of trade should be a high priority for international action in agriculture
(World Bank 1986).
In September 1986, President Conable addressed world trade leaders at the Ministerial
Meeting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (a) in 1987 in Punta de Este,
Uruguay.
In December 1986, a “Poverty Task Force” was established to bring together senior staff to
review the Bank’s poverty work and recommend new programs.
In 1987, President Conable, in an address to the World Resources Institute, announced the
creation of the Environment Department. The new Bank measures, including
environmental assessments of 30 of the most vulnerable developing nations, initiatives
against desertification and forest destruction, and promotion of conservation of tropical
forests, were taken in response to strong negative public reaction to several bank projects
that had had adverse environmental and social impacts. It led to an increase of Bank
environmental staff, introduction of the environmental safeguard policies, and a program of
environmental lending (WBG 2014b, 234).
In February 1987, the World Bank, together with WHO and the UN Fund for Population
Activities, sponsored a conference on Safe Motherhood in Nairobi. President Conable
established the Safe Motherhood Initiative to focus on women’s health needs.
In 1987, Adjustment with a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth
(Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart 1987) detailed the negative impact of SAPs on health and education;
its title is now used commonly to describe policy recommendations that came out of the study.
In September 1987, the Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) initiative was launched
with the African Development Bank and UNDP. TheWorld Bank also issued “Education in
Sub-Saharan Africa: Adjustment, Revitalization and Evaluation,” an education policy paper
in September. (World Bank 1987).
In June 1988, the Bank approved a US$175 million emergency loan to assist reconstruction
in Rio de Janeiro following floods and landslides in February 1988. President Conable issued
a statement, urging support for Brazil’s debt relief efforts.
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In September 1988, President Conable pledged reconstruction assistance to Bangladesh,
following flooding.
In December 1988, Conable addressed the GATT trade negotiations in Montreal, warning
against the trend of protectionism, as a threat to the growth of both rich and poor nations.
The World Debt Tables 1988–9 were issued by the World Bank.
In June 1989, the Bank adopted operational guidelines for debt and debt-servicing payments.
In August 1989, the Debt-Reduction Facility for IDA-only countries was established.
In November 1989, the Bank published “Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable
Growth,” which analyzed development experiences since independence in SSA and
explicated long-term development strategies (World Bank 1989).
The UNICEF Adjustment with a Human Face report detailed negative impact of SAPs on
health and education; its title is now used commonly to describe policy recommendations
that came out of this study.
In November 1989, the study, “Managing Agricultural Development in Africa” (MADIA)
by Uma Lele was published. The study chronicled the relative roles of external shocks,
domestic policies, and aid to African agriculture in explaining performance in selected
African countries (Lele 1989).
1990s Called the “lost decade” for developing countries with slow growth and mounting debt, the
OED Country Assistance Evaluation for Brazil (OED 2004b), for example, noted the 1980s
radically transformed the Bank’s relationship with developing countries, with far-reaching
impact on the Bank’s declining presence in overall resource transfers, and even more so, in
the agricultural sector—a decided shift from projects to macroeconomic and sector lending;
leading to the establishment of a PREM network in 1998.
In the 1990s, partnerships and trust funds began to proliferate in response to major
international initiatives, such as the Montreal Protocol and the United Nations Conference
on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992, leading to the establishment
of Ozone Trust Fund and Global Environment Facility (GEF). Additional initiatives in the
latter half of the 1990s—the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in 1996, and the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)—further expanded the scope and boosted
momentum for partnerships. There was little or no interaction between these initiatives and
agriculture—GEF’s forestry and biodiversity initiative and agriculture; HIPC, with its focus
on social sectors almost to the exclusion of agriculture; and CGAP’s focus microfinance.
In 1990, the Bank’s first World Development Report on poverty was published, focusing on
poverty reduction promotion of economic opportunities for the poor, delivering social
services to the poor, and provision of transfers and safety nets (World Bank 1990).
In 1990, Eastern Europe became an active recipient of Bank loans; the first loans to Croatia,
Slovenia, and Poland were approved in February.
In November 1990, the Global Environment Facility, jointly administered by the World
Bank, UNDP, and the United Nations Environment Programme was launched. Later in the
month, Conable traveled to Moscow, as the first World Bank president to visit the Soviet
Union, to discuss ways in which the Bank could help the Soviet Union, as it moved to a
market economy.
In December 1990, President Conable issued a statement on GATT negotiations: “Many
developing countries, already struggling with debt burdens, environmental crises and
chronic poverty, have made difficult political and economic choices in their efforts to
liberalize their trade regimes.” He again warned against protectionism, which he predicted
would “increase international tension and diminish prospects for world economic growth”
(WBG 2014b, 261).
In 1991, the World Bank reorganized again, becoming more fractionated. The Vice
Presidency for Sector and Operations Policy was replaced by three new vice presidencies:
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Human Resources Development and Operations Policy, Finance and Private Sector
Development, and Environmentally Sustainable Development. All research was
consolidated under the Chief Economist and Vice President for Development Economics.
Regional Technical Departments were made smaller, and the sector operations divisions
were strengthened.
In 1991, the Bank published a “Forest Policy” strategy paper, the first on the subject since
1978, declaring that it would not finance commercial logging in tropical forests (World
Bank 1991).
In September 1991, Lewis Preston became the 8th Bank president.
In December 1991, the first grant from GEF was approved, a US$4.5 million project to
protect the biological diversity of two endangered forest ecosystems in Poland.
In 1992, the Portfolio Management Task Force Report was issued on “Effective
Implementation: Key to Development Impact,” known commonly as the Wapenhans Report,
a mammoth effort to identify steps needed to improve project implementation, leading to
the establishment of the Quality Assurance Group (World Bank 1992).
In April 1992, President Preston announced the World Bank Governors had approved the
membership of 13 of 15 republics of the former Soviet Union, with approval expected for
remaining two shortly thereafter.
In May 1992, President Preston declared, “Sustainable poverty reduction is the overarching
objective of the World Bank. It is the benchmark by which our performance as a
development institution will be measured” (WBG 2014b, 272).
In October 1992, the World Bank announced US$20 million in grant funds for famine relief
to East Africa.
In the 1993 reorganization under President Lewis Preston, Agriculture and Natural
Resources Department (AGR), Environment Department (ENV), and the Consultative
Group for International Agricultural Research Secretariat (CGIAR) were established as
separate entities, with relatively little interaction among the three.
In July 1993, the Executive Directors approved the recommendations of the Wapenhans
Report. The bank introduced “a country-by-country approach into the management of it
lending operations . . . the Bank began collaborating with authorities in borrowing
countries to review the performance of the portfolio in each country and resolve systemic
problems . . . [which] represented an important shift in the Bank’s business practices . . . to
a greater concern with development results in the field of Bank-supported operations”
(WBG 2014b, 286).
In November 1993, the World Bank hosted a conference on world hunger. President
Preston announced the Bank would expand support for microlevel credit programs.
In June 1994, the World Bank issued Governance: The World Bank’s Experience, which
argued that good government is critical to economic development (World Bank 1994).
In June 1995, James Wolfensohn was appointed the 9th World Bank president, following
the death of President Preston in May 1995. Between 1995 and 2005, Wolfensohn brought
renewed focus on poverty reduction and actively promoted the much needed, bottom-up,
inclusive community and social development.
In November 1995, following the peace agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
and Serbia, the World Bank and the European Commission announced plans for a donor
conference to mobilize resources for postwar reconstruction and economic normalization.
In December 1995, the World Bank participated in World AIDS Day. At this time, the Bank
had already invested US$700 million in prevention and control health projects, 49 percent
in SSA. Also, the African Programme for Onchocerciasis Control, a joint international
partnership program of governments, NGOs, bilateral donors, and international agencies,
was launched at ceremonies in Washington.
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In February 1996, President Wolfensohn launched the World Bank Participation
Sourcebook. Moving beyond traditional cooperation with member governments, he sought
“to include participation in decision-making by nongovernmental organizations, the private
sector, community groups, cooperatives, women’s organizations, and the poor and
disadvantaged. He called for empowerment of stakeholders—including borrowers, directly
affected groups, indirectly affected groups, and the Bank itself—in development decision-
making” (WBG 2014b, 305).
In March 1996, Wolfensohn and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced
the UN Special Initiative for Africa, a joint expanded program of assistance to SSA.
In April 1996, the World Bank sponsored a conference on Early Childhood Development,
following upon its report, “Early Child Development: Investing in the Future” (Young 1996).
The 1996 WDR: From Plan to Market analyzed successes and failures in transition
economies (World Bank 1996).
In September 1996, the conference, “Rural Well-Being: From Vision to Action” was held in
Washington, DC. In the following month, the Bank urged member countries “to place rural
development at the top of their policy agendas. . . . [S]ince most of the world’s poor lived in
rural areas, the strategy for reducing poverty, achieving food security, and protecting the
environment depended upon the rural development” (WBG 2014b, 311).
In January 1997, the World Bank issued the report, “Poverty Reduction and the World
Bank: Progress and Challenges in the 1990s.” (World Bank 1997c).
In 1997, the Bank’s “Vision to Action” report was issued by the Agriculture Department, in
an attempt to revive Bank lending to agriculture (Ayres and McCalla 1997).
In June 1997, Wolfensohn addressed the UN Earth Summit, urging “revitalization of
environmental goals” and prioritizing “climate change, protecting biodiversity, ozone
depletion, desertification, and clean water” (WBG 2014b, 318).
In August 1997, the Bank issued Everyone’s Miracle? Revisiting Poverty and Inequality in
East Asia and India: Achievements and Challenges in Reducing Poverty, two publications
that showed that, despite the “East Asian Miracle,” poverty and inequality remained serious
problems (Ahuja et al. 1997; World Bank 1997b).
In November 1997, the Bank issued “Confronting AIDS: Public Priorities in a Global
Epidemic” (World Bank 1997a)
In April 1998, the first meeting of the full assembly of GEF was held in New Delhi.
In November 1998, the World Bank report, “Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t
and Why,” advocated for “more foreign aid and for open trade, secure private property
rights, the absence of corruption, respect for the rule of law, social safety nets, and sound
macroeconomic and financial policies” (WBG 2014b, 337).
In December 1998, the World Bank released Global Economic Prospects and the Developing
Countries 1998–99, which described how developing countries will be most vulnerable to
the global economic slowdown (World Bank 1999).
In January 1999, Wolfensohn called for adoption of a Comprehensive Development
Framework.
In April 1999, the World Bank, together with the AfDB and IMF, agreed to establish the
Joint Africa Institute (JAI) to provide training to government officials and private sector
participants on macroeconomic policies, poverty alleviation, gender issues, good
governance, and environmental and reform policies.
In September 1999, the World Bank launched a new strategic plan on HIV/AIDS:
“Intensifying Action Against HIV/AIDS in Africa: Responding to a Development Crisis.”
Also, in September, Wolfensohn was appointed to a second term as president.
On September 30, 1999, the World Bank warned that the fight against poverty was failing,
based on poverty data and consultations, published later asVoices of the Poor (Narayan 2000).
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The Bank announced a joint production of IMF and client governments, the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) to focus on client “ownership” of the development process.
In October 1999, Wolfensohn communicated to World Bank staff a broader approach to
development—a shift in focus from lending to a knowledge bank model of assistance.
2000s The Bank increased its focus on corruption and governance and potentially, an important
initiative for agriculture; it announced removal of three staff members and debarring of
three Swedish firms from contracts in December 2000.
In March 2000, the Meltzer Commission Report (Meltzer 2000) was “highly critical of the
Bank and the Fund, and urged they be radically reduced and restructured” (WBG 2014b,
358). Also released in March was the World Bank’s study, Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone
Hear Us? (Narayan 2000).
On March 22, 2000, President Wolfensohn addressed the Second World Water Forum, The
Hague.
In April 2000, the World Bank announced a plan to “jumpstart governments into providing
free basic education for all children” by 2015, at the World Education Forum in Dakar,
which convened government partners, UN agencies, the Bank, NGOs, and academia (WBG
2014b, 361).
In July 2000, the Bank pledged US$500 million to assist AIDS prevention and treatment in
Africa at the XIIIth International AIDS Conference in Durban, South Africa. In September,
the Bank pledged increased support to combat HIV/AIDS in Caribbean countries.
In 2001, Wolfensohn and Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon issued a joint
statement calling for reduction in agricultural subsidies in the developed world, saying that
the subsidies were preventing exports from the developing world to the rich countries.
In 2001, the WDR again focused on “Attacking Poverty” (World Bank 2001).
In January 2001, President Wolfensohn pledged Bank support for reconstruction work in
Gujarat, India, following an earthquake.
In February 2001, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation pledged US$20 million for
elephantiasis elimination, to be channeled through a World Bank trust fund.
In April 2001, the World Bank and the IDB signed a Memorandum of Understanding to
strengthen their collaboration.
In July 2001, the Bank’s Executive Directors endorsed a new environmental strategy to
ensure environmental concerns are integrated in all projects and programs, developed after
consultation with over 30 stakeholders throughout the world.
In September 2001, the Bank announced it would join the UN as a full partner in implementing
MDGs, endorsed by 189 countries at the September 2000 UN General Assembly.
In October 2001, Joseph Stiglitz, the World Bank’s Chief Economist and Senior Vice
President from 1997–2000 was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences.
In October 2001, WHO and the Bank launched the Global Plan to Stop TB.
In January 2002, the World Bank and IMF launched the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Conference.
In May 2002, the Bank launched the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.
In August 2002, donor countries agreed to highest replenishment (US$2.92 billion) for GEF.
Also, in August, the Bank joined governments and multilateral institutions in launching the
Global Village Energy Partnership, with the aim of reducing poverty in rural areas, by
doubling the number of people who gain access annually to lighting, heating, mechanical
energy, and electrical power.
In September 2002, the Bank partnered with the International Emissions Trading
Association (IETA) on the Community Development Carbon Fund (CDCF) initiative, a US
$100 million fund to reduce GHG emissions in small developing countries and rural areas
of all developing countries.
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On September 27, 2002, the World Bank and the WTO established a Standards and Trade
Development Facility, to link aid to trade opportunities in the fight against poverty.
In September 2002, the World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings opened amid growing anti-
globalization protests. Wolfensohn called on rich countries to improve donor coordination,
untie aid, and agree on a “fixed timetable” for the elimination of agricultural subsidies
(WBG 2014b, 400).
In October 2002, the Bank announced a new revised forest policy and strategy, with a more
balanced approach toward forests on conservation, poverty reduction, and growth, rather
than the exclusive focus on conservation, as in the 1991 Forest Strategy. The reformulated
2002 forest strategy aimed to increase focus on the livelihoods of people living in extreme
poverty and who depend on forests, while improving the environmental protection of
forests in the developing world with increased focus on forest governance.
In November 2002, the first BioCarbon Fund was launched to focus on land use, allocating
resources to projects that transform landscapes and directly benefit poor farmers, as they
earn income from sequestering or conserving carbon.
In 2003, the revised agricultural and rural development strategy, Reaching the Rural Poor,
was released, after consultations with government officials, civil society organizations,
academics, the business community, and donor agencies (World Bank 2003b).
In March 2003, the World Bank released “Water—A Priority for Responsible for Growth
and Poverty Reduction: An Agenda for Investment and Policy Change” to reemphasize the
role of water as key to growth and poverty reduction.
In May 2003, the World Bank released “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and
Development Policy,” a report that asserted that ethnic tensions and old political feuds are
rarely the cause of civil wars, but rather poverty, heavy dependence on natural resource
exports, and other economic forces lead to conflicts (Collier et al. 2003).
In July 2003, a new set of indicators, Worldwide Governance Indicators, tracking quality of
governance, covering 200 countries were published by the Bank.
In October 2003, the Grant Facility for Indigenous Peoples was established to fund projects
initiated and managed by Indigenous Peoples in developing countries.
In January 2004, the World Bank established a US$25 million trust fund to build capacity
and strengthen institutions in Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS).
In June 2004, the World Bank, together with UNDP, UNEP, and the World Resources
Institute, issued a landmark report, “World Resources 2002—2004: Decisions for the
Earth—Balance, Voice, and Power” (UNDP et al. 2004), which called for “fundamental
changes in how decisions are made concerning the world’s natural resources,” and stressed
the need “for changes to arrest the accelerating deterioration of the world’s environment
and to address the crisis of global poverty” (WBG 2014b, 446).
In 2004, OED issued the first phase of the “Addressing the Challenges of Globalization: An
Independent Evaluation of the World Bank’s Approach to Global Programs,” addressing
issues of global partnerships, recommending improved management of the growing trust
fund portfolio (OED 2004a).
In September 2004, the first twoWorld Bank Public Information Centers (PICs) in Vietnam
were launched to share knowledge and provide access to a rich source of information on
various topics of development.
In April 2005, theWorld Bank released a new study, “Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning
from a Decade of Reform,” which reviewed the impacts of policy and institutional reforms
introduced in the 1990s on economic growth (World Bank 2005b; see, also, Rodrik 2006).
In May 2005, the World Bank, after consultation with the Governments of India and
Pakistan, announced an agreement for the appointment of a Neutral Expert to address
differences concerning a project governed by the Indus Waters Treaty.
In June 2005, Paul Wolfowitz became the 10th World Bank president.
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In August 2005, the World Bank, FAO, the International Union for Conservation of Nature
(IUCN), WorldFish, and developing countries launched a Global Program on Fisheries,
“PROFISH,” to reverse the trend toward fish depletion (see https://www.worldbank.org/en/
topic/environment/brief/global-program-on-fisheries-profish).
In September 2005, the World Bank publication Where is the Wealth of Nations? provided
new estimates of total wealth, which included produced capital, natural resources, and
human skills values and capabilities, noting that measures such as GDP ignore resource
depletion and environmental damage (World Bank 2005e).
In October 2005, TerrAfrica, a new partnership to address land degradation and increase
sustainable land management throughout the Africa region was announced at the UN
Conference of the Parties on Desertification in Nairobi. TerrAfrica was developed after calls for
action from the UNConvention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), as well as from the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the CAADP/NEPAD Environmental
Action Plan, and the G8 Gleneagles Summit Africa statement (World Bank 2015).
In November 2005, the World Bank study, Reducing Poverty on a Global Scale drew on
more than 100 case studies of poverty reduction to identify factors for successful reduction,
including leadership, commitment, institutional innovation, learning, experimentation, and
donor assistance (Moreno-Dodson 2005).
In December 2005, at WTO Trade Talks in Hong Kong, the Bank engaged in strong advocacy
to resume agricultural trade talks, reduce protectionism, and increase market access.
The December 2005 Bank report, “Reaching the Poor: What Works, What Doesn’t, and
Why,” examined health, nutrition, and population programs that often fail to reach the
poor who most need them (Gwatkin, Wagstaff, and Yazbeck 2005).
In 2006, the Bank Group worked closely with the World Organisation for Animal Health
(OIE), the World Health Organization (WHO) and FAO, as well as partner countries and
private donors and IMF, to develop initiatives at both the regional and international levels
to prevent the spread of avian influenza and reduce the risk of outbreaks turning into
pandemics. Two vice presidents were appointed to coordinate the Bank’s external response
and an internal one, to examine and improve, as needed, the existing contingency plans for
Bank staff and families.
In February 2006, the AfDB, ADB, IDB, European Investment Bank, European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, IMF, and the World Bank agreed on policies and
practices to address internal and external problems of corruption.
In March 2006, the World Bank published the report, “Reengaging in Agricultural Water
Management: Challenges and Options,” which called for doubling rural irrigation
investment to improve agricultural productivity and avert a global food crisis in the next
20 years (World Bank 2006).
In September 2006, the World Bank launched a four-year, US$24.5 million plan, Gender
Equality as Smart Economics, to increase economic potential of women in areas such as
infrastructure, agriculture, and finance in developing countries.
In October 2006, the World Bank released The Other Half of Gender, a book on gender
equality, arguing for a focus on relations between men and women (Bannon and Correia
2006). It also released the report, “Close to Home: The Development Impact of Remittances
in Latin America,” a study that examined who the money that migrant workers send back
increased growth, reduces poverty, and improves education and health in their home
regions (Fajnzylber and López 2007).
In 2007, the World Bank launched a new framework to speed response to disasters and
emergencies with initial funding for start-up activities and more effective long-term support
for recovery efforts.
In May 2007, the Executive Directors of the World Bank accepted the resignation of
President Paul Wolfowitz, amid scandal. Robert Zoellick was nominated to replace him.
Paul Wolfowitz’s failed Presidency with scandal diminished the Bank’s stature.
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In July 2007, President Robert Zoellick became the 11th World Bank president. He restores
focus on crisis response to the dual food and financial crisis (food crisis spreads first in
Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, followed by the global food crisis of 2007–8).
In October 2007, the World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development was
released, stressing the need to place the agriculture sector at the center of the development
agenda to meet MDGs (World Bank 2007).
In 2007, Zoellick pushed for a Bank response to the food and financial crisis in partnership
with IOs, most notably WFP and FAO. Zoellick increased emphasis on conflict-affected
countries.
In August 2008, the World Bank released new poverty estimates and sets a new poverty line
of US$1.25/day.
In October 2008, the World Book published Gender in Agriculture Sourcebook, that related
underinvestment in women and agriculture, with gender disparities in knowledge, access to
credit, and land, result in higher levels of poverty and greater food insecurity (World Bank
2008). The Bank also joined with governments and the private sector to launch the
Adolescent Girls Initiative (AGI) to promote the economic empowerment of girls in poor
and post-conflict countries. See https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/adolescent-girls-
initiative
In November 2008, the Bank increased support for developing countries in the financial
crisis. Between 2008–13, overall lending and lending to agriculture increased.
In December 2008, the World Bank and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF)
launched the Living Standards Measurement Study—Integrated Survey on Agriculture
(LSMS–ISA) to establish household panel surveys in six African countries, to generate high-
quality and consistent data on rural households.
In March 2009, the Bank published Moving out of Poverty: Success from the Bottom Up, a
study carried out in 15 countries, including interviews with more than 60,000 people
(Narayan, Pritchett, and Kapoor 2009).
In April 2009, the World Bank announced it would triple investments in safety nets and
other social protection programs in health and education over the next two years, to protect
the most vulnerable from the global economic crisis.
In June 2009, the WBG established the Agriculture Finance Support Facility, to expand
rural finance in the developing world, with a US$20 million contribution from the BMGF.
In September 2009, the 2010 WDR: Development and Climate Change was published,
reporting that development goals are threatened by climate change, with heaviest impacts
on poor countries and poor people, and calling for quick action toward a “climate-smart”
agriculture (World Bank 2010).
In November 2009, President Zoellick launched a global urban strategy at an Infrastructure
Finance Summit, to work with developing countries undergoing rapid urbanization.
In December 2009, the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved a US$1.3 billion Crisis
Response Window for IDA to protect LICs from crises. Also, in December, the World Bank
launched the Carbon Partnership Facility at the UN Climate Change Conference in
Copenhagen to help develop programmatic approaches to assist countries “to pursue low-
carbon growth and to accelerate greenhouse gas emission reduction” (WBG 2014b, 698).
In January 2010, the World Bank and Microsoft announced partnership to leverage
information and communication technology in Africa to support social and economic
development.
In March 2010, the World Bank report, “Women, Business and Law” was the first to
measure gender gap using quantitative and objective data (see World Bank 2020c).
In April 2010, WBG’s Open Data Initiative created data.worldbank.org for data access. On
November 8, 2010, on World Statistics Day, President Zoellick stated, “It’s important to
make the data and knowledge of the World Bank available to everyone. Statistics tell the
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story of people in developing and emerging countries and can play an important part in
helping to overcome poverty.”⁴⁴
In December 2010, the World Bank and IMF launched online the Quarterly Public Sector
Debt Database, to provide statistics for 30 emerging markets and developing countries.
In 2011, IEG issued its evaluation of theWorld Bank’s lending to agriculture and agribusiness
in 2011, “Growth and Productivity in Agriculture and Agribusiness. Evaluative Lessons from
World Bank Group Experience,” which covered a 10-year period, 1998–2008 (IEG 2011b).
In April 2011, the World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development (World
Bank 2011c) examined the causes of organized violence in the 21st century, noting “risks of
violence are greater when high stresses combine with weak capacity or lack of legitimacy in
key national institutions” (WBG 2014b, 736).
In June 2011, the first “World Bank Report on Disability” provided an estimate of more
than one billion persons with disabilities globally (WHO and World Bank 2011).
In September 2011, theWorld Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development
(World Bank 2012) noted that gender equality “could raise productivity, improve outcomes
for children, make institutions more representative, and advance development prospects for
all” (WBG 2014b, 747). Also published in September, The State of the World Bank
Knowledge Services: Knowledge for Development was the first institution-wide review of the
Bank’s knowledge work—research, economic and sector reports, technical assistance, and
training (World Bank 2011b).
In April 2012, the World Bank announced its Open Access Policy for Research and
Knowledge and launch of its Open Knowledge Repository.
In July 2012, Jim Yong Kim became the World Bank president.
In August 2012, the sourcebook, Getting to Green—A Sourcebook of Pollution Management
Policy Tools for Growth and Competitiveness was published, to serve as a reference and
technical guide for policymakers and development practitioners (Ahmed 2012).
In October 2012, President Kim called for the World Bank to become a “Solutions Bank” to
work with partners to eliminate extreme poverty. President Kim also spoke of the concept of
“Science of Delivery” in several speeches, with the general message that the world has
invested too much in what to deliver and too little in how to deliver it.
In December 2012, the World Bank report, “The Future of Water in African Cities: Why
Waste Water?” was aimed at changing policymakers’ thinking about urban water
management and planning in Africa (Torres 2012).
In April 2013, the World Bank published The State of the Poor: Where Are the Poor and
Where are the Poorest? which used World Development Indicators to examine extreme
poverty headcount rates (Beegle et al. 2013). The World Bank also announced the
establishment of the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development
(KNOMAD), to provide a hub for knowledge and policy expertise on migration issues.
In November 2013, the World Bank report, “Building Resilience: Integrating Climate and
Disaster Risk into Development,” examined gradual or slow-onset effects of climate
change—sea-level rise, salinization, droughts, as well as extreme weather events such as
floods, cyclones, and heat waves (World Bank and GFDRR 2013).
In 2013, the World Bank’s Agriculture Action Plan 2013–15 was focused on increasing
agricultural productivity and resilience, especially for smallholder farmers (World Bank
2013c). More emphasis was given to climate-smart agriculture, gender mainstreaming, and
nutrition (World Bank 2019b). The department’s name was changed from Agriculture and
Rural Development to Agriculture and Environmental Services.⁴⁵
⁴⁴ https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/world-statistics-day-recognized-important-role-official-statistics-policy-
making-development
⁴⁵ Previously called: Agriculture division (1953–68), Agriculture Projects Department (1968–77), Agriculture
and Rural Development Department (1977–92), Agriculture and Natural Resources Department (1993–7), Rural
Development Department (1997–2002), Agriculture and Rural Development Department (2002–13), and from
2013, the Agriculture and Environmental Services Department.
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Appendix B: Role of the International Finance Corporation
IFC’s mission is to create opportunities for people to escape poverty. IFC’s approach has evolved over
the years: from support to private sector-led growth, in general, to promoting environmentally and
socially sustainable growth, to beginning to pay explicit attention to inclusive growth. There have
been different perspectives of how IFC’s support for private-sector development is helping to tackle
poverty. Yet, there was not enough clarity about what poverty means within the IFC context, and how
IFC’s interventions reach and affect the poor.
IFC’s “IFC 3.0 strategy” is embedded in the Bank Group’s Forward Look vision (discussed in Chapter
5). It recognizes that to achieve impact at scale, IFCmust leverage the strengths of the entireWorld Bank
Group and other development partners to create markets and mobilize private sector resources at a
greater scale. There is huge potential to this effect, which is still unrealized despite rapid growth of IFC.
This new strategy follows IEG’s 2011 evaluation of IFC’s impacts on poverty. Reviewing the decade
2000–10, the evaluation noted that priority given to what it calls “frontiermarkets” has led to increases in
IFC investments in IDA countries, but that these investments need to be spread around in more than the
few IDA countries in which they are currently concentrated. IFC investments in targeted sectors need to
also be expanded “beyond financial markets where trade finance had contributed most to expansion,”
particularly after the financial crisis when international trade finance dried up (IEG 2011a, xi). The
evaluation also recommended that “IFC needs to continue to strengthen its partnership with the World
Bank to enhance its poverty focus and results” (IEG 2011a, xi).
The report noted further that patterns of growth are important, “including making development
impact a key driver of strategy, testing development goals in operational activities, and participating
in funding the IDA. But it can more fully exploit the vast potential for poverty orientation in its
growth supporting activities” (IEG 2011a, xiii).
The evaluation assessed IFC “in terms of how its strategies, projects, and results measurement
framework contribute to growth and to distributional patterns of growth that create opportunities for
the poor” (IEG 2011a, xiii).
At the strategic level, the sectors were defined so broadly as to be consistent with a pro-poor
orientation, but the strategic sectors needed “to be designed and implemented in ways that actually
enhance opportunities and the impact on poor people” (IEG 2011a, xiii).
The IEG report noted that at the project level:
It has been challenging for IFC to incorporate distributional issues in interventions. Fewer than
half of projects reviewed included evidence of poverty and distributional aspects in project
objectives, targeting of interventions, characteristics of intended beneficiaries, or tracking of
impacts. Where projects reflected distributional aspects, targeted the poor, and monitored the
results, they were more likely to achieve better poverty outcomes. Projects that paid attention to
distribution issues performed as well, if not better than, other projects on development and
investment outcomes; this suggest that poverty focus need not come at the expense of financial
success. A broad range of IFC’s interventions can therefore be simultaneously pro-growth and
pro-poor, but this link is neither universal nor automatic. . . .
On development results, most IFC investment projects generate satisfactory returns but do not
provide evidence of identifiable opportunities for the poor to participate in, contribute to, or
benefit from the economic activities that the project supports. The fact that projects do not
provide evidence of enhanced opportunities for the poor does not necessarily mean that they
do not contribute to poverty reduction. Achieving satisfactory economic returns suggests that
they make a positive contribution to growth and therefore most likely to poverty reduction.
However, the relatively high proportion of projects that do not generate identifiable opportu-
nities for the poor suggests the primary reliance on the pace of growth for poverty reduction, at
a time when IFC’s strategies point to more attention to the pattern of growth that it supports.
Greater effort is needed in translating the strategic intentions into actions in investment
operations and advisory services to enhance IFC’s poverty focus. (IEG 2011a, xiv)
With respect to defining frontier regions, IFC needs to consider “the incidence of poverty, spatial
distribution of the poor, and non-income dimensions of poverty” (IEG 2011a, xiv). The evaluation
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recommended the need to sharpen the definition of poverty “and shared understanding of poverty
and poverty impact within the IFC context, and providing guidance to staff on how to operationalize
it within the development effectiveness framework at the strategy and project level” (IEG 2011a, xiv).
The evaluation recommended adoption of “more nuanced concepts of poverty when defining
frontier regions” and “a consultative framework, including the participation of relevant networks
of the World Bank Group and partner organizations to deepen understanding and develop innova-
tive approaches for understanding, measuring, and reporting of poverty impacts within the IFC
context” (IEG 2011a, xiv).
The evaluation further recommended:
At the project level, there is a need to re-examine the stakeholder framework to address
distributional and poverty issues in project design. IFC needs to make explicit in its interven-
tions the underlying assumptions about how projects can contribute to growth and patterns of
growth that provide opportunities for the poor.
On measuring results, for projects with poverty reduction objectives, poverty outcomes ought
to be defined ex-ante, then monitored and reported. For projects that focus primarily on
growth . . . (IEG 2011a, xiv)
The World Bank Group’s Gender Strategy (FY16–23): Gender Equality, Poverty Reduction and Inclusive
Growth describes IFC’s work in advancing gender equality via partnerships with the private sector:
The Partnerships with the private sector are critical to advancing economic opportunities for
women and including men in supporting gender equality in the workplace. One such partner-
ship led by the IFC is SheWorks, a global private sector partnership to improve employment
opportunities and working conditions for more than 360,000 women by 2016 through knowl-
edge sharing and best practices. In its first year, the partnership recruited 13 leading private
sector companies (in nine countries and 20 sectors, including traditionally male-dominated
industries such as financial services, real estate, telecommunications, construction, petrochem-
icals, energy, and information technology) that have pledged to implement a minimum of three
measures to support women in the workplace: flexible work, effective anti-sexual-harassment
mechanisms, and programs to accelerate women in leadership. The EDGE Certified
Foundation, the International Labor Organization, and UN Global Compact provide knowl-
edge support and facilitate implementation of best practices. Early results show increases in
women’s employment numbers. This model will be used to consolidate learning and best
practices for replication by other companies, industries, and regions in the years to come.
(WBG 2015, 43)
Similar to the IBRD, IFC is acting to execute a capital increase plan, “shifting its focus to working
‘upstream’ to open markets and create projects that will increase private investment in all countries,
especially the poorest ones” (World Bank 2019b). The IFC and the World Bank have developed “the
‘Cascade’ approach, which looks for private-sector solutions to development challenges and directs
World Bank programs to overcome obstacles in the private sector framework. This approach is key to
attracting new investment and boosting the impact of every development dollar” (World Bank 2019b).
Historical Evolution of the International Finance Corporation
Highlights of IFC’s chronology are summarized here (World Bank 2016, 2017):
1956: IFC was established under Robert Garner’s leadership with US$100 million in capital.
1957: IFC’s first loan of US$2 million was made to help Siemens’ Brazilian affiliate manufacture
electrical equipment.
1971: IFC Capital Markets Department was created to strengthen local banks, stock markets, and
other financial intermediaries, eventually becoming IFC’s largest area of emphasis.
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1972–4: IFC’s advisory services and field offices grew in the 1970s, helping to build Indonesia’s
first securities markets.
1973: IFC’s first housing finance project: IFC became a founding shareholder in a start-up in
Colombia, later adopting same model in 1978, with HDFC Bank in India.
1974: IFC’s US$17.3 million investment and advice to Korea’s LG Electronics helped it become
one of the first globally competitive, emerging-market companies.
1976: IFC created first small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) finance project, a US$2 million
loan for Kenya Commercial Bank to lend to smaller local companies.
1980: IFC made its first investment in the Tata Group, India: Tata Iron and Steel Company
borrowed US$38 million from IFC.
1981: IFC coined the phrase “emerging markets,” changing the financial world’s perception of
developing countries and defining a new asset class. IFC created the Emerging Markets
Database, the basis of the world’s first emerging markets stock index.
1984: IFC launched the first publicly traded emerging-market country fund, the NYSE-listed
Korea Fund.
1985: IFC provided investment-climate reform advice to China.
1988: During the Latin American debt crisis, IFC helped several Mexican conglomerates reduce
their debt.
1989: IFC received its first triple-A credit rating, a key to a major multicurrency borrowing
program that, by 2016, topped US$15 billion a year.
1992: IFC coined the phrase “frontier markets.” IFC led one of Russia’s first privatization
programs, auctioning 2,000 businesses in Nizhny Novgorod.
1996: IFC entered the microfinance sector with a US$3 million stake in Profund, focused on LAC.
In one of their first investments in a conflict-affected state, IFC helped to launch Bosnia’s
microfinance pioneer (now ProCredit Bank). IFC led Africa’s largest privatization, the US$70
million sale of the government’s stake in Kenya Airways to KLM.
1998: IFC adopted new environmental and social review procedures and safeguard policies.
Responding to the Asian financial crisis, IFC began a five-year, nearly US$1 billion counter-
cyclical investment and advisory package to strengthen clients in Korea.
2002: Amid worsening economic conditions in Argentina, IFC started a series of countercyclical
investments, beginning with US$60 million for the agribusiness client AGD.
2003: Leading commercial banks launched the Equator Principles, modeled on IFC’s standards.
2004: IFC launched its first large-scale gender initiative, encouraging projects to help local
women-owned businesses. IFC oversaw creation of the Emerging Market Private Equity
Association (EMPEA).
2006: New Performance Standards were adopted by IFC.
2007: IFC’s US$5 million investment in FINO, a start-up Indian IT firm, helped expand access to
finance for people in rural areas.
2009: The G20 launched its Financial Inclusion initiative, naming IFC its SME finance adviser.
Responding to the global financial crisis, IFC provided €2 billion to an international effort to
maintain commercial bank lending in Central and Eastern Europe. Having decentralized to be
closer to clients, IFC had more than 50 percent of its staff in the field.
2010: IFC launched a private sector window in the US$1.25 billion Global Agriculture and Food
Security Program, a new World Bank Group initiative formed at the request of the G20.
2012: A year after the end of conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, IFC financed the expansion of the country’s
largest thermal power plant, Azito.
2013: World Bank Group launches its twin goals—ending extreme poverty and boosting shared
prosperity. The People’s Bank of China pledges US$3 billion to IFC’s new Managed Co-
Lending Portfolio Program, becoming the first investor in the new syndications program.
2014: IFC’s first offshore Masala bond in Indian rupees was issued in London. The program has
grown to US$3 billion.
2014: IFC’s partnership with Goldman Sachs, 10,000 Women began with the 2014 launch of the
Women Entrepreneurs Opportunity Facility (WEOF), which expands access to capital for
women entrepreneurs. To date, WEOF has supported the deployment of over US$1.4 billion to
financial institutions, reaching over 53,000 women across 32 countries.
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2015: IFC has played a key role in highlighting the importance of the private sector in achieving
the SDGs. As part of the coordinated World Bank Group response to the Ebola crisis in West
Africa, IFC provided US$225 million to help local banks maintain lending to local SMEs. IFC
was a thought leader in Paris at historical international climate change talks. IFC showcased
emerging-market clients with innovative climate-smart solutions.
Appendix C: Role of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MIGA, a member of the World Bank Group, was composed of 181 member governments as of
August 2016—of which 156 nations are developing countries and 25 are industrialized countries.
MIGA was created to complement both public and private investment insurance sources against
noncommercial risks in developing countries. Its multilateral character and sponsorship by advanced
and developing nations bolstered confidence in foreign investment.
In September 1985, the World Bank endorsed the idea of a multilateral political risk insurance
provider and established MIGA as a part of the World Bank Group in April 1988. MIGA started out
with US$1 billion worth of capital and 29 original member states.
As described in the MIGA Brief, “MIGA: Cultivating Agribusiness Growth”:
Agricultural investments are risky business. . . . Unclear or incomplete laws on property own-
ership may affect profit. Restrictions on revenue repatriation could disrupt a project’s finances
adding to the imbalance between foreign-denominated debt and locally denominated revenue.
Threats such as revolution or terrorism add an additional layer of uncertainty . . .
MIGA provides political risk insurance (guarantees) and credit enhancement support against
certain noncommercial risks to investments in developing countries. In collaboration with our
World Bank Group colleagues, we work with investors to structure deals in ways that benefit all
parties and foster positive relationships with the communities where they invest.
MIGA guarantees [mitigate] the noncommercial risks of agribusiness investments, thereby
lowering the cost of capital and helping secure financing. Our guarantees reassure lenders that
their investments are protected and help equity owners overcome hesitations that may loom
large prior to deal signing, particularly for costly investments in high-risk countries. Once a
deal is in place, MIGA guarantees, backed by the World Bank Group, bring companies peace of
mind, providing an added measure of security that can stabilize a project’s risk profile and
reinforce positive relations with host governments.
MIGA can also help guide agribusiness companies as they face challenges related to the
environmental and social aspects of their investments. For example, key natural resources
need to be managed effectively while yields are increased to meet market demand. Investments
in agriculture can play a significant role in poverty reduction, but only if local production needs
are met and high labor standards are practiced. MIGA has the experience to advise its
agribusiness clients in implementing social and environmental best practices in their opera-
tions. (MIGA 2015)
Some of the areas in which MIGA has provided guarantees include: (1) currency inconvertibility and
transfer restrictions; (2) expropriation; (3) war, civil disturbance, terrorism, and sabotage; (4) breach of
contract; (5) non-honoring of financial obligations. MIGA also provides dispute resolution services for
guaranteed investments to prevent disruptions to developmentally beneficial projects (MIGA 2015).
Since 1988, MIGA has issued more than US$30 billion worth of political risk insurance globally
for more than 750 projects in various sectors. Among the agribusiness guarantees that MIGA has
extended is its support for Agrivision Africa in Zambia, a business operating grain-related agribu-
sinesses and related value-chain assets. In 2011, MIGA initially backed an investment in two
commercial farms in Zambia’s Central Province. In South Africa, MIGA provided coverage for
EcoPlanet’s first investment there in 2015. In the Eastern Cape Region, MIGA provided a guarantee
of US$8.6 million to cover an equity investment for converting degraded land in an impoverished area
into bamboo plantations for the production of activated carbon and bio-charcoal to be sold to local and
export markets. In Ethiopia, MIGA has supported a fruit processing plant, adding to the value chain.
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Administering the West Bank and GAZA Investment Guarantee Trust Fund, MIGA is providing
guarantees for investors developing Medjool date palm farms in Jericho (MIGA 2015).
MIGA’s significant growth under the FY18–20 strategy has been driven by “a deepening partnership
with the Bank and IFC, an increasing focus on business development and product innovation. MIGA
has expanded its reinsurance to seventy percent of gross exposure. This will allow MIGA to sustain its
growth in the medium term as global macro and business conditions evolve” (World Bank 2019b).
Appendix D: Independent Evaluation Group and
World Bank Project Performance Ratings
IEG independently validates all completion reports that the World Bank prepares for its projects (known
as Implementation Completion and Results Report, or ICRs). For more information, see https://ieg.
worldbankgroup.org/methodology and https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/data#
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The Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations
Uma Lele and Sambuddha Goswami
Summary
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) is the only interna-
tional organization charged with comprehensive responsibility for all aspects of agricul-
ture.¹ Hence, it has a critical role in addressing the emerging global challenges of food and
agriculture’s impacts on the environment and on human health. Climate change and its
impacts on agriculture is one of the many environmental challenges. It also has a key role to
play in the rapidly transforming food systems and its impacts on human health. FAO’s
“Save and Grow—A Policymaker’s Guide to the Sustainable Intensification of Smallholder
Crop Production” described the challenge as: “To feed a growing world population, . . . to
grow, agriculture must learn to save” (FAO 2011c, vii). This implies farming systems that
provide a balance of “productivity, socio-economic and environmental benefits to produ-
cers and to society at large,” while ensuring soil health and managing crop diversity and
plant protection to suit a variety of agroecosystems confronting climate change, requires
policies and institutions conducive to meet these challenges (FAO 2011c, vii). (See Box 9.1.)
What are FAO’s specific roles and how well has it been performing them? How can it be
strengthened to meet the daunting challenges going forward, including those which will
emanate from the UN Food Summit in 2021? Can it become a global center of excellence to
help countries achieve the needed transformative changes in their agriculture, as they face
growing environmental and human health challenges? This story explores FAO’s evolving
roles and reforms since the 2007 Independent External Evaluation (IEE), the FAO Director-
General (DG) José Graziano da Silva in 2019, and the initial year and a half of the new DG,
Qu Dongyu’s tenure, in which FAO has made a substantial culture change. What it needs
now are resources to go with change to fulfill its considerable potential to make a difference
to the outcomes.
IEE was the first comprehensive independent external evaluation of any international
organization, on which Uma Lele served and was responsible for review of all of FAO’s
technical work, and therefore, provides a useful baseline derived from her firsthand
evaluative experience. This period of a near decade and a half has witnessed a global food
crisis, the transition from Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to Sustainable
¹ Uma Lele was a member of the Independent External Evaluation of FAO in 2006–7 and was responsible for
overseeing assessment of FAO’s technical work in all areas, including policy, food and nutrition, livestock,
research and extension technical assistance, the FAO–Cooperative Programme with the World Bank, emergency
assistance, forestry, fisheries, soils, water, and statistics. In 2012, she chaired an external panel of experts that
reviewed independent external evaluations of FAO’s work on forestry.
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Development Goals (SDGs), and the Paris Agreement to combat climate change, and now a
proposed Food Summit, following the tragedy of COVID-19. During this period, FAO has
responded to more than 100 recommendations of the IEE, an unusually high number of
recommendations to address its known weaknesses. This chapter outlines how FAO’s
adoption of a strategic framework and matrix management has enabled it to meet the
goals it has adopted for itself, toward SDGs, particularly SDG2 (“zero hunger”). It is a
substantially expanded but necessary agenda. The chapter concludes that FAO has made
considerable progress in its vision and strategy and laid the groundwork with a framework
for being accountable for results. The chapter identifies four issues for FAO going forward.
The first is the old debate on the balance between FAO’s normative, public goods
function and the embrace of SDGs to help member countries advance them. The debate
represents an old fight between developed and developing countries. And even today, there
is no consensus, even within FAO’s staff and Council, and certainly among its external
supporters, on FAO’s relative role in country assistance, which is increasingly used to
forward the SDG agenda, compared to its role in the provision of global public goods
(GPGs).
What are these GPG functions, how different are they from national public goods, and
how well has FAO been able to discharge them? There are multiple GPGs, each requiring a
specific approach to its delivery. We define public goods and how and why GPGs are
different from national public goods, how they are delivered differently depending on the
nature of each, and then discuss implications of their delivery needs later in the chapter.
Second, matrix management is a challenge, which is by no means unique to FAO. It
calls for working across departments at headquarters and with a decentralized system in the
field to achieve shared organizational objectives. Graziano’s top-down management style,
which also prevailed under two former DGs, may have inhibited management effectiveness,
despite the strength of the logical framework he helped to establish. This challenge has
already been addressed by DG Qu Dongyu. He reorganized FAO and has moved to an
“executive director” style, with revisions in the management structure. In July 2020, Qu
Dongyu proposed a second set of reforms to achieve “four betters”—better production,
better nutrition, a better environment, and a better life by further transparent, open,
innovative, responsible, and effective reform. The FAO Council agreed to eliminate depart-
ments and have the division directors, and their divisions, directly report to one of the five
members of the “cabinet”: three Deputy Directors-General (DDGs), the Chief Economist,
and the Chief Scientist, a new position created and announced at the 35th Regional
Conference for the Near East in September 2020. (The titles of most divisions have also
been adjusted.) The DG also announced his intention to minimize silos, encourage cross-
divisional cooperation, and reduce hierarchy and “kingdoms” with team work. The propo-
sals also included creation of the office of Sustainable Development Goals and a new
division of Food Systems and Food Safety, as well as strengthening of the country and
regional offices. The Assistant Directors-General (ADGs) remain in place as special advisors
and thought leaders in their respective areas. The reforms also proposed strengthening three
partnerships—an investment center that collaborates with international financial institu-
tions (IFIs); the Joint FAO/IAEA Centre, which reflects the long-standing strategic part-
nership in sustainable agriculture development and food security, using nuclear science and
technology; and the Joint FAO/WHO Centre that will house the Codex Alimentarius
Commission (CAC) and address issues related to zoonotic diseases. The DG also an-
nounced his intention to strengthen the capacities of FAO country and regional offices,
and a number of responses in support of COVID-19, working with the G20 and World
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Economic Forum among others, promoting digital agriculture and South–South
cooperation.
Morale in the organization had reportedly improved since the new DG’s regime, with
staff being regarded more as a core asset rather than an expense, maternity leave being
lengthened, and staff entitlements brought back in line with UN standards. Long-term
morale will depend on how the DG works with his managers and staff to manage the
organization and works with member states to strategically plan and resource the organi-
zation. A new Strategic Plan should be reviewed by the FAO Council in December 2020 and
be approved by the FAO Conference in June 2021, but the initial signs have been positive.
Third, a big challenge is increasing resources in the context of FAO’s assessed con-
tributions. They have remained flat in nominal terms since 2010–11, shown later in
Figure 9.4, and have declined in real terms, albeit with a slightly increased share of emerging
countries in total assessments based on their rapid economic growth, while FAO’s agenda
has grown and FAO’s dependence on voluntary contributions has increased. It is part of the
generic underfunding of the United Nations (UN) System documented in this book, in the
cases of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the World Food
Programme (WFP), and unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the UN
System has been facing a cash crunch with only 70 percent of the assessments having been
paid. This, too, is not a new issue for the UN System. Therefore, other sources of funding are
needed, including the increased reliance on South–South cooperation as a cost-effective way
of delivering services to developing countries. There is need for further expansion of
resources to meet FAO’s current obligations.
Finally, the chaptermakes a case for establishing FAOas a center of excellence to achieve a
transformative, sustainable food system and to address its GPGs and SDG functions,
supported by predictable funds to be accorded to FAO, well beyond its current level of assessed
and voluntary contributions, with expected transparency in the use of resources.
Introduction
Climate change, including increased frequency and intensity of weather extremes, has
adversely impacted food production and terrestrial ecosystems, contributing to desertifica-
tion and land degradation in many regions. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC 2019) predicted resultant food shortages and likely increased flow of
migrants, which is already redefining politics in North America, Europe, and other regions.
Chapter 12 on WFP is dedicated to the issues of emergency assistance.
Widely recognized, also, is the growing damage caused by food production to the global
resource base and to human health, leading to a growing incidence of noncommunicable
diseases and a focus on shifting sustainable food systems.² Food production is leaving a
growing footprint on the world’s natural resource base, weighing on biodiversity, contribut-
ing to soil erosion and groundwater depletion. It has been driving deforestation and the
overexploitation of fish stocks, and is responsible for a quarter of global greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. In addition, modern food systems, laden with salt, sugar, and fats, have
been recognized increasingly as harmful to human health. With these challenges, food and
agriculture must adapt to climate change, help lower a stubbornly high level of
² Food production in the broadest sense includes fish, forestry, fiber, and fuel.
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undernourishment, while producing increased and more diversified food with less re-
sources. The challenges of food and agriculture have brought together several international
organizations concerned with global food supply, the stewardship of the world’s natural
resources, and human health. FAO is at the heart of this focus, and its roles is expected to
increase with the proposed global food summit in 2021.³
A strengthened FAO will help respond to these challenges more effectively than it has
thus far. Of course, a systems approach, combining food supply, natural resources, and
human health into a single concept, is relatively new for all of us. FAO has been a leader in
starting to move in this direction and to advocate a shift, as evidenced, for example, by its
Strategic Objective 4 (SO4), discussed in this chapter. These are recent ideas, and they will
be at the center stage in the forthcoming UN Food Summit in 2021.
Countries had not demanded this approach until recently, and it is still far from clear if
this broader approach is widely understood, endorsed, or used by international organiza-
tions and member countries, as we demonstrate in the case of other international organiza-
tions in other chapters. FAO will have to continue to lead in responding to these challenges,
as the challenges will call for a more integrative approach across sectors and disciplines than
the one FAO and others have pursued in the individual specific elements of sustainable
management: for example, of crops, livestock, and others. In 2019, FAO, working with the
Rome-based IFAD andWFP, as well as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and
the World Health Organization (WHO), reported rising levels of undernourishment for the
third year in a row, mostly in conflict-affected countries and countries suffering from El
Niño. Out of the 815 million estimated to be hungry, 489 million were hungry due to
conflict, mostly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as discussed further in
Chapter 12 on WFP (FAO et al. 2019).
FAO’s aggregate estimate of Prevalence of Undernourishment (PoU) declined from 821
million in 2019, to 690 million in 2020, prior to the pandemic (FAO et al. 2020, viii). The
decline is mainly because undernourishment estimates for China were adjusted by over 100
million people, based on using a newly available series of household data going back to
2000, which resulted in a substantial downward shift of the number of undernourished in
the world. China’s undernourished decreased from 10 percent of its population to 2 percent.
The new PoU estimates of 690 million hungry represent 8.9 percent of the world popula-
tion, but it is still up by 10 million people in one year and by nearly 60 million over five years
from 2014 to 2019, confirming the trend reported in past editions, even as the number has
changed from that published in recent reports (FAO et al. 2020, 5–6). Food insecurity,
measured as calorie deficit, is now concentrated in South Asia and Africa, although
malnourishment and obesity remain extensive challenges. The OECD–FAO 2020–9 Out-
look predicts that most of the hunger will remain in these two regions, driven by population
growth, climate change and conflict, keeping SDG2 off track and posing a continuing
challenge for FAO (OECD–FAO 2020).
FAO was founded in 1945 as a UN Agency for Food and Agriculture to promote
agricultural development and food security. Australian nutritionist Frank McDougall had
long advocated for an international forum to address hunger and malnutrition, and his
proposals were taken up by Eleanor Roosevelt, who organized a meeting with President
³ This chapter draws on information from the 2007 IEE and the Immediate Plan of Action (FAO 2007a,
2008a), as well as findings from other internal and external evaluations of FAO since 2007, a review of literature,
and personal communications and interviews with professionals familiar with FAO. The shortcomings, however,
are our own.
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Franklin D. Roosevelt. A year later, President Roosevelt convened the United Nations
Conference on Food and Agriculture at Hot Springs, Virginia, in 1943, bringing together
representatives from 44 governments. The Conference ended with a commitment to
establish a permanent organization for food and agriculture. On October 16, 1945, in
Château Frontenac, Quebec, 34 governments signed the constitution for the organization,
and by the end of the first session, held from October 16 to November 1, FAO had 42
members (FAO 2015).
FAO is the only institution with a global mandate to monitor and help eradicate hunger
and improve nutrition by acting as “a neutral forum where all nations meet as equals to
negotiate agreements and debate policy.”⁴ To this end, it provides knowledge and informa-
tion related to all aspects of food and agriculture (UNESCO 1984). FAO has had a long track
record of policy advocacy, as discussed in Chapter 4. In addition to offering perspectives
and leadership in monitoring trends and challenges and, at times, being in the center of a
perfect storm, as discussed in Chapter 3 on the food crisis, which extended from 2007 to
2011, FAO is expected to provide policy advice, information, and practical solutions to
address these challenges. We discussed the global initiatives that emerged after the crisis in
Chapter 5 on global governance and considered them all too inadequate, with a few
exceptions such as the establishment of the Agricultural Market Information System
(AMIS) and the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), detailed in
Chapter 5. Since then, with the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, FAO was
given a pivotal role in monitoring the SDGs, including custodianship of 21 SDG indicators.
FAO, in its 2011 publication “Save and Grow,” proposed a new approach to crop
production that would be environmentally sustainable and holistic (Box 9.1).
These emerging challenges prompted a major rethinking in FAO, starting in 2012, with
the arrival of DG José Graziano da Silva, leading to a new strategic framework in 2013, well
before the SDGs were adopted in 2015. FAO had also actively contributed to the MDGs, and
then to their transition to SDGs, playing a key role in setting the global goals of reducing
hunger, both in the MDGs and SDGs, albeit with a more expansive goal in the transition
from MDGs to SDGs, particularly SDG2.
The new DG, Qu Dongyu, will continue the focus on SDGs, which is likely to be further
accentuated by the dialogues leading up to, and the conclusions of, the Food Systems
Summit 2021 (UN 2020a). The greater alignment with the SDGs and SDG indicators is
likely to drive a focus on ensuring the cross-cutting nature of FAO’s contributions to the
SDGs, built into the responsibilities of division directors and their respective divisions. This
chapter takes stock of where FAO stood at the time of this leadership transition. It explores
why FAO is critical to our collective efforts to reach Zero Hunger (UN 2020b). FAO’s
strategic framework, discussed here, offers a foundation for a clear, logical path to achieving
SDG2 by 2030. Therefore, it is relevant for all actors to fulfill their respective roles, although
certainly the framework and its functioning, including its matrix management can be
improved for the reasons outlined in this chapter. We conclude that the FAO framework
has established a strong foundation for the anticipated changes of a new Strategic Frame-
work to be approved by FAO Conference in June 2021, which will guide FAO and its
member states over the next 6–8 years. FAO’s current structure, as already noted, has
changed following the FAO Council session in July 2020.
⁴ http://www.fao.org/in-action/inpho/links/detail/en/c/214/
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Structure at Headquarters, Challenges of Central vs. Decentralized
Structure, and Declining Funding Structure
FAO’s structure follows the content of its work and consisted, until July 2020, of seven main
departments:⁵
1. Agriculture and Consumer Protection
2. Climate, Biodiversity, Land and Water Department
3. Corporate Services
4. Economic and Social Development
5. Fisheries and Aquaculture
6. Forestry
7. Technical Cooperation and Programme Management
Since then, the organization has changed as shown in Figure 9.1. The Management
Committee now consists of three DDGs under the DG, the Chief Economist, and a Chief
Box 9.1 Save and Grow
The challenge: “To feed a growing world population, we have no option but to intensify
crop production. But farmers face unprecedented constraints. In order to grow, agricul-
ture must learn to save” (FAO 2011c, vii).
Farming systems: “Crop production intensification will be built on farming systems
that offer a range of productivity, socio-economic and environmental benefits to pro-
ducers and to society at large” (FAO 2011c, vii).
Soil health: “Agriculture must, literally, return to its roots by rediscovering the
importance of healthy soil, drawing on natural sources of plant nutrition, and using
mineral fertilizer wisely” (FAO 2011c, viii).
Crops and varieties: “Farmers will need a genetically diverse portfolio of improved
crop varieties that are suited to a range of agro-ecosystems and farming practices, and
resilient to climate change” (FAO 2011c, viii).
Water management: “Sustainable intensification requires smarter, precision technol-
ogies for irrigation and farming practices that use ecosystem approaches to conserve
water” (FAO, 2011c, ix).
Plant protection: “Pesticides kill pests, but also pests’ natural enemies, and their
overuse can harm farmers, consumers and the environment. The first line of defense is
a healthy agro-ecosystem” (FAO 2011c, ix).
Policies and institutions: “To encourage smallholders to adopt sustainable crop pro-
duction intensification, fundamental changes are needed in agricultural development
policies and institutions” (FAO 2011c, x).
Source: FAO (2011c).
⁵ See http://www.fao.org/about/who-we-are/en/
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Scientist, a position created in July 2020. ADG positions remain the same, and there has
been some adjustment of the departments below them. There is also some reorganization of
country and regional offices.
FAO has a field presence in more than 130 countries (see Table 9.1). The decentralized
network includes 5 regional offices, 10 subregional offices, 74 country offices, and 8 offices
with technical officers or FAO Representatives. In addition, FAO has 5 liaison offices and 4
information offices in developed countries. This has been the situation for some time,
except for more recently, with expanded field representation in Papua New Guinea,
Mongolia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. FAO,
like many other international organizations, faces the challenge of striking the right
structural and budgetary balance between fieldwork and the headquarters.
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Figure 9.1 FAO headquarters: New organigrammes
Source: FAO Structure, http://www.fao.org/faoterm/collection/fao-structure/en/
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
636   
Decentralized Offices
This structure (Figure 9.2) should be seen in the context of flat assessed contributions in
nominal terms over a long time and have declined in real terms.
The share of voluntary contributions in total has increased from 58 percent to 66 percent
at the time of completion of this chapter in 2019. One FAO reviewer noted that “the
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Figure 9.2 FAO decentralized offices: New organigrammes
Source: FAO Structure, http://www.fao.org/faoterm/collection/fao-structure/en/
Table 9.1 International organizations’ country presence






Notes: CGIAR has Center headquarters in 15 countries, but the Centers have offices in
more than 75 countries.
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characterization of the [FAO] funding as precarious and fragmented . . . does not tell the
whole story.” It is remarkable in many ways that FAO (and some others in the UN)
continue to have guaranteed funding that member countries are required to pay. Member
countries would not agree to such guaranteed funding if FAO had started up in 2019. The
UN Funds and Programs do not have the requirement of assessed contributions, for
example, and financing for the UN as a whole is precarious, notwithstanding its growing
needs, including the “cash crisis” because of delayed payments mentioned earlier. The
fundamental dilemma that underpins this problem and other issues that the chapter raises
has three parts: (1) the assessed contribution portion of the budget is not growing, and there
are no indications that members will agree to a substantial increase in assessed contribu-
tions at any time in the foreseeable future; (2) almost all funding of FAO activities at the
country level comes from voluntary funding, through specific projects; and (3) FAO’s
Results Framework and the Strategic Objectives (SOs), initially built around the SDGs as
called for by members, and the SDG indicators all represent changes at the country level,
without much of any room to accommodate normative work. As a result, an improved trend
in independent assessments of FAO reforms, since the IEE in 2007, appear to have had little
impact on increased and predictable (assessed) financial support to FAO, needed to enable
it and its partners to the realization of SDG2 on a wider scale, shown later in Table 9.5. This
is notwithstanding the fact that FAO has defined its program of work and budget largely in
support of SDGs, and particularly SDG2. The one significant difference is that the share of
emerging countries, and particularly China, in the assessed contributions has increased,
because their GDP has grown more rapidly than that of developed countries, with a big
jump particularly in China’s assessed contribution—its biannual assessed contribution in
2018 was US$120 million compared to the US contribution of US$220 million. In the
interim, their voluntary contributions have increased, including through South–South
cooperation. The Chinese assessed contribution has increased significantly over the past
several UN budgets (UN System and FAO), to an almost a fourfold increase, so that China is
now the second largest contributor (replacing Japan). The new scale of contribution was
approved by the FAO Conference in 2019. China’s contribution amounts to 12.01 percent
for 2019–21, compared to 7.92 for 2016–18 (Strait Times 2018).
FAO’s Visions and Goals
FAO’s vision is “A world free from hunger and malnutrition where food and agriculture
contribute to improving the living standards of all, especially the poorest, in an economi-
cally, socially and environmentally sustainable manner” (UN News 2016).
The three Global Goals that FAO members have adopted are:
(1) eradication of hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition, progressively ensuring a
world in which people, at all times, have sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life;
(2) elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic and social progress for
all, with increased food production, enhanced rural development and sustainable liveli-
hoods; and
(3) sustainable management and utilization of natural resources, including soil, land,
water, air, climate and genetic resources for the benefit of present and future generations
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[for internal reforms and a strategic framework introduced in 2012, with a fundamental
change in the way it works through matrix management]. (FAO 2019a, 17)
FAO’s core functions include: first and foremost, providing a neutral platform for all
member countries to arrive at international agreements, develop long-term perspectives and
leadership in monitoring and assessing global trends in food security and agriculture,
fisheries, and forestry, and in all aspects of natural resources pertaining to agriculture;
stimulating the generation and dissemination of information and knowledge on all things
relating to agriculture, including, particularly, statistics and international instruments;
setting norms and standards and voluntary guidelines; supporting the development of
national legal frameworks; articulating policy and strategy options; and providing advice,
technical support, technology transfer, and capacity building; and providing emergency
assistance.
FAO operates globally, regionally, and nationally in 130 countries and is governed by a
Conference, comprised of 194 members.⁶ FAO’s data and numerous flagship publications
including the State of Food and Agriculture (SOFA) and the State of Food Insecurity and
Nutrition, as well as those on forestry and fisheries, are routinely drawn upon by international
organizations, such as the World Bank, the IPCC, and the UN System as a whole, as well as
scholars in developed and developing countries, the civil society, and the private sector.
Evolution of FAO since Inception
In 1943, years before the Bretton Woods institutions were established, 44 governments met
in Hot Springs, Virginia, in the United States, to create a permanent international organ-
ization for food and agriculture, FAO. In 1945, the first session of the FAO Conference took
place in Quebec City, Canada, and established FAO as a specialized UN agency. In 1951,
FAO moved its headquarters from Washington, DC, to Rome (FAO 1996b). The Preamble
of the FAO Constitution, as adopted in 1945, states:
The Nations accepting this Constitution, being determined to promote the common
welfare by further separate and collective action on their part for the purpose of: raising
the levels of nutrition and standards of living of the peoples under their respective
jurisdictions; securing improvements in the efficiency of the production and distribution
of all food and agricultural products; bettering the condition of rural populations; and thus
contributing toward an expanding world economy and ensuring humanity’s freedom
from hunger; . . . .⁷ (Phillips 1981a, 9)
FAO uniquely serves both developed and developing countries, unlike the World Bank,
WFP, the International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD), and CGIAR, which
were established to assist developing countries with contributions coming largely from
developed countries. This feature is both an asset and a source of tension in FAO, as
discussed earlier, when the expectations of developed and developing countries differ and
often diverge.
⁶ As the European Union (EU) is a member of FAO, we use “members” rather than “member nations” or
“member states.”
⁷ “Ensuring humanity’s freedom from hunger” was added in an amendment in 1965.
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FAO was created amid concern about food shortages in postwar Europe. It was called the
Food and Agriculture Organization, with “Food” coming first, intentionally. The idea of
“Freedom from Want,” from Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms speech was key.⁸ The Founders
were also concerned with nutrition and rural development and with overproduction, or at
least with problems of marketing and lack of markets for farm production, coming out of
the experience of the Great Depression.
Hence, governments on both sides of the Atlantic decided to support and reinforce the
agricultural sector and farm production. FAO was instrumental in assessing the food
situation, projecting what would be needed to fend off starvation, and recommending
how production could be increased to meet that need. At the time, FAO had little
international competition in nutrition, food, and agriculture. It focused on increasing
local food production by improving farmers’ education and providing farmers with im-
proved technology. FAO was tasked to collect, analyze, interpret, and disseminate infor-
mation internationally, as well as provide technical assistance, if requested by its members
(McCalla 2007b).
By the early 1950s, when industrial countries began to grow again, the World Bank,
which had been engaged in reconstruction, was able to withdraw from that effort, as the
countries it had assisted began to access international capital markets. TheWorld Bank then
evolved to address capital market failures in developing countries and, in 1960, established
the International Development Association (IDA) to assist the poorest developing coun-
tries, which could not afford loans on the terms of the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD). FAO, on the other hand, has always been an organization of
developed and developing country members with diverse expectations; for example, the
nutrition focus in the original FAO mandate was to address hunger, not only in Europe, but
over time, both the membership and the needs of developing countries increased, as they
became more differentiated. While theWorld Bank developed different lending instruments
for the differing needs of borrowers, FAO never created different approaches to deal with
different members, or moved members from one income category to another, as they
advanced and their development needs changed. For example, as emerging countries’ agri-
cultural trade increased, their need for food safety standards increased to meet the level of
standards in the industrial countries with whom they traded, whereas many poor countries
remain dependent on food imports and that dependence has, in some cases, even increased.
FAO needed to be equipped to deal with clientele of different levels of sophistication. For
example, during IEE, Latin American countries expressed their disappointment that FAO
lacked the skill set to deal with their needs in trade and food safety standards.
In the 1960s, FAO helped establish several important conventions: among them, the
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC); international food standards, guidelines,
and codes of practice (Codex Alimentarius); an early warning system (Global Information
and Early Warning System, or GIEWS); and comprehensive data collection systems
(AGROSTAT, now called FAOSTAT). (See FAOSTAT 2019; FAO 2020b; FAO and IPPC
2020; FAO andWHO 2020.) FAO became known as the world’s center for data on food and
agriculture. The 1974World Food Conference, held during a period of food shortages in the
southern Sahara, pressed FAO to promote programs related to world food security at a time
when other donor-funded players began to emerge.
⁸ See https://www.fdrlibrary.org/four-freedoms
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Responsibility for scientific, social, and policy research, originally an FAO priority, was
shifted to CGIAR, when it was established in 1972, on the initiative of private foundations,
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank,
among others. The rapid expansion of CGIAR over the next two decades may have been
viewed within FAO as competition for donor support of traditional research and extension
activities, which FAO had been charged to promote. At the same time, other UN organiza-
tions (such as WFP, discussed in Chapter 12, and IFAD, the United Nations Environment
Programme [UNEP], and the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]); inter-
national nongovernmental organizations (INGOs, including Oxfam, CARE, and Save the
Children); and private sector entities and foundations (including the Rockefeller and Ford
Foundations and, later, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation [BMGF]) were born or
expanded, and the mandates of these organizations complicated FAO’s ability to ascertain
its comparative advantage (Kharas 2007; Lele 2007; McCalla 2007b). FAO went along with
and helped to establish CGIAR (Warren Baum [1986], as quoted in McCalla 2007b). FAO
was granted the status of cosponsor, and the secretariat of the Technical Advisory Com-
mittee of CGIAR was placed in FAO’s governing structure. Along the way, FAO’s previous
DG fought and lost many battles for control, such as over the selection of the chair of
CGIAR’s Technical Advisory Committee. Meanwhile, CGIAR’s various attempts to con-
solidate its research—for example, through inter-Center programs, System-wide programs,
Ecoregional Programs, and Challenge Programs—have so far had limited success (see
Chapter 10 on CGIAR). The recent CGIAR reforms propose to do more.
The election of FAO’s DGs with “one country, one vote,” unlike the case of other
organizations that we have reviewed in this book, is a more common approach in UN
agencies and means donors may have less direct influence but does emphasize more
consensual decision-making and, in these times, needed dialogue. Major reforms have
introduced term limits for the DG, later reducing the term length from six years to four
years, with a limit of two terms that a DG may serve (UN 2003).
As we discussed in various earlier chapters (Chapters 3, 7, and 8), in the 1980s and 1990s,
developing countries tried to keep food security at the forefront of international attention by
promoting the World Food Council, established by the UN General Assembly in December
1974, based on the recommendation of the World Food Conference. The effort failed. The
Council became the only UN organization ever to be abolished in 1993—donors saw little
merit in paying for an agency to plead for aid to agriculture in which they had lost interest.
As we discuss in Chapter 8 on the World Bank, even as the World Bank’s various attempts
to revive interest in agricultural investments failed to elicit support among its country
directors and developing country governments, FAO kept food security on the global
agenda, most notably at the 1996World Food Summit, which adopted a universal definition
of food security and set the goal of halving world hunger (FAO 1996a). Such global goals,
not common in that era of complacency about agriculture, heightened attention to health
and education sectors. To its credit, FAO’s continued focus on hunger contributed to the
eventual adoption of halving hunger, together with poverty reduction, as MDG1 in 2000.
The twin goals have since been divided into two, in SDG1 and SDG2.⁹
The big picture contribution of FAO, discussed in Chapter 4, was to the 1996 definition
of food security, which was the foundation for MDG1, reducing incidence of hunger by half,
⁹ In “A New Profile of the Global Poor,” Castañeda et al. (2018, 251) of the World Bank Data for Goals Group,
note that the world’s poor “tend to be rural and young.” They find that “About 80% of the extreme poor and 76%
of the moderate poor live in areas classified . . . as rural.”
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the setting of the global goal to meet the hunger gap, and the establishment of the
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). CAADP was
heavily criticized outside of FAO at the time, as top-down and externally driven; with
appropriate modifications by African governments, the program has been embraced by
African policymakers and donors, many of whom have forgotten that FAO’s strong push
led to the establishment of CAADP (FAO 2006).
FAO’s five SOs currently provide a larger view of FAO’s mission activity, and the
evaluations of SOs offer some important insights, including the use of safety nets, as in
Brazil’s Fome Zero, rather than just focus on agricultural production and productivity. This
received some push back in-house in FAO in 2012, but, of course, this was not true in 2019,
as documented earlier in references to the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assess-
ment Network (MOPAN) 2017–18 Assessment, UK’s Department for International Devel-
opment (DFID) Multilateral Development Review, and the OED Synthesis report on the
evaluation of SOs (DFID and UK Aid 2016; MOPAN 2018; FAO 2019g). Although FAO’s
estimates of the resources it would take to reduce hunger have included the cost of safety
nets, the evaluation notes that donors and countries have not seen it as FAO’s comparative
advantage. Also, they have seen the strategic framework as an internal FAO exercise, rather
than change in the way FAO operates.
FAO’s other important asset is the unfailing trust of countries’ ministries of agriculture.
Recent assessments of FAO suggest that FAO has successfully reached out to other
ministries and stakeholders, addressing its perceived traditional limitation of being exclu-
sively oriented toward ministries of agriculture. Increasingly, agriculture operates in a larger
space, involving other parts of governments, as well as stakeholders outside government,
civil society, and the private sector in which FAO has been less well known. Its strategic
framework has opened up its agenda.
Ad Spijkers, former FAO Resident Representative, provides an example of Vietnam.
After a long war, the challenges facing the reunified country in 1976 were huge. FAO started
operations there in 1979, and the FAO Country Office in Hanoi worked to expand the
country program during the time of the US embargo; and in the absence of the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and regional development banks, FAO was an
important partner and the main contributor of technical assistance for the country’s
agriculture sector. According to Spijkers: “There were 21 Chief Technical Advisors (CTA)
on UNDP-financed projects executed by FAO in 1990. In the 1980s, FAO’s programme in
Vietnam was its third largest in the world after India and China, still remembered today by
the [Vietnamese] government” (Ad Spijkers, personal communication with Uma Lele,
February 8, 2020).
FAO’s adoption of a wider approach to reducing food insecurity that involves a variety of
other interest groups who are affected by food insecurity is a good development, as evident
in the joint FAO–International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) conference on Zero
Hunger in Bangkok in December 2018.¹⁰ The technical focus of FAO on agriculture, often
perceived as its strength as well as a limitation, has given way to partnerships in developed
and developing countries to overcome FAO’s narrow technical expertise, address the
multidisciplinarity of food insecurity, malnutrition, and obesity, although there is scope
to expand this line of work.
¹⁰ See https://www.ifpri-faobangkokconference.org
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
642   
Performance and Progress on Implementation of Evaluation
Recommendations: Old and New Issues in a Changing Context
Over the years, various bilateral organizations, think tanks, and journals publicly criticized
FAO as irrelevant, overly bureaucratic, and ineffective. However, many internal and
external evaluations and assessments conducted over the past decade, such as MOPAN
2017–18 (MOPAN 2018) and DFID (DFID and UK Aid 2016) have reaffirmed FAO’s
critical role in the food and agriculture sector. The 2007 IEE was the first such evaluation,
commissioned by donors in 2004.
The 2007 Independent External Evaluation and Its Overarching Messages
Published in 2007, the IEE was presented to DG Jacques Diouf, who was serving a third
term, as the donors had been unable to influence the slate of candidates or outcome of the
2005 election. The IEE noted that FAO had many accomplishments: it continued to furnish
a range of essential goods and services that no other organization could and had made
significant contributions to global governance on food and agriculture issues.
The IEE report made more than 100 recommendations (with many more sub-
recommendations), starting with the formulation and adoption of an immediate action
plan (FAO 2007a). In November 2008, a Special Conference of FAO Member Countries
agreed to a US$42.6 million, three-year Immediate Plan of Action, which called for an
overhaul of the financial procedures, organizational structure, and human resources (HR)
management (FAO 2008a). Specifically, the plan outlined the need for:
• A new strategic framework;
• Investments in governance;
• Institutional culture changes and reform of administrative and management systems;
and
• Restructuring for effectiveness and efficiency in both the headquarters and the field.
In its official response to the evaluation on October 29, 2007, FAO management said that
it: “supports the principal conclusion in the report of the IEE on the need for ‘reform with
growth’ so as to have an FAO ‘fit for this century’ . . . ” (FAO 2007c).
The central conclusion of the evaluation was that, “If FAO did not exist, it would need to
be invented” (FAO 2007a, Summary, 59), but that the organization required “reform with
growth” (FAO 2007a, 2). The evaluation offered fifteen messages:
1. FAO needs “reform with growth” (12).
2. FAO is in a “state of crisis which imperils the future of the Organization” (12).
3. “If FAO were to disappear tomorrow, much of it would need to be reinvented” (15).
4. “The world needs FAO to fulfil the potential it has to contribute to the 21st century,
but that potential [can only be realized] . . . if a new political consensus is reached,
based on renewed trust and mutual respect” (15).
5. “The goal posts must shift—FAO’s future relevance and effectiveness will depend on
enhanced strategic and policy capabilities focused both on new realities confronting
food and agriculture and on creating the large enabling environments that will be
needed to address them” (16).
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6. “FAO urgently needs to make tough strategic choices” (17).
7. “FAO must become a more flexible Organization while continuing to be a respon-
sible manager of public funds. It needs to break out of its risk-averse culture, creating
greater efficiency and effectiveness” (18).
8. “As a knowledge organization, FAO’s job is to support Members in ensuring that the
needs of the world within its area of mandate are fully met—not necessarily to
undertake each task itself” (20).
9. “FAO must strengthen its global governance role as a convener, a facilitator and a
source of reference for global policy coherence and in the development of global
codes, conventions and agreements” (21).
10. “FAO’s governance is weak and is failing the Organization. . . . [It] has not ensured an
adequate corporate strategy with realistic priorities, . . . ” (21).
11. “FAO has many talented staff with a deep commitment to the mission of the
Organization, but they are stifled by the fragmented structures of FAO and rigidly
centralized management systems” (21).
12. “There is a widespread . . . [willingness] within FAO for major and fundamental
change, but an almost equal cynicism about whether senior management and the
Governing Bodies can make this happen” (22).
13. “There is scope for FAO to achieve further major efficiency gains” (22).
14. “FAO does not deserve the generally ‘bad name’ it has as a partner [organization]”
(22).
“There is serious misperception in some quarters as to the size and resources of
FAO” (23) (FAO 2007a, Summary, 5–23).
FAO’s Response: The Immediate Plan of Action for
FAO Renewal, 2009–2011
FAO’s official response to the IEE was issued in October 2007. The response noted “that the
report contained both positive and critical assessments of the Organization” and concluded,
“Overall, the underlying analysis and resulting recommendations provide a good basis for
objective discussion of the issues, challenges and opportunities pertaining to the future of
the Organization” (FAO 2007c). The response continued, noting that FAO management
accepted the need for a new strategic framework, welcomed the introduction of measures to
make governance more cohesive and effective, and agreed with the vast majority of
recommendations.
The first step in the post-IEE reform was the adoption of the Resolution 1/2008 and the
preparation of the Immediate Plan of Action, which was discussed and approved by the
35th Special Session of the FAO Conference in November 2008. The plan provided for
enhancing FAO governance and improving its performance through streamlined manage-
ment, and by focusing more closely on core objectives and functions through 274 action
items. The plan introduced a results-based framework for all of FAO’s work, consisting of
global goals, SOs, organizational results, and core functions. It also laid out strategies and
timetables for reforming governing bodies, systems, and organizational structures, as well as
further actions to improve the effectiveness of governance. The plan required funding by
extra-budgetary contributions under the 2010–11 Programme of Work and Budget, and
member countries were urged to contribute extra-budgetary resources of a provisional
amount of US$21.8 million for 2009 to a special trust fund established for this purpose
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
644   
(FAO 2008a). Strong support from FAO headquarters to field offices can help mobilize
donor funds in support of field operations, as some experienced FAO representatives have
stressed.
Center for Global Development’s Assessment of the Immediate
Plan of Action Achievements and Challenges
In 2012, the Center for Global Development (CGD) organized a Working Group on Food
Security, comprised of experts in food and agricultural policy and nutrition, funded by
BMGF. From a governance point of view, this was an interesting exercise. Such assessments
are entirely outside the processes of the UN, in general, and other governmental and
intergovernmental bodies, in particular. The only ones who have a voice are the members,
although such assessments as well as the work of influential INGOs and think tanks can
affect opinions of key member governments. Much of what we have reported in this chapter
relates to what members say, or to evaluations and reports that have been conducted on
their behalf, the IEE, MOPAN, FAO Office of Evaluation (OED) reports, the DFID reviews,
etc. Outside authors, of course, are entitled to their opinions on matters, but they are
entirely outside of the governing body processes. CGD’s task was to take stock of the Rome-
based UN food agencies in the context of the current challenges to agricultural development
and food security. The working group focused on FAO and issued a report in 2013, with two
messages: FAO should shift focus to GPGs and improve its institutional governance (CGD
2013).
The CGD report said that FAO “is the only entity that can provide many of the
needed ‘global public goods’ in the area of its mandate (such as basic research, global
analysis, statistics, international standards, and advocacy). And historically, FAO has
proven to be a valued repository of knowledge and capacity for national development
efforts” (CGD 2013, xii). However, the report also argued that FAO’s capacity to deliver
on GPGs is constrained by its institutional governance: that is, its dependence on
voluntary funds.
While FAO is doing a better job of “ensuring that voluntary contributions do not divert
resources from the main program, and in providing new mechanisms for more flexible
voluntary financial support,” increased reliance on voluntary funds imposes costs on FAO’s
ability “to make strategic budgetary choices” (CGD 2013, xii). CGD recommended that
FAO’s member states ensure that financing is aligned with the organization’s priorities for
its core activities (particularly, statistics), rather than provide funding earmarked for short-
term projects: “member governments should relinquish short-run, locally visible FAO
projects in exchange for a greater role in policy formulation, advocacy, and development
activities that offer more substantial but longer-term dividends” (CGD 2013, xi). However,
as we note later, this advice has not been heeded.
Regarding the shift to GPGs, the CGD assessment recommended that member govern-
ments should reallocate budgets away from the local level to focus on the global level, with
about 50 percent of FAO resources, compared to current levels of 35 percent on GPGs,
including: “assembling, publishing, and analyzing data on food production and consump-
tion; developing early warning systems related to hunger, disease, and pests; and providing a
neutral forum for policy dialogue on issues related to food security and agriculture” (CGD
2013, xi). CGD argued that these goods are “FAO’s most visible and influential
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contribution, and the reality is that there is no realistic alternative source of supply for
them” (CGD 2013, xi).
CGD also highlighted the tension between FAO’s core operational work and its field
activities, with high-income countries often arguing for more focus on statistics and policy
guidelines, at the same time that developing countries are requesting more country-level
technical assistance.
The Assessment of FAO’s Achievements and Challenges
through FAO’s Post-2007 Independent Evaluations
The Intermediate Plan of Action led to a number of changes, including restructuring at
the headquarters, reformed delegation of authority, modernized and streamlined admin-
istrative and operational processes, and greater autonomy of FAO’s decentralized offices.
And sources in FAO suggest the management style under the new DG is already changing
rapidly, with greater delegation of responsibility and accountability in place of micro-
management. With an acceleration of reform activities in 2012, led by the DG, 92 percent
of the reforms were reportedly completed by the end of that year. Only 22 (out of 274)
actions have been abandoned or “parked” for later consideration. The full effect of these
changes is as yet unknown, but the progress made should be considered in terms of the
range of follow-up that FAO has implemented, and not only on the basis of steps
completed.
Since 2007, the need for global attention to agriculture and food security has increased, as
efforts to combat hunger have faced challenges, such as climate change, higher energy and
fuel prices, and growing populations. Several evaluations have looked at various aspects of
FAO’s work and role in agriculture and food security. After the IEE, FAO created its own
evaluation capacity, the OED, which regularly assesses FAO projects, the portfolio of all
FAO work in a given country, and broad areas of the FAO program. The evaluations have
improved in quality and increasingly emphasize themes of critical importance to FAO’s
work. As of July 2020, the OED will report directly to the FAO DG.
External evaluations included the British Multilateral Aid Review, MOPAN’s Organisa-
tional Effectiveness Assessment of FAO, and the 2012 Australian Multilateral Assessment
(DFID and UK Aid 2011, 2016; MOPAN 2011, 2014, 2018, Government of Australia 2012).
Most of these evaluations reiterated the messages of the IEE. With the passage of time, IEE
has rightly faded into the background.
Based on a review of the post-IEE evaluations, FAO has a strong role to play at the
national level and has made significant improvements in the effectiveness of its work at the
country level. Consistent messages from the recent external evaluations include:
• FAO has a clear mandate and a strategy that links to that mandate.
• It commands strong legitimacy and trust at the country level.
• It is highly valued by its direct partners.
• It consistently delivers a wide range of global and regional public goods.
• Its policy work at the global level is excellent and influential.
• The Investment Centre provides FAO with an essential door to the world of
investment.
• FAO continues to be an active advocate of food security.
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• Its impact in on epidemic disease control, including work on rinderpest and avian
influenza is unparalleled.
• It is a global leader on forestry and water.
Problems identified in the evaluations include the tension between FAO’s normative
GPGs function and its field operations, complex governance and structural issues and
related corporate culture, and weak impact at the country level. These problems are
institutional and grounded in long-standing management issues such as decentraliza-
tion. One of the sources of tension remains over the GPGs function. The difference in
the priorities of developed and developing members has also been an important issue.
Issues of interest to advanced (and even to some developing countries) are not
necessarily those that are of the greatest need to the least developed countries; the
countries’ demands or FAO’s supply of assistance have not been consistent always with
real needs for agricultural development, including policies, strategies, and investment
climate. However, evaluations suggest that FAO has substantially improved its global
work, and they all stress the importance of bringing FAO’s global knowledge to bear at
the country level.
FAO Reforms
As noted earlier, FAO initiated a series of organizational reforms in 2009, following the first
IEE (FAO 2007a), with the launch of the Immediate Plan of Action. The process continued
with the introduction of “transformative changes” introduced in 2012 by the new
DG. A number of reform initiatives since have been instrumental in shaping FAO. Key
among these initiatives was FAO’s revised Strategic Framework 2010–19 and the associated
shift to a matrix management model. They have led to a major change management project,
requiring significant changes in the way in which FAO has operated. The reform initiatives
were designed to increase FAO’s effectiveness and the needs of the operating environment.
The process continued to evolve and has aligned itself with the SDGs, launched in late 2015
under the 2030 Agenda.
FAO’s SOs were reduced from 11 to 5 and are articulated within the context of its vision,
attributes, and core functions:
1: Contribute to the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition
2: Make agriculture, forestry and fisheries more productive and sustainable
3: Reduce rural poverty
4: Enable more inclusive and efficient agricultural and food systems
5: Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises (FAO 2017c, 25)
At its 120th session, FAO’s Programme Committee endorsed the 2017–19 Indicative
Rolling Work Plan of Evaluations, which included a synthesis of findings and lessons
from the SO evaluations for consideration by the Committee at its spring 2019 session
(FAO 2016). The findings and lessons were based on the five separate independent
evaluations of SOs and extrapolated how and to what extent the FAO Strategic
Framework (SF) has been effective as a programming tool in support of the
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Organization’s greater development contribution since 2014. The synthesis presented
“14 key messages that reflect the lessons learned from, and the challenges and con-
straints of, the conceptualization, operationalization and results of the SOs, in addition
to a consideration of deliberations on recent global developments of importance to the
Strategic Framework” (FAO 2019g, 1):
• Conceptualization: How relevant are the SOs?
• Operationalization: What were the enabling and limiting factors for the implementation
of the SOs?
• Results: How and to what extent have the SOs strengthened FAO’s contribution to
sustainable development results?
• Looking ahead: What are the main considerations in terms of the 2030 Agenda, UN
Reform, and the SDGs? (FAO 2019g, 1)
This section draws heavily on FAO’s own evaluative description of the design of FAO’s
results framework, the alignment of the SOs and their programs to address the SDGs, and
an overview of the Strategic Programmes, including context, theory of change, and the
related outcomes and outputs to be achieved by FAO and its members. It paints a picture of
FAO substantially different than the one we had developed in earlier drafts of this chapter,
based on FAO’s IEE of 2007, and therefore, is reported first followed by findings of other
external independent evaluations of FAO by its donors. They suggest an organization on the
move, compared to where it stood in 2007 when the IEE was completed, albeit with some
continued long-standing challenges.
FAO Results Framework
Based on a “results chain” model, FAO’s results framework links objectives, outcomes,
and outputs. The results framework provides a guide to plan and monitor FAO’s
work. In its “Overview of FAO’s Strategic Objective Programme,” in April 2018, FAO
noted:
Three levels of results contribute to the Global Goals of Members:
• Strategic Objectives express the development outcomes in countries, regions and globally.
They are expected to be achieved over a long-term timeframe by Members with FAO’s
contributions.
• Outcomes describe changes in the country, regional or global enabling environment and
in capacities available to achieve a specific Strategic Objective.
• Outputs are FAO’s direct contributions to Outcomes. They result from the delivery of
FAO’s interventions at the national, regional and global levels, using both regular and
extrabudgetary resources. (FAO 2018d, 1–2)
Cross-cutting themes on hunger, poverty resilience, etc., is a great idea and innovation.
They need to be empowered, in terms of resource allocation and evaluation of staff from
various departments.
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FAO’s Normative Work
A major issue facing FAO going forward, as it has been in the past regarding normative
work, is that the SDG indicators (and hence, FAO’s results framework) relate to
aggregated changes at the country level, making it very difficult to accommodate
normative work in a results framework built around direct contributions to these
SDG indicators. Members, including both G77 and OECD countries, demand both
normative work and country-level SDG support activities, but there are no indications
that they will be very interested in increasing their assessed contributions. FAO’s
normative work provides public goods. What are these public goods? Public goods
are like clean air. They benefit all. They are non-rivalrous. Consumption by one person
does not diminish the supply for another, and they are non-excludable. No one can be
barred from consuming the good.
The kinds of GPGs that FAO provides include (but are not limited to) international
agreements and establishment of norms and standards—for example, adopting the
IPPC (1951) and the framework for rules to prevent the spread of plant pests by
international trade; food safety (working jointly with WHO) through the establishment
of the CAC with the WHO (1961) and regulating international food safety standards;
monitoring and control of cross-border pests and diseases; developing global informa-
tion, analysis, and statistics on the state of the food, agriculture, forests, fisheries;
developing the Early Warning System for plant, animal, bird diseases, locusts, and
other disasters, which call for timely response (1975); and advocacy on food and
agricultural policies, broadly defined and agricultural development to help reduce global
poverty and hunger. FAO pioneered Integrated Pest Management—for reducing losses
to pests without exposure or reliance on excessive pesticides—and the farmers’ field
school (FFS) approach to disseminate the pest management techniques through farmer
participation (1980s). FAO contains experts in a variety of fields, including agriculture,
nutrition, economics, forestry, fisheries, and social sciences, and it uses this expertise in
networks of other world experts, to provide the essential services of agreements, data,
and knowledge on good practices.
FFS, an adult education intervention, uses intensive discovery-based learning to promote
skills. An International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3IE) Systematic Review noted:
[It] has been used to train 12 million farmers in over 90 countries across Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, the effectiveness of this approach has long been a subject of debate.
Drawing on a systematic review of over 500 documents, this study finds that FFSs have
changed agricultural practices and raised yields in pilot projects, but they have not been
effective when taken to scale. The FFS approach requires a degree of facilitation and skilled
trainers, which are difficult to sustain beyond the life of the pilot programmes.
(Waddington and White 2014)
In contrast, retired FAO Country Manager, Ad Spijkers noted, based on his firsthand
experience in initiating an interregional programme on Integrated Pest Management,
IPM/FFS in Asia, Cambodia, and China (1990–2000): “we can say in hindsight that this
was one of the most successful FAO field programs with millions of farmers who have been
trained with support from, among others, Australia and the Netherlands.” He speculated
that if the training had been linked with policy change with respect to pesticide use, the
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impact of the program would have been long lasting (Ad Spijkers, personal communication
with Uma Lele, February 8, 2020). Spijker’s remarks make one wonder: Would it have been
the result of change in policy or due to program intervention?
“The Strategic Programmes (SPs) [facilitated] the achievement of results at the country
level in the context of each of the five Strategic Objectives” (FAO 2018d, 2). The shift from 11
discipline-oriented SOs (animal health, crop production, fisheries, forestry, nutrition, etc.) to
the five cross-cutting SOs predated the SDGs, but come out of the same wave of thinking
(which FAOalso influenced) to look at the interconnected nature of big objectives that need to
be addressed together. Hunger eradication is one, but so is sustainable production (SO2),
social protection—livelihoods and extreme poverty eradication (SO3), sustainable food
systems (SO4), and resilience (SO5). These look natural now, but they were groundbreaking
in 2012, not necessarily understood or endorsed by FAO staff or the membership. The
resilience agenda, linked to the humanitarian–development nexus, and sustainable food
systems are now similarly common currency, but they were both quite controversial among
Members when they were proposed, as was the idea that FAO and rural and agriculture
programs had anything to do with social protection, also now widely accepted.
Beyond the five, large interconnected SOs, consideration of internal needs of FAO to
meet these goals leads to another objective:
To ensure a robust and practical results-based approach to all of the work of the
Organization, FAO must ensure that it has the internal technical capacity and integrity
to achieve the expected results. Therefore, the Strategic Framework includes a sixth
objective, Technical quality, statistics and cross-cutting themes (climate change, gender,
governance, and nutrition), to ensure technical leadership and integration of statistics and
the cross-cutting issues of climate change, gender, governance and nutrition in the
delivery of the Strategic Objective programmes (SPs). (FAO 2018d, 2)
Alignment with Sustainable Development Goals
The “Overview of FAO’s Strategic Objective Programme” further describes how the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development defines the context for FAO’s work toward the SDGs:
“The main innovation in the MTP 2018–21 has been to identify and use exclusively the SDG
targets and indicators that relate to each SO . . . [resulting] in a new set of SDG-based SO
level indicators that will be monitored biennially to report trends and progress toward
global targets” (FAO 2018d, 2).
This exclusive focus on SDGs poses some challenges in balancing FAO’s GPGs functions,
which we note that donors have demanded, with developmental functions that the devel-
oping country members expect. The issue pertains not only to FAO. In essence, by adopting
the SDGs, whose indicators are almost all linked to verifiable changes at the country level, it
is difficult to fit in the normative work of FAO and others. This was always going to be an
issue for FAO and its own SF and reporting, but it is exacerbated by the UN System Reform
and the heightened importance of aligning all of the UN’s work at the country level to the
SDGs.¹¹ We discuss this further later in the chapter.
The “Overview of FAO’s Strategic Objective Programmes” further noted that at the level
of Outcomes, entire indicators have been replaced with SDG indicators: “Outcome
¹¹ For more information, see “UN Development System Reform 101”: https://reform.un.org/content/un-
development-system-reform-101
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indicators will continue to measure the biennial level of change achieved and . . . [countries’]
progress in those areas where FAO more directly contributed through its work. Overall,
FAO’s work [contributes] to 40 SDG targets measured through 53 SDG indicators as part of
the proposed FAO Strategic Objective results framework for 2018–21” (FAO 2018d, 2).
Operationalization
The SOs have introduced cross-sectoral, interdisciplinary approaches and conceptual fra-
meworks for FAO’s engagement in relation to emerging, interconnected challenges to food
security, nutrition, and well-being, while maintaining environmental and natural resource
sustainability. These are clearly major achievements.
The synthesis concluded, “The Strategic Framework entailed significant investment in
operationalization and implementation arrangements with a view to translating normative
work and knowledge products into tangible policy and practices at country level” (FAO
2019g, 2). How wide is the acceptance of the SOs, internally and externally, which are now
well embedded in FAO’s architecture? FAO’s external stakeholders have sometimes con-
sidered the reforms and SOs to be largely for its internal audience and operationalization,
whereas the staff do not consider them fully integrated internally. So, it should be con-
sidered work in progress. A few other external evaluations, reported and discussed later in
this chapter, have had different views of the extent to which the framework pays attention to
FAO’s normative work.
FAO recognized the need for stronger integration of Strategic Programme 3 activities
with the other Strategic Programmes in order to maximize its contribution to poverty
reduction and SDG1. The Strategic Programmes are: SP1 for the eradication of hunger, food
insecurity, and malnutrition; SP2 to make agriculture, forestry and fisheries more produc-
tive and sustainable; SP3 to reduce rural poverty; SP4 for enabling more inclusive and
efficient agricultural and food systems; and SP5 to increase resilience of livelihoods to
threats and crises (FAO 2018d).
As highlighted in the “Evaluation of FAO’s Contribution to Reduction in Rural Poverty,”
FAO would benefit from deepening its multisectoral, cross-strategic program initiatives,
such as nutrition-sensitive social protection and zero hunger (SP1–SP3), shock responsive
social protection (SP3–SP5), migration (SP3–SP5), inclusive value chain/food systems
(SP3–SP4), and decent employment and improved livelihoods in agriculture, including
family farming (SP2–SP3). Until now, policy-related work was embedded in the three
outcomes of SP3.¹² During the preparation of the Medium Term Plan 2018–21, and in
the context of the SDGs, it became apparent that a stronger, multisectoral effort to support
countries in making progress towards SDG1 was needed. As a response, FAO added a
fourth outcome to the 2018–19 SP3 framework to support countries’ capacities to imple-
ment multisectoral and gender equitable policies, strategies, and programs for poverty
reduction (FAO OED 2017b). Specific emphasis on “addressing the political economy of
¹² According to the OED’s “Evaluation of FAO’s Contribution to the Reduction of Rural Poverty through
Strategic Programme 3”:
Strategic Programme 3 (SP3) was set up to lead the delivery of SO3 under three main work streams aimed to
achieve three main organizational outcomes (OOs):
OO3.1 Rural poor are empowered through improved access to resources and services.
OO3.2 Improved opportunities to access decent farm and non-farm employment.
OO3.3 Strengthened social protection systems to reduce rural poverty. (FAO OED 2017b, 1)
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rural poverty reduction through policy work, advocacy, stakeholder participation, [multi-
sectoral coordination, South–South cooperation,] and partnerships” will be essential for
success (FAO 2018d, 14). MOPAN has highlighted some of these issues, and reportedly, the
new DG has begun to address them, also.
Challenges and Constraints
The Synthesis addressed the challenges and constraints in implementation, faced by the SF,
“largely in relation to skills and technical capacity, resource mobilization, monitoring and
results reporting, operational and administrative procedures” (FAO 2019g, 3). We should
also add that the constraints have resulted from FAO’s assessed contributions, which have
not grown in nominal terms and are declining in real terms in the budget, combined with
retirement of senior staff and their replacements with younger, inexperienced staff and
consultants, as we discuss later.
The Synthesis further noted:
Despite strong conceptualization and commitment, the Strategic Framework encountered
a number of implementation challenges and constraints, particularly in relation to the
balance and distribution of skills and technical capacity (overall and in new thematic
areas), resource-mobilization strategy, structure and mechanisms to deal with the decen-
tralization of donor funding, the transaction and opportunity costs of operational and
administrative procedures, and conceptual issues in defining, monitoring and reporting
results. (FAO 2019g, 3)
Results
In November 2019, FAO issued an evaluation of FAO’s SF, which was designed in 2013, to
better strategically position FAO and “to address the facts that the Organization’s program-
matic activities were defined along silo-like disciplinary lines and that corporate efforts were
not clearly aligned with the country programme priorities agreed with Members” (FAO
OED 2019a, vii). The SF was well conceived to address these goals, and the value of
establishing SOs, as has been confirmed by recent evaluations, employing FAO’s technical
advantage and engagement at the country level in achieving the SDGs.¹³
The evaluation makes clear that FAO has made “commendable efforts” toward managing
“substantial transformation” of its organizational structure so as to “prepare it for the
emerging landscape,” and has considerable achievements to its credit (FAO OED 2019a,
vii). For example, FAO has decentralized and become a more “strategically oriented”
organization since 2013, applying a “learning-by-doing” approach and promoting “more
multidisciplinary work across technical departments at headquarters level” (FAO OED
2019a, vii).
The evaluation urged the new leadership to “fast-track its transformation” by addressing
the issues identified in the evaluation report and “preparing the ground for FAO to adopt a
strategic orientation that has expertise-based engagement and agile implementation as its
new organizational culture” (FAO OED 2019a, 6). The evaluation noted that the SF had led
¹³ See “Our Priorities: The FAO Strategic Objectives” (http://www.fao.org/3/a-mg994e.pdf).
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to FAO’s adoption of an approach based upon “interconnected and cross-sectoral objec-
tives.” Still, FAO needs to “to better support Country Offices in light of the United Nations
Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF)” (FAO OED 2019a, vii).
Further, the evaluation recommended that FAO update “the theory of change underpinning
the Results Framework to identify more tangible, issue-based programmatic objectives”
(FAO OED 2019a, viii). The OED stresses the need for FAO to “articulate the result chains
of its normative work” involving GPGs and development objectives (FAO OED 2019a, viii).
In examining the effectiveness of management arrangements, the evaluation notes:
The matrix-type structure was suited to fostering cross-sectoral thinking and led to more
interdisciplinary work at headquarters. However, it did not have the expected positive
effects on FAO country programmes, in particular, as the matrix did not percolate down
to decentralized levels of delivery. (FAO OED 2019a, viii–ix)
The Evaluation further recommended placing FAO’s Country Offices central to its pro-
gramme delivery structure, by “bringing multidisciplinary teams closer to country level”
and directly engaging “the decentralized and headquarters-based technical teams, also
contributing to FAO’s normative mission, . . . to ensure that FAO warrants the highest
technical inputs to the UNSDCF and country programmes.” Such engagement further
facilitates the integration of FAO’s normative and development missions, in line with the
original vision of the SF (FAO OED 2019a, ix).
New skill sets are called for by the Revised Strategic Framework “to support program-
matic thinking, interdisciplinary approaches, and investment mobilization” (FAO OED
2019a, ix). The Evaluation recommends that FAO “establish mechanisms to ensure its staff
profiles match needs at all levels,” adjusting capacities to changing demands (FAO OED
2019a, ix).
The SF’s programmatic orientation was designed “to strengthen FAO’s mark in estab-
lishing the centrality of food and agriculture to country development agendas” (FAO
OED 2019a, x). SPs have had “limited influence on FAO’s large field programme [due to]
the disconnect to the field, or the top-down orientation of corporate planning systems and
disconnect between the Results Framework and field priorities” (FAO OED 2019a, x).
Other reasons for the failure of SPs to become “programmatic pillars” was the unclear
delineation of FAO’s technical and SP functions, with “the extent by the staffing of SP
teams with technical experts, prompting SP teams to divert to other functions” (FAO
OED 2019a, x). Donors and governments do not follow a programmatic logic. There has
been limited donor support for programmatic approaches and low levels of lightly ear-
marked funding.
Country priorities have been progressively integrated with normative technical work in
FAO’s corporate planning and work. The Evaluation notes improvements toward “bottom-
up planning, based on country priorities, [but] work planning is still excessively oriented
towards regular budget allocations, while significant pieces of technical/normative work and
country programming supported by extra-budgetary resources remain poorly reflected in
planning and reporting” (FAO OED 2019a, x).
The Evaluation described the FAO’s results monitoring and reporting systems (the
Programme Planning, Implementation Reporting and Evaluation Support System, the
Field Project Management Information System, and the Country Office Information Net-
work) as fragmented. Although these systems are able to generate huge amounts of
information, the Evaluation points to the need for “stronger structures and processes for
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strategic and qualitative programme monitoring and review of organizational performance
and development contributions” (FAO OED 2019a, xi).
To improve FAO’s ability to respond to country’s needs, the Evaluation recommended
increasing the efficiency of its administrative procedures “by increasing delegation of
authority to decentralized offices, while establishing the appropriate accountability mechan-
isms to ensure the sound management of risks” (FAO OED 2019a, xi).
Looking Ahead: The 2030 Agenda, UN Reform, and Climate Change
Addressing the future, the Synthesis noted:
Implementing the Strategic Framework has steered FAO in a new direction and better
prepared the Organization for the 2030 Agenda, which will call for similar interdiscipli-
nary approaches, cross-sectoral thinking and collaboration with diverse partners, but on a
much bigger scale. FAO will need to assess the implications for FAO and the next Strategic
Framework of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, UN System Reform and the repositioning
of the UN Development System to deliver the SDGs, as well as the growing profile of
climate change in the development landscape. . . .
Because of the potential programming and resource implications, the new Strategic
Framework [due to be approved by FAO Conference in June 2021] should strike the
right balance between the normative aspects of FAO’s work as a specialised agency and its
contributions to and support for countries in achieving the SDGs. (FAO 2019g, 4)
If we consider support to countries in achieving the SDGs, noted here, as country-level
work, then almost all of this work (with the exception of the Technical Cooperation
Programme’s US$70 million per year) is funded by donor projects and not by the Regular
Programme (RP) financing. The SF encompasses both, of course, but reporting on results
is much easier—in terms of SDG indicators—for country-level work than for the norma-
tive work.
The Synthesis identified some crucial challenges:
With the SDGs central to the evolving development dialogue, the new Strategic Frame-
work and its results chain will need to reflect more explicitly FAO’s contributions to and
support for countries in attaining their SDG targets [emphasis added by the author]. The
narrative will need to be sharpened to reflect FAO’s comparative advantages and role as a
custodian agency. At the same time, specialized agencies like FAO have global obligations
in relevant normative areas that have been approved and funded by their global and
regional governing bodies, in addition to policy and technical programmes, which may
not be adequately reflected in the UN System response, which is rooted entirely within the
SDGs and mapped to SDG targets and indicators. [author’s italicization]
The status of the new United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)
[now known as the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF)],
as the primary UN System-wide support for delivering the SDGs will have implications for
the CPF [country program framework], FAO’s country-level programming mechanism.
CPFs have the potential to become even more important in capturing the priorities,
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specific targets and indicators in national SDG plans to which FAO can contribute.
However, CPFs should also position relevant normative areas and scope out FAO’s potential
role in areas that may not be specified in UNDAF [now, UNSDCF], but are requested by
governments in keeping with FAO’s mandate [After considerable debate, this duality was
agreed upon within the context of UN Development System Reform.] Consequently,
strengthening decentralized office capacity to effectively engage with UN Country Teams
will become increasingly important [authors’ italics added for emphasis].
The rising profile of climate change, not only as major development challenge, but also as
a major funding/financing theme, merits a re-examination of its prominence and position
as a cross-cutting issue within the Strategic Framework. . . .
Stepping up FAO’s resource-mobilization capacity at decentralised levels will become
increasingly important and require greater attention to the packaging, communication
and marketing of FAO’s offerings, comparative advantages and UNDAF-linked contribu-
tions to resource partners and governments. [Most resource mobilization is already done
at the country level, where most of the donor funding decisions are made.¹⁴ Some country
offices are much better at it than others.]
As SDG implementation is nationally owned and led, a large proportion of resources
needs to be leveraged at country level for national SDG implementation plans. For
countries to achieve the SDGs, far more financing needs to be raised than at present.
A large portion of that financing will need to come from government funds, both revenue
and debt, as well as private-sector investment. The scope and budgetary envelopes of CPFs
will be informed by SDG targets and prioritized by Members and the extent to which FAO
can contribute in terms of resource mobilization and investment operations. All of these
things will necessitate an increase in FAO resource mobilization and investment opera-
tional capacity at the decentralized level. Regional and headquarters-based teams will also
be a need to backstop programme preparation, marketing communication and business
development support.
The shift in focus from development funding to financing will require FAO to focus on
investment impact beyond resource mobilization. The financial resources required to
achieve the SDGs call for substantial diversification of and innovation in financing
options. Development flows are transitioning from “funding” to “financing” and there
has been greater focus on alternative financing methods, including blended financial
instruments. (FAO 2019g, 4–5)
FAO has considerable experience in investment support through the Investment Centre,
working with the World Bank since in the 1960s, with the European Bank for
¹⁴ An example of a positive spin-off was the work at the country level in Bangladesh, in 2010, of the
development of the Country Investment Plan for Agriculture, in which the FAO Investment Centre was heavily
involved as well as USAID. A FAO representative was the chair of the donor meeting/coordination. It was a
prerequisite for a successful application for GAFSP, the multi-donor fund hosted by theWorld Bank. USAID/Feed
the Future played a crucial role. Work was divided among six technical papers, which were coordinated by IFPRI,
and the Country Investment Plan was developed and prepared by the FAO Investment Centre. USAID and the
European Commission’s Dhaka offices funded it. It was a participative process of government, scientists,
technicians, universities, the private sector, farmers’ organizations, and NGOs. Bangladesh received a grant of
US$52 million from GAFSP, and soon after, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) approved
an additional US$75 million, while USAID worked on an additional investment program based on the Center for
Innovation and Partnership (CIP). The World Bank followed the process closely, and there was strong involve-
ment of the African Development Bank (AfDB), IFAD, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
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Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), now the second largest partner, and with IFAD
and regional development banks. There is more to be done, particularly with regard to the
private sector, but due to the work of the Investment Centre, FAO is well positioned in this
regard. For example, the work with EBRD is all private-sector related. A new evaluation,
FAO’s “Evaluation of FAO’s Private Sector Partnership Strategy”makes many of these same
points (FAO OED 2019b). The evaluation notes that, at the time of its adoption in 2013,
FAO’s Strategy for Partnerships with the Private Sector contributed to more private sector
collaboration and resulted in several formal agreements being signed, but this has been ad
hoc and one-off, rather than systematic, long-term partnerships. The Evaluation asks FAO
to ensure its role in setting and applying policies, norms, and standards are safeguarded,
demonstrate concrete and tangible impact for SDGs, seek effective resource mobilization
from the private sector, and ensure an open, fair, and transparent process for engagement
with the private sector.
Following the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, several UN organizations
shifted gear and established deeper and more proactive partnerships with the private sector.
FAO has not positioned itself to fully capitalize on such potential and maintains a more
conservative approach. Meanwhile, those partnerships formalized by FAO with private
sector entities have yielded positive but limited results, and appear to have been more
opportunistic and reactive. FAO should strategize on its engagement with the private sector
by identifying priority thematic areas for collaboration.
The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment
Network: Findings and Conclusions
As we discussed in Chapter 6, MOPAN is a network of 18 countries with a shared interest in
assessing the effectiveness of the major multilateral organizations they fund (MOPAN
2017). MOPAN undertakes periodic assessments. The latest MOPAN 2017–18 assessment
noted that “FAO has strengthened its performance since the last MOPAN assessment in
2014. . . . [It has] an enhanced strategic focus; stronger operational management, including
of fiduciary risk; and a stronger commitment to partnerships” (MOPAN 2018, 7).
The assessment identified several key strengths of FAO including:
1. . . . a clear, compelling and focused strategic vision that bodes well for the future.
2. . . . a strong commitment to working in partnerships, [including] through South–South
co-operation and the private sector.
3. . . . the refocusing of FAO’s strategic direction . . . [to] a more integrated, multidiscipli-
nary way of working. The associated shift to a matrix management model has had
profound implications for the way in which FAO operates and organises and staffs itself.
4. . . . a sound, high-quality financial management systems and improved . . . systems of
internal control. (MOPAN 2018, 8)
MOPAN identified five major areas for improvement:
1. “Insufficient attention paid to strategic risk management”;
2. “Operational and reputational risk” of HR management;
3. Tardiness of FAO’s “administrative and operational processes for delivery”;
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4. “Insufficient visibility to the organisation’s crucial normative work . . . Its corporate
results framework (CRF) . . . does not do justice to FAO’s key role as a knowledge
provider . . . against the organisation’s CRF for 2016–17” (authors’ italicization for
added emphasis);
5. Reporting of corporate performance is insufficiently integrated and incomplete.
“Evidence points to important gaps in FAO’s whole-of-organisation view and over-
sight of performance. Interviews and FAO’s own evaluation reports indicate that the
tools and approaches used have limited utility for management. . . . FAO’s ability to
manage and communicate its performance will be important in the future” (MOPAN
2018, 8–9).
MOPAN stressed that FAO’s “key challenge” is that “its normative functions and its role
as a provider of global public knowledge rely on a core budget that has nominally stayed flat
throughout the review period. . . . [T]he bigger debate may revolve around how to sustain-
ably fund activities that have traditionally been core-funded in ways that are acceptable to
members” (MOPAN 2018, 9). Later, in this chapter, we review these challenges from a
historical perspective. How to find sustainable funding for normative work that should
remain core activities of FAO, but for which the members are not willing to pay, hoping that
someone else will pick up the tab through some creative project-funding, poses a challenge.
FAO is a more complex organization than the other four international agencies and uses
a stakeholder model, again, unlike the other four shareholder organizations (see Chapter 6).
While all five agencies dealt with in this book are membership organizations, each member
of FAO, regardless of size or economic importance, has one vote (with the exception of the
European Union); and all, including some that are not members of the Bretton Woods
institutions, are members of FAO. Singapore has been a member of the UN since 1965, but
joined FAO in 2013.¹⁵
FAO was founded to achieve agreements among its members on important issues related
to food security and nutrition faced by all member countries and to serve as a repository of
information and knowledge. This feature was and remains FAO’s main asset, although in
several areas, there are now alternative sources of information and knowledge. Hence, FAO,
like all other international organizations, has been challenged, in a changing external
environment, to define those areas in which it has a comparative advantage and a unique
niche. Developed countries attach considerable importance to FAO’s standard-setting
functions, but many developing countries, including China, also increasingly attach impor-
tance to FAO’s normative work, such as FAO’s Codex Alimentarius, or “Food Code” for
international standards, guidelines, and codes of practice adopted by the CAC to protect
consumer health and promote fair practices in food trade.¹⁶ Developing countries look to
FAO for knowledge as freestanding input, not associated with capital transfers and com-
mercial interests. In addition, there are a variety of cross-border issues—such as food safety
standards, control of pests and diseases, and national information systems on food and
agriculture—that pertain to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which an international
organization such as FAO with its necessary legitimacy, expertise, and access to govern-
ments can address, even as many informal standards have evolved. While FAO remains the
standard- and norm-setting organization and a key source of information and knowledge
¹⁵ See “Membership of FAO”: http://www.fao.org/legal/home/membership-of-fao/en/
¹⁶ The CAC is a central part of the joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme and was established by FAO
and WHO in 1963. See http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/en/
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on global food security, it is much less able to operate as effectively at the country level as it
did in the 1970s, when UNDP funding facilitated a considerable field presence and generally
high-quality staff in the field. Ministry officials who interacted with FAO, who were
interviewed during the IEE (FAO 2007a) and for this chapter by Lele, reported that the
presence of FAO helped developing countries put into place needed systems for soil surveys
and field trials for agricultural crops, among other assistance. Member countries reported
their appreciation for these past services of FAO but noted a decline in FAO’s presence after
withdrawal of UNDP funding.
Organizationally, the erosion of FAO’s responsibilities started slowly in the 1970s; for
example, the end of UNDP financing nearly 25 years ago was a blow to FAO’s high-
quality field presence, and a funding issue that is relevant today, with the organization’s
complex, expanded agenda and stretched field presence. In addition to the emergence of
other organizations such as CGIAR in 1972, and the evolution of CGIAR Centers
(discussed in Chapter 11), as well as problems with bureaucratic management and the
loss of critical expertise at FAO, CGIAR Centers took on the responsibility for crop
trials and the International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR), estab-
lished in 1979, was charged with the function of building the capacity of the national
agricultural research systems. FAO had advised developing countries on the relevance of
building their national agricultural research and extension systems before ISNAR was
established. FAO’s capacity to provide knowledge at scale and of the quality, as it once
did, was noted by IEE. Many have denied this early critical role of FAO, but a recent
paper by Byerlee and Lynam (2020) documents FAO’s critical role, together with that of
USAID, before CGIAR Centers were established. FAO, similarly, once conducted field
trials on crops before the activities of CGIAR’s crop Centers (the International Rice
Research Institute [IRRI], the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center
[CIMMYT], and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture [IITA]) expanded.
As noted earlier, other external evaluations also noted the need for field presence and
country-level results: for example, the DFID Multilateral Aid Review 2013 (DFID and
UK Aid 2013). MOPAN 2017–18 noted, “FAO’s decentralisation agenda, . . . designed to
maintain and enhance the organisation’s relevance and agility, remains a work in
progress” (MOPAN 2018, 24).
Upon taking over the agricultural research function from FAO in 1979, CGIAR estab-
lished the International Service of the National Agricultural Research (ISNAR), ultimately
closing it in 2004, when the Center was merged with IFPRI. Since then, IFPRI has largely
focused on monitoring of data and research on investments in agricultural research and has
not taken up many of the support functions for national agricultural systems that ISNAR
was meant to perform. Building capacity of the national systems, carried out so ably by the
Rockefeller Foundation and USAID in the 1960s and 1970s (Lele and Goldsmith 1989), now
occurs through the investments by multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank, the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and bilateral donors, such as USAID, and
increasingly, Germany. World Bank investments in research and development (R&D) are
important but much too small, relative to needs, as discussed in Chapter 8. The United
States has been, by far, the largest trainer of human capital in agriculture with its rich land
grant university tradition, more recently under its “Feed the Future” initiative (see Elliott
and Dunning 2016). That assistance, however, is now much smaller than the needs. Indeed,
capacity for R&D of developing countries remains one of the largest gaps from the
viewpoint of increasing productivity growth, particularly sustainably (Beintema and
Stads 2017).
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With growing realization of the importance of the provision of GPGs, including its
embrace as an authorized mission of the World Bank since 2000, competition for GPG-type
goals and global partnership programs has grown, many with overlapping objectives. Most
of them are advocacy and knowledge partnerships. It is useful to consider FAO’s distinct
and complementary role in the provision of public goods, in such areas as food safety
standards, control of transboundary pests and diseases, and agricultural statistics, in the
context of this rapidly evolving area.
Among the key challenges that the IEE recognized was the governance and management
of the organization. Specifically, trust in the leadership of FAO had gradually declined
among developed countries over nearly three decades.¹⁷ The fact that only two people had
been elected as FAO DGs for 36 years, 18 years each, and that the leadership had come from
only two regions of the world, contributed to the tension. The last two DGs were elected in
free and fair elections. Graziano was elected uncontested the second time around and did
not continue beyond his prescribed two four-year terms. There is every expectation that
these terms will be honored by the current DG.
Second, over the long history of FAO and WFP, it is not surprising that there has been
tension off and on. WFP was initially part of FAO, and later became a separate entity, in
part because of the different imperatives of their missions. WFP needed to be flexible and
able to respond quickly. FAO’s rules and regulations made it difficult to be agile.¹⁸ More
recently, the peak of tension between FAO and WFP was at the end of Ertharin Cousin’s
term as WFP’s Executive Director, subsiding under the current leadership of David Beasley,
Executive Director of WFP, appointed in June 2017. Recognizing that there is much to do
for each organization, without stepping on each other’s toes, FAO and WFP seem to have
more clearly carved out their respective responsibilities, with more cooperation and less
competition and overlap. There are also tensions between developed country members,
particularly the United States, and developing country members, which was at its peak prior
to the IEE in 2006 (Shaw 2014).
The dynamics between developed and developing countries has also played out very
differently in FAO in recent years. With the emergence of middle-income developing
countries, the old Group of 77 (G77) versus OECD country dynamics no longer works.
Developing countries have become more stratified, and their capabilities and interests are
no longer always aligned closely with the erstwhile, seemingly homogenous G77, whose
numbers have been closer to 130 and whose interests have been less homogenous than
generally acknowledged. Nevertheless, their interests vary more today, depending on the
issue, with ever changing alliances on specific issues, and how they will vote on any issue is
less predictable and more complex than in the past. FAO was headed by a Brazilian, and
since 2019, by a Chinese leader. Other emerging countries are playing important leadership
and contributory roles. Most G77 members voted for China in the last election and most
OECD countries voted for France, and although this is a noticeable divide, it was nothing
like the old days. Even on budget matters, with the growth of middle-income economies, the
assessed contributions of many G77 countries have grown substantially, in some case more
than doubling, so their interest in a zero growth budget is now shared with the United States
¹⁷ Some reviewers of an earlier version of this chapter noted that critics considered the process flawed because
of one-country, one-vote, and some did not like the outcome and would have preferred some type of qualified
voting. There was also grumbling in June 2019 by OECDmembers when the French candidate did not win, but the
Chinese candidate won by a very large margin, on the first round. The US-backed candidate got 12 votes out of
194. Was it a flawed process?
¹⁸ The appointment letter of the WFP director is still issued by the UN secretary-general and the FAO DG.
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and Japan. The EU members saw a decline in their assessed contributions, so they may have
been more open to budget increases, but it was not pressed. These changes have largely
removed the old North–South divide on the budget, but it is even more difficult to envisage a
significant increase in regular program funding through increase in assessed contributions.
In this vein, assessments, including the UK’s DFID and MOPAN 14 upgraded the rating
of FAO’s performance in four important areas: corporate strategy based on clear mandate,
country focus on results, support of national plans, and contribution to policy dialogue—the
rating was raised from “inadequate or below” to “strong or above” (MOPAN 2011,
2014; DFID and UK Aid 2011, 2016). MOPAN (2014), but expressed concerns about
results-based budgeting and management of HR.¹⁹ According to MOPAN 2017–18, too,
results-based budgeting has improved, but not management of HR. As stated earlier, HR
management is getting more attention.
Staff and Council members have stressed FAO’s “controlling” management style, with
relatively little internal consultation with and leeway for senior managers and staff to take
initiatives forward. This management style, too, has begun to change under the leadership
of the new DG, and it has lifted morale.
In the new DG’s first year, he took immediate, corrective action, starting with a change of
the HR director and a reset in the roles of ADG, with division directors now all reporting
directly to one of the DDGs, or to the (new) Chief Scientist and Chief Economist, as
approved by the FAO Council (July 2020).
FAO and Global Public Goods
The IEE performed another important function by articulating the nature and sources of the
tension between GPGs and FAO’s field operations, and the steps needed to address them.
This tension has been attenuated, but it has not gone away and, indeed, the most recent
MOPAN 2017–18 flags that same issue, as shown earlier in this chapter.
Given the complexities of FAO’s mission, its membership structure, and governance, as
well as the fact that it is not a financing institution, generating consensus is often a
challenge. Getting consensus on global policy priorities has been a source of tension over
the years, as has agreement on the role of FAO and the strategies and actions necessary to
generate global outcomes. Some critics have argued that FAO should fulfill its GPGs
function at the global level and divest from performing country activities (see CGD
[2013]). With the advent of the SDGs, however, it is unlikely that any knowledgeable critic
would put forward a view such as this today.
Global Public Goods, the Technical Cooperation Programme, and
Sustainable Development Goals
FAO cannot deliver on its GPGs function in many areas without effective capacity at
the country level to deliver GPGs. Developing countries look to FAO for technical
¹⁹ MOPAN 2017–18 noted:
New recruitment rules designed to promote the representativeness of FAO staff (in relation to
members) over time, risk disrupting field activities in the short term, if not carefully introduced.
More generally, a number of changes have been instituted in ways perceived as arbitrary or lacking
transparency. (MOPAN 2018, 25)
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assistance as a trusted partner. Who will help developing countries to build such a
capacity and how? Evaluations of the World Bank’s global programs, many of which are
donor-funded to generate GPGs, raise similar issues (World Bank 2002). Without
capacity in developing countries and financing, developing countries often are unable
to deliver on public goods. FAO, with its regional and country office presence, has a
comparative advantage in performing the function of creating capacity in developing
countries. Therefore, in certain areas, FAO should take the lead, in a partnership with
others, such as with the World Bank, to command more funding, and with others who
may have specific expertise, such as some of the US or European agencies on food safety
standards, but which may lack FAO’s global reach, infrastructure, and broad legitimacy
among member countries.
The 2017 Evaluation of FAO’s contribution to inclusive and efficient agricultural and
food systems (SO4) supports this conclusion. It notes:
FAO has a comparative advantage in supporting the formulation of standards, providing
authoritative data, and promoting enabling environments for value chain development.
However, SO4 faces capacity gaps in the areas of food safety, trade, value chain develop-
ment, agribusiness, investment support at the regional level, and value chain finance at
headquarters that constrain the ability of the programme to reach the ambition of the
Objective. These gaps pose reputational risks, as well as limit capacities to backstop and
scale-up field projects. [FAO’s production data have come under criticism, and elsewhere
in this book, we point out data issues.] (FAO OED 2017a, 38–9)
All international staff at the country level, with the exception of a FAO Representative and
one or two staff members funded by assessed contributions, are funded by projects. If there
are few SO4 projects, by definition, there are few field-level technical resources. Similarly,
resource mobilization for SO4 has been quite difficult, particularly relative to other more
traditional and easily understood SOs. The vast majority of voluntary resources (which the
report finds already high) are mobilized at the country level, as that is where the donor
decision-making is located.
FAO’s progress on the reforms related to the performance of its GPGs functions con-
tinues to be work in progress. That work contributes to its flagship reports on the State of
the Food and Agriculture, State of the Food Insecurity, and the State of the World’s Forests
and Fisheries, as well as the work of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS). These
activities and products have acquired increasing importance in a globalized, interconnected
world. Yet, the efficiency, effectiveness, and quality of FAO’s operational assistance to
developing countries, even in these specific areas of GPGs, has been hampered by a limited
budget, lingering internal organizational and management issues, and lack of support from
members to synergistically achieve long-term, sustainable results.
Debates surrounding FAO’s global data sets, assembled from data from member coun-
tries and using standard concepts, have related to the timeliness and reliability of data on
food security or forest degradation, discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. The evaluations
(including the IEE) have noted the lack of reliability of data, particularly due to limited
capacity, especially among low-income countries (LICs) to generate high-quality data.²⁰
²⁰ See Morten Jerven’s Poor Numbers: How We are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do
About It (Jerven 2013).
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Hence, the new “50  2030” initiative is significant. It is “the biggest effort made to date
to fund agricultural data collection, with a target of raising more than $500 million in
support of that cause.” The initiative will emphasize three priorities: “First, to scale up
current activities, second, to strengthen collaboration with multiple stakeholders, and third,
to have the commitment of country authorities and the donor community” (FAO 2018c).
Two existing and tested survey approaches will form “the backbone” of the “50 2030”
initiative: FAO’s Agricultural Integrated Surveys (AGRISurvey)²¹ and the World Bank’s
Living Standards Measurement Study’s Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS–ISA).
The “50 2030” initiative brings together the two tools “within a multi-institutional
partnership . . . to make improved agricultural data available in 35 countries by 2025 and
in 50 countries by 2030” (FAO 2018c).
An important innovation of FAO on the measurement of food insecurity is the Food
Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), one of the SDG2 indicators, which was discussed in
Chapter 4.
According to then DG Graziano da Silva: “FAO’s AGRIsurvey allows countries to track
progress on at least four SDG targets, such as labour productivity and income of small scale
holders (SDG2.3), agricultural sustainability (SDG2.4), women’s ownership on agricultural
land (SDG5.a) and food losses (SDG12.3)” (FAO 2018c).
In some cases, such as water, forests, or fisheries, member countries have either lacked
systematic data collection systems or have been reluctant to share data with FAO. With
rapid improvement and reduced costs in geographic information systems (GIS), informa-
tion technology (IT), and other technologies, a surge in data is expected. Still, unless
developing country policymakers attach the importance of data in policymaking and
maintain and build relevant in-country capacities—and unless donors cooperate and do
not fund short-term efforts that compete with and undermine long-term capacity
building—little high-quality data, which FAO can assemble and disseminate, will be
generated by countries. Furthermore, technologies, such as GIS, the Internet, nanotechnol-
ogies, and cell phones will result in “big data” frommultiple sources, and may make the type
of data that FAO has been assembling from member countries’ governments irrelevant in
years to come. In the meantime, FAO will continue to have a critical GPG function in
generating information and knowledge.
FAO has untapped potential to be more effective at the country level, given its unique and
multifaceted knowledge of food and agriculture in interrelated areas of land, water, soils,
forests, and fisheries. Evaluations of FAO programs have noted that FAO is spread thin,
despite the developing world’s need for FAO to be more effective at the country level. FAO’s
evaluations have been divided on this subject. Some have noted the lack of sufficient
attention and resources to its GPG function such as food safety regulations, control of
transboundary pests and diseases; and others have lamented weak work at the country level.
There is no hard and fast rule that can be applied to allocations between these two types of
activities, but it is clear that currently both are under-provisioned for all of the activities in a
country, with the exception of Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) projects, which
are funded through voluntary contributions.
TCP was set up under DG Saouma to use RP funds (assessed contributions) for technical
assistance at the country level: that is, where FAO self-funds country-level activities rather
than relying on voluntary donor funds. This amount is set at 14 percent of the overall RP
²¹ See http://gsars.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/AGRIS-POSTER-700x1000-01-11-FINAL.pdf
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budget, so around US$140 million per biennium. A major evaluation of TCP was underway
when this chapter was being finalized. The Investment Centre, which we discuss later in the
chapter, is the division that implements the Cooperative Programme with the World Bank,
and other project formulation work with the IFIs. Overall, the shares turn out to be something
like 60 percent IFIs and 40 percent FAO RP contributions, which are essentially pooled for
work on projects in agreement with the IFIs. In the World Bank’s case, there is an agreed
number of staff weeks of Investment Centre staff (or consultants hired by FAO) charged at a
standard rate, for support to a series of projects agreed upon by the relevant units in the Bank.
The findings of the TCP evaluation will be presented to the Programme Committee in
November 2020.
There has never been a proposal by management or members to increase the size of the
RP-funded country office staff. Recent reports from the Caribbean, the Gulf Cooperation
Council States (GCCS), and other subregional offices suggest that the level of country
activity depends on project resource mobilization at the country level.
Some interesting questions are raised. Developing countries consider FAO to be the most
trusted international organization, without an agenda of its own. Skeptics see greater trust
in FAO, resulting from the fact that FAO does not offer “tough” advice that is critical of
developing countries’ policies.
Challenges to improving FAO’s performance at the country level have been intertwined
with its weak priority setting at headquarters. For a long time, the debates in the Council
over normative work have been about specific regular program allocations to certain aspects
of FAO’s normative work: antimicrobial resistance (AMR), Codex, and biodiversity being
the most prominent examples over the last several years. The amounts called for in each
case are quite small, a few million dollars for AMR in the food chain and Codex, for
example, with a total price tag for all three of about US$4–5 million. There was never a
suggestion that this money should come at the expense of keeping country offices open, as
opposed to other cost savings in other technical areas.
G77 members often advocate for regular program budget increases. They expect that the
increased budget will lead to more activities in their country (or as a group), but it does not.
The way to increase country-level activities is either to increase the size of the TCP budget,
which is set at 14 percent of the total, as we have noted previously, or to raise more
voluntary funding.
How does the previous discussion relate to FAO’s organizational strategy? FAO has had a
clearer set of priorities since 2007 and, particularly since 2012, FAO has fully embraced
SDGs in its program of work and SF. The organization has been shaped to address these
priorities, including its approach to decentralization. And yet, the need to fund its GPG
agenda has not received the attention it deserves.
FAO’s HR strategy also needed attention. A new director of personnel was appointed in
December 2019. FAO has had considerable turnover of country representatives, some with
qualified recruits (MOPAN 2018). FAO continues to be constrained by lack of growth in
assessed contributions and the need to raise voluntary resources, combined with its
recruitment practices. All of the UN that is funded by assessed contributions has essentially
the same geographic representation guidelines, with the definitions of underrepresented,
equitably represented, or overrepresented by staff numbers, tied to the volume of their
assessed contributions, based on country income. It does not apply to voluntarily funded
projects.
It needs long-term, assured financing—either through increased assessed contributions
from member countries or an endowed trust fund, in return for demonstrated and
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independently evaluated results—for it to be the center of excellence that it could be. An
endowed trust fund would not be the only option. Pooled funding for a certain thematic
area (smaller than one of the SPs, this funding could support normative work at headquar-
ters, country-level activities, and provide additional resources for backstopping that work.
With rapid growth in international trade and changing commodity markets; complex
effects on the outlook for food security and poverty; the growing pressure on land, water,
and genetic resources; and climate change, the world deserves nothing less.
Divided Governance: Southern Leadership with Challenges—
Hierarchical and Authoritarian
FAO’s governance structure of “one country, one vote” was designed as a forum where all
member countries could debate global issues and reach agreements with respect to food and
agriculture policy on an equal basis. FAO is more inclusive than Bretton Woods Institu-
tions. Some of FAO’s members are not members of the Bretton Woods institutions and are
members of FAO by virtue of their membership in the UN.²² The “one country, one vote”
model engenders a high level of trust from FAO’s developing country members, but it is
unclear as to the extent to which this view is shared by developed country members
candidates.
FAO Conference
FAO is directed by the Conference of Member Nations, which meets every two years. Early
on, the Conference met annually, but in 1949, the constitution was amended so that sessions
would be held every two years. The Conference is responsible for acting on applications for
FAO membership, electing the members of the Council, reviewing and approving the
organization’s work program, deciding the level of its budget, setting the scale of contribu-
tions, reviewing the state of food and agriculture, making decisions on administrative and
constitutional questions, and appointing the DG and the Independent Chairperson of the
Council.²³
FAO Director-General
The Conference elects a DG.²⁴ The FAO Constitution (Article VII) provides, “There shall be
a Director-General of the Organization who shall be appointed by the Conference . . . ” and
further, that “Subject to the general supervision of the Conference and the Council, the
Director-General shall have full power and authority to direct the work of the Organization”
(FAO 1945).
²² For a list of members that is searchable by accession date and participation, see FAO’s site: http://www.fao.
org/unfao/govbodies/gsb-membershipandbureau/search-by-region/en/
²³ See FAO’s Governing and Statutory Bodies website: http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/
gsbhome/gsb-home/en/
²⁴ Qu Dongyu of China was elected DG of FAO during the 41st session of the FAO Conference on June 23,
2019.
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The Conference decided to limit the terms of office of future FAO DGs, starting with the
election in 2005, so that FAO DGs “should be appointed for a term of six years, renewable
only once for a further term of four years” (UN 2003). In 2009, Article VII was amended
again to reduce the term limits of FAO DGs to four years, eligible for reappointment only
once for a further term of four years (FAO 2009a). The norm of two terms of four years for
the DG and more frequent rotation would help renew and refresh the organization.
Clear Wins through Partnerships
In the long history preceding Graziano da Silva, there have been a number of clear wins for
global outcomes, centered on FAO, which are often overlooked. Such was the case when
WFP (discussed in Chapter 12) was first formally established within FAO in 1960 to
internationalize emergency food aid. With strong support from the United States, the
Cooperative Programme was established between the World Bank and FAO in 1964. It
has enabled the World Bank, and later, other international organizations, including IFAD
and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to draw on FAO’s technical expertise to expand
their investment operations. Founded in 1964, FAO’s Investment Centre partners with
governments, IFIs, national organizations, the private sector, and producer organizations to
provide investment support services to developing and transition countries in food security,
nutrition, agriculture, rural development, and sustainable natural resources management
(FAO 2014a).²⁵
FAO worked with the World Bank to establish CGIAR in 1972 (Baum 1986, 125–6),
during the avian flu outbreaks, and in addressing the global food crisis in 2008, discussed in
Chapter 8 on the World Bank, as well as on the collaborative “50 2030” initiative on data,
discussed earlier.
The Consequences of Leadership Style
In the case of FAO, both Saouma and Diouf were widely described as autocrats, with
centralized leadership and long tenures becoming problems, but their leadership also had
considerable following. WHO evolved differently. It introduced two 5-year term limits on
leadership in 1996, following the tenure of an ineffective DG. Many in WHO attribute the
establishment of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) to the failure of WHO
leadership to respond to the demand from donor countries’ constituencies to expand
interventions in HIV/AIDS. WHO also experienced substantial rotation of DGs, and they
came from both developed and developing country nationalities. Few completed more than
a single term, with the exception of Dr. Margaret Chan. WHO’s leadership selection, with
greater voice given to the regional directors has had both positive and negative effects. Its
delayed response to Ebola was seen as a result of greater dominance of regional leaders
relative to the global director general, and the emergence of SARs prior to that provided an
altogether different challenge. Some considered WHO’s response altogether too quick, and
others, not quick enough. In any case, the leadership rotation helped restore WHO’s global
²⁵ FAO’s Investment Centre supported about 70 countries in 2017 (FAO 2018b).
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leadership in health to a degree. WHO has also accepted far greater dependence on trust
funds to pursue its health agendas of interest to donors than did FAO until recently, largely
in the areas of communicable diseases, recognizing that donor countries traditionally have
had little interest in increasing the WHO budget to address endemic, noncommunicable
diseases in poor countries (see Figure 9.3, WHO’s Biennial Program Budget). The new
debate on nutrition and health and life-cycle effects of poor food choices on health,
however, has changed the balance of attention donors are giving to noncommunicable
diseases.
Unfortunately, for international organizations, FAO and WHO are not the only organi-
zations that have faced leadership challenges. The World Bank, in 2011, and IMF in 2012,
each went through leadership changes accompanied by controversy and outright scandal,
which emphasized the importance of selecting qualified leaders of integrity, regardless of
nationality, for international organizations. Both of these institutions faced open lobbying
for non-OECD candidates for leadership from established entities within OECD countries,
issues of voting shares of developing countries, and the criteria for future leadership
successions, away from the traditional reservation of positions to US and EU nationals.
While traditional patterns of leadership have ensured funding from OECD countries for
now, it has also jeopardized ownership of the Bretton Woods institutions in a changed
world in which the role of emerging countries has increased.²⁶
FAO’s SF will take time to show greater impacts. Nevertheless, the rapid pace of change
in the other organizations has given FAO a significant challenge: on the one hand, of
substantial costs of the reform process to make the necessary changes, and on the other, of












2000–1 2002–3 2004–5 2006–7 2008–9 2010–11 2012–13 2014–15 2016–17 2018–19
Assessed contributions Voluntary contributions
Figure 9.3 WHO’s biennial program budget: Voluntary contribution and regular budget,
2000–1 to 2018–19 (US$m)
Source: https://www.who.int/about/finances-accountability/budget/en/
²⁶ Devesh Kapur (2019) noted that global governance of intergovernmental organizations was so weakened
under the Trump administration that there was no serious discussion of alternative candidates in the most recent
selection of leaders at the helm in 2019 in the World Bank and IMF.
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enough sums—to turn it into a premier organization, a center of excellence that FAO
deserves to be and one that the world needs, if it is serious about world food security.
It is clear that a sizeable amount of untied funds would be needed annually, together with
organizational reforms proposed by the new DG to turn FAO into a center of excellence as a
way to increase FAO’s impact. The sad reality is that few donors are willing to contribute
unearmarked or slightly earmarked voluntary funds. This could change, as tightly ear-
marked voluntary contributions are now subject to a 1 percent levy, an element of the
reformed funding mechanisms for new UN country teams, to fund the repositioned United
Nations Development System (UNDS).
FAO is working towards less earmarked voluntary contributions through a new “business
portfolio.” The idea is that donors choose certain areas of work where their voluntary
contributions should go while leaving it to the FAO secretariat to determine for which
specific projects these funds would be used. The advantage of these almost unearmarked
voluntary contributions is that FAO can pool funds from several donors so as to implement
much bigger programmatic approaches that evaluations call for reducing significantly the
transaction and administrative costs. The buy-in from donors is still rather lukewarm.
The previous DG’s Brazilian nationality ensured geographic diversification in leadership;
his experience as a key player in Zero Hunger in his own country and his knowledge of FAO
were important assets, although his managerial style was unpopular for being top-down and
centralized, with micromanagement leaving no voice and scope for innovation at lower
levels. Some noted, for Graziano “geographical distribution” had become a mantra, which
has led to serious negative impacts on the technical capacity. In the Audit of the on
Recruitment and Onboarding of Professional Staff, submitted in November 2018, the
Inspector General made a number of very critical remarks. For instance, a survey of hiring
managers found that 74 percent of the managers disagreed (28 percent strongly disagreed)
that recruitment objectives in terms of geographical distribution did not diminish the
technical suitability of appointees. Furthermore, diversity requirements were thought to
give preference to less qualified candidates from target groups. The 2018 Annual Report of
the Inspector General observed: “Most recruitment actions ran smoothly and resulted in the
hiring of technically competent candidates in line with recruitment objectives and guiding
principles (geographic and gender balance). However, there was room for improvement in
some phases of the regular recruitment and onboarding process” (FAO 2018e, 49). The
report noted, “Several hiring managers indicated that in the majority of cases the appointed
candidate is not the person considered most suitable by the PSSC [Professional Staff and
Selection Committees] and this has had an impact on their units’ technical capacity” (FAO
2018e, 8).
FAO Council
The FAO Conference also elects a council of 49 member states (serving three-year rotating
terms), which provides executive oversight of program and budgetary activities. Article V of
the Constitution, covering the FAO Council, states that each member has one representative
and one vote.²⁷ The Council membership reflects the seven regional groups. Usually more
²⁷ See FAO Governing and Statutory Bodies website: FAO Council: http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/
gsbhome/council/en/
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than two-thirds of the Council members are from developing countries (currently 34 out of
the 49 members). The Council is FAO’s second-level governing body, and its work is carried
out under an Independent Chairman (also elected by the Conference), unlike at the World
Bank and IFAD, where the CEO also chairs the board. In the case of the World Bank, the
Zedillo Commission considered this arrangement to be unhealthy and suggested reforms
(Linn 2009; Zedillo 2009). Article V also provides the Council with the assistance of eight
committees tasked with most of the substantive and detailed work.
The Program & Finance Committees work well, are member state-chaired and are central
to FAO’s operations. The Committee on Agriculture (COAG), open to observers from civil
society and private sector, is also a venue for the review of the FAO Work Programme and
suggestions for changes in scope and emphasis of programs (see Figure 9.4).
Figure 9.4 still reflects old thinking. New issues, such as climate change and food systems,
and the need for an integrated approach to problem solving, will need to be given more
attention, even if the organizational structure reflects silos, particularly of the Technical
Committees.
Funding
Figures 9.5 and 9.6 show FAO’s regular and voluntary contributions.²⁸ The assessed con-
tributions (for core technical work, cooperation, and partnerships) are member countries’
contributions, confirmed at the biennial FAO Conference. The voluntary contributions
provided by members and other partners tend to support technical and emergency (includ-
ing rehabilitation) assistance to governments, although some voluntary funds also support
FAO’s core work. With the advent of SP5 on resilience and the global developments in








- Committee on Forestry
- Committee on Fisheries
- Committee on Commodity Problems
- Committee on Agriculture
- Committe on Constitutional and Legal Matters
- Finance Committee
Figure 9.4 FAO’s governing bodies
Source: http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/gsbhome/gsb-home/en/
²⁸ See http://www.fao.org/about/strategic-planning/en/
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countries, although not all of it is “emergency-related,” as in the past. The issues of
emergencies are discussed in Chapter 12.
The total FAO budget planned for 2018–19 was US$2.6 billion. Sixty-one percent of
FAO’s funding came from voluntary contributions from members and other partners, an
increase in recent years, as assessed contributions (39 percent paid by member countries)
have remained unchanged for years and declined in real terms (FAO n.d.; CGD 2013).²⁹
61%
39% Voluntary contributions from
members and other partners
Assessed contributions from
members









2000–1 2002–3 2004–5 2006–7 2008–9 2010–11 2012–13 2014–15 2016–17 2018–19
Voluntary contributions from members and other partners (US$m)
Assessed contributions from members (regular budget) (US$m)
Figure 9.6 FAO’s total approved biannual budget (assessed and voluntary contributions),
2000–1 to 2018–19 (US$m)
Source: Based on data from the Director-General’s Medium Term Plan and Program of Work & Budget Reports
(FAO 2017a) and http://www.fao.org/about/strategic-planning/en/
²⁹ See FAO website: About FAO/Strategic Planning: http://www.fao.org/about/strategic-planning/en/
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The decline in assessed contributions in real terms has been accompanied by a rise in
voluntary contribution resources from US$1 billion in 1996–7 to US$1.6 billion for
2018–19. In 2018, US$1.14 billion was mobilized through voluntary contributions, of
which 55 percent was for development (down from 59 percent in 2017). Because these
figures come from two different biannual programs of work and budget, they should be
treated with caution. Without additional assessed contributions, a major shift in allocating
the RP resources to technical support and backstopping would likely require reducing the
number of country offices, and perhaps scaling down staffing in the regional offices—
neither of which has ever been seriously contemplated or even raised by member govern-
ments or management. So, some kind of an endowment or pooled funds earmarked for
thematic programs, such as response to climate change, might be needed in the future.
FAO’s largest donors over the past few years have been the European Union, the United
States, the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), GEF, the United
Kingdom, Japan, Norway, Germany, UNDP, and the World Bank. These resources are
generally earmarked for fixed-period projects that are directed by donor priority. There is
limited core operational work at the country level. High-income countries often argue that
FAO should focus on statistics and policy, while developing countries call for more in-
country technical cooperation assistance.
Programs and Projects
In 2016–17, FAO implemented programs and projects with a total value of US$1.6 billion.
About 8 percent of the total project funding came from assessed contributions through the
FAO TCP. The remaining 92 percent are funded from voluntary contributions, through the
Government Cooperative Programme (34 percent), Unilateral Trust Funds (UTFs) (5 per-
cent), and other forms of Trust Funds (53 percent) that include UN Joint Programmes. The
“Regular Programme,” the assessed contributions, are flat; those funds cover only a very
small portion of the work in the field (less than 10 percent of project funding). The rest is all
donor-funded projects, now approaching two-thirds of the overall budget. The RP budget
only covers the salary of the FAO representatives, two national professional staff, some
administrative staff, and the rent, lights, and overhead. All other work at the country level,
which is often substantial, needs to funded by projects.³⁰
Operations
According to the “Programme Implementation Report 2016–17,” RP expenditures
accounted for 44 percent of total expenditures, including 5 percent for the
TCP. Extrabudgetary expenditures, accounting for 56 percent of total expenditures, were
reported by type: emergency assistance projects (44 percent), non-emergency field and
global projects (40 percent), and global and interregional projects (16 percent). Fifty-eight
percent of RP resources were spent at headquarters, a 1 percent decrease over 2014–15,
“demonstrating the financial consequences of increasing decentralization of activity within
FAO” (FAO 2019e, 102). Table 9.2 shows that a large portion of FAO’s funding is for
³⁰ From “About FAO/Who We Are”: http://www.fao.org/about/who-we-are/en/
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emergency assistance (the 2010–11 budget for emergency assistance was three times that for
non-emergency activities), and the FAO/Government Cooperative Programme, while
funding for the (non-emergency) TCP (technical support and training) declined. From
the Forty-first Session, June 22–9, 2019, in Rome, the DG’s Foreword for the Program
Implementation Report 2016–17 noted: “the continued flat budgets since 2012–13 put FAO
in a very delicate situation that may, in the near future, impact our delivery of results” (FAO
2019e, 2).
In practice, there is not much competition for RP resources between normative work and
country-level work. The latter is not funded by RP, except for keeping the offices open.
There is competition for RP resources between headquarters (HQ) and regional offices,
which perform somewhat similar functions and are staffed with technical people that
correspond with, and report to, HQ divisions through the matrix management approach.
There is also a problem with the lack of RP financial resources and RP-funded staff time to
backstop project work, but the problem has always been woeful underfunding and lack of
attention to this work. This issue, however, has not been high enough on the members’ or
management’s radar, and that needs to change.
In reality, this was never an important issue for RP resource allocation (as almost all
country-level work is donor project-funded), although it has always surfaced in debates
around the budget. An increased RP budget does not translate into increased country-level
work, and it never has.
The Government Cooperative Programme is a financing modality in which a resource
partner provides funds to FAO for the provision of technical assistance services (such as
policy advice and normative activities) for a specific developing country or group of
countries. Other modalities that received significant funding in recent years include
UTFs, the FAO/EU Food Facility, the UN Joint Programme, and the Multilateral Trust
Funds. UTFs are agreements arranged between FAO and a recipient country, whereby
funds are provided by the beneficiary country to FAO for its technical expertise. The FAO/
EU Food Facility, a three-year program set up in 2009, in response to the soaring food prices
in developing countries, also received a large amount of funding for 2010–11. The facility
focused on improving access to agricultural inputs and services, such as fertilizers and seeds,
safety net measures to maintain or increase agricultural production capacity, and vocational
training and support for agricultural professionals. The UN Joint Programme is a multi-
donor funding mechanism for support of nationally led and owned programming pro-
cesses, such as the FAO/IFAD/WFP/UN Women’s collaborative program entitled “Accel-
erating Progress towards the Economic Empowerment of Rural Women,” which fosters
policies such as gender mainstreaming (FAO 2012a). Multilateral trust funds typically assist
developing countries and multilateral organizations to identify and plan effective and
sustainable agricultural policies, program, and projects, and to monitor their implementa-
tion (FAO 2008c, 2019e).
Since the launch of FAO’s TCP in 1976, projects have been approved primarily to put
FAO’s technical knowledge at the disposal of its member countries. The TCP is financed
only through the RP, and therefore, under FAO’s direct control. It is much smaller than
voluntary contributions. The TCP focuses on improving household or national food
security and rural livelihoods, as well as on reducing poverty, through short-term, quick-
impact technical support and training. Historically, the largest percentage of FAO’s TCP
resources has gone to the Africa region. In 2016–17, 786 TCP projects totaling US$151.9
million were approved, as shown in Table 9.2, compared to 501 projects that totaled US
$145.7 million in 2014–15. “Overall, the level of approvals and number of projects approved
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has increased by 4% and 57% respectively as compared to the previous biennium. The
increase in number of projects is mainly due to a change in how TCPR [TCP Facility]
projects are captured . . . 68% of the approved budget allocation is for national projects”
(FAO 2019e, 92).³¹
As expected, two-thirds of technical cooperation funds are spent in Africa and in Asia
and the Pacific. The biggest need is in Africa. TCP projects address both development
support and emergency assistance needs. The distribution by category of project interven-
tion is provided in Table 9.3.
“During the biennium [2016–17], delivery reached US$135.6 million, compared to US
$125.8 million during 2014–15. [Table 9.4] illustrates the distribution of the TCP assistance
delivered during the biennium appropriation. by category of project” (FAO 2019e, 94).
“The distribution of TCP assistance by Strategic Objectives is illustrated in [Table 9.5].
Over 61% of delivery falls under two Strategic Objectives: Increase and improve provision of
goods and services from agriculture, forestry and fisheries in a sustainable manner (SO2) and
Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises (SO5)” (FAO 2019e, 94).
Delivery of Global Public Goods
It is worth recalling that FAO is considered the only entity that can provide many of the
needed GPGs in the areas of its mandate (such as global analysis, statistics, international
standards, and advocacy). “The Codex Alimentarius or ‘Food Code’ is a collection of
standards, guidelines, and codes of practice adopted by the Codex Alimentarius Commis-
sion,” a body established in 1961 by FAO, and joined by WHO in June 1962. The
Commission’s goals are “to protect consumer health and promote fair practices in food
trade.” The Codex Alimentarius is recognized by WTO as an international reference point








Africa 65.3 274 43
Near East 12.8 54 8
Asia and the Pacific 34.0 194 22
Europe 12.3 73 8
Latin America and the
Caribbean
25.0 184 16
Inter-regional 2.6 7 2
Total 152.0 786 100
Source: FAO (2019e, table 4, 93).
³¹ Reference to the TCP evaluation is made inter alia in Table 1 in Annex 1 to the Report of the 127th Session of
the Programme Committee (Rome, November 4–8, 2019) and in the Report on the 163rd Session of the Council of
FAO (December 2–6, 2019) in para. 11.e: “[The Council] looked forward to reviewing the comprehensive
evaluation of the TCP in 2020 to be presented to the Council through the Finance and Programme Committees”
(FAO 2019f, 4).
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for the resolution of disputes concerning food safety and consumer protection (FAO and
WHO 2020).
The Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, an intergovernmental
forum, was established in FAO in 1983, to deal with issues related to plant genetic
resources.³² Over time, it has also come to cover other components of biodiversity relevant
to food and agriculture, such as animal genetic diversity, forest genetic diversity, aquatic
genetic diversity, microorganisms, and invertebrates. It is the only permanent forum for
governments to discuss and negotiate matters specifically relevant to biological diversity for
Table 9.3 Technical Cooperation Programme project approvals by category











Emergency assistancea 27.4 61 24.4 57
Support to
developmentb
95.7 304 105.4 367
TCP facilityc 22.6 136 22.1 362
Total 145.7 501 151.9 786
Notes:
a Emergency assistance—During the 2016–17 biennium, 57 emergency projects for a total of US$24.4 million were
approved. This compares with 61 emergency projects for a total of US$27.4 million in 2014–15. Projects were
approved, in particular, in response to droughts and floods caused by El Niño and cyclones.
b Development support—In 2016–17, 367 projects amounting to a total of US$105.4 million were approved for
development support, an increase of 21 and 10 percent, respectively, from the 304 projects for a total of US$95.7
million which were approved in 2014–15. Given the requirements for technical support, projects responding to
the outbreak of the Fall Armyworm in African countries are included in this category.
c The TCP Facility is used to respond to requests for limited technical expertise, formulation of project proposals,
and documents for interaction with resource partners, and strengthening program planning. Since 2016, each
TCP Facility is recorded as an individual project rather than a component under a single umbrella project in each
country. This allows for better management of resources and oversight, but has resulted in more than doubling the
number of TCP Facility projects from 136 in 2014–15 to 362 in 2016–17, despite slightly reducing the overall
resources allocated through this modality from US$22.6 million to US$22.1 million. Out of 389 TCP projects with
budgets above US$100,000 active in 2016–17, 59 percent addressed gender equality, exceeding the target of 30
percent for Standard 15.
Source: FAO (2019e, table 5, 93–4).
Table 9.4 Technical Cooperation Programme delivery by project
category, 2016–17
Project category US$ million Percentage
Emergency assistance 20.8 15.3
Support of development 95.5 70.4
TCP Facility 19.3 14.2
Total 135.6 100.0
Source: FAO (2019e, table 6, 94).
³² See http://www.fao.org/cgrfa/en/
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food and agriculture, including policies for the sustainable use and conservation of genetic
resources for food and agriculture, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived
from their use. In 2001, after seven years of negotiations in the Commission, the FAO
Conference adopted the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (Resolution 3/2001), a legally binding treaty covering all plant genetic resources
for food and agriculture, recognizing farmers’ rights and establishing a multilateral system
to facilitate access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and to share the
benefits derived from their use in a fair and equitable way.
Since its establishment, the Commission has overseen global assessments of the state of
the world’s plant and animal genetic resources for food and agriculture and negotiated
major international instruments, including the International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture, an important tool for the management of genetic
resources, and the latter has acquired growing importance, as the focus has shifted from
food production to food systems in which the various parts of GPGs for which FAO is
responsible can form a cohesive whole (FAO 2009b; see, also, http://www.fao.org/plant-
treaty/overview/en/). The discussion of GPGs and how to look at them are germane to
FAO’s restructuring going forward.
How GPGs are delivered, depending on their nature, has implications for financing and
country capacity critical for them to achieve impacts. Delivery typically uses one of three
approaches: the “best shot” approach, the summation approach, or “the shoring up of the
weakest link” approach (Sandler 1992).
The “best shot” approach brings to bear the best scientific know-how and expertise,
regardless of where it is located in the world, and usually addresses issues of interest to
humanity or the environment. The Gates Foundation’s support for children’s vaccines is an
example, as is CGIAR’s work, which develops and delivers advanced plant breeding
technologies to the world. FAO has not been in the business of mobilizing scientific
know-how to generate technologies since CGIAR was established in 1972, but it continues
to provide information on best practices, such as integrated pest management. FAO also
addresses global public policy issues: for example, on plant genetic resources, food safety
(Codex), and voluntary agreements on land and water resources.
Table 9.5 Technical Cooperation Programme delivery by Strategic Objectives, 2016–17




1. Contribute to the eradication of hunger, food insecurity
and malnutrition
19.3 14.2
2. Increase and improve provision of goods and services
from agriculture, forestry and fisheries in a sustainable
manner
50.2 37.0
3. Reduce rural poverty 16.4 12.1
4. Enable more inclusive and efficient agricultural and food
systems
16.9 12.5
5. Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises 32.2 23.7
OB6 Technical quality, knowledge and services, including
the cross-cutting theme on gender
0.6 0.4
Total 135.6 100.0
Source: FAO (2019e, table 7, 94).
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There are still other global public policy issues for which FAO could foster international
agreements, such as with respect to biosafety of genetically modified organisms; intellectual
property rights; information and knowledge on global production, trade, prices and stocks;
and monitoring of the implementation of international agreements. FAO uses the other two
approaches—namely, the summation approach and the weakest link approach—for the
generation of GPGs to a far lesser extent and could do much better in support of these two
other types of interventions. The summation approach involves helping countries to
develop the capacity to deliver a national public good, the sum of which is aggregated
into a GPG, such as FAO’s agricultural statistics that are vital for national as well as global
policymaking. Conservation of genetic resources at the country level could also use a
summation approach to achieve better global outcomes.
The “weakest link” approach helps contain a “public bad” in the weakest, institutionally
least-developed countries, thereby preventing its spread to other countries, as is the case of
avian flu and other bird and animal diseases. FAO needs internal capacity, not only for early
warning of such hazards but also for mobilizing technical assistance to help the weakest
developing countries to contain communicable diseases, as it has done successfully with
rinderpest and avian flu—much in the same way that WHO is relied upon by developing
countries to help contain risks to human health before they become epidemics. Yet, recent
experience with avian flu demonstrates that such a function cannot be performed solely
with emergency assistance. It requires assisting countries to establish long-term capacity in
areas that are politically and socially less “sexy” than gender or environmental issues.
Agriculture, in general, seem to be a less popular area, so international organizations recruit
more food security experts and fewer agronomists, water engineers, livestock specialists, or
foresters.
Understanding the nature of countries’ needs is fundamental for FAO to be able to meet
the needs of its members. The worst locust invasion has hit East Africa in decades, causing
massive amounts of food loss. FAO has launched an emergency appeal for US$76 million to
help governments in East Africa to combat the locust invasion. Conflict and climate change
contribute to the increase in the problem, and timely addressing of the locust problem is
critical (OCHA 2020).
FAO has 194 members today, compared to 39 members at the end of the First Session of
the FAO Conference in 1945 (see Box 9.2) (Phillips 1981b, 13). How countries articulate
their needs and how they are grouped strategically may help FAO to better understand and
respond to the countries’ demands through exchange of transcontinental expertise, based
on the percentage of people dependent on agriculture and natural resources for livelihoods,
the importance of agriculture and rural development to their stage of economic transfor-
mation, their human capital and institutional capacity, the extent of their market orienta-
tion, or their ability to pay for services or contribute to South–South cooperation—rather
than simply by pursuing a supply-driven, regional, or subregional approach.
In the more advanced of developing countries in Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe,
and the Middle East, the demand for high-quality knowledge is considerable, but there are
also many alternative sources of information, often from their own neighborhoods: for
example, among the Southern Cone countries of the southernmost South America. In
contrast, in the least developed countries of sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia, slow
growth, organizational decline, weak regional neighborhoods, and increased reliance on
international assistance suggest a larger role for FAO. Increased institutional diversity offers
the opportunity to leverage FAO’s limited resources through active partnerships at all levels
to a greater extent than FAO has pursued.
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Box 9.2 The FAO’s Diverse Membership Calls for Different
Responses Depending on Internal Capacitya
Emerging economiesb—Large and middle-income, urbanized, or fast-growing countries,
such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Mexico, Morocco, Thailand, Tunisia, and
Turkey.
Economies in transitionc—Countries with specific political and institutional legacies,
such as Central Asian countries.
Other countries—Countries with considerable internal capacity to absorb new infor-
mation and knowledge, such as Bangladesh, Central American countries, Egypt, Indo-
nesia, and Pakistan.
Low-income, food-deficit countriesd—51 small, aid-dependent, slow-growing coun-
tries with limited capacity, including most of sub-Saharan Africa and small Asian
countries, such as Nepal and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
Fragile and conflict-affected arease—Countries with ongoing or recently ended con-
flicts and those in fractious political situations, such as Afghanistan, Central African
Republic, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen, and Syria.
Small island developing statesf—Countries such as Haiti, East Timor, and Tuvalu.
Notes:
a There are a total of 197 members, consisting of 194 member nations, 1 member organization (the
European Union), and 2 associate members.
http://www.fao.org/legal/home/membership-of-fao/en/
b The term “emerging market economy” was first used in 1981 by Antoine W. van Agtmael of the IFC of
the World Bank. Emerging market countries are those that are striving to become advanced countries and
are generally on a more economically disciplined track to become more sophisticated, including increased
fiscal transparency, focus on production, developing regulatory bodies and exchanges, and acceptance of
outside investment. Although some countries like China and India have high production and industry, other
factors like low per capita income or a heavy focus on exports lead to the classification of even large countries
as emerging markets.
According to the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Market Index, 24 developing
countries qualify as emerging markets—including Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt,
Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar,
Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates. The index follows the market
caps of the companies on the countries’ stock markets.
Additionally, the IMF has a similar list of 23 countries, although there are some discrepancies in the list,
compared to the MSCI list. Among the IMF and the MSCI, the S&P, Dow Jones, and Russell all have lists of
emerging markets that follow similar strains, although with some variation (see https://unctadstat.unctad.
org/EN/Classifications/UnctadStat.EconomicGroupings.Criterias_EN.pdf).
c The group of transition economies accounts for the particular circumstances of a group of economies
shaped by socialism and now in transition to a market economy. Transition economies are involved in a
process of moving from a centrally planned economy to a mixed or free market economy. This group
includes Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Starting in 2010, data for the Ukraine exclude the temporarily occupied
territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol (UNCTAD 2018; UN 2019).
d Low-income, food-deficit countries (LIFDCs): List for 2018: The list of the LIFDCs stands at 51
countries, one country less than previously, but with some changes in the composition of the list. Three
countries have graduated from the list: Nigeria, Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea. Nigeria and Papua New
Guinea graduated based on the income criterion, while Pakistan graduated based on the net food-exporter
criterion. Two countries, Congo and Vietnam, have been added to the list for not meeting the three criteria
for exclusion, discussed next (see http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/lifdc/en/).
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There is no scientific way to allocate resources between these competing demands of
GPGs and country programs, but more resources to FAO, along with other reforms and a
clearer demonstration of FAO’s impacts will dampen this debate. A great deal of FAO’s
work is on GPGs, such as statistics, environment and climate change, information systems
for transboundary animal diseases, forest resource assessments, and analysis of trade in
agricultural products. “This work is vital because it creates the background against which
investors—small or large, public or private—make their decisions” (FAO OED 2013,
xxxvii). Most important of these GPGs is FAO’s work in statistics. Several organizations,
institutes, and governments generate “agricultural, forestry and fisheries data . . . None,
however, provide global statistics in such a wide range of areas as FAO” (FAO 2008b, 6).
FAO is unique in assembling, maintaining, analyzing, and disseminating the world’s largest
and most influential statistical data set on agriculture, broadly defined to include area,
yields, and production of crops, livestock, forestry, and fisheries. It is the provider of
statistical inputs into debates on many key global and national issues related to sustainable
and broad-based development.
Indeed, FAO’s position as an international leader in agriculture information and statistics
is increasingly under threat, as other governmental and nongovernmental organizations,
institutions, foundations, and private sector entities, with larger budgets and growing
legitimacy, seek to compete in this area. FAO’s efforts have been hindered by insufficient
resources to perform this function, and even though donor support for its statistical work
has increased, the resources are not nearly what are needed. Donor financing of short-term
data collection efforts to meet their own needs may also hamper the long-term efforts (Lele
2007).
The 2008 independent evaluation of FAO’s role and work in statistics concluded that the
FAO statistics program had challenges, such as the quality of the collection methods, the
quality of the data coming to FAO from national sources, and the quality of FAO data
reaching the user. The evaluation also concluded that critical human and financial resource
The classification as LIFDC, used for analytical purposes by FAO, is traditionally determined by three
criteria. First, a country should have a per capita gross national income (GNI) below the “historical” ceiling
used by the World Bank to determine eligibility for IDA assistance and for 20-year IBRD term applied to
countries included in World Bank’s categories I and II. The 2018 LIFDC list is based on the GNI for 2016
(estimated by the World Bank using the Atlas method) and the historical ceiling of US$1,905 for 2016. The
second criterion is based on the net food trade position (that is, gross imports less gross exports) of a country
averaged over the preceding three years, for which statistics are available—in this case from 2014, 2015, and
2016. Trade volumes for a broad basket of basic foodstuffs (cereals, roots and tubers, pulses, oilseeds, and oils
other than tree crop oils, meat, and dairy products) are converted and aggregated by the calorie content of
individual commodities. Thirdly, the self-exclusion criterion is applied when countries that meet the above
two criteria specifically request FAO to be excluded from the LIFDC category. In order to avoid countries
changing their LIFDC status too frequently, typically reflecting short-term exogenous shocks, an additional
factor was introduced in 2001. This factor, called “persistence of position,” would postpone the “exit” of a
LIFDC from the list, despite the country not meeting the LIFDC income criterion or the food-deficit
criterion, until the change in its status is verified for three consecutive years. In other words, a country is




f UN members (38); Non-UN members/Associate members of regional commissions (20). See https://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/sids/list
Source: Adapted from Lele (2007).
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and capacity limitations affect the ability of FAO to develop newmethods and techniques for
use in national statistical systems, as well as provide direct institutional support to its
members. This evaluation echoed the IEE’s finding in noting that the “most pressing ‘emer-
ging’ data need is actually a ‘re-emerging’ need: to improve the capacity of member countries
for collection and dissemination of country data in order to make the best data available for
use in analytic and decision support tools, with priority on the poorest countries, particularly
those in Africa” (FAO 2008b, 8). The evaluation concluded that FAO must renew its
commitment to improving national statistical capacity and better promote its position of
leadership of agricultural statistics at the international level (FAO 2008b).
There has been considerable progress on the allocation of additional resources in FAO’s
Programme of Work and Budget, although the allocations are not as transparent as they
could be, particularly in the use of voluntary contributions. In the 2011 document, for
example, resources were provided for the development of the Statistical Working System
and a Statistical Data Warehouse; the creation of the Impact Focus Area on capacity
building in information and statistics; and the development and implementation of a Global
Strategy to Improve Agricultural and Rural Statistics. Furthermore, a Statistics Programme
Steering Committee and a Statistics Coordination Working Group were established to
coordinate FAO’s statistical activities (FAO 2011a).
Key accomplishments have included preparation of the first FAO Statistical Programme
of Work 2010–11 (FAO 2013b), re-engineering of FAOSTAT, and development of Coun-
trySTAT (FAO 2010). The 2010 Global Strategy to Improve Agricultural and Rural Statis-
tics was also a significant effort by FAO, World Bank, and the United Nations Statistical
Commission to strengthen agricultural statistics. A Chief Statistician was appointed and
supported by the Inter-Departmental Working Group on Statistics. The Chief Statistician
leads FAO’s work in statistics and seeks to improve the quality of the data that FAO
produces, collects, and distributes. The position is also tasked with improving coordination
of activities within the international statistical community. The International Advisory
Group on FAO Statistics (IAGFS) was subsequently formed, and the first meeting was
held at FAO headquarters in September 2013. “The mandate of the IAGFS is to advise FAO
on statistical priorities, best practices in data compilation, analysis and dissemination, and
on the design and implementation of major FAO statistical projects and capacity develop-
ment programmes” (FAO 2019d). This action will lead to increased transparency, better
quality and methodology, and investment in upgrading software and hardware.
Unfortunately, FAOSTAT and FishSTAT (FAO’s Fisheries and Aquaculture Statistics) are
still not integrated, although it is not clear why. It does make it harder to use the two together,
which is unfortunate, given the increasing attention given to fish as a nutritious food.
Thus, our understanding is that statistics were not entirely recognized as a core function
of the organization. Large shares of the internal finance of statistical activities have been
made dependent upon the SF. The 50 2030 initiative, discussed earlier in this chapter, is a
good initiative (FAO 2018c), but it does not go far enough. Data improvement related to all
matters that FAO is responsible for, using state-of-the-art technology, is essential, and new
technology is now making data accessible to all actors.
Policy Work
Policy work and support for investment will be the cornerstone of economic progress.
Support of qualified staff is critical. If the management does not put in place competent
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staff, the risk of nonperformance is high, with all its consequences. FAO cannot fail and
needs to maintain the support of its development partners.
The 2012 “Evaluation of FAO’s Role and Work in Food and Agriculture Policy,” led by
Jock R. Anderson, reported that FAO’s work on global policy in food security was
excellent, consistent, of high quality, and very influential, but that its work on country-
level policy was lacking in quality, quantity, impact, and accountability. “Policy work, in
its many and varied dimensions, is among the most important things that FAO does”
(FAO OED 2012a, x). This view was also shared by the 2013 “Evaluation of FAO’s Role in
Investment for Food and Nutrition Security, Agriculture and Rural Development,” led by
Roger Slade: “FAO headquarters’ work on global policy issues in FNSARD [Food and
Nutrition, Agriculture and Rural Development] is unequalled . . . and is used by govern-
ments in developing investment strategies” (FAO OED 2013, xxxvii). Anderson and his
team found that, globally, FAO has delivered—despite a large, complex, increasingly
uncertain, and multifaceted world of food and agriculture—and they highlighted several
key achievements, including the annual State of Food and Agriculture and State of Food
Insecurity reports, “global instruments (Voluntary Guidelines, International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources) and the effective servicing of a revitalized Committee on World
Food Security” (FAO OED 2012a, x).
FAO’s comparative advantage for country-level policy work is markedly less than that of
its global-level work, or in comparison with IFPRI, which has a larger presence at the
country level. Country visits by the evaluation team found that, although FAO does not
provide a leading role in policy support at the country level (even as FAO is very close to
governments), it is still:
. . . better suited than any other organization to help developing countries identify, adopt
and implement the policies that address hunger, poverty and sustainability. . . . because it
enjoys unmatched trust, access and ownership, as well as presence in all countries; and it
has technical knowledge in all fields of agriculture, livestock, forestry and fisheries that no
other organization has and it can play the role of a global knowledge broker. (FAO OED
2012a, xi).
The evaluation argued that the inadequacy of the country-level policy work was due to a
level of support for FAO in-country representation that was insufficient to allow engage-
ment in high-quality policy dialogue; to reliance on consultants who produce work of
uneven quality; to lack of organizational accountability and incentives to deliver policy
advice at country level; and to fragmented institutional arrangements for policy (also noted
in the IEE) (FAO OED 2012a).
One major strategy to combat the challenges at the country level has been to further
decentralize, so as to simplify processes and make FAO less hierarchical. Evaluation
findings indicated that FAO’s decentralization reform increased rather than decreased
FAO’s problems with delivering high-quality policy assistance at the country level. The
evaluation attributed this increase to the limitation of the decentralization recommendation
put forth by the IEE. The evaluation argues that the IEE should have recommended a way to
maintain quality control and technical supervision of the work in decentralized offices.
Following the 2007 IEE, FAO experts, from the various fragmented departments that were
responsible for policy work, prepared a paper to outline how they could improve country-
level policy work. The evaluation reported that management did not pay attention to issues
highlighted in this paper, and therefore, concluded that decentralization has a “strong
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potential for improving policy work if appropriate mechanisms to create accountability for
policy work are put in place” (FAO OED 2012a, 93).
Helping Developing Countries to Mobilize Additional Resources for
Investments in Agriculture
Help to developing countries is needed to mobilize resources from unconventional
sources—not just to prepare donor projects—such as from carbon financing and from
private sector and national and international philanthropies, and generally, to create an
investment-friendly, enabling environment in agriculture and related sectors, along the
lines described in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 on structural transformation. The new DG’s
“Hand-in-Hand” Initiative highlights this investment approach to connect the different
stakeholders involved—for example, the rich and the poor provinces in China—to promote
investments.³³ Linking up with IFAD in this initiative would be mutually beneficial.
FAO’s Investment Centre (TCI), established in 1964 to support World Bank investments
in agriculture, is mandated to support and serve the governments of member countries in
the preparation of agricultural investment projects. The two institutions agreed: “to co-
operate together in . . . assisting countries of common membership in the identification and
preparation of agricultural projects of types which fall within the framework of the
economic development objectives and general policies of the Bank and FAO and which
the Bank is willing to consider for financing . . . ” (FAO 1964 [1a]). The agreement provided
for FAO and World Bank to arrange for “technical assistance required for the implemen-
tation of Bank financed projects” (FAO 1964 [1d]). The result was the creation of one of
FAO’s largest divisions, TCI, which has seen its structure and functions evolve with time,
including the negotiation of several more Cooperative Agreements with other IFIs—though,
the one with the World Bank remains the largest by far.
If increasing investments in developing countries’ agriculture is critical, then FAO’s TCI
calls for a closer look. It has helped to design and implement over 2,000 investment
operations, valued at more than US$116 billion, across 170 countries, that have involved
some 95 international experts in various regions of the world. Working mainly in three-way
partnerships, TCI works with member countries and international financing institutions,
including the World Bank, but also IFAD and regional development banks. TCI also
partners with other national and international organizations, lending institutions, the
private sector, and producer organizations.³⁴
Over the years, other IFIs and some bilateral donors (partners) joined the Cooperative
Programme, which was originally established between FAO and the World Bank. For
example, FAO is one of 10 agencies through which countries can request GEF funds. TCI
coordinates FAO’s collaboration with both the GEF Secretariat and other GEF agencies. It
helps member countries identify, develop, and implement GEF-eligible projects. These
projects include co-financing from governments, collaborating agencies, bilateral donors,
IFIs, and FAO, including TCP. The TCI also supports implementation of CAADP, the
strategic agricultural framework of the African Union and New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD), by participating in the national roundtable process, by sharing
³³ See “Hand-in-Hand Initiative Creates a New Business Model for Partners to Work Together to End Poverty
and Hunger.” http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/1253626/icode/
³⁴ See FAO, Support to Investment: http://www.fao.org/support-to-investment/en/
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knowledge through studies and reports, and by facilitating donor coordination, especially
through its role in the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development (GDPRD) (FAO
OED 2013).
The IEE found that the TCI has contributed significantly to agricultural development
investments over the years in member countries. A majority of the stakeholders interviewed
for this evaluation noted that the product quality of what was formerly called Technical
Cooperation Investment, now called Programme Support (FAO 2014a), has been on par
with the quality of investment documents prepared by international financial organizations
or with those prepared by others for them. The IEE made a number of observations and
suggestions regarding FAO’s support for investment, of which not all were accepted by
management. These observations were reinforced by several subsequent studies and evalua-
tions. Since 2007, despite some changes, FAO’s and the Investment Centre Division’s
progress on the IEE’s and others’ priorities has been mixed. In 2018, US$6 billion of US
$7.2 billion total investments made by governments were World Bank-related. Most were
public sector investments. The Investment Center will need to develop capacity to mobilize
private sector resources (FAO 2019b).
Although Slade et al. in their 2013 “Evaluation of FAO’s Role in Investment for Food and
Nutrition Security, Agriculture and Rural Development,” confirmed FAO’s “unrivalled
advantage, the legacy of the skills and knowledge it commands” (FAO OED 2013, vi),
their major findings suggested that FAO needs to do a lot more to increase investments.
Among the actions FAO could take were: “expand support to investment, as demand for its
services outstrips supply, by relaxing binding budgetary constraints [and] move investment
work more effectively to the field where it can assist and guide member governments in
building the skills to do better for themselves” (FAO OED 2013, vi). For example, devel-
oping and implementing a clear and concise, results-based strategy for support to invest-
ment had not yet been accomplished. Nor had FAO leveraged its mandate and comparative
advantage to generate new and innovative partnerships (both internally and externally)
focused, especially on investment. This could be done through farmers and farming
enterprises, the public sector (governments, international and nongovernmental organiza-
tions, or official development assistance), and the private sector (domestic and foreign
philanthropic institutions and private companies). Each type of investment is different and
calls for a completely different strategy, with new and more inclusive development partner-
ships: for example, with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies and the International Cooperatives Alliance.³⁵ FAO also set up a multi-donor
trust fund to allow private sector companies to financially contribute to the organization’s
work and support FAO projects and programs (FAO 2013a), but this has had limited effect
and has rarely been implemented by FAO. FAO has detailed codes of conduct to ensure that
the interests of the food and chemical industries are assessed, administered by the Partner-
ships Division. A new Private Sector Strategy is under development, closely followed by a
newly appointed DDG, who had carried out a series of consultations with the private sector
(May–June 2020), signifying a new approach to interaction with all stakeholders in agri-
culture, livestock, and fisheries, and less focused on financial contributions but rather on
credible and tangible engagement. This is also intended to support a more proactive
³⁵ See “FAO Partners with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent”: https://www.ifrc.org/
en/news-and-media/press-releases/general/fao-partners-with-the-international-federation-of-red-cross-and-red-
crescent/
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“match-making” by FAO with private and public sector financial institutions to get needed
engagement and investment in place.
The “Evaluation of FAO’s Contribution to Inclusive and Efficient Agricultural and Food
Systems (SO4)” recommended:
Mechanisms and policies to partner with the private sector and IFIs should be reviewed so
that there are no unnecessary bottlenecks. There is a need for more practical and calibrated
approaches that recognise the wide spectrum of private sector profiles—from transna-
tional conglomerates down to district-level small enterprise associations. Accordingly,
there is merit in delegating decisions to decentralised levels to pursue limited, short-term,
localised opportunities which do not pose corporate reputation risks. The posting of
partnership officers in some regional offices is a positive step in this direction. (FAO
OED 2017a, 44)
Advocacy
While Roger Slade and his evaluation team reaffirmed FAO’s position as a highly regarded
knowledge organization and neutral global platform, they argued that FAO “has tended
to serve more as a trusted technical advisor than as a pro-active advocate” for food
security (FAO OED 2013, iii). Jock Anderson and his evaluation team were more
favorably disposed, indicating “areas where FAO was most active in advocacy” (FAO
OED 2012a, 43):
• food security (household and national) [also supported by the 2010 Water Evaluation],
• fisheries management, both inland and marine,
• forestry management,
• importance of the agricultural sectors in rural development and livelihoods,
• pesticides and pest management, and
• food safety and standards (FAO OED 2012a, 43)
Food Security
The 2012 policy evaluation also stated that FAO has provided “effective servicing of a
revitalized Committee on World Food Security” (FAO OED 2012a, x), which provides “an
opportunity for FAO to exercise global leadership on important policy issues, such as food
security” (FAO OED 2012a, 26).
The intergovernmental CFS was set up in 1974 to be a forum for review and to follow up
on food security policies with a vision to “strive for a world free from hunger where
countries implement the voluntary guidelines for the progressive realization of the right
to adequate food in the context of national food security” (FAO 2009c, 2). The permanent
secretariat is at FAO, and all three Rome-based food agencies fund and are members of the
secretariat. Food security was not explicitly mentioned in FAO’s original mandate in the
way that nutrition was; yet, food security is an expected outcome of all that FAO does (FAO
2012b). The IEE recognized that the World Food Summits (organized by FAO) are
considered milestones in the global fight against hunger and malnutrition. The two
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World Food Summits helped to keep the hunger on the global agenda, and the inclusion of
the term “hunger” in the first MDG is attributed to FAO’s leadership. Similarly, FAO’s
contribution is justifiably acknowledged for the inclusion of the role of agriculture in
NEPAD, including its leadership of the development of the CAADP proposals—subjects
that, by some accounts, were being overlooked or forgotten (FAO 2007a).
The 2011 “Evaluation of FAO’s Role and Work in Nutrition,” led by Nigel Nicholson,
reported that FAO’s technical assistance on policy, principally related to agriculture and
food security, its advocacy work on the Right to Food, and its technical assistance in support
of policies and legislation in food security and nutrition have been effective, particularly
across the Latin American and Caribbean region. The evaluation noted that its advocacy in
other regions has been less influential, but that this can be attributed to tensions between the
various international actors at the field level (FAO 2011b; FAO OED 2011).
Nutrition
Nutrition is enshrined in FAO’s Constitution, current SOs, and global goals and has always
been central to its mandate. Following the outcome of the IEE and the subsequent
Immediate Plan of Action (FAO 2007a, 2008a), FAO launched its Strategic Framework
2010–19, which acknowledged, “the main challenges facing food, agriculture and rural
development are the large and increasing number of undernourished in the world, the
prospect of rising inequality and problems of access to food by the most vulnerable
populations, and the increased scarcity of natural resources worsened by climate change”
(FAO 2009d, 3) and approved a vision for FAO: “a world free of hunger and malnutrition
where food and agriculture contributes to improving living standards of all, especially the
poorest, in an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable manner” (FAO
2009d, 14). Certainly, since the Global Nutrition Conference in 2014, FAO has increased
attention to nutrition. Lawrence Haddad, Executive Director of the Global Alliance for
Improved Nutrition (GAIN) and a World Food Prize winner and a former critic of FAO’s
limited advocacy of nutrition, in delivering the 2019 “Nutrition Inspiration Award” to
former FAO DG Graziano da Silva, praised his role on several counts, including the “global
zero hunger” campaign, inspired by his Brazilian experience, the introduction of the FIES
(FAO 2020c), FAO’s increased partnerships, and for holding FAO to account for its effort
(Haddad 2019).
However, the place and role of nutrition in the activities of FAO have varied, and in
recent years, it has been severely constrained by a declining budget that is “unacceptably low
in view of FAO’s mandate in nutrition” (FAO OED 2011, 13). During former DG Grazia-
no’s leadership, FAO certainly placed Zero Hunger front and center on the agenda.
Graziano’s Brazilian experience gave him an edge in moving beyond production to safety
nets, traditionally not FAO’s focus. FAO’s SOs contained objectives that came to the center
stage during 2012–19. The 2011 evaluation of FAO’s work in nutrition noted that FAO’s
global and national leadership in nutrition had declined, primarily because it was not
prioritized by senior management. Since that time, though, nutrition has been rising in
importance on international and national agendas. The evaluation confirmed the promi-
nence of nutrition concerns within FAO’s goals and the recognition of malnutrition as a
distinct issue, but argued that FAO’s analysis of nutrition, in terms of “under-nourishment”
embedded as a separate set of activities, creates a “silo” effect within the organization (FAO
OED 2011, 42). This effect had also been reported by the IEE (FAO 2007a).
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The IEE and OED’s “Evaluation of FAO’s Role and Work in Nutrition” also agreed that
there does not appear to be an integrated approach to nutrition across sectors (in particular,
linkages to agriculture and food security efforts and linkages between normative and field
work). The report notes, “a key role for FAO is to articulate the importance of linking
nutrition and agriculture” (FAO OED 2011, 17). Other SOs barely refer to nutrition, and
linkages between the field program and normative work in nutrition are weak. Conse-
quently, there is very little coordination across technical areas in relation to nutrition (FAO
OED 2011, 13). Nonetheless, a program of work has been maintained, and thin resources
are spread over a broad range of activities, principally in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
The 2011 evaluation of FAO’s work in nutrition, as previously noted, pointed to FAO’s
distinct advantages, but it also concluded, “FAO lacks the vision and corporate commitment
accorded to nutrition in its original mandate. Furthermore, it falls short of the expectations
of key stakeholders in addressing increased nutrition concerns worldwide from the per-
spective of agriculture and food-based intervention” (FAO OED 2011, 19). The evaluation
strongly recommended that FAO place nutrition high on its agenda and demonstrate how
its contribution can make a difference against global malnutrition, in order to keep its
relevance and influence in this important area (FAO OED 2011).
The “2012 Strategy and Vision for FAO’s Work in Nutrition,” published in response to
the “Evaluation of FAO’s Role and Work in Nutrition,” repositioned and prioritized FAO’s
work in nutrition and asserted FAO’s “leadership role in bringing stakeholders together, in
generating and communicating knowledge to build political commitment and guide ac-
tions, and in strengthening the capacities of governments and other implementing partners
to act effectively” (FAO 2012b, 2).
In recent years, FAO has carried out substantial work on nutrition strategy, vision, and
guidelines. “FAO’s Role in Nutrition” notes: “Emerging challenges, such as climate change,
environmental sustainability and rapid technological shifts, are transforming food systems
and raising questions about how to feed a growing world population in sustainable ways.”³⁶
The 2014 “Strategy and Vision for FAO’s Work in Nutrition” recognized the need for a
“holistic approach, bringing the potential of food and agricultural systems to bear on the
problem, joining with those working on health and care” to address malnutrition (FAO
2014b, 3). FAO’s unique role is one of sharing knowledge, bringing stakeholders in nutrition
together, and strengthening the capacity of countries to evaluate and monitor their nutrition
situations, and through working with partners, achieve the greatest impact. FAO provides
scientific advice to member countries and international organizations on nutrient require-
ments and recommendations,³⁷ and expertise and to support countries in collecting, and
disseminating information on diet and nutrition and nutrition assessment to evaluate
whether nutritional needs are being met.³⁸ Through its policies and programs, FAO
provides technical assistance to member states and partners to “create an enabling envi-
ronment for the eradication of hunger and all forms of malnutrition.”³⁹
Partners include the Scaling Up Nutrition movement (SUN), the Reach Partnership
(Ending Child Hunger and Undernutrition), the Global Panel on Agriculture and Food
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(NEPAD), UNICEF, WHO, WFP, IFAD, and the World Bank.⁴⁰ FAO’s Nutrition and Food
Systems Division (ESN) coordinates its work to protect, promote and improve sustainable
food systems, focusing on the link between agriculture and nutrition. Jointly with WHO’s
Nutrition Department, ESN leads the Technical Secretariat of the UN Decade of Action on
Nutrition 2016–25—a 10-year commitment by UN member states for implementation of
policies, programs, and increased investments to eliminate all forms of malnutrition.⁴¹
Resilience to Emergencies
Under its Strategic Objective 5, FAO has adopted a proactive approach to dealing with the
growing number of emergencies that the world faces from multiple sources: climate shocks,
economic shocks, conflict and-post conflict situations, and the growing influx of refugees,
by building resilience in countries, communities, and individuals. FAO defines resilience as
“The ability to prevent disasters and crises as well as to anticipate, absorb, accommodate or
recover from them in a timely, efficient and sustainable manner.”⁴²
Under its resilience agenda, FAO’s ambition is to act in seven areas:
• FAO helps countries develop and implement appropriate legal, policy and institutional
systems including, for example, food chain crisis management, disaster risk reduction and
management for the agricultural sectors and the Framework for Action for Food Security
and Nutrition in Protracted Crises.
• FAO builds national and local capacities to reduce the risks and impacts of natural and
climate hazards, food chain threats, conflicts and protracted crisis, to enhance the resil-
ience of agricultural livelihoods.
• FAO promotes knowledge, guidelines, standards and good practices of disaster and crisis
risk governance, risk monitoring and early warning, vulnerability reduction measures,
preparedness and response to shocks.
• FAO helps countries and communities to develop mechanisms for the collection,
analysis and dissemination of data to monitor, warn and act on crises risks and threats
to agriculture, food safety and food security and nutrition.
• FAO advocates and provides assistance to protect the livelihoods of vulnerable farmers,
herders, fishers and tree-dependent communities before, during and after emergencies.
• FAO builds and promotes partnerships and synergies with academic, UN, civil, and
private sector agencies to join forces for increasing resilience of agricultural livelihoods in
order to achieve sustainable development.
• FAO supports countries and regions to mobilise adequate resources for risk reduction
and crisis management, regular information and early warning, risk and vulnerability
reduction at community and household level and emergency preparedness and response
to disasters and crises. (FAO 2017d, 3)
⁴⁰ See http://www.fao.org/nutrition/policies-programmes/en/
⁴¹ See http://www.fao.org/economic/nutrition/en/; https://www.un.org/nutrition/
⁴² See http://www.fao.org/emergencies/how-we-work/resilience/en/
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This is a vast agenda that FAO conducts in three areas: food chain crises, natural hazards,
and violent conflicts and protracted crises. Natural hazards and related disasters include
floods, droughts, and earthquakes. Food chain threats are caused by transboundary plant
pests and diseases and animal diseases, as well as food safety threats, such as nuclear
contamination or avian flu. FAO establishes normative standards and technical guidelines,
and it covers all of FAO’s departments, ranging from Agriculture and Consumer Protection;
Climate, Biodiversity, Land and Water; Economic and Social Development; Fisheries and
Aquaculture, Forestry; and Technical Cooperation (FAO 2017d; 2018a; see, also, http://
www.fao.org/about/who-we-are/departments/en/).
Are international organizations and bilateral aid agencies translating the principles they
outline that were listed here? The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
initiative formed in 1986 to monitor food insecurity situation in eight East African countries
(Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda.)⁴³
provides an example.
The third annual “Global Report on Food Crises,” of the Food Security Information
Network (FSIN 2019b), with its regional focus on the member states of IGAD, marked
another major collaborative effort between agencies in the international humanitarian and
development community to share data, analysis, knowledge, and expertise regarding people
facing food crises. A reference document on the latest estimates of acute hunger in the
world, “it is a public good prepared collectively by 15 leading global and regional institu-
tions,” including, among others, FAO, WFP, USAID, FEWSNET, IFPRI, and UNICEF.⁴⁴
The crisis is a result of poor climate, economic problems, as in Sudan, and protracted
conflict and displacement. “Climate shocks, conflict and economic turbulence were the
main drivers of food insecurity” in the seven countries that constitute the IGAD region in
East Africa in 2018 (FSIN 2019b, 2). The precise reasons are different, however, even within
this microcosm. “Adverse climate was the primary driver in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and
Djibouti where . . . 11.9 million people were acutely food insecure. Prolonged dry conditions
and flash floods negatively affected pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihoods by damaging crop
production, pasture, browse, as well as limiting water sources for both domestic and
livestock usage” (FSIN 2019b, 2).
The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) of Ethiopia, which has been in existence
for 15 years, is intended to be a permanent safety net, operating both in the Highlands and
also the Lowlands, including Afar and Somali. The program underwent a substantial
evaluation by IFPRI in 2013, which noted that it does not work as well as it should in the
Lowlands (Knippenberg and Hoddinott 2017). This is and rightly ought to be the subject of
considerable interest and concern for both government and the development partners who
support the PSNP and are concerned about resilience. Design work on the fifth phase of the
program is starting now and strengthening implementation in Afar and Somali is a priority.
In contrast, IGAD report recommends instead a number of short-term initiatives to address
a series of successive food insecurity events (John Hoddinott, personal communication,
October 17, 2019).
The Food and Nutrition Security Resilience Programme (FNS-REPRO) of FAO, funded
by the Government of the Netherlands, is the first program in Eastern Africa designed
specifically to:
⁴³ See https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/igad-intergovernmental-authority-development
⁴⁴ See FSIN (2019a): http://www.fsinplatform.org/report/global-report-food-crisis-2019/
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. . . foster peace and food security at scale. The programme will employ a livelihood and
resilience-based approach in some of the least stable regions, where interventions are
normally exclusive of a humanitarian nature. Its design will allow FAO and partners to
set good examples of how to build food system resilience in protracted crises and
strengthen cooperation across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus towards this
end. (FAO 2019c)
In Chapter 8 on the World Bank in the section on the Berg Report, we show that the Bank’s
emergency assistance to the East African countries fortunately provided fast considerable
assistance to the countries in support of these emergencies, including to shore up the PSNP.
A recent IMF paper provides a sobering account of possibilities of dealing with emer-
gencies created just by temperature rise. The authors explored how “macroeconomic
policies, structural policies, and institutions can mitigate the negative relationship between
temperature shocks and output in countries with warm climates. Empirical evidence and
simulations . . . [Models] reveal that good policies [such as low public-debt-to-GDP, foreign
aid, and remittances] can help countries cope with negative weather shocks . . . ,” as policy
buffers in the short run (Mejia et al. 2019, 2).
The IMF economists assert that only curbing greenhouse gas emissions, to mitigate
further global warming, could have a long-lasting effect in limiting the adverse macroeco-
nomic consequences of weather shocks. They note, however, that none of the adaptive
policies they have considered “can fully eliminate the large aggregate output losses that
countries with hot climates experience due to rising temperatures” (Mejia et al. 2019, 2).
FAO’s work in emergencies, in the single area of climate change alone, is thus an uphill
task. It is funded almost exclusively from extrabudgetary resources, which are provided by
member countries and intergovernmental organizations, such as the European Union, IFIs,
or other UN agencies (FAO 2020a).
FAO is known for its contributions and impact on epidemic disease control, including
the near elimination of rinderpest and management of the highly pathogenic avian influ-
enza. FAO’s work in emergencies is almost exclusively funded from extra-budgetary
resources, provided by its member countries and intergovernmental organizations. In
2004, a Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities was established to
enhance FAO’s capacity to respond quickly to an emergency. These trust funds provide
FAO with the flexibility and financial resources to react to emergencies before additional
donor funding is secured. Contributions in 2012 slightly declined from US$400 million in
2011 to US$378 million, with the United States, the European Union, OCHA/Central
Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and the United Kingdom as the top contributors
(FAO 2020a). In general, FAO performs two roles with respect to emergencies and
rehabilitation: monitoring, coordinating, and implementing measures to counter epidemics
such as avian influenza; and assisting with immediate recovery from natural disasters or the
consequences of economic changes (price rises), involving agriculture, fisheries, or forestry
(FAO 2007b). FAO describes its emergency program in 2016:
In 2016, FAO’s emergency programme exceeded US$300 million, with contributions from
over 40 resource partners, including 22 FAO member countries and the European Union,
as well as numerous pool funding mechanisms such as the Central Emergency Response
Fund (CERF), and other UN Trust Funds at country level. FAO’s main resource partners
for emergency activities in 2016 were (in order of importance): the United States of
America, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the UN Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Japan,
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Germany, and UN trust funds at country level, of which the main one is The Common
Fund for Humanitarian Action in Sudan. (FAO 2020a)
The second role has become a major task for FAO, with strong financial support from
member states. This role comes with some consequences, however, as emergency response
is, by definition, a specific, focused response to a given situation, which may not necessarily
fall within the “sustainable” focus of FAO’s Strategic Programme Objectives, aligned as they
are to the SDG Agenda. The funds provided, furthermore, are not available for allocation to
FAO’s operations, which are focused on the organization’s current SOs—although this
situation is expected to change under the new DG. As such, the 2017 “Evaluation of FAO’s
Contribution to the Reduction of Rural Poverty through Strategic Programme 3” concluded,
“In spite of demonstrating the relevance and appropriateness of the SP3 approach, FAO has
not been very successful in mobilizing extra-budgetary resources for SP3 themes” (FAOOED
2017b, 3). The Evaluation recommends, “FAO should develop a customized resource mobi-
lization strategy that includes global, regional and country level dimensions and considers the
identification of new funding streams within donor institutions more relevant to SP3” (FAO
OED 2017b, 3). Table 9.6 shows FAO expenditures by the source of funds.









General and related funds:Regular Programme
expenditure versus budget of US$1,005.6
milliona
1,000.1 1,001.8 1.7 0.2
Jointly financed investment activities 35.5 38.5 3.0 8
Voluntary contributions and funds received
under inter-organizational arrangements
131.7 138.0 6.3 5
Government cash contributions and other
sundry income
21.4 20.4 (1.0) (5)
TCP, Capital Expenditure and Security
Expenditure Facility Adjustments
(28.6) (9.2) 19.4 (210)
Currency varianceb (30.7) (33.9) (3.2) 10
Otherc (20.6) (22.6) (2.0) 9
Subtotal 1,108.8 1,132.9 24.1 2.1
Trust Funds and UNDP
Trust Funds/UNDP (excluding emergency
projects)
770.7 816.6 45.8 6
Special relief operations (emergency projects) 616.8 661.8 45.0 7
Subtotal 1,387.5 1,478.4 90.8 6
Total expenditures 2,496.3 2,611.3 115.0 4
Notes:
a Regular Programme expenditure for 2016–17 excludes US$5.6 million funded from carry-over of unspent
balance of the 2014–15 appropriations authorized by the Conference Resolution 6/2015.
b Currency variance represents adjustments to the actual to reflect the translation of euro-denominated transac-
tions at the budget rate of exchange rather than the UN operational rate of exchange in effect at the date of the
transactions.
c Under the line “Other,” the main item represents US$21.5 million for health insurance premiums, which is
recorded as a reduction of After-service Medical Coverage (ASMC) liability for financial reporting.
Source: FAO (2019e, table 9, 99).
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The first case of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) was identified in Asia; other
cases followed in Europe and Africa. “FAO responded within weeks of the initial outbreaks
by implementing small regional and national TCP projects with its own funds while seeking
to raise [additional] donor funds” (FAO 2007b, 6). Meanwhile, FAO collaborated with the
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and WHO to develop technical strategies for
controlling the disease (FAO–OIE–WHO 2011). The Global Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza Programme became a major program for FAO, characterized by high exposure,
complex interagency coordination, management challenges, and large amounts of extra-
budgetary funding (FAO 2007b).
“The First Real-Time Evaluation of FAO’s Work on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
(HPAI),” in 2007, led by Anthony Wilsmore, recognized the importance of FAO in
addressing this emergency with the creation of the Special Fund for Emergency and
Rehabilitation Activities, the rapid mobilization of governments, and the presence of FAO
in isolated areas, where it was the first, and for some time, the only presence assisting
governments in their response to the outbreak or threat of avian influenza. These successes
were achieved within severe resource constraints (FAO 2007b).
CERF, an important contributor to FAO’s emergency activities, was created in December
2005, and launched in March 2006. CERF was established to support more timely and
reliable assistance to those affected by armed conflicts and natural disasters, through a grant
facility of up to US$450 million per year and a loan facility of approximately US$50 million.
This financial instrument provides FAO with early funding, allowing it to respond to the
most pressing needs shortly after a sudden-onset disaster or early enough during a slow-
onset disaster to be effective (FAO OED 2010c). FAO has been one of the largest recipients
of CERF grant funding (FAO OED 2010a). The 2010 “Evaluation of FAO Interventions
Funded by the CERF,” led by Olivier Cossée, looked at FAO emergency activities using this
grant funding and found that, for the most part, FAO in-country technical teams were
doing “excellent work” in their disaster response activities (FAO OED 2010a, 18). FAO, the
report found, provides “an important humanitarian contribution to communities affected
by crises by supporting their self-reliance and local food availability through time-critical
agricultural interventions” (FAO OED 2010a, 67). The report concluded, “The work of FAO
in support of both development and disaster risk management over many decades allowed
the Organization to forge strong links with perennial institutions and actors” (FAO OED
2010a, 67).
The main concern of the CERF evaluation team pertains to efficiency and timeliness,
particularly the slow information exchange between headquarters and the field and the
variable capacity of in-country staff implementing emergency projects. Although not
unique to FAO, the evaluation attributes these challenges to its information management
and decentralization architecture, which does not permit a rapid and flexible flow of
budgetary and implementation information from the field to headquarters (FAO OECD
2010a).
FAO’s strong capacity to deal with transboundary animal diseases (zoonosis and corona
viruses) is undisputed. In 2013, FAO quickly responded to the occurrence of the A(H7N9)
influenza virus in China. It monitored the situation through its wide network of country and
regional offices and key partners, including WHO and OIE (FAO 2013c). FAO and the OIE
Reference Center, the Harbin Veterinary Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of
Agricultural Sciences, led the laboratory analysis. The scientific community and FAO
experts in the Animal Production and Health Section of the Joint FAO/International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture
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worked to optimize diagnostic approaches to better detect this new strain of influenza virus.
They delivered much needed avian flu detection training courses “to contribute to the early
detection of this virus and early reaction capabilities in Member States.” FAO organized
training for multiple sets of countries from Asia (IAEA 2013).
The FAO Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (ECTAD) plans and
delivers veterinary assistance to FAO member countries that are responding to transbound-
ary animal health threats.⁴⁵ By building animal capacity, ECTAD works to respond to
animal disease outbreaks at the source and prevent their spread. ECTAD teams facilitate the
Global Health Security Agenda and Emerging Pandemic Threats, two USAID-funded
programs.
Locusts (a collection of certain species of short-horned grasshoppers) are an important
source of food chain crises in many parts of the world. Heavy rains and cyclones triggered a
surge in Desert Locust populations, causing an outbreak to develop in Sudan and Eritrea,
rapidly spreading along both sides of the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, FAO warned
in February 2019. FAO operates a centralized Desert Locust Information Service (DLIS),
monitoring the Desert Locust situation throughout the world, providing information on the
general locust situation to the global community, and gives timely warnings and forecasts to
countries in danger of invasion A locust plague threatened the livelihoods of 13 million
people in Madagascar. In March 2013, FAO called for US$41 million of donations to fight
locusts. Under the proposed aid plan, US$22 million would be delivered by June for pest
control efforts, and US$19 million were devoted to a three-year plan to keep the insect in
check. The FAO plan called for large-scale aerial operations to spray pesticides over 1.5
million hectares (3.7 million acres) of land from 2013 to 2014.⁴⁶
Forestry
The promotion of the sustainable management of forests and trees has been part of FAO’s
mission since its founding in 1945, when it was mandated to sustain forest timber values to
ensure “continuous productivity of existing forests” (FAO OED 2012b, x). The 2007 IEE
report said, “no other global organization matches FAO’s comprehensive mandate for food,
agriculture, forestry and fisheries, including the production and provisioning of such a
broad range of global goods and services” (FAO 2007a, 21). The OED “Evaluation of FAO’s
Role in Investment for Food and Nutrition Security, Agriculture and Rural Development,”
said FAO’s “Forestry Department’s understanding of forest governance, institutions and
forest management in different countries is often crucial for investment decisions” (FAO
OED 2013, xxxvi).
In the 2012 “Strategic Evaluation of FAO’s Role and Work in Forestry,” team leader
Jürgen Blaser noted that FAO is renowned globally for its combination of technical
knowledge in forests and forestry and a visible role as a “steward of the world’s forests”
(FAO OED 2012b, xi). The evaluation reported that FAO is “visible” within the interna-
tional forestry sector, “relevant” in its forestry activities (work related to supporting forest
governance reform, tenure reform, national forest policy and program development, and
supporting capacity building for relevant institutions), and known as a “timely,”
⁴⁵ See http://www.fao.org/emergencies/fao-in-action/ectad/en/
⁴⁶ See http://www.fao.org/emergencies/crisis/madagascar-locust/en/
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“extensive,” and “effective” generator and disseminator of statistics on the state of forest
resources and forest products (FAO OED 2012b, xi–xii).
The evaluation argued that FAO’s comparative advantages—as an impartial global leader
in forestry, as well as a source for technical expertise in forest resource assessment and
monitoring, global forest-related information services, forest sector policies and planning,
and some aspects of forest resources management—can secure its position as the interna-
tional leader in forestry contributions to food security and poverty reduction. As in other
areas of FAO’s work, however, the evaluation found that FAO faces competition from new
entities in the field who can now offer similar services in places where FAO was once the
sole provider. The emergence of two CGIAR centers, the World Agroforestry Center and
Center for International Forestry Research, as well as the GEF, the International Tropical
Timber Organization, United Nations Forum on Forests, International Union for the
Conservation of Nature, World Wildlife Fund, Conservation International, and UNEP
have fragmented the global forestry agenda (FAO 2007a; Lele, Zasueta, and Singer 2010).
There are now many other entities that can do the same activities as FAO, and yet, the FAO
OED report argued that there is “more need than ever for an impartial global leader looking
at forests and forestry in a holistic sense, linking global, regional and national levels and
relating forests and forestry to other land use sectors” (FAOOED 2012b, xiv). In this regard,
FAO is well positioned and could once again become an international leader in forestry,
given its ability to provide a neutral platform and to meet the cross-sectoral needs related to
forestry contributions to watersheds, food security, poverty reduction, and climate change,
as well as its expertise and capacity to deal with technical issues in forestry and other
activities related to land and natural resources.
Now in its third phase of collaboration, FAO’s Forestry Department, together with the
EU–FAO Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) program, and the UN
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Counties
(REDD+) program partnered, in 2003, to start an initiative that aims to identify linkages
and opportunities for synergies between their respective processes. To facilitate coordina-
tion, the initiative also aims to support the integration of REDD+ and FLEGT activities into
national forest planning processes. Although these processes have specific objectives, they
have similar activities. In particular, both processes aim to strengthen forest governance
through work with policy, legislative, and institutional frameworks, and to implement
activities at national and subnational levels.⁴⁷
Water
The third Global Goal of the FAO Strategic Framework 2000–15 was “the conservation,
improvement and sustainable utilization of natural resources, including land, water, forest,
fisheries and genetic resources for food and agriculture” (FAO 1999).
The Climate, Biodiversity, Land and Water Department has gone through a considerable
evolution over the past 20 years from the department of natural resources, and for a time
when there was no department at all, to now when climate is included in the title. It will de-
emphasize and realign work on the water footprint of food loss and waste in food value
⁴⁷ See the UN–REDD Programme site: http://www.un-redd.org/and the FAO–EU FLEGT Programme site:
http://www.fao.org/forestry/eu-flegt/en/
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chains, following the completion of the study on the methodologies to quantify the water
embedded in food products that are lost or wasted in the food value chain. The follow-up
will be handed over to partners with higher comparative advantages for such analysis.
FAO’s water-related work will concentrate on increasing and improving water productivity
in agriculture and food systems, water accounting and auditing, water quality and food
safety, water governance, and the interlinkages of water and other sectors, including the
nexus approach. The SF includes water scarcity, pollution, salinization, and integrated
natural resources management within the old Strategic Objective D1: Integrated manage-
ment of land, water, fisheries, forest, and genetic resources. FAO’s work related to water is
anchored in the Water Development and Management Unit, part of the Division of Land
and Water in the Natural Resources Department. Like food security, policy, and forestry,
water is also an important aspect of the work of at least eleven other units (FAO OED
2010b).
In 2017, FAO established a portal for water monitoring, developing:
WaPOR, a publicly accessible near real time database using satellite data that will allow
monitoring of agricultural water productivity. The beta release of WaPOR was launched
on April 20, 2017. Based on the methodology review process, a new version WaPOR 1.0
became available in June 2018, focusing first on the coarser resolution level (Level 1),
covering the whole of Africa and the Near East at 250 m ground resolution and then the
national / river basin (Level 2) at 100 m resolution. (FAO 2020d)
FAO’s committees have repeatedly emphasized the importance of water use and manage-
ment for sustainable agriculture, forest, and food security efforts. “Over the last decade,
FAO’s Governing Bodies have frequently discussed issues related to water in agriculture,
given its paramount importance” (FAO OED 2010b, viii). In 2003, the Committee on
Forestry highlighted the forest and water theme. In 2007, COAG discussed a proposal on
“Agriculture and Water Scarcity” and welcomed “the proposal for a multidisciplinary
integrated framework to address water scarcity” (FAO 2007d, 1). The Committee on
World Food Security also repeatedly stressed that FAO should pay particular attention to
water scarcity and drought, and the IEE concluded that FAO was in a weak position in the
water sector (FAO 2007a, CFS 2015). The IEE commissioned a background working paper
onWater Management and Irrigation. The IEE’s core recommendation for water focuses on
the need for “significant realignment of existing resources together with the securing of new
ones, both human and financial,” as well as a “different strategic approach that would enable
[FAO] to contribute to integrated policies and programmes which bring together engineer-
ing, tenure, economics, management and legislation” (FAO 2007a, 158). The findings of the
IEE triggered a complex reform process that was supported by, among others, the under-
taking of an “Evaluation of FAO’s Role andWork Related toWater,” led by Andrew Bullock
(FAO OED 2010b). FAO has moved toward exploiting remote sensing data to map water
productivity (FAO 2020d). Meanwhile, Google Earth is offering Evapotranspiration (ET)
maps.⁴⁸ So, things are moving along, and new technology is replacing AQUASTAT, which
was what water experts had hoped, in supporting the water prize for AQUASTAT.
Bullock and his team found that, at the global level, FAO’s work related to water since
2004 has been relevant to the Global Goals and MDGs, but limited at the country level, due
⁴⁸ See https://eeflux-level1.appspot.com
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to both resource constraints and the absence of an institutional framework for intervention.
The evaluation said that FAO “has a clearly defined role in water and agriculture and related
issues of global relevance,” (FAO OED 2010b, x) and that it has contributed to raising the
profile of agriculture in the international debate on water through active participation in
international forums, such as the World Water Forum and UN–Water, and is recognized
for its good work in maintaining the AQUASTAT global database. Water professionals, on
the other hand, were concerned that FAO was underfinancing AQUASTAT.
Some have expressed concern about the quality of the database, but AQUASTAT has
been frequently nominated and shortlisted for the World Water Award (Chris Perry,
personal communication).The evaluation reported that FAO’s work in water is “unique
and recognised as such” and that FAO’s services in the water sector are in high demand
“as the Organization is recognized as a reliable source of information, technical advice
and support” (FAO OED 2010b, x). Positive results are also reported at the normative
level in publications and training materials, the interface between freshwater manage-
ment and aquaculture, and watershed management. Similarly, in policy and legal advice
in support of water policies and strategies, FAO has reportedly been valuable. The
evaluation also said that FAO is “appreciated by partners and participating countries”
(FAO OED 2010b, xi).
The evaluation points out that the membership of FAO is diverse, its needs and
expectations complex, and the organization’s contribution at the country level has
been “less than fully coherent and coordinated” (FAO OED 2010b, x). This is attributed
to its complexity and the fact that it cuts across sectors and ministries, including
agriculture, water resources, irrigation, energy, environment, forest and watershed man-
agement, health, and municipalities. Although the IEE found that FAO “lost its overall
leadership role” (FAO 2007a, 119) in water, the 2010 OED evaluation concluded that
FAO is still “clearly the lead institution within the United Nations system on water in the
context of food and agriculture” (FAO OED 2010b, x) (see Box A.9.1 for additional
evaluations of FAO).
Implications for the Future
Transforming FAO is a tough but an important task, and under the new leadership of DG
Qu Dongyu, this has already begun. FAO members should provide the strategic guidance
and human and financial resources needed to achieve the improvements intended to serve
the organizational mission and strategy. This will be a central dialogue as the new SF is
reviewed by FAO Council in December 2020, and approved by the FAO Conference in June
2021. Despite improvements in FAO and articulation of a vision and a strategy, there has
been no real increase in the regular budget, with funds increasingly provided as additional
voluntary contributions, often for emergency assistance. Member countries have approved
only a nominal increase, which compares well with the UN’s zero growth. FAO’s current,
regular budget expenditures include 75 percent in staff-related costs. It is difficult to assess if
this is ratio is appropriate in a knowledge organization. It is not so much the ratio as the
fragmentation and unpredictability of voluntary contributions that makes its use less
efficient than it could be.
With an emphasis on SDG monitoring, FAO faces an expanded agenda and growing
competition from international agencies, initiatives, and emerging partnerships. Its
strengths are its legitimacy, access to global data, and knowledge base; and it is highly
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valued by its partners. Its long-term prospects, however, depend on its ability to remain
relevant with qualified, effective staff.
High-level evaluations confirm that FAO is more trusted by developing countries than
IFIs, for its neutrality and for the perception of an absence of any agenda of its own. FAO’s
substantial convening power (McCalla 2007b) and access to global knowledge and expertise,
combined with its ability to produce or mobilize global and regional databases in key areas
of food, agriculture, and natural resources are important assets. FAO also boasts a highly
committed and internationally well-known staff with specialized expertise in agriculture,
forestry, fisheries, international law, and soils that does not exist in other global or regional
institutions. It needs to communicate better and promote its expertise. Notwithstanding all
these assets, for a variety of external and internal reasons, FAO’s performance is less than
the vision of its founders, its potential, or that demanded by the contemporary challenges of
the global food, agriculture, and natural resource system. FAO was expected to work toward
its mandate; when it was founded, the circumstances were very different than the way the
external and the internal environment has evolved (Lele 2007).
Building FAO as a Center of Scientific and Evidence-Based Excellence
We end this chapter by making a case for why FAO needs to be a center of excellence.
In the 2007 report “FAO and the International Financial Institutions: TheWorld Bank and
the Regional Development Banks,” by Alex McCalla and his collaborator David Nielson, a
Senior Economist from the World Bank, now retired, had asserted that in marketing itself to
the world, FAO should strive to be an esteemed knowledge bank in rural development with
multiple centers of excellence within it. Observations that McCalla made are even more
relevant in 2020 than they were in 2007. Not only have the demands on food and agriculture
increased and become more complex, but the technical capacity within international organi-
zations and bilateral organizations to help developing countries develop agriculture sustain-
ably and equitably has declined even further compared to 2007. McCalla noted:
Development agencies are doing less themselves and relying more on others. Rural staff of
the bilateral and multilateral development agencies have much in common with the
interests of the staff of the Investment Centre, but the focus of their working environment
is increasingly on managing the instruments of financial support. Less and less staff time is
available to engage in the underlying sectoral issues and processes. Technical gravitas
within the development agencies is becoming startlingly scarce. (McCalla 2007a, Annex
2, 22)
However, as a 2017 evaluation of FAO’s contribution to SO4 noted:
Main external partners for TCI are the World Bank, IFAD, EBRD, the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The 2013
Evaluation of FAO’s Role in Investment for Food and Nutrition Security, Agriculture and
Rural Development [FAO OED 2013] noted important limitations of TCI to find partners
beyond its current ones, particularly the difficulties in working with ADB [Asian Devel-
opment Bank], AfDB, and EIB [European Investment Bank], mainly due to the need for
regular tendering processes with the latter, while this is not necessary for the other IFIs.
(FAO 2017b, 37)
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And, indeed, such partnerships between FAO and IFC, and FAO and GEF have been well
underway.
Some commentators inside FAO have disagreed with this characterization of FAO by its
own OED.
Yet, there is a need for developing countries to mobilize investment resources beyond
technical assistance and beyond investment of traditional donors FAO serves. Except for
LICs, developing countries are now the major investors in agriculture and related sectors.
They are similarly mobilizing private sector funding. International expertise is needed not
just to prepare donor-aided projects but to help shape countries’ own investment strategies
for environmentally resilient and human health-sensitive agriculture.
In this regard, David Nielson, a veteran World Bank staff member who McCalla had
interviewed in the course of IEE, and later by Lele in the course of this FAO study, had
complimentary observations to make, based on his firsthand experience about the Invest-
ment Centre and its considerable potential going forward:
The Investment Centre has an enormous (still not fully realized) potential to contribute to
rural development initiatives throughout the world. . . .When the Investment Centre is at
its best, the competition cannot really compete. Private sector consultants do not offer the
same access to a critical mass of technical and conceptual support. Academics do not
usually enjoy the same degree of familiarity with the development agencies and the
programs they support in the field. In-country experts in client countries often do not
possess the same degree of exposure to global developments, and cannot claim the same
degree of objectivity for assignments in their own countries as can the staff of the
Investment Centre. (McCalla 2007a, annex 2, 20, 21–2)
Nielson, who has collaborated with TCI many times, highlighted successful World Bank–
FAO collaboration projects in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Uganda: “We mention these
specific initiatives because they illustrate the potential of the [core staffing of the entire FAO
(as financed by the assessed contributions), including but not confined to the] Investment
Centre” (McCalla 2007a, annex 2, 21).
Other areas of FAO have played similar roles, and they are pushing envelopes. A recent
example is the guideline for responsible private investments using sustainable practices
developed by FAO and OECD and promoted through the CFS.
As we have described in this chapter, FAO is the center of expertise on all matters
concerned with food and agriculture, the only international organization charged with such
responsibility. FAO plays a critical role in helping Member States to design and implement
food systems in the broader context of rural development (in agricultural services, rural
finance, irrigation, natural resource management, among others), with the aim of helping
governments and development institutions by providing guidance and assistance in the
field, as they design and implement transformative approaches to mitigating climate change
and promoting healthy food systems. This entails creating an institutional culture as a
knowledge bank. The evidence reviewed in this chapter and FAO’s various evaluations
suggest that this process has been well underway in FAO, but that it needs to be further
supported and strengthened in view of the evidence we have provided. FAO’s staffing and
hiring may be driven less by search for excellence than by concern for diversity. Its ability to
assist countries is fostered by energetic entrepreneurial field staff, who can mobilize
resources working with donors and governments at the country level. It shows:
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• Systematic internal discussions and reviews (by colleagues from FAO and from partner
organizations) of staff outputs stimulate joint thinking and establish a culture of
accountability for quality, both internally and for external clients.
• Building on the work of the SF to establish communities of practice within FAO can
and do establish strategic areas (such as agricultural services, land tenure, rural finance,
water, and natural resource management, among others), which would create syner-
gies among the technical expertise that exists in the rest of FAO, thereby increasing its
technical expertise.
• Enhancing the integrative skills and the intellectual leadership of FAO staff through
aggressive and strategic staffing, and investing in the development of the staff.
Arguments in favor of this approach include:
• As proposed investments in agriculture increase, so will demand for a broad skills mix.
• Most international organizations and bilateral donors have lost technical capacity—the
World Bank, for example, may now have only 200 staff in the agriculture network, half
of them short-term consultants, compared to 495 in the 1990s, and FAO, too, has lost
technical capacity—all need a center from which they can borrow it.
• Project complexity and processing requirements have increased, leaving little time for
those who manage projects to think and address substantive issues.
• Continuity is needed, rather than simply reliance on employment of short-term
consultants with little institutional memory.
• The aspiration of the World Bank and regional banks aspire to deal with climate
change, to scale up successful programs by governments, and link farmers to markets.
It calls for going beyond project investments to country strategies.
• The need for multidisciplinary expertise has increased at all levels.
• University academics bring to bear analytical skills, but they need complementary
operational skills to meet the operational challenges, and bilateral donors have lost
capacity, too.
• FAO has long-standing experience in preparing investment projects for the World
Bank and the regional banks. Of the US$7.2 billion of investment projects in 45
countries in 2018, US$6 billion were World Bank projects in 30 countries (FAO
2019b).
• In some areas—such as participatory water management, water users’ associations,
gender, and FFSs—FAO has been ahead of the curve.
• In other areas, it would be worth conducting surveys of developing countries and
international organizations to assess demand for technical skills.
• Rather than duplicating efforts, international organizations could determine demand
and skill mix needs collectively, to ensure that FAO assembles and supplies skills that
are needed.
• FAO recruits people of the highest caliber, regardless of their nationalities. The de facto
quota system makes recruitment difficult, and FAO’s salaries may not attract top-
notch professionals if the external audits have validity.
• In such areas as participatory forest management, value chains, and nutrition, there is
no reason why FAO could not or should not be able to recruit people and build top
notch capacity.
• FAO has instituted new staff training, coaching, and performance assessment pro-
cesses using external consultants.
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CGIAR
Uma Lele and Sambuddha Goswami
Summary and Implications Going Forward
CGIAR is by far the most complex of the five organizations that we have reviewed in this
book.¹ Uncertain year-to-year funding and lack of growth in funding since 2014 have
challenged CGIAR’s continued ability to contribute to Sustainable Development Goal 2
(SDG2). Successive waves of reforms, detailed in this chapter, have responded to the need to
broaden the research agenda on food security by incorporating the growing complexity of
CGIAR’s agenda: poverty reduction, food security, nutrition, gender equity, environmental
concerns about climate change, and pressure on natural resources threatening yield growth
and production stability, concurrently with the need to promote diversification of produc-
tion by explicitly incorporating biodiversity in the farming systems to increase their
resilience to climate change and resource pressures. This means incorporation of legumes,
agroforestry, livestock, fisheries, fruits, vegetables, and nuts. This agenda has been recently
described by international organizations as broadly encompassing sustainable food systems.
Diversification of farming systems implies it is an effective way to address the triple burden
of hunger, micronutrient deficiencies, and obesity. The growing complexity of the research,
however, has to be achieved in the face of the growing gap in the funding of public sector
research and development (R&D). Public funding of research has had high rates of return,
but funding shortages are occurring, despite this evidence, and even in the face of the
reversal of the long-term trend in hunger reduction demonstrated elsewhere in this book.
The need to increase productivity while building the resilience of agriculture is urgent.
Diversified integrated farming systems are needed to improve environmental and human
health and to curtail excessive reliance for the food security of the poor on a handful of
cereals, such as wheat, rice, maize, and root crops.
CGIAR is based on voluntary funding, but CGIAR’s mission is complex, scientific, and
long-term, conducting research to develop technologies for small farmers to increase their
productivity and manage their resources sustainably. It takes between 5 and 25 years to
deliver technologies and show results at scale. Historically, CGIAR has engaged in capacity
building with developing countries’ national agricultural research systems (NARS), while
also focusing CGIAR research on essential global and regional public goods—that is,
research with a long time horizon, research with substantial spillovers, yet research on the
problems of poor farmers with limited scope to achieve scaled-up demand for inputs or
services relatively quickly. Somewhere along the way, however, this model of global and
regional public goods, through CGIAR and NARS conducting applied and adaptive
¹ Uma Lele was on the founding board of the Center for International Forestry Research, a member of the
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), and a leader of CGIAR’s meta-review, titled “CGIAR at 31,” carried out by
the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group.
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research, has fallen apart. With the exceptions of China and Brazil, developing countries are
not investing, and donors are not financing sufficient resources in their own R&D systems,
with the result that CGIAR has moved downstream to carry out activities that NARS should
do. We suggest some remedies in this chapter.
Many countries are off track in achieving SDG2 and related targets, and only 10 years
are left to reach the goal by 2030. Hence, there is a particular urgency in CGIAR fulfilling
its promise.
Using a historical approach, this chapter explains how CGIAR’s mission has grown over
time, based on changing donor support and expectations, while funding has stagnated. To
meet SDG2 targets among small and marginal farmers, CGIAR has established the target of
US$2 billion annual funding in nominal terms by 2030, as part of its recent reforms. If
realized, it will slightly more than double and stabilize research funding. Increased funding
and its certainty will reduce the distraction of valuable staff time by fundraising activities,
curtail inter-Center competition, and allow researchers to focus on research and its impact,
engaging actively in outreach, as they have done in the past.
CGIAR’s latest reorganization, known as “One CGIAR,” is a major restructuring, de-
scribed in this chapter against the background of history of reforms. It is also responding to
the funding challenges creatively. The proof will be in increased funding support under this
new reorganized structure. The System Board, newly named after “unified governance”
became effective on October 1, 2020, and replaces the old System Management Board
(SMB). It is a self-governing mechanism of the System and Centers, intended to work better
under the troika of managing directors that report to the unified System Board. In addition,
inter-Center research collaborations have been occurring through bottom-up Center-driven
efforts, with benefits of lower operational costs and better ability to improve the quality of
research through skill mixes. CGIAR has focused on crop research on cereals, roots, and
tubers; livestock; trees; land and water management; and policy research. Still, new strategic
partnerships are needed, including with the private sector and civil society, to promote
faster diversification of healthy food production and diversified diets through agricultural
value chains that do no harm, and by greater focus on land and water management. Greater
focus on diet diversification also requires greater engagement with women in production,
food processing, and in consumer awareness and with civil society. We review the history of
CGIAR’s new gender platform, as a positive development.
Partnerships with advanced country institutions have strengthened, as well as those
with developed countries. Partnerships with developing countries were the foundation of
CGIAR’s success during the Green Revolution, but over time, they have weakened in part
due to a shortage of resources and a growing research agenda. Stronger partnerships are also
needed with the private sector. The increasing involvement of private foundations, such as
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), provides CGIAR with opportunities to
achieve transformative change. Nevertheless, CGIAR needs to open up its System to new
funding sources, and with the private sector and to qualified researchers, whether inside or
outside the CGIAR System, to lead research programs to accelerate the delivery of technol-
ogies, thereby creating competition and enhancing the quality of research and outreach.
Developing countries, the intended beneficiaries of CGIAR’s research, still lack sufficient
voice, a phenomenon that is not unique to CGIAR, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 on
global governance. Stronger and more responsible voice for developing countries will
increase their sense of ownership and the effectiveness of CGIAR. The chapter makes a
case for the uses of the International Development Association (IDA) and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to substantially increase investments in
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R&D among World Bank borrowers as well—in the case of IDA, to increase core contribu-
tions to CGIAR.
Introduction
Organizational and cultural change is key to keeping up with the disruptive changes
underway in the global environment. Change is never easy in complex organizations with
growing agendas and competing interests, posing inevitable collective action challenges, as
we have discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 on global governance. CGIAR has been undergoing
considerable change since its establishment and, particularly, since the beginning of the new
millennium and will likely have changed further by the time this study emerges. It is an
organization based entirely on voluntary finance, like the World Food Programme (WFP).
There are key differences between CGIAR and WFP, however. WFP’s mission to provide
emergency assistance to populations in urgent need of food is easily understood and
appealing to donors, and the link between its operations and outcomes are direct and
easy to see for its financiers in a relatively short time, although measuring impacts of WFP’s
activities has been a challenge (Brück et al. 2018). In contrast, whereas CGIAR’s research
has had an extraordinary impact—documented once again in a recent, exhaustive study of
returns to research by Alston, Pardey, and Rao (2020), that with a benefit–cost ratio (BCR)
of 10:1, CGIAR’s research is a long-term endeavor. Earlier, Pardey and Beintema (2001) had
described agricultural research and development (AgR&D) as “slow magic.” It takes at least
5–20 years from the inception of research to demonstrate results on the ground, because
there are many intervening factors between research and final outcomes, over which
CGIAR has no control. Research, by its nature, is uncertain and usually nonlinear. Although
extraordinary scientific advances are speeding up the research process, to deploy new
scientific methods requires engagement in complex partnerships. Engaging in meaningful
enduring partnerships involves issues of intellectual property and resolutions of attribution.
For that reason, this chapter is more than about CGIAR’s research impact. It is about the
political economy of foreign aid, in a context in which the giving of aid is increasingly driven
by short-term pressures to show development impacts rather than by expertise, with
understanding of what it takes to achieve those impacts.
A recent report of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO),
The State of the World’s Biodiversity for Food and Agriculture, noted that only nine crops
produce two-thirds of the world’s food supply,² and biodiversity has declined, in part, due to
the success of CGIAR’s research (FAO 2019). Such concentration of the world’s food supply
in a few crops is a high-risk strategy. Yet, the long gestation lags in conducting research is
also inconsistent with short-term funding and increasing donor demand for results, includ-
ing how the results are generated and what activities donors are willing to finance. The
number of actors in CGIAR has grown, and successive reforms have been intended to make
CGIAR more attuned to changing times and more effective in delivering on its declared
mission. The mission, too, has evolved—to fit the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
and the Paris Accord on Climate Change (see Table A.10.1 in the Appendix). CGIAR’s
latest mission and multiple internal and external stakeholders are listed in Box 10.1.
² Sugarcane, maize, rice, wheat, potatoes, soybeans, oil palm fruit, sugar beet, and cassava.
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Have the changes in CGIAR been the right ones, and enough in the context of a rapidly
changing external environment? How do we know if they have “worked”? If these were easy
questions to answer, they would have already been tackled. One relatively unambiguous
indicator of success is when introduced changes pass the test of time. The more difficult task
is to assess change in terms of its effectiveness, using different criteria: for example, the
ability to mobilize other partners with special assets and additional funding, to achieve
scientific excellence, and to be primed for larger impacts on the lives of the intended
beneficiaries in terms of scale and scope.
Box 10.1 CGIAR’s Vision, Mission, and Internal and External
Stakeholders
CGIAR’s Vision
“A world free of poverty, hunger and environmental degradation” (CGIAR 2017f).
As part of its latest (2019–20) reforms, CGIAR adopted a new mission:
1. Ending hunger by 2030—through science to transform food, land and water
systems in a climate crisis (CGIAR 2019e, 4).
2. “We work to advance agricultural science and innovation to enable poor people,
especially women, to better nourish their families, and improve productivity and resil-
ience so they can share in economic growth and manage natural resources in the face of
climate change and other challenges.”a
CGIAR stakeholders include management of the System-wide CGIAR research pro-
grams (CRPs), management and staff of the Centers, 15 until 2020, some of which are in
the process of formal or informal alliances, their boards of CRPs and Centers and
oversight bodies (Independent Science and Partnership Council [ISPC, renamed the
Independent Science for Development Council or ISDC]; Independent Evaluation
Arrangement [IEA]; Standing Panel on Impact Assessment [SPIA]); and CGIAR man-
agement and governance at the System level (System Council and System Management
Board and Office). Two pairs of the Center—that is, four of the 15 Centers—recently
merged/aligned into formal or informal cooperation, and others are in dialogue about
closer cooperation. The International Center for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF) and
the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) are formally aligned, merging
officially on January 1, 2019, albeit with only one Director-General (DG) and one board
each yet (CIFOR 2019), whereas the International Center for Tropical Agriculture
(CIAT) and Bioversity International signed a Memorandum of Understanding in
November 2018 to form an alliance and since both DGs were leaving, the two Boards
appointed Juan Lucas Restrepo to become Bioversity International’s DG and the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) Designate of the Alliance (CIAT 2018). The International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) and AfricaRice (the Africa Rice Center) are similarly in
dialogue about closer cooperation (CGIAR 2018a). Other related CGIAR actors include
the Global Forum on Agricultural Research and Innovation, donors and international
organizations that support CGIAR through financial support and perform other func-
tions such as trusteeship, developing countries, the private sector, civil society, the
scientific community, and producers and consumers of food.
a See “CGIAR: How We Work: Strategy”: http://www.cgiar.org/how-we-work/strategy
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The CGIAR story should be seen in the context of its extraordinary contribution to the
Green Revolution and subsequently to the spread of new technologies through crop
improvement and other technologies and policies, documented later in this chapter.
However, rapid population growth, urbanization, changing diets, slow economic transfor-
mation, climate change, soil degradation, water shortages, growing obesity, and the need to
create youth employment, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia (SA),
pose new challenges, as we discussed in earlier chapters.
There are also other global trends. Despite substantial accumulated evidence on very high
internal rates of return on investments, public R&D spending in developed and developing
countries (with the exceptions of China, Brazil, and India) has slowed (Hurley et al. 2016).
Beintema and Echeverría (2020) also showed current slowing trends in public sector
research, but most of the growth in global agricultural research spending (excluding the
private for-profit sector) from US$31 to US$47 billion during 2000–16 occurred during
2000–10, and in middle-income countries (MICs). China accounted for about half of the
increase. Combined with growth in other large MICs—their share in global research
expanded from 40 to 59 percent of the global total. In sharp contrast to the growth in
public investment in MICs, however, agricultural research has slowed in the United States
and Europe. It was 0.7 percent during 2000–10, and 0.8 percent during 2010–16. Further-
more, 122 countries out of the sample of 179 countries invested less than US$100 million in
agricultural research in 2016, and 52 of these spent less than US$10 million. The five top-
ranked countries were China (US$8 billion), the United States (US$5 billion), India (US$4
billion), Brazil (US$3 billion), and Japan (US$3 billion). Yet, underinvestment, while
significant in developed countries, is particularly prevalent among countries with small-
and medium-sized research systems. Countries with both small research systems and low
potential to increase their investment in agricultural research will need to adopt alternative
strategies—such as collaboration with countries and regions that share mutual research
needs and goals—in order to acquire the knowledge and technologies they need to achieve
agricultural development and growth in the coming decades. We will return to the implica-
tions of these findings at the end of this chapter.
There is increased reliance on private sector research in developed countries. Part of the
reason for decline in public sector research in the United States, for example, is the
assumption that the private sector will investment more. Fuglie (2016), however, has
shown that private research concentrates on only a few commodities, and responds to
market prices. Current slowing trends in public sector research portend slower agricultural
productivity growth, a phenomenon that is particularly disconcerting, given the proprietary
nature of private sector research.
CGIAR’s quintessential comparative advantage has been in high-quality research, par-
ticularly on germplasm, and in its broad presence throughout the developing world. What,
then, is and will be the role of CGIAR in research and technology development in this new
world, including in genetically engineered crops? What about the strong resistance to
genetically modified crops, even though there has been no evidence found of adverse
impacts on human health (NASEM 2016; Brody 2018)?³ What would happen if CGIAR,
³ The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, an international agreement,
was adopted January 29, 2000, and entered into force on September 11, 2003. It seeks to ensure the safe handling,
transport, and use of living modified organisms (LMOs), derived from biotechnology, that could have adverse
effects on biological diversity or present risks to human health. See the “Convention on Biological Diversity”:
https://bch.cbd.int/protocol/
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which has conducted research using conventional means disappeared, as some have feared
it could do without a stable, predictable level of international financing for agricultural
research and further structural reforms? How will countries at very different stages of
development be affected?
We argue that the new scientific frontiers call for CGIAR to raise its game scientifically to
take advantage of the opportunities provided upstream by the fourth industrial revolution,
while diversifying its research portfolio. It also means “substantially more emphasis on
priority setting [and risk taking], both at the System and the CGIAR Research Program
(CRP) level, if the CGIAR wants to realize its own goal to be at the forefront on how the
international development community should allocate resources for international agricul-
tural research,” as noted in the lessons from evaluations of 15 CRPs (Birner and Byerlee
2016, x). The Birner and Byerlee synthesis of evaluations also noted that “legacy research
and bilateral funding played a large role in CRP resource allocation. . . . [S]uch bilateral
funding often drives CRPs toward [downstream] development activities in which they do
not have comparative advantage” (Birner and Byerlee 2016, x). A recent CGIAR paper
noted, however, that “through W3 (Window 3) and bilateral funding individual Funders
steer approximately 80% of the portfolio directly” (CGIAR 2017e, 2). This suggests the need
to develop a strategy toward bilateral funding, which achieves CGIAR’s strategic objectives,
rather than allowing funding to drive the downstream development research agenda.
Indeed, the intention in setting up the System Council (SC) and Window 1’s unrestricted
funding, was precisely to achieve increased stable funding, but such unrestricted funding
has become scarcer.⁴
The principle of subsidiarity is often invoked in research management. It means per-
forming only those tasks that cannot be performed more effectively at a more local level.
This action should be pursued ideally by actors in developing countries who are entering in
partnership with CGIAR to maximize their joint impacts. This is the way that CGIAR began
in Asia in the 1960s, in partnership with bilateral donors—particularly, the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Rockefeller and Ford
Foundations—by building the capacity of Asian NARS to undertake applied and adaptive
research, while supplying the international public goods of plant material of high-yielding
varieties from CGIAR Centers.
⁴ For more information about funding windows, see the section “CGIAR Fund,” later in this chapter. The
concept of “restricted funding” has changed over time. Before CGIAR’s 2015–16 reforms:
Restricted funds . . . [were] restricted either by attribution (to a particular research program or region)
or by contract (to a project, subproject, or activity). An allocation to one Center as opposed to another
is not restricted funding by the CGIAR’s definition. While a Center’s funds can be allocated to any
program or cost according to a particular Center’s institutional needs or priorities, these cannot be
switched from one Center to another. Different degrees of restriction result in part from donors
allocating funds to the Centers from their various units and budgets. (OED 2003, 188)
The World Bank is the only donor that allocates its resources exclusively to the overall system (that is, to Window
1 [W1]) (Personal communication, Jonathan Wadsworth, former Executive Secretary of CGIAR with Uma Lele,
January 29, 2019). There are other contributors to W1, but they also make other contributions to W2 and W3,
and/or bilaterally. Bank staff sometimes contract Centers for small specific studies, and some IBRD or IDA
borrowers may contract CGIAR to do significant work—however, this latter item is effectively on behalf of the
borrower, not the World Bank. The differences in the three windows are discussed in more detail later in this
chapter.
Notably, even World Bank funding has diminished from US$50 million annually to US$30 million (see
Hagstrom Report [2015]).
According to the 2016 CGIAR System Framework, unrestricted funding is defined as “funding from the CGIAR
Trust Fund that has not been designated by a Funder for a specific Center or research program” (CGIAR 2016a, 4).
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Alston, Pardey, and Rao (2020), in their latest study, noted that in 2016 present value
terms, the costs of the entire CGIAR portfolio over the period 1960–2010 was US$59.7
billion (2016 dollar values). They noted:
If we attribute just one-quarter of the benefits reported in the nine high-payoff projects to
CGIAR (with the remainder to national partners and others), the BCR is 7.5:1; if we count
only the costs of the CGIAR Centers that conducted the relevant R&D, the BCR is 10:1.
If one-half the value of all the reported agricultural TFP growth from 1960–2016 in
developing countries is taken as a measure of the benefit from research investments by
both CGIAR and public agencies in developing countries, a BCR on the order of 10:1 is
implied for research CGIAR and national partners combined. (Alston, Pardey, and Rao
2020, iv)
The 18,000 tons of wheat seed delivered to India by CGIAR’s International Maize and
Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), under Norman Borlaug’s leadership when India
lacked the capacity to produce quality seed, led to the start of the Green Revolution. Most
importantly, private foundations and external bilateral and multilateral assistance helped
build India’s capacity (Lele and Bumb 1995; Lele and Goldsmith 1989). In a 2017 publica-
tion, “Improving System Financing Modalities,” CGIAR addressed this same issue of
restricted funding and its relationship to upstream or downstream research (CGIAR
2017e). For CGIAR to move upstream, developing countries will need to provide comple-
mentary investments in research in their own NARS and be capable of producing appro-
priate applied and adaptive technologies suited to their local circumstances, while relying on
the CGIAR Centers to conduct upstream, state-of-the-art, international or regional public
goods research. Except for China, Brazil, and to a lesser extent India, by and large,
developing countries have not been investing enough in agricultural research and innova-
tion systems to keep up with the growing challenges, as we discussed in Chapter 7 on
financing for sustainable structural transformation.
This recent growth of agricultural research in the private sector and emerging countries
presents an underexploited opportunity and challenges for CGIAR and governments of
donor and developing countries to carve out a new niche for CGIAR research and
technology. Partnering with the private sector poses a challenge of trade secrecy and
intellectual property rights. It can be managed and overcome through innovative licensing
approaches and by organizations such as the African Agricultural Technology Foundation
(AATF), a not-for-profit organization that facilitates and promotes public–private partner-
ships to access, develop, adapt, and deliver appropriate agricultural technologies for sus-
tainable use by smallholder farmers in SSA.⁵ Even American farmers warn that
consolidation of big agrochemical companies, like Bayer and Monsanto, will make matters
worse for them, with declining commodity prices and increasing input costs, particularly
with the weakened voice of public sector research entities, even in developed countries, as
noted here (Varinsky 2018).
CGIAR’s internal partnerships among its Centers have improved, as well as steps to
consolidate centers; for example, as detailed in Box 10.1, the International Center for
Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) and Bioversity International have formed an alliance, the
International Center for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF) and the Center for International
⁵ See https://www.aatf-africa.org
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Forestry Research (CIFOR) have merged, and other such ideas are being actively explored.
Partnerships with advanced country institutions are also increasing, as donors make their
funds increasingly available in-kind, in the form of domestic research capacities for collab-
oration with CGIAR rather than in cash. However, CGIAR has a long way to go in
improving partnerships with the private sector and with emerging countries. CGIAR
entities need to become leaders of different “themes,” establishing global and regional
digital platforms and networking globally with key actors, many of whom are not currently
part of CGIAR, rather than CGIAR Centers primarily being the small-scale “doers” of
research. Such evolution, which is already underway, could be faster and wider through the
“One CGIAR” approach.
A third major new and disruptive change prompts the need to promote balanced diets in
the face of rapidly changing food habits and needs of consumers—that is, in the context of
the growth of ultra-processed junk food and sugary beverages—and changes in the structure
of agricultural production and value chains accompanying them. As we discussed in
Chapter 4, some have attributed these changes in food demand structure directly to the
outgrowth of value chains and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the food industry. Going
forward, it is conceivable that new digital platforms such as “Uber eateries”⁶ could provide
healthier food, while creating more flexible employment for youth and women. Indeed, the
COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the employment and food situation for the poorest
while accelerating the use of digital tools. In Chapter 4, we showed how small and marginal
Mexican farmers are being absorbed into the process of farm consolidation and have been
moving out of agriculture to nonfarm employment, where their reliance on purchased food
has increased. Concurrently, Mexico was exporting healthy fruits and vegetables to North
America under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). “Few predicted when
Mexico joined the free-trade deal that it would transform the country in a way that would
saddle millions with diet-related illnesses” (Jacobs and Richtel 2017). Vegetables are an
important source of micronutrients, and making active alliances with all relevant providers,
such as the World Vegetable Center (AVRDC),⁷ is critical. The Center’s location in Taiwan
has, for decades, been controversial for its inclusion in the CGIAR System, due to the
objection of the People’s Republic of China to a Center based in Taiwan. CGIAR can help
diversify agricultural production from its cereal-centric past and crowd-in all possible
technologies and know-how for fruits, vegetables, fisheries, and poultry, by involving
relevant concerned actors to help farmers produce and consumers eat healthy food.
CGIAR’s future relevance, effectiveness, and impact depend critically on such a new vision,
strategy, and donor behavior (see Table A.10.1 in the Appendix). Developing countries will
also need to change their cereal-centric food policies, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
Once the Heart of the International System
CGIAR’s story is one of growing organizational complexity and declining share of global
expenditures, from 4 percent in the 1990s to less than 2 percent in 2020, evolving in a
changing context, which makes reforms difficult. We examine the history of its partnerships
and its prospects of establishing more partnerships, in a new context of a rapidly emerging
⁶ A “virtual” online restaurant, with food available for delivery. See Garsd (2018).
⁷ AVRDC was formerly known as the Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center and was established
in 1971 in Taiwan. See https://avrdc.org
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number of actors, providing an opportunity to establish a new platform with the private
sector and NARS—as highlighted at the end of the chapter—to enhance the prospects of
CGIAR’s contribution to world food security going forward. A related theme of this story is
CGIAR’s unpredictable financing with unrestricted funding, despite its extraordinary
impact on the world’s food supply, particularly in developing countries, but also benefiting
countries such as the United States and Australia, and paradoxically, despite substantially
increased donor funding of CGIAR since 2008 until 2014, when it peaked. In the past,
CGIAR has sought increased funding without regard to its quality, meaning, certainty,
predictability, timeliness, and restrictions. Evidence thus far suggests that its large funding
volume, without certainty, predictability, and timeliness, is not necessarily good for pla-
nning CGIAR’s long-term research activities or, in particular, for their execution and,
therefore, only of short-term benefit for its intended beneficiaries.
Even with only 4 percent of the global share of agricultural research, CGIAR was
described by the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED) in 1999 as “at
the heart of an international system linking developing and industrial nations” (Anderson
and Dalrymple 1999, vii). That share had declined to less than 2 percent of total agricultural
research funding by 2020 (Beintema and Echeverría 2020). In celebrating its own achieve-
ments, CGIAR noted that, with the near doubling of the world population from 3.8 billion
since its establishment in 1971 to 6.8 million in 2011, the world would not have been able to
feed itself without CGIAR’s contributions (CGIAR 2011b).⁸ Although a counterfactual is
impossible to construct—if the world would have found alternative ways to increase its food
supply, several independent reviews and impact studies over the years have credited CGIAR
with being one of the best investments that donors have made (OED 2003; FAO 2007;
CGIAR 2008, 2011a, 2020c). (See Box A.10.2 in the Appendix.)
In addition to improved germplasm, CGIAR has also delivered knowledge about policies
and institutions, conserved biodiversity for germplasm improvement, contributed to
human capital through collaborative research and training of developing country nationals,
and been a credible policy advocate for global food and nutrition security. Strategic partner-
ships, even in which CGIAR’s presence is small, can have a huge leveraging effect on the
entire CGIAR System, and this lesson has implications for partnerships going forward.
Now, though, it faces several strategic challenges. First, while it has had a loyal base of
funders, it needs to attract new sources of funding, as it did in early 2000, with BMGF;
second, short-term funding has posed challenges in conducting long-term research; and
third, increased funding for Africa has come at the cost of investments in other regions, with
implications for CGIAR’s impacts of its overall research.
CGIAR Growth and Consolidation
Since its establishment in 1971, CGIAR has grown from 4 Centers—the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI), CIMMYT, CIAT, and the International Institute of Tropical
Agriculture (IITA)—to 15 Centers, headquartered in 12 developing and 2 developed
countries on 5 continents, with many stations and offices of the 15 Centers located in
more than 60 countries and how with mergers of two sets of Centers (CIAT and Bioversity,
and CIFOR and ICRAF)—13 Centers. Much of the System’s growth of Centers occurred in
⁸ In 2017, the population had reached 7.5 billion (UN 2019).
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the 1980s, adding Centers on water, agroforestry, and forestry. While there were good
reasons for expansion, the need for two separate centers for forestry and agroforestry was
much debated, as were the two livestock centers, which eventually merged. The expansion
of these Centers occurred at the instigation of donors, with CGIAR’s hope that acceding to
donors’ wishes for expansion would lead to increased donor funding (McCalla 2017).
Funding did not materialize, however, on the scale envisaged until the 2007–8 food and
financial crises, which also coincided with the beginning of major reform efforts of CGIAR,
to be discussed later in this chapter. Governance and management reforms were meant to
bring a more organized structure to a system, which its stakeholders considered unwieldy. It
was an informal organization of Centers and a growing number of members (64 members
in 2009, consisting of donors, international organizations, and developing countries
intended to be the System’s contributors and beneficiaries). Developing countries contrib-
uted land, forests, biodiversity, and generous access to their societies. (See Table A.10.1 in
the Appendix on the evolution of CGIAR’s mission, centers, and membership.)
In 2017, some of the 15 Centers—independent, nonprofit research organizations—were
in the process of merging of their own volition, in part due to the inability of the System to
raise adequate funds. The 15 Centers are AfricaRice, Bioversity International, CIFOR,
International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), CIAT, Inter-
national Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), IITA, International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI),
CIMMYT, International Potato Center (CIP), IRRI, International Water Management
Institute (IWMI), ICRAF, and WorldFish (see Figure 10.1). As previously noted (see Box
10.1), some of the Centers are in the process of merging or forming alliances, aligning their
research to strengthen their capacities and accelerate impacts.
CGIAR is present in 70 countries. Funding in nominal terms has grown from US$19.5
million in 1972 to US$1,057 million in 2014, the peak year of funding, after which it
declined (excluding the Centers’ own income). Despite the unpredictability, uncertainty,
and often, restricted nature of funding, which inhibits high priority and high-quality
research, CGIAR is still the world’s leading research partner on crops, livestock, aquacul-
ture, and forestry, with approximately 11,000 staff in 96 countries (CGIAR 2016c). Of those,
2,072 were internationally recruited staff. To put CGIAR funding and staffing in perspec-
tive, China’s annual expenditures in 2013 for agricultural research were US$9.4 billion
(constant 2011 purchasing power parity [PPP] dollars), with the full-time equivalent (FTE)
number of researchers at 43,200; in 2008, Brazil’s expenditures were US$2.7 billion (con-
stant 2011 PPP dollars), with FTE researchers of 5,869 in 2013; and India’s expenditures
were US$3.3 billion (constant 2011 PPP dollars) in 2014, with FTE researchers of 12,747
(IFPRI 2016).
The Overarching Context: Sustainable Development Goals and CGIAR’s
Strategy and Results Framework—An Attempt at Results Orientation
and Accountability
Adoption of SDGs in 2015, by all member countries, led international organizations to align
their work and strategy with SDGs and their targets. CGIAR is no different. CGIAR
acknowledges that its Strategy and Results Framework (SRF) is ambitious. By 2030, its
proposed action, together with its partners, is expected to result in three System Level
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Figure 10.1 Where CGIAR works

























Outcomes (SLOs), shown in Table 10.1. This is a considerably more articulated set of goals
than previously.
Clearly, some donors appreciate this approach, as the Norwegian assessment of CGIAR
illustrates (see Chapter 6 on the governance of the Big Five) (Government of Norway 2014).
Table 10.1 CGIAR’s three System Level Outcomes and 10 targets with their 2022 intermediary
and 2030 final values
Three goals or System
Level Outcomes
Ten targets
Descriptions and intermediary 2022 values (to




1. Reduce poverty 1. One hundred million more farm households
have adopted improved varieties, breeds, or trees,
and/or improved management practicesLinks to
SDG1, SDG2, SDG12, SDG14, and SDG17.
350 million
2. Thirty million people, of whom 50 percent are
women, helped out of povertyLinks to SDG1,
SDG2, SDG5, SDG8, SDG10, and SDG17.
100 million
2. Improve food security
and nutrition for health
3. Improve the rate of yield increase for major
food staples from current < 1 to 1.2–1.5 percent/
yearLinks to SDG1, SDG2, SDG12, and SDG17.
< 2.0 to 2.5
percent/year
4. Thirty million more people, of whom 50
percent are women, meeting minimum dietary
energy requirementsLinks to SDG1, SDG2, SDG3,
SDG5, SDG6, SDG12, and SDG17.
150 million
5. One hundred fifty million more people, of
whom 50 percent are women, without
deficiencies of one or more of the following
essential micronutrients: iron, zinc, iodine,
vitamin A, folate, and vitamin B₁₂Links to SDG2,
SDG5, SDG12, and SDG17.
500 million
6. Ten percent reduction in women of
reproductive age who are consuming less than the
adequate number of food groupsLinks to SDG2,





7. Five percent increase in water and nutrient
(inorganic, biological) use efficiency in
agroecosystems, including through recycling and
reuseLinks to SDG2, SDG5, SDG6, SDG12,
SDG14, SDG15, and SDG17
20 percent
8. Reduce agriculturally related greenhouse gas
emissions by 0.2 Gt CO2-e yr–1 (5 percent),
compared with business-as-usual scenario in
2022Links to SDG13, SDG15, and SDG17.
0.8 Gt CO2-e yr–1
9. Fifty-five million hectares (ha) degraded land
area restoredLinks to SDG 15, SDG16, and
SDG17.
190 million
10. Two and one-half million ha of forest saved
from deforestationLinks SDG13, SDG15, SDG16,
and SDG17.
5 million ha
Source: CGIAR (2015b, adapted from table 1, 5); CGIAR (2017b); CGIAR Strategy (https://www.cgiar.org/how-
we-work/strategy/)
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The SC’s 5th meeting paper shows that CGIAR is moving to nine results indicators
(CGIAR 2017c), and the CGIAR 2016–30 SRF has three SLOs, with CRPs focusing,
variously, on 10 intermediate targets (as relevant to them) (CGIAR 2015b).
Since the CGIAR Centers were established in the 1970s and 1980s, their work has always
supported objectives similar to those of SDGs, which were devised and adopted in 2015, but
in the past the Centers did not formally align their objectives to some larger goals. Since its
establishment in 1972, the first-ever effort to develop a CGIAR System-level, results-
oriented SRF was initiated in 2010. Several economists closely associated with CGIAR
were critical of the approach, which they considered mechanistic when applied to research
(for example, see Binswanger [2011] in an internal review of one of the early CRPs in 2010,
and Alex McCalla [2014, 2017]).
The Strategy and Results Framework
CGIAR’s SRF is an overarching structure, increasingly used to define the System’s strategic
directions. It has evolved over time, based on consultations and lessons learned. The latest
SRF (2016–30) has three goals: (1) reduce poverty, (2) improve food security and nutrition,
and (3) improve natural resources and ecosystem services (CGIAR 2015b). The SRF links 11
CRPs in 2020 (1. Agriculture for nutrition and health; 2. Climate change and food security;
3. Forests, trees and agroforestry; 4. Fish and agri-food systems; 5. Maize; 6. Livestock; 7.
Policies, institutions, and markets; 8. Wheat; 9. Rice; 10. Roots, tubers, and bananas; and 11.
Land, water, and ecosystems) to seven SDGs, to which the research results are targeted: for
example, no poverty (SDG1), zero hunger (SDG2); good health and well-being (SDG3);
gender equality (SDG5); clean water and sanitation (SDG6); climate action (SDG13); and
life on land (SDG15); and moderately, to the 5 SDGs targeted at decent work and economic
growth (SDG8); reduced inequalities (SDG10); responsible consumption and production
(SDG12); peace, justice, and strong institutions (SDG 16); and partnerships for the goals
(SDG17).
CGIAR’s various external observers often note, as did the external review panel of
Hayami, Lipton, and Mule (2003), appointed for the CGIAR Meta Review in 2002, that
an entire new vocabulary continues to emerge in CGIAR, which is difficult even for veteran
CGIAR observers to keep track of, so as to understand how it operates—a phenomenon not
unique to CGIAR. External panels often note the steep learning curve in understanding an
institution’s vocabulary, with the alphabet soup of frequently changing acronyms, with
implications for whether and how short-term consultants and advisors can be useful in
contributing to decisions that have long-term effects. Equally, or even more challenging,
donors or developing country officers, new to CGIAR, need to understand what it all means
and how the System operates. To ground the SLOs at the level of research activities, CGIAR
has also introduced the concept of Intermediate Development Outcomes (IDOs), to
empower researchers to think through the contexts in which their outputs might contribute
to development outcomes. Below this level are Sub-Intermediate Development Outcomes
(Sub-IDOs), which represent research outcomes adopted by immediate users, such as
researchers of NARS and national policymakers. In the latest SRF (2016–30), 10 IDOs
and 30 Sub-IDOs are aligned with 3 SLOs, 4 IDOs, and 16 Sub-IDOs, which are, in
turn, aligned with 4 crosscutting themes: (1) Climate Change, (2) Gender and Youth, (3)
Policies and Institutions, and (4) Capacity Development, which are critical to attaining their
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/9/2021, SPi
 719
goals and targets. The SRF is a “living document and will be periodically updated with new
challenges and opportunities that reflect lessons learnt” (CGIAR 2015b, 15). By 2030,
according to the latest SRF, the action of CGIAR and its partners will result in, among
other attained goals, 150 million fewer hungry people, 100 million fewer poor people—at
least 50 percent of whom are women, and 190 million ha less degraded, while mitigating
and adapting to climate change risks and shocks, ensuring gender and youth equity and
inclusion, strengthening the policy and institution-enabling environment, and developing
the capacity of national partners and beneficiaries (CGIAR 2015b).
CGIAR’s and its partners’ contributions to the achievement of their global goals have
been quantified by 10 targets (allied with three SLOs), summarized in Table 10.1, for two
time periods: by 2022, to reflect outcomes from the six-year next generation of CGIAR
CRPs commenced in 2017 (CRP II 2017–22), and by 2030 to align with the SDGs.
How incremental benefits are measured—for example, 100 million more households, of
whom 50 percent are women—raises a number of measurement and attribution issues,
when CGIAR is increasingly involved in complex multi-actor, multilevel partnerships.
These are issues explored later in the chapter.
Successive Waves of Reforms and the Tragedy of the Commons
In view of the rapidly changing external environment, CGIAR deserves credit for having
gone through frequent reforms. Important questions are: did CGIAR make decisions that
have had long shelf lives, and how beneficial have these reforms been in mobilizing more
and stable funding and improving CGIAR’s effectiveness?
Three distinguished development experts who were members of the external review
panel of CGIAR’s Meta Review, carried out in the World Bank’s Evaluation Department
in early 2000 (OED 2003), called the situation a “Tragedy of Commons”—a term coined by
Garrett Hardin in an article in Science in 1968, to describe what happens to common pooled
resources when they are overused and eventually depleted, as a result of the self-interest of
individual stakeholders, without regard to the common good (Hardin 1968). The Meta
Review showed that donors, Centers, and CGIAR Center scientists and managers acted in
pursuit of their interests at the cost of CGIAR as a system (Hayami, Lipton, and Mule 2003).
Indeed, as discussed later, some of our interlocutors have wondered if CGIAR is a system at
all, or still an assortment of Centers that do not constitute a system (personal communi-
cation, Greg Traxler, September 28, 2015).
The characterization—the “Tragedy of Commons,” applied in 2003—and continued into
2017 (CGIAR 2017d).⁹ The 2003 Meta Review identified several issues, some of which
CGIAR continued to face in 2017 (OED 2003). By 2002, CGIAR’s funding for productivity-
enhancing agricultural research—a global or regional public good ideally suited to a publicly
funded global network—had declined by 6.5 percent annually in real terms between 1992
and 2001, whereas expenditure on policies and protection of the environment increased by
3.1 percent annually during the same time. Overall, CGIAR funding stagnated in nominal
terms during that same 1992–2001 period, declining in real terms by 1.8 percent annually.
⁹ In “Improving System Financing Modalities—A Scoping Note,” issued April 28, 2017, it was noted: “CGIAR’s
funding system—like the natural landscapes we work in—faces a constant risk of the ‘tragedy of the commons,’
whereby incentives at an individual (funder, Center, CRP or ISC) [level] do not always align with the collective
benefit of maintaining system funding” (CGIAR 2017d, 9).
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Most importantly, the degree of restricted funding earmarked to specific projects increased
from 36 percent of total funding in 1992 to 57 percent in 2001.
The characterization of Professors Yujiro Hayami, Michael Lipton, and Mr. Harris Mule,
of CIGAR as a “tragedy of commons” provides a useful backdrop against which to review
changes in the external environment that CGIAR has faced and its reforms during 2003,
2008–11, and since 2015 (Hayami, Lipton, and Mule 2003).
Centralized and Decentralized Models of International Agricultural
Research and Its Financing
The Meta Review of 2003 noted that the great successes in the 1970s and early 1980s
achieved by the original two CGIAR Centers—IRRI focused on rice research based in the
Philippines and CIMMYT focused on wheat in Mexico—occurred because the two CGIAR
Centers had substantial scientific autonomy, but also had a core scientific strategy at both
Centers, which maintained high standards for research. The two Centers submitted propo-
sals, which were vetted by a strong scientific authority based on the System’s priorities
(originally, the Technical Advisory Committee [TAC] and in 2003, the interim Science
Council, discussed later in the chapter). The System supported research of high priority and
high quality by making financial allocations to the Centers. The Centers carried out the
research with considerable scientific autonomy. The panel noted that the CGIAR of 2000
was formally similar to this original model. It had “a System-level hierarchy and institutions,
incurring substantial associated costs” (Hayami, Lipton, and Mule 2003, 1). Yet, in practice,
the near autonomous Centers did not look to the CGIAR System for finances. Instead, they
raised “an increasing majority of their funds bilaterally, tied to specific uses or projects” and
activities that donors preferred (Hayami, Lipton, and Mule 2003, 1–2). The Centers had
little incentive to agree on a common “System-level” strategy. Even if they did, it could not
be enforced, because the scientific body had lost its power to allocate funds. Instead
CGIAR’s new funding policy was to reward the Centers, who had raised funds directly
from donors, with matching grants that the donors, rather than the scientific committee,
approved. Donors were interested in an immediate impact of research and, therefore,
increasingly opted for downstream operational research, more like development projects.
This was the beginning of the process of dilution of the role of science in priority setting in
CGIAR with an increasing focus on direct development impacts.
The most recent proposals for improving System funding put it differently:
The system-funding model and associated CRP modality is perhaps imbalanced in terms
of being:
a. over-determined on how system-level funding is received, and how research is managed
across the system and over time; and
b. under-determined on how system-level financing is allocated and its results framework,
expected added value/quality, and funding cycle. (CGIAR 2017d, 3)
CGIAR’s “loss of strategic focus” and “drift downstream,” were already evident in the
CGIAR System’s natural resource management (NRM) research (Hayami, Lipton, and
Mule 2003, 3). Even if returns were high, such research was location-specific and better
accomplished by involving the active participation, and even the leadership, of NARS. The
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meta reviewers, in their Advisory Committee Report, continued, “Also, adoption of NRM
advice by farmers often depends on productivity gains, which are larger with good germ-
plasm, attuned to sustainable high productivity under specific environmental constraints.
Therefore, falling CGIAR funds for germplasm research and conservation can undermine
the usefulness of NRM research” (Hayami, Lipton, and Mule, 3). This makes partnerships
with NARS, in the conduct of NRM research, even more critical than germplasm research.
The highly variable agroecosystems into which new varieties and hybrids must be targeted,
developed, and fitted make it essential that NARS be actively involved, if not take the lead in
such research.
To correct the decline in funding for germplasm, the Meta-Evaluation recommended in
the report, “The CGIAR at 31” that CGIAR should:
• “Increase funding for conventional germplasm enhancement and plant and animal
breeding research, in which CGIAR possesses a comparative advantage; . . . and devolve
that portion of CGIAR’s applied and adaptive NRM research program that does
not constitute global or regional public goods research to national and regional
agencies . . . ”
• Substantially raise the share of CGIAR outlay devoted to the core competencies—
germplasm collection and improvement—on which gains from other CGIAR
activities rest; the Bank and bilateral donors should act to reverse the collapse in
external assistance to agriculture and to increase unrestricted funding to CGIAR (OED
2003, 38).
How have CGIAR’s reforms in 2001–3, 2009–11, and 2015–16 built on these previous
findings? All three sets of reforms are detailed in Table A.10.2 in the Appendix.
As a background to understanding these reforms, we quote the latest 2020 study of
returns to CGIAR research by Alston, Pardey, and Rao. They echo the findings of 2003 Meta
Review and observations of Hayami, Lipton, and Mule of 2003:
In round figures, over the past five decades the CGIAR has spent about $60 billion in
present value terms. This investment—mainly through its contributions to enhancing
yields of staple food crops—has returned tenfold benefits (i.e., a benefit-cost ratio of 10:1),
manifest as less-easily measured payoffs for poor people from greater food abundance,
cheaper food, reduced rates of hunger and poverty, and a smaller geographical footprint of
agriculture. This does not count substantial benefits accruing in high-income countries.
(Alston, Pardey, and Rao 2020, i)
Alston, Pardey, and Rao (2020) noted further:
. . . the greater part of the evaluation evidence pertains to research directed at improving
crop and livestock productivity—especially staple food grains (e.g., wheat, rice, maize) and
crops (e.g., cassava, edible beans, and pulses). This was the narrow focus of the founding
four centers and, albeit to a lesser extent, the early expansion centers added in the 1970s.
Much less of the evidence pertains directly to the broader agenda of the centers added
since 1980, which accounted for more than 40% of the total CGIAR budget in the mid-
1980s and still accounted for almost 30% of the budget in 2017. The lack of evidence on
the economic returns to research conducted by the post-1980 expansion centers may
reflect a lack of measurable impact, but it may also reflect conceptual and empirical
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challenges in measuring the benefits—for instance, as the studies reported by Pardey and
Smith (2004) describe regarding policy-oriented R&D (POR) conducted by IFPRI, other
CGIAR centers, and other policy researchers (e.g., Pannell et al. 2018). (Alston, Pardey,
and Rao 2020, 27, 29)
Writing in 2003, Barrett pointed to evaluation complexities as one explanation for “ . . . a
dearth of ex post impact assessment of CGIAR NRM research” (Barrett 2003, 25). Barrett
(2003, p. 24) also noted:
. . . given the relatively recent launch of most of the CGIAR’s NRM research and the
excessively diffuse nature of some of the early research in this area in the early-to-mid
1990s, it seems unreasonable to expect to see significant aggregate level evidence of any
impact just yet. The absence of clear, quantitative evidence of impact to date does not
imply the absence of current, much less likely future impact; it merely means we simply do
not know yet.
More recently, the CGIAR Standing Panel on Impact Assessment (SPIA) commissioned
various studies seeking to rectify the dearth of evidence of impact in certain understudied
areas, including NRM and policy-oriented research. Subsequently, Stevenson and Vlek
(2018) reviewed nine studies of the adoption of NRM practices commissioned by
SPIA. In a foreword to that review report (p. iv), Karen Macours, the chair of SPIA,
noted that the adoption rates for NRM practices were consistently and surprisingly lower
(often much lower) than expected, and accordingly expressed some pessimism about the
associated flows of benefits (Alston, Pardey and Rao 2020, 27, 29–30).
2001–2003 Reforms: Introduction of Challenge Programs and Some
Organizational Centralization
The reforms, commenced in 2003, established an Executive Committee consisting of
donors, Centers, and other stakeholders, moving in the direction of formality, more akin
to the one that exists in 2017 and 2020. It was the first major attempt to improve CGIAR
governance and management, and to transform CGIAR’s Center-based research to globally
visible Challenge Programs (CPs). CPs, in some ways the antecedents of today’s CRPs, were
a way for CGIAR to elevate its game, open the System to outside researchers, strengthen
partnerships with NARS and other research actors, and mobilize additional funds, while
avoiding consolidation or elimination of Centers which, from experience, had turned out to
be politically difficult and diverted attention from the business of conducting research
(Özgediz 2012). The changes set in motion have continued in subsequent reforms, albeit
too slowly.
Lessons of three of the four CPs approved—on water and food, biofortification, climate
change, and one submitted by the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA)—have
influenced subsequent CGIAR reforms. CPs worked around the issue of System-wide
priorities, an issue that has remained with CGIAR, while promoting inter-Center collabo-
ration. The CP on Water for Food showed that if the Science Council vetting continued to
be preempted by the raising of “tied”money, in support of large CPs, then it would subvert
the scientific process and affect science quality (CGIAR Science Council 2008). Creation of
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the Executive Committee showed that it could increase efficiency in decision-making and
delegation by the membership at large to the Executive Committee members’ works. Con-
version of the TAC to the interim Science Council stripped TAC of the onerous reviews of
Center’s programs and management function. Establishment of a CGIAR System Office to
provide common shared services to all the Centers showed mixed results, as Centers were not
enthusiastic about the idea of centralization. Adoption of a formal Charter of the CGIAR
System paved the way for formalization of the System—a System to measure performance,
reduce the number of CGIAR meetings from two to one per year, and invest in strategic
communications to improve efficiency. Paralleling these initiatives, the Centers advanced
their capacity to work together, taking collective action by forming an informal alliance.
What Did Not Work in the 2003 Reforms?
An issue that still affects today’s reforms is that Centers viewed, as a threat, the opening of
the System with the introduction of CPs, without restrictions on who could submit
proposals. Separately, the Centers were also concerned that CPs were taking money from
their budgets. Responding to internal pressures, three CPs were selected from among
proposals submitted by the Centers themselves, as lead institutions. Importantly, this shut
off the opening of CGIAR to external competition, a phenomenon that has also influenced
the latest reforms. CGIAR points out that Center leadership of CRPs and Platforms has
many advantages (fiduciary responsibility, trust of donors, performance management and
CGIAR-wide risk management, and adherence to CGIAR policies). The CP experiment did
not achieve full traction, never coming close to the original intent of placing half of all
CGIAR research under CPs within five years (Özgediz 2012), but it paved the way for
achieving this aim in the post-2008 reforms. With the exception of the Genebank Platform
with its six-year partnership (2017–22) between the Global Crop Diversity Trust and
CGIAR, CGIAR Centers are lead centers of CRPs and Platforms. Proposals were submitted
by the Centers and the Global Crop Diversity Trust, and the development of the proposals
involved partnerships.
The CPs brought in some additional funding, but also diverted other funding, including
some of the World Bank’s that otherwise would have gone to the core Centers’ programs. It
created winners and losers among the Centers, as only a few Centers coordinated CPs. The
major benefit of these reforms was in demonstrating how the CGIAR System could run
multi-institutional global research programs, thereby helping to prepare mindsets for an
even bolder application of this principle in reforms starting in 2008.
The 2003 reforms helped improve CGIAR business processes. The Executive Council
initiative showed how the Donor Group could manage its affairs through delegation. The
Performance Measurement System focused on results and efficiency of Centers, but
the Centers disliked it because of the additional burden of generating the data required.
The “virtual” System Office experiment did not generate much integration but helped with
inter-unit communication. The new Science Council could develop a new set of priorities
but was unable to mobilize the scientific community toward the goals of CGIAR and had no
resource allocation authority, unlike in the past.
2009–2011 Reforms and Evolution to 2020
The period 2008–15 was the time of the most far-reaching reforms, which in turn provided
the foundation for the post-2015 reforms. As noted in a section titled “Governance
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ambiguities” in the “Final Report from the Mid-Term Review Panel of the CGIAR Reform,”
in 2016:
The entities in the reformed CGIAR include the Fund Council (FC) and Fund office (FO),
the CB [Consortium Board], and CO [Consortium Office], the ISPC [Independent Science
and Partnership Council], the IEA [Independent Evaluation Arrangement], and the 15
Centers each with their own respective Boards. There are also currently 16 CPRs—
partnerships with their own governance structure and systems. (CGIAR 2016b, 24)
The CGIAR Fund was established in 2010 and remains a key component of the reforms
even in 2020. The creation of the Consortium of International Agricultural Research
Centers, which operated under the name CGIAR Consortium, set up initially as a contrac-
tual joint venture and then as an international organization in 2012. The CGIAR Consor-
tium has since, with the 2015–16 reform, changed its name to CGIAR System Organization.
The CO, based in Montpellier, France, is now called the CGIAR SystemManagement Office
(SMO). The FO was based in Washington, DC, and the IEA and the renamed ISPC,
formerly the Science Council and now the ISDC, were and are still based in Rome.
Governance reform in 2010 created the FC, CB, and Funders Forum to replace the previous
Executive Council and Annual Business Meeting. Programmatically, an overall CGIAR SRF
was put into place, providing the overarching themes in which a set of large CRPs was
started. The totality of CRPs involved essentially covered much of the CRP in all Centers,
each with a Lead Center and many participating Centers and other partners.
According to Wadsworth (2016), then Executive Secretary of the FC and Head of the
CGIAR FO:
The fundamental rationale of the Fund was influenced by . . . the Paris Declaration with its
emphasis on donor harmonization, alignment, reduced conditionality, transparency,
untied aid, predictability of funding and mutual accountability. The Fund had three
main objectives which have been identified as solutions to current difficulties faced by
CGIAR, namely: a) to increase the overall level of funding which was not growing in line
with the increased need for research and CGIAR’s ambition to do more, b) to improve the
predictability of funding for research in order to plan and carry out long term research
initiatives which require known budgets over 5–10 year time horizons and to attract and
retain top researchers, and c) to provide stability of funding and fund use flexibility
through timely disbursements, with a greater proportion as unrestricted funding, and to
ensure continuity of research which if stopped cannot be easily restarted. (Wadsworth
2016, 1)
A new vision was adopted: “to reduce poverty and hunger, improve human health and
nutrition, and enhance ecosystem resilience through high-quality international agricultural
research, partnership and leadership” (CGIAR 2011d, 10–11), along with four strategic
outcomes enshrined in the first results-oriented SRF, developed in 2010, which were later
reduced to three in the 2016–30 SRF (CGIAR 2016a) and remained in the latest SRF
available in 2020: 1. Reduced poverty; 2. Improved food and nutrition security for health;
3. Improved natural resource systems and ecosystem services.
Key features of the 2009–11 reform included:
• The 2009 reform, intended as a move away from the fragmented and restricted projects
and Center-based programming and funding, pursued funding in support of major
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program areas (CRPs), drawing on the existing competencies of the relevant Centers
and partners to achieve results. The reform sought to define distinct roles for “doers”
(“suppliers” of research) and “funders” to establish clear accountabilities, and to move
away from a complex overlay of reporting and funding relationships, which led to
heavy oversight and micromanagement by funders, yet without accountability for
results from the CGIAR Centers, leading to frustration on both sides.
• A new consortium of CGIAR Centers (then named CGIAR Consortium and modified
into a SystemManagement Board in 2016 [CGIAR 2019b]), and System Board in 2020,
working with partners and the ISPC’s advice, was given responsibility for overseeing
the development of the strategic research agendas set out in the SRFs, programs that
came to be known as CRPs, and for implementation of results. A reinvigorated
partnership culture, supported by incentives and processes, could promote partnership
approaches and instill new dynamism into the agenda with a research environment,
which would attract, develop, and support the best scientists. Stable funding for
Centers to invest in the development of scientists and in their facilities would support
great science. Incentives for partnership and openness could allow CGIAR scientists to
work with peers in agricultural research institutes, NARS, UN agencies, and the private
sector with more fluidity, and to see their research translated into results. The
Consortium was to evaluate the organization against the CRPs and move to reduce
overlaps, including merging of Centers, as appropriate, to optimize the governance and
management units, while CGIAR infrastructure and campuses remained similar or
increased.
Linking CGIAR Research Programs to System-wide Priorities
The SRF emphasized program financing with provisions for institutional support to the
Centers (CGIAR 2008). The idea that the SRF would be setting the priorities, against which
CRPs would be approved, turned out to be a myth. Rather, in the first round, approved
CRPs were based on legacy research, but the latest round refined the CRPs, with input from
independent reviews by ISPC on the quality of research proposals submitted by the Centers,
which then resubmitted after reviews. In short, science quality, rather than alignment with
strategic priorities, became the driving criteria for approval. Who sets the priorities, and on
what basis, remains a debated question since the focus remains on cereals and root crops,
when consumption patterns have changed, leading to malnutrition and obesity. More
balanced diets require livestock, poultry fruits, vegetables, and nuts. While there is some
shift in this direction, much more needs to change in CGIAR if the quality of consumption
is to be a concern. The key questions have been what types of CRPs should CGIAR promote,
when should it partner with others, and what are the implications of competition for the
limited funding.
In its June 2017 report, “An Overview of Links between Obesity and Food Systems:
Implications for the Food and Agriculture Global Practice Agenda,” the World Bank
identified entry points for action:
Agricultural Research Subsystem
1. Incentivize more public sector research on high quality and underserved foods (le-
gumes, fruits, vegetables) to increase productivity and shift relative prices.
2. Ensure that cereal research and provision on inputs include a nutrition focus, and not
just a yield focus, and that results are communicated to producers.
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3. Encourage private sector advances in research favoring high quality and underserved
foods.
Production Subsystem
1. Ensure that bio-fortified cereals are the norm, where they are available and agronom-
ically competitive, rather than the exception.
2. Eliminate subsidies and other production/price support measures for production of
unhealthy ingredients for food processing.
3. Encourage production (and consumption) of fruits, vegetables, and pulses. (World Bank
2017, xi)
Since then, the evaluation of ISPC by IEA noted that, despite having delivered a substantial
body of work, there is considerable debate at the SC, its standing committee—the System
Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (SIMEC)—the SMB, and among donors,
about what exactly should be the role of the ISPC in the future (O’Kane and Pehu 2017).
There is general agreement that a strong capability to identify the research challenges to
delivering on CGIAR’s goals is needed, as well the ability to identify new research devel-
opments and directions (foresight analysis).
Seraj and Pingali (2018) edited Agriculture and Food System to 2050, the first systematic
foresight assessment by CGIAR to bring together state-of-the-art knowledge on the CGIAR
System. There are few surprises for those familiar with the agricultural development
literature. Yet, it is a comprehensive reference book for researchers and research leaders
in developed and developing countries. How this will affect CGIAR’s priorities going
forward to achieve transformative change is unclear. There is also agreement that measur-
ing and evaluating the impact of research in the System is vital, but there is debate about the
utility of other roles currently carried out by the ISPC, and whether some of the ISPC
outputs would be better delivered through other mechanisms. Another part of the debate is
whether the ISPC is value for money. Those familiar with the System say that the issue of
value for money of ISPC is not just a supply side issue but also one of the demand side. The
SC has not clearly articulated what it wants from its advisory body.
CGIAR Fund
The original intent was to finance the agreed upon CRPs through only two funding
windows, one for unrestricted (pooled) contributions to be allocated to CRPs by the FC
(Window 1), and the other for contributions that targeted specific CRPs (Window 2).
The plan did not materialize on the scale expected. Altogether, there are 80 donors (see
“CGIAR Funders,” http://www.cgiar.org/about-us/our-funders/). New funding arrange-
ments through Windows (that is, Window 1 [W1], Window 2 [W2], and Window 3
[W3]) were introduced in 2011, as part of the 2008 reforms. Initially, only W1 and W2
were conceived, but donors preferred the option of channeling contributions directly to
specific Centers. So, a third window was added to the CGIAR Fund structure.
A notable shift between funding windows/bilateral for the top 10W1 andW2 donors was
observed between 2012 and 2015. The top 10 donors, who collectively represented over 90
percent of the total W1 and W2 funding in 2012, reduced their W1 and W2 funding by US
$62 million, a 20 percent reduction from the 2012 level (CGIAR 2017d).
In 2017, fund transfers to Centers from the CGIAR Fund (Windows 1, 2, and 3)
represented 56 percent, or US$475 million of total funding. Bilateral project grants repre-
sented as much as 41 percent, or US$348 million of total funding. The remaining 3 percent,
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or US$25 million came from Centers. W1 andW2 funding declined from US$262 million in
2015 to US$220 million in 2016, and further to US$161 million in 2017, a 39 percent
decrease, or US$101 million in 2015 to 2017. By contrast, in 2016, W3 funding increased to
US$321 million from US$291 million in 2015, in 2017 it decreased slightly to US$314
million, representing about 8 percent growth in 2015 to 2017, or US$22 million. Bilateral
project grants declined by 10.5 percent, or US$41 million, from US$388 million in 2015 to
US$348 million in 2017. Centers continued to use more of their own funding, decreasing
the Center contribution by 14 percent, from US$29 million in 2015 to US$25 million
in 2017 (CGIAR 2018c). We explain the differences between Windows 1, 2, and 3 later in
this section.
The “Improving System Financing Modalities” paper issued October 2017, requests the
SMB to “manage within-cycle funding adjustments to CRPs to enable CGIAR’s research
agenda to respond when relevant to an evolving environment.” It also asks the SC to
consider introducing “the possibility of earmarking of Window 2 funding contributions
for individual flagship projects, in the event that this modality is the means by which a
Funder wishes to make contributions to W2” (CGIAR 2017e, 1). Some noted a further shift
away from System and CRP funding, reflecting a lack of confidence in the System and CRP
modalities to get allocations “right.”
To build the System-wide structure now, some suggest that, perhaps, 10 or 20 percent of
all funds raised by Centers be contributed to the System-wide infrastructure; this idea
should have been considered in the 2008 and 2015 reforms, but was not. Already, there is
the System cost percentage (SCP) levy on W2, W3, and bilateral funds, which are collected
and transferred to W1 to provide funds for the CGIAR SMO, the Independent Science for
Development Council (ISDC), IEA, and SMB costs of operation. There is a formula for
calculating the percentage value, but 2 percent has been close to the actual costs of these
System entities. It can be adjusted if the percentage becomes too large or too small. SMO has
done a good job at ensuring that Centers pay their percentage on bilateral funds (W2 and
W3 levies are automatically deducted by the trustee). The actual recovery rate is probably
close to 90 percent. Thus, many of the original financing issues and their relationship to the
organizational structure tend to be complex and need to be tackled. Figure 10.2 shows
contributions to the CGIAR Fund by major donors through W1, W2, and W3 and bilateral
channels for the 2011–17 period. The 10 largest CGIAR Fund donors in the period 2011–15
(the United States, BMGF, United Kingdom, World Bank, the Netherlands, Australia,
Sweden, Canada, Switzerland, and the European Commission) accounted for over
65 percent of total CGIAR income and over 90 percent of CGIAR Fund income
(Wadsworth 2016, 8). Few donors chose a single channel; 10 donors funded via all four
streams (that is, W1, W2, W3, and bilateral), and 32 donors contributed to one or more of
the three funding windows:
Window 1: Thirteen donors contributed to this window of completely untied funds.
Contributions of some donors to W1 have declined from the past for various reasons.
The World Bank, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand,
and France “made contributions exclusively or primarily through W1” (Wadsworth
2016, 9). The decline may be explained that in the donor trust in W1. Some say that Centers
have been fairly transparent in saying that they treat W1 as core funding and use it to
subsidize under-funded bilateral and W3 contracts with donors. Understandably,
W1 donors object to such practices and have moved to W2 (or even W3) to ensure they
get value for money. The Centers may have abused the System, rather than it being a flaw in
the System itself.
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Window 2: Of the 12 donors contributing to W2, four were also W1 donors. The
Netherlands, Australia, Switzerland, Belgium, Ireland, Russia, and International Develop-
ment Research Centre (IDRC) “placed greater emphasis on W2 in their overall contribu-
tions mix” (Wadsworth 2016, 9).
Window 3: Twenty-five donors contributed to W3 by allocating their contributions to
specific CGIAR Centers. The United States, BMGF, the European Community, Japan, India,
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and China “made contribu-
tions exclusively or primarily through W3” (Wadsworth 2016, 9). BMGF has indicated that
it is looking to move more funding into W2 and W1—contingent on seeing real signs of
current reform proposals being enacted. USAID may follow suit, but more than half of
USAID money comes from country office budgets, so will that will invariably be project
dictated. The Washington-derived USAID funds could move to W1/W2 once a new
“system collective” funding regime is agreed upon for a new more targeted and focused
research portfolio.
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Figure 10.2 Top 30 donors’ contributions to the CGIAR Fund by Window 1, Window 2,
Window 3, and bilateral, 2011–2017 (US$m)
Source: CGIAR Financial Reports.
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Establishing a contractual relationship between the FC represented by the World Bank
and the Consortium, based on program performance, lasted six years (2011–16) but was
problematic. So, the separation of the governance and management roles of the System was
replaced in another round of reforms starting in 2015. The clear decision-making and
accountability mechanisms, as proposed in the 2008–15 organization, did not work. There
were issues in the relationship between the CB and the CO, as well as between CO and the
Centers. The Chair and the CEO of the CO were observers in the deliberations of the
FC. The terms of reference of CEO and chair vis-à-vis the Centers and donors were also not
clearly defined, leading to personalities rather than functions, according to some commen-
tators of this chapter, including work style, micromanagement, and authoritarian tenden-
cies of the previous CEO, contributing to effectiveness, among the many features that
needed revision.
The reformed CGIAR SC of 2016 was intended to be more of a stakeholder model, rather
than the shareholder model that it was prior to reforms, but the outcome may be more of a
shareholder model. Together with its chair, appointed for a four-year term, the SC has a co-
chair elected at each meeting. Every three years, eligible funders and developing countries
consult and agree upon their constituencies, which may be composed of one or more
governments or organizations. Each constituency determines the rules and procedures to
govern how it operates. The 20 voting members of the Council for the period July 2016–
June 2019, which includes 11 bilateral donors, are the African Development Bank, Australia,
BMGF, Canada, East Asia and the Pacific, the European Commission, Germany and
Belgium (one constituency), Japan, Latin America and the Caribbean, Mexico, The Neth-
erlands, Norway, SA, SSA, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland,
the United States, and the World Bank.¹⁰
The SC had a relatively more balanced constituency system. Earlier, some commented
that, before the recent reorganization, the FC was close to a shareholder model and the CB
with Center representation had seemed very “Western.” FAO was a founding cosponsor,
and its financial contributions, through the waving of overheads and in the past with direct
contributions to ISPC/IEA budgets, accorded it skin in the game. CGIAR severed its
relations with FAO and moved ISPC and its new incarnation, ISDC, out of FAO headquar-
ters. By moving CGIAR offices out of the World Bank to Montpellier, France, this premier
international System has essentially moved to a provincial place, although France is proud
to have increased its influence, as discussed in this chapter.
Other than BMGF, there is no representation of either the private sector or civil society.
Developing country board members have not played a proactive role, so it is largely a
traditional donors’ club and has not helped to increase a sense of ownership, even among
emerging countries. The governance structure of the SMB and SC, which came into effect
on July 1, 2016, impressed many of CGIAR’s funders and the Centers themselves with the
changes that took place (CGIAR 2017g). It was an improvement over the very confronta-
tional CB approach, which prevailed in the past and which seemingly defended the interests
of the Centers, but Centers did not see it that way. They saw the approach as serving the
interests of the CB.
¹⁰ For more information about the composition of the System Council, see https://www.cgiar.org/how-we-
work/governance/system-council/sc-composition/
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CGIAR Research Program Governance and Management Review
The CRP Governance and Management Review of 2014 identified a total of 23 active CRP
governance bodies, varying in terms of composition, size, function, and degree of inde-
pendence. Some CRPs had a single governance body, while others were found to have the
functional equivalent of two or more, and overall, CRP governance was found to be heavily
influenced by lead and participating Centers. External partners had limited roles at the
governance level, and women and individuals from target regions were significantly under-
represented. The imbalance in representation and participation in CRP governance under-
mines confidence in the legitimacy and fairness of decision-making. The review also noted
the increased potential for conflicts of interest for Lead Center boards between their duty to
their Centers and their accountability to the Consortium for CRPs. A key finding of the
review was the lack of a common understanding about roles and relative authority at the
System level among the FC, the Consortium, and the Centers (Robinson et al. 2014). Some
readers of the chapter draft, familiar with CGIAR, have commented that these shortfalls
were predictable and predicted.
The review also considered the extent to which CRP leaders had the authority to manage
for results. It found the current “reporting line for CRP leaders, which for most is through
the lead center DG, does not provide the CRP leader with authority to manage for results”
(Robinson et al. 2014, 12). The number and structure of CRP governance and management
committees also limit the scope and authority of CRP leaders. The shift in investment from
Centers to programs, uncertainty about the levels and flow of W1 and W2 funds, and the
relative imbalance between resources generated by the Fund and those generated by the
Centers have heightened the sense of risk on the part of the Centers, sharpening concerns
about a loss of standing within the System as a whole. The review also noted that while the
basic accountability framework for CRPs was functional, the governance bodies closest to
CRPs were less so (Robinson et al. 2014).
Eight recommendations emerged from the review, which were intended to highlight a
core group of principles that support good governance and effective management, rather
than a rigid set of structures.
The recommendations were informed by the need to:
• streamline structures,
• strengthen the [independence and] legitimacy of decision making,
• provide CRP leaders with the authority to manage for results,
• strengthen accountability and transparency, and
• recognize the need to sustain the institutional capacity of centers. (Robinson et al. 2014, 78)
In terms of CRP leadership, governance, and reporting, the CGIAR Consortium generally
agreed with the review and its recommendations, except for one important difference:
namely, that it believed the CRP leader should report administratively to the Lead Center
DG, and programmatically to the Independent Steering Committee (Robinson et al. 2014).
Consolidation of Research Programs
If the objective of CGIAR going forward is diet diversification, then it needs to establish or
bring in the System Centers, such as the AVRDC, to promote production diversification,
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including toward fruits and vegetables. The 2008 reforms led instead to the establishment of
16 relatively conventional CRPs based on CGIAR’s traditional research. By all accounts,
inter-Center collaboration increased, with several Centers involved in individual CRPs, but
true consolidation of research has not yet been achieved, and CGIAR’s own evaluations of
CRPs noted the mixed quality of research proposals (Birner and Byerlee 2016). The initial
16 CRPs coincided with the 15 Research Centers. In CRP Phase 1, 12 Centers were involved
in multiple CRPs, but three Centers (Bioversity International, ICRAF, and AfricaRice) did
not lead any CRPs. All CRPs except CRP4 had continued legacy research and selectivity
exercised through ISPC reviews to improve quality—a very worthy and necessary
development—but not sufficient for priority setting.
After some months of implementation, this dysfunctional arrangement was already
viewed by many with buyers’ remorse and thought to be less effective than the Executive
Council, which it had replaced. This dissatisfaction led to the establishment of the SC and
the System Board.
Top-Heavy Administrative Superstructure of CGIAR Research Programs
Each CRP has a program management committee with an average of 10 members, thus
engaging 150 people at management level (15 CRPs with 10 members each), who meet, on
average, four times each year. Also, for each CRP, there is an advisory committee/panel/
board of another 10 people, so that is another 150 people at the advisory/governance level
meeting, on average, twice yearly. The joint submission of the Centers to the Panel
described “ambiguity about whether the Centers are part of the Consortium or not and
the uncertainty concerning the obligations in both directions [having] severely impeded the
building of trust and cohesion between the Centers and the CB/CO” (CGIAR 2014b, 24).
Even with a single board, this governance ambiguity between Center management and CRP
management would continue, unless steps are taken to streamline governance.
2014 Mid-Term Review Panel of CGIAR Reform
The Mid-Term Review Panel was appointed in mid-2013 to assess progress in the imple-
mentation of the 2008 reforms. It called for the importance of a clear mission and vision as a
global network, together with a high-quality SRF, developed by wide consultation with
stakeholders to develop a keen sense of ownership focused on outcomes. A lack of an
effective SRF leads to an inability to prioritize research and its outcomes, so that budgets can
be allocated to the highest priority research activities. Also, it is difficult to establish robust
metrics across the research portfolio (beyond the individual project) to be able to assess the
System’s value. Some stakeholders agreed with the Mid-Term Review recommendation that
the preparation of the SRF should not be rushed, so that donors and Centers can be fully
engaged and that priorities should be based on scientific considerations (CGIAR 2014b).
The review made many recommendations on the substance of the research strategy: for
example, on greater emphasis on nutrition, reduction of food wastage, restoration of
degraded lands, increased resilience, and investments in big data. Specifically, it
recommended:
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• the establishment of a broadly representative single board, which includes the private
sector and civil society; the latter has not yet been achieved;
• the replacement of the FC and the CB with a single CGIAR Board supported by one
Administrative Unit, thereby replacing the FO and CO and eliminating the prevailing
ambiguity in the governance structure;
• the strengthening of CGIAR’s ability to deliver its research mission and development
impact; and
• the acceleration and scaling up of partnerships that are solution-driven, public–private
collaborations (CGIAR 2014b).
Financing Prospects
The 2014 Mid-Term Review was not optimistic about improving financing:
While the balance between Windows 1 and 2 and the contributions channeled through
Window 3 and other bilateral funding may not be ideal for maximizing the focus on CRPs,
the Fund Council and other CGIAR partners should be primarily focused on maximizing
the total amount of funding available for high-quality, high-priority research. . . .
Several donors indicated to the Panel that continued funding is conditional on perfor-
mance and highlighted the difficulty of securing long-term, predictable commitments to
fund CGIAR Research Programs, as well as the uncertainties around maintaining, let
alone significantly increasing, funding. (CGIAR 2014b, 9)
The Review Panel urged the pursuit of innovation in funding, such as green bonds and
public–private partnerships.
Comments on the Consultation Draft of the Mid-Term Review urged caution to the
Panel, suggesting that both a slower pace and more minor changes were preferred to major
changes in governance that the Panel had proposed. The Panel argued that those comments
“seriously underestimate the urgency of the need for such change and the significant
problems that were identified in the evidence that the Panel was able to review” (CGIAR
2014b, 7).
2015–2016 Reforms: Which Reforms Were Abandoned?
A significant difference in the new SC, from the earlier FC established during the 2008–15
period, was that a unitary structure was introduced to replace the dual structure of funders
and doers, which the former CGIAR Fund governance framework had created as recom-
mended by the external review in 2008, but which had not worked well (CGIAR 2019b).
The FC decided to transition to a new governing arrangement and put in place a
transition team at the 13th FC Meeting, April 28–30, Bogor, Indonesia.¹¹ Over the period
of May 2015 to May 2016, the FC’s governance committee stewarded the work of the
(largely) independent transition team. However, final decisions on the actual organizational
structure (very different from the April 2015 decision in Bogor) were made by electronic
decision in mid-June 2016. The new organizational structure of CGIAR announced by the
¹¹ A meeting summary is available at: https://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10947/3942/FC13%20Sum
mary%20FINAL.pdf
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FC reflected the lessons learned from the major reorganization undertaken, beginning in
2008 and continuing until 2011. The SC became the strategic decision-making body of the
CGIAR System, under the CGIAR System Framework (CGIAR 2016a). Reformed govern-
ance and advisory bodies include the CGIAR SC; the CGIAR SO with a CGIAR SMB, and
the SMO; a General Assembly of the Centers; System-wide advisory bodies (ISPC termed
ISDC in 2019, IEA, and Internal Audit Function, clearly different from the historical
Centers’ CGIAR Shared Services Internal Audit Unit); and a newly conceived Partnership
Forum to replace the Funders Forum (CGIAR 2019b). Funders and the Centers also agreed
that they would review the role of ISPC and IEA after the transition. ISPC was renamed as
the Independent Science for Development Council in 2019. Figure 10.3 presents the latest
CGIAR System Framework. We include in part to show the complexity of the organization.
A new organizational structure to reflect the One CGIAR reforms in 2019–20 was issued
in 2021.
The former FC decided to radically transform the administrative support arrangements
for the new governing arrangements—into a single office, by building on the existing legal
personality of the formerly titled CGIAR Consortium as an effective transition. Some
bilateral donors were not enthusiastic about the relocation to Montpellier, France. The
location was selected through open competition of governments and a committee led by the
‘CGIAR System Framework’—Defines “CGIAR System” elements
+ governs the CGIAR System Council
CGIAR Research Centers
CRPs and Platforms within broader
Center research efforts
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Figure 10.3 CGIAR organizational structure since July 2016
Source: Courtesy of CGIAR.
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incoming SMB Chair, who visited all proposed sites and made the final selection. India,
Kenya, France, and Canada put in bids (Canada subsequently retracted its bid). The bid
from France included substantial investment in the form of a custom-built office complex at
the Agropolis Campus in Montpellier and the usual expat privileges (Personal communi-
cation, JonathanWadsworth, former Executive Secretary of CGIAR with Uma Lele, January
29, 2019). What does the merger and physical move away from other international
organizations mean to CGIAR? It remains to be seen.
CGIAR entities charged with different responsibilities include ISPC/ISDC; the SPIA,
which is part of ISPC/ISDC; Strengthening Impact Assessment in CGIAR (SIAC), which
was a project of SPIA, and the CO and Board, now the SMO and SMB; as well as CRP
independent advisory committees and Center Boards.
In July 2016, the CGIAR Consortium was transformed into the CGIAR System Organ-
ization, and the CGIAR Consortium’s constitution was replaced by the Charter of the
CGIAR System Organization (CGIAR 2019b). Taking note that the role of the SMO is to
provide administrative support to the SC, SMB, and the General Assembly of the Centers,
the annual priorities and work plan of the SMO are shared across all three—in November in
advance of a new year to the SC for budget ceiling approval and SMB approval of key
themes, and then to the General Assembly in January of the current year, with the General
Assembly of Centers created as part of the revised CGIAR governance structure that came
into being on July 1, 2016, and the General Assembly Meeting serves as a forum for Centers
to discuss issues related to the CGIAR System and the CGIAR System Office. Functional
responsibilities of the General Assembly regarding the SMB provide “additional clarity on
the accountability lines between the SMB and the General Assembly, and potentially
explor[e] additional rules of procedure to enhance transparency and effective relationships,
for consultation with the General Assembly in advance of formal adoption by the Board”
(CGIAR 2019c, 3).
The SC composition that was finally agreed to was more akin to a shareholder board,
with participation of developing country members also, subject to the level of their weighted
contribution, based on a formula. Also, BMGF is now represented on the SC.
To incentivize W1 and W2 funding windows, funding is weighted as follows: W13;
W22; W3, and bilateral3—funders were ranked in weighted order, and the top 15 were
allocated donor seats (bilateral donors pushed hard to have same weighting as W3 and won
the argument—that was a mistake) (Personal communication, Jonathan Wadsworth,
former Executive Secretary of CGIAR with Uma Lele, January 29, 2019).
In the governance reforms, the Centers also gained more voice with the establishment of
the SMB, until it was changed again. Of the nine voting members, six were Center-affiliated
members (who could be either Center Board of Trustee members or Directors General).¹²
Critically, the Center-affiliated members serve as voting members, representing the CGIAR
System and not the specific Centers with which they are affiliated.
Comprised of eight voting members, two ex-officio non-voting members, and six active
observers, the One CGIAR System Board is responsible for providing leadership and
governance for CGIAR in the delivery of its mission and for appointing and overseeing
the Executive Management Team (EMT), which currently consists of three managing
directors.¹³ “Working in partnership with the CGIAR System Council, the new System
¹² For more information about the governance of the SMB, see https://www.cgiar.org/how-we-work/
governance/system-organization/system-management-board/smb-composition/
¹³ See “Executive Management Team,” https://www.cgiar.org/how-we-work/governance/emt/
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Board reviews the effectiveness of the CGIAR System, striving for excellence, and adopts
and monitors compliance with CGIAR policies, procedures, and guidelines, with a view to
ensuring results and the continued relevance of CGIAR’s agricultural research for
development.”¹⁴
Until August 31, 2020, the Board of the CGIAR System Organization was known as the
“CGIAR System Management Board,” or SMB. For this reason, some related documents
still contain this terminology, which are anticipated to be adjusted through relevant
approvals by the end of 2020.
One reason offered for a single board in 2016 was to overcome conflicts of interest across
Centers, but was this goal achieved? Under the previous reform, the Centers only appointed
one observer to the CB to represent the Centers’ interests. Since July 2016, the Centers
gained more direct access to the donors, as two Center representatives were ex-officio non-
voting members of the SC until August 2020. Therefore, they no longer had to rely
exclusively on the Executive Director of the CGIAR System Organization and the Chair
of the SMB (as was the case under the previous reform), to speak on their collective behalf.
The General Assembly of the Centers enables Center Board of Trustee Chairs and Directors
General to come together to address a variety of issues related to the CGIAR System and
CGIAR System Organization. In practice, the Centers began to use the General Assembly
mechanism to appoint a co-convener of each of the Board Chairs and Directors General
groups, and these two individuals also served as the ex-officio non-voting members of the
SC (CGIAR 2019b).
What Did the 2009–2011 and 2015–2016 Reforms Achieve?
Important achievements during the 2009–11 and 2015–16 reform periods have been
realized in three areas: (1) increased inter-Center collaboration; (2) advancement in the
application of the theory of change (TOC) to CRPs; and (3) greater transparency in
partnerships involving advanced country institutions.
Although CGIAR has retained almost all its founding principles, such as Center auton-
omy and donor sovereignty, the most significant and potentially rewarding development,
since CGIAR was established, was the adoption of a new, more formal, organizational
structure, starting in 2008, which it has since transformed into One CGIAR. It is too early to
know how One CGIAR will perform. The SMO had underway a major effort to reduce the
bureaucratic superstructure of the System, consisting of Center management and boards
and CRPs and their superstructure, as the initial optimism about reforms in 2008 gave way
to skepticism. The new management of the 2020 System Board hopes to turn that around,
conveying a greater sense of optimism about the way forward.
Growing Skepticism about CGIAR Began Giving Way to Cautious Optimism
and Continued Donor Demand for Impacts
Despite the increase in funding and reforms in the System since 2003, or perhaps because of
the way reforms were engineered, the 2008–15 reforms were viewed as reorganizing chairs
on the deck, and CGIAR was thought to be becoming a marginal player, with a concern that
¹⁴ See “CGIAR System Board,” https://www.cgiar.org/how-we-work/governance/system-organization/system-
board/
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the System could disappear altogether—with individual Centers surviving as independent
entities. Skeptics have included Alex McCalla, veteran of CGIAR and chair of CGIAR’s TAC
from 1988 to 1994, and thereafter, Director of Agriculture in theWorld Bank, starting in the
mid-1990s; and Gordon Conway, an eminent biologist who has played leadership roles
internationally and in CGIAR (Conway 2012; McCalla 2017). McCalla and Conway have
attributed the risk of irrelevance to several factors: fiddling with the bureaucratic super-
structure of the organization; vested interests; unwillingness to respond to the changing
science; and, in response to donor demands, a downward drift toward development
objectives oriented toward service delivery.
The organization and leadership of the SMB in 2018 resulted in a positive view that the
governance arrangement was working well. Donor demand for demonstrating impacts is
not new. The demand has been persistent at least since the early 1990s, when CGIAR faced
its first major financial crisis. The System has been responding to those expectations,
through major System-level reforms in 2001–3, 2009–11, 2015–16, and 2019–20, and
several mini-reforms, as well as with publications of impact studies. In the meantime,
while the tools to understand pathways to impacts have improved considerably in recent
years, there remain many challenges in assessing impacts outside of germplasm, such as
those related to policy research or research on NRM (Renkow 2016).
Convincing evidence on the impacts of NRM interventions, other than zero tillage, is
limited (as was noted at the Conference on Impacts of International Agricultural Research:
Rigorous Evidence for Policy, Nairobi, July 8, 2017). IWMI, one of the CGIAR Centers, was
instrumental in making “more crop per drop” a household slogan and highlighting the
groundwater crisis, particularly in India. There is a growing consensus, however, that “more
crop per drop,” while necessary, is not enough. Total water use in agriculture at the basin
level needs to be reduced. Packages of technological, institutional, and policy solutions to
these challenges, however, are needed, and they have been more difficult to develop, for
example, from participatory management to water accounting and monitoring. NRM
research is location-specific, so that the development of tools to address certain kinds of
generic issues are distinct from applied problem-solving research and need a careful
examination. In a recent review article on CGIAR’s environmental impacts, Garcia (2020)
described the challenge well. The literature is currently inadequate to guide innovation and
policy. In particular, few studies employ the necessary rigorous research designs: that is,
approaches that isolate causal relationships rather than correlational associations.
Isolating causal relationships is always a challenge for empirical work, and particularly so
when the underlying relationships are complicated. Agricultural intensification can affect
the environment through different channels. Changes to the inputs that often accompany
intensification, such as fertilizers or crop varieties, may have direct impacts on the imme-
diate environment through contamination of groundwater or run-off. Indirect impacts may
also arise from changes in the profitability of agriculture, or adjustments in prices if output
increases. This may change where it is profitable to grow crops or raise livestock, which
could lead to either more or less land under production. The specific locations where
agricultural land expands or contracts will, in turn, affect other environmental outcomes.
While the impacts of intensification on land use are relatively well studied, effects on
greenhouse gases, water quality, and biodiversity remain largely devoid of causal evidence
that accounts for changes in farmer behavior and the adjustment of related markets.
Funders have a role to play in filling this gap in the evidence: supporting research that
pins down the causal impact of agricultural intensification on the environment will—by the
logic of supply and demand—lead to more research in this area. SPIA, in a call for proposals
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issued in collaboration with the Environmental Market Solutions Lab (emLab) at the
University of California–Santa Barbara, is taking this approach, albeit at a very modest
scale relative to the need. Several new SPIA-funded empirical studies of different agricul-
tural innovations are underway, each rigorously estimating a causal relationship between
the rollout of an agricultural innovation and environmental outcomes, such as air quality,
rangeland health, and land-use and land-cover change. While these empirical questions
were difficult to address to begin with, they now face additional implementation challenges
amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Each study has a strong measurement strategy centered on
remote sensing, which not only offers the possibility of measurement at a large scale but also
makes socially distant COVID-resilient data collection possible. So, we are optimistic that,
despite the many challenges posed by the pandemic, these projects will still deliver the high-
quality evidence that is sorely needed (Garcia 2020).
Donors, on the other hand, have continued to keep funding tied, fractionated, and less
predictable. In turn, a combination of complexities about the research agenda, CGIAR’s
growing organizational complexity, and the multiplicity of vested interests has affected the
pace of reforms and their outcomes (Lele 2020).
Addressing New Research Challenges: CGIAR Research Portfolio of
CGIAR Research Programs and Platforms, 2017–2022
Synchronization and extension of the first set of CRP portfolios (2010–16) and development
of a new CGIAR SRF continued in 2014, with the FC approving the extension of the 15
CRPs to the end of 2016. The new draft SRF was discussed during November 2014 and
approved March–April 2015. Each CRP proposal describes a more coherent research
program associated with at least one SLO, while also describing how it would consider
unintended consequences on the other two SLOs.
Table 10.2 shows that the new CGIAR Research Portfolio (CRP 2) builds substantially on
the 2010–16 portfolio, but differs in key aspects:
• CRP 2 proposals “demonstrate greater synergy” within and among them and propose to
“deliver impact that is greater than the sum of their parts,” and this process could be
taken substantially further (CGIAR 2015c).
• With greater experience and with the review process, the scientific quality of proposals,
the monitoring of programmatic outputs, and mentoring have improved, although this
is a work in progress. There are significant differences among proposals in terms of
quality. The ISPC’s assessment of revised proposals in 2016 rated Fish; Forests, Trees,
and Agroforestry (FTA); and Livestock as weaker than the others. Even within a single
CRP, there are differences in ISPC ratings that are assigned to specific flagship
programs.
• The portfolio has a focus on outcomes, “with all programs expected to be based on a
clearly defined theory of change, well defined impact pathways, and identified outputs,
as well as research outcomes, and specified targets toward (sub-) intermediate devel-
opment outcomes as defined in CGIAR’s 2016–2030 SRF” (CGIAR 2015c).
• The portfolio “makes explicit the collaboration among the agri-food system CRPs in
defined geographies via Site Integration Plans, [reportedly] developed in close consul-
tation with national partners and each other, and with well-defined coordination
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mechanisms, led by a specified center or CRP in each country or site” (CGIAR 2015c).
This is an area that requires far more work, as the consultations about the Site
Integration Plans indicate. There are many management issues on leadership, coordi-
nation, funding, and collaboration with NARS yet to be sorted out.
• The four crosscutting, global-integrating CRPs “will work closely with each other and
with the 8 agri-food CRPs to leverage best practices across the portfolio” (CGIAR
2015c). The question is whether the decision-making and resource allocation struc-
tures and processes now in place facilitate and incentivize these types of collaboration,
or instead impose unintended barriers.
• The proposed Managing Directors (MDs) of the EMT will call the shots and instruct
DGs what they need to do (like vice-presidents in the World Bank). Of course, DGs do
not like the idea of taking orders from anyone—many DGs have been able to get their
Boards to follow the directions proposed by the DGs, so doing what one common
board decides through the executive powers of the MDs is an alien concept for them.
• The new portfolio also promotes three crosscutting platforms: (1) GeneBank Platform,
(2) Platform for Big Data in Agriculture, and (3) Excellence in Breeding Platform.
Also, it “addresses gender, capacity development, and monitoring, evaluation and
learning as functions coordinated by specific Centers or Communities of Practice to
ensure integration and coordination across the CRPs” (CGIAR 2015c).
Table 10.2 CGIAR Research Programs (CRPs): CRP I (2010–2016) vs. CRP II (2017–2022)
CRP I (2010–2016) [16 CRPs] CRP II (2017–2022) [12 CRPs + 3 Platforms]
CRP 3.1: Wheat 1: Wheat 8 Agri-Food Systems
(AFS) programsCRP 3.2: Maize 2: Maize
CRP 3.3: Rice (Global Rice Science
Partnership, GRiSP)
3: Rice
CRP 3.4: Root, Tubers, and Bananas
(RTB)
4: Roots, Tubers and Bananas
(RTB)
CRP 6: Forests, Trees, and
Agroforestry (FTA)
5: Forests, Trees and Agroforestry
(FTA)
CRP 3.7: Livestock and Fish Livestock
Fish
CRP 3.5: Grain Legumes Grain LegumesDryland Cereals
CRP 3.6: Drylands Cereals
CRP 1.1: Dryland Systems
CRP 1.2: Humidtropics
CRP 1.3: Aquatic Agricultural Systems
(AAS)
CRP 4: Agriculture for Nutrition and
Health (A4NH)




CRP 7: Climate Change, Agriculture,
and Food Security (CCAFS)
Climate Change, Agriculture, and
Food Security (CCAFS)




CRP 5: Water, Land, and Ecosystems
(WLE)
Water, Land, and Ecosystems
(WLE)
CRP 8: Genebanks GeneBank Platform 3 Platforms
Platform for Big Data in
Agriculture
Excellence in Breeding Platform
Source: CGIAR website, Research Portfolio: https://www.cgiar.org/research/research-portfolio/
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The Gender Platform has had a complicated history and is described in the Appendix
(see Box A.10.1).
Gender research was underway in CGIAR from at least the 1980s, but due to lack of
funding, it died several times, yet with a significant amount of research ongoing as part of
CRPs, particularly since 2017. It survived mainly due to donor pressure, but also died due to
lack of donor funding, and a full-fledged Gender Platform was formally launched only in
January 2020. Its implementation has been slow for the reasons discussed in the Appendix.
The outputs and outcomes of CGIAR research and related activities span the entire target
sub-IDOs of the SRF (at the portfolio level, a total of 953 key outputs were listed in 2017).
Eighteen percent of key outputs are principally linked with Capacity Development, while
10 percent and 4 percent of those were principally linked with Gender and Youth,
respectively. Across all platforms, significant levels of outputs are targeted to Capacity
Development, while the Genebank Platform did not indicate any key outputs tagged with
Gender and Youth, due to the nature of the activities. At the aggregate portfolio level, the
total budget for year 2018 will be US$762 million, comprised of W1–W2 funding of only
US$199 million (26 percent) and W3-Bilateral funding of US$559 million (73 percent). The
W1/W2 total funding was rather sad and approaching an untenably low level, but Centers
understandably tend to be almost unanimously unwilling to share their W1/W2 funding.
Centers find W1/W2 to be a precious resource, but those who favor reforms say Centers
may have squandered the good will of donors and have only themselves to blame. If the
Centers want to return to the past, this is an excellent strategy to bring it about.
Sixty-four percent (US$484 million) of the portfolio budget is made up of Agri-Food
System CRPs, with 31 percent (US$234 million) and 6 percent (US$43 million) made up of
Global Integrating CRPs and Platforms, respectively (Table 10.3 shows the Planned Budget
for 2018 for CRPs). In CRPs, the share of W1–W2 funding is around 12–37 percent
(average 23 percent). Among platforms, Big Data is fully dependent at start-up on
W1–W2 funding, while the Excellence in Breeding Platform and Genebanks maintained
49 percent and 30 percent W3 and Bilateral funding, respectively.¹⁵
Role of National Agricultural Research Systems in Gender Research
NARS should ideally address issues of gender and youth, but they have not been sufficiently
proactive, despite international initiatives, such as the Global Conference on Women in
Agriculture, jointly co-sponsored by GFAR, the Indian Council of Agricultural Research
(ICAR), the Asia–Pacific Association of Agricultural Research Institutions, and many
donors in New Delhi, March 13–15, 2012 (GFAR 2012). How CGIAR can stimulate
NARS research remains a question. The emphasis on TOCs has been a welcome one and
has compelled scientists to think through the pathways by which their work achieves
impacts. Scientists and Centers are also being asked to quantify the contribution of their
research to the various outcomes along the development pathway—often all the way down
to poverty reduction in numbers. This is a tall order and an unreasonable one to meet in a
rigorous way. Many things can happen downstream to mediate impact, or even negate it,
but that does not necessarily mean the technology was not worth developing. This is
¹⁵ See “Annual Plan of Work and Budget Reports” for each of the CRPs: https://www.cgiar.org/re
search/annual-plan-work-budget/page/2/
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Table 10.3 Summary of CGIAR Research Programs (CRPs) planned budget, 2020 (US$m)






Grain Legumes and Dryland
Cereals (GLDC)a
9.2 35.3 44.5 6
Fishb 5.96 25.46 31.42 4
Forests, Trees and Agroforestry
(FTA)c
9.99 76.89 86.88 12
Livestockd 21.34 34.26 0 55.6 7
Maizee 11.68 54.42 66.1 9
Rice 13.92 45.81 59.73 8
Roots, Tubers and Bananas (RTB) 20.09 47.4 0.7 68.19 9
Wheatf 14.2 39.1 53.3 7
Total [8 Agri-Food Systems (AFS)
Programs]
106.38 358.64 0.7 465.72 62
Agriculture for Nutrition and
Health (A4NH)g
20 65.06 85.06 11
Climate Change, Agriculture and
Food Security (CCAFS)h
20.95 41.87 62.82 8
Policies, Institutions, and Markets
(PIM)i
16.29 40.24 56.53 8
Water, Land and Ecosystems
(WLE)j
9.2 21.15 0.53 30.88 4
Total [4 Global Integrating
Programs (GIP)]
66.44 168.32 0.53 235.29 32
Platform for Big Data in
Agriculture
3.5 0 3.5 0
Excellence in Breeding Platformk 1.7 6.21 7.91 1
Genebank Platform 15.27 13.35 28.62 4
Gender Platforml 4.46 0 4.46 1
Total [4 Support Platforms] 24.93 19.56 44.49 6
Grand total 197.75 546.52 1.23 745.5 100
Notes: a The provisional budget for 2020 allocated by SMO is US$9.2 million, which includes 2 percent CSP. The
budget in the table is expressed at 100 percent spending levels. For operation purposes, CRP–GLDC is currently
planning to spend 90 percent of this budget until further guidance is received from SMO.
b This reflects the revised CGIAR Research Financing Plan 2020–1, as submitted to the SMB 16th meeting and is
subject to approval by that meeting. The 2020 W1 and W2 budget is based on guidance provided in the 2020–1
FINPLAN for 90 percent of W1 target (US$1.959 million) and W2 (US$3.998 million). Cross-program invest-
ments are also funded byW3/bilateral. However, the figure for cross-program investments is embedded under the
FP1 and FP2 W3/bilateral budget.
c Includes CRP management, program-level communication and outreach, foresight, monitoring, evaluation,
learning and impact assessment, and support to program integration (for example, cross-FP integrative opera-
tional priorities).
d Total CRP budget for 2020 has increased by approximately 37 percent, compared to the Annual Plan of Work
and Budget (POWB) 2019, due to both an increase in W3/bilateral funds and use of unallocated or unspent W1/2
funds from the CRP Strategic Investment Fund from previous years.
e Includes M-MC buffer for 2020 W1&2 volatility and FX risk; **Best estimate based on 2018/2019 data.
Figures updated quarterly and sent to SMO.
f W1&2 incudes carryover within CIMMYT Res (FP 1-4). W3/Bilateral are best estimates, will be updated in 1st
quarter reporting to SMO.
g Planned contribution in 2020 of non-CGIAR partner in Flagship 1, Wageningen University and Research and in
Flagship 5, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, is US$5,826,029 and US$515,730, respectively.
h Planned W1/W2 funds total US$20.953 million, comprising US$19.306 million as per the 2019–21 Financial
Plan (US$19.7 million for year 2020 gross of 2 percent CSP) and extraordinary additional W2 funding from
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) for US$1.647 million allocated to IITA directly.
Continued
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creating an unhealthy pressure to show unreasonably big numbers. Of course, accountabil-
ity is necessary, but expectations also need to be reasonable. And, it is important to
acknowledge that not all research will yield winners, and that good science needs the
freedom and space to learn from its mistakes. Furthermore, although all CRPs focus on
the TOC and downstream impacts, evidence of the precise nature of links to developing
countries’ NARS in CRPs is very limited; there are occasional references to the 20 site
selections, also discussed variably as country focus. This casual approach to partnerships
with NARS of developing countries contrasts to the treatment of partnerships with devel-
oped countries’ institutions provided in the CRPs.
An important emerging trend is the greater role of developed country institutions in
CRPs. Donors are expecting CGIAR Centers to be vehicles, through partnerships, for
increased access of developed country institutions to developing countries to conduct
research. Whereas this has been the US approach bilaterally for decades—helping to
generate the Green Revolution—this is a recent phenomenon in the case of other bilateral
donors: for example, in the case of UK’s Department for International Development (DFID)
or the Netherlands. As resources become more limited, and the need to engage domestic
constituents for continued support to CGIAR has increased, this is indeed an effective way
to employ science in developed countries, provided the process is transparent and compet-
itive. This is useful as a complementary arrangement but not at the cost of the core CGIAR
funding, and there must be a strong presence of developing countries’ NARS. Perhaps
increased South–South cooperation can help foster this bilateral support in place of the
currently very fragmented, ad hoc approach.
Growth of private sector investments in agricultural R&D in emerging countries is
relatively recent. The investments are a result of a combination of advances in genetic






% share in total
% share in total
i PIM implemented a policy allowing carryover of up to 10 percent of each participating Center’s 2019 budget by
flagship upon justification. Amounts to be finalized after audit confirmation of 2019 expenses.
j Financial reporting for 2019 has not been completed, therefore carry-forward funds are estimated; the carry-
forward budget provided here is intended for use in 2020. Remaining 2018–19 funds will be carried forward for
use in 2021; all W1/W2 figures are net of CSP; all gender-related funding is included in Flagship budgets; this
budget includes confirmed bilateral, W3, and Center funding as of January 2020. Incoming information suggests
that the total bilateral funding will increase; as requested, we note that the bilateral contribution fromWater, Land,
and Ecosystem’s core non-CGIAR partner, RUAF (FP3), will be approximately US$200k in 2020.
k This budget does not include use of the expected W1&W2 carry-over funds. They will be allocated to Module 1
(US$420,000), Module 2 (US$533,600), Module 3 (US$543,000) 4 (US$514,400), and 5 (US$450,000).
l A call was made for proposals for a fourth research support Platform, the CGIAR Gender Equality in Food
Systems Research Platform, approved by the SMB. This Platform began its implementation period in January
2020.
Source: CGIAR website, Annual Plan of Work and Budget: https://www.cgiar.org/research/annual-plan-work-
budget/
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animal science, digitization and robotics . . . often referred to collectively as ‘digital agricul-
ture,’ ‘precision farming,’ or ‘smart farming’ ”—or as part of the fourth industrial revolution
technologies, and increasing marketization of the agricultural supply chains (Jaruzelski,
Staack, and Johnson 2017, 90). Together, they “are creating the foundation for a new, more
productive and sustainable future of agriculture” (Jaruzelski, Staack, and Johnson 2017, 90).
To grow, emerging countries will have to follow the path of the more advanced knowledge
powerhouses, such as Japan and South Korea, where private sector investments are nearly
four times the public sector R&D.
There is also a structural change underway in farm ownership patterns in emerging
countries, which we outlined in Chapter 2. It is leading to land consolidation and the
creation of “a multiplier effect because farmers who automate are able to manage larger
fields and greater numbers of animals” (Jaruzelski, Staack, and Johnson 2017, 90). Such
consolidation is occurring more rapidly in countries that have good infrastructure—only
one-third of the farms in Africa are located near a road. And, as we noted in Chapter 2 on
structural transformation, countries which have been able to create off-farm jobs are
growing more rapidly—for example, in East and South East Asia—as compared to SA
where the average farm size is declining (ICRISAT 2017).
In their chapter in The Global Innovation Index 2017, Barry Jaruzelski, Volker Staack,
and Tom Johnson note:
Much of this new wave of innovation is enabled by the shift in corporate R&D towards
software, advanced hardware, and service offerings. The integration of embedded software
and sensors in farm equipment, in the soil, and on the animals—as well as the ability to
reliably and inexpensively connect and network agricultural producers, suppliers, pro-
ducts, and customers using cloud-based systems and shared analytics—has significant
potential to increase output. Such innovations are enabling major gains in yields, asset
productivity, and sustainability that will be key factors in meeting the escalating demand
for food. (Jaruzelski, Staack, and Johnson 2017, 90)
A CGIAR Imperative: Stable, Predictable, Unrestricted Funding
CGIAR, like all of the big five has continually sought to address it funding sources, methods
of financing, and linkage to the design and implementation of its programs.
CGIAR’s Financing Challenge
The fast growth in CGIAR financing from 2010 to 2014 had led to great optimism
(Figure 10.4).
The latest dashboard indicates that System revenue and expenses were not only lower by
about US$200,000 in 2019, compared to the peak revenue of US$1,067,000 reached in 2014,
but there was a deficit with revenue of US$828,000, compared to the expense of US$836,000,
a deficit CGIAR has experienced since 2016.
Jonathan Wadsworth, the former Executive Director of CGIAR made a number of
perceptive observations. “Existence of the Fund probably had a major effect on accelerating
growth of CGIAR and passing the $1bn/yr target by providing a multilateral approach and
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new funding channels” (Wadsworth 2016, 2). Whether the 2007–8 food and financial crisis
or the reforms, however, caused the fast growth in post-2008 funding remains a debated
issue. Perhaps both played a part. In 2017, funding declined to US$840 million from the
2014 peak (CGIAR 2017h). Importantly, the reform “did not achieve the objective of
attracting the majority of CGIAR funding through pool means (W1 & W2) which would
have enabled a truly multilateral approach to international agriculture research through the
CGIAR CRPs” (Wadsworth 2016, 2). Finally, the fragmented funding has kept the trans-
action costs of fundraising for CGIAR high and the aid quality low. Wadsworth noted,
“Centres continued with the heavy burden of fundraising resulting in many hundreds of
bilateral projects persisting across the CGIAR with all the concomitant inefficiencies both
programmatic and administrative. This may have limited CGIAR’s potential for uniquely
transformational research, impact and change that is needed in the global food and
agriculture system” (Wadsworth 2016, 2 [emphasis added]). A 64 million dollar question
is why is this the case, and whether and how the donor behavior described here can be
changed.
The decline in the share of unrestricted (core) funding over time is closely related to
priority setting, the changing role of technical advice, and the fragmented funding and
program of work. Before the 2008 reforms, the 15 CGIAR Centers had 3,500 bilaterally
funded programs of assorted sizes, time horizons, and scopes of research. After the reforms,
the number of programs was reduced by 900, but there were still 2,600 such programs






























































Nominal (actual) 1972 dollars
Figure 10.4 CGIAR: Evolution of funding (nominal and in 1972 US dollars), 1972–2019
(US$m)
Note: Excludes Center own income.
Source: Based on data from CGIAR Financial Reports; 2017 CGIAR Research Financing Plan (CGIAR 2017i);
CGIAR Center Financial Result – 2016 (CGIAR 2017a).
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Over seven years (2011–17), the distribution of contributions across the Fund windows
changed strikingly; the share of unrestricted W1 + W2 dropped dramatically from
84 percent of the Fund receipts in 2011 to 36 percent in 2017, with the W1 funding
(completely unrestricted) falling from a high 66 percent to 19 percent of the Fund receipts
over the same period. Correspondingly, W3 grew from 16 percent of the Fund receipts in
2011 to 65 percent in 2017 (see Figure 10.5) (CGIAR 2018c).
In the meantime among developing country partners, only Brazil was enjoying a gener-
ous level of investment, increasing from 1 percent to nearly 2 percent of agricultural gross
domestic product (GDP) in agricultural research from 1980 to 2016 (Figure 10.6). China’s
funding as share of agricultural GDP was less than 0.5 percent but showed a clearly
increasing trend. India’s funding level while the increase was not nearly as great as China’s,
only half that amount according to latest numbers. Finally, sub-Saharan Africa’s share of
agricultural research in agricultural GDP among its approximately 46 countries has shown a
clear declining trend since the 1980s (Figure 10.6).
Unrestricted funding to the Centers, therefore, makes a big difference in their ability to
partner with developing countries.
In 2010, prior to establishment of the CGIAR Fund, unrestricted core funding to Centers
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Window 3 Window 2 Window 1
Figure 10.5 CGIAR Fund receipts by Windows, 2011–2019 (US$m)
Source: Based on data from CGIAR Financial Reports 2011 (CGIAR 2012); 2012 (CGIAR 2013); 2013 (CGIAR
2014a); 2014 (CGIAR 2015a); 2015 (CGIAR 2016c); 2016 (CGIAR 2017h); 2017 (CGIAR 2018c); CGIAR (2020e);
CGIAR Financial Report Dashboards (https://www.cgiar.org/food-security-impact/finance-reports/dashboard/).
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percent in 1988, whereas restricted funding increased from 16 percent (US$33 million) in
1988 to 81 percent (US$446 million) in 2011 (Figure 10.7).
In short, prospects in 2017 did not seem as good for the level, stability, or predictability of
funding (through multi-year pledges that CGIAR has sought), as they did a just few years
earlier. As late as 2013–14, plans were underway to double CGIAR annual funding to US$2
billion.
Wadsworth noted, and we agree, that CGIAR’s fragmented funding approach is unique
for an international organization of its size and achievements, and:
A more existential question for CGIAR is to ask why other multilateral initiatives such as
the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria [GFATM and the GAVI Vaccine
Initiative (GAVI), both “vertical funds” but often used by CGIAR’s 2015 Transition Team,
as two of several identified comparator organizations] are able to function at much higher
levels of long term pledged funding with a policy that severely restricts earmarking of
funds by contributors, while CGIAR seemingly cannot, despite having the financial
support of many of the very same donors? (Wadsworth 2016, 4)
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Figure 10.6 Agricultural research spending as a share of AgGDP: Brazil, China, India, and SSA,
1981–2016 (%)
Source: Based on data from ASTI/IFPRI (https://www.asti.cgiar.org)
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Vertical Funds: A Possible Model?
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) is frequently men-
tioned as a possible model for CGIAR financing. Richard Manning, who has helped raise
funds for a number of international organizations, told us that the Global Fund is not a
relevant model. It is mainly financing country programs of commodities with big economies
of scale, so the incentives for donors are very different. Research systems in other areas such
as health are better comparators (Richard Manning, personal communication, October 2,
2017). Despite the World Health Organization’s (WHO) best efforts, there is no real
equivalent to CGIAR that has been successful in developing a coordinated approach from
the outset. In health, a set of sector- or issue-specific initiatives exists (the Medicines for
Malaria venture, heavily backed by BMGF, in much the same way, it is putting money into
CGIAR, even if it is viaW3). Tropical agriculture is rather unusual in having achieved amore
coordinated approach. The challenge is how to sustain it. The System Financing Modalities
paper presents several ideas for discussion, including a large-scale commitment push,
separate GeneBank funding, and changes in the way funds are raised for individual CRPs
and allocated among CRPs, delinking W1 and W2 funding, and instead of “salami slicing,”
allocating resources across CRPs in a more discriminating way (CGIAR 2017d, 2017e).
Those familiar with the financing of the Global Fund argue the comparisons are not
valid. GFATM makes grants to countries to achieve health outcomes, which are achievable
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Unrestricted (% in total) Restricted (% in total)
Figure 10.7 Composition of CGIAR funding: Restricted vs. unrestricted, 1988–2011
Notes: Restricted vs. unrestricted data are available up to 2011, and since then, the data are available by W1, W2,
W3, and Bilateral.
Source: Based on CGIAR Financial Reports.
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of all medical research is devoted to conditions that account for 90 percent of the global
disease burden. Moreover, due to limited support for research that addresses some of the
most neglected diseases and populations, the world’s best scientists are not sufficiently
engaged. Research, in the health sector on tropical diseases, established under the aegis of
WHO, has had difficulty attracting funding from donors in the same way that agricultural
research has difficulty attracting resources (WHO 2020). The same is true for CGIAR.
BMGF’s Discovery & Translational Sciences program aims to create and improve
preventive, diagnostic, and therapeutic interventions for infectious diseases, as well as
other conditions that affect mothers, infants, and children (BMGF 2020). Being selective
under W3, BMGF is providing considerable support for agricultural research within
CGIAR, but has so far been reluctant to provide predictable, sizable, long-term funding in
return for reform of the System as a whole.
Replenishment Model
CGIAR could have put in place—and it still can do—a system of three-year replenishments
at the time of the 2008 reforms. However, replenishments have been hard to achieve, as
examples of Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), IFAD, and regional
banks can testify. So, CGIAR is trying to obtain longer term commitments, even without
replenishments.
The final IDA19 replenishment meeting took place in Stockholm, Sweden, December
12–13, 2019. A global coalition of development partners agreed on a historic US$82 billion
financing package for IDA countries for fiscal years 2021–3, representing a 3 percent
increase in real terms, compared to IDA18 (IDA 2020). An additional new approach, in
view of the successful US$82 billion IDA19 replenishments over three years, would be to
support African countries’ national and regional research through IDA funds. With grad-
uation of big IDA borrowers like India, and the new ability of IDA to borrow on the
commercial market, based on IDA subscriptions, there is more money in IDA, than it can,
perhaps, usefully commit.
IDA, a coalition of more than 60 donor and borrower governments is ratcheting up the
fight against extreme poverty with a record US$75 billion commitment to the World Bank’s
fund for the poorest countries. IDA needs to be deployed actively to support R&D at the
country and regional levels. There is substantial aid and goodwill toward SSA, from which a
global vision of partnership built upon a CGIAR-run platform can emerge. The IDA’s
potential recipients can individually and regionally commit to contributing up to US$1
billion annually and predictably to help build a joint program.
CGIAR in the World Bank and the International
Development Association
The Bank has had a key role in the establishment of CGIAR as a founding member.¹⁶ It has
traditionally contributed net income from IBRD loan repayments to CGIAR, first justified
¹⁶ We are grateful for comments from Jonathan Wadsworth, Karen Brooks, and Will Martin. Views and
shortcomings are entirely our own.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/9/2021, SPi
748   
by Robert McNamara at the founding of CGIAR in 1972. Such contribution of IBRD net
income was justified on grounds that CGIAR research is long-term, requires bulky capital,
and the best of scientific talent—on a global scale. CGIAR achieves benefits with substantial
cross-border spillovers. CGIAR investments have been spectacularly successful, particularly
in contributing to the Green Revolution in Asia, containing cassava mealybug in Africa, and
in biofortified crops all over, documented recently by a comprehensive study of returns to
CGIAR research (Alston, Pardey, and Rao 2020), but its mission of food security and
nutrition remains unfulfilled. Indeed, the number of undernourished and extremely
hungry—that is, those persons whom WFP supports—has increased substantially. Thus,
the challenge of food security and nutrition has expanded and become more complex
with the need to address climate change, natural resource degradation, conflict, rainfed
agriculture, and a diversified food production system, many areas that IDA supports, in
contrast to the research on monoculture focusing on a handful of crops, such as rice, wheat,
and maize that CGIAR has conducted in the past.
Relatedly, the need for more public goods investment in CGIAR has increased, as its
resources have diminished, particularly since 2014 (Figure 10.4), and they become more
fragmented, unpredictable, and tied to small, short-term projects.
The Scale and Need for Agricultural Research in IDA Countries
IDA countries are the poorest and least food secure. According to the various background
papers prepared in support of IDA19, 500 million people live in extreme poverty in the
currently IDA-eligible countries, and their numbers have not diminished over successive
IDA replenishments. There are more violent conflicts in IDA countries than at any time in
the past 30 years. Economic growth has often been accompanied by inequalities, also
leading to exclusion. Gender gaps remain high in education and employment. Around
20 million jobs need to be created in IDA countries annually for the next decade, according
to IDA19 background papers, simply to meet the growing number of young men and
women entering the labor market. High unemployment contributes to growing involuntary
displacement of people.
Total factor productivity growth in agriculture has been the slowest in SSA, compared to
other regions, whether it is considered by regions or by income categories (see Figure 2.1).
This is, in part, because their investment in R&D, already low as share of agricultural GDP,
has declined over time (Figure 10.6). Given the small size of their R&D establishments, there
are diseconomies of scale in research. They need to collaborate with other neighboring
countries to take advantage of scale economies. That is why regional cooperation in R&D is
needed. And partnership with CGIAR can help promote it.
CGIAR has allocated a sizeable share of its own funding to Africa, in situation where its
own funding has not grown, and indeed, has declined since the peak was reached in 2014,
and with a sizable share of the funding in W3 (Figure 10.5), it is restricted, fragmented, and
unpredictable reducing its overall impact.
CGIAR has currently set a target of US$2 billion by 2030, but in the current fiscal
environment, CGIAR’s traditional donors are fiscally strapped, so that raising new addi-
tional funding is difficult. Several of CGIAR’s donors are also IDA contributors. After
reaching a peak in 2013, the flow of official development assistance (ODA) grants to IDA
countries has declined, largely due to the shift in official grant financing toward non-IDA
countries due to natural disasters and humanitarian assistance to refugees.
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The Potential of IDA Funding Both to IDA Countries and to CGIAR
IDA19 replenishment of US$82 billion is a testimonial to the confidence donors have placed
in IDA as an institution since its establishment in 1960. IDA has proven to be successful in
supporting enhanced food security in Asia, contributing to reducing poverty by nearly one
billion people, and contributing to the graduation of several IDA countries. No other
multilateral institution has the record of stable fundraising and performance as does
IDA. Evidence of more than 2,000 World Bank and IDA-funded agricultural projects
from 1970 to 2018 (Figures 8.14 and 8.16; Table 8.1) shows that OED/IEG performance
ratings of completed projects in low-income countries (LICs) are systematically lower than
those of low-middle-income countries (LMICs) and MICs, even when the performance of
LICs improves, and increasingly, completed Bank-funded projects lack estimates of returns
on investment because of the difficulty of quantifying many investments (IEG 2010).
Contrast this with the high rates of return realized by funding CGIAR research, which are
widely documented. The latest study shows a benefit cost ratio of 10:1 for CGIAR invest-
ments (Alston, Pardey, and Rao 2020). Despite these clear benefits, IDA borrowers have
limited capacity to meet the investment requirements.
More funding for CGIAR, so mobilized by using IDA as the demand pull, will require
it to create programs in greater consultation with developing countries. It will bring a
cascading combination of global, regional, and national public goods research, scientific
rigor, training, and institution building, assuring relevance, particularly if the funding is
used in partnership with scientists in advanced, developed, and developing countries. IDA
for CGIAR will require support of major IDA deputies/CGIAR donor countries in addition
to agreement in principle of IDA-eligible countries both at the broader strategic level as well
as on specific research programs of mutual interest.
Potential Scope and Use of IDA Funding to CGIAR
Allocation of IDA to CGIAR of up to US$1 billion annually, out of a total of US$82 billion
over three years, arguably, is an insignificant amount for IDA but a substantial increment
for CGIAR. Its funding was US$870 million in 2020. IDA funding can support CGIAR
activities downstream to applied and adaptive research, and even extension activities of the
kind national systems should perform.
With more predictable and diversified financial support to IDA countries, these collective
tendencies can strengthen NARS. They can also create obvious demand for complemen-
tarity of global or regional GPGs from CGIAR, as it did during the Green Revolution with
improved germplasm or with cassava mealybug, or more recently, with biofortified crops.
Relatedly, additional IDA resources would make the reorganization successful from the
vantage point of view of donors and recipients as a whole, so CGIAR can deliver global and
regional public goods for which CGIAR was established: that is, research with large spil-
lovers, and economies of scale and scope.
IDA funding to CGIAR, from US$500 million to up to US$1 billion annually, can ensure
a triple win: (1) success of the latest CGIAR reorganization to achieve its larger stated global
and regional public goods functions; (2) getting the global development community closer
to achieving SDG2 (food security and nutrition) and other related SDGs (gender equality,
climate change, water management) by 2030, given that many LICs are currently off track;
and (3) helping low-income, IDA-eligible countries to build their R&D capacity, raise their
investments in R&D, and by strengthening their food and agricultural sectors, achieve
broad-based sustainable growth, thereby helping them graduate from IDA eligibility.
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Nevertheless more funding for CGIAR from IDA should be more flexible and yet tied to
increased funding from IDA to the national-level institutions to build national capacity, as
an essential element of “IDA for CGIAR” for delivery and impact on the ground. IDA
funding is necessary but will not be sufficient. Some of the big global R&D issues of interest
to CGIAR, such as climate change, necessarily involve big non-IDA countries. Ideally, IDA
funds would be matched by pooled funding from traditional donors plus emerging coun-
tries to ensure the range of GPGs that are needed. A combination of stimulating demand
from borrowing countries and pooled funding from other partners will increase the
ownership of CGIAR in developing countries.
In short, as CGIAR pivots toward its rearticulated mission of transforming agro-food
systems for climate resilience and healthy diets, funding will be critical. CGIAR is still
uniquely positioned and equipped to play a major role in enabling and accelerating the
transformation of the world’s food system. It will call for modifying some of the restrictive
IDA procurement and safeguarding rules. It will call for strong, creative, collective leader-
ship of donors, of the kind that led to the establishment of CGIAR under McNamara’s
leadership in which profits on IBRD loans were used to cross-subsidize CGIAR.
Funding of the CGIAR Windows on a Multi-Year Basis
None of the proposals discussed here directly addresses the core funding problem. The
traditional donors are key to this. There is a good case for a more formal, periodic
replenishment system, so that the three windows (not the bilateral funding) are replenished
on a multi-year basis. That could also be the venue for trying to get a better balance between
the windows, as well as reaching out to new donors.
Thus, for example, W3 was and remains essentially a pass-through mechanism to
channel donor funds to individual Centers. The World Bank as Trustee of the CGIAR
Fund entered intoW3 transfer agreements directly with the Centers receiving theW3 funds.
However, the legal agreements between the FC, represented by the World Bank, and the
CGIAR Consortium also had terms that governed the use of W3 funds. These requirements
flowed down through the CGIAR Consortium to the Centers in Program Implementation
Agreements, along with W1 and W2 requirements. The new arrangements came into effect
on January 1, 2017.
The FC did not enter into any contractual relationships with the System Board of the
group of Centers or the individual Centers, with respect to the use of W3 funds, and it did
not take part in setting CGIAR priorities. Indeed, a review of the continuation of W3 was
planned after a two-year transitional period of reforms, but W3 continues. The creation of
W3 defeated the purpose of a consolidated research agenda under a System-level umbrella,
with both the increasing share of W3 financing and the creation of a considerable amount of
uncertainty and instability in the funding, as different Centers have different abilities to
raise resources (Özgediz 2012). W1 and W2, taken together to mean unrestricted program
funding, as a replacement for the previously defined unrestricted Center core funding
declined to 19 percent (US$161 million) of CGIAR’s total revenue in 2017, from the 2014
peak of US$383 million (35 percent of the total), while bilateral funding fell from 69 percent
in 2011 to 41 percent in 2017 (CGIAR 2017h) (see Figure 10.7). Unless this imbalance can
be dramatically reversed, the newly proposed reforms will fail, because there will be no
incentives and discipline to get Centers to conduct research collaboratively and within the
System’s framework of priorities.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/9/2021, SPi
 751
Independent scientific advice and priority setting have taken the biggest tolls in succes-
sive reorganizations of CGIAR. Our interviews suggest that donors do not appear to want
independent scientific advice, and neither do the Centers. While there are a few notable
exceptions, by and large, donors also do not seem to want to see priority-setting efforts,
perhaps because it would disturb their ongoing bilateral relationship, and they would have
less control over resource mobilization. This is contrary to the argument made by Hayami,
Lipton, and Mule (2003), or that implied in the funding reforms of 2008, in creating two
windows, even though the current arrangement of three windows entails high transaction
costs, with each Center doing their own fundraising, as the Mid-Term Review emphasized
(CGIAR 2014b).
Growth of Window 3 Funding
The most significant change has been the rapid growth of W3, which exhibited more than a
18-fold increase from US$17 million in 2011 to US$314 million in 2017, which was 37
percent of CGIAR’s total revenue in 2017, and an increase from only 2 percent in 2011 (see
Figure 10.8; CGIAR 2018c). W3 and bilateral projects are intended to contribute to the
achievement of the CGIAR SRF through alignment with CRP activities and objectives.
However, most are project-specific (Wadsworth 2016). While bilateral funding is likely to
remain an important component of overall CRP financing, the extent to which CRPs are
reliant on bilateral support, whether through the Fund or through Centers, has the potential
to distort priority setting within the CRPs and limit the flexibility to allocate resources. At
the System level, coherent and integrated strategy for resource mobilization reportedly
exists but reinforces a hyperawareness of boundaries and distinctions in standing
among organizational entities intended to be complementary and collaborative (Robinson
et al. 2014).
The new CGIAR Trust Fund was set up in 2017. It had to be set up for legal reasons, but
essentially remains the same as the old trust fund. According to One CGIAR’s Resource
Mobilization, Communication and Advocacy Strategy:
The year 2017 was the first of Phase 2 of the CRP portfolio, and although revenue for 2017
was below the peak revenue for 2013, pooled investments stabilized. . . . [I]n 2019, coordi-
nated advocacy around CGIAR’s climate agenda and momentum around One CGIAR
generated the first—albeit moderate—increase in pooled funding since 2013. (CGIAR
2020c)
ODA has been the main source of CGIAR funding. More than 50 percent of the funding
comes from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–Development
Assistance Committee (OECD–DAC) countries. Other sources of funding include founda-
tions and the private sector, multilateral development banks (MDBs), and international
financial institutions (IFIs), and other non-DAC countries sources.
“System Council Funders (all sources) provide more than 70% of all funding to CGIAR. . . .
They also provide 99% of the pooled funding to the shared research agenda. All other
sources of funding are contributed through Window 3 and bilateral” (CGIAR 2020c, 6).
One CGIAR’s 2020 multi-channel action area approach entails strengthening relations
with existing SC funders, growing emerging markets, tapping climate funds and finance,
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engaging country partners and IFIs, and cultivating innovative and private finance (CGIAR
2020c, 10).
Effects of Levels of Fragmented Funding on the Research Program
The drop in Windows 1 and 2 affected System-wide CRPs differently. CRPs were created
under the 2008 reforms. “Seven CRPs exceeded or came close to achieving full total budgets;
five CRPs achieved 75–90% full budgets; and four CRPs fell below 75% full funding despite
two of the latter receiving close to their approved W1+W2 budgets” (Wadsworth 2016, 2).
There are suggestions that CRPs, which had directors who were particularly skilled at
fundraising or which had themes that were appealing to donors, kept their funding intact.
As noted earlier, CGIAR set up a Trust Fund in 2017.
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Figure 10.8 CGIAR total implemented revenue by all sources of funding and total expenditure,
2011–2019 (US$m)
Source: Based on data from CGIAR Financial Reports 2011 (CGIAR 2012); 2012 (CGIAR 2013); 2013 (CGIAR
2014a); 2014 (CGIAR 2015a); 2015 (CGIAR 2016c); 2016 (CGIAR 2017h); 2017 (CGIAR 2018c); CGIAR (2020e);
CGIAR Financial Report Dashboards (https://www.cgiar.org/food-security-impact/finance-reports/dashboard/).
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The Need for Multi-Year Funding
CGIAR has sought multi-year contribution agreements from donors to increase stability
and predictability of funding and assure timely disbursements to research programs. Only
40 percent of Fund receipts in 2014, however, reached formal multi-year agreements.
“Timely disbursements from the Fund were only possible when the Fund carried sufficient
resources over from one year to the next to enable smoothing of the skewed nature of Fund
receipts, which occurred mainly in the final quarter of the year” (Wadsworth 2016, 2). Such
funding was at the lowest level in September 2017.
Funding uncertainty has affected the quality of partnerships with NARS. Centers are
hesitant to make commitments on collaborative research when they are uncertain of the
flow of funds; this is a particularly significant issue with developing countries’ NARS, which
depend on external resources for collaborations, given their own underfunding, more so
than in developed countries. These funding prospects must be seen in the larger context in
which CGIAR operates and its ability to deliver on promised results.
Several external factors beyond the control of CGIAR in recent years explain its funding
challenge: for example, with the huge refugee crisis, the largest human displacement since
the Second World War, aid budgets were reallocated to refugee management at home and
for the humanitarian crisis abroad in several European countries. In 2017, Syria, Yemen,
South Sudan, Somalia, and northern Nigeria each experienced emergency demands for food
and other forms of aid. Strong anti-globalization movements that swept Western countries,
as reflected in the Brexit vote and the 2016 US election, have also taken a toll on aid budgets.
Now, stimulus packages in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and slower growth in
OECD countries have stretched their resources. However, these challenges call for a
stronger, not weaker CGIAR. As part of the G20 Summit in July 2017, “the Merkel plan”
called for more investment in Africa, as a way of stemming the anticipated tide of an
estimated 100 million African migrants to Europe if nothing was done, according to the
German Foreign Minister Gerd Muller. Chancellor Merkel vowed to invest some US$335
million to attract foreign investors to Africa and vowed to convince the other 19 nations
attending the July 2017 G20 summit to show greater commitment to the continent’s
struggling economies (G20 2017). Although more resources have been committed to Africa
in recent years, needs are even greater, as we showed in Chapter 5 on global governance and
Chapter 7 on finance.
CGIAR’s Need to Adeptly Change and Develop Its Priorities
CGIAR, by its very definition, needs to be able to restate its priorities, based on the rapidly
changing science and technology, on the one hand, and the changes in CGIAR:
1. Climate-smart agriculture, focusing on urgently needed adaptation and mitigation
options for farmers and other resource users.
2. Genetic improvement of crops, livestock, fish and trees, to increase productivity,
resilience to stress, nutritional value and efficiency of resource use.
3.Nurturing diversity, ensuring that CGIAR in-trust plant genetic resources collections are
safely maintained, genetically and phenotypically characterized to maximize the exploi-
tation of these critical resources for food security, productivity, nutrient rich crops and
resilient farming systems.
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4. Natural resources and ecosystem services, focusing on productive ecosystems and land-
scapes that offer significant opportunities to reverse environmental degradation and
enhance [sustainable intensification of] productivity.
5. Gender and inclusive growth, creating opportunities for women, young people and
marginalized groups.
6. Nutrition and health, emphasizing dietary diversity, nutritional content and safety of
foods, and development of value chains of particular importance for the nutritional benefit
of poor consumers.
7. Agricultural systems, adopt a systems approach to optimize economic, social and
environmental co-benefits in areas with high concentrations of poor people.
8. Enabling policies and institutions to improve the performance of markets, enhance
delivery of critical public goods and services, and increase the agency and resilience of
poor people. (CGIAR 2015b, 4)
These clearly are not operational priorities. Some reviewers of this chapter have argued that
the lack of such priorities, operationally defined so that compliance can be enforced, is one
of the main reasons that donors are hesitant to provide funding to W1 and W2. They have
little idea as to how their funds would be deployed. Has ISPC/ISDC been too timid in setting
priorities, or have donors been reluctant to encourage ISPC to set priorities, because they
would rather allocate resources according to the wishes of their officials and domestic
constituencies?
CGIAR Activities and the Challenge of Alignment with a Proliferation
of Global Agendas
The goals and targets of CGIAR’s SRF reflect and are aligned with increasing worldwide
political convergence on necessary actions to meet the competing demands of global
development. CGIAR’s new SRF is expected to achieve global ambition, reflected in many
different initiatives (CGIAR 2015b): SDGs, United Nations’ Zero Hunger Challenge, G8
Nutrition for Growth Compact, the Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture’s
(GACSA) commitment, the Bonn Challenge on Landscape Restoration of the International
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets of the
Convention on Biological Diversity. CGIAR has signed the G8’s Nutrition for Growth
Compact, which has committed, inter alia, to reaching 500 million pregnant women and
children with effective nutrition interventions by 2030; preventing at least 20 million
children under the age of 5 from having stunted growth; and saving at least 1.7 million
lives by reducing stunting, increasing breastfeeding, and treating severe acute undernutri-
tion. CGIAR also cofounded the 2014 Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture, which
has undertaken to reach 500 million farms with climate-smart interventions by 2030.
CGIAR and the Global Conference on Agricultural Research
for Development
CGIAR relied upon the Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development
(GCARD), an innovative platform introduced in 2008, to open itself to outside partners,
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including, in particular, the NARS of developing and developed countries. GCARD 1 in
2010 replaced CGIAR’s annual general meeting. A Roadmap, based on a theme paper
prepared by Lele et al. (2010) and negotiated heavily by regional organizations and the
Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR) Steering Committee, was adopted. The
Roadmap clearly needed to evolve over time and be monitored, but like many other such
well-intentioned roadmaps, its implementation was never systematically overseen or mon-
itored. The agendas and the participation of stakeholders in subsequent GCARD meetings
on the opening of the CGIAR System to outside stakeholders did not materialize. Regional
research organizations are weak and do not always represent the interests of disparate
national systems of different sizes and clout.
Our interviews of CGIAR stakeholders suggested a loss of confidence in the GCARD
process in organizing effective interactions between national and regional stakeholders and
CGIAR. GFAR’s leadership, in turn, was disappointed that it did not have the opportunity
to play an effective role. Whatever the underlying reasons, including leadership and money,
it seems GCARD did not realize the potential it held, when CGIAR replaced its annual
general meetings with the format of GCARD in 2009, to open itself to global consultations.
This is unfortunate but inevitable, because it had no decision-making power and very little
influence.
Learning from the lessons of the CPs, CGIAR leadership did not open the leadership of
CRPs to non-CGIAR actors, avoiding the creation of competition for the CGIAR Centers.
Opening the System could have increased research quality by receiving proposals from
developed or emerging countries. The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EM-
BRAPA), for example, provides a case of a cutting-edge research program on soils, Bt
cotton, and biotechnology and is already engaged in partnership with several African
countries (Reifschneider et al. 2016). How well the Brazilian partnership and other such
South–South collaborations are working and the strength of their commitments to play
roles in multilateral agencies need an independent review to build larger, more inclusive
scientist-to-scientist and farmer-to-farmer global partnerships.
SRF Priorities: Disconnect between Stated Priorities
and Research Allocation
In the CRP 1 process, Birner and Byerlee (2016, x), in the CGIAR report on the “Synthesis
and Lessons Learned from 15 CRP Evaluations,” noted that the priorities of the 2010–16
SRF were “so generic that they provided little guidance either to the choice of a CRP
portfolio or the relative importance among CRPs within a portfolio. Nonetheless, all
evaluations concluded that the CRPs align well with CGIAR SLOs.” Further, the Centers
built on the ongoing historical legacy research, thus turning to somewhat of an “old wine in
a new bottle” approach, not necessarily bringing new science to old research programs or
new research programs, except for climate change, which was started in 2003 as a Challenge
Program, and the CRP4 on food and nutrition also started as a challenge program Harvest-
Plus, subsequently incorporated into the broader CRP on Agriculture for Nutrition and
Health (A4NH).
Priorities are meaningful if they influence resource allocation, but should the priorities be
determined by the size of the “bang for the buck”—that is, return to investment—or driven
by what are “desirable outcomes,” regardless of whether CGIAR has a comparative advan-
tage in them? There are also other issues in assessing impacts—impacts of germplasm
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research are relatively easy to measure, whereas those from processes in NRM are difficult to
measure. Also, where outcomes materialize only over time, even if CGIAR is not able to
achieve them acting alone and certainly not on a large scale, it is not easy to figure out
what has been spent against each “priority”—and even harder to do ex ante allocations
against them.
There are funding problems at various levels. In 2017, funding in W1 and W2 was only
one-third of the funding from bilateral donors. Donors provide funding dependent on
which objective is appealing to their domestic constituencies, as we show in Chapter 6 on
the governance of the Big Five. There is no mechanism to make Centers or donors abide by
the priorities or outlaw objectives that do not fall inside the priorities. Priorities have been a
well-meaning list—not to be taken literally. Better scientific advice from an independent
scientific board may help to improve priorities by having them based more on rapidly
advancing science and changing consumer demand.
The Role of the Scientific Advisory Board in Establishing Priorities
CGIAR needs a broad-based, multidisciplinary scientific advisory body with international
reputation, equivalent to the National Academies of Sciences of advanced countries, with
deep knowledge of development. CGIAR needs scientific advisors with knowledge and
expertise in research organizations in advanced and emerging countries, the private sector,
and poorest countries that can go outside the traditional CGIAR approaches. One of the
recommendations of the Independent Evaluation of ISPC is to do just that, including
renaming ISPC to ISDC (CGIAR–IEA 2017). There has been a history of relabeling entities,
from TAC to Science Council to ISPC, and now ISDC, but changing functions and behavior
remain a challenge. Effective January 1, 2019, the ISDC was established as “an external,
impartial standing panel of experts in science and development subject matters (including
food systems innovation matters that extend beyond the agricultural sector) appointed by
the System Council and accountable to it, with the responsibility of providing rigorous,
independent strategic advice to the System Council . . . ” (CGIAR 2018d, 1). Some of our
interlocutors remained cautiously pessimistic that this change would not make any differ-
ence if the underlying power structure and funding system remains the same.
The Benefits of Opening the CGIAR System to All Qualified Researchers
CGIAR needs to open its System to allow all qualified researchers, whether from the inside
or outside the CGIAR System, to lead research programs to accelerate delivery of technol-
ogies, thereby creating competition and enhancing the quality of research and outreach.
This was one of the key recommendations from the Structure and Governance Working
Group in 2009, but it faced strong center opposition, and little or no support among donors.
SMO states that CRPs have steering committees with a majority of external members, but
that is not the same as external researchers conducting research. This has been a contentious
issue in CGIAR. Centers are happy to form partnerships, but fear that opening up the
System will accelerate its demise, particularly if advanced countries’ universities are more at
the cutting edge of science, and as the Centers’ scientists argue, not necessarily as committed
to development objectives, compared to publishing and more resource mobilization.
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The Increasing Requirement for Monitoring and Impact Assessment
of CGIAR Research Implementation
A monitoring system for the implementation of CGIAR research needs to be established
with the monitored output routinely reviewed by an independent scientific body with clout
and credibility, and with regular reporting to the CGIAR donors and intended beneficiaries.
The monitoring must be done not only for accountability but, more importantly, as a tool of
learning, providing feedback information on successes and failures to guide adjustments in
research objectives and methods.
Measurement of Impacts and Capacity Development
Approaches to measure both impacts of technology generation and capacity development in
institutions need to be strengthened to scale up impacts. In addition to the most recent
impact assessment by Alston, Pardey, and Rao (2020), retrospective studies of CGIAR’s
impacts have attributed 0.7–1.0 percent yield growth annually between 1965 and 2000 to
genetic gains, with about half of that attributable to CGIAR (Byerlee 2016). In aggregate,
without CGIAR’s genetic improvements, world food production would have been 5 percent
lower and food prices 18–21 percent higher (Evenson and Gollin 2003; Byerlee 2016).
Nearly 90 percent of all the reported gains that CGIAR attributes to its research is
attributable to germplasm improvement of rice, wheat, and maize alone and, to a lesser
extent, to several other rainfed crops, as well as biological control of cassava mealybugs (see
Box A.10.3 in the Appendix).
Questions about Extraordinary CGIAR Impacts
It should be noted that in exhaustive reviews of returns to food and agricultural R&D, new
questions have been raised on these extraordinary estimates. Hurley et al. (2016), using
2,829 estimates throughout the world, and Pardey et al. (2016a), reviewing internal rate of
return (IRR) estimates and the corresponding 129 BCRs averaged in SSA from 1975 to 2014,
have both questioned the credibility of previous estimates:
The large dispersion in the reported IRRs and BCRs makes it difficult to discern mean-
ingful patterns in the evidence. Moreover, the distribution of IRRs is heavily (positively)
skewed, such that the median value . . . is well below the mean. . . . The weight of
commodity-specific evaluation evidence is not especially congruent with the composition
of agricultural production throughout Africa, nor, to the best that can be determined, the
commodity orientation of public African agricultural R&D. (Pardey et al. 2016a, 1)
Hurley et al. (2016) observed that it is not difficult to see how policymakers may question
the credibility of such evidence. In Africa, although Pardey et al. (2016a) found research
investment evidence to be worrisomely small, they noted further:
Many countries throughout SSA are failing to sustain the long-run commitments to
investments in [their own] R&D (and associated educational and science-based regulatory
capabilities) required to develop the local innovation and institutional capacities that have
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been pivotal to the agricultural productivity performance of countries elsewhere in the
world. This is in spite of the growing body of IRR and BCR estimates reported here, which
suggests that overall, governments throughout the region are continuing to underinvest in
research directed to their food and agricultural sectors. (Pardey et al. 2016a, 7)
Observers of African research argue that underfunding of agricultural research in Africa is
in part because governments in SSA see the CGIAR Centers as a sufficient substitute for
their own NARS. At the end of the chapter, we note this same unintended consequence in
many other developing countries, particularly in countries where CGIAR Centers are
located.
The impacts of research on policies and on NRM are harder to measure and demonstrate
than those of germplasm research. Particularly in the case of NRM research, the focus has to
be more on learning and less on end results. IFPRI’s research has been widely lauded, and it
has been one of the fastest growing research centers, among CGIAR’s 15 Centers, suggesting
donors believe policy research is important, regardless of the difficulty of garnering evidence
on impacts. Despite a flurry of activity, starting around 2007, there has been a distinct lull
since in the production of quantitative ex post impact assessments of policy-oriented
research within CGIAR. Impact assessment is costly in terms of both time and money, so
the most obvious explanation for this lull is that from the perspective of CGIAR researchers
and administrators managing that research. The costs of meaningfully deriving such
quantitative assessments outweigh the benefits that such assessments confer on their
institutions (Hazell and Slade 2016; Renkow 2016).
Strengthening Impact Assessment in CGIAR
Currently, a special grant program financed by several of CGIAR’s funders supports the
SIAC work program of the SPIA, a subgroup of the ISPC. Evaluation of SIAC was meant to
“demonstrate accountability to SIAC donors for Phase 1 (2013–2016); and to draw lessons
and make recommendations [to] inform the second phase of SIAC and future directions of
SPIA” (CGIAR–IEA 2016, vi). The evaluation notes several areas for improvement:
First, the theory of change of SIAC needs revisiting in depth before taking major decisions
on the scope and activities of any further phase of SIAC—with a focus on how SIAC
activities and outputs can be best designed to lead to institutional strengthening of impact
assessment in the CGIAR. Second, more work needs to be done to agree on the compar-
ative advantage of SIAC/SPIA and its priority activities vis-à-vis impact assessment
conducted by Centers and CRPs. We believe this is a priority for the forthcoming
evaluation of ISPC/SPIA. . . .
Another area for possible improvement is to broaden out external partnerships, in
particular to get greater involvement of nationals of countries where the work is taking
place. . . . [T]he Fund Council has been unable to exercise effective governance of
SPIA/SIAC to date, and . . . the new System Council [needs to address this] through its
“Strategic Impact, Monitoring and Evaluation Committee” and/or through the
ISPC. Furthermore, . . . despite the commitment and hard work of its members, the Project
Steering Committee (PSC) is not appropriately composed and configured for either a
management or a governance role, and [we] suggest that this be revisited before a second
phase. (CGIAR–IEA 2016, vi–vii)
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The Development of Theories of Change for CGIAR
The CGIAR System has systematically moved to adopt a theory framework (Box 10.2).
This approach is not altogether accidental. The idea of the TOC was conceived in the
context of donor-funded development projects, and its application to research proposals
have been questioned by many, but its adoption may be explained by the downward drift of
CGIAR research (McCalla 2014, 2017; Birner and Byerlee 2016). Some note that TOCs are
often done as window dressing to check a box. Moreover, many TOCs share the fatal flaws
of the old log frame mindsets from which they have evolved. They ignore the complexity,
uncertainty, and nonlinearity of change in a real life context.
TOCs are highly context-specific and require a high degree of participation of all
concerned stakeholders to determine if the theory mimics reality closely. If applied care-
fully, it can stimulate micromanagement of downstream processes beyond the control of
CGIAR several years forward. Often, the causal chain is not unidirectional, with much
learning involved in achieving ultimate impacts, if what Howard White and David Raitzer
(2017) call the “funnel of attrition” is to be avoided.¹⁷ This is why a culture of learning and
adaptive management is key. Many unanticipated factors intervene in the adoption process,
which affect impacts. Going back to the earlier processes to correct links—for example,
inappropriate targeting of nutrition interventions and the mother-in-law factor that White
outlined—is typically the role of NARS.¹⁸ We show this schematically in Figure 10.9; see,
particularly, the box for site selection of countries. Most importantly, the adoption process
takes place in countries at the local and regional level. The approach of the CRPs cannot
materialize without the active participation of NARS. Yet, since the reforms started in 2008,
our interviews suggested that partnerships with NARS have weakened and, particularly,
their participation in the design of CRPs. An enormous amount of time is spent by CGIAR
scientists on templates of programs of work and budgets, and reporting with the help of IEA
and ISPC/SPIA, piloted in 2017. The intent is to bring annual planning and reporting into
closer alignment for the better planning and assessment of program progress toward
Box 10.2 Theory of Change
“Theory of Change (TOC)—presents an explicit identification of the ways by which
change is expected to occur from [intervention to] output to outcome and impact. The
TOC questions the assumptions about causality underlying the relationships between
[interventions,] outputs, outcomes and impact. In TOC the assumptions present the
mechanisms of change. There is no single method or presentational form agreed for
TOCs.” (ISPC 2012, 2)
¹⁷ White and Raitzner (2017, 23) describe funnel attrition: “The motivation behind the funnel is that
participation rates and effect sizes diminish along the causal chain, so that final effects are not as large as project
designers often envision . . . There may be substantial attrition because exposure is not universal, participation may
be partial, behavior change may not always occur, and conditions for full effects may not always be present.”
¹⁸ According to White (2014, 6), “And for women in joint households—meaning they live with their mother-
in-law—as a sizeable minority do, then the mother-in-law heads the women’s domain. Indeed, project participa-
tion rates are significantly lower for women living with their mother-in-law in more conservative parts of the
country.”
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CGIAR’s 2022 targets, for learning and adapting by management and, potentially, for
portfolio or resource adjustment in the future. Owing to great funding uncertainties,
scientists have been distracted from conducting science, but also this is due to the depend-
ence on bilateral funding, and contrary to when there was more unrestricted funding
available without micromanagement and forms to complete so as to report on research.
Only a fifth of resources now come from Windows 1 and 2 (see Figure 10.7). Standardiza-
tion of the language of program descriptions, the common vocabulary of TOCs, CRP/
Flagship programs and clusters of activity, annual milestones, outputs, program outcomes,
indicators, and targets have become a common language and are providing clarity to
administrators in framing research effort and results. The year 2017 was an experimental
one for performance management design and implementation, and further improvements
to this interim program of work and budget template are being made for 2018, based on
recent experience.
For illustrative purposes, we provide a stylized TOC, shown in Figure 10.9. Individual
CRPs and their 57 flagship programs, in which the 16 CRPs were divided, involve numerous
CRP-specific Intermediate and Sub-Intermediate Outcomes that should lead to SLOs. The
major impact pathways should be supported by a thorough and realistic TOC. The inde-
pendent review process has helped to improve the quality of proposals of the initial four
SLOs in the first SRF. The TOC approach has similarly been turned into a mechanistic
approach. Our own interviews suggest that a genuine systematic involvement of NARS in a
partnership mode on a routine basis is costly. There are no resources for them to engage in
partnerships or to conduct the downstream activities needed to realize results on the
ground, unless they allocate resources from their own NARS’ budgets, which are short of
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Figure 10.9 CGIAR: Theory of change (TOC)
Source: Authors’ depiction.
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dressing”—a good idea in principle, but one that does not account for the complexity of the
innovation process involved in the course of implementation.
A New Vision for CGIAR
CGIAR made a big impact when hunger was the only challenge and an exclusive focus on
increasing calorie supply made sense. At midlife, CGIAR has evolved, but it has not nearly
reached the transformation needed to respond to the two radical paradigm shifts in
agriculture, combined with a highly changed external environment: environmentally sus-
tainable food production and healthy nutritious food for an expanding, urbanizing, and
more prosperous population, without leaving behind the billion poor and hungry. These
new challenges are accompanied by extraordinary changes in the world. Encapsulated in the
fourth industrial revolution, the far-reaching technological changes in scope and speed, and
the new tools accompanying them from the emerging countries, have profound implica-
tions for how and where food is produced and consumed (Lele and Goswami 2017). Today,
meat and milk can be produced without animals, and urban food with vertical farming.
Climate change, the growing incidence of obesity, the risk of pandemics, zoonosis, food
safety issues, the threat of antimicrobial resistance are all part of the system. To solve
problems at scale, we need to harness technologies through markets and public sectors of
“the system” to achieve public good based on coordinated global approaches.
Can CGIAR be the prime mover to radiate change out into the community of
stakeholders—that is, donors, NARS, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), national
governments, and the private sector—around a new vision beyond hunger eradication,
important as that is? Without the large-scale mobilization of all concerned actors, CGIAR
will not be able to continue its impact in the future. Why do we believe the time is right for
such an initiative? And what would motivate stakeholders to participate around clearly
defined objectives? They all should want to be part of the two sets of global goals: namely,
the SDGs and climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Some possible objectives of the transformed CGIAR could be:
(1) An expanded dual research agenda on sustainable production food and healthy food
consumption with strong health linkages.
(2) A platform for broadly shared, easily accessible information to match supply from a
wide range of sources with demand/need.
(3) Large-scale mobilization of talent wherever it exists.
(4) Public–private partnerships/funds to achieve accelerated impact on the quality of the
environment and health through science.
(5) The “newly transformed organization” would be a marketplace for matching
demand (and need) for technology with the supply of technology generation and
delivery. Wadsworth previously described this concept as CGIAR becoming a
“chassis” to which the best science from anywhere in the world could be attached
and supported.
CGIAR research needs to move upstream to generate essential international and regional
public goods of importance to developing countries, which only CGIAR can provide, and
offer an alternative proposal based on public–private partnerships. It would be a global
movement for collaboration on technology generation and adoption, which CGIAR could
spearhead, coordinate, and facilitate to address the downstream challenges of SDG2,
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eradicating hunger and malnourishment sustainably. It needs to actively and transparently
solicit participation of all types of technology providers and users from the public, private,
and NGO sectors, including international, regional, and national providers.
Defining CGIAR’s Niche Based on Its Comparative Advantage
In a dynamic world, CGIAR needs to clearly define its niche and priorities, based on its
comparative advantage and relative to new entrants as providers of technologies, particu-
larly the private sector and emerging countries and research universities.
CGIAR’s share in total public and private expenditures on AgR&D has shrunk to
1 percent, down to 1.7 percent of the public expenditures in 2011, from 4 percent in 1999
(Pardey 2017). At the same time, the gap between poor and rich countries for public
AgR&D has widened considerably. In per capita terms, the difference has increased
from 7.7-fold in 1980 to 11.7-fold in 2011. In 2011, high-income countries spent
US$17.73 per person, compared to US$1.51 in LICs. Also, regions of the world experiencing
the highest rates of population growth are the places where per capita investment in AgR&D
is among the lowest in the world. The population in SSA has nearly tripled since 1980 (372
million) to 1,023 million people today and will increase by 2030 to 1,418 million and by
2050 to 2,168 million. The top 10 countries, however, accounted for 70 percent of AgR&D
worldwide in 2011.The bottom 100 countries contributed just 9 percent of their spending in
that year’s total. These 100 countries include some of the poorest and are home to 22
percent of the world’s population (Pardey et al. 2016b, 2016c). So how should public–
private roles be viewed?
In the case of the United States, “private R&D is commercially oriented. Companies,
which must hold down costs, concentrate R&D funds on research that is likely to result in
sales and profits, preferably on research that will lead to intellectual property that can be
protected by patents” (NIFA 2004, 48). According to Fuglie et al. (1996, iii): “More than 40
percent of private agricultural R&D budgets is for product development research, compared
with less than 7 percent of public agricultural research.”
Public sector investments can serve a critical role in promoting innovation in specific
areas, where the private sector cannot justify the investment, such as important basic
research that may yield benefits only in the longer term (GHI 2011).
Joachim von Braun and Philip G. Pardey noted perceptively in 2006:
Recent developments in both the developed and developing worlds mean that poor
countries may no longer be able to depend as they have in the past on spillovers of new
agricultural technologies and knowledge from richer countries, especially advances related
to enhanced productivity of staple foods.
As a consequence of these changes, simply maintaining their current agricultural R&D
policies may leave many developing countries as agricultural technology orphans in the
decades ahead. Developing countries may have to become more self-reliant and perhaps
more dependent on one another for the collective benefits of agricultural R&D and
technology. Some of the more advanced [former] developing countries like South
Korea, Brazil, China, and India seem to be gaining ground, with productive and self-
sustaining local research sectors taking hold. (Foreword by Joachim von Braun, Director
General, IFPRI, in Pardey, Alston, and Piggott [2006, xix–xx])
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Confirming their observation, India’s gross expenditure on R&D in 2015 was about 90
percent of the combined investment of 35 low-income and 55 low-middle-income countries
(personal communication, T. Ramasami, July 5, 2017). Evidence specific to the 54 countries
of the African continent, including many small and least developed countries, provided by
Beintema and Stads (2017) also confirms this story (discussed in Chapter 7 on financing).
Further, Reifschneider et al. (2016) described Brazil’s partnership with Africa.
Regionally, CGIAR research is concentrated where the majority of the world’s poor and
hungry live: Africa receives over 50 percent of the investments, Asia receives about
30 percent, and poverty hot spots in Latin America receive about 20 percent. With all the
hallmarks of downstream research, CGIAR in its SRF states:
We must redouble our focus on women and young people, extend our efforts to improve
dietary quality among the poor and vulnerable, and intensify our work on climate-smart
agriculture—all given new prominence in our research agenda. At the same time we will
continue to build on our long record of achievement in research to improve the produc-
tivity of staple foods, livestock and fish, and to restore and protect the natural resources
used to produce them—our traditional areas of strength. (CGIAR 2015b, 1)
CGIAR’s demonstrated traditional strengths, however, have not been in gender or NRM,
and going forward they cannot be realized without CGIAR putting some of its own money
where it says its priorities are and engaging in active, long-term, high-quality partnerships
with NARS, as shown in the Appendix.
The SRF makes clear the research program “reflects the collective expectations of the
donor community” (CGIAR 2015b, 1). It lacks an exploration of the rapidly changing
science—how it is currently incorporated into CGIAR’s research and its implications for
CGIAR strategy going forward. Similarly, the SRF lacks a discussion of the objective reality
in developing countries, such as the changing structure of agriculture with the dual growth
of unviable holdings and the rising role of commercial farmers. How it will focus on the
reduction of hunger and poverty is unclear. Malnourishment and the growing incidence of
micronutrient deficiencies are now substantially larger and a faster growing problem than
that of hunger (filling the calorie gap by increasing supply, which has been CGIAR’s
demonstrated impact, rather than improving or changing consumption). The newer need
for diversification of diets calls also for diversification of farming systems and NRM—going
beyond research on traditional cereals and roots and tubers, which has been CGIAR’s forte.
CGIAR’s focus on biofortification of many crops provides a powerful strategy (discussed in
Box A.10.2 in the Appendix), as well as on value chains (again, an area in which its research
has been very limited).
Recognizing Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats:
A SWOT Analysis
SWOT analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats will help us summa-
rize the preceding discussion in the chapter of the global research system, thus allowing us
to evaluate these four elements as an input into structured planning.
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Strengths
CGIAR is the logical candidate to operate a global platform, as the largest (US$1 billion)
global research network with a presence in more than 70 countries and supported by 65
principal donors It has the largest collection of germplasm, a well-proven track record in
increasing food security and nutrition, providing policy research, and fostering institutional
development. It undertakes research on some of the major commodities and natural
resources of forestry and agroforestry, soils, water, and climate change. It is engaged in
thousands of partnerships with research and development institutions at the global,
regional, and national levels throughout the developing world. Some of these partnerships
are genuine, and others are ghost partnerships. CGIAR has a demonstrated track record of
impact, trust, and credibility, and it is one of the Big Five international organizations
concerned with food and agriculture, with long-standing partnerships. (See Box A.10.2 in
the Appendix on CGIAR’s achievements.)
Weaknesses
CGIAR’s research funding of less than US$1 billion is not nearly enough to make a dent on
poverty and hunger among a billion people, most of them women and children. There is a
huge funding gap at the national level and in CGIAR. Most important is the deficit of
political commitment and leadership at all levels. The original intent in establishing CGIAR
in 1971, was that all countries would develop effective NARS within 20–30 years, and
indeed, the Rockefeller Foundation and USAID in the 1960s and 1970s and the World Bank
in the 1980s worked actively toward this goal by investing in agricultural research and
educational institutions at the national level and supporting regional organizations. CGIAR
has built capacity mainly through collaborative research involving NARS partners and
establishing research networks. Bilateral and multilateral organizations and, particularly,
investments by the United States in universities have strengthened institutions at the
national and subnational levels. Donor interest in institution building has declined, how-
ever. It is a long-term task, whereas donors have increasingly shorter time horizons, and
often, political commitment is lacking in developing countries where such attempts were
made and where a strong sense of ownership is critical to sustain efforts. Countries go
through cycles—India had strong political commitment when it was in a food deficit status.
In Ethiopia, the University of Oklahoma was engaged in an attempt to build Haramaya
College in the 1950s. After a series of ups and downs in the new millennium, Ethiopia is
taking its AgR&D seriously with good outcomes (Bachewe et al. 2018).
One objective of this networked platform would be to “leave no NARS behind”—with a
serious intent to graduate some NARS into quality NARS—like that of China, Brazil, and
India, or smaller ones, like those of Chile or Uruguay—while choices will have to be made
about which NARS have the capacity and scale to graduate into lead research organizations,
and which ones should develop advanced capacities to select, borrow, and adapt technol-
ogies developed by others, and also to establish global norms and standards for scientific
partnerships. If we do not aspire for something big, we will not get there.
Under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP),
African policymakers undertook to allocate 10 percent of their national budgets to the
agricultural sector, with a growth of 6 percent annually, but, in reality, only a few have done
so—an argument that the former president of IFAD, Kanayo Nwanze, emphasized at the
Malabo summit in an open letter to the African Union heads of state (see more discussion in
Chapter 4 on food security and Chapter 7 on financing) (Nwanze 2014).
Donor expectations from CGIAR are unrealistic. The funding remains fragmented and
unpredictable, more focused on development and less on basic and strategic research, while
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the scope and ambition of its research has expanded. Not surprisingly, partnerships with
lagging developing countries—those with large incidence of hunger—are far weaker today
than they were in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite 55 percent of CGIAR’s research effort
already in Africa, the impacts there have been modest. Donors have become obsessed with
targets and performance that is tangible, visible, and can be measured each year, thus
dealing with the symptoms rather than the underlying causes of limited performance.
Africa’s research challenges are great, and its research systems are weak and fragmented,
with great underinvestment. The spectacular successes of biological control of the cassava
mealybug, dryland maize, orphan crops, and, more recently, biofortified orange-fleshed
sweet potatoes and some varieties of rainfed rice show that there is huge unrealized
potential. Unlike in Asia, CGIAR has not been able to devolve applied and adaptive research
downstream to African countries, or to regional organizations in cases where NARS are too
weak or too small, under-resourced, and face diseconomies of scale because of prolonged
underinvestment in agricultural R&D. Even in Asia, there is greater scope for NARS, such as
India’s efforts to be more effective, and context for CGIAR to follow the principle of
subsidiarity: that is, using an organizing principle that posits that activities should be
handled by the lowest or least centralized competent authority. This principle will recognize
the greater role of NARS, and World Bank loans and credits could proactively promote
NARS–CGIAR collaborations.
Opportunities
Agriculture is key to growth. GDP growth in SSA slowed sharply to 1.2 percent in 2016,
down from 4.8 percent in 2013—the lowest level of growth in more than two decades. The
World Bank forecasts an increase in growth to 2.6 percent in 2017, to 3.2 percent in 2018 in
SSA, predicated on moderately rising commodity prices and reforms to tackle macroeco-
nomic imbalances. Per capita output is projected to shrink by 0.1 percent in 2017, and to
increase to a modest 0.7 percent pace of growth over 2018–19. At these rates, growth will be
insufficient to achieve poverty reduction goals in the region, particularly if constraints to
more vigorous growth persist (WBG 2017).
Per capita income growth was negative, –1.5 percent in 2016, weighed down by popu-
lation growth (2.7 percent in 2016). Positive per capita income growth returned in 2017,
2018, and in 2019. An important contributor to the slower growth in both GDP and
agriculture was conflict and climate change in several major African countries. There is
variation across countries, particularly between resource-rich and resource-poor countries,
but overall, the region’s economic growth trend remains below pre-financial crisis levels,
with greater inequality than anywhere else in the world. Slower growth deepens the
challenge of reducing poverty. Despite progress, the share of the population living on
US$1.90 a day or less remains very high, estimated at 41 percent in 2013, and has increased
by 112 million since 1990, although the prevalence has declined from 54 percent
(World Bank 2020).
Science is advancing very rapidly, and to keep pace and maintain relevance, CGIAR must
have access to cutting-edge scientific infrastructure and scientific skills by augmenting
North–South and South–South collaborations—thereby increasing ownership of and access
to developing countries’ farmers and consumers, with increased transparency, accountabil-
ity for results, and on a scale that even CGIAR’s expanded research program cannot
realistically provide. Underinvestment in CGIAR and NARS remains widespread. Although
agricultural research spending in SSA grew by nearly 50 percent between 2000 and 2014, the
accumulated backlog of underinvestment in research and education is so considerable that
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it would take years of consistent effort to build capacity, even if investment in R&D
increased considerably (Traxler 2004; Blackie et al. 2010). Thirty-three out of 40 countries
(for which data were available to Beintema and Stads [2017]) spent less than 1 percent of
their AgGDP on agricultural research. Across SSA, although the numbers of agricultural
researchers increased by 70 percent during 2000–14, the very large share of senior, PhD-
qualified researchers approaching retirement is a problem. Without adequate succession
strategies and training, significant knowledge gaps will emerge.
Threats
The gap between new science needing human resource capacity to take the science forward
is widening rapidly over time both at the national level and the level of CGIAR, and the
drop-off of current cohorts of trained staff in Africa will be exponential, as a large
proportion reach retirement in next 5–10 years (ASTI, IFPRI, and FARA 2011). Education
systems and capacity development of young researchers needs to be revamped in NARS,
and both need much more investment. A number of crosscutting issues are in need of
resources to address. For example, issues involving gender and youth; data management;
monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL); and capacity development have to be incor-
porated within the allocated resources of a scientific project, and the resources are stretched
very thinly for that process in most projects. Therefore, additional investments are needed
in support of these crosscutting aspects.
Threats to CGIAR are caused by donor policies and changes in donor priorities that lead,
in turn, to CGIAR’s inability to attract and retain qualified experienced staff.
Donor dependence and funding volatility also remain critical in Africa. Outdated
research facilities and equipment impede the conduct of productive research, compromis-
ing the number and quality of research outputs, ultimately translating into reduced impacts.
Again, the issues with small NARS LICs are not new. External support for African
agriculture and African NARS was considerable in the 1970s, then declined precipitously,
but now seems to be on a growth trajectory again. However, at the recent rate of growth in
African research expenditures, it will take years to get back to the old level.
It is time to rethink how to leverage limited CGIAR resources to have a far larger impact
on SSA, by pursuing a consistent, long-term, predictable strategy, more along the lines of
what the Rockefeller Foundation pursued in India to help achieve a Green Revolution, albeit
using recent technologies and tools more appropriate to Africa—beyond the misnomer of
the Green Revolution.
Key Perspectives for a Transformed CGIAR
CGIAR’s entire Global Platform in 2020 consisted of the CGIAR Portfolio of 2017–22, of
the 12 CRPs and 3 research support platforms plus the newly launched gender platform that
underpin the research of the whole System. The CRP is restricted by legacy activities of the
past 40+ years. There is a huge gap in research on vegetables, fruits, and nuts (that should
compose 50 percent of our daily diets for health and nutrition). There are hundreds of
young start-up enterprises, using new technology—for example, dairy and meat industries
without cows, vertical farming, insect farming (for animal and human feed), microbes, and
bacteria, etc. Many of these venture capital-based enterprises will fail, often lacking suffi-
cient capital and access to other delivery mechanisms. Some will go on to set the pace. They
are unlikely to have the public good at heart; some may even create considerable
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unemployment in agriculture—thus, CGIAR and others need to be in these emerging spaces
and new tech fields to conduct public goods research as a counterweight to commercial
disruptive research with consequences for environment, the poor, and disadvantaged.
From such a perspective, some of CGIAR’s new initiatives are promising: big data in
agriculture, excellence in breeding, and gene banks to conserve and make available 750,000
accessions of crops and trees under the International Plant Treaty, thereby improving
efficiency, enhancing use, and ensuring compliance with international policy. Also, there
are four crosscutting themes (Climate Change, Gender and Youth, Policies and Institutions,
and Capacity Development), which are intended to interact closely together and with the
CRPs to leverage best practices across the portfolio. The platform will include many other
actors, however, with whom CGIAR and NARS will collaborate. The following list is
illustrative, rather than comprehensive.
There are a large number of bilateral donors, international and regional organizations,
philanthropic organizations such as BMGF’s Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
(AGRA), universities in advanced countries, and NARS of emerging countries. NARS of
large emerging countries such as China, Brazil, and India already play a significant role
through South–South collaboration bilaterally—but much is bureaucratic and political, and
not results-oriented—or through triangulated arrangements involving multilateral or UN
organizations, such as WFP and a strengthened FAO, along the lines recommended. They
should be invited to be a part of a global network, led by CGIAR. This will entail a very
substantial and different partnership effort than exists today.
AGRA, established by BMGF and the Rockefeller Foundation in 2006, has already given
778 grants to 18 countries for agricultural development, with a total commitment of US$430
million between 2006 and 2016. Building on the systems and tools for Africa’s agriculture—
quality seeds, soil health, access to markets, and credit—coupled with stronger farmer
organizations and agricultural policies, countries have gained experience in a decade working
with AGRA in many areas: strengthening agricultural input systems; technology and its
adoption; building resilience through growth of structured markets for quality produce and
operational capacity of output systems; strengthening business growth, finance, and risk
management in national- and regional-level systems; and reducing impact of agricultural
volatility. Unfortunately, no independent evaluation of AGRA activities is available to the
public, despite a decade of aid, unlike the aid by multilateral organizations that undergo
independent impact evaluations, which even BMGF has often actively supported for external
aid (AGRA 2016b). AGRA has also worked with the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s African
Center for Crop Improvement (ACCI) and with the West African Center for Crop Improve-
ment (WACCI) of the University of Ghana, Legon, to train hundreds of NARS breeders from
across the continent in applied breeding methods. On the less positive side, organizational
constraints have siloed their programs, making it difficult for them to deliver integrated
programs of support to individual countries and subregions in which work on crops, soils, and
markets are brought together synergistically for greater impact and sustainability. AGRA is
moving in this direction, but we are not aware of the actual progress.
More than US$30 Billion Expected in Commitment
to African Agriculture
At the sixth African Green Revolution Forum in September 2016, AGRA announced
commitments totaling more than US$30 billion to boost production, income, and
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employment for smallholder farmers and agricultural businesses on the African continent
over the next 10 years. The initiative is backed by the African Union Commission, the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), AfDB, AGRA, key NGOs, companies, and
donor countries.
As part of the “Feed Africa” campaign, AfDB has committed US$24 billion over 10
years—a 400 percent increase over its previous commitments—to help drive agricultural
transformation on the continent. Through the flagship program called the Technologies for
African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT), the AfDB works with CGIAR to support the
“Feed Africa” campaign by providing the needed and proven agricultural and food proces-
sing technologies and implementation strategies for inclusion within the Bank’s loans to
Regional Member Countries (RMCs). BMGF pledged at least US$5 billion to development
initiatives on the continent over the next five years, including at least US$1 billion for
agriculture, with a focus on the Foundation’s ongoing efforts to “expand crop and livestock
research, strengthen data collection for decision-making, and improve systems to deliver
better tools, information and innovations for farmers” (AGRA 2016a). The Foundation also
pledged to match other development partner support for AGRA programs on a one-to-one
basis. AGRA’s links to CGIAR are not clear, although BMGF is one of the largest donors to
CGIAR (Wadsworth 2016). The original position of AGRA was that NARS were grossly
underfunded and needed more support than the CGIAR Centers.
The Rockefeller Foundation announced US$50 million in new funding, in addition to US
$105 already committed to AGRA. In addition, the Foundation committed US$130 million
to the YieldWise initiative: “work directed by AGRA and other partners that is deploying
better storage, handling and processing capabilities to reduce the significant post-harvest
losses on African farms due [to] spoilage or pests” (AGRA 2016a). IFAD pledged more than
US$3 billion to Africa, with a focus on efforts to generate jobs in farming and food
production and value chains, particularly for African youth and African women. And
WFP pledged to purchase at least US$120 million of the agricultural products that it
distributes annually—10 percent of its annual procurement budget—from smallholder
farmers through a partnership called the Patient Procurement Platform (AGRA 2016a).
In a single fiscal year, the World Bank approved US$9.3 billion (20 percent of its total
commitment) for Africa for 109 projects in 2016–17. This amount includes US$669 million
in IBRD loans and US$8.7 billion in IDA commitments, of which US$200 million was from
the IDA Scale-up Facility. “Key focus areas include raising agricultural productivity,
increasing access to affordable and reliable energy, building resilience to climate change,
strengthening fragile and conflict-affected areas, and promoting good-quality education”
(World Bank 2016, 24). Procurement issues would need to be addressed.
South–South Research Cooperation Is Thriving
Thriving South–South cooperation is not always viewed favorably by Northern actors. It
seems to be partly a result of apprehension and competition, partly a genuine sense of
superiority about Western modes of bilateral cooperation, and partly a lack of knowledge. It
might be well worth doing systematic comparative studies of how Northern and Southern
countries cooperate in order to identify their strengths and weaknesses, because cooperation
is here to stay and should grow.
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In the Agricultural Innovation Marketplace, Reifschneider et al. (2016) described the
South–South collaboration established by Brazil’s EMBRAPA with African countries in
an upbeat, optimistic way. Since 2010, the Africa–Brazil Agricultural Innovation Market-
place (MKTPlace) has implemented 82 projects around the world. A new program, Building
on the Successes of the Marketplace (M-BoSs), was developed; it focuses on previously
fruitful MKTPlace projects in order to provide extended financing and wider adoption of
positive practices. The MKTPlace has been supported by an open group of some of the same
partners that have made cash and in-kind contributions totaling approximately US$21
million. Partners include: FARA, Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture
(IICA), EMBRAPA, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency of the Ministry of Foreign Relations
of Brazil (ABC/MRE), UK’s DFID, BMGF, IFAD, the World Bank, FAO, and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB). MKTPlace has organized four major international
events, several partner policy dialogues, and funded 82 R&D projects, with 42 under
implementation. It has also paved the way for successful projects to be scaled up through
the new joint initiative, M-BoSs, which has already mobilized over US$9 million
(Reifschneider et al. 2016).
China and India each have substantial bilateral and trilateral programs on the continent
of Africa, including collaboration in agriculture and climate change. The launching of a new
agriculture partnership (Feed the Future–India Triangular Training Program [FTF–ITT])
between the United States and India was announced in July 2016, “to achieve Ever Green
Revolution to address Global Food Security” (Government of India 2016). Originally
announced during a state visit by then US President Barack Obama to India in November
2010, this collaboration sought to establish a long-term farmer-to-farmer exchange.
According to the Indian Ministry of Agriculture’s press bureau, “The effort included
Triangular Cooperation adapting technological advances and innovative solutions to
address Food Security Challenges in Africa. This pilot stage focused on three African
Countries i.e., Kenya, Liberia and Malawi with potential to expand throughout the African
Continent in [the] future” (Government of India 2016). South Korea and Taiwan similarly
have cooperation on rice with Africa.
Such a platform will enhance the Northern donors’ gradual efforts to (1) overcome
fragmented, North–South bilateral aid to African agriculture and research; (2) greatly
complement the allocation of over 50 percent of the CGIAR research expenditures to SSA
around a strategic framework; and (3) strengthen applied and adaptive research down-
stream, which ideally NARS should conduct. Most importantly, it will greatly enhance
CGIAR’s impacts on two major continents.
CGIAR’s 2020 Reforms
CGIAR underwent reorganization once again in 2019–21, at a time when this chapter was
being finalized. Box 10.3 contains the key elements of reforms. Proposed reforms build on
the changes already made to System governance in 2016 (and indeed, some instituted well
before for nearly two decades, as the history of CGIAR outlined in this chapter illustrates).
Ambitious in their nature and described as the biggest change in CGIAR’s history by some,
the SRG’s vision for “One CGIAR” is that of a global leader and recognized brand, both of
which CGIAR already possesses, but the proposal seems to be to do more and better
through five interconnected elements (CGIAR 2019d).
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In June 2020, CGIAR announced the appointment of its inaugural CGIAR EMT,
composed of three Managing Directors who are collectively charged with stewarding the
creation of a more unified “One CGIAR”—a CGIAR that is impactful partner for our
funders, national research systems, the agricultural community, and global and regional
agencies.
The Executive Management Team consists of, first, a Team Convener and Managing
Director, Research Delivery and Impact. A second Managing Director is responsible for
Institutional Strategy and Systems, and a third Managing Director is responsible for Global
Engagement and Innovation (CGIAR 2020c).
Two of the three appointees are highly experienced women. Collectively, the three bring
demonstrated experience in transforming the way that institutions think, work, and partner.
The appointments are another key implementation step, of the unanimous decision taken
by CGIAR’s SC in November 2019, to endorse a bold set of recommendations to create One
CGIAR. These recommendations, developed by CGIAR together with its funders and
partners, outline the key elements of a unified One CGIAR (CGIAR 2019e, 2020c):¹⁹
1. A sharper mission statement and impact focus to 2030, aligned with the SDGs;
2. Unified governance under a “CGIAR System Board”;
3. Institutional integration, including more aligned management under an empowered
EMT, common policies and services, and a unified country and regional presence;
4. A new research modality; and
5. More, and pooled, funding.
Box 10.3 Five Key Elements of CGIAR’s Proposed Reforms
1. One Mission: Ending Hunger by 2030—through science to transform food, land,
and water systems in a climate crisis, focused on nutrition, poverty, gender,
climate, and environment. Target date: 2030, to be reflected in agreed mission,
by end of 2020.
2. Unified governance—Common Board to provide unified governance. Target date:
July 1, 2020.
3. Institutional integration:
a. Integrated operational structure—three managing directors in place by April
2020
b. One CGIAR policies and services. Target date: 2021–2
c. One CGIAR at the country and regional level. Target date: End 2020.
4. New research modality. Target date: January 2022.
5. More and pooled funding: 50 percent pooled funding to be achieved by end of
2022.
Source: CGIAR (2019e, 4–5).
¹⁹ See, also, “CGIAR System Reference Group,” https://www.cgiar.org/how-we-work/strategy/cgiar-system-
reference-group/
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One CGIAR’s NewMission is “Ending hunger by 2030—through science to transform food,
land and water systems in a climate crisis,” focused on five impact areas: (1) nutrition and
food security; (2) poverty reduction, livelihoods, and jobs; (3) gender equality, youth, and
social inclusion; (4) climate adaptation and greenhouse gas reduction; and (5) environmen-
tal health and& biodiversity (CGIAR 2019e, 8).
These are high expectations from CGIAR to chart a new course for CGIAR—based on
the extensive leadership experience, complementary skills, and access to scientific expertise
and resources—to ensure that CGIAR can deliver on its mission of ending hunger by 2030.
One CGIAR is expected to be much more than the sum of its parts, “reaching out across
CGIAR with a systems lens, listening to and working with the Director Generals and
scientists of every Center to bring CGIAR’s incredible expertise, partnerships, and resources
together to deliver innovation on the ground and impact at a systems level” (CGIAR 2020c).
The inaugural EMT was appointed for an initial term of two years to drive transforma-
tional change at pace and report collectively to the SMB. “A key element of its role will be to
identify how to best leverage CGIAR’s nearly 10,000-strong staff and its diversity of talent
and brands to deliver as One CGIAR” (CGIAR 2020c).
The new CGIAR System Board, with 50 percent male/female representation has broad
diversity across eight voting members. Center boards are represented by this common slate
of members with a minimum two-thirds majority. Centers were in process of changing their
Charters to adopt new Board construct, expected October 2020.²⁰
As part of reforms CGIAR has adopted US$2 billion as an aspirational target by 2030,
targeting a sustainable US$2 billion investment in research (CGIAR 2020c). CGIAR held
public consultation on its Research Strategy from October 16–26, 2020, and this will be
shared to a targeted group of partners and open for feedback on cgiar.org.
Based on various recent reports, CGIAR has assumed that there is strong evidence of
global will for an improved CGIAR. It cites the 2019 EAT-Lancet report (Willett et al. 2019);
the IPCC Report to the 2019 UN Climate Action Summit (IPCC 2019); key themes on food
systems presented at the 2020 World Economic Forum (WEF 2020); Global Nutrition
Report (GNR 2020), and related planning discussions for the 2021 UN Food Systems
Summit (UN 2020a, 2020b).
As an integral part of the CGIAR System and the governance body of the CGIAR System
Organization, the CGIAR System Board (“System Board”), comprising eight Voting mem-
bers, two Ex-Officio Non-Voting members and six Active observers, is responsible for
providing leadership and governance for CGIAR in the delivery of its mission, and for
appointing and overseeing the Executive Management Team.
Working in partnership with the CGIAR SC, the System Board keeps under review the
effectiveness of the CGIAR System, its reputation for excellence, and adopts and monitors
compliance with CGIAR policies, procedures and guidelines, with a view to ensuring results
and the continued relevance of CGIAR’s agricultural research for development.
The System Board may recommend actions that may be considered to better respond to
the evolving challenges of international agricultural research, taking into account any
recommendations of the SC.
²⁰ For more information, see “CGIAR System Board,” https://www.cgiar.org/how-we-work/
governance/system-organization/system-board/
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Appendix: Mainstreaming Gender Platform—An Example of
Collective Action Challenge in CGIAR
Increased incomes in the hands of women and their greater control of assets is known to increase
their decision-making power, their productivity, food security, and nutritional outcomes, as well as
the outcomes for their children. Societal preferences and norms about gender influence women’s
participation in household decision-making, processes of technological change in agriculture, and
women’s opportunities to work outside their homes. Women comprise nearly half of the world’s
agricultural labor force, yet their unequal access to economic opportunities results in less benefits to
them than to men from their participation. Also, persistent gender gaps in access to resources and
markets and in decision-making are widely understood in the development literature as a constraint
on overall agricultural productivity and growth and as factors contributing to the persistence of
hunger and undernutrition, with adverse impacts on children, such as underweight, high infant and
child mortality, stunting and wasting—all with life-cycle effects on future generations. We explored
some of these issues in Chapter 4.
Here, we showed that CGIAR’s research on gender received a kickstart from the 2008 External
Review, including its mainstreaming and outreach. CGIAR has produced a considerable body of
research, but the progress has been slow and uneven across Centers, halting and scattered due to lack
of a coherent strategic vision and collective action challenges, and reinforced by shortage of funding.
In 2020, CGIAR finally launched a crosscutting gender platform, much as it has done with other such
platforms. Whether it will lead to a coherent program will depend on the platform leader providing
strategic direction and leadership, combined with predictable resources to the program.
Research must be distinguished from other gender-related programs in CGIAR, which have an
early history. They are not covered here—for example, CGIAR’s Gender & Diversity Program and a
program on Gender, Diversity Inclusion in Workplaces in CGIAR. Both started in the 1980s.²¹
Post-2008 History of Gender Research
The CGIAR Independent Review Panel Report of 2008 noted that the CGIAR System had not built
“on best practice institutional accountability approaches to mainstream gender and to devise special
measures, where necessary, to address the specific needs of women and girls” (CGIAR 2008, 4). The
Review Panel Report of the CGIAR System devoted an entire chapter (chapter 4) to the issues of
gender and diversity, and recommended that “the Consortium and the Fund adopt a gender strategy
based on accountability for integrating gender in the work of partnerships” (CGIAR 2008, 12).
This does not mean that CGIAR was not addressing gender issues in the 1980s and 1990s. For
example, Joachim von Braun published several important pieces of research on commercialization of
agriculture, food aid, and famines in which gender was one of several dimensions, and therefore, that
research did not get “tagged” as gender research, with some exceptions—for example, his research on
The Gambia.²² Agnes Quisumbing’s research on property rights, and Ashby’s research on partici-
patory technology development and adoption at CIAT also included treatment of gender, but such
research declined because of lack of funding and attrition of qualified staff (see, for example,
Quisumbing and Kumar [2014]; Lilja and Ashby [1999]).
²¹ Based on email exchange with Vicki Wilde, who became the first director of the Gender and Diversity
program in 1999. In 2017, the CGIAR conducted an independent review of its history of work in this area. For the
CGIAR’s new Framework for Gender, Diversity and Inclusion in CGIAR’s Workplaces, see CGIAR (2020d), and
for the approved Action Plan for Gender, Diversity and Inclusion in CGIAR’s Workplaces (2020–2021), see
CGIAR (2020a).
²² Some of the examples of this research include:
On commercialization: von Braun, Hotchkiss, and Immink (1989); von Braun, Puetz, and Webb (1989); von
Braun and Webb (1989); von Braun, de Haen, and Blanken (1991); von Braun and Kennedy (1994). On famine:
Webb and von Braun (1994); von Braun, Teklu, and Webb (1998).
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Recent evidence suggests that mainstreaming across CGIAR is occurring in number of places.
CGIAR’s CRPs use “OECD–DAC gender equality policy markers” (OECD 2016) to classify CGIAR
research outcomes. (CGIAR 2018b, 11, 42). CRPs have been reporting on these markers to the
System Management Organization annually since 2017, providing independent verification of the
supporting evidence. The proportion of reported research outcomes in which gender was recorded as
“significant” increased from 16 percent in 2017 to 33 percent in 2019. Conversely, the proportion of
outcomes in which gender was recorded as “not targeted” fell from 77 percent in 2017 to 57 percent
in 2019 (information courtesy of CGIAR SMO and Programs).²³
Recently, three independent reviews of CRPs—namely, of A4NH, Wheat and Grain Legumes, and
Dryland Cereals—also confirm these findings of greater treatment of gender (CAS Secretariat 2020a,
2020b, 2020c), but it has taken a long time to get to this point because of collective action problems
within CGIAR.
In 2009, following the external review’s findings of the CGIAR Independent Review Panel in 2008
of inattention to gender (CGIAR 2008), Canada’s International Development Research Centre
(IDRC) funded IFPRI to conduct a consultation about what should be done—whether there should
be a “gender program” like the four other CRPs then funded: Climate Change, HarvestPlus, Water
for Food, and Sub-Saharan Africa. A structured e-consultation at each Center, followed by a longer
discussion, came up with the recommendation for a platform that would support gender across all
the CRPs, but one of the Center directors (of CIP, headed by a woman) opposed the idea, arguing that
gender work would divert resources away from the CRPs. Although her male counterparts among
Center directors supported the idea, the SMB dropped it. So, the CRPs proceeded without any
requirement for gender. Yet, every time the issue of gender was raised, the then ISPC expected gender
specialists in CGIAR to address the issue, but without assigning any resources.
The gender mainstreaming assessment of CRPs in 2013 (Assessment of the Status of Gender
Mainstreaming in CRPs commissioned by the FC and submitted by the CO at the FC 10th meeting,
Nairobi, November 6–7, 2013) noted that the reform of CGIAR, following the 2008 external
evaluation, had not tackled the problems identified by the “Stripe Review on Social Sciences”: namely,
the weaknesses of the social science capacity (Barrett et al. 2009; Ashby, Lubbock, and Stuart 2013).
And those issues continued to prevail in gender research in 2013. Mainstreaming gender effectively
into CGIAR research depended fundamentally on strong social science and the appropriate mix of
disciplines. While that assessment looked at the integration of gender into CRPs, the context, the
status, and the use of social science in CGIAR had not improved.
ISPC suggested the gender platform be housed in PIM (a CRP called Policy, Institutions and
Markets, an entity that was certain to be funded), rather than as a separate platform (with no history
in CGIAR and possibly more uncertain budget). However, fund allocation rules soon handcuffed the
gender platform while others were able to thrive. Ashby, Lubbock, and Stuart (2013) noted that
allocated funds were divided in 13 Centers, and the precise source and certainty of amounts are
unclear from the reporting. Some CRPs earmarked a significant percentage of their total budget for
gender, while others provided little (as shown in Ashby, Lubbock, and Stuart 2013, 16, table 2).
Thus, whereas in 2012–13, most CRPs did not include gender in their original proposals or
budgets, CRPs varied greatly as to the extent to which gender was mainstreamed. Those CRPs
relatively advanced in gender implementation were the research programs concerning Aquatic
Agricultural Systems (AAS); Policies, Institutions and Markets (PIM); Agriculture for Nutrition
and Health (A4HN); Climate Change; Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS); and Forests, Trees
and Agroforestry (FTA). These CRPs prioritized research themes and defined sites to undertake
gender-relevant research and data collection.
Although the CO expected CRPs to mainstream gender in their own programs, it recruited a
senior advisor on gender in research in its own office in 2013. She, in turn, established standards for
integration of gender in all of the CRPs, an important contribution.
The notion of a Gender Platform was proposed as early as April 2010 by gender experts within
CGIAR, when the CRPs were being set up, and again in 2015, when three platforms—the Big Data
Platform, Excellence in Breeding, and Gene Bank—were approved. To qualify as a platform, a
²³ I am grateful to Julia Compton for mustering this evidence.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 6/9/2021, SPi
774   
program had to work across Centers around common themes and also involve external partners. In
principle, the gender program qualified on those grounds.²⁴
Yet, in 2015, for the CO’s call for proposals for platforms on various topics, including gender,
gender outcomes were not among the 10 core intermediate development outcomes (IDOS) in
CGIAR’s SRF, approved May 2015 for implementation in the 2016–30 period. Gender was among
the four “cross-cutting” outcomes. That helped to set the stage for more serious attention to gender in
impact pathways, and 2022 outcome targets and milestones. Also, annual reporting on gender
findings and outcomes was formalized. Most platforms were turned down, with only Big Data,
Excellence in Breeding, and Gene Banks accepted. A full gender proposal was not accepted. ISPC
asked PIM to host a gender platform as part of Phase 2 of the CRPs (starting in 2016), as a flagship
platform on Gender, without the responsibility and financial resources to support gender across the
whole System. PIM contracted two external specialists in gender to lead the Gender flagship program.
The PIM Gender flagship had two clusters, one of which was the gender platform, coordinated by the
Royal Tropical Institute (KIT). The other was a PIM research-focused cluster led by an IFPRI staff
member, and the larger flagship was led by faculty at University of Oxford.
The 2016–17 Independent Evaluation of Gender in CGAIR, IEA (CGIAR–IEA 2017) focused on
CRPs for the period 2011–16, but considered the new framework of the second phase of CRPs and
substantial changes to the overall governance architecture of CGIAR during 2016.
Evolution of the CGIAR SRF is evident from these SRFs. The 2010–15 SRF identified gender
inequality as a critical area that directly affects CGIAR’s likelihood of success in all areas (CGIAR
2011d), but the 2016–30 SRF made an explicit commitment to tackle gender equity throughout
CGIAR, including by closing the gender gap in equitable access to resources, information, and power
in the agri-food system by 2030 (CGIAR 2015b). Women featured as 50 percent of the targets for
2010–15 SRF System-Level Outcomes and specific targets to reduce women’s micronutrient malnu-
trition. Additionally, “gender and inclusive growth” became one of eight strategic research priority
areas (CGIAR 2011d). (See discussion on CGIAR priorities, Table 10.1.)
The “Evaluation of Gender in CGIAR” was the first independent, System-wide evaluation on this
topic. It turned out to be timely and influential. Its main purposes were:
• accountability to the CGIAR system as a whole on progress at system, Center, and CRP levels:
in developing appropriate gender strategies in pursuit of the objectives contained in the SRFs;
integrating gender analysis in their research and engaging in appropriate gender research and
impact analysis; and in achieving gender equity and inclusiveness at the workplace [emphasis
added]. (Baden et al. 2017)
While a single evaluation covering both gender in research and gender at the workplace was first
envisaged, both contributing to the common objective of gender equity, the distinct set of issues and
actors of these two led to different impact pathways. The evaluation noted the significant progress
towards gender equity, attributing it at least in part to pressure from key System donors. Key
institutions were strengthened, and gender mainstreaming was incorporated across all research
programs, resulting in a growing body of gender research, but with different degrees of treatment
and different quality of research, due, in part, to differences in the extent and quality of gender
staffing. It called for renewed System-level leadership and an updated framework that reflects a clear
System-level commitment on both gender in CGIAR research and at the workplace, the appropriate
balance of effort and investment between gender-specific research, capacity building, and main-
streaming (or integration of gender) across different flagships (Baden et al. 2017).
The evaluation noted, however, that using gender analysis to inform overall priority setting
remains a key challenge. It recognized that for those CRPs with more limited resources and capacities
investments in gender-specific research will require collaboration with other CRPs with shared
interests and more experience, and/or with specialist strategic partners (Baden et al. 2017).
The evaluation noted that cross-CRP collaboration and learning was needed:
²⁴ For recent history, see: CGIAR Gender Platform: About Us: https://gender.cgiar.org/genderplatform/
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A few CRPs—notably, PIM, CCAFS—enabled by the Gender Network have played an impor-
tant role in fostering collaboration on gender research and promoting the adoption of new tools
and methods for gender research, notably on value chains and climate change. External
partnerships and funding have also been key enablers of more formal collaboration, alongside
long-standing professional relationships between leading gender researchers and Centers.
(Baden et al. 2017, xvi)
Putting Gender under PIM with PIM’s proposal for a sixth flagship on Gender, the platform’s
resources were subject to limitations, owing to overall funding amounts to PIM and sharing of those
among six flagships. Yet, PIM convened an annual conference and supported calls for research on
topics, like seed systems and feminization of agriculture, with KIT supporting other Centers to
address gender.
The evaluation suggested that the SMB should maintain or strengthen the capacity of System-level
bodies, notably the SMO and the Gender Platform, to be able to carry out their respective budgeting,
monitoring, and accountability, and learning and coordination functions, within the reformed
system, with regard to integrating gender in CGIAR research. Of the 11 recommendations for future,
action included need for a clearer vision and action plan for gender equity; greater consistency in
gender research; stronger systems for monitoring and evaluations of outputs and outcomes; and
support to gender capacity and expertise (Baden et al. 2017).
At the Consortium meeting in Berlin in 2018, donors noted again that having a platform under
PIM was not sufficient—it did not have enough resources or profile at the System level.²⁵ The gender
platform under KIT was also very under-resourced, but an impression was also created at the Berlin
meeting that the donors were upset because the platform was not performing (putting the blame on
the platform rather than on the System for not supporting it). Eventually, they put out a call for a new
Gender Platform around March 2019. Had a platform been established early on—for example, in
2011—gender research would have advanced more rapidly (CGIAR 2018b).
CGIAR Has Promoted More Inter-Center Competition than Coherence
Many gender researchers within CGIAR would have preferred to design one joint proposal, but
CGIAR opted instead for competition. ILRI led the development of one proposal on behalf of a
consortium of eight CGIAR Centers: Africa Rice, CIMMYT, CIP; ICARDA, ICRISAT, IITA, and
IRRI. IFPRI led a proposal including the Alliance of Diversity International and CIAT, CIFOR/
ICRAF, IWMI, WorldFish, African Women in Agricultural Research and Development (AWARD),
KIT, Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), and the ISEAL Alliance. The ISPC selected the
ILRI-led proposal, with a note that they should draw on the other proposal as well, a decision
officially adopted in November 2019, in Chengdu (CGIAR 2019e).
Some Examples and Achievements of CGIAR’s Gender Research
CGIAR’s body of literature on gender covers a range of economic, social, anthropological, political,
and technological issues, such as legislation aimed at eliminating gender-based discrimination and
gender parity in property rights, and the extent to which these laws and policies have been enforced.
IFPRI has been a leader in gender research, some say, because it was taken up by (male)
economists with serious credentials, so it was not dismissed as “lightweight” or merely “advocacy.”
IFPRI has had two DGs with serious gender research credentials. In other Centers, often junior
women (frequently without gender training) undertook research. IFPRI also set up the Gender Task
Force and extended gender work across the Institute, not just in the Poverty, Health, and Nutrition
division.
²⁵ 6th CGIAR System Council Meeting, Berlin, Germany, May 16–17, 2018: https://www.cgiar.org/meeting-
document/6th-cgiar-system-council-meeting/
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Other early work on gender and participatory management outside IFPRI was at CIAT by Lilja,
Ashby, and Sperling (2001) on assessing impact of participatory research and gender analysis.
IFPRI continues to publish prolifically on gender, some of it imbedded in other development
work, such as on water, property rights, technology adoption, but not always tagged as gender-related
papers, so it is hard to identify key outputs from the website. Its public policy influence has also been
considerable, the 20th anniversary of the Beijing conference, led to a series of blogs on the key
publications, grouped by topics (Theis, Quisumbing, and Meinzen-Dick 2015a, 2015b, 2015c,
2015d).
IFPRI worked closely with FAO on the 2011 State of Food and Agriculture (SOFA) (FAO 2011),
and produced a book based on the background paper (Quisumbing et al. 2014).
Since that time, the development of the project-level Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture
Index (WEAI) is probably the biggest “seller.” Originally released in 2011, there are now four
different versions of the aggregate index, which quantifies women’s empowerment and measures
gender parity, with the different versions modified for different purposes, including the abbreviated
WEAI (A-WEAI), the Project WEAI (pro-WEAI), and the project-level WEAI for market inclusion
(pro-WEAI+MI).²⁶
Additional relevant works include:
• The Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) Annual Report on
gender (Quisumbing, Meinzen-Dick and Njuki 2019).
• A forthcoming IFPRI publication on “Advancing Gender Equality through Agricultural and
Environmental Research,” from the PIM flagship support, is a good summary of the state of the
art (Anisimova 2019).
• A big initiative involving several Centers includes the GENNOVATE (Enabling Gender
Equality in Agricultural and Environmental Innovation) project. An article by Badstue et al.
(2018) provides an overview.²⁷
Other communities of practice in other Centers include breeding, water, and forestry, in which
gender is an important part—for example, in CIMMYT, IRRI, ICRAF, and CIFOR. The breeding
initiative also includes a gender initiative.
Some of the key coordinated works on gender in 2019 include dynamics in seed systems,
feminization of agriculture, and gender transformative approaches (GTAs). A synthesis of CGIAR
gender research in agriculture fostered several gender communities of practice, and CGIAR co-
organized the Seeds of Change Conference in Canberra, Australia, where nearly 60 CGIAR scientists
drove the global agricultural research for development agenda forward.²⁸
A4NH is the one CRP that has explicitly had “inclusion” in its work.²⁹ And CIFOR has a good set
of guidelines for addressing intersectionality. Much of the gender work does include some attention
to intersectionality, but the System itself does not seem to seriously consider whether it would
prioritize, for example, dominant farming communities or marginalized groups (pastoralists, indig-
enous, etc.). The CGIAR Performance Report 2019 (CGIAR 2020b) and the 2017 Annual Perfor-
mance Report (CGIAR 2018b) have sections on gender and other social issues.³⁰
Critics argue that one weakness of focusing on gender is the overlooking of other social exclusion
issues, such as ethnicity or caste (Doss and Kieran 2013). Discussion can be found in the A4NH 2015
evaluation (Compton et al. 2015); it has led to taking up wider social equity issues, but the gender
community in CGIAR offers strong pushbacks.
²⁶ For more information, see WEAI: Versions, https://weai.ifpri.info/versions/
²⁷ Other papers are available at https://agrigender.net/all_issues.php
²⁸ CGIAR Gender Platform: “Seeds of Change” Annual Scientific Conference 2019. https://gender.cgiar.
org/annual-conference-2019/
²⁹ See the 2015 publication, “Independent CRP-Commissioned External Evaluation of the CGIAR Research
Program on Agriculture for Nutrition and Health (A4NH)” for the background paper on Gender and Equity:
http://www.a4nh.cgiar.org/files/2015/01/Background-papers-for-the-A4NH-evaluation.pdf
³⁰ See, also, “CGIAR Gender Platform”: https://www.cgiar.org/research/program-platform/cgiar-gender-
platform/
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Another weakness was that the mechanism of allocating funds to CRPs was not adjusted to
recognize the special status of the Gender Platform, with the result that donors wishing to support the
platform directly had difficulty doing so. Within a fixed allocation to PIM, funds directed to the
Gender Platform were subtracted dollar for dollar from support to the other flagships addressing
policy and institutional issues. Inflexibility of the funding mechanism combined with a perception
that a platform hosted within a program to signal a lack of priority to gender and impeded the
visibility of the work.
A Gender Platform at Last
CGIAR launched a Gender Platform in January 2020. It puts gender equality at the forefront of global
agricultural research for development and is based in ILRI.³¹ The platform was rebuilt in 2019 as a
freestanding entity within CGIAR, comparable to the other existing platforms (CGIAR 2019a). This
platform was too slow to get off the ground, in part, due to lack of confirmed budget for the platform
in 2020.³² Three “modules” are being set up: (1) Evidence led by IRRI; (2) Methods led by IFPRI; and
(3) Alliances by CIAT.
The stakeholders of Gender Research are Coordinators from each of the CGIAR Centers, Research
Programs and Platforms, and core members of the Platform include gender scientists and postdoc-
toral fellows from across the CGIAR System. The Platform is also intended to serve external partners,
including NARS, university partners, NGOs, multilateral institutions, and governments with which
CGIAR collaborates.
Research on GTAs was a key focus for the platform and CRPs in 2019 (Wong et al. 2019). Also a
significant work on GTA has been carried out by WorldFish (with Helen Keller International and
others), led by Cynthia MacDougall.³³
The Platform published a discussion paper on GTAs in agriculture to support a European
Commission project that aims to embed GTAs in policy dialogue, programs, and working modalities
of FAO, IFAD, andWFP (Wong et al. 2019). While the initial Gender flagship at PIM was led by KIT,
the new Gender Platform has moved entirely within CGIAR. On women’s empowerment, in 2019,
A4NH entered the second phase of the Gender, Agriculture, and Assets Project (GAAP2).³⁴ While
this is one of the big, exciting areas of gender work with over 100 organizations in 55 countries using
WEAI or its variations, it is mostly IFPRI’s work, not CGIAR-wide. GAAP2 developed a project-level
Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (pro-WEAI) in 2017, with integrated quantitative and
qualitative work, to measure women’s empowerment and inclusion in agricultural development
projects.³⁵ Following the launch of the pilot version of pro-WEAI in 2018, two papers on pro-WEAI
development were published in World Development (Malapit et al. 2019; Yount et al. 2019).
Lessons from the Gender Research Experience: Toward A Stronger
Mainstreaming of Gender in CGIAR?
Gender and inclusion are one of the Results Areas of the One CGIAR. This is a positive step. How will
that translate into accountability for serious attention to gender? Will gender be built into the DNA
of each of the areas of research or will it be treated as an icing on the cake, nice to have if there are
“extra” resources? A stronger accountability at the System level is expected under One CGIAR, with
two champions of gender on the Executive Team.
³¹ See CGIAR Gender Platform: About Us: https://gender.cgiar.org/genderplatform/
³² Personal communication, email exchange between PIM director, Frank Place, and Uma Lele.
³³ See “Crafting the Next Generation of CGIAR Research—Beyond Gender and Development/Gender Trans-
formative Approaches,” CGIAR Gender Platform, January 14: https://gender.cgiar.org/nextgen-gender-gta/
³⁴ See “Agriculture, and Assets Project (GAAP)”: About GAAP2, https://gaap.ifpri.info/about-gaap2/
³⁵ See “GAAP2: Project-level WEAI”: https://gaap.ifpri.info/resource/project-weai/
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A cross-cutting platform would help support gender work, to make sure it is of high quality, and
would draw together gender work from across the System/programs, so that the whole is greater than
the sum of the parts. The unit should also have resources for some strategic gender research—for
example, on methods development—that may not be undertaken by individual areas of research,
regardless of whether they are conducted by women or men.
Key donors have been BMGF, USAID, IDRC, the Government of Canada, and the Australian
Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR). They need to continue to insist that the
Gender program is supported financially to thrive, and SMB and the CO need to be much more
proactive in supporting Gender.
Box A.10.1 What is Gender Mainstreaming?
The Gender Mainstreaming evaluation (Baden et al. 2017) defined mainstreaming as:
‘[T]he process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action . . . and the
strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of
the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political,
economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not
perpetrated’ (UN 1999, 24). Mainstreaming gender in research refers to the use of the analysis of
gender differences to inform the entire research cycle: targeting, priority setting, research design,
implementation, research adoption/utilisation, monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment
(CGIAR 2011c, 3). (Baden et al. 2017)
Box A.10.2 In CGIAR’s OwnWords, Extraordinary Impacts of CGIAR’s
Productivity-enhancing Research in the Developing World
“A 2008 study estimated the overall annual economic benefits of CGIAR research on the three
main cereals alone, and just in Asia, at US$10.8 billion for rice, $2.5 billion for wheat and $0.8
billion for maize . . . ” (CGIAR 2011b, 8).
“As a result of crop improvement research within and beyond the CGIAR, 65% of the total area
planted to the world’s 10 most important food crops is sown to improved varieties” (CGIAR
2011b, 8).
“About 60% of the food crop area planted to improved varieties is occupied by many of the
approximately 7,250 varieties bred using genetic materials from the CGIAR” (CGIAR 2011b, 8).
“According to a 2008 study on potato improvement, varieties originating in the CGIAR were
planted to more than 1 million hectares, double the area documented just 5 years before” (CGIAR
2011b, 9).
“Research to maintain resistance to a single major disease of wheat—leaf rust—generated
benefits from 1973 to 2007 that are currently worth $5.4 billion” (CGIAR 2011b, 9).
“CGIAR research on yield stability estimated that the global economic value of genetic
resistance to various wheat diseases amounts to as much as $2 billion annually” (CGIAR
2011b, 9).
Continued
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Box A.10.2 Continued
“More than 50 new maize varieties with drought tolerance have been adopted on a
total of 1 million hectares across East and Southern Africa . . . ” (CGIAR 2011b, 9).
“A novel approach to seed dissemination has put a new flood-tolerant rice variety in the hands
of 100,000 Indian farmers . . . ” (CGIAR 2011b, 9).
“A landmark 2003 study on the impact of crop improvement research from 1965 to 1998
painted a counterfactual scenario of what the global food system would be like without CGIAR
research:
• Developing countries would produce 7–8 percent less food.
• Their cultivated area would be 11–13 million hectares greater, at the expense of primary
forests and other fragile environments.
• Their food consumption per capita would be 5% lower on average.
• Some 13–15 million more children would be malnourished” (CGIAR 2011b, 10).
Through reduced food prices and increased employment, CGIAR has had huge impacts on
reducing poverty and providing training for hundreds of scientists in developing countries. “The
overall economic benefits of the CGIAR were estimated to range from US$14 billion to more than
$120 billion” (CGIAR 2011b, 10).
“A 2007 review of investments in agricultural research carried out by five CGIAR Centers and
their partners in South Asia since the end of the Green Revolution period in the early 1980s found
average annual benefits of more than $1 billion from research on maize, rice and wheat alone, far
above the CGIAR’s total annual expenditures in the region” (CGIAR 2011b, 10–11).
“The economic returns—reaching a current value of US$9 billion on research on just one of
the pests, the cassava mealybug—far exceed the CGIAR’s total investment in Africa since 1971”
(CGIAR 2011b, 11).
Improved varieties of maize and cowpeas, and gains with improved common beans have been
registered in Africa. “New Rice for Africa, branded NERICA rice, combines the high yields of
Asian rice with African varieties’ resistance to local pests and disease. It has spread to 250,000
hectares in upland areas [West Africa], helping reduce the rice import bills and generating higher
incomes in rural communities” (CGIAR 2011b, 12).
“Recent research has begun to document the nutritional benefits from improved crop varieties.
In Mozambique, the introduction of new orange-fleshed sweet potato rich in beta-carotene
significantly increased the intake of this vegetable precursor of vitamin A among young children
in 850 households, according to a 2007 study” (CGIAR 2011b, 12).
Impacts of research on natural resources have been difficult to measure and demonstrate. The
examples that “CGIAR at 40” included were: In Zambia, the spread of an agroforestry system known
as “fertilizer tree fallows,” to renew soil fertility; in Malawi, successes in aquaculture; in Benin,
adoption of the leguminous climbing shrub Mucuna pruriens as a cover crop by 10,000 farmers; in
the Indo-Gangetic Plains of SA, zero or reduced tillage in the rice–wheat systems reducing costs of
cultivation among adopters by 10 percent while increasing yield by 10 percent (CGIAR 2011b, 12).
In policy research, which has been growing rapidly, notable benefits cited include liberalization
of rice price policies in Vietnam, a food-for-education program in Bangladesh, and improved
pesticide policies in the Philippines (CGIAR 2011b, 14).
CGIAR’s gene banks: CGIAR spends US$6 million annually to protect its gene banks, holding
the collections in trust on behalf of humanity. “In 2006, the 11 Centers with genebanks signed
superseding agreements that placed the collections under the International Treaty on Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture and adopted its standard contract for exchanging
genetic materials” (CGIAR 2011b, 16).
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Box A.10.3 The New Frontier of Biofortification to Address Hidden
Hunger
Breakthroughs in biofortification, beyond the achievements reported in Box A.10.1, are an
illustration of new frontiers, in which CGIAR could make huge contributions. At the time of
writing this chapter, biofortification was benefiting more than 20 million people in farm house-
holds in developing countries, which are now growing and consuming biofortified crops, again a
global public good par excellence. It is a cost-effective and sustainable tool in the fight against
hunger and micronutrient deficiencies, and CGIAR has been at the forefront of this technology,
demonstrating important results, with four researchers, Maria Andrade, Robert Mwanga, Jan
Low, and Howarth Bouis, receiving the 2016 World Food Prize for biofortification. There is huge
scope to mainstream biofortification work throughout CGIAR’s breeding work and beyond, since
CGIAR does not do research on many commodities, including edible oils, fruits, and vegetables
that are important for changing diets and contribute to reduction of poverty and hunger, and
improving nutrition.
HarvestPlus, a part of the CGIAR Research Program on Agriculture for Nutrition and Health,
started as a Challenge Program in 2003, and now included in CRP 4, has focused on three
micronutrients identified by the WHO (see also Chapter 4 on food security and nutrition
security):
• Vitamin A deficiency—Approximately 30 percent of preschool-age children are deficient;
nearly 5.2 million preschool-aged children suffer from night blindness caused by vitamin
A deficiency; and over 19 million pregnant women in developing countries are vitamin
A deficient.
• Zinc—Over 17 percent of the world’s population is at risk of inadequate zinc intake, which
causes stunting and worsens diarrhea and pneumonia, the most common cause of death
among children in developing countries. Globally, approximately 23 percent of preschool-
aged children are stunted. Inadequate zinc intake is estimated to be greater than 25 percent
in SSA and 29 percent in SA.
• Iron—Iron deficiency is the most common micronutrient deficiency in the world, impairing
mental and physical capacity. Twenty-five percent of anemia in preschool children and 37
percent in women of reproductive age is attributable to iron-deficiency; worldwide, 800
million women and children are affected by anemia. Iron-deficiency is the leading cause of
anemia in developing countries (HarvestPlus 2020).
The movement to scale up biofortification into an action-oriented agenda, which Bouis and
Saltzman (2017), and Norman Borlaug well before them, have advocated, is gathering momen-
tum to improve nutrition globally. Bouis and Saltzman (2017, 49) asserted:
To reach one billion people by 2030, there are three key challenges: 1) mainstreaming
biofortified traits into public plant breeding programs; 2) building consumer demand; and 3)
integrating biofortification into public and private policies, programs, and investments. While
many building blocks are in place, institutional leadership [and financial support] is needed to
continue to drive towards this ambitious goal.
Source: Bouis and Saltzman (2017); HarvestPlus (2020).
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Table A.10.1 Evolution of CGIAR’s mission, Centers, and membership
Year Center and members Mission/mandate/vision
1971 • 4 CGIAR Centers
• 18 members
To stave off hunger by increasing the productivity
of dominant staple grains (rice, wheat, and
maize). Strategic, science-based focus on
increasing “the pile of rice on the plates of food-
short consumers” (OED 2003, 3).
1980 • 13 CGIAR Centers
• 35 members (including 4 developing
countries)
The research portfolio was later broadened to
include cassava, chickpea, sorghum, potato,
millet, and other food crops, as well as pasturage.
CGIAR’s original mission statement, in its First
System Review of 1977, was “ . . . to support
research and technology that can potentially
increase food production in the food-deficit
countries of the world” (IEG 2002, 7).In 1985, the
mission statement was amended, for the first time,
by the TAC Review of CGIAR Priorities and
Future Strategies (TAC37 Los Baños) to include
the notion of sustainability “ . . . to contribute to
increasing sustainable food production in
developing countries in such a way that the
nutritional levels and general economic well-
being of low income people is improved” (IEG
2002, 7).
1990 • 13 CGIAR Centers
• 35 members (including 4 developing
countries)
Food security and poverty eradication in
developing countries through research,
partnerships, capacity building, and policy
support, promoting sustainable agricultural
development based on the environmentally sound
management of natural resources.In the early
1990s, the CGIAR mission statement was
reformulated at the TAC Review (MTM92
Istanbul) as follows: “ . . . in partnership with
national research systems, to contribute to
sustainable improvements in the productivity of
agriculture, forestry and fisheries in developing
countries in ways that enhance nutrition and well-
being, especially of low-income people” (IEG
2002, 7).
2000 • 16 CGIAR Centers
• 58 members (including 22 developing
countries)
CGIAR’s mission statement was again updated at
the 1995 Ministerial-Level meeting in Lucerne:
“ . . . to contribute, through its research, to
promoting sustainable agriculture for food
security in the developing countries” (IEG
2002, 7).“The Third System Review in 1998
[ICW98, Washington] recommended formal
amendment of the mission statement to include
explicit reference to poverty and environmental
sustainability. The Group responded with a
decision to change the statement to read: ‘ . . . to
contribute to food security and poverty
eradication in developing countries through
research, partnership, capacity building, and
policy support, promoting sustainable agricultural
development based on the environmentally sound
management of natural resources’ ” (IEG 2002, 7).
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2009 • 15 CGIAR Centers
• 64 members (including 25 developing
countries)
Vision: “To reduce poverty and hunger, improve
human health and nutrition, and enhance
ecosystem resilience through high-quality
international agricultural research, partnership
and leadership” (CGIAR 2011d, 10–11).
2010 • New CGIAR business model
• 15 CGIAR Centers
• CGIAR Fund
• Fund Council (FC)
• Fund Office (FO)
• CGIAR Consortium
• Consortium Board (CB)
• Consortium Office (CO)
2015 • 15 CGIAR Centerso CGIAR System
Council (SC)
• CGIAR System Organization (SO)
• CGIAR System Management Board (SMB)
• CGIAR System Management Office
(SMO)
• 14 CGIAR Centers
Vision: “A world free of poverty, hunger and
environmental degradation” (CGIAR 2017f).
Mission: “To advance agricultural science and
innovation to enable poor people, especially
women, to better nourish their families, and
improve productivity and resilience so they
canshare in economic growth and manage natural
resources in the face of climate change and other
challenges” (CGIAR 2016a, 10).Vision: “A world
free of poverty, hunger and environmental
degradation” (CGIAR 2017f).
2019 • CGIAR’s System Council endorsed a bold
set of recommendations in November
2019 to create One CGIAR. A new
organizational structure to reflect the One
CGIAR reforms in 2019–20 will be issued
in 2021.
• The System Board, new name after
“unified governance” became effective on
October 1, 2020, replacing the old “System
Management Board.”
Mission: “Ending hunger by 2030—through
science to transform food, land and water systems
in a climate crisis” (CGIAR 2019e, 8).Five Impact
Areas:i. Nutrition and food securityii. Poverty
reduction, livelihoods and jobsiii. Gender equality,
youth and social inclusioniv. Climate adaptation a
d greenhouse gas reductionv. Environmental
health and biodiversity (CGIAR 2020e)
Note: CGIAR “Members” changed to “Fund Donors” with the new business model in 2010.
Source: See IEG 2002; CGIAR 2011d; CGIAR 2016a; CGIAR 2017f; CGIAR 2019e; CGIAR 2020e; https://
www.cgiar.org/how-we-work/strategy/
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Table A.10.2 CGIAR’s reforms in 2001–2007, 2008–2015 (June) and post-2015
Time period Governance
structure
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11
The International Fund for Agricultural
Development
Uma Lele and Brian C. Baldwin
Summary
The vision of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) for the post-
2015 rural world is one in which rural extreme poverty is eliminated through inclusive and
sustainable agriculture and rural development, and in which poor rural people and com-
munities, including those who live in remote areas, are empowered to build prosperous and
sustainable livelihoods. IFAD’s comparative advantage is focused on rural people at the
bottom of the pyramid, women, and marginalized people. External evaluations have shown
that IFAD, a small and agile organization, has been effective in addressing its declared
mission. Its dilemma going forward is whether to assist poor people in only poor countries,
or even in lower middle-income countries (LMICs) and middle-income countries (MICs),
as it has done in the past. An assessment is needed of whether the current paradigms of
average per capita country income are sufficiently robust to support IFAD’s mandate,
particularly in countries with acute per capita income inequality.
Demonstrating impacts beyond selected projects chosen for in-depth impact evaluations
has been a challenge, but then IFAD is not alone in that regard. It has underway a vigorous
program of impact assessments, but generalizing beyond findings of individual, costly, time-
consuming impact evaluations has been a challenge at a time when the Eleventh Replen-
ishment (IFAD11) may barely reach US$1.1 billion of the US$1.2 billion replenishment
target over a three-year period. And, if the trend continues, the next replenishment, which
starts in 2020, is likely to enter into the replenishment cycle of other institutions, including
the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) and GAVI (the Vaccine
Alliance). The International Development Association (IDA) and the African Development
Bank (AfDB) are also going through their replenishment processes, but in the case of IDA at
a much higher level. The IDA18 replenishment was US$75 billion over three years.
If the stated aim of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to “leave no one behind”
is to be achieved by 2030, IFAD’s replenishment must be high on the donor agenda. There is
a growing consensus that special measures are needed to address SDG2 (zero hunger and
rural transformation), particularly SDG targets 2.3 and 2.4.¹ At the same time, the level of
¹ SDG Target 2.3: “By 2030, double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, in
particular women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal
access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets and opportunities for
value addition and non-farm employment.”
SDG Target 2.4: “By 2030, ensure sustainable food production systems and implement resilient agricultural
practices that increase productivity and production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity for
adaptation to climate change, extreme weather, drought, flooding and other disasters and that progressively
improve land and soil quality.”
See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg2
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indebtedness of some borrowing countries is real, and another process for Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) is needed. As one of the founding and responsive institutions of the
HIPC debt relief initiative (HIPC–DI), IFAD needs the financial support already provided
to other HIPC–DI aligned institutions to ensure its continued involvement in addressing
both debt relief and debt sustainability.
The challenges for IFAD, on the supply side, is whether it should continue with business
as usual, which could be challenging, given stalling official development assistance (ODA)
and implicit reduction in the program of loans and grants, or if it should turn to the market
to leverage its replenishments against market forces. Responding to these developments will
test IFAD’s ingenuity, creativity, and capacity for innovation. On the demand side, there is a
huge gap between needs and expectations and what can actually be delivered under the
existing architecture and funding structure. ODA to agriculture represents only 5 percent of
total ODA. Progress toward ending poverty and hunger has stalled while growing food
insecurity, linked to fragility and climate change, threatens IFAD’s ability to achieve the
SDGs by 2030. IFAD is at a crossroads and, together with the development community and
specifically, its Executive Board, it needs to choose among options. For IFAD to continue its
declared mission of addressing rural poverty across and within all developing country
member states, it will need both innovative financial and programmatic mechanisms,
supported by the respective commitments and a broader range of partners.
Background
One of the major responses to the food crises in the early 1970s, and a significant outcome
of the 1974 World Food Conference, was the establishment in 1977 of IFAD, the 13th
specialized agency of the United Nations (UN).² The purpose in establishing IFAD was not
only to increase investments in the poor, but also to recycle the petrodollars from the first oil
shock for development purposes. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) played a significant role in the establishment of the Fund, including the provision
of a portion of IFAD’s initial funding, with the understanding that the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and other developing countries would
also provide resources. This initial OPEC commitment led to an agreement that gave OPEC
countries a role in the governance of IFAD, including equal voting power (on the basis of
one country, one vote) among the three categories of members: OECD, OPEC, and
developing countries (IFAD and the OPEC Fund 2005). However, as IFAD’s funding base
has evolved, so, too, has how the voting structure and voting rights are distributed,
according to paid contributions. As of March 2017, the OECD category has 48.7 percent
of votes; OPEC, 12.5 percent; and member countries, 38.8 percent. Except for two pre-
sidents, all of IFAD’s presidents have come from OPEC countries, and Gilbert Fossoun
Houngbo, former Prime Minister of Togo, took office as the sixth president of IFAD on
April 1, 2017.
Structurally, the Governing Council has the highest decision-making authority (each
member state is represented by one governor and an alternate), and the Executive Board is
responsible for overseeing IFAD operations and approving its work program and budget.
The Executive Board is composed of 18 members and up to 18 alternates, elected at the
² See IFAD: Governance: https://www.ifad.org/en/governance
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annual session of the Governing Council, and is distributed as follows: List A has eight
members and eight alternates (primarily countries in the OECD); List B has four members
and four alternates (primarily countries in OPEC); and List C has six members and six
alternates; two each in the three regional subdivisions of List C member states (developing
countries). The president is appointed at the meeting of the Governing Council by a two-
thirds majority of the total number of votes, for a four-year term and eligible for only one
further term (IFAD 1976).
Article 2 of the agreement, which established IFAD, states:
The objective of the Fund shall be to mobilize additional resources to be made available on
concessional terms for agricultural development in developing Member States. In fulfilling
this objective the Fund shall provide financing primarily for projects and programmes
specifically designed to introduce, expand or improve food production systems and to
strengthen related policies and institutions within the framework of national priorities and
strategies, taking into consideration: the need to increase food production in the poorest
food deficit countries; the potential for increasing food production in other developing
countries; and the importance of improving the nutritional level of the poorest popula-
tions in developing countries and the conditions of their lives. (IFAD 1976, 4)
At the time of its founding, the emphasis was on increased production by the poor for the
poor. It was further agreed that IFAD would focus on the provision of financing for
agricultural development projects in poor rural areas. The agreement stated that IFAD
would finance loans and grants on terms deemed appropriate by the Fund, based on a
country’s economic status and prospects in relation to the nature and requirements of the
interventions needed. In 2007, alongside other international finance institutions, IFAD
introduced the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) that allowed IFAD to provide devel-
opment finance on grant terms to countries that the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/
World Bank had categorized as having unsustainable levels of debt. These terms were
outlined in IFAD’s “Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing,” updated several times over
the years, the latest update being in September 2019. It states that its major target groups,
regardless of a country’s stage of economic development (an important perspective, bearing
in mind the graduation of several members to MIC status), were to be small and landless
farmers in the poorest countries and regions of the world. Attention would also be given to
the promotion of the role of women in food production (IFAD 1978, latest revision 2013).
The future of smallholder agriculture and IFAD’s niche, with its focus on serving the
poorest people in rural areas of the developing world, has been a recurring theme in the
agricultural economics profession and germane to the work of financial institutions.
A policy brief for the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development (2008, 1) characterized
challenges of service delivery in the context of the options that different types of small
farmers face as, “Stepping up, stepping out, and hanging in,” depending on their circum-
stances. The policy brief suggests the first option calls for increasing farm productivity, the
second entails off-farm migration, and the third, mere survival, depending on the types of
farms. In a separate paper, Poulton, Kydd, and Dorward (2006) also characterized small
farms as staple crop producers making subsistence livings, cash crop producers, and supply
chains of modern high-value producers (as opposed to traditional export commodity
producers). They argued that a key issue is the difficulties that smallholders face in accessing
coordinated services for more intensive production and market access, and the way that
these differ between staple food crop production, traditional cash crop production, and
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export market production. The authors stressed the importance of coordination of service
development and delivery, and depending on farmer needs, different forms of intermediary
institutions needed to achieve such coordination. The challenge of organizing service
delivery for small farmers has been perennial. Finding effective ways to reach them has
not been easy. Donors-funded, integrated rural development projects in Africa in the 1970s
were ineffective (Lele 1992).
Donors then pursued partial subsectoral approaches—such as extension and financial
services, privatization of trade to substitute for marketing boards, and community-based
organizations for extension and water management.World Development Reports (WDRs) in
2003 and 2004 were devoted to transforming institutions and making services work for the
poor (World Bank 2003, 2004). WDR 2008 and the various World Bank agriculture and
rural development strategies have addressed issues of service delivery (World Bank 2007).
(See Chapter 8 on the World Bank.) New in recent literature is the avoidance of blueprints,
an acknowledgment of the importance of domestic political commitment at the top,
recognition of the need for political stability for the evolution of institutions through
learning by doing, and substantial adaptive capacity of institutions and human capital in
countries for innovation to materialize. As we document throughout this book, however,
these concepts have been themes in development literature all along. Translating knowledge
into policies and institutions over the long haul has been the harder challenge.
IFAD’s Evolving Mission
In the 1980s, IFAD’s niche status was unique among international financial institutions
(IFIs) in its focus on the poorest rural groups (see “An Independent External Evaluation of
the International Fund for Agricultural Development” [IFAD 2005]). IFAD’s dual status as
an IFI and a specialized UN agency distinguished it from its partner food and agriculture
organizations in Rome—the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP).³ It has always been predominantly a
financing institution for programs and projects designed initially by member countries,
using technical assistance provided by IFAD, and implemented by contracted cooperating
institutions, usually IFIs.
In the 1990s, IFAD’s mission evolved to encompass a broader agenda of rural develop-
ment that included, alongside the infrastructure programs that were a feature of early IFAD
funding, access to markets and financial services, and institutional strengthening.
A statement of IFAD’s vision in 1995 broadened the Fund’s objectives to include “the
design and implementation of innovative, cost-effective and replicable programmes” and
asserted that IFAD “be the catalytic institution of a mutual enrichment process which
mobilizes resources and knowledge in a strategic, complementary and dynamic coalition of
clients . . . committed to the cause of the rural poor” (IFAD 1997, 5). Thus, IFAD began
producing a comprehensive set of country strategic plans for investment opportunities,
starting in 1985, and Country Strategic Opportunities Programmes (COSOPs) were intro-
duced in 1998, through which it began identifying and designing its own projects. Evidence
of a broadening mission is also visible in the late 1990s and 2000s, and in the report of its
scorecard. The Strategic Framework for 1998–2000 describes IFAD’s core business as:
³ See IFAD: United Nations Agencies: https://www.ifad.org/en/united-nations-agencies
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. . . innovative pilot projects and programmes in rural and agricultural development
(agricultural production, microcredit, rural infrastructure, self-help groups, land tenure);
projects and programmes focusing on poverty eradication, household food security and
new markets for marginal areas, and the formation of effective partnerships with other
development institutions and organizations (at the international, national and subnational
levels) to broaden development impact; and increasing public awareness of the situation and
needs of the rural poor, while raising additional resources for them. (IFAD 1997, 12)
The Strategic Framework for 2002–6, Enabling the Rural Poor to Overcome Their Poverty,
identified three strategic objectives: “strengthening the capacity of the rural poor and their
organizations; improving equitable access to productive natural resources and technology;
and increasing access of the poor to financial assets and markets” (IFAD 2001, 6).
IFAD’s Strategic Framework for 2011–15 emphasized “enabling rural women and men to
overcome poverty” (IFAD 2010e, 5) and its “overarching goal is: enabling poor rural people
to improve their food security and nutrition, raise their incomes and strengthen their
resilience” (IFAD 2010e, 7). The Framework called for better leverage of its comparative
advantage: “working with poor rural people and with other partners to reduce poverty and
improve food security” (2010e, 23), with a focus on achieving both a greater and more
sustainable impact in its operations.
In 2014, as background to the 10th replenishment of its resources, IFAD announced its
new “Strategic Vision for IFAD 2016–2025: Enabling Inclusive and Sustainable Rural
Transformation” (Box 11.1). The new vision was needed, IFAD said:
The global context for smallholder agriculture and rural development has changed
significantly in recent years and will undoubtedly continue to change in major ways in
the post-2015 period. IFAD’s operations and activities in the future will necessarily be
affected by these changes and their development impact will depend on how well
smallholder farmers, governments, and IFAD address key challenges, such as climate
change, and how well they take advantage of emerging opportunities such as increasing
demand for food resulting from higher incomes and rapid urbanization. (IFAD 2014h, 2)
The 2016–25 Strategic Framework is being operationalized through the 3-year Medium
Term Plans (MTPs), aligned to the respective replenishment periods. As such, the MTP
2016–18 translates into action the strategic objectives set out in the IFAD Strategic Frame-
work 2016–25: “It enables IFAD to achieve its stipulated outcomes, namely: (i) enabling
policy and regulatory frameworks at national and international levels; (ii) increased levels of
investment in the rural sector; and (iii) improved country-level capacity for rural policy and
programme development, implementation and evaluation” (IFAD 2016f, iv). IFAD has
increased its focus on value chains and markets, rural finance, natural resource manage-
ment, climate change, and youth—recognizing that small farm development is critical in
view of the nearly 500 million small farms globally. The challenge for IFAD will be to
capture the knowledge that exists, identify the gaps, operationalize findings into a develop-
ment strategy that delivers outcomes and impact at the country level, and at the same time,
secure the financing and architecture to deliver these results with member countries across
the spectrum of IFAD’s global membership base.
IFAD adopted its first Nutrition Action Plan for 2016–18, subsequently revised to the
Nutrition Action Plan 2019–25, with a framework to guide IFAD’s actions in accelerating
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Box 11.1 IFAD’s Strategic Vision, 2016–2025: Enabling Inclusive and
Sustainable Rural Transformation
In the global effort to realize [the Strategic] Vision:
• IFAD plays both a leadership and a catalytic role. It leads by forging partnerships
with governments, rural communities, farmers’ organizations, the Rome-based
agencies (RBAs) and other development partners. Through such partnerships, it
leverages its financial resources, expertise, and knowledge.
• IFAD is the partner of choice for governments, institutions, and smallholder farm-
ers, and is recognized as the premier UN Agency and international financial
institution (IFI) that has built a clear comparative advantage in smallholder agri-
culture and rural development.
• IFAD is the recognized global leader in investment in smallholder agriculture, rural
people and rural communities achieved by mobilizing and leveraging resources and
by developing innovative financing mechanisms and instruments.
• IFAD continues to develop and innovate in its areas of expertise and comparative
advantage, adjusting its operational priorities in response to changes in smallholder
agriculture and the rural economy. It recognizes the comparative advantage of its
partners in other policy and development areas.
• In the IFAD10 period, IFAD consolidates and advances the work begun under IFAD9,
paying particular attention to: mainstreaming gender equality and women’s empow-
erment; mainstreaming climate-smart agriculture and the sustainable management of
natural resources; promoting nutrition-sensitive agriculture; laying the foundations
for stronger partnerships with the private sector; and promoting the social and
economic empowerment of poor rural people and strengthening their resilience.
• IFAD mainstreams scaling up in all phases of its operations and gives greater
emphasis to the sustainability of its programmes and projects, viewing scaling up
as mission-critical.
• IFAD continues to diversify its knowledge and expertise and adopts a differentiated
approach for its work in various country contexts-fragile states, low-income coun-
tries (LICs), and middle-income countries (MICs).
• IFAD develops its knowledge generation and sharing capacity, particularly in the
area of impact evaluation studies, to learn from its experience, encourage innova-
tion, support policy dialogue and improve the impact of its operations. IFAD
encourages knowledge-sharing with members, with a particular focus on South-
South and triangular cooperation.
• IFAD continues to enhance its effectiveness and efficiency by consolidating its
reforms of the last 10 years in its business model, organizational structure, human
resource management, and business processes. It ensures that its organization
continues to be fit-for-purpose, demonstrating that investment in smallholder
agriculture is good value for money. (IFAD 2014h, 1)
Source: “A Strategic Vision for IFAD 2016–2025” (IFAD 2014h).
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the mainstreaming of nutrition into its investments. It has been developed in a highly
participatory and consultative manner, involving IFAD staff (at headquarters and IFAD
country offices/hubs), as well as with key partners and IFAD Executive Board representa-
tives, with the objective of aligning it with the new IFAD11 target of mainstreaming
nutrition into 50 percent of projects at design, capturing lessons learned to date in order
to accelerate nutrition mainstreaming during IFAD11 and IFAD12, and building on
opportunities created by IFAD’s decentralization and restructuring (IFAD 2019b).
The 2019 Annual Report on the Results and Impact of Operations (ARRI) indicates that
IFAD’s project performance in the 2016–17 period has been flat, less well than the World
Bank’s but better than that of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and AfDB (IFAD 2019h).
Diversification of Funding Sources
IFAD’s original mandate to develop and provide funding for rural poverty alleviation has
meant that IFAD has continually sought to seek additional financing outside the three-year
replenishment process. Supplementary funding mechanisms, mainly bilateral, have pro-
vided resources that enable IFAD to make further allocations to member countries.
A further example has been the Spanish Trust Fund, established in 2010–11, which was
used to co-finance and scale up the country financing operations, especially in MICs (IFAD
2010c). This €300 million fund, for which IFAD was trustee, allowed IFAD to increase its
external resources and to scale up projects that it funded, enabling a larger impact (IFAD
2010c). In addition, as another example, a framework agreement with the Islamic Devel-
opment Bank would support co-financing rural development in 26 countries. Similarly, a
partnership with the OPEC Fund for International Development promotes innovative
financing mechanisms to attract private sector investment in agriculture (IFAD 2012b).
In 2014, to supplement the 2013–15 financing program, IFAD secured a €400 million loan
from KfW (KfW Bankengruppe), which has been used to on-lend to IFAD ordinary term
borrowers, thereby securing lending targets to MICs, while also ensuring that IFAD
replenishment sources resources are increasingly focused on the highly concessional
(IDA) member countries (IFAD 2015b). This was followed, in 2016, with a similar arrange-
ment with Agence Française de Développement, and, in the context of the IFAD11
replenishment discussions (2017), the possibility of accessing market funds, as practiced
by other IFIs.
IFAD10 replenishment meetings concluded that IFAD’s financial model was not sus-
tainable for it to expand. The model of core replenishment contributions as the sole source
of its external funding is unlikely to be adequate in the future, particularly if IFAD is to
expand its operations to a level that reflects better the estimated demand for IFAD
resources, yet is within the organization’s capacity to deliver. IFAD would need to find
alternative sources of financing besides replenishments options to expand the Programme
of Loans and Grants (PoLG): sustained mobilization of core and unrestricted complemen-
tary contributions through replenishment cycles—borrowing to leverage IFAD’s resources;
borrowing from sovereign states and state-supported institutions in the short term; and
exploring the scope for borrowing from the market in the long term. Market borrowing was
not considered an option for IFAD10, however. Options also include expanding the
programme of work (PoW) through supplementary funding and a more strategic and
targeted approach to cofinancing.
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IFAD11 was the first after the SDGs were adopted, and its deliberations related to IFAD’s
financing and operations for the period 2019–21. Meeting five times between February 2017
and February 2018 for the Consultation on the Eleventh Replenishment of IFAD’s Re-
sources, member states agreed to expand the Fund resources by US$100 million per year, to
reach a total of US$3.5 billion for the three years of IFAD11. All combined, these changes
and increased financing were made to enable IFAD to increase its outreach from almost 100
million poor rural people today, to 120 million by the end of 2021 and achieve greater
impact across a range of the SDGs, with a focus on youth, the private sector, and poor rural
areas and facilitating transformation. IFAD also undertook to examine how to leverage
diversified sources of development finance to increase its PoLG.
The IFAD 11th Replenishment of its core financing for the 2019–21 period was con-
cluded on February 12, 2018, prior to the session of IFAD’s Governing Council, following a
postponement of the final pledging session at the December 2017 replenishment meeting.
The Governing Council (February 2019) subsequently reported that total pledges (as of
January 31, 2019) amounted to US$934.4 million equivalent, corresponding to 78 percent of
the IFAD11 target of US$1.2 billion, compared to US$1,030 million for IFAD10 (IFAD
2018c, 2019e, 2019f). Some countries, notably the United States, Spain, Denmark, and
Belgium, did not pledge. Although unprecedented, these non-contributions (the United
States’ IFAD10 pledge was US$90 million) were partially offset by increased pledges from
China (from US$60 million to US$81 million) and the Netherlands (from US$75 million to
US$86 million).
The Replenishment target of US$1.2 billion is to provide for a lending and grant program
of up to US$3.5 billion. IFAD will continue to use its Sovereign Borrowing Framework to
borrow up to 50 percent of the replenishment target (from lenders such as KfW) and will
consider concessional partner loan frameworks, similar to those introduced by IDA and the
AfDB. Finally, IFAD has initiated discussions with member states to explore other possible
market funding—for example, the Agri-Business Capital Fund and the Smallholder and
Agri-SME Finance and Investment Network—but the amount and source of this funding
are currently being assessed by management and would be subject to Governing Council
authorization (IFAD 2019c).
Following changes to its allocation framework and as part of the IFAD11 Replenishment,
IFAD will allocate 90 percent of its core finance to LICs and LMICs, with 10 percent going
to upper middle-income countries (UMICs) (for example, China, Mexico, Brazil), which
will mean a decrease in levels of funding to UMICs. In line with the Addis Ababa Financing
for Development meeting, IFAD will try to further develop partnerships (and co-financing)
with the private sector but has recognized that it remains a challenge (IFAD 2019c).
External Evaluations and Assessments of IFAD and IFAD’s Responses
IFAD was subject to an independent external evaluation (IEE) in 2004–5. The evaluation,
which reviewed IFAD’s performance from 1994 to 2003, came to three strategic conclu-
sions. First, IFAD needs to focus on improving its impact by increasing its efficiency,
promoting innovations that can then be scaled up by others, and strengthening partnerships
with other development actors. Second, to tackle challenges relating to the global demand to
achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), despite the relative decline in ODA to
the agriculture sector, IFAD would need to make significant changes to its operating model,
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including its management processes, and develop a new human resources policy. Third,
IFAD would need to make changes to its governance, including a greater role for the
Executive Board in overseeing the aid effectiveness of the Fund’s activities (IFAD 2005).
Following this evaluation, and in accordance with the findings, IFAD implemented rigorous
reforms relating to targeting, decentralization, supervision, and country presence.
Furthermore, the IEE posed more strategic questions: namely, whether IFAD should
consider “embrac[ing] a multi-sectoral approach to rural development and engage in new
policy areas—including new aid modalities—related to rural poverty reduction, or focus
[ing] on being an innovative, pro-risk institution that works specifically to support the
agricultural productive potential of the poor, often in difficult and marginal areas” (IFAD
2005, 20). The evaluators believed this was an area where IFAD could exercise its specific
expertise, but doing so would require a sharper operational approach to innovation and
identification of groups to target.⁴
Another issue raised in the IEE is IFAD’s comparative advantage. What makes IFAD
different from the other IFIs? What value does it add? The answer could or should lie in
IFAD’s niche focus on the poorest of the poor in rural areas, and its mandate and experience
within agricultural and rural development. No other UN agency or IFI claims to do so. It
may also lie in its willingness to innovate, such as in its use of community empowerment
approaches to rural poverty reduction, which enable governments to participate effectively
in the process and can provide a basis for subsequent replication or expansion by govern-
ments and development agencies. Or it may lie in the relative weight of the Fund’s
contribution to agricultural and rural development, compared with overall ODA and the
investments of IFIs. IFAD still has some way to go to fill this financing role in addressing
rural poverty. Therefore, as the auspices for an increase in ODA are not bright, the role of
IFAD as a mobilizer of funds for rural development would be both increasingly appropriate
and in line with its founding charter (IFAD 2005). IFAD is now seeking to address this
challenge with its evolving approach to borrowing funds (sovereign and, potentially, market
based), particularly for lending to MICs.
In both 2010 and 2013, IFAD was assessed by the Multilateral Organisation Performance
Assessment Network (MOPAN). Key findings were:
• “IFAD continues to be acknowledged for its clear and unique mandate and its
commitment to instilling a results-oriented culture throughout the organisation”
(MOPAN 2013, ix).
• “IFAD’s country strategies systematically include objectives and results statements
related to relevant cross-cutting priorities (gender, environment, and food security
and nutrition). . . . In 2012 it launched an innovative Adaptation for Smallholder
Agriculture Programme (ASAP), which provides financing to scale up and integrate
climate change adaptation across IFAD’s new investments” (MOPAN 2013, ix).
• IFAD “adopted a Country Presence Policy and Strategy [2014–15] in which it formally
approved the establishment of up to 40 country offices . . . ” (MOPAN 2013, 97).
⁴ These same issues have come up periodically for the World Bank, and the Bank has gone back and forth
between these choices. In Chapter 8 we argue that the World Bank, as the only multisectoral organization with
larger resources, greater access to finance and planning ministries, and so forth, began looking at agriculture in the
context of an overall structural transformation of economies, and assisting in addressing large infrastructure
constraints (rural roads, power, water) and policy, and institutional challenges that keep people in poverty (Losch,
Fréguin-Gresh, and White 2012).
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“The 2013 corporate-level evaluation of IFAD’s institutional efficiency noted that the
limited substantive delegation of authority may conflict with the changing business
needs associated with a decentralised institution” (MOPAN 2013, x).
• “IFAD has sound policies and practices in place for financial accountability, . . . has
significantly improved its HR management policies and practices in recent years and
remains committed to ambitious reforms in this area” (MOPAN 2013, x).
• “A review of IFAD’s performance reports indicates that the organisation is delivering
outputs in its thematic priority areas and reporting on these, but its reporting on
higher level development results does not include sufficient data on its contributions to
outcomes and impact” (MOPAN 2013, xii).
• “In the absence of a theory of change and data on outcomes and impact, it is difficult to
appreciate the progress towards achieving the objectives outlined in IFAD’s Strategic
Framework 2011–2015” (MOPAN 2013, xii).
In response to these earlier MOPAN assessments, IFAD, as had other institutions assessed
by MOPAN, highlighted the role of its own Executive Board-approved Results Framework
and, additionally, the challenges of attribution of outcomes in a multi-stakeholder sector as
diverse as agriculture.
The most recent MOPAN assessment 2017–18, noted that IFAD is “an agile, responsive
and well-performing organisation. The Fund’s strategy, organisational architecture and
operating model are all very well geared to deliver IFAD’s mandate and are sufficiently
flexible to adapt to the changing global context and to member states’ evolving needs and
priorities” (MOPAN 2018, 7). In a similar vein to its earlier assessments, IFAD’s 2017–18
MOPAN evaluation noted:
IFAD’s results culture is strong and growing stronger, and the evaluation and accounta-
bility functions continue to be robust. The Fund has now established the basics of results-
based budgeting. At the operations level, developments such as the Social, Environmental
and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP) have further strengthened the intervention
design process, including the mainstreaming of the cross-cutting issues such as gender and
environment, although good governance and human rights remain a step back. Where
outlooks could be stronger—notably on speed of disbursement—IFAD is making progress
or is actively addressing the institutional shortcomings that have been linked with
comparatively weaker performance. (MOPAN 2018, 7)
Although MOPAN notes that, “IFAD is better equipped to deal with a tighter financial
environment,” the assessment nevertheless indicates that with “the lack of growth in the
value of member state core contributions” (MOPAN 2018, 8), a key “challenge for IFAD
continues to be securing full funding for its programme of loans and grants” (MOPAN
2018, 19). In this regard, the move toward market borrowing, and the support of its
members to do so, is key.
TheWorld Bank, in its response to MOPAN’s assessment of its performance, pointed out
issues to MOPAN, which are also relevant to consider also in the context of MOPAN’s
assessment of IFAD. They include, the need to consider the organization’s partnerships with
other international organizations, as well as with all other stakeholders; to conduct MO-
PAN’s assessment working with the development effectiveness scorecards of the organiza-
tions; and to consolidate reviews and evaluations being conducted by several different
donors and organizations (UK’s Department for International Development [DFID], the
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Australian Agency for International Development [AusAID],⁵ and MOPAN), rather than
conducting them serially.⁶ The assessments of IFAD by the DFID Multilateral Aid Review
(MAR) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) are also cases in
point of multiple assessments. In response to the World Bank’s observations, the MOPAN
3.0 approach, initiated in 2016, puts an increased emphasis on assessing development
effectiveness alongside organizational effectiveness (MOPAN n.d.). This issue of numerous,
separate evaluations is also noted in the case of CGIAR (see Chapter 10). The reality is that
bilateral donors still place great emphasis in decision-making of their own assessments,
instead of trusting either the organizations or the evaluations carried out by other donors. In
this regard, in 2017, DFID introduced a requirement at IFAD for a separate “Performance
Report” (IFAD 2018a).
To the concern about multiple assessments, we would add the need to improve the
statistics on which assessments are based, and the need to build country capacity and
harmonized processes between donors and country statistical systems. The latter raises
questions about looking at organizational and country performance on a project-by-project
basis, as distinct from helping countries to put into place systems that will help them to
achieve their stated development objectives on their own. The latter objective has received
relatively little attention in ODA, despite being part of the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness and the subsequent follow-up surveys and initiatives (OECD 2008).
In 2010–12, the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) evaluated IFAD’s institutional
efficiency and the efficiency of the operations it funded (IFAD 2013c). In line with OECD
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines (OECD 2002), the evaluation de-
fined efficiency as a measure of how economic resources (funds, expertise, and time) are
converted into results. The efficiency evaluation, discussed with the Executive Board in early
2013, acknowledged that IFAD is “well recognized and valued as an institution dedicated to
the eradication of rural poverty and improving food security in developing countries”
(IFAD 2013c, 38), and confirmed that IFAD has introduced a number of “new operational
processes and a new business and delivery model” (IFAD 2013c, 33). The evaluation’s
overarching message to IFAD was to “raise the bar” (IFAD 2013c, 7). The main findings are:
• IFAD has significantly increased its work program over the years, indicating progress
toward its aim to be the leader in reducing global rural poverty.
• Partners and beneficiaries appreciate IFAD’s focus on small and landless farmers,
women, and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups.
• Performance is comparable to other multilateral development banks,⁷ but IFAD’s
mandate and scale lead to higher costs relative to its outputs, and thus lower output
efficiency than larger partners.
• To become a center of excellence, IFAD must catalyze scaling up and raise impact
efficiency. The evaluation’s view was that IFAD’s value for money is compromised by
too many projects across too many countries. Therefore, operations should be reduced,
with larger programs focused on fewer countries.
⁵ AusAID, however, considered IFAD’s ratings on effectiveness as “strong” in relation to delivering results,
aligning with Australia’s priorities, strategic management and performance, cost and value consciousness, and
transparency and accountability; and “satisfactory” in relation to contributing to the wider multilateral system and
partnership behavior (Government of Australia 2012).
⁶ The response was by Joachim von Amsberg, Vice President and Head of Network Operation Policy and
Country Services, World Bank, to Gerry Cunningham, Chairman, MOPAN, Dublin, Ireland, January 17, 2003.
⁷ The finding of comparable performance to other multilateral development banks is also supported by the
“The 2012 Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations,” IOE of IFAD (IFAD 2012c).
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• Improving efficiencies in the differences senses described will require greater prioriti-
zation and differentiation of operational services, with a stronger focus on results at
country level.
• A stronger accountability framework, both within IFAD and its Executive Board, is
fundamental for improving performance management (IFAD 2013c).
IFAD’s Action Plan and Reform Agenda
In response to the 2004–5 evaluation, IFAD was to address the identified challenges through
an agreed Action Plan. These efforts were most visible in IFAD’s operations and its
operating model. As part of these efforts, IFAD developed a number of new strategies
and policies, including a Targeting Policy (IFAD 2006c) and the results-driven 2007–10
Strategic Framework (IFAD 2006a), one of the key elements of its Action Plan. Within this
framework, IFAD’s mission was further expanded, as evident in its overarching goal “that
rural women and men in developing countries are empowered to achieve higher incomes
and improved food security at the household level” (IFAD 2006a, v).
An independent, donor-sponsored review of the Action Plan was conducted in 2008.⁸ Its
objectives were to assess the progress that IFAD had made in implementing reforms and the
potential effects of the reforms on development effectiveness. The review gave an overall
positive assessment of the Fund’s progress in implementing the commitments, as outlined
in its Action Plan. It concluded that some meaningful steps had been taken to improve the
organization’s development effectiveness (IFAD 2008a). For example, IFAD had produced
its first results measurement framework (IFAD 2007b), with a set of indicators for reporting
on progress achieved against the IFAD Strategic Framework 2007–10 (IFAD 2006a), which
included a new self-evaluation exercise. Innovation and knowledge management strategies
were developed, the Report on IFAD’s Development Effectiveness (RIDE) was produced
(IFAD 2017c), and a new quality assurance system was implemented.
Following the IOE’s 2010–12 evaluation of IFAD’s institutional efficiency, IFAD’s man-
agement (IFAD 2013g) and the Executive Board (IFAD 2013d) responded positively,
generally embracing these recommendations. The board also underlined the importance
of reconciling enhanced operational selectivity, which the evaluation recommended with
IFAD’s mandate of operating in all regions to serve all borrowing member states, both LICs
and MICs. From a selectivity perspective, it is worth considering if IFAD needs to be in
high-middle-income countries, such as Brazil and China, where per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) is high. Nevertheless, along many non-income parameters, poverty is as
severe in some MICs as it is in LICs. A 2017 IFAD report, “Tailoring Operations to Country
Context—A Holistic Approach,” noted that “countries experience the ‘middle-income
trap’—a situation in which growth slows after reaching middle-income levels,” which is
also compounded in rural areas with growing income inequality, as compared to urban
areas (IFAD 2017e, 6). This highlighted the need for South–South knowledge components
in IFAD projects, from which the poorer performers could learn some direct lessons on
strategy, policy, investment planning, and implementation of high quality. Moreover,
there is a case to consider that lending to high-income countries typically costs less in
⁸ The independent assessment of the IFAD Action Plan, conducted in 2008, was commissioned by the
Governments of Canada, Norway, and the Netherlands; prepared by Ted Freeman, Goss Gilroy Inc. Management
Consultants (Canada), Stein Bie, and Noragric, The Norwegian University of Life Sciences, July 8, 2008.
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preparation and larger project size is possible, with disbursements usually faster. This raises
the question as to whether there is a trade-off between increasing efficiency and assisting the
poorest in LICs.
However, such a trade-off would be somewhat in conflict with IFAD’s mandate of
operating in all regions to serve all borrowing member states. Although lending to high-
income countries is typically for larger sized projects, it is not necessarily cheaper, and while
disbursements may be faster, that is more likely a function of project type (for example,
credit), than country type. Therefore, there is no substantive evidence of a trade-off of
efficiency that should divert assistance away from the poorest in LICs.
IFAD management developed a Consolidated Action Plan to Enhance Operational and
Institutional Efficiency. The plan, discussed in the IFAD Evaluation Committee and
Executive Board in September 2013, covers each of the evaluation recommendations,
addressing first the actions related to enhancing IFAD’s operational effectiveness and
efficiency and then the proposed actions to enhance institutional efficiency. The document
also contains an annex listing each action, with its proposed timeframe and an indication of
potential costs (IFAD 2013e). The Plan’s progress is also assessed annually through the
President’s Report on the Implementation Status of Evaluation Recommendations and
Management Actions (PRISMA), which reported that “almost all items are on track, and
significant efforts and reforms have been initiated across departments” (IFAD 2015c, 8).
IFAD’s Operating Model
As a result of IFAD’s evolving strategy, and also, in response to the external evaluations and
assessments, IFAD made several shifts in its operating model, performing its own supervi-
sion and increasing its country presence. This was accompanied by a sharper focus on
targeting the poorest people in rural areas, which led to the development of the Results-
Based Country Strategic Opportunities Programs (RB-COSOP) and a Targeting Policy
(IFAD 2006c), both introduced in 2006. The RB-COSOP was to be aligned with national
priorities. The documents emphasize synergies between lending and nonlending instru-
ments, results and performance management, learning and accountability, partnership
building and harmonization, and innovation and scaling up (IFAD 2013k).
Targeting
IFAD’s Targeting Policy defines its overall target group as: “rural people who are living in
poverty and experiencing food insecurity [in developing countries], and who are able to take
advantage of the opportunities to be offered (sometimes referred to as the ‘the productive
poor’ or ‘active poor’ ”) (IFAD 2006c, 12). Under the policy, a target group would be
identified through gender-sensitive poverty and livelihood analysis, which incorporates
the views of poor women, men, and their organizations. Attention is also to be paid to
including marginalized minorities and indigenous peoples. Geographically, IFAD targets
areas with high concentrations of poor people or with high poverty rates.
At the Governing Council session in February 2018, at the Consultation of the Eleventh
Replenishment of IFAD’s Resources, member states agreed on a Results Management
Framework (RMF) for the Fund covering 2019–21 and including a range of indicators
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and associated targets. Those include targets for decentralization (3.6.1 [ratio of budgeted
staff positions in IFAD country offices/regional hubs] and 3.6.3 [percentage of supervision/
implementation support through IFAD country offices/regional hubs]) and institutional
efficiency (3.7.1 [ratio of IFAD’s administrative expenditure to PoLG], 3.7.2 [ratio of actual
administrative expenditures to IFAD’s PoW], 3.7.3 [ratio of IFAD’s actual administrative
expenditures to annual disbursements], and 3.7.4 [ratio of the administrative budget to the
ongoing portfolio of loans and grants]. These targets in turn include six indicators related to
decentralization and efficiency. IFAD targets were based on the updated information on
decentralization, as well as informed by the revision of the delegation of the authority
framework (IFAD 2018a).
Martin Ravallion, in his article, “How Relevant Is Targeting to the Success of an
Antipoverty Program?” summarized his argument, based on a cash transfer program in
China:
Policy-oriented discussions often assume that “better targeting” implies larger impacts on
poverty or more cost-effective interventions . . . standard measures of targeting perfor-
mance are uninformative or even deceptive about impacts on poverty, and cost-
effectiveness in reducing poverty. . . . In program design and evaluation, it would be better
to focus directly on the program’s outcomes for poor people than to rely on prevailing
measures of targeting. (Ravallion 2009, 205)
Other reports on targeting—for example, from the ADB, as discussed in Chapter 8 on the
World Bank—suggest that based on a number of case studies of major Asian programs and
a long history of targeting, there has very been limited impact of targeting on poverty
reduction relative to macroeconomic policies.
Several evaluations conducted by IFAD’s IOE have addressed geographic targeting and
found that IFAD projects are implemented across a wide geographic area, spread too thinly
across the country (which is especially a concern in larger countries), or cover non-
adjoining states or provinces within countries.⁹ The evaluations concluded that such
geographic targeting has constrained effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability, and there-
fore, merits attention in the design of future COSOPs and projects (IFAD 2013i).
Country Programme Evaluations (CPEs) confirm that IFAD’s approach to targeting, in
general, was appropriate in most countries and that thematic targeting in country (as
opposed to geographic): that is, through value chains, has been more effective. The shift
to strengthening the links between the rural poor and markets has enhanced relevance,
although implementation has remained challenging. In Nigeria, Vietnam, and Zambia, the
introduction of support for value chains has increased the relevance of IFAD support for
vulnerable groups, such as landless laborers, farmers with very limited land, and unem-
ployed youth. The use of local expertise and participation of local stakeholders in the design
and implementation of IFAD-supported interventions have enhanced the relevance of
IFAD support for some MICs, such as China. The poorer performance in other countries
is attributable to weak institutional capacity in the areas where IFAD was working; greater
difficulties in targeting the poor (Ecuador and Mexico); and weak government ownership
⁹ Examples of IFAD Independent Office of Evaluations include: Country Programme Evaluations in Brazil
(IFAD 2008b); Mali (IFAD 2007a); India (IFAD 2010d); and Indonesia (IFAD 2014c).
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(Mexico). None of these were issues in China, where convergence with government
programs generated significant government commitment (IFAD 2014b).
Nevertheless, IFAD’s clear emphasis on the poor has helped to focus light on the poor in
several MICs, and in doing so, emphasized the importance of rural poverty alleviation in
countries with rapidly expanding national economies, highlighting the issues of political
commitment, national ownership, and the importance of getting targeting right, if this is
indeed the approach to pursue. Hence, IFAD’s focus on Northeastern Brazil and areas of
Southern Mexico where, within all projects, the specific component design usually has
characteristics that focus on and respond to poorer households, reflects IFAD’s predesign/
design household analysis.
Targeting remains of key concern to IFAD, and the ARRI of 2016 highlighted IFAD’s
targeting approach, central to its mandate of rural poverty reduction, noting, “Comprehen-
sive targeting approaches enable operations to reach the poorest of the poor by combining
solid livelihood and poverty analysis, based on context-specific circumstances, and dynamic
participatory processes” (IFAD 2016a, 13). The report, however, noted, “The 2015 evalua-
tions found that poverty analyses conducted at design do not sufficiently capture the
differences among groups of poor rural people, [and] thus, more can be done to ensure
that appropriate attention is devoted to IFAD’s targeting strategies at design and that
monitoring efforts are deployed during implementation” (IFAD 2016a, 13). In terms of
strategies to address this approach, geographical targeting is an option, but can encounter
other problems—lack of government commitment, working with minorities, remoteness,
and lack of access to investments in rural infrastructure that could link poor farmers to
markets—can all be very daunting, so that only where other supporting services exist or are
developed can this work be beneficial. In China, benefits included savings in transport time
and costs, and improved access to markets, services, and information. In Nigeria, by
contrast, the CPE found that inadequate market linkages were a significant constraining
factor, followed by deficiencies in roads and transport conditions, storage, access to credits,
and market information (see, also, Nchuchuwe and Adejuwon 2012). In Ghana, flooded
roads have been repaired and improved in one district, but the lack of production planning
and marketing channel support has prevented local producers from taking full advantage of
the improved infrastructure.
Attention to Africa
IFAD has also given a high priority to reducing poverty in Africa, committing 50 percent of
its total resources. The deepest poverty and hunger are found in sub-Saharan Africa, with
the largest number of fragile countries and countries with resource constraints, all providing
special challenges. In July 2003, at the African Union summit in Maputo, Mozambique,
leaders of the continent pledged to allocate at least 10 percent of their national budgets to
agriculture and to achieve at least 6 percent annual agricultural growth. In the same year,
they adopted the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP),
pledging to develop national agriculture through defined investment plans. In 2006, African
leaders committed to allocating 1 percent of agricultural GDP to agricultural research and
development (R&D). IFAD noted in its report on Africa, “Fulfilling the Promise of African
Agriculture”:
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In the decade since the Maputo Declaration, fewer than 20 per cent of countries have
fulfilled either of their Maputo commitments; more than 30 have signed the CAADP
compact with at least 19 countries launching detailed plans to accelerate agricultural
development; and 8 countries have exceeded the R&D pledge.
With a view to scaling up investment in rural spaces, production systems, consumption
markets, natural resources and environmental services, and influencing the post-2015
development agenda, IFAD supports the call for an “enhanced Maputo” agreement:¹⁰
• Increase investment and improve services to smallholder farmers, especially women,
including concrete timetables for meeting their existing pledges.
• Prioritize and accelerate policies and investments that support smallholder farmers.
• Increase transparency and accountability in the implementation of an enhanced
Maputo framework, while engaging smallholder farmers on accountability. (IFAD
2014a, 16)
The African Union declared 2014 the Year of Agriculture and Food Security with a spotlight
on African agriculture. Against this background, IFAD asserted: “IFAD has delivered more,
to more people, and delivered it better. At the end of 2013 there were 241 ongoing
programmes and projects worldwide with an IFAD investment of US$5.4 billion, compared
with US$3.9 billion for 217 programmes and projects at the end of 2009” (IFAD, 2014e, 1).
Since its establishment, IFAD has invested US$15.6 billion in projects that have “reached”
approximately 420 million people (IFAD 2014e, 6) and used the IFAD9 Replenishment
discussion with member states to provide information on its Impact Evaluation Initiative,
which covered household characteristics (assets).
Supervision
One step that IFAD took to increase its impact was the development of a Supervision and
Implementation Support Policy in 2007. The agreement that established IFAD in 1977 did
not allow for direct supervision, nor was IFAD expected to have a country presence or be
involved in policy dialogue. The development of a Supervision and Implementation Support
Policy was commended in an evaluation by the IOE, which noted that the policy provided
IFAD the opportunity “to get ‘closer to the ground’ in borrowing countries and to
understand the country context more fully” (IFAD 2012a, iii). The evaluation also said
that the policy “facilitated more direct [and rapid] follow-up with implementing agencies to
address bottlenecks that emerged during project implementation,” and it allowed IFAD to
better cultivate partnerships with multiple stakeholders (IFAD 2012a, iii). However, the
evaluation concluded that implementation arrangements were inadequate, owing to lack of
a basic supervision manual, insufficient training on implementation support, and absence of
a coordinated approach to supervision across IFAD departments and regions. The evalu-
ation recommended that IFAD consider “best practices from the different approaches to
increase harmonization, efficiency and shared responsibilities [and accountability] across
IFAD departments” (IFAD 2012a, iii).
¹⁰ See the African Union’s 2003 Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security: https://www.nepad.
org/caadp/publication/au-2003-maputo-declaration-agriculture-and-food-security
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Country Presence
Another significant reform of IFAD’s operating model is the development of a permanent
field presence. When the reform started in 2006, one country office was operational. By the
end of 2010, 29 of the 30 authorized offices were operational, and by the end of 2016, 40
IFAD Country Offices (ICOs) were serving a total of 77 countries, covering approximately
80 percent of its total financing, with 58 percent of them in Africa. This initiative is being
implemented through the Corporate Decentralization Plan, completed in 2016. It includes
three models for ICOs: (1) subregional hubs; (2) country programme groups; and (3) single
ICOs. This plan would enable IFAD to supervise its programs and projects more closely,
reduce response times, and promote scaling up (IFAD 2016d). In its comments on the new
Country Presence Policy (IFAD 2011a, 2011c), the evaluation office commended IFAD for
its commitment to enhancing its development effectiveness, but suggested that portfolio
performance and other criteria be considered when selecting countries in which to establish
offices. The document also encouraged more clarity about the process for selecting the
appropriate mode of presence. The evaluation office comments point out, for example, that
hosting the IFAD presence in the country offices of a multilateral development banks would
provide further opportunity for more focus on nonlending activities, such as policy dia-
logue, partnerships, and knowledge management, thought to be key components of the
“mission critical” push to scale up IFAD operations (Hartmann et al. 2013, 1; IFAD 2013f).
However, the majority of IFAD offices are linked to the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), which has enabled bilateral agreements (and staffing and support
services) to be more easily managed. Although the evolution of the overall process has
emphasized a shift in emphasis from supervision by mission to a process of “continuous
supervision,” there is a concern that projects and programs, meant to be implemented by
governments through loan or grant financing, could be perceived as IFAD initiatives
implemented by IFAD with consequences for real government ownership and sustainability
(IFAD 2013h, 59).
IFAD reports that its country presence has translated into cost savings, due to outposting
of staff from headquarters and increased local hiring (IFAD 2010b). According to the
Country Presence Strategy, the estimated cost of the 39 country offices (in 2013) was US
$12.51 million, with US$8.65 million covering staff costs and US$3.86 million, non-staff
costs (IFAD 2013f, 2). The 2017 work programme and budget has budgeted US$5.22
million for non-staff costs of the ICO program, but staff costs, including staff at IFAD
permanently assigned to ICO management or staffing costs of IFAD Country Program
Officers are not suballocated from existing departmental budgets (IFAD 2016f). IFAD
country presence efforts have been complemented by progress in decentralizing its pro-
gram, administrative, and financial operations to the field. Initial administrative procedures
were issued in 2009, in a comprehensive Country Presence Handbook, outlining all admin-
istrative features of the set-up, and operation of country offices was developed in 2011
(IFAD 2011a, c). An updated “Country Presence Strategy (2014–2015)” was presented to
the IFAD Executive Board in December 2013 (IFAD 2013f), followed in 2016 by the
Corporate-level Evaluation of “IFAD’s Decentralization Experience” (IFAD 2016d) and,
as noted previously, the 2016 Corporate Decentralization Plan. The Plan indicated that
there was a “consistent pattern of improvement in project efficiency and effectiveness
due to decentralization, suggesting that more country presence is generally better”
(IFAD 2016b, ii). The analysis, based on project status reports and project Completion
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Reports, however, showed marginal improvements only, with only the Vietnam office given
delegation of budget authority, an issue raised by MOPAN (2013).
IFAD Operations
Like many other development finance institutions, IFAD uses a performance-based alloca-
tion system (PBAS) to allocate financing to member states. The IFAD PBAS allocates all of
IFAD’s Replenishment sourced to IFAD country lending/grant (DSF) programs. Resources
are distributed to each respective country program, according to a formula approved by the
Executive Board. The formula was initially based on rural population, per capita gross
national income (GNI), and country performance. Other institutions that use a PBAS
include the IDA of the World Bank (where the system was first developed), AfDB, ADB,
the Inter-American Development Bank, the Caribbean Development Bank, and the Global
Environment Facility (GEF). IFAD’s PBAS follows similar approaches to the other institu-
tions, with the exception that IFAD’s approach included an annual Rural Sector Perfor-
mance Assessment that emphasizes rural sector issues and has accordingly lessened the
influence of the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). The
role of CPIA has been further reduced with modifications in IFAD’s PBAS approach in
2016–17, following the evaluation,¹¹ and with the introduction of other variables, including
climate vulnerability. However, for all the institutions utilizing a PBAS approach, such
modifications are a zero-sum game, insofar as the total resources available for distribution
among countries at any one time do not change. What can change is the allocation at
country level, and in this regard IFAD faces, unlike other IFIs, a unique allocation man-
agement problem, given the many eligible members (List C eligible borrowing countries
currently total 139, compared to other IFIs, who have much fewer), but only limited annual
resources to allocate. Although the number of borrowing countries usually averages 90
during a respective replenishment period, the total funds available are approximately only
US$3.2 billion over the three-year period. The issue is compounded by the fact that only
IFAD, of all the IFIs implementing a PBAS, includes ordinary term borrowing MICs in its
PBAS to receive Replenishment-sourced financing. Other IFIs use market-based funds
to finance ordinary term borrowers, and some member countries are concerned that
their Replenishment contributions are going to MICs rather than least developed
countries (LDCs).
Figure 11.1 shows the number of programs under implementation over time. Since
starting operations in 1978, IFAD has financed low-interest loans and grants (about
US$28 billion) for more than 900 projects and programs that have reached some 483
¹¹ According to “IFAD’s Performance-based Allocation System Corporate-Level Evaluation” of April 2016
(IFAD 2016e), as summarized by the Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG):
Overall, the PBAS [has been] found to be relevant [MOPAN and bilateral assessments]. The formula
should better factor in some key dimensions of IFAD’s priorities, such as food security, nutrition and
climate change. It also should improve the way it considers vulnerability issues as determinants of
country needs. The evaluation finds the system’s effectiveness to be on the whole moderately
satisfactory. The rationale for including or excluding countries from the PBAS and the underlying
mechanisms guiding the capping system should be made more explicit and institutionalized. Among
the recommendations, the need to refine the PBAS design, by sharpening its objectives and strength-
ening the rural poverty focus; streamline the process for better effectiveness; and enhance management
and governance, by taking a more corporate approach to the PBAS in general. (ECG 2016)
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million poor rural people.¹² Annual commitments rose to slightly over a billion in 2013
(about the same size as CGIAR’s annual expenditures per year, although the two are not
strictly comparable—IFAD creates investment projects, and CGIAR funds research pro-
jects). When leveraging co-financing by donors and governments is accounted for, however,
IFAD’s portfolio seems much larger. Including funds and external and domestic
co-financing, total investments in agricultural development, poverty reduction, and
improved food security between 2009 and 2013, leveraged by the annual commitments
shown Figure 11.2, rose from US$7.9 billion to US$12.2 billion. In 2013, 72.8 percent of
financing was for low-income, food-deficit countries (as classified by the FAO), and
52.6 percent was for the LDCs (as classified by the UN) (IFAD 2015a). As we showed in
Chapter 8 on the World Bank, performance of LICs and LDCs has been consistently weaker
than that of more advanced countries. This calls for special approaches to rural develop-
ment strategies, as well as to project development and project implementation, such as the
iterative processes being developed by the United States Agency for International Develop-


























































































Number of effective programmes and projects under implementation
Total IFAD loan and grant operations
Cofinancing (multilateral + bilateral + NGO + other)
Domestic contributions
Loan + DSF grant disbursement
Figure 11.1 IFAD’s operational summary, 2001–2018 (US$m)
Source: Based on IFAD Annual Reports.
¹² See “IFAD: About Us”: https://www.ifad.org/en/about
What it means to “reach” people is fraught with ambiguity. If they live near a road, it may mean access to
markets, a very different matter than being reached by access to finance, seed, inputs, or knowledge. Moreover, the
impacts of IFAD’s projects and programs on incomes or welfare depend on another complex set of factors.
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Scaling Up
In 2009, IFAD undertook an institutional scaling-up review, for which Brookings Institu-
tion conducted a desk analysis of IFAD’s country and thematic operational approaches
(Linn et al. 2010). The review also considered IFAD’s corporate strategy, operational
policies, processes, and instruments, as well as its budgetary and human resource manage-
ment practices to determine whether they were supportive of a systematic scaling-up
approach to development. In parallel, the IOE carried out a corporate evaluation of
IFAD’s approach to innovation and scaling up, which concluded that scaling up is critical
for IFAD if it is to achieve its goal of reducing rural poverty. It also found that IFAD had
effectively supported the scaling up of successful agricultural and rural development
programs in a number of countries, but that this success has not always resulted from a
systematic operational approach. It was often due to fortuitous circumstances. Therefore,
IFAD’s strategies, operational policies, processes, and instruments, as well as its budgeting
and staff incentives, need to evolve to support a more proactive and systematic approach to
scaling up (IFAD 2010a, 2012b; Thapa and Hessel 2016).
In 2010, IFAD commissioned another review of its approach to scaling up operations.
The review, carried out by the Wolfensohn Center for Development at the Brookings
Institution, concluded that “IFAD knows how to scale up and has done so successfully



















































Latin America and the Caribbean
Near East, North Africa and Europe
East and Southern Africa
West and Central Africa
Asia and the Pacific
Figure 11.2 IFAD approved amount by region, 1978–2019 (US$m)
Source: https://www.ifad.org/en/web/operations/operations-dashboard
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operational work than it has received to date” (Linn et al. 2010, 45). The assertion of
successful scaling up seems to contradict IFAD’s own assessment. It also concluded that
scaling up will have to be a part of institutional change and a more systematic approach
guided by a simple and focused strategy. The review warned against “creating a new
‘mantra;’ forgetting that scaling up is a means to an end, not the end itself; creating
excessively burdensome processes; and spreading IFAD’s human resources too thin”
(Linn et al. 2010, 45).
The review’s observations are perceptive, not simply because of what they state, but
because the review was authored by former senior World Bank managers and is a com-
mentary on aid, generally, if not at least on agriculture. Citing Hartmann and Linn (2008),
the review notes that ambitious development goals have been set, but not yet met by the
international community:
The challenge is not just a matter of more, better coordinated and less volatile aid. A key
constraint that needs to be overcome is that development interventions—projects, pro-
grams, policies—are all too often like small pebbles thrown into a big pond: they are
limited in scale, short-lived, and therefore without lasting impact. This may explain why
so many studies have found that external aid has had only a weak or no development
impact in the aggregate at the global and at the country level, even though many individual
interventions have been successful in terms of their project- or program-specific goals.
(Linn et al. 2010, 2, citing Hartmann and Linn 2008, 2)
The review diagnosed a major challenge for IFAD. It is confronted the gap between its small
size and the large scale of poverty in the rural areas it was mandated to address. Hartmann
et al. (2013, 1) noted, “For many years, IFAD stressed innovation as the key to success,
giving little attention to systematically replicating and building on successful innovations.”
Hartmann and Linn (2008, 8) defined what scaling up meant for IFAD, from a World Bank
2004 conference:¹³ “expanding, adapting and sustaining successful policies, programs or
projects in different places and over time to reach a greater number of people.”
IFAD is devoting increased efforts to scaling up in recent years. In the Evaluation
Synthesis Report on IFAD’s Support to Scaling Up of Results, however, it was noted,
“Almost all COSOPs since 2010 have made reference to scaling up, but few have articulated
a strategy for it” (IFAD 2017b, vi). Only two countries (Liberia and Vietnam) included fully
developed scaling-up strategies (IFAD 2017b). Other CPEs assessed scaling up as moder-
ately satisfactory or in need of strengthening. Overall, scaling up is, typically, ad hoc,
without sufficient consideration for linkages with knowledge management, policy dialogue,
and partnership building. A more strategic and systematic effort might have ensured a
wider replication and scaling up of successful innovations. Scaling up is particularly
important in MICs, with their large number of rural poor. Promoting sustainability of
benefits, as well as ensuring IFAD assistance, can have a wider impact on rural poverty at
the national level. Partnerships with government, the private sector, and other donors are
critical for scaling up, particularly, given IFAD’s relatively limited resources. With regard to
governments, this also requires IFAD to work with a range of national-level counterparts,
both technically and nontechnically capable. This is, however, a challenge in some coun-
tries: for example, in China where only limited dialogue is possible between IFAD and the
¹³ The World Bank conference, “Reducing Poverty, Sustaining Growth: Scaling Up Poverty Reduction. Case
Study Summaries,” A Global Learning Process and Conference, was held in Shanghai, May 25–7, 2004.
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National Ministry of Agriculture. A strong partnership could possibly offer opportunities
for scaling up successful innovations tested in IFAD-supported projects into national policy,
with activities funded through domestic resources.
So, what does IFAD need to do? The Brookings review recommended several steps:
Step 1: Define the scale of the issue to be addressed and the appropriate scale of
intervention up front along with a suitable time horizon.
Step 2: Define suitable pathways of scaling up by identifying the drivers and spaces for
scaling up, including the costs of project implementation (or service delivery, etc.).
Step 3: Explore the institutional, organizational, and policy context that allows scaling up.
Step 4: Define the partners who can assist with or take over the scaling-up process and
what needs to be done to bring them on board.
Step 5: Define the appropriate operational instruments (loans, grants, technical assistance,
policy dialogue, etc.) for IFAD to support the scaling up process.
Step 6: Monitor and evaluate the pilot or experimental project as well as the scaling-up
process in terms of the suitability of the pathway and impact on the rural poor. (Linn et al.
2010, 12)
According to the study, successful scaled-up innovations have been few and far between:
“the River Blindness Program in West Africa, which largely helped to eradicate the wide-
spread and deadly disease onchocerciasis; the Grameen Bank and BRAC [Building
Resources Across Communities] programs of microcredit for poor people in Bangladesh;
and the Progresa-Opportunidades program in Mexico and similar conditional cash transfer
programs elsewhere in Latin America, which have helped tackle endemic poverty” (Linn
et al. 2010, 3). The challenge lies in making sure that scaling up is appropriate. Therefore,
the study suggests quite an elaborate approach to scaling up externally designed and funded
projects. It does not point out, however, that some of the largest poverty programs in the
developing world, including some of those cited by the Brookings study, were designed,
championed, and implemented by national policymakers or social entrepreneurs. This
applies, for example, to the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, the Amul Dairy Schemes, the
National Rural Employment Scheme in India, the cash transfer programs in Brazil and
Mexico, and land reform in China. The probability of large impacts is much higher if
indigenously conceived, planned, and implemented programs are supported by external aid,
and their quality improved, rather than ideas always being introduced, designed, and
financed externally. The latter often tend to experience too little domestic ownership.
And yet, the scope for improving public expenditures of developing countries remains
vast. In a recent book on public works that have become popular interventions among
developing country governments, Subbarao et al. (2013) noted:
While this combination of past and emerging experiences demonstrates the potential of
public works programs as an important safety net for addressing the poor’s vulnerability
to shocks, the overall record of achievement is uneven. Public works programs are beset by
myriad challenges involving transparency and leakage, including in India’s nationwide
flagship program MGNREGS [Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme]. Issues of governance and corruption have arisen in many programs across the
globe, and threaten to rob public works instruments of their credibility and repute in
achieving their stated objectives. (Subbarao et al. 2013, 2)
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The same is true of school feeding programs (see Chapter 12 on WFP). Looking to donors’
pilot interventions to scale up, while overlooking the effectiveness of already existing
government programs is a weakness of the Brookings proposal. Progressa, now called
Opportunidades in Mexico, was a government intervention that has been responding to
domestic evaluations. Indeed, demand for evaluation offices within governments has
increased, as citizens are demanding more accountability of public funds. The challenge is
to ensure evaluation findings have an impact on improving program interventions. Evalua-
tions of many of the School Feeding Programs in India have had remarkably little impact on
improving interventions.
The Consolidated Action Plan to Enhance Operational and Institutional Efficiency
concluded:
Scaled-up impact is the key to long-term efficiency, which in turn depends upon IFAD
supporting high-quality projects and programmes with demonstrated impact . . . despite
improvement in recent years, IFAD’s performance is predominantly moderately satisfac-
tory, which could limit opportunities for scaling up successful innovations promoted by
IFAD-supported projects and programmes through partner resources. (IFAD 2013b, 1)
In commenting by the IOE on IFAD’s Plan, their first recommendation was: “Scaling up of
high-impact, innovative approaches emerging out of IFAD-supported projects and pro-
grammes should become the objective of IFAD’s business model” (IFAD 2013b, 1).
Clearly, the challenge is to convince governments in the developing world and their
cooperating donors to scale up those agricultural investments that are working and to
introduce policies that create an enabling environment for innovation and scaling-up
activities. An additional essential element to scaling up is the need to adhere to a long-
term commitment rather than a one-off, three-to-five-year project, followed by a quick exit.
IFAD’s success in Peru, in which it supported the government in scaling up agricultural and
rural development investments in poor areas of the Andes over a 20-year period, had two
critical ingredients: government commitment to operating at scale and donor willingness to
support governments in doing so (Cleaver 2013).
We concur with this assessment of the importance of domestic strategy and commitment
from the outset to design sound programs that would have impacts and the need for long-
term presence. While external actors can be critical to success, as they were for the River
Blindness program or the Green Revolution, those conditions rarely exist in today’s aid
environment. So, as happened with Grameen, Amul, Mexico, or Brazil’s conditional cash
transfers, the desire to scale up must come first from domestic actors, from policymakers,
civil society, or the private sector. They need a long enough presence, an ability to learn by
doing, and exceptional domestic political and strategic savvy to succeed. Much of the
writing on scaling up overlooks these important domestic commitments, which external
actors can support. The Green Revolution and River Blindness programs were initiated and
supported by outside agencies. In both cases, the World Bank, working with other partners,
played a critical role. Yet, in both cases, the partners also had smart technological solutions,
and they were willing to create institutions and to provide human capital and financial
support long enough to nurture and sustain their growth. Those conditions often do not
exist. Today’s donors have a short-time horizon; they tend to be impatient for results, look
for them mechanistically, and typically, are not interested in building long-term, domestic
human or institutional capacity. Each of the large successful programs noted here have had
a minimum of 10 to 15 years of a gestation period. While access to cell phone technology is,
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at a minimum, necessary, it is the institutions, policies, good practices, and their routine
monitoring and independent evaluation that tend to take time to establish.
IFAD has made a significant effort to ensure that scaling up is mainstreamed into
operational activities. It is explicitly incorporated as an institutional objective in the
formulation of IFAD’s Medium-Term Strategic Framework 2011–13 (IFAD 2011b).
A scaling-up agenda under the program to be funded by the ninth replenishment of
IFAD’s resources during 2013–15 was approved by IFAD’s Governing Council in February
2012, and IFAD’s internal guidelines for formulation, implementation, and monitoring of
country programs and projects have been adjusted to reflect the focus on scaling up.
Replication and scaling up has also been added to the 2013–15 RMF with targets set for
2015. The IFAD Report on Development Effectiveness 2014 noted, “Performance with
respect to replication and scaling up has strengthened considerably” (IFAD 2014f, 3).
Nevertheless, scaling up can only happen when dialogue with clients is strong. IFAD is
staffed with qualified, dedicated people in the field, who are respected by client countries; it
is flexible in a variety of ways, and it carefully identifies national leaders who have the
commitment and the demonstrated tenacity and potential to establish, monitor, and
support scaled-up programs. In May 2019, IFAD announced new targets as part of its
updated RMF for the 2019–21 period, as noted earlier in this chapter (IFAD 2019g). The six
indicators on decentralization and institutional efficiency would be informed by IFAD’s
ongoing change and reform agenda, including co-financing targets and historical trends in
mobilizing supplementary funds and other IFAD-managed resources. Decentralization
targets include greater presence of field staff and greater country programming closer to
the action, as well as targets for reduced operating costs.
IFAD’s Approach to Rural Poverty in Middle-Income Countries
IFAD’s evaluation of its engagement in MICs is full of rich insights relating to its strategy
and raises strategic questions for IFAD, as well as for the development community com-
mitted to eradicating extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity by 2030 (IFAD
2014b). Because the poorest of the poor are IFAD’s declared focus, more so than other IFIs,
the evaluation rightly stresses that MICs are highly diverse. The synthesis evaluation
illustrates that there are many different ways of classifying MICs (Vázquez and Sumner
2012). The majority of the world’s poor live in the MICs (including 75 percent below
the poverty line). Half of the world’s poor are in China and India alone; 67 percent
are concentrated in only five MICs—India, China, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Pakistan—
while 80 percent live in only 10 countries (IFAD 2014b). Given that IFAD resources may
be spread across many countries, as many as 97 countries in 2013–15, the question arises
whether it should concentrate its human and financial resources on fewer countries and
achieve better results, particularly in light of other findings.
Second, by spreading IFAD’s loans, grants, and staff over 97 countries, many countries
receive as noted in the previous discussion on PBAS, very limited resources. The financial
resources offered may be too little to make a significant difference—or even to be of
interest—and the rationale for country presence will either be nonexistent or very limited.
As the evaluation of “IFAD’s Engagement in Middle-income Countries” pointed out,
greater country selectivity would ensure that IFAD was able to deploy a minimum “critical
mass” of resources wherever it worked (IFAD 2014b, 36). This is not the case at present.
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IFAD is a global organization with a mandate to lend to all member states, and its
membership may not agree to focus on only a few countries. Finally, as the evaluation
notes, “a goal of maximizing the total impact on poverty . . . would suggest that resources
should be allocated in line with the distribution of rural poverty, and in a way that
maximizes the likely impact of those resources” (IFAD 2014b, 32). The PBAS partially
does this, but the PBAS could be calibrated to further accentuate this goal by introducing
indicators such as the UN Poverty Index.¹⁴ Although some MICs have large numbers of
poor people, many countries, such as Jordan and the Republic of Moldova, do not.¹⁵ In
2013, 25 percent of the PBAS allocation went to “two largely MIC regions—LAC [Latin
America and the Caribbean] and NEN [the Near East and North Africa], containing 1.7
percent to 2.3 percent of the rural people living in extreme poverty (US$1.25/day) or
poverty (US$2/day) respectively” (IFAD 2014b, 32).
Distribution of resources is related to the issue of the internal graduation across financing
terms and, eventually, to the possibility that countries “self-graduate by opting not to
borrow or not to renew their membership” [and consider changing their List status]
(IFAD 2014b, 33). Subject to “Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing” (IFAD 2019d),
replenishment resources are available to all List B and C members without respect to their
income level: that is, to both MICs and LICs, and with lending terms calibrated to GNI per
capita thresholds. This is different than the World Bank’s IDA, “where replenishment
resources are only available to a sub-set of IDA qualifying countries (currently those with
GNI per capita up to US$1,205)” (IFAD 2014b, 33).¹⁶Once IDA countries graduate over the
IDA cut-off rate, and through blend terms, countries become eligible to borrow from the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) at IBRD terms, sourced
from market funds, not replenishment. Those same countries borrow at ordinary terms
from IFAD, with the terms aligned to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)
benchmark rate, like IBRD.
As such, IFAD needs a strategic approach to both resource mobilization and program
choice that either focuses on countries with the highest number of poor and excels in
addressing their problems—or continues to spread itself too thin and raises far more
resources to address those issues. ODA resources have become increasing scarce, however.
IFAD has sought to address poverty through its engagement with MICs (IFAD 2011c), but
also, in response to the evaluation of IFAD’s middle-income strategy, the development of a
country selectivity approach (IFAD 2014b), and developing an approach for sovereign
borrowing (IFAD 2015d).
Finally, the evaluation synthesis for IFAD’s engagement with MICs, reports:
There is no evidence from the project data that IFAD-supported projects perform better in
MICs than in LICs, possibly because IFAD-supported projects in MICs tend to be located
in poorer, remote and more difficult regions, where context is similar to that found in
LICs, and in some cases, in fragile states. Moreover, . . . (i) the projects evaluated by the
IOE in MICs were designed around a decade ago and would not have benefitted fully from
important reforms introduced in recent years (e.g., wider country presence, direct
¹⁴ The PBAS could be calibrated by increasing the –0.25 exponent on GNI/capita, for example.
¹⁵ The international absolute poverty line US$1.90/day was updated from US$1.25/day in 2015, as the
threshold for extreme poverty, but the World Bank has established two higher thresholds of US$3.20/day and
US$5.50 per day in LMICs and UMICs, respectively (World Bank 2018).
¹⁶ IDA eligibility was based on GNI per capita of US$1,175 in fiscal year 2020.
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supervision, enhanced leadership of CPMs [Country Programme Managers] in project
design processes, etc.); and (ii) the sample is relatively small and therefore more data and
closer monitoring to validate and understand the differences in performance between
upper UMICs and LMICs is needed. (IFAD 2014b, 15)
In many respects, IFAD programs face similar challenges in all types of countries, and of
critical importance, programs in MICs are not necessarily different from those in LICs.
Nevertheless, although previous evaluations reflect a range in performance across the world,
the evaluation of IFAD projects in China notes that the latest round of four integrated rural
development projects since 2009 has been very successful (IFAD 2014d). The IFAD
evaluation of those projects further noted that projects are successful when they are well-
designed and underlined that more resources must be allocated to enhancing no-lending
activities (knowledge management, policy dialogue, and partnerships), as well as to South–
South and triangular cooperation. IFAD has financed 27 agriculture and rural development
projects and programs in China. IFAD’s financial contribution of around US$775 million,
since the approval of its first loan in 1981, corresponds to a total project cost of US$1.94
billion. China has been the second largest recipient of IFAD’s assistance. IFAD’s project
results in China are very similar to those of the World Bank, discussed in Chapter 8.
Interestingly, although the donor community rejected the idea of integration based on its
experience of poor projects in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1970s, the integrated approach is
alive and working well in China. Instead of completely abandoning it, the Chinese have
made a religion of adaptation and learning from mistakes (IFAD 2014d).
Non-lending issues (policies, capacity, and partnerships) are particularly important in
MICs (especially, UMICS) and are becoming more important as national incomes increase.
“IFAD’s non-lending activities will be more successful if they are supported and comple-
mented by an adequate lending programme” (IFAD 2014b, 16). Non-lending activities have
been the weakest area of IFAD’s support, although there are signs of improvement after
2011. Knowledge management, policy dialogue, and partnerships are particularly important
in MICs, and even more so in UMICs (IFAD 2014b).
IFAD’s Performance in Measuring Development Effectiveness: The Use
of Scorecards and Results Management Frameworks
IFAD, like FAO and the World Bank, measures its development effectiveness, not to be
confused with impact assessment. In the case of IFAD, the World Bank, and other
multilateral development banks, this has taken the form of RMFs, usually developed in
parallel with respective replenishment processes that cover 3–4-year cycles (IFAD 2007b,
2009, 2011d, 2014g, 2017d, 2019f). Since 2005, IFAD has used a six-point ratings scale to
assess performance on each evaluation criterion and report on operational performance in
ARRI analyses. Ratings from 2002 onwards are recorded in an independent evaluation
database, which is publicly available. Projects rated moderately satisfactory or better are in
the “satisfactory” zone (4–6), while projects rated unsatisfactory or worse are in the
“unsatisfactory” zone (1–3). These scorecards are used in the replenishment of resources,
the processes of mobilizing resources, ensuring accountability for results, and enabling
strategic dialogue with financiers and clients. These efforts continue to be improved, with
considerable energy devoted to preparing RMFs/scorecards that tell us how lives of the poor
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are being transformed on the ground. This has led to both an elaboration of outcome
indicators and separately of the development of impact evaluations. IFAD has come a long
way in operationalizing these lessons and increased its effectiveness and efficiency. IFAD’s
performance, measured in terms of the ratings of its projects, reached an all-time low in
2003–5. After extensive reforms following the 2004–5 Independent External Evaluation,
IFAD is now a more agile organization. The 2013–14 evaluation of institutional and
programmatic efficiency has resulted in further reforms to achieve greater institutional
efficiency in internal processes and procedures and in the efficiency of program outputs,
outcomes, and impacts (IFAD 2013c). Despite the reforms, IFAD still faces challenges in the
rapidly changing aid environment. Evaluations have called on it to “raise the bar” in the
efficiency of its projects (IFAD 2013c, 7), in the measurement of its impacts, and on scaling
up its operations. It has been urged to develop strategic collaboration with the other Rome-
based food and agriculture agencies, specifically, streamlining administrative procedures,
particularly disbursement, to reduce processing time and costs. Yet, each Rome-based
agency has its own personality and identity, and despite many years of efforts, developing
true, results-based partnerships has not been easy, as discussed in the Chapters 9 and 12 on
FAO and WFP, respectively.
Like other IFIs, IFAD’s overall structure of the RMF was conceived as a hierarchy in
which an immediate lower level result (at the project level) underpins, explains, and
contributes to higher level results (at the level of the portfolio, and then, the organization).
The scope of the RMF has been expanded substantially over the years. It is also aligned with
the reporting instruments of other IFIs, notably the World Bank, AfDB, and ADB.¹⁷ Like
the World Bank, the RMF is intrinsically an organizational scorecard linked to organiza-
tional efficiency and administrative budget allocation.
The RMF is tied to the replenishment period, a results and impact management system, a
PBAS for transparent and predictable allocation of resources, and annual reporting on
development effectiveness—the RIDE and ARRI, produced by the IOE.¹⁸ In addition, IFAD,
in the 2016 RIDE, has reported on impact-level indicators for the first time, assessed
through the IFAD9 Impact Assessment Initiative (IAI) (IFAD 2016g). IFAD has noted
that number of people that increased their incomes to above the poverty line is, on its own,
inadequate to assess the impact on the well-being of IFAD’s beneficiaries. IFAD argues in
RIDE 2016 that rural poverty impact “is a composite of five impact domains: household
income and assets, agriculture and food security, human empowerment and social capital,
institutions and policies, and markets” (IFAD 2016f, 2). In parallel, IFAD has also produced
a Development Effectiveness Framework for measuring results, including impact, under-
pinned by a theory of change (IFAD 2016c). A revised Results and Impact Management
System (RIMS) consolidated RIMS indicators with the Core Indicators of the IFAD RMF:
“For a subset of projects (approximately 15 percent of the portfolio), IFAD will conduct
rigorous outcome and impact assessments on an ‘attribution’ basis, through its impact
assessment programme” (IFAD 2017f, 5). Impact-level indicators, linked to SDG targets will
include: the number of people experiencing economic mobility; the number of people with
¹⁷ IFAD has chaired the Multilateral Development Bank Management for Development Results (MfDR)
working group and coordinated the annual production of the Common Performance Assessment System
(COMPAS) since 2012.
¹⁸ IFAD has revised its RMF as part of the IFAD11 2019–21 replenishment process.
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improved production; the number of people with improved market access; and the number
of people with greater resilience. The 2016 RIDE reports that the IAI indicated:
IFAD’s investments in rural people generate results in a number of critical areas, including
assets, resilience, livestock ownership, agricultural revenues, nutrition and women’s
empowerment. Projections indicate that some 44 million beneficiaries are enjoying sub-
stantial increases in agricultural revenues, and 28.8 million and 22.8 million beneficiaries
have realized significant gains in poultry and livestock asset ownership, respectively.
Moreover, impact estimates suggest that IFAD investments can reduce poverty by up to
9.9 per cent, corresponding to an aggregate result of 23.8 million people moved out of
poverty in the 2010–2015 period. (IFAD 2016g, iv)
Although most IFIs use a 3- or 4-level RMF, IFAD uses a 5-level approach, with Level 1
reporting on global poverty, food security, and agricultural investment outcomes, including:
the proportion of population below the international poverty line of US$1.90 a day; the
prevalence of undernourishment in population; the prevalence of (moderate and severe)
food insecurity; and the prevalence of stunting among children under five years of age. The
second level, country-level development outcomes and impact delivered by IFAD-
supported projects reports on the number of people experiencing economic mobility; the
number of people with improved production, market access, and greater resilience, which
link with FAO’s Strategic Objectives and indicators (see Chapter 9).
Level 3 focuses on country-level development outputs delivered by IFAD-supported
projects: for example, agricultural technologies, rural financial services, marketing, micro-
enterprises, and climate change adaptation. Level 4 reports on operational effectiveness of
IFAD-supported country programs and projects and examines issues such as portfolio
management, while Level 5 assesses IFAD’s institutional effectiveness and efficiency,
including its administrative efficiency and human resources management. The analyses
conducted as part of the RIDE by IFAD have indicated that “IFAD’s systems are adequate
for early identification of problem projects (including inefficiency and a lack of sustaina-
bility); and that the Fund has been able to improve performance of the majority of problem
projects” (IFAD 2018b, 1–2).
The ARRI annually assesses IFAD’s rural poverty impact, based on a sample of recent
project evaluations, in terms of institutions and policies; natural resources, the environ-
ment, and climate change; food security and agricultural productivity; household income
and assets; and human and social capital and empowerment.¹⁹ Overall, the reported rural
poverty impact of IFAD operations has improved over the past decade, and an upward
trend is particularly visible in recent years, albeit from a slightly less than 60 percent of
projects still rated as moderately satisfactory during the 2009–11 period (IFAD 2013a). This
trend has continued with the 2016 ARRI noting “improved performance during IFAD9 on
operational priorities such as rural poverty impact, human and social capital empowerment,
innovation and scaling up, gender equality and women’s empowerment” (IFAD 2016a).
The 2018 ARRI noted:²⁰
¹⁹ Rural poverty impact is defined as “the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the
rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development
interventions” (IFAD 2017a, 6).
²⁰ The quantitative findings of the 2018 ARRI were drawn from a sample of 320 project evaluations, completed
between 2002 and 2016, as well as 45 country strategy and programme evaluations, with a collection of 2,542
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There is a lack of agreement within the Fund on the target group and strategies needed . . .
[the] trend towards market-oriented projects as well as IFAD’s increased focus on the need
for greater attention in targeting to gender equality, indigenous peoples and youth calls
attention to the possible need to re-examine and clarify IFAD’s target group and strategies.
Effective targeting requires robust poverty analysis and well-informed targeting strategies
to meet the needs of poor rural people. [IFAD’s experience illustrates] the importance of
developing targeting strategies and designing and implementing projects on a foundation
of strong contextual understanding. There is also the need for realistic and flexible
targeting to allow for modifications in a rapidly changing world, particularly in fragile
or post-conflict contexts. (IFAD 2018d, 16)
The 2019 ARRI noted that, “Overall, the performance of IFAD operations shows flat or
slightly declining trends. While 75 percent of all evaluation ratings were positive between
2007 and 2017, satisfactory and better ratings are diminishing. These trends are also
reflected in Management’s project completion report ratings for all criteria” (IFAD
2019h, 7). The Foreword to the ARRI by Oscar Garcia, Director, Independent Office of
Evaluation of IFAD, further noted:
IFAD project performance continues to outperform that of the African Development
Bank and Asian Development Bank in the agriculture sector in their respective regions.
However, globally and in the regions of Latin American and the Caribbean as well as the
Near East, North Africa and Europe, IFAD project performance is now lower than that of
the World Bank, whose definition does not include sustainability of benefits. (IFAD
2019h, 7)
Impact Assessment
Generally, across major international institutions, there is a lack of impact indicators
attributable to that institution. Only IFAD, CGIAR, GAFSP, and GEF have set at least
one impact target generated by their own operations, whereas the others have reported only
lower level outputs and outcomes. Moreover, only in the case of IFAD, and to some extent
CGIAR, can one see an attributed impact target and an explanation for how it is to be
produced and measured. In light of this, IFAD’s approach of attempting to attribute an
impact to the institution, rather than merely monitoring its contribution, remains unusual
among IFIs. Winters and Garbero (2018) recounted the many challenges in doing impact
assessment. They consider attribution of outcomes to a particular intervention and estab-
lishing a counterfactual by far to be the biggest challenge. There are also other challenges,
including measuring costs and benefits, aggregating the impact of individual interventions/
projects to corporate-level impacts, issues of external validity—some of these are discussed
in Chapter 8 on the World Bank. During the 9th Replenishment, which included the
aspirational goal of raising 80 million people out of poverty, IFAD embarked on impact
assessment as part of its RMF. It undertook to conduct impact assessments on 15 percent
ratings from their project reflect evaluations, which allows the Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) to update and
refine its statistical analyses (IFAD 2018d, 6).
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of its portfolio to be able to report impacts on its corporate objectives (see, also, Gaarder
and Brown 2019).
FAO has improved the data that countries collect routinely and which FAO reports
(and which support the State of Food Insecurity and Nutrition in the World and the State of
Food and Agriculture reports).²¹ It is also supplementing these macro data with household
surveys. It is no accident that there are few credible studies of donor or government
interventions that relate outcomes to investments and influence policy.²² Both FAO and
IFAD are working closely with theWorld Bank on the 50 x 2030 initiative as a central theme
to support better data management and results reporting at the country level. A key
opportunity for both IFAD and FAO is the greater alignment of their results frameworks,
consolidation of indicators, and further enhancement of their existing collaboration on
SDG indicators (FAO 2018).
The 2018 ARRI concludes:
Conducting benchmarking analysis, the 2018 ARRI finds that IFAD project performance
continues to outperform the Asian Development Bank and African Development Bank in
the agriculture sector in their respective regions. In Latin America and the Caribbean,
IFAD project performance is on par with the World Bank, but falls behind in the Near
East, North Africa and Europe region, as well as globally. . . . Overall, the performance of
IFAD operations has been positive. Seventy-six percent of all evaluation ratings are
moderately satisfactory or better in the period 2007–2016. Currently, 80 percent or
more projects assessed against the criteria of relevance, innovation, scaling up, rural
poverty impact and IFAD performance as a partner are rated moderately satisfactory or
better. (IFAD 2018d, 6)
When comparing performance between the periods 2007–2009 and 2014–2016,
IFAD’s performance as a partner shows good performance and improvement, while
project performance has declined. Following a decline from 2009 to 2011, perfor-
mance across the criteria improved up to the 2012–2014 period, after which rural
poverty impact and government performance as a partner began to decline. In the
period 2014–2016, only IFAD performance as a partner shows continuing improve-
ment, having overtaken rural poverty impact as the strongest performing criterion
since 2013–2015, while trends in overall project achievement and project performance
are flat, and declining in rural poverty impact and government performance as a
partner. (IFAD 2018d, 10–11)
The 2018 ARRI highlights however that the portfolio performance trend is flat, with signs
of deterioration. In the period 2014-2016, sustainability, efficiency, innovation, scaling up,
gender equality and women’s empowerment, government performance and rural poverty
impact all declined slightly. Sustainability of benefits and efficiency remain long-standing
²¹ See, for example, “Acting on Food Insecurity and Malnutrition, the Food Insecurity and Capacity Profile”
(FAO 2014).
²² Some notable exceptions are studies of Training and Visits extension, a Systematic Review of Farmer Field
Schools. See Waddington and White (2014).
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bottlenecks for project performance, with the lowest means in the entire period of
2007–2016. (IFAD 2018d, 6)
IFAD management has recognized these issues in the RIDE 2018, while recognizing the
effect of using a 36-month rolling average and the impact of fragile state performance.
Management has sought to address the concerns through decentralization; a programmatic
approach; a streamlined design process to reduce time lags; and a facility for faster project
start-up. Future ARRIs will need to specifically assess the effects of these initiatives as,
in themselves, they have elements of commonality with similar approaches used by
other IFIs.
Rural poverty impact showed an overall improvement from 2009–11 to 2012–14 for
projects rated moderately satisfactory or better, declining to 81.4 percent in 2014–16. The
2018 ARRI noted: “Satisfactory ratings represent 32.2 percent of projects in 2014–2016,
guaranteeing steady good performance. No highly satisfactory ratings have been reported in
rural poverty impact” (Figure 11.3). Figure 11.4 depicts rural poverty impact by replenish-
ment period (IFAD 2018d, 35).
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Figure 11.3 Rural poverty impact by project completion years (three-year moving period)
(% of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better, all evaluation data series)
Source: Data provided by Jacqueline Souza, IFAD.
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Conclusion
The 2019 SOFI report (State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World), jointly prepared
by FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, has highlighted that 9.2 percent of the world
population (or slightly more than 700 million people) were exposed to severe levels of food
insecurity in 2018. An additional 17.2 percent of the world population, or 1.3 billion people,
have experienced food insecurity at moderate levels, meaning they did not have regular
access to nutritious and sufficient food. Moreover, overweight and obesity continue to
increase in all regions, particularly among school-age children and adults. In 2018, an
estimated 40 million children under five were overweight (FAO et al. 2019).
IFAD’s vision in which rural extreme poverty is eliminated through inclusive and
sustainable agriculture and rural development is of continued importance to address
SDG2 (zero hunger and rural transformation), particularly SDG2.3 and SDG2.4. External
evaluations have shown that IFAD, a small and agile organization, has been effective in
addressing its declared mission, and therefore, remains a central tool for more investment
through development programs. This investment needs to be made in rural areas in all
member countries to strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity of food systems, people’s
livelihoods, and nutrition in response to climate variability and extremes. Moreover, IFAD’s
ability to develop partnerships with government, the private sector, domestic actors, policy-
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Figure 11.4 Rural poverty impact by replenishment period (% of projects rated moderately
satisfactory or better, all evaluation series)
Source: Data provided by Jacqueline Souza, IFAD.
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partnerships. This goal includes the targets both of promoting effective public, public–
private, and civil society partnerships, and mobilizing additional financial resources for
developing countries.
Addressing rural poverty across and within all IFAD’s developing country member states
will need both innovative financial and programmatic mechanisms, supported by the
respective commitments and a broader range of partners. IFAD’s mandate remains rele-
vant, particularly in LMICs and MICs with acute per capita income inequality, but there is a
huge gap between needs and expectations and what can actually be delivered under the
existing architecture and funding structure. Responding to these developments and to the
dilemma of whether only to assist poor people in poor countries (as defined by average per
capita country income) will test IFAD’s ingenuity, creativity, and capacity for innovation.
Going forward, however, IFAD faces several challenges going forward, which have been
explored in the course of IFAD’s 10th and 11th replenishment with no clear resolution yet.
On the supply side, continuing with business as usual could be challenging, given stalling
ODA and slow progress in increasing replenishments. ODA to agriculture has increased by
30 percent over the past five years, but it is still only 5 percent of total ODA. Implicit in the
reliance on the traditional model of replenishments is the possibility of reduction in its
program of loans and grants.
On the demand side, there is a huge gap between needs and expectations and what can
actually be delivered under the existing architecture and funding structure. Progress toward
ending poverty and hunger has stalled as growing food insecurity, linked to fragility and
climate change, threatens IFAD’s ability to contribute to achieving SDGs by 2030. IFAD is
thus at a crossroads with several options on the supply and demand side, which we have
discussed in this chapter.
Together with the development community, and specifically, its Executive Board, IFAD
needs to choose among options. For IFAD to continue its declared mission of addressing
rural poverty across and within all developing countries among its member states, IFAD
will need both innovative financial and programmatic mechanisms, supported by commit-
ments from a broader range of partners. IFAD is implementing recommendations of
existing external evaluations and the IOE or the Officer of Audit and Oversight, but it
should also carry out a further independent assessment in 2021.
The IFAD10 replenishment meetings concluded that IFAD’s financial model, as the sole
source of its external funding, is unlikely to be adequate in the future; particularly, if IFAD is
to expand its operations to a level that better reflects the estimated demand for IFAD
resources, and yet, is within the organization’s capacity to deliver. IFAD would need to find
alternative sources of financing beyond replenishments to expand its PoLG. This could
mean sustained mobilization of core and unrestricted complementary contributions
through replenishment cycles, and borrowing to leverage IFAD’s resources in the short
term from sovereign states and state-supported institutions and in the long term from the
market. Options also include expanding the PoW through supplementary funding and a
more strategic and targeted approach to co-financing. Market borrowing was not consid-
ered as an option for IFAD10.
The Eleventh Replenishment (IFAD11) was the first to occur after the SDGs were
adopted, and its deliberations concerning IFAD’s financing and operations were for
the period 2019–21. Meeting five times between February 2017 and February 2018 for the
Consultation on the Eleventh Replenishment of IFAD’s Resources, member states agreed to
expand the Fund resources by US$100 million per year to reach a total of US$3.5 billion for
the three years of IFAD11. These changes, combined with increased financing, were effected
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to enable IFAD to increase its outreach from almost 100 million poor rural people today to
120 million by the end of 2021 and to achieve greater impact across a range of the SDGs,
with a focus on youth, the private sector, and poor rural areas, facilitating transformation.
IFAD also undertook to examine how to leverage diversified sources of development finance
to increase its PoLG.
The drive by successive IFAD presidents to increase the PoLG has not come without
consequences. Until the Ninth Replenishment, IFAD has traditionally relied on member
state contributions to finance its PoLG (IFAD 2019a). Since the Ninth Replenishment of
IFAD’s resources, however, IFAD has gradually become more dependent on its capacity to
generate internal resources (that is, reflows) and on borrowing. The use of advance
commitment authority (ACA) was allowed with the regular IFAD9 contributions of US
$1.17 billion, a Ninth Replenishment PoLG of US$2.4 billion (IFAD 2013j). The introduc-
tion of this approach was, as noted, “a major change with respect to the practice under
previous replenishments” (IFAD 2013j, 1), and secured higher PoLGs, despite replenish-
ment levels that had not shown substantial growth. IFAD has become, therefore, more
dependent on its capacity to generate internal resources (reflows) and ensure that reflows
match or exceed the rate of disbursements, in line with its Liquidity Policy (IFAD 2006b).
As the IFAD PoLG and loan commitments have increased, so, too, with a time lag, has
the need to finance the increasing levels of disbursements required by the implementation
of these approved loans. In addition, IFAD has also been disbursing for its approved grants,
including those authorized under the DSF and making payments on the debt servicing of
the sovereign borrowing as well (for example, Spain, Germany–KfW). This has put pressure
clearly on IFAD’s internal resources and the underlying assumptions, including the levels of
investment income and loan reflows, in particular, from UMICs and LMICs (noting that
some loans to MICs are entirely financed from sovereign borrowing), all of which have
affected IFAD’s liquidity levels. IFAD has recognized these issues, and as IFAD12 replen-
ishment discussions proceed has, as of December 2019, approved a Capital Adequacy Policy
and is finalizing a new Liquidity Policy, with the objectives of both securing a substantial
replenishment and establishing the basis for IFAD to receive a AAA credit rating, as a basis
for market borrowing.
Building on the resourcing strategies of partnerships is important for IFAD, particularly
given IFAD’s relatively limited resources and, as MOPAN 2017–18 notes “the lack of
growth in the value of member state core contributions” (MOPAN 2018, 8) and the
challenge in “securing full funding for its programme of loans and grants” (MOPAN
2018, 19). As IFAD11 barely reaches the US$1.1 billion of the US$1.2 billion replenishment
targets, it places emphasis not only on the move toward market borrowing, and the support
of its members to do so, but also on forging more profound partnerships with other
financial institutions, including the World Bank Group, regional development banks, and
other institutions such as GAFSP, whose partnership approaches to governance structures,
civil society, and the private sector are lessons for IFAD.
IFAD’s mandate remains relevant, including in LMICs and MICs with acute per capita
income inequality, but there is a huge gap between needs and expectations and what can
actually be delivered under the existing architecture and funding structure. As IFAD
continues the IFAD12 Replenishment discussions, responding to these developments and
the dilemma of whether only to assist poor people in poor countries (as defined by average
per capita country income) will test IFAD’s ingenuity, creativity, and capacity for partner-
ship engagement, innovation, and financial management. IFAD will most certainly need
and deserve more resources.
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The World Food Programme
Uma Lele and Sambuddha Goswami
Summary
The World Food Programme (WFP) is the world’s largest humanitarian organization
addressing hunger and promoting food security. The need for emergency food aid has
increased. It is a result of a combination of several factors: climate change; the global
economic crisis, prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic; and a growing population of
involuntarily displaced people, resulting from conflicts throughout the world.
WFP started with an objective of internationalizing US food aid. President Eisenhower
suggested initiating a pilot program in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), reflecting the confidence that the United States held for FAO and the UN
System, which it had helped to establish. Internationalizing food aid was intended, in part,
to diffuse the controversy surrounding disposal of large US food surpluses—the outcome of
US price policies—with the benefit of feeding food-deficit countries while also addressing
the disincentive effects of food aid on domestic food production. Growing rapidly, inter-
national emergency assistance has gone through substantial evolution from aid in-kind to
cash transfers, and from emergency aid to building capacity of developing countries to
address emergencies. Most importantly, it has filled a void that would have existed hadWFP
not responded rapidly and innovatively to meet the growing needs of emergency assistance
in serving the largest displaced human population in the world. For its achievements, WFP
was awarded the 2020 Nobel Peace Prize. The award highlighted the need to address issues
of peace and security, without which the needs for emergency food aid cannot be brought
under control. The chapter shows how cooperation across international and bilateral
organizations has evolved and where it needs to go in the future.
The World Food Programme at Its Establishment
When the United States desired a means to convert its bilateral food aid into a multilateral
asset—a move that enjoyed strong support among US farmers and shipping companies—
the idea behind WFP was born. US President Dwight Eisenhower first proposed such a food
aid scheme, to be administered through the United Nations (UN) system in 1960. The
scheme was formalized as a food aid “experiment” in 1961 by George McGovern, director of
the US Food for Peace Program at the FAO. Seven months later, the UN General Assembly
and FAO established WFP for a three-year trial period via parallel resolutions. In 1965, the
UN General Assembly and FAO approved two additional resolutions to extend the organ-
ization for “as long as multilateral aid is found feasible and desirable,” and WFP quickly
solidified as part of the UN system (WFP 2020n). (See the chronology of events in the
Appendix to this chapter.)
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When viewed from a contemporary state of international cooperation, the creation of
WFP seems amazing. At the height of its economic and political power, the United States
was willing to internationalize its food aid, and it turned to a UN agency to do the job,
showing its trust in the multilateral system.
“In the 1960s, program food aid from donor harvests, provided in the case of the United
States via concessional sales on easy credit terms, represented a substantial share of food
aid” (Hoddinott, Cohen, and Barrett 2008, 295). The surplus aspect of food aid resulted in
political tensions with some recipient nations, such as India.¹ The United States remains the
largest contributor to WFP—in WFP’s own words, a testament to WFP’s comparative
advantage as an operational, multilateral institution, and to its logistical and political
efficiencies relative to bilateral aid (WFP 2020c). WFP’s model has changed fundamentally
since its establishment. The continued shift from food aid to food assistance for sustainable
hunger solutions has positioned WFP well for the transformations called for by the 2030
Agenda. It has also led to the merging of emergency and development assistance, posing
renewed challenges for the global development and humanitarian assistance architectures,
as we pointed out in Chapter 8 on the World Bank. The World Bank has substantially
increased its assistance to conflict countries, disaster assistance, and displaced people.
The World Food Programme’s Strategic Planning Process
WFP’s purpose, role, values, and principles have been calibrated under a series of strategic
plans, beginning in 2004.² The 2004–7 Strategic Plan reflected, first, a new approach that
linked WFP’s priorities to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), outlined manage-
ment priorities and business process mechanisms, stressed the need for partnerships, and
introduced results-based management. The plan also added support for access to education,
addressing gender disparity, and helping governments manage food assistance programs to
WFP’s strategic priorities (UN 2016b; WFP 2003).
WFP had not previously had a comparative advantage or a proven record of success in
some of these areas. The subsequent 2006–9 Strategic Plan built on this foundation by
providing a longer term perspective for WFP contributions to the MDGs and introducing a
section on risk management (WFP 2005b). In this respect, WFP has been very good at using
the strategic planning process to reframe and to demonstrate its continued relevance in a
changing world.
According to the 2006–9 Strategic Plan, WFP’s “core programme goal . . . is to contribute
to meeting the Millennium Development Goals through food-assisted interventions target-
ing poor and hungry people” (WFP 2005b, 3). Though the plan does not represent a radical
shift that would indicate a longer term approach, the five strategic objectives for the period
were defined as contributing to global efforts to achieve the MDGs. The plan pointed out
that the final report of the UNMillennium Project acknowledged food-based programs that
contribute to the MDGs—among them school meals, deworming campaigns, nutrition
support for pregnant and lactating women and children under five, and tree planting.
¹ US bilateral assistance was particularly large in India—10 million mt/years were imported from the United
States during the food crisis in 1964–5 and 1965–6, raising issues about the use of counterpart funds that the
Government of India generated through sale of the food to the public (Lele and Goldsmith 1989).
² The Final Report on the Governance Project states the strategic framework is supported by a Strategic Plan
that provides the context for WFP’s operations during a four-year period (WFP 2005a). These strategic plans
included 2004–7 (WFP 2003); 2006–9 (WFP 2005b); and 2008–13 (WFP 2007).
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The plan cited WFP assistance activities that align with these programs—food for educa-
tion, mother and child health and nutrition, and food for work (WFP 2005b).
Going Forward: 2014–2017 Strategic Plan, Zero Hunger,
and the 2030 Agenda
WFP’s Strategic Plan 2014–17 framed its priorities around three “R’s:” Respond, Reduce,
and Rebuild (WFP 2013f). The plan called for pursuit of four Strategic Objectives based on
MDGs:
• Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies;
• Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in
fragile settings and following emergencies;
• Reduce risk and enable people, communities, and countries to meet their own food and
nutrition needs; and
• Reduce undernutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger. (WFP 2013f, 3)
Further, the 2014–17 Strategic Plan articulated WFP’s perceived role in achieving zero
hunger, setting the stage for its resilience-building activities to reduce vulnerability of
populations (WFP 2013f). WFP’s operations are oriented toward fighting hunger and
now are cast as responding to the UN Secretary-General’s Zero Hunger Challenge. Thus,
WFP’s work in social protection, gender, disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation,
agricultural investment, and market strengthening has a place under an anti-hunger
mandate, which is broader than its traditional and perceived humanitarian role.
Considerable internal planning has been underway to reorient WFP’s work in the post-
2015 humanitarian and development context, as defined through the 2015–16 Summit
Season, and to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of WFP’s delivery. Strategic priorities
under the next revision of the Strategic Plan 2017–21 are based on achieving zero hunger
and tied to Global Goal 2 (WFP 2016c).
Current World Food Programme Objectives and Strategies
The WFP Strategic Plan 2017–21 continues to provide the overall vision for achieving zero
hunger and guides the organization within the context of the 2030 Agenda. WFP’s five
strategic objectives and eight strategic results are:
Strategic Objective 1: End hunger by protecting access to food
Strategic Result 1: Everyone has access to food
Strategic Objective 2: Improve nutrition
Strategic Result 2: No one suffers from malnutrition
Strategic Objective 3: Achieve food security
Strategic Result 3: Smallholders have improved food security and nutrition through
improved productivity and incomes
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Strategic Result 4: Food systems are sustainable
Strategic Objective 4: Support SDG [Sustainable Development Goal] implementation
Strategic Result 5: Developing countries have strengthened capacities to implement the
SDGs
Strategic Result 6: Policies to support sustainable development are coherent
Strategic Objective 5: Partner for SDG results
Strategic Result 7: Developing countries access a range of financial resources for develop-
ment investment
Strategic Result 8: Sharing of knowledge, expertise and technology, strengthen global
partnership support to country efforts to achieve the SDGs (WFP 2017d, 4–5)
WFP’s Annual Performance Report for 2019 noted:
WFP achieved strong performance under Strategic Objective 1. . . . Activities for achieving
Strategic Result 1 accounted for 68 percent of WFP’s total direct expenditures in 2019 in
86 operations. WFP distributed 4 million mt of in-kind food and US$1.5 billion in cash-
based transfers under this strategic result. Overall, 53 out of 69 countries with operations
under Strategic Result 1 met their outcome targets. Unconditional food assistance enabled
more than 80 percent of beneficiaries in nine countries to reach acceptable food con-
sumption levels. However, many households in countries facing highly volatile situations
and insufficient funding or access had poor food consumption patterns, leaving them
exposed to critical health and nutrition challenges.
Performance under Strategic Objective 2, improve nutrition, strengthened over 2018,
driven largely by a combination of better performance and new reporting against Strategic
Result 2, no one suffers from malnutrition. To combat high malnutrition rates, WFP and
its partners implemented nutrition-specific treatment and prevention activities in 49
countries; in 2019, 47 percent of the 17.2 million beneficiaries of WFP nutrition activities
were in countries experiencing Level 3 or Level 2 emergencies. Programmes for the
treatment of moderate acute malnutrition achieved strong recovery rates of 90 percent
among enrolled children during the year, while mortality rates were well below globally
accepted levels. Overall, treatment programmes reached 60 percent of eligible children,
women and girls. WFP also worked with governments to develop nutrition policies and
programmes that, for example, provide nutritious school meals or food fortification. The
scale-up of food fortification activities brought major successes in the Dominican Repub-
lic, Panama, and Peru, where 41 new commercial brands of fortified rice were launched on
national markets.
WFP partially achieved its targets under Strategic Objective 3, achieve food security,
recording moderate progress under Strategic Result 3, smallholders have improved food
security and nutrition, and satisfactory performance under Strategic Result 4, food
systems are sustainable. Activities under these strategic results were carried out in 53
countries and were aimed at improving the productivity, sales and incomes of vulnerable
people and smallholder farmers and addressing systemic problems in food systems. Under
Strategic Result 3, although targets were met for smallholder sales made through WFP-
supported aggregation systems, results against two other indicators related to food
expenditures and the production of more nutritious crops deteriorated, compared with
2018. Under Strategic Result 4, a strong rating was achieved in 2019, with strong progress
against targets on dietary diversity and smallholder sales and post-harvest losses, and
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
852   
moderate progress on food consumption improvements. WFP’s resilience work in 2019
included the Sahel integrated resilience programme (2019–2023), which assisted 1.3
million people in more than 1,400 villages through a package of activities including
Food Assistance for Assets (FFA), school feeding, malnutrition treatment and prevention,
and support for smallholder farmers.
Under Strategic Objective 4, on supporting SDG implementation, WFP performed well in
2019, as measured in terms of achievements against targets for Strategic Result 5, devel-
oping countries have strengthened capacities to implement the SDGs, and for Strategic
Result 6, policies to support sustainable development are coherent. Available resources for
Strategic Objective 4 amounted to US$143 million. Compared with 2018, there were
substantial improvements in reporting. Of the 10 indicators used to track performance
under Strategic Result 5, the targets for 7 were either achieved or on track to being
achieved in 2019. Through country capacity strengthening activities in 44 countries,
WFP enhanced food security and nutrition policies, programmes and systems while
reaching or surpassing more than 75 percent of the targets for this area of work. In
India, WFP supported the Government’s Targeted Public Distribution System, the largest
food safety net in the world, reaching 800 million vulnerable people each month. WFP
also facilitated South–South and triangular cooperation through its centers of excellence
in Brazil, China, and Côte d’Ivoire. The centers of excellence helped countries to design
and implement 15 national anti-hunger policy documents and mobilized US$2.3 million
for field-based projects.
Results under Strategic Result 6, which focuses on developing institutional reform and
coherent policies to improve food security and nutrition, were positive in 2019. However,
only four country offices included relevant indicators for this strategic result in their
logical frameworks, limiting WFP’s ability to provide an overall performance assessment.
New capacity strengthening indicators were included in the revised corporate results
framework to help resolve this issue in 2020.
WFP performed well under Strategic Objective 5, partner for SDG results, with nearly 100
percent of the 30 reporting countries meeting or exceeding 80 percent of their targets. In
2019, US$1.3 billion was available for work under this strategic objective. The good result
demonstrates improvements made during the year to enhance the assessment of WFP
performance by, for example, reporting results irrespective of the number of countries
measuring the relevant indicator and introducing a new method for measuring outcome
indicators. This strategic objective consists of Strategic Result 7, on ensuring developing
countries have access to diverse resourcing, and Strategic Result 8, on enhancing global
partnerships. (WFP 2020a, 12–13)
Evolving Mandate: Balance between Food Aid and Food Assistance
The 2008–13 Strategic Plan laid out a “historical [mandate] shift from WFP as a food aid
agency to WFP as a food assistance agency, with a more nuanced and robust set of tools to
respond to critical hunger needs” (WFP 2007, 1). It introduced a revised context for WFP’s
work and overarching approach to its activities that further defined WFP’s role in food
assistance and development, linking objectives, goals, and tools. Although the 2008–13
Strategic Plan formally framed this mandate shift, WFP’s work had already been heading in
this direction over the past two strategic plans (see Box 12.1) and continues in the form of
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
    853
country strategies in the most recent period, as outlined later in the chapter. Language in
this plan drew on WFP’s historic mission and perceived comparative advantage within the
global food and agriculture architecture to justify a new and broader development role for
the organization; the 2014–17 Strategic Plan consolidated this evolution.
Beginning in 2016, WFP underwent a substantial restructuring. The process known as
“Integrated Road Map” (IRM) aligned WFP to the SDGs and has moved the organization
from project-based work to planning through Country Strategic Plans (CSPs) (WFP 2016b).
This process has now been completed on a structural level, with all Country Offices having
moved to a CSP (in November 2019, the last of the first-generation CSPs were approved).
Operationally, WFP is still adapting as an organization to the massive increase of funding
that it has experienced since 2015, and the overall UN reform process will also require WFP
to adapt its planning processes (WFP 2018c). This restructuring, as well as factors such as
climate change and the humanitarian–development–peace nexus, would certainly take on a
stronger role in the next Strategic Plan.
WFP’s strength lies in emergency response, especially in large-scale, sudden-onset dis-
asters. The shift recognizes the specific contexts in which hunger occurs and provides
resources and efforts to society’s most vulnerable to alleviate those conditions. In terms of
WFP’s declared mission, this means not just short-term emergency interventions but also
Box 12.1 Evolution of the World Food Programme’s Mandate Shift
through its Strategic Priorities
1994 (Mission Statement): Save lives in refugee and other emergency situations
! 2004/2006 (Strategic Plans): Save lives in crisis situations.
! 2008 (Strategic Plan): Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies.
1994: To improve the nutrition and quality of life of the most vulnerable people at critical
times in their lives; and
! 2004/2006: Support the improved nutrition and health status of children, mothers,
and other vulnerable people.
! 2008: Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition.
1994: To help build assets and promote the self-reliance of poor people and communities,
particularly through labor-intensive programs
! 2004/2006: Protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks.
! 2008: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster, or
transitional situations.
2004: Help governments establish and manage national food assistance programs.
! 2006: Strengthen the capacities of countries and regions to establish and manage
food assistance and hunger reduction programs.
! 2008: Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger including through
handover strategies and local purchase.
2004/2006: Support access to education and reduce gender disparity in access to education
and skills training.
! 2008: Taken out.
2008: Reduce acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures.
Source: WFP (2003, 2005b, 2007).
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“multi-year support programmes designed to lift a whole nation’s [food security and]
nutritional indicators,” balancing the urgency of eradicating hunger in the present with
the long-term objective of ending hunger for all (WFP 2020j).
WFP classifies Emergency Response operations according to a three-level scale:
• Level 1 Response: Emergency operations within the response capabilities of the relevant
WFP Country Office (CO), with routine support from Regional Bureaux (RB).
• Level 2 Response: Emergency Response operations requiring regional augmentation of
country-level response capability.
• Level 3 Response: Emergency Response operations requiring mobilisation of WFP
global response capabilities in support of the relevant CO(s) and/or RB, i.e., a Corporate
Response. (WFP 2014g, 1)
The growing numbers of Level 3 emergencies and the frequency of their onslaught and
intensity have “diverted attention from other protracted, chronic and lower-level emergen-
cies” of less political importance and visibility (WFP 2017d, 14). In 2019, WFP responded to
18 Level 3 (six) and Level 2 (twelve) concurrent emergencies, the largest number that WFP
had faced thus far at one time (WFP2019g, 1–2). Two aspects stand out in this transition: first,
from delivering food aid in-kind to providing food assistance, including cash-based transfers
(CBTs), which is clearly discernible; and second, from food procured from traditional food
surplus countries such as the United States to at least partially obtaining it from nearby
emerging countries, thereby reducing costs with local procurement and delivery to benefici-
aries (WFP 2017e). Of course, CBTs are not realistic in countries with shortages of food and
high food prices: for example, in Syria and Yemen. So, WFP pursues a flexible policy.
Food aid still constitutes an important feature of WFP. It arose from a largely unidirec-
tional, top-down vision: disposal of surplus food to hungry people. At least in theory, “food
assistance, by contrast, involves a more complex appreciation of people’s long-term nutri-
tional needs and of the diverse approaches required to meet them. This conceptual shift has
been at the core of WFP’s transformation in recent years” (WFP 2020j). While WFP
remains the world’s leading humanitarian agency, it is aiming “to combine frontline action
with the quest for durable solutions” (WFP 2020j).
WFP’s funding has skyrocketed (US$8.0 billion in 2019), and so has its internal capacity
(18,500 staff) (WFP 2020a). The organization has undergone restructuring to better link the
emergency–development divide, making capacity building a strategic objective. One key
consideration is what does a stronger role for WFP in development mean for its ability to
uphold humanitarian principles. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), those principles are humanity, neutrality, impar-
tiality, and independence. They provide the foundations for humanitarian action. In a time in
which access is one of themain difficulties in emergency relief, this question is highly relevant
today. Ultimately, as the Nobel Committee has emphasized, demands on WFP will diminish
only when there is less conflict and more peace and security.
Food assistance has become part of a policy mix that advances social well-being in
general. In line with the SDGs, and in particular with SDG2,³ WFP has also shifted from
³ SDG2: “End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.” See
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg2
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emphasis on the quantity and quality of food to one on the nutritious character and
seasonality of food, with a roadmap to shift the focus of operations to the country level
and to increase country capacity (see Table A.1.1 in Chapter 1 on the thematic framework of
the SDGs). Crucially, WFP’s food assistance attempts to enlist beneficiaries as actors—
giving them a voice, and, wherever possible, a choice in what food they receive and how they
receive it. This last principle has been steadily gaining prominence. And it helps explain why
over the last decade, in-kind food assistance (the only type there was until the mid-2000s)
has partly given way to CBTs. “Cash” for WFP means a range of instruments, in the form of
physical bank notes, vouchers, or electronic funds, given to beneficiaries to spend directly. It
is also more popular as a tool among most donors. “In fact, both cash and in-kind assistance
are likely to co-exist for the foreseeable future, with WFP increasingly adept at using them
singly, alternately or jointly, in any given setting” (WFP 2020j). Indeed, WFP is now the
largest cash provider in the humanitarian community: for example, US$2.1 billion of CBTs
and commodity vouchers were distributed to 27.9 million people in 2019, 38 percent of
WFP’s global assistance.
From 2011 to 2019, the increase in CBTs has been significant, a 866 percent growth in
CTs, compared toa 17 percent growth in food transfers (in mt). WFP was expected to
expand its delivery of CBTs to US$2.17 billion in 2019 (WFP 2019b).
We explore the reasoning behind this evolution later in the chapter.
Voluntary Funding Principally from Governments
The 1965 resolution language of “desirability” is reflected in WFP’s mandate and govern-
ance structure. Unlike FAO, WFP relies exclusively on voluntary contributions. Members
are drawn from the UN system of state classifications, but the organization receives no dues
or assessed contributions. Instead, donations of cash, food, and other in-kind contributions
from governments, private actors, and individuals are the source of WFP’s operations.
Governments remain the principal source of WFP funding, with an average of 60 govern-
ments underwriting projects on an entirely voluntary basis (WFP 2020l). The United States
is the largest donor of food aid, giving about half of all food aid, but the European
Commission (EC), Germany, Canada, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, and Australia are
also major donors, along with Russia, China, and South Korea. The United Kingdom is
the fourth largest donor (WFP 2020c). The World Bank contributes some resources, but
those are not significant in the overall scheme of things.
International Framework for Food Assistance
WFP’s evolution has occurred in the context of a rapidly evolving international framework
for both humanitarian and development assistance. The Food Assistance Convention
(FAC) was adopted by a number of key food aid donors in April 2012 in London. It
replaced the previous food aid convention and deals with bilateral and multilateral food
assistance. The idea behind the FAC, unlike in the past, is to address the food and
nutritional needs of the most vulnerable people in the world. It is the only international
legal agreement requiring signatories to provide a minimum amount of food aid (UN 2012).
Ed Clay of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) noted in his commentary, “What’s
the Use of the 2012 Food Assistance Convention?”: “Symbolically, it implies a donor
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commitment to address world hunger.” Following repeated renegotiations, FAC was drafted
in December 2010 by “officials responsible for food aid from the United States (US),
European Union (EU), Japan, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, and Argentina, and chaired
by Canada” (Clay 2012).
According to Imogen Calderwood in her 2018 article, “76,000,000 Don’t Have
Enough Food. Here’s How Food Helps Them” noted that the FAC enabled information
sharing and guiding principles to 16 member countries providing food assistance, with
countries’ minimum annual requirements. She noted the United States was the largest
donor and:
. . . made a minimum commitment of US$2.2 billion for 2018; the EU’s commitment was
350 million euros; and Canada has committed CAD $250 million.
There are many different ways that the funding committed by governments is distributed,
with many governments also running their own projects overseas.
But in general, governments assess the situation and work out who is best placed to deliver
the necessary aid—whether that’s through their own bilateral programmes, an NGO
[nongovernmental organization], or a multilateral agency (which means funded by
many different governments) like the [World Food Programme of the] United Nations.
(Calderwood 2018)
Other international consultations and agreements which have helped international consen-
sus and frame WFP assistance and its overarching strategy include:
1. The SDGs discussed extensively in the previous chapters, including, in particular,
SDG2;
2. SDG17 on international partnerships. WFP has reformulated its strategy to be attuned
to SDGs in much the same way as have FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD), and CGIAR, as discussed in chapters concerning these orga-
nizations (UN 2020); and
3. The first humanitarian summit organized by UN Secretary-General in Istanbul in
2016, which was also a watershed in bringing member countries together around
humanitarian issues and influencing WFP’s strategy (Lattimer 2015).
Other major conferences and agreements, and their relevance to ending hunger include:
1. The World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (March 2015, Sendai, Japan):
More than 80 percent of the world’s food-insecure people live in countries that are
prone to natural hazards and characterized by land and ecosystem degradation.
Disasters affect all dimensions of food security: without protection from disaster
risks, the most vulnerable people cannot begin to build their resilience (WFP
2015c). The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 201530, adopted at
the World Conference, contributes to the 2030 Agenda and hunger reduction,
especially by calling for investment in disaster risk reduction for resilience, including
through social protection systems and enhanced disaster preparedness for effective
response and to “Build Back Better” (UNISDR 2015, 21).
2. The International Conference on Financing for Development (July 2015, Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia): The Addis Ababa Action Agenda is integrated into the 2030 Agenda
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through SDG17. Despite progress reflected in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, many
issues remain unresolved (UN 2015).
3. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Paris Agreement)
(December 2015): Climate change has a disproportionately negative impact on food-
insecure people and could increase the risk of hunger and malnutrition by up to 20
percent by 2050. Climate change will deepen vulnerability to disasters, especially in
resource-scarce environments dominated by high prevalence of food insecurity and
malnutrition (FAO 2017a; UNFCCC 2020).
4. The United Nations Summit for Refugees and Migrants (September 2016, New York):
Large movements of people will continue or possibly increase as a result of violent
conflict, poverty, inequality, climate change, disasters and environmental degradation
(UN 2016a).
5. Third United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development
(HABITAT III) (October 2016): Hunger and malnutrition among the urban poor are
recognized as a challenge to achievement of the 2030 Agenda (UN-Habitat 2020).
6. The first Global Refugee Forum organized by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), December 16–18, 2019: Designed to be a platform to rally
international financial and other support, including opportunities for refugee reset-
tlement and to exchange good practices (Karasapan 2020).
In-Kind Food Distribution
WFP notes that providing food to people has been the “cornerstone” of their work (WFP
2020q). While WFP shifted from food aid to food assistance in the form of cash transfers—
food in-kind has remained a fundamental part of WFP’s work, often the best solution for
fragile or crisis situations. WFP further states: “After a natural disaster, during lean seasons,
or in conflict or displacement situations, when people are cut off from their normal sources
of food and cannot access enough food to meet their needs, WFP’s in-kind food assistance
aims to fill the gap” (WFP 2020o).
Also, in situations of hyperinflation, as in Zimbabwe in December 2019, WFP was
providing food for about 2 million people with an expected rapid scale-up aiming to support
4.1 million people.
Conflict as a Major Driver of Emergency Assistance
It is clear that WFP has become the frontline agency responding to emergencies caused by
conflict, climate shocks, pandemics and other disasters, tackling ongoing emergencies in 15
countries or regions, but the majority are fueled by conflict. According to the WFP
Management Plan 2020–2:
In 2017, the global economic impact of violence was US$14.76 trillion in purchasing
power parity, equivalent to 12.4 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) and 45
percent of GDP in the ten countries most affected by conflict. The cost of armed conflict
totalled US$1.02 trillion in 2017, driven by conflicts in the Middle East, North Africa and
South Asia.
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. . . About 74 million food-insecure people (or two-thirds of those facing acute hunger) are
located in countries suffering conflict and insecurity. Sixty percent of hungry people and
75 percent of the world’s 155 million stunted children live in conflict-affected countries.
(WFP 2019h, 9–10)
UNHCR reported 79.5 million forcibly displaced people at the end of 2019, and as of mid-
2020, at least 80 million people around the world, an all-time high, including refugees,
internally displaced persons, and asylum seekers, who fled their homes to escape violence,
conflict, human rights violations, and persecution (UNHCR 2019, 2021). Among them are
nearly 26.9 million refugees, around half of whom are under the age of 18. There are
millions of stateless people, who have been denied a nationality and lack access to basic
rights, such as education, health care, employment, and freedom of movement.
The World Bank had reported a much lower number earlier. Omer Karasapan, Regional
Knowledge and Learning Coordinator at the World Bank, in his commentary, “Sharing the
Burden of the Global Refugee Crisis,” noted that the “global forced displacement crisis
continues unabated,” with 71 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, and 37,000 new
people fleeing their homes each day. Of the total, 25.9 million are living in foreign lands, and
41.3 are internally displaced (Karasapan 2020).
Two-thirds of WFP’s work is in countries affected by conflict, where people are three
times more likely to be undernourished as those living in countries without conflict. In
addition, to emergency assistance, WFP’s work focuses on relief and rehabilitation, devel-
opment aid, and special operations (WFP 2020q).
Developing Countries Host Majority of Refugees
How widely known is it that developing countries face the bulk of the refugee problems?
Developing countries have taken in 84 percent of the refugees (Karasapan 2020). Most of
the refugees (57 percent) have fled Syria, Afghanistan, or South Sudan. Turkey, no longer
a developing country, hosts the largest number (3.7 million) with Colombia hosting
1.8 million.
As a share of population, Lebanon and Jordan are first and second, with 156 and 72
refugees per 1,000 citizens, respectively. According to the WFP Management Plan 2020–2,
“Most refugees do not want to leave their own homes. Nine out of ten migrants from Africa
and eight out of ten from Asia prefer to stay on their own continent” (WFP 2019h, 10). And
that explains why a large share of refugees reside in the regions of their origin, with huge
burdens on conflict-affected regions.
Global Scale and Range of World Food Programme Activities
Food and cash transfers are the principal activities of WFP. In practice, however, WFP
carries out a variety of activities and its fundraising strategies are closely aligned with its
activities:
• Globally, WFP assisted 97.1 million people in 83 countries in 2019, 70 percent of those
facing critical hunger levels (WFP 2020a). Women and girls comprise 52 percent of
those receiving food assistance fromWFP, while 1.3 million women take part inWFP’s
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FFA and Food for Training projects, which increase people’s skills and resilience. In
2018, WFP had already provided direct assistance through its operations to 84.9
million people using cash-based and food transfers. The recipients included 14.7
million refugees—37 percent more than in 2017—and 3.4 million returnees and 13.1
million internally displaced persons. Children—26.8 million girls and 25.4 million
boys—are the primary recipients of WFP assistance. They accounted for 62 percent of
total beneficiaries (WFP 2019i, 2020a, 2020q).
• Food distributions remained the main response modality in 2019, increasing by 9
percent from US$3.2 billion in 2018 to US$3.5 billion. However, the largest growth
rates were in the CBT modality, increasing by 22 percent since 2018, and capacity
strengthening and service delivery activities, increasing by 31 percent.
• CBTs and associated costs accounted for 32 percent of total direct expenditures in
2019, compared with 30 percent in 2018, while the capacity strengthening and service
delivery modality made up 9 percent of the total, compared with 7 percent in 2018.
Continued investment in both areas is a central strategy for WFP in assisting bene-
ficiaries, increasing their resilience and improving their livelihoods.
• An estimated 27.9 million people received CBTs in 2019. This included cash transfers,
value vouchers, and commodity vouchers. Nearly half of the transfers were pro-
grammed in Syria and five other countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Somalia, and
Yemen. The amount of transfers represents a significant increase from 2017 and 2016,
in which 19.2 million beneficiaries and 14.3 million beneficiaries were assisted, respec-
tively. Seventy-five percent of CBTs were made via digital payment mechanisms, such
as cash accounts, e-vouchers, and mobile money transfers (WFP 2019a, 2020a). CBTs
contribute to food security, also serving as a starting point or fostering financial
inclusion and boosting markets and local financial sectors. Furthermore, CBTs have
led to cost savings of US$0.9 million. WFP spent an average of 6.6 percent of the
transfer value on transfer costs in 2019, which was less than in 2018 (WFP 2020b).
• In 2019, 4.2 million mt of food was distributed, 8 percent procured in developing
countries (WFP 2020a). On any given day, according to WFP, it has 5,600 trucks, 20
ships, and 92 planes on the move, delivering food and other forms of assistance (WFP
2019i, 2019k, 2020q).
• WFP is also the largest provider of school feeding programs worldwide, providing
school meals to more than 17.3 million children in 2019 (50 percent girls) in 59
countries, often in the hardest-to-reach areas, and improving both their nutrition and
their access to potentially life-changing education (WFP 2020a). Its school feeding
programs have been ongoing for 50 years, now partnering with governments in school
feeding in 100 countries (WFP 2017b, 2017c, 2019a, 2020t).
• About 40 percent of total humanitarian spending is on food assistance. WFP’s food
assistance expenditures went up from 2009 to 2016, from US$2.2 billion to US$5.3
billion, more than doubling the spending. Food transfers went up by 17 percent from
2011 to 2019 (from 3.6 percent mt to 4.2 million mt). In 2019, 9.6 million people
received WFP food assistance to cover immediate food shortfalls while they received
training and constructed assets to build their resilience to shocks and strengthen their
livelihoods. Since 1990, WFP has built the capacity of national governments, with 44
taking over school meal programs. Globally, 368 million children benefitted from daily
school meals (WFP 2017e). While there has been major progress in this area, 73
million of the most vulnerable children worldwide still do not receive school meals
(Partnership for Child Development 2018). In 2019, WFP invested in the future of
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more than 17 million girls and boys by partnering with governments to provide school
meals, snacks, or take-home rations (WFP 2020a).
• WFP connects smallholder farmers to markets in 40 countries. In 2019, WFP procured
US$37.2 million worth of food from smallholders in 29 countries (2 percent of the
value of all food procured for 2019), who produce most of the world’s food (WFP
2019c, 2020a, 2020u).
• Under WFP’s FFA initiative, WFP has developed 134,000 hectares of land and non-
farm land; 9,700 water points (ponds, shallow wells, reservoirs) used for agriculture,
livestock, and/or fisheries were built or rehabilitated; and 8,800 km feeder roads were
built or repaired (WFP 2020a).
• Six thousand, seven hundred bridges were restored, which improves people’s long-
term food security and resilience to climate change (WFP 2020a, 2020k).
• “WFP development projects focus on nutrition, especially for mothers and children,
addressing malnutrition from the earliest stages through programmes targeting the
first 1,000 days from conception to a child’s second birthday, and later through school
meals” (WFP 2019k). In 2019, 10.8 million children received special nutritional
support; 6.4 million women received nutritional supplements; and 400,000 HIV-
affected received food support, all together in 18 countries (WFP 2020a).
• “WFP also provides services to the humanitarian community, including passenger air
transportation through the UN Humanitarian Air Service, which flies to more than
280 locations worldwide” (WFP 2020w).
WFP uses Forecast-based Financing in 10 countries to provide cash to vulnerable
families, allowing them to buy food, reinforce their homes, and take other steps to build
resilience ahead of climate disasters like droughts, storms or floods (FAO 2017b).
Types of World Food Programme Operations
The Annual Performance Report of 2019 for the World Food Programme reported: “WFP’s
direct assistance for beneficiaries in 2019 consisted of 4.2 million mt of food and US$2.1
billion in CBTs. This was in addition to theUS$610million invested in capacity strengthening
and service delivery activities in support of the humanitarian and development community.
Most of the food and CBTs were delivered through general food distributions, followed by
nutrition, school feeding and food assistance for assets activities” (WFP 2019a, 39).
The majority of CBT activities in 2019 were in the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern
Europe and Central Asia region, particularly in Yemen and for the Syrian regional refugee
response. However, CBTs were used to some degree in two-thirds of all country offices in
the region. In 2019, in Lebanon, when civil unrest contributed to the devaluation of the
currency, WFP, in partnership with the Ministry of Social Affairs, responded with condi-
tional and unconditional CBTs totaling US$285 million to support basic food needs for
more than 1 million beneficiaries (WFP 2020a).
Level and Extent of Emergencies
The Annual Performance Report of 2019 for WFP also reported: “WFP was responding to
seven Level 3 and 11 Level 2 emergencies in 20 countries at the end of 2019 . . . ”
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WFP distributed 67 percent of its in-kind food, 78 percent of its cash-based assistance
and 48 percent of its specialized nutritious foods (SNFs) to extremely food-insecure and
malnourished people in some of the world’s largest emergencies, which were in Yemen, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Syrian Arab Republic, South Sudan, Mozambique,
three countries in central Sahel—Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger—and Nigeria (WFP
2020a, 39–40).
Three other program areas of significance: school feeding, nutrition, and FFA, discussed
previously, addressing immediate food needs through cash, voucher, or food transfers, while
at the same time promoting the building or rehabilitation of assets that will improve long-
term food security and resilience (WFP 2019a).
Trends in World Food Programme’s Operations
and Sources of Funding and Allocation
WFP has seen rapid growth in its activity in the new millennium (Figure 12.1). As discussed
in Chapter 3, food aid needs temporarily spiked, starting in 2008, following the food and
financial crises, but the recent rise in need for food aid is a result of conflict, leading to large
involuntary displacement of human population, and climate change. In 2019, WFP raised a
record US$8 billion, compared with US$7.2 billion in 2018, and yet, faced a funding gap of
US$4.1 billion (WFP 2020a). WFP staff have had to make difficult decisions in the case of
emergencies that are forgotten or overlooked by the international community, because they
are of little political interest. Contributions to WFP, by October 3, 2020, reached US$8.5
billion in 2020, as of January 2021. The high cost of assisting people in long drawn-out
conflicts needs more financial support than ever.
Sources of Funding
WFP’s revenue increased by 10 percent to a record $US8 billion in 2019. The top five donors






















































Figure 12.1 Total annual contributions to WFP, 2000–2020* (US$bn)
Note: *As of January 17, 2021.
Source: Based on data from https://www.wfp.org/funding
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percent (that is, a 2 percent increased, compared with 2018), with the United States being
WFP’s top donor, with 36 percent designated for large-scale operations in South Sudan, the
Syrian Arab Republic, and Yemen. The generous contributions were insufficient to cover
identified needs of food insecure populations, with a funding gap of US$4.1 billion.
Government donors provided 86 percent of 2019 funding, while the remainder came
primarily from various UN funds, host governments, private donors, and the World
Bank. In 2019, the largest increase was from the United States, which contributed US$910
million more than its 2018 contribution of at US$2.5 billion. Germany, the United King-
dom, the EC, and Saudi Arabia made up the remaining top five donors. All of the top five
donors strengthened their commitments, except for the EC, from which overall funding
decreased, compared to 2018. WFP’s top 10 government donors (excluding UN pooled
funds) in 2019 were the United States at US$3.4 billion (42 percent of all contributions),
followed by Germany (US$887 million), the United Kingdom (US$698 million), the EC (US
$686 million), Saudi Arabia (US$387 million), United Arab Emirates (US$272 million),
Canada (US$190 million), Sweden (US$159 million), Japan (US$157 million), and Norway
(US$89 million) (WFP 2020a, 2020c). And funding from nongovernmental partners,
including private sector institutions, represented only 1.6 percent of the total (WFP
2020a, 2020d).
Similarly, 5 percent of WFP’s funding, US$420 million in 2019, was unearmarked or
softly earmarked. Known as flexible funding, it continued a worrisome trend of low levels of
unearmarked contributions (Figure 12.2). The top 10 contributors of flexible funding in
2019 were Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Denmark,
Australia, Canada, Ireland, and Belgium. Their combined contributions amounted to US





























2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Direct contributions Unearmarked and softly earmarked contributions
Figure 12.2 Flexible funding as a share of total contributions, 2003–2019 (%)
Source: Adapted from WFP (2019a, figure 3, 24); WFP (2020a, figure 4, 25).
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When donors do not impose conditions, WFP can determine the country program or its
activities in which “the contribution will be used and how it will be used” (WFP 2020h). They
are crucial for WFP’s responses to emergencies, protracted relief, and recovery efforts and
allow WFP to respond with flexibility and predictability but also promptly to crises (WFP
2020h). At the activity level, however, some progress was made, with the percentage of
earmarked funds decreasing from 80 percent in 2018 to 70 percent in 2019, mainly due to
the increased flexibility of several of the top 10 donors—Canada, Germany, Japan, and Saudi
Arabia elected to allocate funds to less restrictive levels of the “line of sight” from resources to
results, including strategic outcomes, strategic results, and CSPs (WFP 2020a, 25). In 2019, the
top 10 donors accounted for 87 percent of total contributions, a 2 percent increase compared
with 2018, with the five top donors alone accounting for 76 percent. Government donors
provided 86 percent of 2019 funding, while the remainder came primarily from various UN
funds. To diversify its funding base and foster new partnerships, WFP adopted a five-year
private sector partnership and fundraising strategy in 2019. The strategy covers the period
from 2020 to 2025 and establishes ambitious targets for increasing contributions from
individuals and businesses in the three pillars of the strategy: impact, income, and innovation.
Increasingly, recipient governments are also becoming donors although they provide
small amounts. The top 10 in 2019 were: China, Honduras, Burkina Faso, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Benin, Burundi, Lesotho, Ghana, and South Sudan.⁴ In statistical terms, the WFP
story is one of successful multilateralization of bilateral food aid, termed food assistance, as
food aid quantities have diminished, and donors have moved to cash transfers and other
kinds of humanitarian aid are coming into vogue.⁵
Regional Allocation of World Food Programme Funding
Figure 12.3 illustrates the budget and funding received for operations in the six WFP regions.⁶
⁴ See https://www.wfp.org/funding/2019
⁵ In a study of alternative transfer options in Colombia and Ecuador byWFP and the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI), Hidrobo et al. (2012) found that:
The cash transfer incurs the lowest costs to participants in terms of waiting times and transportation
costs. . . . The main complaints of voucher recipients are lack of food items and higher prices in super-
markets. The main complaint of food recipients is torn food packaging, and the main complaint of cash
recipients is lack of understanding on how to use the debit cards. Across all three modalities, the transfers
are reported to be mainly used for consumption of food items; however, voucher recipients in comparison
to cash recipients spend a larger percentage on food. Almost none of the food transfer or voucher is sold to
buy other items. Besides food consumption, food recipients tend to share their transfer with friends or
family, or save their transfer for later use. Cash recipients also report saving a small share of their cash for
later use and spending a small portion on nonfood items. (Hidrobo et al. 2012, xi)
Generally, these transfers seem to have positive effect on nutrition. How sustainable they are is unclear. Nutrition
knowledge was found to increase from baseline to follow-up; largest knowledge gains occurred on food items rich
in iron and vitamin A, and on infant feeding practices (Hidrobo et al. 2012).
⁶ WFP’s Annual Performance Report for 2019 noted:
WFP’s 2019 contribution revenue reached US$ 8 billion in 2019, 10 percent higher than in 2018 and 15
percent higher than 2017. Despite this historic level, the funding gap of US$4.1 billion was US$1.3 billion
higher than the gap in 2018 as rising food insecurity outstripped contributions. While responses to Level 3
emergencies were generally well funded, operations in small and medium-sized countries suffered from
lack of resources. Ten countries accounted for 65 percent of WFP’s total direct expenditure in 2019, and 78
countries for the remaining 35 percent. The under-resourcing of many country operations led to reductions
in numbers of people assisted and the sizes and duration of rations provided, helping to perpetuate
inequalities and food insecurity. (WFP 2020a, 9)
The Annual Performance Report for 2019 also noted that with a funding gap of: “ . . . US$ 4.1 billion, or 34 percent
of identified needs, despite record contributions, . . . [and] could not reach the target of distributing 5.6 million mt
of food . . . the 4.2 million mt distributed still represents the largest amount of in-kind distributions in WFP’s
history and 75-percent achievement of the yearly target” (WFP 2020a, 51).
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According to WFP’s Annual Performance Report for 2019:
In 2019, WFP faced a funding gap of US$4.1 billion, or 34 percent of identified needs,
despite record contributions [US$1.3 billion higher than the gap in 2018, as rising food
insecurity outstripped contributions]. The organization could not therefore reach the
target of distributing 5.6 million mt of food, but the 4.2 million mt distributed still
represents the largest amount of in-kind distributions in WFP’s history and 75-percent
achievement of the yearly target . . . (WFP 2020a, 51)
According to WFP’s Annual Performance Report for 2018:
The Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia region is by far the
largest by budget and contributions and encompasses some of WFP’s largest operations,
including those in Yemen, the Syrian Arab Republic and surrounding countries, the Sudan
and Iraq. This region had the lowest funding gap in 2018, at 21 percent. . . .WFP’s larger
operations in all regions have generally been better funded.
The Latin America and the Caribbean region had the second highest funding gap in 2018,
at 45 percent. With the exception of Colombia, all countries in the region had needs-based
plans with budgets less than US$50 million in 2018. The region as a whole has the smallest
budget in WFP and includes relatively few direct deliveries, with efforts focused more on
capacity strengthening . . . (WFP 2019a, 29)
WFP’s Annual Performance Report for 2019 noted further:
Aggregated expenditures of the regional bureaux show a similar trend as in previous years,
with the Regional Bureau for the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central
Asia accounting for 47 percent of total expenditures and the Regional Bureau for East
































Contribution revenue Funding gap
Figure 12.3 Funding gap by region, 2018 (US$bn)
Source: WFP (2019a, figure 6, 30).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
    865
expenditure, illustrating the extent to which WFP’s efforts are concentrated in a small
number of countries. The remaining regional bureaux received 11 percent for West Africa,
10 percent for Southern Africa, 7 percent for Asia and the Pacific and 3 percent for Latin
America and the Caribbean. (WFP 2020a, 24)
Figures 12.4 and 12.5 illustrate the distribution of funds by region, as well as:
the ten recipient countries that accounted for 65 percent of WFP’s total direct expendi-
tures in 2019. The remaining 78 countries with active operations accounted for the
outstanding 35 percent. All countries in the top ten received more in expenditures than
in 2018, with the largest increases noted in Yemen (US$652 million), the Syrian Arab
Republic (US$80 million) and Ethiopia (US$71 million). Expenditures increased in
Mozambique by US$100 million in response to the devastation caused by Cyclone
Idai, and in Zimbabwe by US$74 million as worsening drought increased needs. (WFP
2020a, 23)
The Importance of the Need for Regular and Increasing Contributions
FAO notes, “Since WFP has no independent source of funds, all donations either in cash or
in-kind must be accompanied by the cash needed to move, manage, and monitor WFP food
assistance” (WFP 2020l). (See Table 12.1.) After a spike in 2007–8, annual contributions to
WFP resumed a downward trajectory of overall spending on food aid and agricultural
development, and for official development assistance (ODA), the share of food and agri-
culture has dropped from 20 percent to the single digits since the 1970s (von Braun and




























































Figure 12.4 Top 10 recipient countries by direct expenditures, 2019 (%)
Note: Direct expenditure in 2019 was US$7.2 billion.
Source: WFP (2020a, figure 3, 24).
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Government contributors are relatively consistent—the top-ranked aggregate donors
between 2015 and 2019 were the United States, Germany, EC, United Kingdom, Canada,
Japan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, and Norway, in that order (WFP
2020c).⁷ With the exception of Ethiopia and Pakistan, the top 20 government contributors
to WFP were from upper-middle to high-income economies (WFP 2020c).
The 20 largest aggregate WFP donors between and 2015 and 2019 account for nearly 93
percent of total contributions, and 96 percent in 2019, much of which arrives with strings
attached as tied donations and with earmarks, with limitations on activities
(Ramachandran, Leo, and McCarthy 2010; WFP 2020c). This has been attributed both to
donor preference for short-term, restricted commitments and to a “reactive and unpredict-
able revenue mobilization model,” reliant on emergency appeals (Ramachandran, Leo, and
McCarthy 2010, i).
Unrestricted contributions, the so-called direct or multilateral contributions, were
around 5.4 percent of the total contribution in 2019; the largest providers traditionally
have included Sweden, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Denmark,
Australia, and Canada (WFP 2019f, 2020h). In 2019, WFP received US$419.9 million in
multilateral contributions, representing approximately 5.4 percent of total contributions
received (WFP 2020a). However, flexible contributions (occasionally referred to as “multi-
lateral” in WFP publications) remained at just 5 percent of WFP’s total resources, well
below a 20 percent mark in 2008 (Figure 12.6). The overall trend indicates that flexible
donations to WFP are increasing (Figure 12.7), but not nearly what WFP should ideally
have to reduce costs and increase flexibility in its own operations.
Asia and the 
Pacific
7%
Latin America and 
Caribbean
3%
Direct expenditure: US$7.2 billion











Figure 12.5 Aggregated expenditures by the regional bureaux, 2019
Source: Adapted from WFP (2020a, 24).
⁷ Note: UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) was the 8th top five-year aggregate donor, followed by
Sweden (9), UN Other Funds and Agencies (excl. CERF) (10), United Arab Emirates (11), and Norway (12);
private donors were number 13 in the 2019 list (WFP 2020c).
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The top 10 multilateral contributors in 2019 were Sweden, United Kingdom, the Neth-
erlands, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Australia, Canada, Ireland, and Belgium (WFP
2019f, 2020h).⁸
Over a five-year period, starting in 2008, WFP invested US$7.4 million in developing its
capacity to mobilize private funds, yielding a US$549 million “return” that also contributed
to operating costs and the Program Support and Administrative (PSA) budget. Of the total,
US$283 million is considered sustainable, and US$266 million was received as “one-off ”
donations to specific projects or emergency appeals. The majority of private sector funding
supported programs, such as school meals, health and nutrition, and emergency relief;
approximately 10 percent was received in-kind.
Table 12.1 World Food Programme contributions
Donors Governments (traditional donors and host governments)*
Organizations (corporations, nonprofit organizations)
Individuals







In-kind (means to grow, store, cook, or transport food; fundraising)
Programmetypes Programme types include the Country Portfolio Budget (CPB);
development projects (DEV); Immediate Response Account (IRA);
emergency operations (EMOP); protracted relief and recovery
programs (PRRO); and flexible funding with no programme specified
Food aidcategory Emergency (provided to victims of natural or man-made disasters on a
short-term basis; freely distributed to targeted beneficiary groups and
usually provided on a grant basis; channeled multilaterally, through
NGOs, or sometimes bilaterally)
Project (supports various types of projects such as agricultural,
nutritional, and development; usually freely distributed to targeted
beneficiary groups; can also be sold on the open market; provided on a
grant basis and is channeled bilaterally, multilaterally or through
NGOs)
Program (provided on a government-to-government basis; not
targeted at specific beneficiary groups; sold on the open market and can
be provided either as a grant or a loan)
Delivery/purchase modes Local Purchased, distributed, and used in recipient country
Triangular Purchased in third country for use in recipient country
Direct
Note: Note that “host government” refers to beneficiary countries. Although “national government” is sometimes
the preferred term, as “host” can be perceived as patronizing, “host” is typically used to avoid confusion.
Source: Author’s construction, based on http://www.wfp.org; WFP (2020e).
⁸ WFP classifies contributions as direct or multilateral, the latter indicating contributions with no usage
restrictions.
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Figure 12.6 Share of flexible contributions in total contributions to the World Food
Programme, 2008–2019 (%)
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Figure 12.7 Directed (earmarked) and flexible contributions to the World Food Programme,
2008–2019 (US$bn)
Source: Adapted from WFP (2019a, 2019f, 2020h).
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Private sector funding represented a small fraction of overall donations, and WFP has
been actively working toward harnessing individual donors to the extent that the United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and UNHCR, with their longer standing records are
known for doing. The US$7.4 million was a loan from WFP to the private sector unit, and
not an investment, as the WFP Executive Board asked that the new private sector function
should be self-financing. Other UN agencies, like UNICEF and UNHCR, have had massive
investments in their private sector functions (especially, on individual giving), which was
not the case forWFP when this was written. So, the comparison needs to be interpreted with
caution.
As an agency based on voluntary donor contributions, in many ways, WFP is only as
good as the sum of its membership base—prone to least-common-denominator decision-
making or open to the enterprise and innovation of its members. Beneficiary nations are
likely disinclined to be assertive. However, forward-thinking countries stand to drive reform
and innovation (Ramachandran, Leo, and McCarthy 2010). In addition, the graduation of
countries from recipients to middle-income countries (MICs), attention to South–South
cooperation, and aid funds being “passed through” beneficiary governments to fund WFP
operations all stand to affect power dynamics and priorities. WFP is continuing shift to
cash-based programming as an effective transfer modality, which provides beneficiaries
with choices regarding how they utilize assistance to address multiple, cross-cutting needs.
World Food Programme Expenditures and the Focus on Fragile States
According to WFP’s 2019 Annual Performance Report:
WFP’s continuing shift to cash-based programming as an effective transfer modality that
provides beneficiaries with choices regarding how they utilize assistance to address
multiple, cross-cutting needs.
. . . Food distributions remained the main response modality in 2019, increasing by 9
percent from USD 3.2 billion in 2018 to USD 3.5 billion. However, the largest growth rates
were in the cash-based transfer (CBT) modality, increasing by 22 percent since 2018, and
capacity strengthening and service delivery activities, increasing by 31 percent.
CBTs and associated costs accounted for 32 percent of total direct expenditures, compared
with 30 percent in 2018, while the capacity strengthening and service delivery modality
made up 9 percent of the total, compared with 7 percent in 2018. Continued investment in
both areas is a central strategy for WFP in assisting beneficiaries, increasing their resilience
and improving their livelihoods. (WFP 2020a, 29)
According to WFP’s 2019 Annual Performance Report, WFP spent US$7.2 billion in fiscal
year 2019, compared with US$6.6 billion in 2018 (WFP 2020a). The 2019 APR further
notes:
The majority of CBT activities were in the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and
Central Asia region, particularly in Yemen and for the Syrian regional refugee response.
However, CBTs were used to some degree in two thirds of all country offices in the region.
In 2019 in Lebanon, when civil unrest contributed to the devaluation of the currency,
WFP in partnership with the Ministry of Social Affairs responded with conditional and
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unconditional CBTs totalling USD 285 million to support basic food needs for more than
1 million beneficiaries [Figure 12.8]. (WFP 2020a, 30)
In 2019 expenses reached a record level for WFP, with an increase over 2018. The 2019 APR
noted:
WFP assisted 97 million people—the largest number since 2012—while operating in 88
countries. [It rapidly] responded to Level 3 and Level 2 emergencies in 20 countries—the
highest annual total ever. These ranged from long-standing operations, such as in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, to the rapid scale-up of operations when Cyclone Idai
hit Mozambique.
. . . [D]onors stepped up . . . and provided a record-breaking US$8 billion in confirmed
contributions. [This unprecedented amount of funding] was a testament to donors’
confidence in WFP’s ability to save lives and change lives. [The funds were used to
procure] food valued at more than US$2.3 billion, . . . including US$37 million-worth
from smallholder farmers, for direct distribution. In addition, US$2.1 billion was provided
as cash-based transfers.
Roughly two-thirds of [WFP’s life-saving] food assistance went to girls, boys, women and
men facing severe food crises, overwhelmingly as a result of conflict. In South Sudan and
Zimbabwe, WFP’s ability to quickly ramp up humanitarian assistance helped to avoid
famine. After the world’s largest humanitarian crisis in Yemen deteriorated early in 2019,
WFP nearly doubled its support in some areas despite huge security, access and supply
constraints. In the Sudan, WFP became the first United Nations agency since 2011 to be




















































Figure 12.8 Growth in expenditures by transfer modality, 2018–2019 (US$m)
Note: “Other” includes implementation and direct support costs.
Source: Adapted from WFP (2020a, figure 8, 30).
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The State of Fragility 2018, published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) opens with an editorial, which asserts:
Fragility poses a major global threat to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development. In 2016, more countries experienced some form of violent
conflict than at any time in the past 30 years. Close to 26,000 people died from
terrorist attacks and 560,000 people lost their lives because of violence. The number
of displaced people in the world is the highest since the end of the Second World War.
(OECD 2018, 7)
OECD classified 58 countries, with a total population of 1.8 billion persons, as fragile or
living in conflict in 2016, but the number of persons affected by conflict is projected to grow
to 2.3 billion by 2030 (28 percent) and 3.3 billion by 2050 (34 percent) (OECD 2018).
“Poverty, too, is increasingly concentrated in fragile contexts” (OECD 2018, 17). Nearly 688
million people, or more than 80 percent of the world’s poorest are chronically food insecure
in 2019, according to FAO et al. (2020).
That means in 2019, almost 60 percent of the world’s hungry people are living in areas
affected by armed violence, conflict is the single greatest challenge to achieving zero
hunger.⁹ According to UNHCR (2021), at least 79.5 million people around the world
have been forced to flee their homes. Among them are nearly 26 million refugees, around
half of whom are under the age of 18. There are also millions of stateless people, who have
been denied a nationality and lack access to basic rights, such as education, health care,
employment, and freedom of movement. At a time when 1 percent of the world’s popula-
tion have fled their homes as a result of conflict or persecution, WFP’s work is very
important. Eighty percent of the stateless people face acute food insecurity. Most live in
developing countries.
OECD (2020) noted that fragile contexts were home to 460 million people living in
extreme poverty in 2020, or 76 percent of the worldwide total. Fragile contexts account for
23 percent of the world’s population, but also 43 percent (26 million people) of those
expected to fall into extreme poverty due to COVID-19 by the end of 2020. Even before the
shock of COVID-19, the majority of fragile contexts were on track to meet just one SDG—
SDG13 on climate action—and progress was particularly challenged on SDG2 (zero hun-
ger), SDG 3 (health), and SDG 5 (gender equality).
Most of WFP’s largest emergency operations take place in conflict areas, since 10 out of
13 of the world’s main food crises are driven by conflict (WFP 2019e). A new dimension has
recently been added: peace. The relevance of the humanitarian–development–peace nexus
and its influence on policymakers has been underlined with the United Nations Security
Council Resolution 2417, which condemned the starving of civilians as a method of warfare,
as well as the unlawful denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations, in highlighting
the link between peace and food security.¹⁰ Food security is a key element of WFP Executive
Director David Beasley’s speeches, and WFP has begun to investigate its role in that nexus
through a partnership with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
⁹ See “Food Assistance: A Step to Peace and Stability—Nobel Peace Prize 2020.” https://www.wfp.org/conflict-
and-hunger#:~:text=With%20almost%2060 %20percent%20of
¹⁰ “Unanimously adopting resolution 2417 (2018), the Council drew attention to the link between armed
conflict and conflict-induced food insecurity and the threat of famine.” See https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/
sc13354.doc.htm
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For donors like Germany, operationalization of the nexus is a priority also with regard to
WFP. Notably, food delivery is more costly in conflict-affected countries. When agriculture
and trade are disrupted by conflict, “a simple plate of food can cost more than a day’s wages.
In South Sudan, for example, it could be the equivalent of a New Yorker having to pay US
$348 for a modest lunch such as a plate of bean stew” (WFP 2019e). In 2019, this cost has
increased to US$393.¹¹
More than half of WFP’s revenue was designated for WFP operations in South Sudan, the
SyrianArab Republic, and Yemen (WFP 2019a).WFP’s 2019Annual Performance Report noted:
Nearly US$4.9 billion was spent on work under this strategic result [Strategic Objective 1:
End hunger by protecting access to food]—a record amount accounting for 68 percent of
total expenditures.
A significant amount of work towards achieving Strategic Result 1 was carried out through
emergency operations in Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Syrian Arab
Republic, South Sudan, Mozambique, central Sahel and Nigeria.
Unprecedented levels of funding allowed 86 operations to distribute 4 million mt of in-
kind food and US$1.5 billion in CBTs and commodity vouchers, primarily through
unconditional transfers to help meet immediate food needs. To address the underlying
causes of malnutrition, 80 percent of WFP operations also incorporated nutrition-
sensitive objectives into their programmes, while 34 countries integrated asset creation
and livelihood activities into their emergency responses with the aim of fostering resilience
to future shocks.
In fragile settings, 67 operations supported schoolchildren with nutritious meals, snacks or
take-home rations to provide an essential safety net for the children and their families and
to help restore normality, reduce vulnerability to hunger and protect livelihoods. In more
stable settings, WFP provided technical and capacity building support to governments for
transition to and scale up of national school feeding programmes. (WFP 2020a, 55)
In many respects, 2019 Level 3 and Level 2 emergencies in 20 countries—the highest ever
annual total—compares with seven Level 3 and nine Level 2 emergency responses by WFP
in 2018, which were conflict or climate-related emergencies, presenting obstacles to human-
itarian access. In 2018, WFP implemented its first-ever preemptive response, in the Sahel, to
prevent “a lean season from becoming a large-scale crisis” (WFP 2019a, 8). While meeting
these emergencies, WFP country offices continued to implement their CSPs, and the
performance ratings of WFP’s functional area (defined as a WFP division, department, or
other unit that specializes in specific areas of WFP’s work) were “medium” to “high.” WFP
is implementing all of its cross-cutting, using its policies and instruments to ensure that its
operations account for key cross-cutting issues (WFP 2019a).
Factors Underlying Change in the Nature of Response
The reasons behind WFP’s change in the response are several. First, key donors have moved
from in-kind food aid to local and regional procurement. Cash transfers have increased, and
there is greater interest in moving from short-term aid toward longer-term social
¹¹ See “The Cost of a Plate of Food 2020.” https://cdn.wfp.org/2020/plate-of-food/
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protection, safety nets, nutritional interventions, and school lunches. There is also growing
evidence that traditional justification for US food aid, by far the largest food aid supplier,
tied to US sources of food and shipments is wasteful. Strategically and politically, US food
aid is less significant today than it was in the past.¹²
WFP argues that with these changes, the distinction between humanitarian assistance
and development assistance has been blurred, as development assistance has begun to
address food (in)security, and humanitarian assistance has begun to take on “resiliency,”
using food assistance to create livelihood security (WFP 2017d). This raises larger issues for
the food security architecture. And yet, the share of development projects has declined
relative to the various emergency responses, as shown later in the chapter.
Financially, humanitarian assistance comes from a different “pocket” in most donor
countries than development assistance. Structurally, it raises issues about where food
assistance belongs—whether with the larger food security architecture of FAO, the Com-
mittee on Food Security (CFS), the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Task Force (HLTF)
on Global Food and Nutrition Security initiative with Rome-based institutions, or with
humanitarian and relief agencies of the UN and the NGO community. In the past, there
have also been concerns about food aid displacing food trade and about issues related to the
World Trade Organization. With declining food surpluses, trade displacement is less of a
concern. On the other hand, with climate change, low and variable stocks, growing demand
on food sources for biofuels, and growing food purchases coming from middle-income
developing countries, there is also concern about whether cash and food would be readily
available in periods of crisis, such as occurred with the rising food prices and low stocks in
2007–8.
The following analysis considers WFP’s evolving mandate and governance in the larger
context of global food aid and food assistance in a highly changed world of declining food
surpluses and a declining justification for food aid in-kind¹³—and yet, with the continued,
and indeed, growing need for emergency assistance, particularly in the context of urgent
unexpected needs, including climate-related and other disasters, intrastate conflicts, and the
threat of terrorism originating in and aided by failed states. Given the growing number of
failed states, there is also an interest in establishing a more seamless transition in interna-
tional assistance from emergencies to rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development—to
ensure development gains are not reversed by humanitarian emergencies. This raises
important questions about WFP’s comparative advantage as the world’s largest
¹² Stephanie Mercier, an independent agricultural policy consultant and a former chief economist for the
Democratic staff of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, and Vincent Smith, director of the agricultural studies
program at the American Enterprise Institute and a professor of agricultural economics at Montana State
University, have argued that US food aid, which has not changed much since the 1950s, is in urgent need of
reform. They call for “common sense reforms” to eliminate “wasteful mandates,” protecting US shipping
mercantile company interests, requiring almost 100 percent of all food aid be sourced in the United States and
US ships to carry at least half of the US food aid. Food aid is less than 1 percent of US agricultural exports and a
negligible proportion of all US agricultural production. Reforms that relax US sourcing and cargo preference
requirements will save as much as US$400 million yearly, by reducing administrative and transportation costs.
Such savings could enable the United States to help several million more people in need each year, literally saving
the lives of tens of thousands of children. Citing Erin Lentz, Christopher Barrett, and Miguel Gomez (2013), the
authors noted that a United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) pilot program in nine countries, authorized
by the 2008 Farm Bill, allowed US food aid to be procured in or near the countries where help was needed. The
study by Lentz, Barrett, and Gomez (2013) found that local and regional sourcing on average generated savings of
53 percent on grains and 25 percent on pulses and legumes, compared to US sourcing (Mercier and Smith 2018;
see, also, Barrett [2017]).
¹³ Of US$5.6 billion in confirmed donations in 2014, 73 percent, or US$4.2 billion, was in cash contributions—
a record, and a 22 percent increase over 2013 (WFP 2015h).
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humanitarian agency, par excellence, as it moves to provide development assistance, albeit
with less of an advantage.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs, embodied in the WFP
Strategic Plan 2017–21, remain the focus of WFP’s work (UN 2020; WFP 2017d, 2019j).
Global commitments in 2018 of relevance to WFP include those related to the reform of the
UN development system and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2417, as dis-
cussed earlier (WFP 2017d, 2019d).
Large-Scale Emergency Funding
Large-scale emergency funding remained concentrated on a small number of operations,
with more than 35 percent of the contribution revenue earmarked to Level 3 operations in
South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Yemen. Yemen was the largest operation, with
an increase of 41 percent in directed contributions in 2019, compared to 2018, accounting
for 20 percent of WFP’s global portfolio (WFP 2020a, 23).
Funding for countries supporting refugees from the Syrian crisis saw a significant
decrease in contributions: for example, for WFP operations in Turkey and Jordan. In
Turkey, the level of contributions fell by nearly 50 percent, from US$792 million in 2018
to US$405 million in 2019, but beneficiary numbers also decreased significantly, owing to
the closure of camps and continued devaluation of the Turkish lira (WFP 2020a, 23).
Governance and Recent Changes in Organizational Structure
A 36-member executive board oversees WFP’s humanitarian and development food aid
activities. This model is more akin to a shareholder model than the “one country, one vote”
model of FAO. The composition of the Executive Board nevertheless ensures that develop-
ing nation members have a significant stake in decision-making. Board seats are determined
by election and divided equally between the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
and FAO. Of the 36 seats in total, 21 are from developing countries, with the majority
selected by FAO. Fifteen are from developed country donors, the majority selected by
ECOSOC (WFP 2014c). In 2019, all but one of the developing countries on the board
were contributing governments or had contributed in the preceding five-year period (the
exception was Equatorial Guinea) (WFP 2020g).
The WFP Board, like the boards of other multilateral organizations, strives to make all
decisions by consensus, and the Board President is expected to make every effort to achieve
such consensus before a matter is put to a vote. The unique nature of WFP governance is
unlike the other four international organizations we reviewed; WFP has two parent bodies
(UN and FAO). The UN Secretary-General and FAO Director-General appoint the Exec-
utive Director in consultation with the board. The WFP Secretariat, led by the Executive
Director, manages day-to-day operations and administration. Strategic direction is influ-
enced by a confluence of external forces, as we demonstrated earlier, and its influence on the
organizational architecture. While the board presidency has regularly rotated between
northern and southern stakeholders, the Executive Director, apart from in an acting
capacity, has usually been from a developed country. Since 1992, the Executive Director
has been a US citizen—unique among UN agencies, and much like the World Bank,
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indicative of the top donor standing of the US government. The United States, through the
Executive Director, has relatively greater potential political power to push for changes
within the organization, while the Board has greater potential to influence the strategic
direction of the organization with wider legitimacy and accountability (WFP 2020g,
2020m).
WFP has been an agile organization responding to rapidly changing external circum-
stances. WFP’s governance, oversight and organizational reforms have been taking place at
least since the beginning of the new millennium, but the most fundamental changes have
been influenced by the shift of its mandate from food aid to food assistance and all that
accompanies it. In November 2014, for example, “the High-Level Committee on Manage-
ment endorsed the three lines of defense model promulgated by the Institute of Internal
Auditors as a reference model on risk management, oversight and accountability for UN
System organizations. WFP adopted the model as part of the update of its internal control
framework in 2015,” necessitated by its increasingly decentralized regional and country
operations (WFP 2018e, 4). Figure 12.9 illustrates the model at WFP.¹⁴
In March 2019, WFP adopted a new organizational structure to increase the effectiveness
of its response to the rapidly changing external environment. The new structure at head-
quarters “responds to the greater complexity of operations, including WFP’s increasing
recognition of the humanitarian, development and peace nexus and protracted crises”
against a background of increasing resource levels, available to WFP, by more than 25
percent during 2017–19 (WFP 2019h, 12).
The new structure is underpinned by five interrelated pillars under the leadership of the
Executive Director to provide a more accountable and coherent headquarters structure. The
five pillars are: (1) resource management; (2) program and policy development; (3) opera-
tions management; (4) operations assistance; and (5) partnerships and advocacy. The
regional directors who manage 85 percent of WFP’s resources now have a direct reporting
line to the Executive Director. Several other organizational changes include improved
management of supply chains, the school feeding program, stronger treatment of gender
issues, increase in monitoring and evaluation including decentralized monitoring in the
field, and generally increased accountability of the organization (WFP 2019h).
WFP’s overall governance and assurance architecture is presented in Figure 12.10;
principal governing bodies and independent entities report to the Board.
As early as 1999, a Governance Project was initiated to make the Board more strategic
and efficient; the exercise was driven by the Board and the then Executive Director
Catherine Bertini’s recognition of the shifting demands of global development challenges
(WFP 2005a). The Governance Working Group called for new frameworks for strategy,
policy, oversight, and accountability to serve as an action plan for the organization and
future work. Under five headings, the group presented 23 recommendations, 22 of which
were approved.¹⁵ Tellingly, the one recommendation not approved regarded a redrafting of
the mission statement; the Board feared such discussion might expose differences of
opinion about WFP’s role among members (WFP 2005a, 7). Reviewing current thinking,
Harvey et al. (2010), captured this transition in a paper on food aid and food assistance in
emergency and transitional contexts:
¹⁴ The Ethics Office, which is part of the second line of defense at WFP, also carries out whistleblower
protection activities, which are strictly independent of management.
¹⁵ The five headings were roles of governance, functions of governance, processes of governance, annual
programme of work, and structure of governance (WFP 2005a, 6).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
876   
Food assistance instruments might include direct food-based transfers (such as general
rations, food-for-work, supplementary feeding or vulnerable group feeding and school
feeding), food subsidies, cash transfers and vouchers (including school or user fee waivers)
and agricultural and livestock support. Food subsidies, fee waivers and livestock support
are rarely considered to be part of food assistance, but do fit some definitions. Further
ambiguity remains over when cash transfers should be counted as food assistance, and
what forms of support to agricultural production (seed provision, fertiliser subsidies and
extension services) and what aspects of nutritional interventions should count as food
assistance. (Harvey et al. 2010, 3)
The paper identified five priority areas for action:
• developing a new food security architecture which incorporates food assistance;
• working towards greater clarity of terms and definitions;
• where appropriate, continuing to expand beyond food aid to the use of cash and a
broader food assistance toolbox;
• linking food assistance more clearly to the expansion of social assistance within national
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Figure 12.9 The three lines of defense at the World Food Programme
Source: WFP (2018e, figure 2, 5).
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• linking food assistance more clearly to overall nutrition strategies that address treatment
as well as underlying causes. (Harvey et al. 2010, 4)
Harvey et al. (2010, 4) recommended, “These areas of action should be addressed in a
number of contexts, from the highest levels of the UN to the G20/G8 to agencies imple-
menting food assistance programmes on the ground.” Taking these actions, the paper said,
“will require serious thought and careful negotiations amongst stakeholders,” and warned
that:
The default policy option is to allow food aid to continue its decline into near irrelevance
and put nothing else robust in its place. In a context where problems of food insecurity as a
result of disasters are likely to increase as a result of climate change, and where large
numbers of people experience protracted crisis, the need for a flexible, coherent and
accountable system to meet the needs of food insecure and malnourished people should
be an urgent priority for the international aid system. (Harvey et al. 2010, 4)
WFP’s Hunger Map 2020 (Figure 12.11) depicts the prevalence of undernourishment in the
population of each country in 2017–19; 8.9 percent of the world’s population did not get
enough to eat in 2019. If the current trends continue, the number of hungry people will
reach 840 million by 2030. Using its Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM), WFP






























Figure 12.10 World Food Programme governance and assurance architecture
Source: Adapted from WFP (2018e, figure 1, 3).
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of publicly available resources, such as live dashboards and the HungerMapLIVE, launched
in 2020, that tracks food security in near real time in over 90 countries.¹⁶
Continuing trends since the late 1980s, emergency food aid delivery comprises a majority
and increasing share of global food aid, with a decline in program aid.
Assistance Programs Have Increased
Although the majority of food aid continues to be in-kind transfers, the share of this type of
aid fell from over 90 percent of food aid in 1991 to 62 percent in 2012 (WFP 2013e, 2020i).
Figure 12.8 shows expenditures by transfer modality for 2018 and 2019: food transfers and
costs makeup 49 percent of direct expenditures in 2019.
The proportion of food aid purchased both locally or triangularly decreased: that is, it
declined by 26 percent for local purchases and by 21 percent for triangular purchases. The
decline in physical delivery of food aid and an increased use of cash and voucher transfer
modalities, which grew exponentially over the past decade, are reflective of WFP’s shift to
food assistance In the case of CBTs, WFP is the largest humanitarian agent of such transfers
(WFP 2013d).
Using household data from Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme, Hirvonen and
Hoddinott (2020) examined recipients’ preferences for cash or in-kind payments. House-
holds that are closer to markets and financial services are more likely to prefer cash to food
payments. However, when food prices rise, preferences are seen to shift to in-kind transfers.
No more than 17 percent of surveyed households preferred only cash, and the median
household preferred no more than 50 percent cash.
Financial Implications of the World Food Programme’s Mandate:
Shifting from Food Aid to Cash Transfers
WFP’s ability to deliver both food aid and assistance, as well as on other development roles
is dependent on both the volume and nature of voluntary contributions, as well as its
financial framework.¹⁷ Changes from donors would help WFP shore up its operations.
Greater commitments of untied cash donations from the United States and other major
donors can provide WFP significant operational flexibility to execute prudent financial
management operations. Donor contributions to the proposed Food Security Trust Fund at
the World Bank would further support WFP hedging operations.
A 2010 study by the Center for Global Development (CGD), noting that WFP has
extremely limited ability to manage financial risk, stated:
The WFP procures all its food through spot markets, which subjects it to substantial
commodity and transport price risks and significant delays delivering food. Relying on
¹⁶ See VAM: https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/Reports_Explorer
¹⁷ The financial framework refers to the general and financial regulations and rules, financial structures,
policies, systems, and processes that support operations and provide financial oversight and accountability for
stakeholders (WFP 2016a).
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reactive emergency appeals and on donors that tend to earmark contributions and make
commitments one year at a time only adds to operational inflexibility and uncertainty.
. . . The Programme should consider implementing a targeted hedging pilot strategy.
(Ramachandran, Leo, and McCarthy, 2010, abstract)
The CDG report recommended that WFP adopt risk-management instruments, such as
physical call options, forward contracts, and futures contracts. The plus side of the proposed
strategy would be increased predictability and efficiency of WFP operations. The minus side
would be that it would take away funds from long-term assistance, given that it has always
been easier to raise funds for emergencies than for long-term development (Ramachandran,
Leo, and McCarthy 2010).
WFP’s current financial framework underwent a Financial Framework Review (FFR),
completed in 2016, the goals of which were to: (1) increase predictability of resources; (2)
increase flexibility; (3) enhance accountability; and (4) simplify resource management
(WFP 2016a).
In a strategic planning document, in 2007, WFP described its work as an asset in bridging
the “gap between crises, recovery and sustainable longer-term solutions” (WFP 2007, 3).
That same theme continues in WFP’s Strategic Plan 2017–21, albeit in a radically trans-
formed world of SDGs and accelerated action needed to end poverty and hunger by 2030, in
just ten years and in which multi-stakeholder engagement is crucial (WFP 2016c). Simul-
taneously, in its Strategic Plan 2017–21, WFP “responded to 13 major emergencies in 2014
and 12 major emergencies in 2015. Current trends in climate-, conflict- and health-related
crises are increasing the number of people living in hunger and . . . [point to the necessity]
for WFP to . . . focus on saving lives and livelihoods in emergencies, if it is to help countries
achieve the 2030 Agenda” (WFP 2016c, 9). The Strategic Plan continued, “Climate change
threatens to break down food systems by increasing frequency and severity of natural
hazards, with a disproportionate impact on vulnerable food-insecure households. The
global community cannot and should not keep saving the same lives every year” (WFP
2016c, 9).
The plan also noted that “protracted crises have become the new norm, while acute
short-term crises are now the exception” (WFP 2016c, 10). Recognizing the impact of the
crises on populations with food insecurity and undernutrition, CFS adopted the Framework
for Action for Food Security and Nutrition in Protracted Crises (CFS–FFA) in 2015. “WFP
has unique strengths and capacities for responding to affected populations in protracted
crises, and for acting on the principles set out by the CFS-FFA” (WFP 2016c, 10). WFP has
gained significant experience in both humanitarian and development contexts, so it is well
suited “to help strengthen the resilience of affected people in protracted crises by also
applying a development lens in its humanitarian response, and by aligning its recovery and
development interventions accordingly” (WFP 2016c, 10).
Bridging Humanitarian and Development Functions: A Case for
Safety Nets on Humanitarian and Productivity Grounds?
WFP frequently provides social protection, or safety-net types of assistance, in the case of
emergencies to three types of countries: (1) countries which have no institutional infra-
structure of safety nets; (2) countries with some but weak infrastructure; and (3) countries
with relatively well established safety net infrastructure. Behavioral economics of poverty
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has suggested a strong need for institutions to better assist countries in bridging this gap
between poverty and vulnerability. Together, such gaps often lead farmers to use technol-
ogies that may be less productive in good weather years, but more productive in bad weather
years.¹⁸ This may lock households into decision-making patterns that are less risky in the
short term, but offer lower reward strategies for long-term development. The donor
community increasingly sees food assistance and other social safety nets as freeing vulner-
able populations to take risks to shift to more profitable forms of farming or other sources of
income generation, rather than to continue to focus just on household survival. Building
national systems—combined with a shift from short-run to more durable approaches—is
increasingly becoming a unifying framework for assistance provided by different actors
(WFP 2015f).
In a useful review of 12 case studies jointly undertaken by WFP and the World Bank on
humanitarian assistance and social protection, it was noted:
To some extent, however, a distinctive feature of humanitarian assistance revolves around
the degree of involvement and engagement of national authorities (Konyndyk 2018;
Stoddard 2017). For instance, . . . out of the U$27.2 billion of international humanitarian
assistance in 2017, only 2.5 percent was channeled through host governments. . . . The rest
was directed outside government structures, including via some 4,480 actors comprising
international and national nongovernmental organizations, civil society, and others.
Meanwhile, a number of national governments are, of course, also allocating domestic
resources to address emergencies within their own borders . . . (Gentilini, Laughton, and
O’Brien 2018, 2–3)
Gentilini, Laughton, and O’Brien (2018) identified several takeaway lessons from WFP and
World Bank assistance, including possible challenges and trade-offs from practical experi-
ence. Small-scale, externally funded quality pilot programs of social safety nets can have
demonstration effects at a national scale, as in the case of Mauritania, particularly for those
countries supported by international organizations. Similarly, large-scale emergency re-
sponses can provide “proof of concept” for national social safety net programs, as in the case
of Lebanon. Guinea’s World Bank-funded and WFP-implemented school feeding pilot
program in remote, Ebola-affected areas also offers promise of support for human capital.
Sharing information, through common registries of humanitarian data, and building a
bridge between humanitarian and development assistance has begun to take place, albeit
on a small scale.
The spread of safety nets has its critics, not just among conservatives in donor countries
but also among those who argue that excessive spread of safety nets creates dependency and
adds to fiscal woes, particularly if the resources come at the cost of productive investments
in agricultural research and development, physical infrastructure, or schooling. In any case,
in low- to middle-income countries, such as Tanzania and Egypt, WFP provides new types
of assistance, such as vouchers for use in markets to poor or marginalized communities. In
less developed countries, WFP has partnered with FAO, IFAD, and the World Bank to help
farmers broker transitions to more productive farming methods.¹⁹ Even in a changed
¹⁸ This might be because higher productivity technology may depend more on inputs purchased on credit, and
crop failure in a bad year may result in a farmer becoming bankrupt, perhaps even losing his land. See Barrett and
Lentz (2010); Banerjee and Duflo (2012).
¹⁹ From the FAO/IFAD/WFP Working Together report:
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environment, food and agriculture agencies can work together to help countries “graduate”
from conflict, crisis, or emergency situations to rehabilitation, reconstruction, and devel-
opment (WFP 2015f).
Beyond the household level, current trends—climate change, protracted conflict, displace-
ment, and urbanization, discussed throughout this book—make a bigger case for bridging the
gap, an argument articulated in WFP’s corporate advocacy messages around the 2015 and
2016 global meetings. In making the case for “complementarity between humanitarian and
development assistance,” WFP emphasizes the imperative to protect development gains
(WFP 2015i, 2). With shocks to be expected, humanitarian response, paired with emergency
preparedness, are put forth as central to supporting the new Global Goals. WFP’s advocacy
promotes enhancing complementarity between humanitarian and development assistance.
Partners
WFP’s long-standing mantra has been “we deliver better,” but acknowledging that no single
organization can address current complex food security and nutrition challenges alone, is
shifting to “we deliver better together.” WFP engages with governments, civil society, the
private sector, other UN and international organizations, as well as with less traditional
partners, such as academia, think tanks, and the media. A recently articulated Corporate
Partnership Strategy 2014–17 (CPS) presented a typology of partners according to strategic
contributions (WFP 2014f, 14–15):
• Resource partners who provide human, financial, and technical resources
• Knowledge partners who contribute information
• Policy/governance partners who work on both internal corporate and country- and
regional-level hunger governance
• Advocacy partners who support global messaging around food security and nutrition
• Capability partners who support programs and operations
Next, this typology also helps to classify potential partners in Table 12.2.
In all cases, WFP applies three types of guiding principles for all types of WFP partner-
ships: (1) strategic principles—the framework within which all WFP partnerships must
operate to further its goals; (2) precautionary principles to limit risk and exclude partner-
ships that may be detrimental to WFP’s reputation, status, or operating efficiency; and (3)
prescriptive principles to establish the rules of good practice for all partnership work; as a
signatory to the 2007 Principles of Partnership in the UN Global Humanitarian Platform, it
requires equality, transparency, a results-oriented approach, responsibility, and comple-
mentarity (WFP 2014f, 10–11).²⁰
The CPS frames partnership strategically to promote improved outcomes for benefici-
aries. Four levels of participation, which vary according to the situation, were identified as
“key stages in a participatory process: (1) information sharing in a one-way flow; (2)
In Zambia, WFP is providing food rations to enable farmers to make the transition to ‘conservation farming,’ an
agricultural system whose goal is to maintain and improve crop yields and resilience against drought and other
hazards, while minimizing environmental degradation. At the same time, FAO provides seeds and implements to
make the transition. (FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2003, 2)
²⁰ For more information about the 2007 Principles of Partnership, as defined in the UN Global Humanitarian
Platform, see www.globalhumanitarianplatform.org
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consultation in at least a two-way flow of information; (3) collaboration with shared control
over decision-making; and (4) empowerment with the transfer of control over decisions and
resources” (WFP 2000, 5).
WFP works with a wide range of partnerships, from sharing information with potential
partners to their involvement, and determination of who influences and/or shares control
over food-assisted activities. Partners contribute to the design and or implementation of
programs and provide feedback and advocacy. “Stability eventually allows participants to
become empowered decision-makers, actively influencing the choice of activities and
services, benefiting from higher returns and assuming greater risks. The challenge is to
increase participation over time, with participants increasingly making decisions and
controlling the use of resources” (WFP 2000, 5).
Partnerships with Civil Society
As a “major buyer of staple food—some 80 percent of which comes from developing
countries—for a cash value of over US$1 billion a year,” WFP’s Purchase for Progress
(P4P) program connects smallholder farmers to markets in 35 countries worldwide. WFP
has pledged to source 10 percent of its food purchases from smallholder farmers and
encourages national governments and the private sector to buy food also in ways that will
benefit smallholders (WFP 2020s).
WFP describes the P4P further:
On the supply side, P4P works with a variety of partners to promote smallholder farmers’
entrepreneurship as a way to build resilience and address long-term nutrition needs.
Working mainly with farmers’ organizations and other partners, P4P provides training
and assets to improve crop quality, facilitates access to finance and promotes marketing.
Women, whose role in farming is often unpaid and labour-intensive, are particularly
encouraged to take part in decision-making and benefit economically from their work.
(WFP 2020s)
Table 12.2 Potential partners for humanitarian assistance
Typology Illustrative types of partners (by no means exhaustive and sometimes
overlapping)
1. Resource partners Bilateral and multilateral partnersPhilanthropists, private
sectorTraditional and nontraditional donors




4. Advocacy partners NGOs, communication experts
5. Capability partner Knowledge, skills, and resources—universities, think tanks, research
institutions
Notes: See, also, WFP (2004b), “New Partnerships to Expand theWFP Donor Base.” Twinning “involves matching
an in-kind contribution or service from a donor with a cash donation from another donor to meet the associated
costs of a contribution” (WFP 2004a, 7). To assist donors, the following options are available: with another
member state; a twinning fund; and twinning with private contributions. Contributions in cash or in-kind; debt
swaps in return for funding, e.g., Italy’s debt-swap agreement with Egypt, and South–South cooperation.
Source: WFP (2004a, 2004b, 2014f, 2020r).
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The Final Report for the P4P pilot (January 2009–December 2013) summarized these results:
As of December 2013, P4P had engaged with over 830 FOs [farmers’ organizations] over
the duration of the pilot with 647 still being targeted in December 2013. These 647 FOs
represent a total membership of over 1.5 million farmers. P4P capacity development has
reached over 768,000 attendees since the first training sessions in 2009. . . . The number of
training sessions delivered per year increased each year of the pilot, from just over 100
sessions delivered in 2009 to over 1,800 in 2013 alone. (WFP 2014c, 1)
Increasingly, WFP relies on NGO partnerships for its newer means of assistance, such as
cash, vouchers, and P4P, but we simply do not know the precise numbers. Involvement
fluctuates depending on the number of NGOs or projects at a given time in a given
geography. WFP says it partners with more than 1,000 national and international NGOs
(WFP 2020q).
The 2014–17 strategy, “We Deliver Better Together” (WFP 2014f), stated:
Each year WFP works with 1,500 to 2,000 civil society organizations, the majority of which
are local, community-based NGOs. Most of these relationships are quasi-contractual,
where WFP is outsourcing local delivery to national or international NGOs. WFP’s annual
NGO Partnership consultations, held each year since 1995, have undergone a major
transformation over the last two years. The meeting now takes place at Chief Executive
Officer Level, with over 100 participating NGOs. This successful annual consultation will
continue to be a key feature of WFP engagement with NGO partners. (WFP 2014f, 18)
WFP’s 2019 Annual Evaluation Report (AER) noted that were 2,890 partnerships with
national and international NGOs in program activities and 3,035 national and international
NGO partnerships in services. The largest number of partnerships was in implementation,
followed by monitoring (WFP 2020v).
Involvement fluctuates depending on the number of NGOs or projects at a given time in
a given geography. NGOs are WFP’s primary operational partners (see Box 12.2), providing
food assistance distribution and helping to implement a variety of development activities,
including education (especially in primary schools), health, and agricultural development
(food-for-training), as well as its newer means of assistance such as cash, vouchers, and P4P.
Large international NGOs, such as World Vision International, Save the Children
International, and CARE International, are the main NGO collaborators, though many
Box 12.2 Examples of Partnerships with Civil Society
• SARC, Aga Khan Foundation, and Action against Hunger—Syria
• World Vision—Myanmar
• Islamic Relief—Kenya
• Catholic Development Commission—Malawi
• Caritas Bolivia—Bolivia
• Christian Child Fund—Ghana
Source: “Partnerships in Action” (WFP 2020p).
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smaller regional organizations work in five or more countries. There are pros and cons to
reliance on international NGOs in terms of costs and long-term sustainability of operations,
without continued reliance on external financing. Local NGOs have taken on increasing
prominence where political, security, and cultural issues limit access by international NGOs
and WFP itself, such as in conflict settings, though local capacity issues limit cooperation in
some contexts.²¹
Private sector partners include corporations, local businesses, foundations, and private
organizations (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation [BMGF] and the Alliance for a Green
Revolution in Africa [AGRA], for example). As with US bilateral assistance, WFP increas-
ingly seeks out public–private sector partnerships—not only for financial resources, but to
tap specialized private sector expertise and personnel, particularly in nutrition, security,
logistics, financial services, and business modeling,²² not to mention employee giving,
consumer campaigns, and public awareness.²³ In other instances, high-profile partnerships
lend star power to fundraising campaigns and emergency appeals (WFP 2018a),²⁴
WFP has traditionally collaborated on emergency relief, logistics, and operations. WFP’s
recognized expertise is formalized in its lead roles in the cluster system—including as lead
agency of the global Logistics and Emergency Telecommunication clusters, providing UN-
wide air transport and emergency information and communications technology (ICT)
services, and co-lead of the Food Security cluster with FAO (OCHA 2020).
Collaborations with International Organizations
WFP collaborates within the UN and Bretton Woods systems with a view to developing
quick and effective responses to crises. In its Annual Performance Report for 2018, in its
efforts to achieve food security, WFP reports partnering with FAO, IFAD, the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the Global Child Nutrition Foundation,
the Partnership for Child Development at Imperial College, London, and Brazil’s Centre of
Excellence against Hunger (WFP 2019a, 17). WFP works “side by side” with the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to provide “logistics support and expertise for
the distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets” (WFP 2019a, 133). Also, in a collab-
oration on school feeding with a focus on girls’ education, WFP has “successfully
²¹ The Syrian crisis illustrates the near total reliance on local NGOs to reach populations effectively trapped by
political and security access issues. Note that, in late 2015, the role of local NGOs and local capacity was at the
heart of a series of IRIN News (now The New Humanitarian) interviews and articles and subsequent debate. See,
for example, “What Refugees Really Think of Aid Agencies?” The New Humanitarian, March 5, 2015: http://www.
thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2015/03/05/what-refugees-really-think-aid-agencies. The primacy of local
ownership and capacity is a large issue not addressed in this chapter.
²² Examples highlighted in WFP materials include: MasterCard providing technology and payment for e-card
projects to allow beneficiaries to buy from markets, as well as marketing expertise, and PepsiCo Foundation
providing supply chain and performance management assistance to improve logistics and operational efficiency.
See https://www.wfp.org/news/mastercard-and-world-food-programme-announce-100-million-meals-commit
ment and https://www.wfp.org/videos/teaming-pepsico-fight-child-malnutrition-0
²³ For example, in 2013, Michael Kors launched a WFP awareness campaign and promotional scheme,
whereby a portion of watch purchases would be donated to WFP to “Stop Hunger” (see https://insight.wfp.
org/sharethemeal-on-world-food-day-93337a59b31d). In cause-related marketing campaigning, companies
encourage independent consumer giving, independent of product purchase.
²⁴ Examples of campaigns and celebrity involvement include: Christina Aguilera, Kate Hudson, the Malian
group Amadou and Mariam (the first WFP Ambassadors Against Hunger for the EU, mobilizing donors among
their fan base). See, for example, https://www.wfp.org/news/kate-hudson-named-goodwill-ambassador-united-
nations-world-food-programme
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operationalized approaches with partners such as the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), the United Nations Population Fund [UNFPA] and the United Nations Entity
for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), to address . . .
barriers through integrated platforms, . . . to be supported, scaled up and become a normal
part of WFP school feeding programmes” (WFP 2019a, 53).
WFP has participated in “numerous critical initiatives to strengthen partnerships with
fellow United Nations agencies and other partners” (WFP 2019a, 63). Some examples
include: (1) WFP and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies implementing a pilot program for global national society capacity strengthening;
(2) an addendum signed by WFP’s Executive Director and UNHCR’s High Commissioner
on data sharing agreement of 2011; (3) WFP’s strategic coloration as a member of the
steering committees for the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) United Nations Network and the
United Nations Standing Committee on Nutrition; and (4) WFP leadership in the Global
Nutrition Cluster, and on the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on the Prevention and Control
of Non-communicable Diseases (WFP 2019a).
The partnerships have taken on newdimensions in the changing humanitarian climate—as
manifested in its close partnership withWHO throughout the Ebola response, and increasing
work (if not competition) with UNHCR in serving refugee needs (WFP 2014b). The heads of
WFP, UNHCR, and the UN Refugee Agency, signed an agreement in Geneva on May 15,
2017, which committed WFP and UNHCR to collaborate in providing cash-based assistance
for refugees. Cash is a way to effectively assist refugees, with the participation of recipient
communities, host governments, donors, and humanitarian agencies. Building on the strong
long-standing partnership between the agencies, the agreement aims to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of cash-based aid through a predictable arrangement with the participation
of all relevant stakeholders. The new agreement seeks to improve assistance to refugees while
bringing benefits to local economies (UNHCR 2017).
The Rome-based agencies have “specific but complementary” mandates in the drive to
reduce hunger, food insecurity, and rural poverty. Acknowledging respective missions and
expertise, each organization states it has ensconced collaboration in its organization’s
strategic planning. In Chapters 9 and 11 on FAO and IFAD, respectively, we have shown
the evolving nature of these organizations. Clearly, the pressure from the donors to
collaborate has increased but fragmented, tied funding to each organization does not always
enable them to play up to their comparative advantages.
In a simplified example of the division of labor, FAO provides agricultural development
“inputs”—knowledge on policies, institutions, and technologies andmaterials—whileWFP and
its NGO partners can have on-the-ground community engagement “outputs” experience. In
South Africa and Zambia, WFP and FAO paired immediate food relief with longer-term
agricultural development assistance to enable farmers and communities to transition to sus-
tainable and profitable farming systems. As early as 2003, these collaborations were underway
(FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2003). WFP’s agricultural livelihood work and recovery activities have
been debated over time. Recovery and livelihoods require access to land that is often lost in
emergencies, as well as seed and technical knowledge about what to grow and where. The
expertise of FAO in providing development assistance—for example, on livelihoods and food
policy—versus WFP’s comparative advantage in the logistics of moving food aid has been a
source of tension. WFP has more than 19,600 staff, of whom 87 percent are based in the field.²⁵
²⁵ See “WFP at a Glance”: https://www.wfp.org/stories/wfp-glance
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Working with IFAD, WFP contributes to policy analysis, advocacy, and operational
support. At a project level, WFP and IFAD combine international lending with works
programs. In the broader architecture, FAO, IFAD, and WFP also officially collaborate via
various international platforms (such as theWorld Food Summit), in developing coordinated
approaches to international and regional initiatives (such as NEPAD), and in addressing
development issues (such as HIV/AIDS and gender mainstreaming) (WFP 2019a).
Despite ongoing tensions regarding possible mission creep and overlap, as well as varying
degrees of effectiveness of collaboration, the Rome-based agencies’ recent policy and
advocacy collaboration have resulted in the development and eventual acceptance of a
stand-alone food security and of SDG2 for ending global hunger, which was widely heralded
as a successful example of UN cooperation. FAO, IFAD, and WFP also issued joint
messages, including, specifically, on social protection, in advance of the Addis Ababa
Conference on Financing for Development referred to earlier.
Collaboration with the World Bank at the country level included the response to the
Ebola epidemic, in which the Bank stepped outside of its normal development focus and
supported WFP emergency efforts, including both logistics and food assistance (IEG 2013).
Other examples include targeting in Lebanon to support social assistance through electronic
vouchers;²⁶ as well as serving as an implementing partner to the Government of Chad to
support refugees from the Central African Republic with relief and resilience activities
under a Bank grant.²⁷
WFP, UNICEF, and the World Bank worked together under the World Bank-funded
Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP), described in Chapter 8, with WFP envi-
sioned to lead the emergency response and the Bank providing assistance through transfers,
workforce, and health and nutrition programs. In South Sudan, the World Bank, WFP,
FAO, and UNICEF are participating in an Emergency Food and Nutrition Security Project,
with US$50 million funding by the World Bank, for support and protection for 580,000
people (World Bank 2017).
WFP also contributed its expertise in school feeding (see Box 12.3), under GFRP, along
with other social safety net activities, such as public works programs and transfers, as well as
collaborating on needs assessments.²⁸ The reports from the World Bank on the crisis clearly
suggest theWorld Bank was in the lead and thatWFP played a key supportive role. Whereas
WFP was using international NGOs, the cost of doing business was considerably higher,
according to World Bank reports (see World Bank 2012).²⁹ In Chapters 9 and 10 on FAO
²⁶ For Lebanon, see http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/111451467996685776/pdf/94768-CAS-
P151022-R2016-0126-OUO-9-Box396270B.pdf
²⁷ For Chad, see https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/09/12/chad-a-60-million-world-
bank-grant-to-support-refugees-and-host-communities
²⁸ According to “The World Bank Group and the Global Food Crisis: An Evaluation of the World Bank Group
Response”:
GFRP projects also financed the continuation or expansion of existing food-for-work programs—through
community-driven development and social investment funds in projects financed by the Bank, other donors
(such as WFP), or the government—designed to provide poor workers with an additional source of income even
as they supported the creation, rehabilitation, and/or maintenance of public infrastructure. For public works
programs to meet social safety net objectives, they need to have clear criteria for location, low wages to ensure self-
selection of poorer workers, high labor intensity and use of unskilled labor, a portfolio of community-level
investments, and sufficient duration to provide meaningful income transfers. These elements were not always
present due to political economy considerations taking precedence. (IEG 2013, xvii)
²⁹ The Final Report of GFRP, “Progress and Lessons Learned,” noted:
Strong coordination and partnerships with entities such as UN organizations and civil society organizations is
important, however obligations should be clearly defined. For example, when partnering with UN organizations,
such as theWorld Food Programme, collaboration on a common reporting standard should be clearly defined and
meet the needs of both institutions. (World Bank 2012, 7)
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Box 12.3 School Feeding Program
The World Food Programme’s school feeding program has evolved considerably since
its inception. The 2009 joint publication of the World Food Programme and the World
Bank Group, “Rethinking School Feeding: Social Safety Nets, Child Development, and
the Education Sector,” provided “a new analysis of school feeding programs” (Bundy
et al. 2009, x). It benefited “from combining the World Food Programme’s practical
experience in running school feeding programs with the World Bank Group’s develop-
ment policy dialogue and analysis” (Bundy et al. 2009, x). It explored “how food
procurement may help local economies and . . . the centrality of the education sector in
the policy dialogue on school feeding” (Bundy et al. 2009, x). Since that study, WFP has
published reports to help governments, policymakers, donors, NGOs, and other partners
to explore the costs and benefits of school feeding programs to help them design effective
programs capable of responding quickly to today’s crises, while maintaining fiscally
sustainable investments in children’s education and general human potential in the long
term.
In the words of the then World Bank President Robert Zoellick and WFP Executive
Director Josette Sheeran: “A key message from [the first and subsequent reports] . . . is
that the transition to sustainable national programs depends on mainstreaming school
feeding into national policies and plans, especially education sector plans” (Bundy et al.
2009, x). The international community appears to have gone “beyond the debate about
whether school feeding makes sense as a way to reach the most vulnerable. . . . [to] focus
on how school feeding programs can be designed and implemented in a cost-effective
and sustainable way to benefit and protect those most in need of help today and in the
future” (Bundy et al. 2009, x). Such reports are already becoming flagship products of
WFP. According to the 2013 “State of School Feeding Worldwide” report, 368 million
children received school meals, with up to US$75 billion invested each year. WFP
advocattes school feeding as part of social protection systems to support the most
vulnerable families and children and can be scaled up in response to crises. According
to the report, at least 38 countries that WFP surveyed scaled up their programs in
response to armed conflict, natural disasters, and food and financial crises. The pro-
gram’s performance, however, has been highly variable. In low-income countries, the
programs are donor dependent and high in cost. The report noted that linking of school
feeding to local agriculture was likely to make the program more sustainable but also
urged greater aid coordination. Programs such as these emphasize the importance of
linking WFP’s work to the work of other international organizations, most notably
IFAD’s and the World Bank’s development programs in agriculture and education to
improve their chances of being more sustainable (WFP 2013d).
In its School Feeding Strategy 2020–30, “WFP lays out its vision of working with
governments and partners” and gives many examples of countries with which it is
working “to jointly ensure that all primary schoolchildren have access to good quality
meals in school, accompanied by a broader integrated package of health and nutrition
services” (WFP 2020x, 6). It has been particularly timely and relevant in the context of
COVID-19.
Source: Bundy et al. (2009); WFP (2013d); WFP (2020x).
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and CGIAR, respectively, we point out that bilateral donors present in the countries support
CGIAR Centers or WFP; however, their staff at headquarters—who often represent the
organizations on the boards of these organizations—do not necessarily address questions of
the comparative advantage of the organizations and whether their assistance in the field
may contribute to mission creep, rather than the organizations playing to their comparative
advantages. Thus, for collaboration between international organizations to work sustainably
on a longer-term basis, the WFP strategy would need to be reexamined on the grounds of
effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. Since many of the same representatives serve on
the boards of all Rome-based organizations, this should, in principle, be easily addressed.
Information Systems for Food Security
WFP’s mandate requires effective food security monitoring for all program design, pla-
nning, and operations. Over the years, WFP has strengthened its Information Systems for
Food Security (ISFS) initiatives, particularly through VAM, established in 1994 to improve
monitoring of vulnerability to food insecurity. VAM supports “a comprehensive under-
standing of both structural and emergency factors causing food insecurity” (FAO 2010, 4;
see, also, WFP 2007, 2015g).
Partner agencies draw on WFP’s field experience and food security analysis functions,
leveraging, in particular, WFP’s deep field reach for its household and market monitoring.³⁰
Structural factors influencing food insecurity, it should be noted, have not been WFP’s
comparative advantage in the past, but as its emergency food aid activity has declined, it has
been gradually carving out a niche for itself in this area. Although FAO houses regional and
country-level knowledge and technical expertise, VAM has evolved to provide geospatial
and economic analysis, food security monitoring and assessments, post-shock assessments,
and thematic analysis. Additionally, VAM oversees WFP’s near real-time food security
monitoring capacity, with systems in place and tracking food security daily across 38
countries and counting.
WFP undertakes food security analysis in close collaboration with partners worldwide,
including governments, UN agencies, local/international NGOs, regional bodies, and aca-
demic institutions. These partnerships ensure a shared understanding of food security
problems and common priorities for action.
VAM has had particular expertise in and tools for analysis of household coping capacities
and food access. And it has evolved into DataViz (DataViz.vam.wfp.org). Some contempo-
rary products include:
• Market Functionality Index (MFI)
• Asset Impact Monitoring from Space (AIMS)
• Essential Needs Assessments
• The Minimum Expenditure Basket
• Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA)
• Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA)
³⁰ Including governments, Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), FAO, OCHA, UNHCR,
WHO, the World Bank, research institutes, and local and international NGOs (WFP 2015g).
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• Market Analysis and Monitoring, “The Market Monitor”
• Joint Assessment Missions (JAM), conducted with UNHCR
• Crop and Food Security Missions (CFSAM), conducted with FAO (WFP 2015g; see,
also, WFP 2011a)
As part of an initiative on open data, WFP has made much of its data publicly available. The
“VAM One Stop Shop” has now been replaced by DataViz (DataViz.vam.wfp.org), where
all VAM resources can be accessed. In tandem with DataViz and as part of the efforts
toward open data, WFP also launched the HungerMapLIVE (hungermap.wfp.org) in
January 2020, a Global Hunger Monitoring System (and global public good) that tracks
and predicts food security in near real time across over 90 countries.
In 2010, the governing bodies of WFP and FAO initiated an evaluation of the two
agencies’ support to IFIS, the first joint evaluation of its kind (FAO 2010). The evaluation
concluded that the systems of WFP and FAO are increasingly built on partnership and
consensus, although dimensions such as nutrition, gender, and urban issues were not
sufficiently accounted for. In general, WFP provides critical household-level expertise on
joint needs assessments in countries to which it provides food and other forms of assistance
and increasingly, also engages in agricultural livelihood work and recovery activities, in
addition to its more traditional distribution and logistics support.
The FAO and WFP Joint Thematic Evaluation describes FAO’s contribution to food
security analysis in this way:
FAO develops, maintains and supports a wide range of global, regional and national ISFS
initiatives including GIEWS [Global Information and Early Warning System], Food
Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems (FIVIMS), FAOSTAT
[the statistics division of FAO], the State of Food Insecurity (SOFI), Food Outlook and
market surveys, among others. An important part of FAO’s ISFS support consists of
capacity development at regional and national levels through initiatives such as the Food
Security Information for Action programme. Many of these initiatives aim at enhancing
national and local capacities to generate and manage food security information in support
of policy analysis and decision-making. (FAO 2010, 4)
One joint initiative between FAO and WFP, that also included IFPRI, is the Food Security
Information Network (FSIN), with 16 global and regional partners. Launched in October
2012, FSIN aims to strengthen ISFS and support decision-making. FSIN is intended to serve
as a platform for standards and knowledge setting, with emphasis on linking country
capacity needs with existing initiatives and expertise at the regional and global level—“a
new vision for country-led information systems and networks for food and nutrition
security” (FSIN n.d.). (See also WFP 2015f.)
WFP has sought to improve its program management and decision-making through
the development of corporate ISFS to help meet its overall food assistance objective. And
as we discuss below, the recent corporate strategies go substantially further to move
action to the country level. The Joint Evaluation noted, “WFP is increasingly providing
support to ISFS capacity development at national and regional levels. At the same time
FAO’s shrinking budget has led that agency to decrease its ISFS capacity development
support” (FAO 2010, 4). As FAO’s reforms are beginning to take hold, FAO is obtaining
considerable support from donors for its resilience agenda at the field level (see
Chapter 9).
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Partners in Assistance
WFP follows a country ownership principle that, while not new, is particularly relevant to
the changing context of humanitarian and development assistance (WFP 2007).³¹ Collab-
oration with governments—both donors and beneficiaries—is built into the WFP partner-
ship model. Ideally, WFP interventions are coherent with beneficiary government plans,
such as the country strategy note, as in the US Millennium Challenge Corporation model.³²
Starting in 2009, WFP began piloting a country-level strategic and programmatic planning
approach, the output of which would be the CSPs. This approach more closely tied activities
to country priorities, defining WFP’s role based on country needs and specifying
government-determined targets (WFP 2015b).
Objective 5 of the 2008–13 strategy—to strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce
hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase—makes country own-
ership explicit (WFP 2007). The 2014–17 strategy more clearly emphasizes building coun-
tries’ capacity to deal with emergencies as an objective, as shown earlier. If most WFP
engagement is emergency assistance (and the current number of Level 3 emergencies shows
no sign of abating), then it is unclear if WFP staff has the time, presence, and influence with
governments on to affect important policy and strategic agendas. The 2014–17 Strategic
Plan (discussed next in the section on the WFP mandate) also counts policy and program-
matic advice as an important tool in meeting its strategic objectives. In asserting this quasi-
technical assistance function, WFP language again notes its historic position in working
closely with countries and communities and its expertise as relevant to an assistance role
(WFP 2013f). However, in the past, that assistance was in the form of food aid, which has
now diminished in importance.
World Food Programme’s Comparative Advantage
Challenges to the global system, such as climate change and rising food prices, require new
and more flexible tools to help the world’s poor—a requirement that is increasingly
acknowledged within the UN system and by changing bilateral approaches (Feed the Future
and the Millennium Challenge Corporation). While WFP seeks a new role for itself, it also
brings aspects of its past role to bear in meeting those changing demands. WFP considers
itself the largest and most operational UN agency (WFP 2007), with considerable depth of
field experience, logistics expertise, and staff resources. Credibility with local partners and
governments, a “can-do” orientation demonstrated through staff motivation and commit-
ment, and a problem-solving ethos are often-cited traits of the organization.³³ The WFP
CPS includes an organizational “Unique Value Proposition,” describing what partners have
said they value and what they can expect to benefit from WFP (WFP 2014f, 13, 26):
³¹ In its 2008–13 Strategic Plan, WFP subscribes to the “widely recognized principles of ownership, alignment,
harmonization, management for results and mutual accountability” (WFP 2007, 8).
³² According to the WFP mission statement, food aid should be integrated with country development plans
and coordinated with other forms of assistance. The starting point is the country plan; the country strategy note is
the framework. The 2008–13 Strategic Plan emphasized country ownership, stating: “In emergency contexts,
when national capacities might be overwhelmed, WFP can help governments act . . . Governments should take the
lead in disaster preparedness and response, . . . In longer-term development contexts, all WFP interventions must
be coherent with and aligned with to governments’ priorities and frameworks” (WFP 2007, 8).
³³ See the “Strategic Evaluations Synthesis” (WFP and GPPi 2015).
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• Responsiveness and agility
• Expertise
• Accountability and transparency
• Delivery focus
• Scale of operations
WFP has unique experience working in poor security environments, a characteristic that
is particularly valuable given recent security threats to development organization work
around the world (as recently evidenced by WFP’s presence in Syria).³⁴ Some of its
capabilities are rooted in its multilateral nature—it can engage in environments where
individual donor countries could not provide assistance, for either security or political
reasons. Its deep-field reach can also be attributed to its network of NGO operational
partners, on whom it relies for food delivery in many hard-to-reach areas.
These strengths are represented in its cluster system leadership—as lead for logistics and
emergency telecommunication and co-lead on food security along with FAO. A 2015
headline in The Guardian asserted WFP to be one of the “best bits” of the UN:
The reality is that WFP is still the best-placed, best-resourced global agency for distribut-
ing food when disaster strikes. If it needs to build bridges and roads, it can. If it has to drop
food out of planes, it will. Its staff have even used elephants, yaks and donkeys to fulfil
what remains its core mission: to deliver food into the hands of the hungry poor.
(Chonghaile 2015)
The same article goes on to acknowledge WFP’s interest in moving beyond the image of
food sacks. While in 2015, it appeared there would be no abating to the numbers left hungry
by disaster, WFP was eager to highlight its development activities, under the resilience
banner.
WFP’s 2014 synthesis of evaluations of 2013 summarizes these strengths and challenges,
noting that the institution’s reputation for delivering large-scale humanitarian aid in
difficult circumstances was confirmed by the evaluations, with commendations for its
logistics capacity and food security analysis (WFP 2014a). WFP’s programming has been
aligned generally with governments and other external partners, and where possible, it has
sought to move toward food assistance and long-term planning. And, yet, as stated in the
AER for 2013:
Funding was a significant and recurring challenge and one of the key factors influencing
strategic choices. Dependencies on a single donor, and rigidities in donor support,
particularly when in-kind donations were involved, often constrained programmatic
choices and prevented adoption of long-term approaches. A further influence on strategic
choice concerned country office access to appropriate human resources, particularly
important for the shift from food aid to food assistance and for strengthening national
capacities. (WFP 2014a, 8)
An important question for WFP is whether a short-term emergency assistance agency with
uncertain clients and uncertain funding can realistically take on the challenges of long-term
³⁴ See Masood (2015): “Pakistan Warns Aid Groups to Follow Unspecified Rules.”
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development in areas in which it may not have had a comparative advantage? Or, should it
just continue to focus on being the world’s best emergency assistance agency, especially
given that emergencies remain a growth industry, and work with others (FAO, IFAD,
World Bank, regional banks) to address the transition from emergency to development?
Such thinking needs to be increasingly applied to organizations to establish them as
centers of excellence, but given the current donor financing realities, it does not eliminate
the unnecessary sense of competition and rivalry rather than a spirit of cooperation.
Development Activities
For WFP, development assistance involves increasing the capacity of nations to independ-
ently withstand and navigate crisis—effectively building in a sunset clause for food aid. Zero
Hunger implies that there should no longer be a need for WFP’s role as a food relief agency.
At the same time, WFP’s approach acknowledges that while the threat of hunger will always
loom, given the rise in emergencies due to the effects of climate change and conflict and the
attendant increase in displaced and refugee populations, nations can be better equipped to
manage these causes.³⁵ WFP’s new direction makes emergency relief paramount and
incorporates nutrition, capacity building,³⁶ country ownership, support of and reliance on
markets, and partnerships. WFP’s development roles have evolved to be cast under a broad
banner of a resilience agenda. WFP sees its new comparative advantage as a balance
between its natural relief role (respond) and one of assisting nations to mitigate threats
(reduce) and provide relief themselves (respond, rebuild).
Consistent among WFP’s priorities throughout the evolution of its mandate are saving
lives and supporting livelihoods. Newer development activities are generally supportive of
these overarching strategic objectives. How WFP contributes to saving lives is apparent in
the tools it uses for its emergency food relief work: targeted food and nutrition assistance,
work-for-food programs, cash or voucher-based social safety net programs that facilitate
food access and support markets, and activities to rebuild infrastructure following crises.³⁷
In 2019, WFP gave assistance through a combination of food, cash-based assistance, and
vouchers to 97.1 million people, compared to 84.9 million in 2018, and 88.9 million in 2017.
This included 23 million men, 15,7 million women, 29.5 million girls, and 28.9 million boys.
Also included were 10.6 million refugees, 2.9 million returnees, 15.5 million internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and 68.1 million residents. This entailed 3.9 million tons of food
and cash-based assistance and vouchers to 27.9 million people, as well as conditional cash
transfers to 60 million people, with 17.3 million school children receiving school meals and
take-home food (WFP 2020a).
Despite this orientation, the majority ofWFP assistance is still emergency relief, largely to
countries that are not able to take care of their own relief (WFP 2012c). If this trend
continues, WFP will find it difficult to claim to be knowledgeable about food security in
countries where poverty and hunger are most prevalent—most of these are MICs, such as
³⁵ Observers are also redefining humanitarian response vis-à-vis “traditional” development activities, acknowl-
edging a broad array of longer-term engagements and multidimensional approaches needed “to save lives,
alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity before, during, and after man-made crises and natural
disasters” (GHA 2016, 2).
³⁶ WFP’s country capacity strengthening (CCS) is provided, in response to stakeholders’ request, for support of
national food security and nutrition systems, enhancing the autonomy and resilience of nations. SeeWFP (2018d).
³⁷ WFP Strategic Plan 2008–13, Strategic Objectives One and Three (WFP 2007).
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India, though some of the least developed states also have high poverty incidence. The
countries with the greatest prevalence of undernourishment in 2019 were Haiti, Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Madagascar, Chad, Liberia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Lesotho.
Countries with the worst food crises in 2019 were Yemen, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, The Sudan, and Nigeria.
Furthermore, it will be challenged to have the internal capacity to do enough to help
countries prepare for their own emergency assistance, with a view to getting itself out of
that business.
Resilience
WFP’s policy on resilience describes its perceived comparative advantages in food security
and nutrition, explicitly articulating a dual humanitarian and development mandate.³⁸
Within the policy, WFP defines a new resilience-building approach to programming—the
way activities are conceived and designed, as well as aligned with governments and partners’
plans and actions: “A resilience-building approach to programming helps to mitigate the
damaging effects of shocks and stressors before, during and after crises, thereby minimizing
human suffering and economic losses” (WFP 2015d, 2).
This language deftly and explicitly bridges the humanitarian and development divide,
and the policy seeks to connect its proven expertise in responding to emergencies to the
development context, asserting: “WFP’s long experience in humanitarian and development
contexts has established areas of comparative advantage in building resilience for food
security and nutrition” (WFP 2015d, 8). However, WFP’s role will be seen through its ability
to deliver on this approach and in the political dialogue around the World Humanitarian
Summit and implementation plans for SDGs 2 and 17. Indeed, resilience is the area where
organization’s relative comparative advantages will likely manifest most visibly. FAO, IFAD
and WFP have engaged to frame their collaboration and partnership around strengthening
resilience and food security (FAO, IFAD and WFP 2015).
WFP’s guiding principle is to permanently change people’s lives for the better by bridging
the divide between humanitarian and development activities. In the five countries of the
central Sahel region, where vast humanitarian, development, and peace challenges collide,
WFP implemented an integrated five-year resilience programme designed to build resil-
ience and ultimately reduce the need for emergency support. This combined effort by the
Rome-based agencies; international, regional, and national partners; government institu-
tions; and universities enabled 1.3 million people to receive a package of support, ranging
from school meals to community asset creation, in the first year of the operation. WFP’s
cost–benefit analysis indicates that investing in resilience programmes in the Niger alone
can generate a nearly fourfold return over a 20-year period for every dollar spent.
This approach helps break the cycle of intergenerational poverty by connecting people—
particularly the schoolchildren, women, and smallholder farmers who are furthest behind in
educational and economic opportunities.
Alongside conflict, the other major driver of global hunger is the impact of a changing
climate on agricultural production, which requires multi-year investments in resilience
³⁸ Note that definitions of the resilience concept differ according to various development actors. WFP focuses
on the abilities to absorb, adapt, and transform, ensuring “that shocks and stressors do not have long-lasting
adverse development consequences” (WFP 2015d, 3).
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Earlier, we mentionedWFP investments in the future of more than 17 million girls and boys
by partnering with governments to provide school meals, snacks, or take-home rations.
Disaster Risk Reduction
WFP’s ability to respond to crisis is contingent on early warning and preparedness systems.
It is in the area of disaster risk reduction where WFP has perhaps the clearest comparative
advantage to lend to development contexts, frequently expressed as the means to safeguard
development and prevent losses of development gains from shocks and stresses, and a
prerequisite for eliminating hunger. Disaster risk reduction activities include: the Platform
for Real-time Impact and Situation Monitoring (PRISM),³⁹ early warning systems, asset
creation activities aimed at preserving resources and infrastructure, VAM (discussed ear-
lier), supply chain management, logistics, and emergency communications. WFP seeks to
support governments in development capacity in these areas, including through new
finance and risk-transfer tools. Examples include weather risk insurance and climate-
related risk capacities.
Climate Change
WFP’s engagement around climate change is underpinned by the reality of the majority of
the world’s hungry living in environments especially prone to climate change—over the past
decade, nearly half of WFP’s emergency and recovery operations responded to climate-
related disasters (WFP 2014e). WFP’s asset creation programs are intended to help protect
the livelihoods of vulnerable households from extreme weather shocks. In 2019, these
activities paved the way for rural transformation through the rehabilitation and reforesta-
tion of an area of land roughly twice the size of Singapore, and increased access to markets
and natural resources through the construction or repair of roads, bridges, and wells. FAO
et al. (2018) noted that 51 low- and middle-income countries experienced early or delayed
onset of seasons; the number of extreme weather events has doubled since the early 1990s
(WFP 2018f).
WFP draws on disaster risk reduction mechanisms and analysis capacity, described
earlier, to support communities in: climate change adaptation, climate and food security
analysis, climate services, and safe energy for cooking (WFP 2018b).⁴⁰ Between 2010 and
2015, 40 percent of its operations included climate adaptation activities.
With the assets created by this project, smallholder farmers were able to concentrate on
agricultural commercialization. Activities included helping households to diversify their
livelihoods, improve community assets, generate income from fruit and vegetable produc-
tion, beekeeping and fishponds, and create micro-irrigation schemes and water harvesting
systems to ensure access to water for agriculture. As part of an integrated package of
interventions, climate services were provided to targeted people and work started on the
development of microinsurance products.
³⁹ See https://innovation.wfp.org/project/prism?
⁴⁰ See “Climate Services”: https://www.wfp.org/climate-services; and “Climate Action”: https://www.wfp.or
g/climate-action
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Social Protection
Social protection is defined as the policies and programs designed to protect people from
shocks and stresses throughout their lives. Social protection for food security and nutrition
promote activities that transfer income and food to participants as a safety net, and promote
livelihoods.⁴¹ WFP cites 40 years of experience in the implementation of safety net and
asset-building programs (WFP 2014e). From the 2012 Safety Nets Policy Update: “WFP
plays several core roles in supporting national safety nets . . . defined in line with WFP’s
comparative advantages” (WFP 2012d, 3), as related to food assistance for food and
nutrition security. The nexus of WFP’s comparative advantage with the broader field of
social protection is through safety nets for food security and nutrition. Activities include
community asset creation projects, engagement to promote mother and child health, school
feeding, cash-for-work programs, as well as through cash or voucher-based transfer mod-
alities for food assistance. As noted earlier, WFP is focusing more on extending technical
advice to support national social protection schemes. Two of the more well-known elements
of WFP’s engagement in social projection are FAA and School Meals.
FAA provides vulnerable households with food, cash, or vouchers to cover food gaps and
allow resource allocation to livelihood or human capital, in return for their participation in
asset creation and protection (WFP 2015f). Based on a 2005 internal review of its develop-
ment policy and upon the recommendation of the FAO director-general, WFP committed
to expand the FAA program under the Resilience Unit to support agricultural livelihoods
(WFP 2005b, 2007). From 2014 to 2019:
• 78,909km of roads were built or repaired
• 53,748 ponds, wells, and reservoirs were built or rehabilitated
• 1,545,755 hectares of land were rehabilitated (the definition of rehabilitated land has
varied across reporting years, with some including forests planted).⁴²
The program provides food in exchange for a resource that vulnerable communities have
in abundant supply—labor. Work is tied to complementary development projects, such as
infrastructure (irrigation, schools, roads), environment (forest recovery), or small business
development.
School Feeding is a safety net provided to ensure every child’s access to education, health,
and nutrition, including in-school meals, take-home rations, and homegrown school feed-
ing programs to support local agriculture.⁴³ WFP has long been engaged in school feeding,
which uses food as incentives to promote multifaceted development goals—nutrition,
school enrollment, girls’ participation, and in the instance of local procurement, agricultural
development and markets. School Feeding is one of the more visible WFP social protection
programs, particularly popular with its donors. In 2019, WFP invested in the future of more
than 17 million girls and boys by partnering with governments to provide school meals,
snacks, or take-home rations. It is a powerful incentive for poorer families to send their sons
and—especially, their daughters to school and keep them there. WFP also provided
technical and capacity-building support to governments of MICs to enable them to scale
up their own national school feeding programs. However, WFP acknowledges that it needs
⁴¹ See “Social Protection and Safety Nets”: https://www.wfp.org/social-protection-and-safety-nets
⁴² Based on WFP Annual Performance Reports.
⁴³ See “School Meals”: https://www.wfp.org/school-meals and WFP (2014d, 2017c).
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to be even more ambitious. So, in 2019, WFP developed the School Feeding Strategy for
2020–30, which sets out how WFP will work with partners to ensure that children living in
extreme poverty benefit from school meals (WFP 2020x).
These activities reflect WFP’s efforts to build a niche in technical assistance and capacity
development. WFP engages increasingly in policy dialogue and supporting knowledge
exchange between countries.
Nutrition
WFP’s nutrition programs serve its vision of assured access to the right foods at the right
time to ensure an active and healthy life. WFP took on a new approach in 2009, which
included mother and child health and nutrition (MCHN), school feeding, care and support
for people living with disease, and management of pandemics (WFP is the lead agency for
dietary and nutrition support under the UNAIDS division of labor and supported 2.3
million people in 28 countries in 2011, and provided policy and programmatic advice
through its HIV and TB programs).⁴⁴ Nutrition is seen as cutting across all operations and
programs, including emergency-related food distribution. As such, a key WFP nutritional
input is determining and advising about appropriate food baskets for people facing hunger
and malnutrition.
WFP implemented a variety of nutrition programs in 74 countries in 2019. Nutrition-
specific programs for preventing and treating acute malnutrition, preventing stunting and
micronutrient deficiencies, and treating malnourished clients undergoing HIV and tuber-
culosis treatment reached 10.8 million children and 6.4 million women and girls. WFP
worked with governments to develop nutrition policies and programs for the provision of
nutritious school meals and for food fortification. In 2019, more than 287,000 mt of SNFs
were distributed in 50 countries to complement WFP’s general food and cash-based
assistance. Social and behavior change communication activities in 44 countries fostered
improved attitudes and behavior regarding health, nutrition, and child feeding practices
among vulnerable people (WFP 2020a).
In 2019, 10.8 million children received special nutritional support, 6.4 million women
received additional nutritional support, 400,000 people affected by AIDs received food
assistance, and 18 of the 35 countries affected by HIVAIDS were to receive food assistance
(WFP 2020a). Specific WFP interventions range from developing micronutrient powders,⁴⁵
support for locally produced brands of foods and supplements to prevent or treat malnu-
trition, and dietary education in communities.
As previously discussed, WFP asserts an advantage to addressing malnutrition attributed
to its deep field presence, which allows it to tailor responses to meet specific nutritional
needs. Despite its many activities, however, it faces ongoing challenges to articulate its value
added, vis-à-vis traditional development agencies, particularly with governments. Perhaps
necessarily, nutrition activities illustrate WFP’s global advocacy efforts and its diverse
partnerships in managing the crowded development landscape. The 2012 Nutrition Policy
⁴⁴ WFP implements HIV programs in 50 countries. See “UNAIDS/Co-sponsors/World Food Programme”:
https://www.unaids.org/en/aboutunaids/unaidscosponsors/wfp and WFP (2013a).
⁴⁵ Special nutritional products include: Fortified Blended Foods, Ready-Use Foods, andHigh Energy Biscuits. See
“Specialized Nutritious Foods”: https://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/communications/
wfp255508.pdf
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set out its work with UN partners, civil society, academia, and the private sector (WFP
2012e). WFP’s efforts are coordinated with UNICEF, FAO, andWHO, all subscribing to the
Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) roadmap of actions to address malnutrition. As such, each
commits to exploit its comparative advantage in advocacy, technical assistance, and
enhancement of national capacities (WFP 2012e). WFP’s focus is on treatment of moderate
acute malnutrition, prevention of moderate acute malnutrition (wasting), prevention of
chronic malnutrition (stunting) and micronutrient deficiencies, and nutrition-sensitive
programming. Under an agreement with UNICEF, WFP addresses moderate acute malnu-
trition and UNICEF handles severe acute malnutrition.
WFP is a leader in the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN). GAIN and WFP
co-convene the SUN Business Network, which facilitates business engagement with nutrition
interventions in the movement’s 33 member countries. In June 2013, WFP along with the
FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, and WHO signed a joint Commitment Letter and Work Plan that
outlined a harmonized framework for UN support of the SUN Movement, including a
platform for interagency cooperation. At the same time (June 8, 2013), WFP Executive
Director Ertharin Cousin announced new collaborations with SUN, including an expanding
partnership with UNFPA and private sector initiatives. She announced that WFP would join
the “Every Woman, Every Child,” Health 4+, and Adolescent Girls Initiatives, under which
WFP would expand support to more than 50 UNFPA program countries, starting with pilot
countries Burkina Faso, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Zambia. Further, she announced that the
Sun Business Network co-chairs, WFP and GAIN, had launched a Business and Innovation
Program to provide technical support to governments to assist them in involving local private
sectors in national SUN activities (WFP 2013b). SUN has evolved substantially.
Capacity Building
Capacity building has become a crosscutting theme for WFP, ensconced in its strategic
objectives at least since 2004, and based on its experience and long-standing field presence,
working closely with beneficiaries.⁴⁶ As an illustration, WFP undertakes support for small-
scale farming, training, works programs, and policy and programmatic advice, all areas in
which WFP had no previous record or comparative advantage. To this end, WFP increas-
ingly seeks to leverage external expertise.⁴⁷
Purchase for Progress
As the world’s leading humanitarian agency, WFP is a major buyer of staple food, some 80
percent of which comes from developing countries, for a cash value of over US$1 billion per
year.⁴⁸ By adopting smallholder-friendly procurement, WFP contributes to the strengthen-
ing of local economies and supports the increased resilience and productivity of rural
communities—one of the pillars of its hunger eradication strategy.
⁴⁶ See “The Year in Review, 2011” (WFP 2011c).
⁴⁷ Three modalities are cited in WFP’s discussion of its Country Strategic Planning Process: (1) Centres of
Excellence, (2) a Technical Experts Network, and (3) South–South and triangular cooperation (WFP 2015b).
⁴⁸ For the latest information, see “Purchase for Progress”: https://www.wfp.org/purchase-for-progress
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Through the P4P program, WFP, which has pledged to source 10 percent of its food
purchases from smallholder farmers, encourages national governments and the private
sector to buy food in ways that benefit smallholders.
On the supply side, P4P works with a variety of partners to promote smallholder farmers’
entrepreneurship as a way to build resilience and address long-term nutrition needs.
Working mainly with farmers’ organizations and other partners, P4P provides training
and assets to improve crop quality, facilitates access to finance and promotes marketing.
Women, whose role in farming is often unpaid and labor-intensive, are particularly
encouraged to take part in decision-making and benefit economically from their work.
Over the years, P4P has expanded to some 35 countries, and helped transform the way
more than one million smallholder farmers in Africa, Latin America, and, to a lesser extent,
Asia interact with markets.
WFP cites several examples of how P4P is changing people’s lives abound. Zambian
farmer Harriet Chabala increased her production of beans by 50 percent over two years. In
recognition of her entrepreneurial skills and consistent supply to WFP for three consecutive
marketing seasons, she received an equipment loan from her local cooperative for a tricycle.
The tricycle can navigate poor quality roads, enabling Harriet to provide transport services
to move crops and people to and from towns and markets. She is planning to repay her loan
in just one year, instead of over the three years as she had agreed. The benefits of P4P are
clearly visible in her village: farmers have replaced grass roofing with metal sheeting, and
today, there are three cars and more than 10 motorbikes where previously there were none.
P4P’s experience demonstrates the roles that demand-driven, pro-smallholder procure-
ment can play in addressing nutritional and other developmental challenges; building
stronger markets; lifting rural communities out of poverty; and contributing to SDG2
(eradication of hunger) and SDG15 (responsible consumption and production).
On the other hand, there are examples, such as in Kenya, where a combination of
droughts and lack of cash by local governments have posed challenges for the sustainability
of the school feeding program.
P4P was launched in September 2008, at the onset of the transformative strategic plan
period and was underway in 19 pilot countries a year later (WFP 2012b). The pilot program
(through 2013) aimed to increase incomes of small farmers through purchase of local food
commodities, providing supply-side technical expertise and access to credit. In 2014, WFP
reported 370,000 mt of food were purchased under the project, putting U$148 million in the
hands of local farmers (WFP 2015j). P4P provided over 10,000 farmers and 80 farmers’
organizations with new skills in management and farming techniques (another example of
mission creep) (WFP 2011b). US advocates for bilateral Local and Regional Purchase (LRP)
have singled out P4P as an example of a well-tested, highly accountable process (Borgen
Project 2013). Over 50 government, UN, organizational, and private sector partners col-
laborate on the program.
The evaluation of the pilot initiative highlights the benefits for the organization in
elevating host-government perceptions of it as a viable development partner. At the same
time, it shows that the amount of capacity-building improvement of farmer organizations
was less and took longer to achieve than envisioned as an outcome of the project (WFP
2015e).
Although P4P materials credit the project with combining WFP demand with partners’
capacity development efforts (WFP 2015e), the evaluation recommends for future pro-
gramming that WFP “concentrate on its areas of comparative advantage,” focusing on the
demand side (procurement) and leaving the supply-side capability to other players—that is,
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its development partners (WFP 2015e, 3). Again, P4P materials described the pilot as “a
neat intersection for the mandates of the three [Rome-based] agencies” (WFP 2015e, 22).
Both FAO and IFAD have partnered to some degree—with FAO providing supply-side
support, technical assistance, and investment analysis, and IFAD linking smallholders to
credit and P4P to IFAD-funded programs, though the evaluation observes that a lack of
definition of roles resulted in “friction” (WFP 2015e, 7).
The latest data on the P4P program indicate 300,000 women participate, three times the
number in 2008, and 1 million farmers have changed the way they engage with markets. Six
hundred thousand metric tons of food have been purchased directly from smallholder
farmers through P4P.
Support for Markets
The key objectives of WFP have been:
• Improve effectiveness of food assistance by improving cost-effectiveness and improv-
ing timeliness;
• Increase the capacity of suppliers and school meals procurement committees to
effectively and efficiently procure local commodities for school’s meals, promoting
sustainability of school feeding;
• Strengthen local and regional food market systems, improving access to culturally
acceptable commodities and connecting them to Government of Kenya Home Grown
School Meals Program; and
• Improve nutrition of students by increasing access to and use of various high-quality,
nutritious and culturally appropriate foods in school’s meals.
Some of its work has entailed:
1. Assessment of local food systems,
2. Capacity building for national and county institutions,
3. Capacity strengthening for local traders and FOs,
4. Develop school meal menus using local and nutritious produce, and
5. Procure locally produced, drought-tolerant crops.
Emerging Lessons Based on Evaluations: World Food Programme’s
Emergency vs. Development Mandate
An estimated 80 percent of global humanitarian needs are in areas facing violent conflict.
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Recommendation on the Humanitarian–
Development–Peace Nexus3 adopted by the DAC of OECD, provides a framework for
guiding Member States and UN entities in enhancing effective collaboration across human-
itarian, development, and peace strategies in relevant settings. WFP is committed to
adhering to this framework.
In 2019, WFP performed very well in governance and independent oversight functions.
The organization was ranked first among more than 1,000 organizations in the Aid
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Transparency Index, scoring 99 percent. It reduced the number of outstanding high-risk
audit recommendations from 68 to 62 and carried out 87 percent of actions requested at
Executive Board sessions by agreed deadlines. This was slightly below the target of 95
percent because of the record number of documents submitted to the Board—the highest in
WFP’s history, which increased the total number of requested actions by nearly 50 percent.
WFP evaluations and an earlier examination by CGD also pointed out the need for new
funding systems to support assistance activities, particularly as the majority of contributions
and food delivery continues to be for emergency relief. In its consideration of new
modalities for food aid and assistance, the CGD found that donor earmarks hinder
WFP’s ability to use new tools (in this case, LRP). The authors of the CGD report (who
did not address the broader WFP mandate shift, but appear to have taken it for granted)
called for financial hedging and increased untied contributions from its primary donor
members. Development activities require more predictable, multi-year funding streams to
support long-term objectives (Ramachandran, Leo, and McCarthy 2010). Current numbers
suggest donor support has not yet caught up with WFP’s new model and vision.
The lessons learned and conclusions of the post-2008 internal evaluations indicate that
the primary constraints to implementing WFP’s new vision are internal and systemic. The
four evaluations generated 24 recommendations with 6 common courses of action:
a) Adapt and strengthen systems for management support to the change process.
b) Clarify conceptual ambiguities and programme priorities and sharpen WFP’s strategic
positioning, building on existing strengths.
c) As part of (B), enhance communication and understanding with partners.
d) Adapt WFP’s internal systems and procedures to support and enable the changes
required (or accelerate where already in hand). These include strengthening monitor-
ing and evaluation to provide the evidence base to demonstrate effectiveness.
e) Developing a funding system that better assures predictable, long-term funding to
support the type of activities undertaken in the food assistance approach.
f ) Assertively adapt human resource development plans and/or partnering strategies to
ensure the technical expertise and skill sets needed for the new or expanding fields of
endeavour. (WFP 2012a, 9)
The World Food Programme’s Nobel Peace Prize
The Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2020 to WFP “for its
efforts to combat hunger, for its contribution to bettering conditions for peace in conflict-
affected areas and for acting as a driving force in efforts to prevent the use of hunger as a
weapon of war and conflict” (NobelPrize.org 2020).
According to the press release from the Nobel Committee, WFP “is the world’s largest
humanitarian organization addressing hunger and promoting food security. In 2019, WFP
provided assistance to close to 100 million people in 88 countries who are victims of acute
food insecurity and hunger” (NobelPrize.org 2020). As the UN’s primary instrument for
eradicating hunger, SDG2, demands on WFP have increased. In 2019, 135 million people
suffered from acute hunger, the highest number in many years. Most of the increase was
caused by war and armed conflict.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
902   
The Nobel Committee noted:
The coronavirus pandemic has contributed to a strong upsurge in the number of victims
of hunger in the world. In countries such as Yemen, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Nigeria, South Sudan and Burkina Faso, the combination of violent conflict and the
pandemic has led to a dramatic rise in the number of people living on the brink of
starvation. In the face of the pandemic, the World Food Programme has demonstrated an
impressive ability to intensify its efforts. As the organisation itself has stated, “Until
the day we have a medical vaccine, food is the best vaccine against chaos.” (NobelPrize.
org 2020)
And the awarding of Nobel prize was also a call to the international community to continue
to support WFP and in support of multilateral cooperation. The Nobel Committee wanted
to stress the importance of international cooperation to tackle complex problems and the
need for WFP to receive the financial support it has requested. It noted:
The link between hunger and armed conflict is a vicious circle: war and conflict can cause
food insecurity and hunger, just as hunger and food insecurity can cause latent conflicts to
flare up and trigger the use of violence. We will never achieve the goal of zero hunger
unless we also put an end to war and armed conflict. (NobelPrize.org 2020)
The Nobel Committee emphasized:
Providing assistance to increase food security not only prevents hunger, but can also help
to improve prospects for stability and peace. The World Food Programme has taken the
lead in combining humanitarian work with peace efforts through pioneering projects in
South America, Africa and Asia.
The World Food Programme was an active participant in the diplomatic process that
culminated in May 2018 in the UN Security Council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution
2417, which for the first time explicitly addressed the link between conflict and hunger.
The Security Council also underscored UN Member States’ obligation to help ensure that
food assistance reaches those in need, and condemned the use of starvation as a method of
warfare.
With this year’s award, the Norwegian Nobel Committee wishes to turn the eyes of the
world towards the millions of people who suffer from or face the threat of hunger. The
World Food Programme also plays a key role in multilateral cooperation on making food
security an instrument of peace, and has made a strong contribution towards mobilising
UN Member States to combat the use of hunger as a weapon of war and conflict. As
the UN’s largest specialised agency, the World Food Programme is a modern version of
the peace congresses that the Nobel Peace Prize is intended to promote. The work of the
World Food Programme to the benefit of humankind is an endeavour that all the nations
of the world should be able to endorse and support. (NobelPrize.org 2020)
In response to the announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize on October 9, 2020, the
Executive Director of WFP, David Beasley, former Republican governor of South Carolina,
spoke characteristically with passion from Niger in a PBS interview. He noted that with the
COVID-19 pandemic, 270 million are expected to be hungry, compared to 135 million in
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2021, SPi
    903
2020. WFP will need addition US$5 billion dollars. He appealed to the world’s 200
billionaires, as he has in the past, to contribute more funds to WFP as soon as possible.
Or, he said the consequence would be massive famines, mass migration, and destabilization
due to war and conflicts (PBS News Hour 2020).
Developments in 2020
The WFP Executive Director noted that 2020 would be the worst year for humanitarian
crises since the Second World War, affected by the unending wars in the Syrian Arab
Republic and Yemen, the deepening crises in hotspots such as South Sudan and the central
Sahel region of Africa, the increasingly frequent natural disasters and changing weather
patterns, and the economic crisis in Lebanon affecting millions of Syrian refugees (Lederer
2020). An estimated 135 million people suffered acute hunger in 55 countries in 2019; this
number was predicted to double in 2020, as COVID-19 became a new driver of food
insecurity. The world was already facing a “perfect storm.” The COVID-19 pandemic is
the worst health and socioeconomic disaster in more than a century, overwhelming the
global humanitarian system. It has swept through the developed world, as well as threatened
hunger crises in the poorest countries where the majority of WFP’s beneficiaries live (WFP
2020f).
WFP’s revenue to a record US$8 billion in 2019, an increase of 10 percent. The top five
donors to WFP contributed 76 percent of funding, designating 36 percent for large-scale
operations in South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Yemen. Despite the generous
contributions, they were insufficient, with a funding gap of US$4.1 billion, to cover
identified needs of food insecure populations (WFP 2020a, 8).
In 2019, WFP responded to an unprecedented number of Level 3 and Level 2 emergen-
cies in 20 countries (see Box 12.4). Across 88 countries, it provided assistance to 68.1 million
local residents—27 percent higher number than in 2018, in addition to 10.6 million
refugees, 2.9 million returnees, and 15.5 internally displaced persons—18 percent more
than in 2018 (WFP 2020a, 4, 36).
School meals or take-home rations were provided to 17.3 million children, and 17.2
million in nutrition programs in 2019, of which 10.8 million children and 6.4 million
women received support (WFP 2020a, 114).
Through food assistance for assets programs, nearly 134,000ha of land and forest
were rehabilitated or replanted, and more than 50,000 community assets, such as
community infrastructure, roads, and water points, were built, rehabilitated, or devel-
oped in 2019. Also, WFP distributed a record US$2.1 billion in CBTs. WFP’s overall
performance in functional areas was rated “medium” to “high,” as in 2018, with work in
90 percent of these areas rated as meeting, or on track to meet, WFP’s targets. The year
2019 marked the first that performance reporting was fully aligned with the aims of
CSPs (WFP 2020a, 8).
So, the difference in 2019, over previous years, was the growing number of emergencies,
their complexity, intensity, and long duration, as well as WFP’s ability to fundraise and
respond to 7 Level 3 and 11 Level 2 emergencies in 20 countries.
Violent conflicts were the primary drivers of the emergencies. Level 3 emergency
responses were also established in the central Sahel and Mozambique, and continued
support was provided for existing Level 3 responses in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Nigeria, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Yemen (WFP 2020a, 9).
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Emergencies affected more people than in any of the previous 20 years, with protracted
conflicts in several countries, including Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Yemen, as well as the adverse impacts of climate
change on agricultural production and food security. Among the top five global hazards
identified in 2019 were environmental risks such as extreme weather events. While infec-
tious disease outbreaks have increased in frequency, many countries were unprepared to
respond to a pandemic (WFP 2020a, 8–9).
Donors gave a record-breaking US$8 billion in confirmed contributions in 2019. Funds
were used by WFP to procure food, valued at more than US$2.3 billion, including US$37
million worth from smallholder farmers, for direct distribution. An additional US$2.1
billion in CBTs was provided (WFP 2020a, 4).
Among the steps that WFP took was the establishment of the Global Surge Unit early in
the year, which ensured that experienced staff are available for immediate deployment
during emergencies. This unit enabled staff deployment within the first hours following a
crisis in countries, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Mozambique. Overall, in 2019,
Box 12.4 Growing Role of Emergencies in Food Assistance
WFP classifies Emergency Response operations according to a three-level scale:
• Level 1 Response: Emergency operations within the response capabilities of the
relevant WFP Country Office (CO), with routine support from Regional Bureaux
(RB).
• Level 2 Response: Emergency Response operations requiring regional augmentation
of country-level response capability.
• Level 3 Response: Emergency Response operations requiring mobilisation of WFP
global response capabilities in support of the relevant CO(s) and/or RB, i.e. a
Corporate Response. (WFP 2014g, 1)
The growing numbers of Level 3 emergencies and the frequency of their onslaught and
intensity have “diverted attention from other protracted, chronic and lower-level emer-
gencies” of less political importance and visibility (WFP 2017d, 14). In 2019, WFP
responded to 18 Level 3 (six) and Level 2 (twelve) concurrent emergencies, the largest
number that WFP had faced thus far at one time (WFP 2019g, 1–2). Two aspects stand
out in this transition: first, from delivering food aid in-kind to providing food assistance,
including CBTs and second, from food procured from traditional food surplus countries
such as the United States to at least partially obtaining it from nearby emerging
countries, thereby reducing costs with local procurement and delivery to beneficiaries
(WFP 2017e).
Food aid still constitutes an important feature of WFP. It arose from a largely
unidirectional, top-down vision: disposal of surplus food to hungry people. At least in
theory, “food assistance, by contrast, involves a more complex appreciation of people’s
long-term nutritional needs and of the diverse approaches required to meet them. This
conceptual shift has been at the core of WFP’s transformation in recent years” (WFP
2020j). While WFP remains the world’s leading humanitarian agency, it is aiming “to
combine frontline action with the quest for durable solutions” (WFP 2020j).
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WFP provided 4.2 million tons of food, 2.1 billion of cash transfers and vouchers, and
trained 620,000 people (WFP 2020a, 9).
Strategic Result 1 of the WFP Strategic Plan 2017–21 that everyone has access to food
(discussed later in the chapter) accounted for 78 percent of the 2019 earmarked funds.
Earmarked funding increased by 23 times, whereas completely flexible funding remained
flat. In 2019, only 5 percent of WFP’s total contribution revenue was fully flexible, a lower
percentage than in the previous three years. The top 10 donors accounted for 87 percent of
total contributions, which was an increase of 2 percent over 2018; the top five donors
accounted for 76 percent of total contributions. Government donors provided 86 percent of
2019 funding (WFP 2020a, 9).
Earmarked funding is tied in two ways: the destination for which is it used, and within
the destination the purposes for which it is used. Thus, not only do the top 5 or top 10
countries get most of the emergency funding but also within it, Strategic Result 1, which
accounted for 78 percent of 2019 earmarked funds (WFP 2020a, 9). In contrast, Strategic
Result 2, that no one suffers from malnutrition, received only 6 percent of earmarked funds,
and WFP had minimal activity in terms of Strategic Result 6 (policies to support sustainable
development are coherent) and Result 7 (developing countries have access to a range of
financial resources for development investment) (WFP 2020a, 25). These data offer sub-
stantial insight into donor support as distinct from general rhetoric. Similarly, high-profile
emergencies are well funded in terms of share of needs funded, compared to less visible
needs.
The United States contributed US$3.4 billion, accounting for 42 percent of all contribu-
tions in 2019. The next biggest donor countries were Germany (11 percent), the United
Kingdom (9 percent), and Saudi Arabia (5 percent). The EC contributed 9 percent of 2019
funds (WFP 2020a, 22). To diversify funding and reduce the risk of reliance on a single
donor, WFP adopted, in 2019, a five-year, private sector partnership and fundraising
strategy (2020–5) that is focused on three pillars—impact, income, and innovation—for a
private sector funding facility (WFP 2020a, 9).
Ending Poverty and Hunger—Questions for Future Sustainability
WFP has been an emergency assistance agency par excellence and takes pride in that
distinction. Humanitarian assistance has been the fastest growing segment of development.
WFP’s non-bureaucratic procedures have enabled it to respond to emergencies quickly,
although FAO’s emergency assistance also has been increasing and its procedures have
improved considerably. WFP has been reinventing itself in development assistance, while
also having established its position as the humanitarian response agency of choice. This
view of a new role is still not broadly shared within the agency, but many now recognize that
food aid in tonnage cannot remain the sole focus of WFP in the future, if it is to remain in
business. Even experts in logistics and procurement, therefore, are accepting this new reality
and recognize that to survive and grow, the organization must change with the times and be
innovative. It is a major cultural shift, however, for WFP to move from the “getting things
done”/logistics focus to one that is based on innovation, policy and programs, and building
the capacity of vulnerable countries to help themselves. Moreover, it is not clear if WFP is
cost-effective in undertaking some of these activities.
WFP is betting that it can bank on its humanitarian expertise as its comparative
advantage while moving into a new and expanded role. It recognizes that it cannot and
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should not take on certain development roles and must work with UN partners. There is
clearly a learning curve. How steep it is and how it will play out remains to be seen.
Emergency assistance will remain an important part of international assistance. With
climate change, extreme droughts and floods, continued internal strife, accelerated global-
ization leading to rapid cross-border spread of communicable diseases from birds and
animals to humans and across national borders, WFP will continue to have business. And
regardless of investments in national policies and systems to prepare for and respond to
crises made or developed by international actors and increasingly by countries themselves,
the humanitarian community will continue to have a role where national resources are
absent or insufficient. These conditions do not appear to be abating—to the contrary, are on
the rise—and the costs of providing for beneficiaries are higher.
WFP also has established a niche in school feeding and public works—areas in which it
used food aid in the past. Most of the growth of safety nets in low-income countries,
particularly in Africa, has been financed through short-term donor assistance, whereas
MICs are increasingly using their own resources to provide such safety net programs. Many
of these country programs entail substantial fiscal commitments and major policy and
institutional issues. The World Bank decidedly has had a comparative advantage in addres-
sing them. Whether WFP can go beyond piloting small-scale experiments and help to
embed them at scale in countries’ own strategies, with respect to safety nets, is as yet unclear.
WFP could develop capacity in developing countries for emergency assistance, but it
faces a number of obstacles. Field staff view it as a development activity rather than a
humanitarian endeavor. As in other international organizations, field staff tends to be
skeptical of “policy” and “strategy” involved in capacity building. WFP has seen itself as
operational, rather than policy-focused or academically focused (which is WFP’s perception
of FAO or IFAD). The challenge lies in bridging the divide and translating the idea of
capacity to WFP’s in-country work and convincing donors that this is worthwhile to fund.
Also, capacity development tends to be a crosscutting theme, rather than a strategic
objective in and of itself, under the 2014–17 Strategic Plan (WFP 2013f). How should we
interpret this? Capacity development should either be emphasized across the board, or if it
is indeed seen internally as less important, then it should be removed as a strategic objective
and slowly phased out. The evaluations noted a need for “adequate human and financial
resources for the longer-term and predictable engagement this [capacity development]
requires,” in contrast to WFP’s short-term, rapid emergency response expertise (WFP
2015a, 3).
The world is moving to local procurement, South–South cooperation, and twinning
arrangements (pairing cash with developing world donations of food to developing world
partners to cover transportation costs). WFP’s comparative advantage in long-term devel-
opment assistance needs to be demonstrated and documented. Lack of evidence is not lack
of advantage. It may be too soon to tell in terms of its activities in certain areas, though cash
transfers and vouchers are proving promising. WFP is innovative but may not be good at
knowledge management. WFP’s cost effectiveness also could be better documented. Some
activities in local procurement, cash transfers, and vouchers also demonstrate that these
mechanisms get food to people faster than food aid did; this needs to be documented. It is
not clear what happens to the movement to develop capacity of civil society to provide
development assistance in developing countries when international institutions like WFP
expand their roles, together with international NGOs, often at the cost of building the
capacity of the domestic civil society—a criticism figuring largely in the debate in the
2015–16 summit season. International NGOs are sometimes vilified, because they thrive
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on emergencies in developing countries and donor governments support them—sometimes
at the cost of building national capacity. Haiti is a classic example of the NGO “hives”
obstructing the development of domestic capacity, even if inadvertently. On the other side
of the spectrum, Syria is an example of the essential role of national capacity and national
organizations needed to access populations.
There is evidence that, typically, multilateral aid tends to be delivered, more cost
effectively than bilateral aid; food-related development assistance would benefit from an
independent evaluation to assess its efficiency and explore how it could be linked more
effectively to long-term development assistance provided by FAO, IFAD, and the World
Bank to achieve sustainable food security. At the same time, we believe emergency assis-
tance will continue to remain an important dimension of international assistance, andWFP,
having excelled in this area, should not abandon that critical mission, including through the
building of capacity in developing countries to help themselves in emergencies.
Finally, the changed global environment means that not only the governing boards of the
individual organizations but also the G7 and G20 need to assess the implications of
increasing emergencies and populations living in conflict areas, to better address the
transition from emergency aid to rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development in a
holistic global architecture for food and agriculture. To begin with, the governing members
of collaborating organizations need to clearly identify the comparative advantages and
disadvantages of each organization. Representation on the governing boards across WFP,
FAO, and IFAD is common for several member countries. Yet, it is unclear if they address
the larger issues of the long-term comparative advantages of the three Rome-based orga-
nizations and their implications for reforms from a strategic perspective. Such a look needs
to take account of each organization’s performance on the ground, which is increasingly
available through their independent evaluations, and now WFP’s Nobel Peace Prize, and
consider how developed and developing countries alike can strengthen the international
organizations to achieve excellence rather than promote mission creep. Furthermore, since
2008, the international financial institutions, like World Bank and IFAD, have geared up to
address food and financial crises and unexpected pandemonium, individually and collec-
tively, through global partnerships (see Chapter 8 on the World Bank and its treatment of
the food crisis). IFAD similarly undertook an evaluation of its operations in fragile
countries. The radical changes in the world call for a Bretton Woods-type examination of
the need for a new architecture, building on the one inherited 70 years ago.
Appendix: Chronology
1960s
1960 US President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed a food aid “scheme” to the UN General
Assembly.
1961 George McGovern, director of the US Food for Peace Program proposed establishment of a
multilateral food aid program with a fund of US$100 million in commodities and cash, as a
three-year experiment. WFP officially established November 24, 1961, with UN General
Assembly resolution.
1962 WFP’s first Executive Director, Addeke Henrik Boerma was appointed, serving from May
1962 to December 1967.WFP’s first emergency operation was in response to an earthquake
in Iran in September that resulted in 12,000 deaths. WFP sends survivors 1,500mt of wheat,
270 tons of sugar and 27 tons of tea.
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1963 WFP’s first development program was launched for the Nubians in Sudan, after the
construction of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River in southern Egypt led to the
resettlement of 50,000 indigenous Nubian people thousands of kilometers to the south of
their homeland. Over four years, WFP provided food aid, as Nubians developed their new
lands.WFP’s first school meals project in Togo was approved. Five thousand school children
were provided nourishment in the pilot project that also aimed to increase school
attendance.
1970s
1973 WFP responded to famine after six years of drought in Africa’s western Sahel in seven
countries, home to 25 million people, with 30 cargo aircraft from 12 national air forces, in a
relief effort that lasted three years.
1975 WFP’s cash shortages, arising from a global food shortage in 1972 and an energy crisis
resulting from a war in the Middle East, were alleviated with a series of cash donations from
Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal, beginning with a US$50 million grant in 1975, the largest
donation to date from a single country after the United States.
1980s
1980 WFP led a multinational inter-agency relief effort for the first time, to assist 370,000
Cambodian refugees, who fled violence in Thailand.
1984 WFP delivered 2 million tons of food aid in response to Ethiopian famine. Media images of
the famine’s devastating effects prompted “Band Aid” and “Live Aid” fundraising efforts.
WFP led 87 separate relief operations.
1989 WFP worked amid chaos in the “failed state” of Somalia, run by war lords in the absence of
centralized authority.
1989 Operation Lifeline Sudan was launched. Leading a consortium of UN agencies and 40
NGOs, WFP airdrops 1.5 million tons of food, in a dawn-to-dusk operation with 20 cargo
aircraft, above what is now South Sudan, to save hundreds of thousands of lives threatened
by civil war.
1990s
The balance between development programs and emergency interventions shifted back and forth.
1992 WFP’s first large-scale relief operation in Europe was prompted by the disintegration of
Yugoslavia, involving thousands of people in worst humanitarian crisis since the Second
World War.
1992 Catherine Bertini became WFP’s first woman to serve as Executive Director of WFP. Also
the first woman to head a UN organization, Ms. Bertini was the 9th executive director,
service from April 1992 to April 2002.
1994 The Rwandan genocide led to massive displacements of the population, with 3 million
people fleeing into the then eastern Zaire, Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi. WFP responded
to the crisis with food aid and later played a key role in rebuilding the ravaged country.
1997 The Kyoto Protocol was signed, acknowledging the impact of climate change. WFP
develops longer term aid projects, with more partnerships.
1998 WFP delivered more than 330,000 tons of wheat and rice to feed 19 million people affective
by flooding in Bangladesh.
1999 During the Kosovo armed conflict, WFP established a network of mobile bakeries when
conflict led to Europe’s largest refugee crisis since 1945. WFP provided relief to hundreds of
thousands of Kosovar refugees in Albania and Macedonia. Eight mobile bakeries supplied
flour to local bakeries to produce bread for more than 200,000 people on a daily basis.
2000s
The Millennium Development Goals established shared, measurable objectives to reduce hunger and
poverty. Food aid was increasingly replaced by food assistance, with cash and vouchers emerging as a
complement to in-kind food distributions.
2000 WFP established the first UN humanitarian response facility located in Brindisi, Italy, for
strategic pre-positioning of emergency relief supplies for international organizations,
NGOs, and other UN agencies.
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13
Perspectives Moving Forward
Uma Lele, Manmohan Agarwal, Brian C. Baldwin,
and Sambuddha Goswami
The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those
who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too
little . . .
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1937¹
Summary: Why and When of the Study
This study had been underway for several years and was completed just before COVID-19
crisis gripped the world. Several factors prompted the study. First, was a recognition that
differentiation among developing countries was increasing, while seemingly a consensus
about convergence was emerging in the literature. Not only sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), but
also South Asia (SA) was falling behind in structural transformation: that is, in the decline
in the share of agriculture and increase in productive employment in nonagriculture,
particularly in manufacturing. Again, considerable differences were noticeable within and
among regions: for example, in SA, Bangladesh was surging ahead while India’s growth was
beginning to slow, and similarly, Vietnam was surging ahead in Southeast Asia. Relatedly,
the growing complexity of the development process and the consequent increasing special-
ization in the economics profession meant that agricultural economists were largely focused
on specific determinants of smallholder productivity levels and growth in developing
countries, and often within it, on component parts, such as research and extension or
fertilizer subsidies. General economists, on the other hand, have focused on industrializa-
tion and there has been relatively little interaction between these sectoral specializations, in
contrast to the early days of development economics. Second, external aid, particularly,
from international organizations (IOs)—such as the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), CGIAR, the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD), and the World Food Programme (WFP)—had played an active role
in the areas of agricultural and rural development and food security until the end of the
1980s, but their roles had diminished, as developing countries had come into their own. We
wanted to explore the reasons behind the change in the level and type of external support
and the phenomenon of emerging countries.
All five IOs that we have focused on were established in the post-Second World War
period. If anything, their relevance has increased, with growing demographic pressures,
urbanization, climate change, and a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportion with
¹ See https://www.loc.gov/item/today-in-history/january-20/
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the largest involuntary displacement of people since the Second World War. Most IOs,
perhaps with the exception of the World Bank, however, are now strapped for resources.
Furthermore, bringing the humanitarian crisis under control would require exceptional
leadership from the superpowers that have contributed to the conflict and involuntary
displacement, causing untold misery to millions of innocent households. Third, China’s
emergence as a superpower has changed the balance of power globally with its growing role
in trade, aid, and foreign direct investment (FDI). In November 2020, China entered into
the largest trade agreement with its neighbors, following the withdrawal of the United
States, after Trump’s election in 2016, from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The previous
Obama administration had helped to put the agreement together, after years of negotia-
tions. At the time of the completion of this manuscript, neither the United States nor India
had joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement (RCEP), com-
prising the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, China, Japan,
Korea, and New Zealand.
Also, the global architecture meticulously built on a liberal world order in the post-
Second World War period under the United States’ leadership has developed cracks.
Donald Trump’s election in 2016 made those cracks highly visible, reminding the world
that US presidential elections have global consequences. Yet, those cracks already had been
faintly visible during the Obama presidency. For outside observers, Obama’s election was a
tribute to the American democracy of unity in diversity, when after a 400-year history of
slavery, the first Black man was voted into the White House. However, by Obama’s own
blunt admission in his new book, A Promised Land, his election, signifying the political
power of the Black and Brown voters, rattled the white middle class (Obama 2020). They
had already suffered from globalization with the loss of factory jobs, following China’s entry
into the global economy in the 1980s, paradoxically engineered by a Republican US
president (Nixon), leading to China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).
China then became the world’s largest supplier of manufactured goods. The Biden–Harris
victory has assured the United States’multilateral reengagement, but it has also stressed the
fragility of the international system, based on US election results. The continued sense of
insecurity among the white middle class in the United States is reflected in the denial of the
election results among a large portion of the 72 million Americans who voted for Trump in
the 2020 election. It limits the degree of freedom of the Biden–Harris administration in
foreign policy. In short, although Trump has lost the election, Trumpism has not ended and
may well make it difficult for the new US administration to pursue bold pro-multilateral
strategies in the areas of trade, aid, and climate change. The realignment of the balance of
global economic power from North–South to East–West further complicates matters, if not
making the return to the old-style multilateralism difficult.
The COVID-19 pandemic and the global economic slowdown have accelerated digital-
ization. That, in turn, has further exposed the inequities in global economic growth and the
lack of access to health care and job security for millions in the working class, a result of
growing within-country income inequalities, which are more acute in the United States than
in Europe. Six individuals own half the stock in the stock market. Additionally, environ-
mental challenges of climate change, soil degradation, water shortages, forest fires, and
deforestation have been knocking on a few doors, and they are not confined to developing
countries. California is a hotspot for water shortages, and California and Australia for forest
fires, with the largest loss of biodiversity in Australia (Give2Asia 2020).
At the end of this inquiry, the global tragedy of COVID-19 arrived. It hit the poorest and
the working class the most, but also highlighted the triumph of the rapidly emerging science
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in the discovery of vaccines in record time. It dispelled many of the myths created in four
years of the Trump administration. The frequently assailed “deep state” played a positive
role in establishing public–private partnerships, which led to the manufacturing of
vaccines—although with the right leadership at the top, it could have done much more to
promote health messages based on science. Immigrant entrepreneurs from Lebanon and
Turkey played key roles in the discovery of the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines. Global supply
chains expedited vaccine production and delivery. With differential performance on
COVID-19 control, even among G20 countries, rapid access of the world’s population to
the vaccines has now reached urgency both on humanitarian grounds and as the only way to
achieve global economic recovery.
On the downside, the rapid spread of COVID-19 has been accompanied by the rapid
spread of hunger including in the United States, the richest country and one of the most
productive in agriculture. Social media have played a key role in spreading misinformation,
leading to large-scale rejection of common-sense solutions, such as the use of masks, social
distancing, and other precautions needed to contain COVID-19. Social media’s counter-
productive role in the spread of misinformation has undermined science, facts, and
evidence. It has implications for the containment of the current and future pandemics, as
well as the realization of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and more broadly, about
the role of regulation of private platforms to achieve public good.
In response to these challenges, or perhaps because of them, the global community has
been setting high goals in the form of SDGs, the Paris Climate Change Accord, and the
United Nations Secretary-General’s Food Systems Summit in 2021. The latter calls for a
total transformation of the global food system to achieve environmentally sustainable food
production, and nutritious, equitable, healthy food consumption, broadly defined as a
sustainable food system, within the planetary limits of growth. The Summit aims to
accelerate achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 2 (SDG2) and other related
SDGs, which are currently off track, to reach the stated goals by 2030 (UN 2020e).
Against this background, in this study, we have explored the progress to date on food and
nutrition security. What does it tell us about how the challenges of hunger and food
insecurity have been addressed over the decades? How has the state of knowledge influ-
enced what decisions were made? Were the emerging opportunities fully exploited to tackle
the challenges? How were lessons of experience used to modify strategies to help transform
the food system? And, equally important, what do we need to do differently than in the past
to achieve the new high goals?
In the preceding chapters, we have documented that the Green Revolution was both
necessary and timely to address the recurring food shortages in developing countries,
particularly in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. The focus was on productivity growth and
calorie needs for human consumption. How did “movements” affect analysis? The envi-
ronmental costs of land use changes (deforestation and biodiversity loss) were not counted
in productivity measures, even though the environmental movement had taken hold prior
to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992.
Land conversion to oil palm in Indonesia, and livestock and soybean production in the
Amazon, are part of the quarter of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions which now come from
agriculture. Focus shifted from agricultural productivity growth to improved nutrition
around 2007–8, due to the advocacy of the international nutrition community (a nutrition
movement?), starting with a series of articles in Lancet. A more balanced diet is now
considered desirable, consisting largely of plant-based foods—for example, in the EAT-
Lancet Commission report (Willett et al. 2019)—including pulses, livestock, fruit,
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vegetables, and dairy. What is clear from the evidence, however, is that higher income has
not necessarily translated into better nutrition. On the contrary, evidence is mounting that
often higher income is associated with decline in diet quality, leading to obesity and
increased incidence of disease. Furthermore, higher production does not ensure the poor
have access to food. These various knowledge gaps between aspirations and reality in the
spheres of productivity growth and GHG emissions, between income and nutrition, and
between production and nutrition need to be closed. Yet, our knowledge on how to close
these gaps is limited.² Also, translation of existing knowledge into practice is often well
behind the state of knowledge, which means there is huge scope to improve outcomes.
Reforms have occurred differentially across developing countries, including in achieving
diversified food production and linking it to the quantity and quality of nutritious food
consumption, particularly among poor populations. Such an outcome is complexly related
to the process of structural transformation: that is, whether productive employment is
created in the agricultural or the nonagricultural sector, and if it generates enough income
for households to afford access to nutritious foods through the food system. Structural
transformation has lagged in many countries, but even where transformation has occurred,
as in the now advanced countries, environmental management has been inadequate and
nutritious healthy food is not always consumed. This situation suggests that the past notion
of structural transformation is in need of refinement to account for new concerns based on
accumulated evidence. In the rest of this chapter, we bring these pieces of the puzzle
together and indicate gaps in our knowledge and gaps in the application of the existing
knowledge to achieve sustainable food systems for all.
FAO and the World Health Organization (WHO) have defined a healthy diet as a dietary
pattern that meets a person’s nutritional needs (macronutrients and micronutrients),
ensures optimal growth and development, and promotes health across the lifespan, specific
to their gender, age, physical activity level, and physiological state. It must supply adequate
calories for energy balance and include a wide variety of high-quality and safe foods across a
diversity of food groups to provide the various macronutrients, micronutrients, and other
food components needed to lead an active and healthy and enjoyable life. Healthy diets
should include: at least 400g of fruit and vegetables per day (excluding starchy roots);
legumes, nuts, and whole grains; energy intake balanced with expenditure (on average
2,000–2,500kcal per person), with less than 10 percent of total energy intake from free
sugars (FAO 2004; FAO and WHO 2019; WHO 2020a).
The concept of “food systems” is relatively recent. FAO introduced the concept in its
State of the Food and Agriculture (SOFA) report in 2013 (FAO 2013). The Second Nutrition
Conference in 2014 and subsequent reports of the High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) on
Food Security and Nutrition elaborated on the concepts—for example, the HLPE reports on
“Food Losses and Waste in the Context of Sustainable Food Systems” and “Nutrition and
Food Systems,” and the various Global Nutrition Reports (GNRs) have refined these ideas
² Alston, MacEwan, and Okrent argued:
Well-directed taxes on calories, sugar, or fat might be economically efficient ways of reducing obesity,
as might regulation of television advertising, food labeling policies, or other nutrition education
programs. Policies that induce the food industry to redesign foods may be more effective than policies
that rely on inducing response by consumers. Farm subsidies and nutrition policies are largely
irrelevant to the issue and modifying agricultural R&D [research and development] policy is not an
economical way to curb obesity. However, preventive approaches directed at children show some
promise. (Alston, MacEwan, and Okrent 2016, 443)
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(FAO 2013; HLPE 2014, 2017; IFPRI 2014, 2015; 2016; Development Initiatives 2017, 2018;
GNR 2020). The food systems concept broadly includes all actors, ranging from producers
to consumers, and their interactions influencing food security and nutrition outcomes. It
considers the increased role of supermarkets, multinationals, and FDI at one end of the
spectrum and traditional small-scale, informal food systems at the other end. Among these,
the HLPE (2017) Framework has been, by far, the most widely referred to by IOs, and FAO
introduced a dashboard in June 2020 based on the HLPE recommendation (https://
foodsystemsdashboard.org).
In a paper on food systems, Brouwer, McDermott, and Ruben (2020) noted that
32 international reports were produced in a period of less than a decade that use different
concepts of food systems. They discussed how the concept of food system has evolved,
distinguishing different pathways for food system transformation. They outlined the ana-
lytical underpinnings, implications for multi-stakeholder governance, and how those con-
cepts deal with critical trade-offs between multiple food system objectives—namely,
nutrition and health, environmental sustainability, and resilience—and social inclusion,
among others. So, the objective function has become increasingly complex. And yet, the
human capital and the institutional capacity, including regulatory systems to address the
complexity, have not kept pace with the challenges in developing countries, particularly in
low-income countries (LICs) and low-middle-income countries (LMICs) with the greatest
incidence of poverty and hunger. Furthermore, the extent to which these concepts have
been embraced by developing country members of the UN System, as a holistic policy-
making device, or by their citizens as practice to be applied to their daily diets, remains to be
seen, and it is impetus for the UN Secretary General’s 2021 Food Summit (UN 2020d). The
idea is to prompt a bottom-up demand.
The definition of food security was first introduced at the 1974 World Food Conference
(UN 1975). Its four pillars of availability, access, utilization, and stability have taken years to
be widely debated and understood, with the focus in most LICs and LMICs still being largely
on production and, perhaps, some on access. The latter came into currency as Sen’s work on
entitlements influenced the UN System and Right to Food movements through nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) (see Sen [1981]), and in response to the excessive strin-
gencies of the structural adjustment period of the 1980s. So, institutional infrastructure for
safety nets was established and/or strengthened as part of the public infrastructure. How-
ever, safety nets are still weak. Where the fiscal base is weak, countries are dependent on
foreign aid, and even in large developing countries like Brazil, India, and Indonesia, there is
scope for better targeting, for avoiding leakages, and for increasing efficiency.
The concept of sustainability of food systems is even more recent, although the idea of
sustainability has been around at least since the Brundtland Report, and perhaps, much
earlier in Hicks’ Value and Capital; for example, income is what can be consumed
sustainably, with many conceptual interpretations, such as intergenerational sustainability,
sustainability, and equity, and many challenges for measurement and operationalization
of the concept (Hicks 1939; WCED 1987). An excellent recent paper by Béné et al. noted
that the concept of sustainability, “although widely used by all the different communities of
practice, remains poorly defined, and applied in different ways and usually based on a
relatively narrow interpretation” (Béné et al. 2019, 116). In so doing, the authors argued—
and we concur—that attempts “to equate or subsume healthy diets within sustainability in
the context of food system may be misleading and need to be challenged. . . . [T]rade-offs
between different dimensions of food system sustainability are unavoidable and need to be
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navigated in an explicit manner when developing or implementing sustainable food system
initiatives” (Béné et al. 2019, 116).
Agricultural economics literature has extensively discussed the growth of value chains,
starting with the supermarket revolution (Reardon et al. 2003; Reardon, Timmer, and
Minten 2012), but the literature exploring impacts is generally new for supermarkets and
other value chain-related revolutions on (1) dietary transition; (2) equity in terms of
changes in rural and urban employment (for example, impacts of scale economies); (3)
environment (from increased processing, packaging, transportation, refrigeration); and (4)
energy use, and thus, more generally, on “sustainable” food systems (Reardon et al. 2012).
Additionally, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, there is much reevaluation of the
benefits of the emerging food systems in terms of sustainability, as illustrated by the recent
World Bank paper, which stressed the benefits of deconcentration of marketed surpluses,
traceability, and a more transparent market information system, owing to digitalization,
whereas in the past, scale economies were considered inevitable and efficient (Lampietti,
Elabed, and Schroeder 2020). In short, we will need a universally understood, easily
accepted, and monitorable concept of a sustainable food system that reflects the diversity
of circumstances. Developing countries will have to embrace these ideas and make them
their own, and they will have to explore the full implications of sustainability, including
trade-offs. Thus, much work remains to be done to meet the ambition of the proposed Food
System Summit 2021, given the gap between past efforts and future ambition.
Outline of the Chapter
In the first section, we report some early known impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic tragedy
on the poverty–food security–nutrition–health nexus and its implications for action.
In the second section on outcome indicators, we summarize what the various indicators
suggest the world had achieved prior to the pandemic in reducing poverty; increasing food
security and nutrition; reducing infant and child mortality, stunting, wasting, anemia; and
improving gender empowerment since progress on the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) began to be monitored. Already visible was differing state capacity to address
agricultural productivity growth and achieving food security and nutrition, one of the
important subgoals of SDG2 (see Box 4.4). To learn lessons, our retrospective review
dates back 75 years to when President Roosevelt led the establishment of liberal world
order. In 1941, by co-signing the Atlantic Charter with Churchill, he created the framework
of the liberal world order. He took the initiative with the Hot Springs Conference in 1943,
for the creation of FAO and the UN. The Bretton Woods Conference was held during July
1–22, 1944. The Bretton Woods institutions were established in October 1945, after
Roosevelt’s death in April 1945. President Truman followed up on many of these initiatives
and more. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established in 1947,
with a legal agreement between many countries, and had the purpose of promoting
international trade by reducing or eliminating trade barriers, such as tariffs or quotas. Its
purpose was the “substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimina-
tion of discriminatory treatment in international commerce . . . on a reciprocal and advan-
tageous basis” (GATT 1947, 2, 22).
In the third section on agricultural productivity growth, we report how agricultural total
factor productivity (TFP) growth, albeit without the measurement of environmental
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losses or gains, has performed across regions and countries over time, using various
measures. Productivity growth is vital to food security and nutrition and to structural
transformation. There are huge differences in aggregate productivity growth performance
across regions and countries, and by and large, countries that have done poorly in agricul-
tural productivity growth have also lagged behind in structural transformation. As we have
pointed out, however, structural transformation has not assured transformational change in
food systems for the better.
Furthermore, the proposition that small farms perform better than large farms in
productivity has been dispelled. How productivity is measured has also changed over
time from partial to total productivity. Recent evidence suggests that all sizes of farms can
achieve productivity growth and success, but for smallholders to be productive requires the
functioning of the factor and product markets, as well as strong public policy where markets
do not function or where small farmers have limited access to information, knowledge,
inputs, and markets. Productivity growth measures have not included changes in the quality
or quantity of natural resources (Fuglie et al. 2020). This is beginning to change, but this
analysis is in the early stages of development and not yet a useful guide for moving toward
sustainability.
Finally, we present extensive evidence of premature deindustrialization in developing
countries: that is, their share of the industrial sector in gross domestic productivity (GDP)
peaks at earlier levels of per capita GDP than is true for industrialized countries.
In the fourth section, we describe the overall financial flows to developing countries and,
specifically, to food and agriculture, and the current woefully low levels of investment and
low share of official development assistance (ODA) in these flows, and why ODA needs to
be used strategically to leverage greater public and private investments in food and
agriculture and related sectors. We summarize the contribution of the five major IOs—
the World Bank, FAO, WFP, CGIAR, and IFAD—to food security, productivity growth,
structural transformation, and global governance. Together, they commit about US$21.3
billion annually in the form of financial flows and technical assistance, of which nearly US$8
billion was in the form of emergency assistance in 2018–19. A recent study, titled “Growing
Better: Ten Critical Transitions to Transform Food and Land Use,” estimated needed
resources of US$300–50 billion annually for the transformation of food and land use
systems to 2030 or a total of US$2 trillion. The study envisages support from multilateral
banks, bilateral donors, philanthropic contributions, and the private sector, among others
(FOLU 2019). Researchers working on the Ceres2030 project, on the other hand, suggest a
much more modest amount of needed resources: “donor governments must spend an
additional US$14 billion a year on average until 2030 to end hunger, double the incomes
of 545 million small-scale farmers, and limit agricultural emissions in line with the Paris
climate agreement” (Ceres2030 2020). This means roughly doubling the amount of aid
given for food security and nutrition each year, and must also be accompanied by an
additional US$19 billion a year from the budgets of LICs and middle-income countries
(MICs).
These estimates are not comparable. They have different stated objectives and different
models of underlying estimates, but each suggests substantially larger than current resource
flows to developing countries of total annual ODA of US$150 billion to all sectors.
With climate change, growing environmental pressures, the need for healthy consump-
tion for all, and the range of new technologies that have come on stream, which we list
in Chapter 2, substantial investments are needed in human and institutional capital
and physical infrastructure to realize the potential of technical change, even taking into
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account other private financial resources and national investments to achieve sustainable
production.
In the fifth section on global governance of food and agriculture, we discuss the role of
the G20 in the global architecture for food and agriculture. Whereas they started with a
promising start at the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis, as a collective, their contribu-
tion has not increased relative to their potential. We explain why.
Finally, in the sixth section, we outline the role of a grouping of 54 industrial and
emerging countries for which the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) monitors agricultural policies, to show that changes in their policies
would offer scope for improvement in the overall policy environment and investment
climate at the global level of between US$500 billion and US$700 billion annually. The
World Bank, in collaboration with FAO, OECD, and developing countries, has initiated a
project to repurpose subsidies to achieve a triple win of increased efficiency, more targeted
benefits, and better environmental outcomes (personal communication, Madhur
Gautam, World Bank Lead Economist with Agriculture Global Practice, with Uma Lele,
December 21, 2020).
Experience of the last five decades shows our understanding of the growing complexity of
achieving food security and nutrition, with the multiplicity of systemic risks presenting a
need for us to adopt a system’s view, which enables horizontal and vertical integration. On
the other hand, there has been an increased tendency to simplify solutions in bits and pieces
to strip away complexity, interactions, externalities, and spillovers. With reforms at the
country level, resources could be released and reallocated for greater, more equitable, and
hopefully, more sustainable global outcomes enshrined in the SDGs—goals to be achieved
by 2030. SDG2 is presented in Box 4.4.
COVID-19: An Extraordinary Tragedy and the Imperative
to Build Better
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva noted in her
plenary speech on October 15, 2020,³ “an economic calamity that will make the world
economy 4.4% smaller this year and strip an estimated $11 trillion of output by next year.”
She also noted “untold human desperation in the face of huge disruption and rising poverty
for the first time in decades.” She continued, “We face . . . a Long Ascent for the global
economy: a climb that will be difficult, uneven, uncertain—and prone to setbacks,” but
suggested, “we will have a chance to address some persistent problems—low productivity,
slow growth, high inequalities, a looming climate crisis. We can do better than build back
the pre-pandemic world—we can build forward to a world that is more resilient, sustainable,
and inclusive.”
IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) report in October 2020 noted “global growth is
projected to be –4.4 percent in 2020,” an upward revision of 0.8 percentage points,
compared to the June update, as there were signs of a stronger recovery in the third quarter,
offset partly by downgrades in some emerging and developing economies. In 2021, growth
is projected to rebound to 5.2 percent, 0.2 percentage points below the June projection, but
³ See “A New Bretton Woods Moment by Kristalina Georgieva, IMF Managing Director, Washington, DC”:
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/10/15/sp101520-a-new-bretton-woods-moment
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with a decline in GDP per capita in emerging countries, except for China, more than in
industrial countries (IMF 2020d, xv).
IMF estimated the cumulative COVID-19-related output loss over 2020 and 2021 could
be around US$9 trillion, the greatest downturn since the Great Depression of 1929
(Gopinath 2020). IMF’s WEO update of June 2020 estimated the Latin America and
Caribbean (LAC) region will shrink by 9.4 percent in 2020, nearly four percentage points
worse than the April projection. SSA’s projected GDP trade, expected to decline by 3.2
percent in 2020, is double the contraction predicted in April of 1.6 percent. On average, per
capita incomes across the region will fall by 5.5 percent in 2020, to levels last seen nearly a
decade ago. This will likely lead to more poverty and widen income inequality, as lockdowns
disproportionately affect informal sector workers and small- and medium-sized companies
in the services sectors. Asia’s economic output in 2022 is expected to be about 5 percent
lower than the level predicted before the crisis, and this estimated gap is much larger, if we
exclude China, where economic activity has already started to rebound (IMF 2020b).
Furthermore, IMF notes that “support from all development partners is essential to address
the sizable financing needs, including debt relief for the most vulnerable countries,”
including particularly those in Africa (IMF 2020a, v).
China is the only developing country that has achieved a positive GDP growth (CGTN
2020). Since then, IMF’s April 2021 forecast suggested global prospects are looking better
one year into the pandemic, albeit highly uncertain. The latest WEO places growth at
6 percent for 2021, compared to 2020’s unprecedented contraction of –3.3 percent.
Recovery is, by and large, dependent on vaccination globally, and the lack of access to
vaccines is making recovery hard to imagine for some countries, while others are making
good progress. Dr. Malhar Nabar, Division Chief of the World Economic Studies Division
in IMF’s Research Department, in a podcast, described these divergent recoveries as a big
concern. Two important messages from this section are, first, the growing differentiation
between China and the rest of the developing world, and second, the vulnerability of the
working class—those who do not have the luxury of working from home—to pandemics.
And this phenomenon prevails throughout the world, a result of growing structural inequal-
ities, weak social protection, and different degrees of political will and state capacity to
address these issues.
Economists from the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) have argued
that key elements are impacts on labor supply; effects of social distancing; shifts in demand
from services involving close contact; increases in the cost of logistics in food and other
supply chains; and reductions in savings and investment (Laborde, Martin, and Vos 2020).
The fastest, most effective responses have come from countries in East Asia, in addition to
China: that is, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and in Oceania, New Zealand. The
wealthiest nation has not been the most effective in protecting its working class from
COVID-19. Going forward, a well-functioning public health system and adequate social
protection are critical—and the reasons for and consequences of not acting expeditiously
need to be well understood.
Historian Ramachandra Guha (2020) has called COVID-19 a sixfold tragedy that is still
unfolding: a medical crisis, an economic crisis, a humanitarian crisis (part of a broader
social crisis), a psychological crisis, governance crises, and a crisis in democracy itself. The
multiplicity of crises raises more fundamental questions about development strategy than
did the 2006–7 financial crisis.
The big tension since the Reagan–Thatcher period, over the last 40 years, has been about
whether incentives to the rich, as “job creators,” will achieve broad-based growth, or
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whether distribution of benefits directly to the needy is necessary. In the post-structural
adjustment period, there has been a growing international consensus, including, particu-
larly, among Bretton Woods institutions that were at the forefront of the Washington
Consensus, about the need to balance incentives to the rich to create jobs with direct
distribution to the poor by actively promoting social safety nets (World Bank 2012). Social
safety nets are now widely accepted and promoted. Yet, the already acute income inequality
has worsened in the COVID-19 pandemic. More than 50 percent of the stock value on Wall
Street was owned by only six individuals at the end of 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic has
exposed many of the weaknesses in the existing pattern of growth.
Poorest people throughout the world are affected more by COVID-19 than the well-off.
The stimulus packages and financial policies of low interest rates and easy money, which
industrial countries have provided, are based on important lessons that policymakers
learned from the 2008 financial crisis: act quickly and decisively. At the same time, there
has been disjuncture between the real economies and the stock market. COVID-19 has also
highlighted that universal health services are needed, including an agile, responsive,
evidence-based public health system essential to delivering, including to the poor and the
most vulnerable, rapidly and effectively—particularly when spillovers of communicable
disease are substantial, knowledge about the disease evolves with the spread of the disease,
and the spread needs to be contained speedily. In addition to China, relatively more
democratic East Asian countries, including Taiwan, South Korea, and New Zealand in
Oceania, have shown this effectively, as have countries such as Germany and Italy—and in
the latter case, even after a substantial initial setback. The United States, the richest country
in the world with a sophisticated medical infrastructure, has lacked a public health system,
as have developing countries like India.
The COVID-19 pandemic has also brought home the universal nature of the health and
economic crises. No country is spared. Yet, economies in SSA are the hardest hit, being
affected not only by the health and social distancing impacts, but also by lower commodity
prices and declines in remittances, as noted by Laborde, Martin, and Vos (2020). They also
estimate that, globally, almost 150 million people are projected to fall into extreme poverty
and food insecurity. Other estimates differ from theirs, which Laborde, Martin, and Vos
(2020) argued are a result of less refined analysis than theirs.
Millions of poor people worldwide have lost their jobs; 25 million in the United States, of
whom 6 million had regained their jobs by mid-July 2020. An estimated 288 million
migrants of the 600 to 700 million rural residents in China (Wang et al. 2020), and an
estimated 56 million migrants in India had to return home (Lele, Bansal, and Meenakshi
2020). With the exception of some industrial countries, such as Canada, Germany, and
Denmark, with strong social safety nets, they have operated well below their capacity. In
much of the rest of the world, the poor have very limited or no social safety nets, no
unemployment insurance, no furloughs or emergency payments. Almost all are paid on a
per day or per month basis (so, no work means no income).
As poor households depend mainly on their labor for income, they face the tightest
income constraint, and a trade-off between hunger and risk of exposure to the virus,
stressing the urgent need for social safety nets (Ravallion 2020). Even before the COVID-
19 pandemic, our research presented in earlier chapters showed that SDG indicators on
poverty reduction and decline in hunger show little relationship. In 2010, the World Bank
declared a goal to end poverty (MDG Targets 1.1: “To halve the proportion of people whose
daily income is less than $1.25” and 1.3: “To halve the proportion of individuals suffering
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from hunger in the period between 1990 and 2015”).⁴ Whereas poverty declined by two-
thirds, mostly in Asia, incidence of hunger, measured mainly as a calorie gap, declined by
only 256 million using FAO’s Prevalence of Undernourished (PoU) and, indeed, the
downward trend in hunger turned in an upward direction in 2015, with a reported 821
million hungry, even before COVID-19 was detected. How firm are the hunger numbers?
FAO substantially revised its hunger estimates in 2020, but not for the first time. The
revisions were in two respects: based on new survey data going back 10 years, FAO revised
China’s estimate downward, as having reached less than 2 percent of the hungry population,
meaning, technically, China reported no more hunger (FAO et al. 2020, 5–6). FAO, on the
other hand, revised African hunger upward, so that by 2030, it was estimated that 412
million would be undernourished, compared to 204 million undernourished by 2030 in SA
(FAO et al. 2020, 11, table 2). The revisions, described subsequently, do not incorporate the
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, but they highlight the lack of affordability of nutritious
diets for a large majority of the population.
Fanzo et al. (2020) have advocated a dashboard approach, and FAO formally adopted
this approach in June 2020. Yet, major data gaps exist on actual food consumption. The
incidence of hunger has increased since the COVID-19 pandemic, with extensive losses of
jobs associated with adherence to social distancing measures and other containment
measures that countries have adopted.⁵ Social distancing is next to impossible in crowded
slums of LICs, but also in low-income neighborhoods in New York or New Jersey. The poor
have limited savings and little or no access to institutional finance (Baye 2020; Jones, Egger,
and Santos 2020). Lack of access of small businesses to finance is a phenomenon throughout
the developing world. With their limited access to the health care infrastructure and the type
of jobs they hold, which requires them to work in the field rather than at a desk, the so-
called essential workers are more exposed to infections, particularly as deadly as COVID-19
(Lele, Bansal, and Meenakshi 2020). So, in the short run, there is a huge trade-off in
protecting health and earning a living.
Studies in China show zero income for migrant wage earners in the month of February,
with substantial declines in spending on food (56 percent), children’s education, and health.
The specter of undernourished men, women, and children walking scores of miles across
states to reach their homes in India has been difficult to watch. The situation for labor in
India is worse than in China, because with three decades of strong growth, China had
already met all MDGs by 2010, whereas India still bears a third of the global burden of
hunger and malnutrition, a higher than average level of the world’s stunted children, and a
growing incidence of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs), particularly, diabetes and can-
cers, increasing the population’s vulnerability to COVID-19.
Agricultural production, and indeed, agricultural trade, as a whole, has held up better
during the COVID-19 pandemic than it did during the food crisis in 2007, as discussed in
⁴ See MDG Monitor for targets, https://www.mdgmonitor.org/mdg-1-eradicate-poverty-hunger/.
The World Bank’s Millennium Development Goals website declared for MDG1: “The world achieved Goal 1
five years ahead of schedule. In 2010, an estimated 21% of people in the developing world lived at or below $1.25 a
day—down from 43% in 1990.”
The site further indicates that only “54% of developing countries have met or are on track to meet the goal of
cutting extreme poverty in half” (https://www5.worldbank.org/mdgs/poverty_hunger.html)
⁵ The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) reported multiple shocks (the COVID-19 pandemic
and containment measures, armed conflict, and insecurity) in many parts of the African continent, causing severe
disruptions to agricultural farming systems with devastating impacts on affected populations. These shocks have
severely affected the functioning of food markets, among other impacts, disrupting the movement of food from
surplus to deficit areas (AGRA 2020).
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Chapter 3, in part because the pandemic has been largely a demand shock, with occasional
disruptions in supply chains, whereas the 2007 crisis, which continued until 2012, was
primarily a supply shock. Global trade increased threefold from 2000 to 2016, and most
countries are more dependent on agricultural imports today than 20 years ago
(Schmidhuber and Qiao 2020). So, observers worry that disruptions caused by COVID-
19 could trigger a repeat of the food crisis of 2007–8, when a sharp rise in prices was
exacerbated by panicking governments imposing export bans. In contrast, supplies on the
global markets in 2020 have been abundant. There are many more exporters and importers,
so competition is stiff and international shipping costs have diminished (Schmidhuber and
Qiao 2020). Torero (2020) confirms this observation. Also, in 2020, fewer countries have
imposed export bans, as compared to 2007–12 (like Vietnam did on rice). The message to
keep supplies flowing that was learned in the 2007–8 crisis sees echoes throughout the
world. Thus, although there is less cause for worry on the trade front, with climate change,
the global food situation can turn around quickly if there are successive droughts in major
commodity-exporting countries, as happened during the 2007–12 crisis (Torero 2020).
And, except for the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), an initiative started
in 2010 to improve market information, and the small Global Agriculture and Food Security
Program (GAFSP) to meet the investment deficit, established following the food crisis, not
much has changed for the better. These initiatives, while limited in scope, show that, with
the collective political will exercised by the G20, which we discuss later, much more can be
accomplished going forward.
“Remittance flows into low-income and fragile states represent a lifeline that supports
households as well as provides much-needed tax revenue” (Sayeh and Chami 2020, 16).
Remittance flows in 2018 to LICs and fragile countries reached US$350 billion, exceeding
FDI, portfolio investment, and foreign aid as the single most important source of income
from abroad. According to the World Bank, remittance flows are expected to drop
20 percent, a fall of about US$100 billion in 2020 over 2019 (Sayeh and Chami 2020, 17).
For small countries most dependent on migration, the drop has been as high as 40 percent
(Emont 2020). Such a drop “is likely to heighten economic, fiscal, and social pressures on
governments of these countries already struggling to cope even in normal times” (Sayeh and
Chami 2020, 16).
Evolution of trade has been more complex. According to a 2019 McKinsey Global
Institute report:
Goods-producing value chains have become less trade-intensive . . . Between 2007 and
2017, exports declined from 28.1 to 22.5 percent of gross output in goods-producing
value chains.
Cross-border services are growing more than 60 percent faster than trade in goods, and
they generate far more economic value than traditional trade statistics capture . . . [There
are at least] three uncounted aspects [of service trade] made (the value-added services
contribute to exported goods, the intangibles companies send to foreign affiliates, and free
digital services made available to global users). National statistics attribute 23 percent of all
trade to services. (Lund et al. 2019)
Yet, with declining commodity prices, commodity exporters have faced growing trade
deficits and increased indebtedness. Also, in Africa, rapid population growth has cut into
the per capita growth in agricultural productivity and GDP. Additionally, conflict and
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climate change have been aggravating the problem of increased incidence of hunger around
the world, since 2015, with a growing demand for humanitarian assistance, even without
considering the effect of the pandemic, according to joint publications of FAO, IFAD, the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), WFP, and WHO (FAO et al. 2018, 2019).
Impacts of Pandemic Could Have Been Minimized
Some form of a pandemic was fully anticipated and could have been contained by investing
a small fraction of the lost GDP in preparation, with a high return on investment and
avoidance of much human suffering.⁶ Experts are already predicting future pandemics, due
to growing population densities, forest clearing, urbanization, and growing interaction
between wildlife and human population. There is a lesson for preparedness to deal with
those coming down the pike—among other things, the need for much stronger health
systems with universal access to health, if not on ethical grounds, then because of the
infectious nature of COVID-19 (and other viruses), which hit the least protected the
greatest.
How Is COVID-19 Different than Other Pandemics?
Like the 1918 influenza pandemic, but unlike the more recent 2014–16 Ebola virus or the
2009 H1N1 “swine flu” outbreaks that became regional pandemics, COVID-19 is a world-
wide phenomenon. Unlike severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), recognized in 2003, it
is more infectious, with yet unknown effects on the human body (WHO 2020d). Rapid
globalization and increased travel and communication have helped COVID spread more
quickly. Unlike the past food or financial crisis, there is also huge uncertainty about both the
response to policy actions, such as the success in “bending the curve,” and the emergence of
second and third waves. China and Singapore are experiencing second waves, and there
have been small recurrences in New Zealand. Therefore, the importance of vigilance, trust
in government, broad knowledge in the population, and a scientific approach to the control
of COVID-19 involving all stakeholders—the scientific community, government at all
levels, citizens, and the private sector—that has involved shutting down entire cities,
countries, and sectors; staying at home; movement restrictions; contact tracing; testing;
⁶ In 2005, President George W. Bush unveiled an ambitious US$7.1 billion plan to ready the United States for a
possible pandemic. It called for early detection, international cooperation, stockpiling of vaccines and medical
equipment, and public education about pandemic prevention (Charatan 2005). The Bank approved a Global
Program on Avian Influenza Control and Human Pandemic Preparedness and Response (GPAI) in January 2006,
a horizontal Adaptable Program Loan (APL) that allowed for use of up to US$500 million (extended to US$1
billion in June 2009) to finance national avian influenza control and human pandemic preparedness projects. The
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) report on “Responding to Global Public Bads” demonstrated the tremen-
dous convening power of the Bank to mobilize support, but also how the World Bank struggles to continue to
support important global agendas. “Following the example of the Bank’s successful shift in approach to natural
disasters, moving from a responsive approach using emergency instruments to one that favors preemptive risk
reduction and risk management through regular country programs and operations” may be the way to achieve
success (IEG 2013, viii). In 2015, Bill Gates gave a TED Talk on pandemics and the Obama administration briefed
the incoming Trump administration through convening US expert panels just before its departure (Gates 2015;
PBS News Hour 2020). The IEG report recognized the high convening capacity of the Bank but also noted that
“once the spotlight has moved on, particularly for issues that do not fit neatly into existing institutional structures
and strategies,” the Bank is unable to sustain this interest on a long-term basis (IEG 2013, 47).
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diagnosis; and treatment are of paramount importance to gain time and devise more
specific strategies. Full economic activity cannot realistically resume until and unless the
virus is under control, and business, labor, and consumers have confidence that returning to
work and spending their hard-earned income is safe again (Taylor 2020).
A related and quite unanticipated tragedy highlighted by the pandemic is the growing
hostility of some key advanced industrial countries’ leaders, including in the United
States and the United Kingdom, toward science and evidence, and an unwillingness to
learn from other more successful countries in their crisis mitigation. Thus, they could
no longer be seen as role models, as in the past. The Economist describes the United
Kingdom’s response as a “bad response, badly handled” (Economist 2020b). The Biden
victory in the United States will almost certainly change the state of affairs there, but
with two-thirds of the 70+ million voters questioning even the 2020 presidential
election outcome, the road ahead for evidence-based policy, including vigorous action
on climate change mitigation, will not be easy in the United States. The disjuncture
between the scientific approach and politics is strident in the United States, whether it
relates to the response to the pandemic at home, contributions to the WHO, or
withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Accord and multilateral trade agreements.
It is symptomatic of the current malaise of global cooperation, while global challenges
requiring global cooperation are accumulating (see, for example, Friedman and Plumer
2020; Joseph 2020).
Notwithstanding the deprivation, there are also scores of inspiring stories of human
spirit—a 15-year-old girl in India bicycling over 700 miles to bring her sick father home,
riding on the back of her bicycle (Gettleman and Raj 2020), and scores of health workers
and other “essential workers,” including migrants, serving their own or adopted societies at
substantial risk to their health and the health of their families.
Who would have imagined that not just China, but small countries in the East Asia and
Pacific region (EAP), like Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and New Zealand, having
quickly implemented “test, trace, and treat,” would be able to contain the disease while it
proliferated in highly developed countries, exposing the countries’ long-standing structural
weaknesses of income and wealth disparities, and exercise of individual freedom over social
responsibility?
Important questions about trust in leaders and public institutions, and relatedly, political
leadership, reliable information versus opinion and rumors (often propagated via social
media), not to mention state capacity—issues which were already under threat before the
pandemic got underway—have been laid bare by it. COVID-19 has exposed deep-seated
weaknesses in the past growth patterns, including growing societal apathy toward acute and
increasing income and wealth inequalities; neglect of the environment; lack of universal
access to sick leave, health, and education; and inadequate social security systems in
rich and poor countries alike for the laboring class whose crucial roles in the service
economy are only now universally being recognized as “essential service” providers
(Tomer and Kane 2020).
The pandemic has stressed the imperative to “build a better,” environmentally resilient,
socially more humane world—away from business as usual. While there are positive signs in
the growth of movements like Black Lives Matter, which have spread rapidly from the
United States to Europe, it is unclear how robust or long lasting they are likely to be in
transforming hearts and minds of societies from the vestiges of slavery, Jim Crow laws, and
plain old colonial views of Blacks and other nonwhite races. Will arms sales to countries in
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the Middle East and Africa, which are fueling conflict and creating refugees and thereby
increasing demands on WFP, be curtailed with an active focus on peacemaking? How the
West responds matters as a good or a bad example to developing countries.
Elsewhere, we have argued that addressing complex challenges requires strong, thought-
ful leadership and state capacity. While some countries have shown state capacity, there is
chaos in global governance at the regional and global levels. The Economist noted in its June
2020 issue on “The New World Disorder” that 75 years after the creation of the United
Nations:
The UN is struggling, as are many of the structures, like the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), designed to help create order
out of chaos. This system, with the UN at its apex, is beset by internal problems, by the
global struggle to cope with the rise of China, and most of all by the neglect—antipathy
even—of the country that was its chief architect and sponsor, the United States.
The threat to the global order weighs on everyone, including America. But if the United
States pulls back, then everyone must step forward . . . (The Economist 2020a, 8)
If other countries do not step up, the world risks “a great unravelling, much like the
nightmare in the 1920s and 1930s that first impelled the allies to create the UN and its
siblings” (The Economist 2020a, 8). The Biden administration has introduced a sense of
normality into the global world order but has not yet begun to tackle the key global
challenges: income and power, inequalities, climate change, future threats of pandemics,
human rights, and an arms race.
An important need of developing countries, lagging in development, is for their future
growth strategies to be more holistic, effective, humane, and equitable, with their leadership
and their states having the political will to deliver on these goals, and with the involvement
of civil society, the private sector, religious groups, and all other actors.
Outcome Indicators: What Did We Achieve before the Pandemic?
In the previous chapters, we demonstrated that prior to COVID-19, the world had wit-
nessed extraordinary progress in human development, particularly since 1990. Nearly 1.2
billion people had been lifted out of poverty since 1990, after the international community
adopted eight MDGs (including 21 targets and 60 indicators) in 2000 and started monitor-
ing their progress until 2015, the end of the MDG period (UN 2016).
The number of people living in extreme poverty fell from 1.9 billion in 1990 to 836
million in 2015. Most progress occurred in the new millennium. By 2011, all developing
regions, with the exception of SSA, had achieved the target of halving the number of people
living in extreme poverty. The most populous countries in the world—China and India—
played a major role in the worldwide reduction of poverty. China’s remarkable progress
reduced extreme poverty in EAP from 54 percent to 2.1 percent between 1990 and 2015.
SA’s progress has also been impressive, with a decline from 52 to 12.4 percent in the same
time period, but with accelerated reduction since 2008. In contrast, the poverty level in SSA
did not change between 1990 and 2002. The rate of poverty decline has accelerated since,
though about 43 percent of sub-Saharan population continued to live in extreme poverty in
2015 (UN DESA 2016).
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Another measure of poverty is the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative at
the University of Oxford and the Human Development Report Office of the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), a measure that we described in Chapter 4. Key findings
of the report of the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2020, “Charting Pathways out
of Multidimensional Poverty: Achieving the SDGs” include:
• Across 107 developing countries, 1.3 billion people—22 percent—live in multidimen-
sional poverty.
• Children show higher rates of multidimensional poverty: half of multidimensionally
poor people (644 million) are children under age 18. One in three children is poor
compared with one in six adults.
• About 84.3 percent of multidimensionally poor people live in Sub-Saharan Africa (558
million) and South Asia (530 million).
• 67 percent of multidimensionally poor people are in middle-income countries, where
the incidence of multidimensional poverty ranges from 0 percent to 57 percent nationally
and from 0 percent to 91 percent subnationally.
• Every multidimensionally poor person is being left behind in a critical mass of indica-
tors. For example, 803 million multidimensionally poor people live in a household where
someone is undernourished, 476 million have an out-of-school child at home, 1.2 billion
lack access to clean cooking fuel, 687 million lack electricity and 1.03 billion have
substandard housing materials.
• 65 countries reduced their global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) value signif-
icantly in absolute terms. Those countries are home to 96 percent of the population of the
75 countries studied for poverty trends. The fastest, Sierra Leone (2013–2017), did so
during the Ebola epidemic.
• Four countries halved their MPI value. India (2005/2006–2015/2016) did so nationally
and among children and had the biggest reduction in the number of multidimensionally
poor people (273 million). Ten countries, including China, came close to halving their
MPI value. (OPHI and UNDP 2020, 3)
Macro-level estimates suggest that there has been faster progress on reducing income
poverty, as estimated by the World Bank, over recent decades than in reducing hunger, a
puzzle that we explored in Chapter 4. In the State of Food Security and Nutrition (SOFI)
2020, FAO has revised the hunger estimates again, both retroactively and prospectively, so
the overall hunger level in 2020 is 690 million, compared to the earlier estimate of 821
million, and yet, incidence of hunger has increased by about 60 million people since 2014,
with a substantially higher incidence of hunger in Africa forecast by 2030 (FAO et al. 2020,
viii).⁷ This comparative picture is presented in Figures 13.1 and 13.2.
Thus, although there was a decline in the numbers of undernourished in developing
countries, FAO estimated that, until 2015, this decline was smaller than the huge decline in
the number of poor that the World Bank estimated. In 1990, 1.01 billion people were
undernourished, compared to 785 million in 2015, a. drop in undernourished of only 226
⁷ The drastic acceleration of food insecurity to 2030 in SOFI 2020, compared to the projections of the previous
year’s SOFI, appears to be mainly due to revisions in population estimates. Indeed, the report asks readers, who
tend to be consummate readers of FAO’s food insecurity estimates, not to compare the old and new estimates.
Furthermore, the changes appeared to be based on adjustments in just a few countries (FAO et al. 2020).
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million (FAO et al. 2019, table 2, 9). The proportion of undernourished people (PoU) in the
developing regions has fallen by almost half since 1990, from 23.3 percent in 1990–2 to 12.9
percent in 2014–16; this is close to the MDG hunger target, which was to halve the
proportion of undernourished (UN DESA 2016, 5). Between 2005 and 2015, greater
progress was made. Nearly twice as many people escaped chronic undernutrition during
the latter decade compared to 1990–2005. The faster decrease in poverty was partly due to
faster economic growth during this period. The rate of hunger reduction varied widely by
region: East Asia, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Caucasus and Central Asia
achieved the MDG target. China alone accounted for almost two-thirds of the total
reduction in the number of undernourished people in the developing regions since 1990.
Northern Africa attained an overall level below 5 percent. In contrast, the pace of reduction
in SA and SSA, where there are still high concentrations of undernourished people, had
been too slow to achieve the target. In SSA, for 2014–16, the rate of undernourishment was
almost 23 percent. Although the hunger rate has fallen, since 1990 the number of under-
nourished people has increased by 44 million, indicative of the high population growth.
There is wide variation across the subregions. Northern, Southern, andWestern Africa have
already achieved or are close to meeting the target. In Central Africa, however, progress has





























































































Western Asia and Northern Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 13.1 FAO’s latest (2020) estimates of hunger and projections show slower decline in
hunger than World Bank estimates and projections of poverty: Performance and projections by
region, 1990–2030
Note: *Projected values. **The projections up to 2030 do not reflect the potential impact of the COVID-19
pandemic; and Eastern Asia’s data not reported after 2010, as the prevalence of undernourishment is less than 2.5
percent.
Source: Based on data from FAO et al. (2020).
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political upheaval, with the number of undernourished doubling between 1990 and 2015
(UN DESA 2016, 21). According to the latest World Bank estimates of poverty, the only
remaining incidence of poverty will be in Africa in 2030, if we consider the $1.90 (2011 PPP)
per day poverty line. Only 53 percent of the world’s population, about 3.9 billion of the 7.3
billion, earned at least income of US$5.5 per day (2011 PPP) in 2015, enough to afford a
nutritious diet, and nearly three-quarters earned at least US$3.2 per day (2011 PPP)
(Figure 13.3). Similarly, projections of hunger show increases mostly in Africa. Under the
old projections, the number of hungry by 2030 was estimated to be 216 million in SSA and
the prevalence (percentage of population) was 7.4 percent. According to new estimates, the
number of undernourished people was estimated to be 235 million in 2019, and will be 412
million by 2030, with a prevalence of 29.4 (FAO et al. 2020, 9, table 1, 11; table 2). FAO’s
most conservative estimate is that more than 3 billion people in the world cannot afford
healthy diets. The cost of a healthy diet is five times the cost of basic minimum diet, making
it unaffordable for the poor. The cost also exceeds average food expenditures in most
countries in the Global South: 57 percent or more of the population cannot afford a healthy
diet throughout SSA and SA (FAO et al. 2020, 66). This number is like the World Bank’s
estimate of the population earning more than US$5.50 per day (2011 PPP) year
(Figure 13.3).
The development community then adopted the more ambitious 17 SDGs in 2015 with




































































































Number of people undernourished (millions) Prevalence of undernourishment (%)
Figure 13.2 World: Number of people undernourished (millions) and prevalence of
undernourishment (%)—projections to 2030
Note: *Projected values. **The projections up to 2030 do not reflect the potential impact of the COVID-19
pandemic.
Source: Based on data from FAO et al. (2020).
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In 2015, 736 million people lived in extreme poverty, and this was reduced to about 650
million in 2018.⁸ Extreme poverty dropped just 1.4 percentage points in the three years
between 2015 and 2018 (Sánchez-Páramo 2020). Uneven progress across regions as well as
in countries is very significant.
According to Carolina Sánchez-Páramo, Global Director of the Poverty and Equity
Global Practice (GP) at the World Bank:
The two regions with the poorest people in 1990 were East Asia and Pacific and South
Asia, accounting for 80 percent of the extreme poor. With China’s rapid reduction of
poverty, the concentration of the global poor shifted from East Asia in 1990s to South Asia
in 2002, and then to sub-Saharan Africa in 2010. . . . [H]alf of the world’s poor live in just
five countries—India, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Bangladesh.
The top two countries—Nigeria and India—are showing diverging trends [even before
COVID-19]. Nigeria may have already overtaken India as the country with the most
extreme poor while India has been rapidly reducing extreme poverty and estimates









































A: Number of poor (millions) 








































B: Percentage of poor using 
World Bank’s different poverty lines
Number of poor (millions) at $1.90 a day (2011
PPP)
Number of poor (millions) at $3.20 a day (2011
PPP) 
Number of poor (millions) at $5.50 a day (2011
PPP)
Percentage of poor (% of population) at $1.90 
a day (2011 PPP)
Percentage of poor (% of population) at $3.20 
a day (2011 PPP)
Percentage of poor (% of population) at $5.50 
a day (2011 PPP)
Figure 13.3 Number of poor and percentage of poor using World Bank’s poverty lines of
US$1.9, US$3.2, and US$5.5 per day, 1981–2015 (using 2011 PPP)
Source: Based on data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2020b), http://data.worldbank.
org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators
⁸ The World Bank estimated that the share of people in extreme poverty declined to 8.6 percent of the world
population in 2018 (World Bank 2018).
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The decline of global extreme poverty continued, but was slowing before the COVID-19
pandemic, in part because of the decline in growth. The deceleration indicated that the
world was not on track to achieve the “zero hunger” (SDG1) target, even before the
pandemic. “The share of the world population living in extreme poverty declined to
10 per cent in 2015, down from 16 percent in 2010 and 36 percent in 1990” (UN
Statistics Division 2020). However, the pace of poverty reduction was already decelerating,
estimated to be 8.6 percent in 2018. Moreover, baseline projections suggested that 6 percent
of the world population would still be living in extreme poverty in 2030, missing the target
of ending poverty. Thus, if growth slows, poverty reduction will also decline.
Hunger reduction has not occurred as rapidly as poverty reduction. After decades of
steady decline, the trend in world hunger—as measured by the prevalence of
undernourishment—reversed course in 2014. The new estimates of 690 million hungry
amount to 8.9 percent of the world population, but it is still up by 10 million people in one
year and by nearly 60 million over five years from 2014 to 2019, confirming the trend
reported in past editions, even as the number has changed from that published in recent
reports (FAO et al. 2020, 5–6). The new estimates underscore “the immense challenge of
achieving the Zero Hunger target by 2030” (SDG2) (UN 2020a). FAO attributes the rise to
the increasing incidence of conflict-affected countries (often a leading cause of famine),
compounded by climate-related factors, such as the El Niño phenomenon, inflicting both
drought and flood conditions (FAO et al. 2018). The global PoU also suggests a reversal of
the downward trend that was sustained over recent decades (FAO et al. 2018). SOFI 2020
reported:
The reasons for the observed increase of the last few years are multiple. Much of the recent
increase in food insecurity can be attributed to the greater number of conflicts, often
exacerbated by climate-related shocks. Even in some peaceful settings, food security has
deteriorated as a result of economic slowdowns threatening access to food for the poor.
The evidence also reveals that the world is not on track to achieve the SDG 2.1 Zero
Hunger target by 2030. Combined projections of recent trends in the size and composition
of the population, in the total food availability, and in the degree of inequality in food
access point to an increase of the PoU by almost 1 percentage point. As a result, the global
number of undernourished people in 2030 would exceed 840 million.
The PoU in Africa was 19.1 percent of the population in 2019, or more than 250 million
undernourished people, up from 17.6 percent in 2014. This prevalence is more than twice
the world average (8.9 percent) and is the highest among all regions. [Africa’s per capita
agricultural output had increased slightly in 2016 from the peak reached in the early 1970s,
but after a precipitous drop from the mid 1970s to 1983, from which it recovered by 2005
with a sharp V and since increased slightly.]
Asia is home to more than half of the total undernourished people in the world—an
estimated 381 million people in 2019. Yet, the PoU in the population for the region is 8.3
percent, below the world average (8.9 percent), and less than half of that of Africa. Asia has
shown progress in reducing the number of hungry people in recent years, down by 8
million since 2015.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the PoU was 7.4 percent in 2019, below the world
prevalence of 8.9 percent, which still translates into almost 48 million undernourished
people. The region has seen a rise in hunger in the past few years, with the number of
undernourished people increasing by 9 million between 2015 and 2019.
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In terms of the outlook for 2030, Africa is significantly off track to achieve the Zero
Hunger target in 2030. If recent rates of increase persist, its PoU will rise from 19.1 to 25.7
percent. Latin America and the Caribbean is also off track, although to a much lower
degree. Mostly due to deterioration in recent years, its PoU is expected to increase from 7.4
percent in 2019 to 9.5 in 2030. Asia, while making progress, will also not achieve the 2030
target based on recent trends.
Overall, and without considering the effects of COVID-19, projected trends in under-
nourishment would change the geographic distribution of world hunger dramatically.
While Asia would still be home to almost 330 million hungry people in 2030, its share of
the world’s hunger would shrink substantially. Africa would overtake Asia to become the
region with the highest number of undernourished people (433 million), accounting for
51.5 percent of the total. (FAO et al. 2020, xviii–xix)
Other forms of malnutrition include more than 2 billion people with micronutrient
deficiencies and 600 million obese, data monitored by WHO (2020b, 2020c).⁹ One in
seven newborns suffered from low birthweight in 2015; no progress has been made in
reducing low birthweight since 2012 (UNICEF 2019).
Stunting has been decreasing in nearly every region since 2000. Globally, stunting
declined from one in three to just over one in five between 2000 and 2019. UNICEF noted:
In 2019, 21.3 per cent [144 million],¹⁰ or more than one in five children under age 5
worldwide had stunted growth. That said, overall trends are positive. Between 2000 and
2019, stunting prevalence globally declined from 32.4 per cent to 21.3 per cent, and the
number of children affected fell from 199.5 million to 144.0 million. In 2019, nearly two
⁹ SOFI 2020’s reported on food insecurity in the world:
While the 746 million people facing severe food insecurity are of utmost concern, an additional 16
percent of the world population, or more than 1.25 billion people, have experienced food insecurity at
moderate levels. . . .
The prevalence of both moderate and severe levels of food insecurity (SDG Indicator 2.1.2) is
estimated to be 25.9 percent in 2019 for the world as a whole. This translates into a total of 2 billion
people. . . . Total food insecurity (moderate or severe) has consistently increased at the global level since
2014, mostly because of the increase in moderate food insecurity. (FAO et al. 2020, xix)
The report further noted that “out of the 2 billion people suffering from food insecurity, 1.03 billion are in Asia,
675 million in Africa, 205 million in Latin America and the Caribbean, 88 million in Northern America and
Europe and 5.9 million in Oceania” (FAO et al. 2020, 23).
SOFI 2020 also noted how the pandemic will affect its estimates: “The global crisis induced by the COVID-19
pandemic will certainly bring these figures to much higher levels, even in regions of the world like Northern
America and Europe, which have traditionally been more food secure” (FAO et al. 2020, 23).
With respect to obesity, SOFI 2020 noted:
Adult obesity continues to rise, from 11.8 percent in 2012 to 13.1 percent in 2016 and is not on track to
reach the global target to halt the rise in adult obesity by 2025. If the prevalence continues to increase
by 2.6 percent per year, adult obesity will increase by 40 percent by 2025, compared to the 2012 level.
(FAO et al. 2020, xx)
¹⁰ SOFI 2020, observing some progress in reducing stunting, noted:
Rates of stunting reduction are far below what is needed to reach the World Health Assembly (WHA)
target for 2025 and the SDG target for 2030. If recent trends continue, these targets will only be
achieved in 2035 and 2043, respectively.
. . .Most regions have made some progress in reducing stunting between 2012 and 2019 but not at the
rate needed to achieve the 2025 and 2030 targets. Globally, stunting estimates vary by wealth. Children
from the poorest wealth quintile had a stunting prevalence that was more than double that of children
from the richest quintile. (FAO et al. 2020, xx)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/9/2021, SPi
   939
out of five stunted children lived in South Asia while another two out of five lived in sub-
Saharan Africa [representing 40 percent and 54 percent of all stunted children in the
world, respectively]. . . . [N]umbers have increased at an alarming rate in West and Central
Africa—from 22.4 million to 29.0 million.
In 2019 globally, 47 million children under five were wasted of which 14.3 million were
severely wasted. This translates into a prevalence of 6.9 per cent and 2.1 per cent,
respectively [significantly above the 2025 target (5 percent) and the 2030 target (3 percent
for this indicator)]. In 2019, more than half of all wasted children lived in South Asia and
one quarter in sub-Saharan Africa, with similar proportions for severely wasted children.
At 14.8 percent, South Asia’s wasting prevalence represents a situation requiring a serious
need for intervention with appropriate treatment programmes. Under-five wasting and
severe wasting are highly sensitive to change.
Middle East and North Africa had the highest overweight prevalence in 2019 with 11.0
percent affected, followed by Eastern Europe and Central Asia at 10.8 per cent and North
America at 8.9 per cent. The lowest overweight prevalence in 2019 was seen in South Asia
at 2.5 per cent followed by West and Central Africa at 2.6 percent. East Asia and the
Pacific had the highest number of overweight children in 2019 with 10.4 million affected,
followed by Middle East and North Africa with an estimated 5.4 million overweight.
Overall, the two Asian regions (East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia) account for
nearly two out of every five overweight children in the world. North America is the only
region that has seen a statistically significant increase in the number of overweight
children between 2000 and 2019. (UNICEF 2020a)
The global prevalence of overweight children under 5 years of age has not improved, going
from 5.3 percent in 2012 to 5.6 percent, or 38.3 million children, in 2019 (FAO et al. 2020). The
number of overweight children worldwide has remained stagnant for more than a decade.¹¹
SOFI 2019 reported that overweight and obesity “continue to increase in all regions,
particularly among school-age children and adults” (FAO et al. 2019, viii). “In 2018, an
estimated 40 million children under five were overweight. In 2016, 131 million children 5–9
years old, 207 million adolescents and 2 billion adults were overweight. About a third of
overweight adolescents and adults, and 44 percent of overweight children aged 5–9 were
obese” (FAO et al. 2019, xiv).
Both the under-5 mortality rate and the number of under-5 deaths have fallen by more
than half since 1990 but less than the targeted amount.
¹¹ According to SOFI 2020:
Worldwide, 14.6 percent of infants were born with low birthweight (less than 2,500 g) in 2015. The
trends for this indicator at global and regional levels show that some progress has been made in recent
years, but not enough to achieve the target of a 30 percent reduction in low birthweight by 2025 or even
by 2030.
Globally, as of 2019, it is estimated that 44 percent of infants aged less than six months were exclusively
breastfed. Currently, the world is on track to achieve the 2025 target of at least 50 percent of babies
younger than six months being exclusively breastfed. If additional efforts are not made, however, the
global target for 2030 of at least 70 percent will not be achieved before 2038. Most subregions are
making at least some progress, except Eastern Asia and the Caribbean. If the Eastern Africa, Central
Asia and Southern Asia subregions maintain their current rates of progress, they will reach the targets
set for both 2025 and 2030. (FAO et al. 2020, xx)
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As UNICEF noted:
The world made remarkable progress in child survival in the past few decades, and
millions of children have better survival chances than in 1990–5, 1 in 26 children died
before reaching age five in 2018, compared to 1 in 11 in 1990. Moreover, progress in
reducing child mortality . . . accelerated in the 2000–2018 period compared with the 1990s,
with the annual rate of reduction in the global under-five mortality rate increasing from
2.0 per cent in 1990–2000 to 3.8 per cent in 2000–2018. Despite the global progress in
reducing child mortality over the past few decades, an estimated 5.3 million children
under age five died in 2018roughly half of those deaths occurred in sub-Saharan Africa.
The global under-five mortality rate declined by 59 per cent, from 93 deaths per 1,000 live
births in 1990 to 39 in 2018. Despite this considerable progress, improving child survival
remains a matter of urgent concern. In 2018 alone, roughly 15,000 under-five deaths
occurred every day, an intolerably high number of largely preventable child deaths.
(UNICEF 2020b)
Nearly half of all deaths in children under 5 are attributable to undernutrition; under-
nutrition puts children at greater risk of dying from common infections, increases the
frequency and severity of such infections, and delays recovery.
COVID-19 may have just wiped out recent years of progress on global poverty reduction.
For the first time since 1990, there has been an increase in estimated global poverty, with the
poorest regions (SA and SSA) the hardest hit. Kharas and Hamel’s (2020) revised estimate
of the number of poor people in the world as a result of the pandemic shows that about 690
million people are likely to be in poor households in 2020, compared to their previous
estimate of 640 million people. Their post-COVID-19 estimate of extreme poverty is that
the world will see a rise this year of about 50 million people compared to their original 2020
estimate and by 40 million people compared to their 2019 forecast. Kharas and Hamel
noted further that “the number is, however, far smaller than the estimates put forward in
one scenario by Sumner and co-authors [Sumner, Hoy, and Ortiz-Juarez 2020], who
suggested that poverty could rise by 420 million to 580 million people, a figure that has
been picked up by the media and advocacy organizations as ‘half a billion’ ” (Kharas and
Hamel 2020). The IMF scenario for 2020 suggests that all the progress in reducing poverty
since the launch of the SDGs in September 2015 has been lost, and that 2020 will be the first
time in this century that the number of poor people will rise, a fact which can be seen in real
time as the World Poverty Clock ticks “backward” (IMF 2020c). This setback comes after a
period of poverty reduction, averaging almost 100 million people per year between 2008 and
2013 (Kharas and Hamel 2020). The authors have tried to identify the most seriously
affected countries of the COVID-19 crisis, and show 12 countries likely to experience an
increase in poverty of over 1 million people in 2020 as a result of the pandemic. They are
located mainly in Asia and Africa, with the exception being Brazil. India and Nigeria are
likely to add 10 million and 8 million to the poverty rolls in 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic
has underscored the vulnerability of people who have only recently been able to escape
poverty. See, also, Lele, Bansal, and Meenakshi (2020).
Analysis done by Schmidhuber and Qiao (2020) of FAO shows that most countries are
more dependent on imports today than they were 20 years ago. This has made observers
worry that disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic could trigger a repeat of the food
crisis of 2007–8, when a sharp rise in prices was exacerbated by panicking governments.
(See, also, Schmidhuber, Pound, and Qiao [2020].)
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Agricultural Productivity Growth across Regions and Countries Using
Various Measures and Relationship to Structural Transformation
Changes in poverty and hunger need to be seen in the context of structural transformation,
movement of population out of agriculture to higher productivity manufacturing, and its
relationship to the farm structure, which has been changing, too, with growing differenti-
ation in farm sizes across countries and substantial differences among countries and over
time in their agricultural productivity growth. This performance, in turn, influences prog-
ress on structural transformation, but it is unclear if a reduction in rural population through
urban migration increases average labor productivity, or whether an increase in labor
productivity results in a reduction in the share of labor in agriculture through rural–urban
migration. Differing rates of demographic transition add to the complexity. Demographic
transition was very rapid in East Asia but is the slowest in SSA with SA in the middle.
Our analysis of structural transformation evolved from a two-sector to a three-sector
analysis, providing new insights. It started with a transformation of the economies from
agriculture to the nonagricultural sector using data on 127 countries, covering a 34-year
period (1980–2013) (Lele, Agarwal, and Goswami 2013, 2014, 2018). The data generated by
FAO provided estimates of economically active populations in the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors and was an input into the World Bank’s study of “Accelerating Agri-
cultural Productivity Growth” in India (World Bank 2014). Our work essentially followed
Timmer’s approach to structural transformation. It showed that:
1. India had fallen behind in structural transformation relative to China and Indonesia,
by several different criteria: that is, decline in the share of population in agriculture at
the beginning and the end of the period, share of manufacturing sector in the
economy over time, and demographic transition, even though the three countries
started with similar initial conditions in the early 1960s of small farm-dominated
agriculture. Indonesia developed a thriving plantation sector, producing rubber, palm
oil, and other cash crops, albeit at the cost of rapid deforestation, typically not
measured either in the work on transformation, or in Fuglie’s TFP estimates. Pro-
ductivity, measured as value-added per worker, increased in all three countries in both
the agricultural and the nonagricultural sector, a unique achievement compared to
other developing regions.
2. The productivity in the nonagricultural sector was faster than in agriculture in all
three countries, more so in China than in India. Indonesia’s growth stumbled during
the 1997 financial crisis and resumed after a lag.
3. Internal terms of trade between agriculture and nonagriculture moved in favor of the
nonagricultural sector in all three countries: that is, relative prices moved against
agriculture.
The next stage of our analysis (Lele, Goswami, and Nico 2017) used panel data on a
three-way sectoral breakdown of employment in agriculture, manufacturing, and service
sectors for 139 (104 developing + 35 developed) countries over the 1991–2014 period, from
International Labour Organization (ILO)–Global Employment Trend (GET). ILO’s break-
down of employment in the agriculture, manufacturing, and service sectors is based on
household labor force surveys and employment surveys, and therefore, likely measures
labor input in sectors, including in agriculture, more accurately than FAO’s earlier estimates
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of the economically active population in agriculture without the actual input. It is an
important breakthrough in understanding the process of structural transformation.
Where does labor move when it leaves agriculture—to the manufacturing or the service
sector? And what are the labor productivity differences in these sectors? A difference in the
ILO and FAO data used earlier, apart from the intersectoral breakdown of employment, is
in the estimation of labor input.¹² With a few notable exceptions, ILO estimates of labor in
agriculture, which measures labor input more directly than FAO, as the population
dependent on agriculture, are lower than FAO estimates of labor in agriculture: for example,
in Brazil. There are also some differences in trends in the labor inputs in agriculture between
the FAO and ILO data. This data set helped us to explore differences in employment
generated and changes in productivity of labor in the agriculture, industry, and service
sectors over time. The analysis covered the period of rapid economic growth in developing
countries—that is, from the 1990s—and the slowdown since the 2007–8 crisis.
Difference in the shares in GDP and employment is at the heart of structural transfor-
mation, and the difference is much larger in developing countries at early stages of
development, reflecting the large backlog of labor in the traditional sector. This difference
narrows (approaches to near zero) rapidly, as per capita income increases and labor moves
out of agriculture to other sectors. In developed countries the shares of value-added and
employment are very close and reach near zero as income increases.
The share of value-added in the industrial sector in total GDP increases with the increase
in per capita income, first in both developing and developed countries, but then the share of
value-added in the industrial sector starts to decline in developing countries, exhibiting the
phenomenon of premature deindustrialization (Rodrik 2016). Furthermore premature
deindustrialization occurs at earlier income levels in developing countries. The inverted
U-shaped trend in the share of industrial value-added with changes in per capita income
means that as countries mature in their economic growth process, industry’s share in GDP
declines. Regional analysis shows different results: African countries are by far the most
diverse in patterns of structural transformation.
Thinking has evolved not only on what numbers tell us about poverty and hunger, but
what measures to use to assess farm productivity and changes in it, and how it is related to
farm structure: that is, to the distribution of farm sizes and changes in them over time.
Considerable consensus existed for nearly half a century, perhaps when markets were less
dynamic, that small farms are more productive than medium and large farms, and produc-
tivity was often measured in terms of yields per unit of land. The international development
community has supported small farm development based on that consensus. Over the past
decade, however, there has been more extensive use of TFP as a measure, replacing partial
productivity; the former is done using panel data across time periods to determine changes,
and improved econometric methods have helped in this measurement (Foster and
Rozensweig 2017; Gautam and Ahmed 2018; Rada and Fuglie 2019). Since land is the
scarce factor in Asia with little scope for land expansion, this may be an appropriate
¹² FAO’s data on the economically active population refer to the number of employed and unemployed
persons, including those seeking work for the first time, and cover employers; self-employed workers; salaried
employees; wage earners; unpaid workers assisting in a family, farm, or business operation; members of producers’
cooperatives; and members of the armed forces. The economically active population is also called the labor force.
ILO’s data on employment refer to all persons above a specified age, who were, during a specified brief period—
either one week or one day—in the following categories: paid employment (whether at work or with a job but not
at work) and self-employment (whether at work or with an enterprise but not at work). For the purposes of the
aggregate sectors (agriculture, industry, and services), definitions of the International Standard Industrial Clas-
sification (ISIC) System were used.
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measure there and not necessarily in LAC and SSA. Nevertheless, the consensus on efficacy
of small farm development has broken down, with growing recognition of the importance of
factor markets in agriculture and access to inputs in determining farm factor productivity,
including in LAC and SSA.
Several key areas of economies of scale: include (1) skills and technology; (2) finance and
access to capital; and (3) the organization and logistics of trading, marketing, and storage.
(See, for example, Collier and Dercon [2014]; Dercon and Gollin [2014].) Related reasons
for questioning traditional thinking—namely, that small farms are more productive than
medium and large farms—include:
1. Questions about the historical, theoretical, and empirical validity of the body of
literature on the leading role of agriculture in transformation;
2. The changing comparative advantage of small and large farms under globalization
and its consequences, from the growing injection of external capital into agriculture or
FDI, also often described as “land grab” in SSA;
3. More importantly, investments by the African urban elite in farming (Jayne et al.
2014), with communal land increasingly being converted to private ownership in
collaboration with officials. This latter is understandably less controversial than land
acquired through FDI:
4. Inability of small farmers to compete, in responding to the new opportunities
provided by the growth of value chains and supermarkets; and
5. Returns to investment in agriculture, relative to other sectors. With improved access
to inputs, in Bangladesh, even the tiniest farms can use fertilizer, high-yielding crop
varieties, and increasingly are able to rent mechanization services, with consequent
positive effects on farm productivity.
A recent nuanced consensus has emerged that productivity exhibits a U-shaped distri-
bution with respect to farm size, across a broad range of countries with quite different levels
of per capita income and farm size (Rada and Fuglie 2019: for example, in Bangladesh and
India. At one end of the spectrum with a predominance of small farms are countries like
China and Tanzania, and at the other end, in Brazil, even the smallest farms are often
multiple times the size of the large farms in Bangladesh and China. Overall mid-size farms
may lose the labor advantage of small farms without the advantage of access to better factor
and output markets of large farms. Access to capital to substitute machines for labor and
output markets are clearly important incentives to increasing productivity on medium-sized
farms. A variety of institutional innovations have emerged to use mechanical equipment: for
example, through the emergence of rental markets. Characteristics such as soil quality,
thought to be better on small farms, seem not to have held up when tested empirically (Bevis
and Barrett 2020). At the same time, measurement error and heterogeneity together account
for as much as 70 percent of the dispersion in measured productivity. Yet, another
revisionist view in recent years is that the potential for efficiency gains through reallocation
of land across farms and farmers may be relatively modest (Gollin and Udry 2019; Rada and
Fuglie 2019).
The reason for the U-shaped curve, with respect to farm size, seems to be that the
smallest farms are able to cultivate their land intensively mostly using their own labor, but as
farm size increases, the ability to mobilize additional resources does not increase commen-
surately until the farms reach a significant size, when they are able to deploy machinery and
have access to capital. Institutional changes within countries, such as secure rental contracts
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in China, which Bangladesh still lacks, and access to small-scale machinery in Bangladesh,
which liberalization of imports has enabled, make a difference in outcomes. By reporting the
measurement of technical efficiency by farm size, Gautam and Ahmed (2018) argued that
further policy reforms, such as more secure land tenure in Bangladesh, will also encourage
less efficient, larger farms to rent their land to smaller farmers who are more efficient, with
the farm sector as a whole moving closer to the technical efficiency frontier, as these large
farms seem to encounter greater technical inefficiency problems than small farms.
Although evidence has accumulated on how TFP can be increased by reducing techno-
logical inefficiency and by improving policy, infrastructure, and institutions (Fuglie 2012),
there is now extensive evidence, also, which we presented in earlier chapters, that there has
been substantial difference in TFP growth among regions, and between low-, middle- and
high-income countries. East Asian countries have experienced the most rapid growth,
followed by West Asia, and Latin America.
Despite a leg-up, starting with the Green Revolution, TFP in SA has not maintained high
growth. Africa’s productivity growth is the slowest. Productivity growth by income levels of
countries also shows that higher income countries perform better, while LICs perform the
least well. Hence, country-specific strategies are needed to improve markets of particular
importance to particular countries.
The cause and effect of this is unclear, but our research does show that high-income
countries invest much more in agriculture, when measured as the share of GDP invested in
agriculture, than do LICs. This phenomenon is related in part to the low savings and
investment rates of LICs, as we documented in Chapter 2, and low investment in human
and institutional capital, for which we offer reasons later.
How does TFP growth relate to structural transformation of countries? In a closed
economy, rapid productivity growth in agriculture assures increased supply of “wages
goods”—that is, food, fiber, and other raw materials—as well as labor supply to a burgeon-
ing urban/manufacturing sector, increased savings and investments for growth of the
manufacturing sector, and rural markets for good and services in the manufacturing sector.
W. Arthur Lewis (1954) and Johnston and Mellor (1961) articulated these intersectoral
linkages, and Timmer (2009) formalized these relationships. How has this played out in
reality? Writings of Lewis and early scholars of transformation did not devote much
attention to the issues of how markets develop and evolve and how they operate in absence
of regulation. They assumed that intersectoral transfers of food, labor, and capital occur
automatically in the course of transformation.
Recent analysts have devoted considerable energy to developing literature on value
chains; most notable among them is Thomas Reardon. He acknowledged in a paper
coauthored with Barry Popkin, whose work has focused on dietary transition, that the
literature on value chains has lacked integration of different strands, particularly relating to
deteriorating diet quality, a process Popkin and Reardon (2018) described in their work on
supermarkets and changing food habits in Latin America. The phenomenon, they noted, is
also accompanying development of supermarkets and subsequent phases of value chains in
Asia and Africa. “The Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region faces a major diet-related
health problem,” with enormous economic and social costs, which they argued is a result of
profound shifts:
Major shifts in intake of less-healthful low-nutrient-density foods and sugary beverages,
changes in away-from-home eating and snacking and rapid shifts towards very high levels
of overweight and obesity among all ages along with, in some countries, high burdens of
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stunting. Diet changes have occurred in parallel to, and in two-way causality with, changes
in the broad food system—the set of supply chains from farms, through midstream
segments of processing, wholesale and logistics, to downstream segments of retail and
food service (restaurants and fast food chains). (Popkin and Reardon 2018, 1028)
They “marry and integrate the nutrition transition literature with the literature on the
economics of food system transformation,” thus far largely unconnected, a phenomenon
they called “two ships passing in the night” (Popkin and Reardon 2018, 1028).
Documenting the “rapid growth and transformation of that broad food system in LAC,
with the rapid rise of supermarkets, large processors, fast food chains and food logistics
firms” is a “double-edged sword” (Popkin and Reardon 2018, 1028). With respect to
negative dietary trends, they noted the “the rise of consumption of fast food and highly
processed food . . . in parallel to various positive trends, e.g. the reduction of the cost of food,
de-seasonalization, increase of convenience of food preparation reducing women’s time
associated with that, and increase of availability of some nutritious foods like meat and
dairy” (Popkin and Reardon 2018, 1028).
The authors noted further:
One striking aspect of the conditioners of food system transformation in LAC is that the
central influential policy was dismantling of government control of the food system—
liberalization of FDI, elimination of food price controls and subsidies, privatization of the
government systems of food and farm input distribution—that was largely not accom-
panied by regulations that managed the rapid development of the private food system,
with the exception of some public food safety and phytosanitary standards. The latter were
regulations encouraged by global food companies. However, the social consequences of
the food system transformation, e.g. the impacts on health . . . were not part of the public
debate. There was also little or no regulatory attention to curbing bad health effects (e.g.
taxes on sodas and required caloric labelling). Debates on them have only recently begun
in LAC. (Popkin and Reardon 2018, 1040)
Regulatory systems need to be further developed. Popkin and Reardon (2018, 1057) argued
that “when consumers demand healthier foods and beverages, we will begin to see these
changes for an array of fiscal and regulatory reasons.” Chile, Mexico, and Brazil have begun
to adopt such actions. It is unclear if such regulation is a result of stronger consumer
demand for healthy food, or improved technical knowledge among policymakers on the
role of nutrition for health. It could also be a result of international advocacy. Future
research should better understand the origins of policies. Computational power and data
multiply every two years, but the road ahead is long and success will not be easy. Asia and
Africa are behind Latin America in urbanization, but the challenges of unhealthy food
systems and weak regulation remain equally daunting.
As the SOFI 2020 report indicates: “many lower-income countries, where populations
already suffer nutrient deficiencies, may need to increase their carbon footprint in order to
first meet recommended dietary needs and meet nutrition targets, including those on
undernutrition” (FAO et al. 2020, xxiv). We can expect, therefore, to see these themes
further explored in the lead-up to, and including, the Food Systems Summit in 2021 and
three of the specific objectives that will focus on “shifting to sustainable consumption
patterns”; “nature-positive production at sufficient scale” and “advancing equitable liveli-
hoods and value distribution” (UN 2020d).
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Stalling of structural transformation in India and SSA, relative to East and Southeast
Asian countries, is in part because agricultural productivity growth has been slower,
population growth higher, and investment in R&D and physical and human capital lower
than in the countries in East and Southeast Asia. Even Bangladesh, which was well behind
India, has made more rapid progress, especially since 1996, by adopting a variety of reforms
and moving toward transformation (Gautam and Ahmed 2018). (See Lele [2019] for a
comparison of growth in India, China, and Bangladesh.)
Yet, in India, unlike in SSA, overall supply of food has not been a challenge. More
significant is uneven performance across regions in the absence of a national food market,
thwarted by the policy of Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee Act until 2020, and
the lack of an effective demand for food.¹³
Agri-food supply chains, including processors; wholesalers and retailers; traditional,
small-scale operations; family operated stores; and modern processors and supermarkets
now constitute 70 to 80 percent of the value-added that consumers pay outside the farming
sector—that is, in the service sector—which creates nonfarm employment. Farmers with
market access and larger farms have an edge over small farmers with poor links to markets.
Kshirsagar and Gautam (2013) documented this well in the case of India.
Not all the evidence related to transformation enables the telling of a consistent story: for
example, about industrialization. Martin and Mitra (2001) provided evidence that agricul-
tural productivity growth was higher than industrial productivity growth in 49 countries for
which they analyzed data during the 1967–92 period. Considerable recent evidence pre-
sented in the preceding chapters, however, shows no convergence in the rates of agricultural
productivity among regions, and the levels are the lowest in SSA. The lack of convergence
seems to be related to the limited transferability of biological agricultural technology, as
technology is often more location-specific than we assume, due to highly divergent ecolog-
ical conditions. In the case of hybrid sorghum and millet varieties delivered by the
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), they have
spread more rapidly in India than in Africa due to the presence of a more active private
sector in India (K. Shalinder, personal communication, June 22, 2020).¹⁴ Thus, location-
specific research and technology development is needed, and often this has been lacking.
¹³ India’s Agricultural Produce Marketing Act (APMA) is a relic of the colonial period. It was intended to
regulate market fees that producers pay to middlemen by individual states enacting laws—given agriculture is a
state subject. APMAs were meant to avoid farmer exploitation by middlemen, first initiated with regard to cotton
marketing and exports in the 1930s. In the 1960s a number of states passed APMAs and appointed Agricultural
Produce Marketing Committees, but over time, the committees became a vested interest, more interested in
collecting fees than reforming market infrastructures. They limited the freedom of farmers to sell produce to
outsiders in or outside the states, as technology enabled digital information and online sales, thereby reducing
options of and returns to farmers. In May 2020, the central government announced it would formulate a central
policy that will allow interstate sale of commodities, including online sales. It will have to garner support from
state governments, some of which are opposed to reforms.
¹⁴ The Indian seed industry has grown rapidly and is quite robust now. Policy reforms have played a significant
role. (See Singh and Chand 2010; Chauhan et al. 2016.) Where open pollinated varieties (OPVs) are used, such as
in pulses and most of rice, farmers can use their own seed for 3–4 years. Hence, the profit margin for the private
sector is not attractive in OPVs (they are also bulky and another entity can produce OPVs by using the same seed
and sell in the market). With the lack of private sector interest in OPVs, these are mostly made available through
government seed corporations.
ICRISAT India exchanges parent material with SSA countries to be used to develop hybrid lines in that
environment. They have to do crossing and multi-location trials using different parent materials in India and
SSA. Normally, it is not possible simply to transfer the same seed to SSA. They need to do the crossing in those
locations and then, following local policy, they announce the hybrid developed. This is being done currently and,
hopefully, the private sector is likely to emerge in the near future there.
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In the case of machinery, however, although technology is transferable in principle, it may
be indivisible, if the machines are not of the size that can fit small farms, as noted by Foster
and Rozensweig (2017) in India.
Furthermore, we provide considerable evidence of premature deindustrialization in many
countries with rapid growth of the service sector. Some of this evidence may be explained, in
part, by the nature of the data. Services reported earlier as manufacturing have been separated
now and are reported as belonging to the service sector. There is more to the slow progress on
industrialization in India, compared to China. See Lele and Goswami (2020).
While there is growing attention to sustainability issues, defining sustainability has been a
challenge. In addition, there are many different interpretations of sustainability, rather than
actual empirical evidence of sustainability (Echeverría 2020). Sustainability is not incorpo-
rated in the measurement of productivity growth in agriculture across countries, as we
reported earlier. The TFP measurement for Southeast Asian countries, which we discussed
in Chapter 2, includes the value of oil palm production, but does not include the loss of
forests and carbon emissions caused by it. Several countries (OECD and emerging coun-
tries) have adopted targets, plans, and policies to mitigate GHGs or to facilitate adaptation
to climate change, but only New Zealand and Ireland have clear legally binding targets
(OECD 2020). World Bank projects’ measurement of carbon emissions or reduction in
them is ad hoc.
Several projects address issues of water savings, but unlike in China, where an integrated
approach to water savings is pursued, there is little systematic measurement of water savings
(Lele 2021, forthcoming). We provide some examples of quantitative measurement—for
example, studies that explore the environmental dimensions quantitatively, such as the
growth of area under minimum tillage in Brazil, leading to increased sustainability of land
use, or the economics and environmental impacts of land conversion of forests to oil palm
in Malaysia and Indonesia, and why without sizeable payments for environmental services,
land conversion is difficult to contain in light of dynamic demand for palm oil in Asia. Yet,
overall, notwithstanding the massive literature, environmental sustainability has not re-
ceived the attention it deserves (Bhattacharyya et al. 2015; Noel et al. 2015; Nkonya,
Mirzabaev, and von Braun 2016). Much of the work is fragmented, such as on water,
forestry, soils, or climate change, rather than with an integrated view of sustainability.
Role of Small, Medium, and Large Farms
Issues of productivity by farm size and its determinants, as we discussed earlier, are
fundamental to poverty reduction, food and nutrition security, and environmental sustain-
ability. We discuss here the sheer magnitude of the small farmer challenge globally and
suggest that farms of all sizes have an important role, either directly or indirectly, in poverty
alleviation and structural transformation from agriculture to nonagriculture, including
industrial development. FAO estimates are by far the most comprehensive and documen-
ted, as we described in Chapter 2. While not perfect, they are based on national agricultural
censuses carried out in more than 100 countries, using standard concepts, albeit conducted
at different times. Other estimates are based on household surveys, which, typically, have
attracted much attention from researchers, but are not representative and focus only on
small farms. Globally, as much as 84 percent of farms are smaller than 2ha, and they operate
only about 12 percent of farmland; they have been at the center of external assistance for
more than half a century, particularly the assistance of IOs. In countries at lower levels of
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income, smaller farms operate a far larger share of farmland than do smaller farms in higher
income countries. In low- and lower middle-income countries, as well as in countries of
EAP (excluding China), SA, and SSA, 70–80 percent of farms are smaller than 2ha and
operate about 30 to 40 percent of the land (Lowder, Skoet, and Raney 2016). Globally,
Lowder, Skoet, and Raney (2016, 24) estimate that more than 410 million farms are less than
1ha in size, and more than 475 million farms are less than 2ha in size, supporting claims
that there are about 500 million small farms worldwide (those with less than 2ha). Further
analysis by FAO has underscored “the importance of not referring to family farms and small
farms (i.e., those of less than 2ha) interchangeably: the latter account for 84 percent of all
farms worldwide, but operate only around 12 percent of all agricultural land, and produce
roughly 36 percent of the world’s food” (Lowder, Sánchez, and Bertini 2019, v).
Clearly, small farms alone are not feeding the world, as is sometimes mistakenly asserted
and as we documented in Chapter 2. And indeed, most of the world’s exports, except for
rice, come from North and South America. Yet, 400 to 500 million small farms involve at
least 2 billion people, assuming a family size of four, and they have the potential to make
rural areas, where there is the most food insecurity and poverty, more food secure. Hence,
the SDGs’ focus on smallholder agriculture, which is the focus of IOs and assistance as well.
In Chapter 2, we documented that small farms are getting smaller (in Asia, and increas-
ingly, in Africa), and large farms are getting larger, mostly in the Americas. There appears to
be little land consolidation in developing countries of Asia, outside of China, in part because
progress on land titling has been slow, although technological progress on land registration
has been considerable.
Emergence of medium-sized farms seems to be an important trend in Africa. How real is
this trend? Jayne and Muyanga (2018) described it and defined medium-scale farms as
ranging from 5ha. to 100ha. Using demographic household survey data over time, they
showed that the share of these farms in total cultivated land in Africa is growing relative to
the customary land cultivated by small farmers, a result of the larger role of urban, middle-
class Africans investing in agriculture. “The rapid rise of medium-scale holdings in most
cases reflects increased interest in land by urban-based professionals or influential rural
people. About half of these farmers obtained their land later in life, financed by nonfarm
income” (Jayne et al. 2016, 197). Many medium-scale farms, owned by influential rural
and urban people, purchase land in customary areas and convert it to leasehold or freehold
titled land.
Jayne and Muyanga (2018) observed that with rapid population growth, small farms are
getting smaller in Africa, and food surplus is coming from a small number of these medium-
scale farms with few growth linkages to the rest of the rural areas. It is the kind of
phenomenon that Lele and Mellor (1981) described in their paper, “Technological Change,
Distributive Bias and Labour Transfers in a Two Sector Economy.” Depending on the
nature of technological bias, whether capital- or labor-intensive, farm sizes and technologies
tend to have very different implications for rural employment and the nature of direct and
indirect growth linkages, depending on the size of marketed surpluses and rural employ-
ment that farms generate. Marketed surpluses also affect home consumption and food
prices, given the differing income elasticities of food for different farm households.
Relatedly, Jayne, Chamberlin, and Benfica (2018) noted nearly three decades later:
New private actors are investing heavily in areas of agricultural commercialisation. Sitko,
Burke, and Jayne (2018) document the rapid investment by large-scale traders in regions
where medium-scale farms (and hence marketed farm surpluses) are growing rapidly. The
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sheer volume of food needed to support Africa’s rapidly growing cities is creating major
new opportunities for not only farmers, but for small- and medium-scale trading and
processing enterprises within food value chains (Reardon 2015). (Jayne, Chamberlin, and
Benfica 2018, 782)
This literature illustrates the role of medium-sized farms in agricultural development as new
production techniques, digitalization, and marketing are being used. As these new farms
produce for urban markets, the need for imports of food staples (for example, rice) could
decline if urban households switch to more indigenous crops. The purchasing power of
“influential rural and urban people” will continue, however, increasingly supplemented by
local, institutional capital, attracted to such enterprises as they see the business risks being
reduced.
The IOs reviewed in this book have consistently embraced a small farm strategy for more
than half a century. There has been a growing literature in the last decade questioning the
focus on the small farm only, and raising the trade-offs between production, employment,
rural poverty alleviation, and urban food requirements. Some economists have supported
development of medium-scale and large farms, arguing that the burgeoning urban demand
for food in Africa can only be met by supporting larger farmers (Collier and Dercon 2014;
Dercon and Gollin 2014). Africa’s food import dependence has increased, and therefore, it
is imperative to support larger farmers. Furthermore, if more labor is pulled out of
agriculture, labor productivity, and presumably TFP, increases in both sectors. Next, we
explore how those productivities evolve by farm size based on evidence.
To understand these various strands of argument, we first empirically examined the
process of structural transformation, now quite different than that envisaged by W. Arthur
Lewis (1954) and Simon Kuznets (1955, 1966).
Using ILO data for 139 (104 developing + 35 developed) countries over 1991 to 2014 for
three sectors—the agriculture, industry, and service sectors—we tested these ideas. In earlier
analysis, we had done so using two sectors starting in 1980 (Lele, Agarwal, and Goswami
2018). Three-sector analysis of this more recent period showed that whereas developed and
developing countries as a group follow the behavior that Lewis (1954) and Kuznets (1955,
1966) described, there are considerable differences across regions and within countries in
this pattern. Concern about premature deindustrialization is strongly confirmed from the
data, with those developing countries generally lagging in SDGs, such as in SA and Africa,
also lagging in structural transformation. Their share of agriculture in GDP has declined
rapidly, but their share of employment in agriculture has not declined rapidly enough. As a
result, a large share of poverty remains in rural areas. Their demographic transition has
been slower, too. Unlike in East Asia, birth rates have declined less slowly than death rates.
Land, labor, and total factor productivity in agriculture has grown, but more slowly than
countries where irrigated wheat and rice or plantation crops have accelerated transforma-
tion. Much of the employment growth has occurred in the service sector rather than in
manufacturing. Even when labor has migrated to urban areas, it has led to the creation of
more slums, rather than a labor force finding employment in manufacturing in large
numbers.
Regression analysis showed that the share of employment in agriculture to total employ-
ment declines in developing countries and labor productivity in agriculture increases
rapidly, but this growth in productivity tapers off as per capita income grows, whereas in
developed countries agricultural worker productivity growth accelerates, as we showed in
Chapter 2. This is, perhaps, because FAO data on the Agriculture Orientation Index (AOI)
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of government expenditures continue to increase in industrial countries—that is, the
countries continue to invest in agriculture—whereas developing countries, other than
China, have failed to do so. The AOI measures the central government’s contribution to
the agriculture sector, compared to the sector’s contribution to GDP.
In developing countries, agricultural value-added per worker increases at an increasing
rate, unlike in developing countries, perhaps because of the continued higher investment in
agriculture. The inverted U-curve trend in the share of industrial value-added, with changes
in per capita income, reveals the phenomenon of premature deindustrialization—as coun-
tries mature in their economic growth process, industry’s share in GDP declines. Value-
added per worker in industry rises faster in developed countries than developing countries,
and in the service sector it increases at the same rate in the two groups of countries, as per
capita income grows. The results for all 139 countries (38 developed and 101 developing)
suggest that the elasticity of labor productivity, with respect to changes in per capita income,
is highest in agriculture, followed by the industry and service sectors in developing econo-
mies. In developed economies, however, the elasticity of labor productivity is highest in
industry, followed by the service and agriculture sectors, as we showed in Chapter 2. This
outcome in the developing economies could be a result of increased investment in agricul-
ture, but it could also be explained by the rapid withdrawal of labor from agriculture to the
industrial or the service sector. The difference in patterns of structural transformation
across regions is characterized by where the displaced labor goes. In LAC, labor productivity
in nonagriculture is lower than in agriculture, supporting the findings of Martin and Mitra
(2001) (as we discuss later), so that the process of growth slows down. Labor productivity in
other regions is higher in industry than in services. Where labor moves predominantly to
the service sector, the process of growth is slower. As per capita income increases, the
difference between the share of value-added in agriculture and the share of employment in
agriculture approaches zero (as labor moves out of agriculture), as poverty in agriculture
declines and productivity differences between agriculture and nonagricultural sectors close.
Countries exporting food, agricultural raw materials, and manufactures show these tenden-
cies, but the rest of the SSA subgroups (such as exporters of fuels and exporters of ores and
metals) do not. All subgroups, except food-exporting countries, show signs of premature
deindustrialization at different per capita GDP thresholds.
There also continues to be a debate on the role of agriculture vs. industry in terms of
economic growth. Industry has traditionally been considered to be the escalator of growth,
first articulated by Kaldor (1966) and later by Page (2015), Rodrik (2016), and others,
noting that elasticity of demand for industrial products tends to be higher than for
agriculture or the service sector until the economy matures. In addition, technological
change is faster, and the scope for productivity growth greater, in the industrial sector
than in agriculture. Therefore, the faster the growth of manufacturing, the faster the growth
of overall GDP. Indeed, today’s industrialized countries experienced more rapid growth of
manufacturing than GDP growth from the 1950s until 1973, after which their manufactur-
ing growth decelerated and even became negative, and the service sector came into the
ascendancy, which was explained largely in terms of higher income elasticity of demand for
services than manufacturing in mature economies.
Dasgupta and Singh (2006, 16), like several others we reviewed, noted “pathological
deindustrialization” in several Latin American and African countries in the 1980s and
1990s. Per capita income fell for almost a quarter of a century after 1982 in SSA. They
explained the triple phenomenon of premature deindustrialization, jobless growth of
manufacturing in the formal sector, and faster growth of services than of manufacturing.
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They used the Kaldorian framework and generalizations derived by Kaldor about the
relationship between the growth of output and employment in different sectors of the
economy. The service sector, consisting of information and communications technology
(ICT), telecommunications, business services, and finance, is replacing or complementing
manufacturing as a new or as an additional engine of economic growth in emerging
countries, in much the same way that we documented the case of the changing structure
of trade in goods and services in the Introduction.
Page (2015) explained failure to industrialize in SSA by a combination of factors related
to trade, agglomeration, and skills. He argued Africa and India no longer have the option of
labor-intensive exports, which East Asia experienced earlier. Technology has been changing
rapidly, and it calls for complex networked interactions.
The new narrative of global supply chains, however, has stressed the close complemen-
tarity of industry and service sectors during globalization, with a less clear distinction of the
“desirability” of manufacturing as the escalator of growth. Bangladesh and Vietnam have
done well on manufacturing. So, it is likely that some countries will do better than others. In
the meantime, the global supply chains, which were given credit in the literature as sources
of growth, focusing particularly on East Asia as the hub, had already slowed by 2018 (IMF,
World Bank, and WTO 2018). The IMF and other analysts attributed the slowing of the
global trade to the China–US trade dispute. The global COVID-19 crisis, with growing
evidence of dependence on China for supply chains of medical equipment, has reinforced
concerns about undue dependence on trade.
Developing countries spend a lower share of total expenditures on agriculture than their
industrial counterparts, and they spend much of that support in the form of input subsidies.
Despite those subsidies, some like Argentina and India implicitly tax their agriculture, as the
OECD’s Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2020 report noted (OECD 2020).
Only one-eighth of total support goes to agricultural innovation systems, inspection and
control systems, and rural infrastructure. If those are excluded, then their support for public
goods, particularly for research, extension education, and transportation that would link
farms to markets, is limited indeed (UNCTAD 2019). These findings are significant, given
other evidence that:
1. Traditional sources of OECD ODA are shrinking relative to other sources (for
example, private finance, remittances, philanthropy, and South–South cooperation);
2. Competition from other sectors, in need of large-scale capital and promising quick
disbursements, is crowding out investment in agriculture, with the result that public
goods in agriculture have been—and continue to be—underfunded by donors and
governments alike;
3. Rapid growth in the domestic revenues of developing countries has not necessarily
resulted in more resources to agricultural development;
4. There are substantial increases in private sector funding, South–South cooperation,
and remittances, but information is limited on their extent, or how they benefit
agriculture;
5. Innovative sources of financing, such as taxes on transactions, airlines, and auctions,
have not been explored much in areas for climate change mitigation, biodiversity
conservation, and water management; and
6. Governments could provide targeted payments to produce environmental public
goods; however, only a handful of countries have adopted these policies, and they
represent a small share of total support for agriculture.
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Overall Financial Flows to Developing Countries and the Role of
International Organizations
In Chapter 7, we outlined the financing picture. The “Big Five” organizations together spent
or committed about US$21.4 billion annually on food and agriculture (of which about one-
third is humanitarian or emergency assistance assistance) in 2018–19. Their role should be
seen in the context of the overall financial flows, including remittances to developing
countries (OECD 2019b). Those flows reached US$1 trillion in 2010, 3.6 times greater
than 2002, and peaked in 2016 at US$1.5 trillion (in 2016 constant prices) (see Figure 7.1)
(OECD 2018, 2019c).
Over recent years, growth has been driven particularly by rapid increases in remit-
tances, growing almost 4.4 times since 2002, and in private resource flows, predomi-
nantly FDI. Over the past two decades, developing countries have steadily increased
their share of global FDI receipts. FDI has represented one of the largest sources of
developing countries’ external financing, although FDI to developing countries dropped
by about a third over 2016–17, following a 12 percent drop in overall external finance
from 2013 to 2016, as well as project finance down 30 percent in the first quarter of 2018.
External finance to poor countries is declining, despite a promise by the international
community three years ago to increase development finance flows, through private
investment. The latter have remained in decline in recent years, as we discuss below
(OECD 2018).
ODA from advanced economies is below target and has fallen as a share of total
resources received by many developing countries, while other flows such as remittances
and philanthropy are increasing but comparatively small in recent years (OECD 2019c).
In overall financial flows (US$1.3 trillion in 2017), over 46 percent was from private flows,
nearly one-third as personal remittances, only 15 percent from ODA, and the remaining 6
percent was other official flows (OOF), including export credits in 2017. In 2018, net
ODA flows from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries
amounted to US$150.4 billion (constant 2017 US dollars) in the form of grants, official
aid loans, or contributions to multilateral institutions, and this amount had fallen by
2.7 percent from 2017, with a declining share going to the neediest countries (OECD
2019a, 2021).
Total ODA commitments to Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (AFF) amounted to only
US$11.2 billion (constant 2017 US dollars) (see Chapter 7, Figure 7.8).
By 2020, of all the different kinds of financial flows, only ODA flows had slightly
increased to US$161.2 billion, or 0.32 percent of the combined gross national income
(GNI) of OECD member countries, compared to 3 percent in earlier years (USAID
2019a, 2021). According to the World Bank, remittances and private capital flows had
collapsed. Global remittances were projected to decline sharply by about 20 percent in 2020
due to the COVID-19 pandemic and shutdown, the sharpest decline in recent history.
UNCTAD noted that global foreign direct investment fell by 42 percent in 2020, and
outlook remained weakin 2021 (UNCTAD 2021). (See Chapter 7, Figure 7.1.)
Remittance inflows totaled US$706.6 billion in 2019, of which US$550.5 billion was going
to LMICs (an increase of about 4.7 percent over the previous year), and these flows were
projected to reach US$574 billion in 2020 and US$597 billion by 2021, involving some 272
million migrants (Ratha et al. 2019). FDI flows to developed economies had already fallen
sharply to an estimated US$643 billion in 2019, from their revised US$683 billion in 2018
(UNCTAD 2020).
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FDI inflows to AFF increased from US$0.33 billion in 1991 to US$1.8 billion in 2017,
with significant year-to-year volatility. FDI inflows to AFF peaked in 2007, when they
reached a record high of US$11.6 billion (in constant 2010 US dollars) (FAO 2020a).
Role of International Organizations
In these unprecedented times of global pandemic and the post-pandemic challenges, the
world needs extraordinary leadership at the global and national levels of the kind President
Roosevelt provided when he established the United Nations and the Bretton Woods
institutions at the zenith of US economic and military power, when the United States
could have been less magnanimous and less full of forethought. The G20 discussed later in
this chapter has largely accepted and advocated for this world order, although Trump
systematically undermined the multilateral system. FDR coined the term “United Nations,”
first used in the “Declaration by United Nations” of January 1, 1942, during the Second
World War. Representatives of 26 nations pledged their governments to continue fighting
together against the Axis Powers (UN 2020b). The invisible COVID-19 pandemic and the
deep global recession are different, but equally complex challenges to overcome as were the
Axis Powers. COVID-19 respects no borders and quickly became a global epidemic.
The World Bank in Food and Agriculture
Our history of the World Bank is longer than that of other organizations because it has had
the longest and biggest financial presence in the largest number of countries, wrestling with
the evolution of development thought, and particularly, the role of agriculture. Starting in
1944 until the time of this writing in 2020, and covering activities of 14 World Bank
presidents, has allowed us to look at how the rapidly changing external and internal
environment influenced Bank operations. We use periodization as an approach. In 1973,
in a speech by President McNamara in Nairobi at that year’s Annual Meetings in Kenya,
McNamara made the case that the Bank’s mission should be to alleviate “absolute poverty,”
which he described as “a condition of life so degrading as to insult human dignity,” yet, “so
common as to be the lot of some 40% of the peoples of the developing countries”
(McNamara 1973). Since then, poverty alleviation of the lowest income groups has been
the Bank’s central mission, transforming the Bank from a staid infrastructure funding
organization into a premier development organization, although World Bank presidents
prior to McNamara laid a strong foundation for the Bank as well as for agriculture. In 2013,
the Bank added to this mission the need to achieve shared prosperity (World Bank 2018, xi).
Although we have discussed several indicators of performance, including decline in poverty
and hunger, infant and child mortality, nutritional status, stunting and wasting, and total
productivity growth, which are central to the missions of poverty eradication and shared
prosperity, it is not possible to relate these outcomes directly to Bank inventions. However,
there are number of other qualitative ways in which we can determine the World Bank
contribution, and we do so here.
Several key conclusions specific to agriculture contained in Chapter 8 on the World Bank
are highlighted here. First, developing countries’ active voice in the Bretton Woods Con-
ference in 1944, particularly the Mexican representation, forever defined the scope of the
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World Bank, making it an institution addressing reconstruction as well as development.
Second, early presidents, in the 1950 and 1960s, laid important foundations for the Bank’s
role in agriculture. The Green Revolution preceded the McNamara presidency. The Bank’s
contribution and the contribution of US bilateral aid and private foundations to the Green
Revolution has been much deeper and wider, despite the controversy that surrounds it—
more enduring than the Bank’s role in integrated rural development in Africa under
McNamara, although a number of environmental challenges including soil degradation,
water shortages, loss of biodiversity, and GHG emissions have ensued following the Green
Revolution, and regrettably, they have not been addressed as effectively and rapidly as they
should have been. Without the Green Revolution, there would have been no food security or
political stability throughout Asia. Issues currently being debated between developed and
developing countries, including the developing country shares in the Bank’s subscribed
capital and the debt burden, have been perennial since the Bretton Woods Conference,
where 44 delegations met and thrashed out the articles of agreement, and have yet to the
tackled (Lowrey 2012).
Establishment of the International Financial Corporation (IFC) and the Economic
Development Institute (EDI) (now called World Bank Institute) were important to advan-
cing the Bank’s mission in agriculture. EDI offered training on project appraisals for
developing country nationals. EDI was established in 1956 and played a pivotal role in
helping developing countries to prepare projects. Project lending became an innovative
instrument for discreet investments, which the Bank could use to persuade skeptical Wall
Street investors to invest in the Bank, minimizing defaults on loans—an important factor in
the Bank’s ability to mobilize commercial capital on the open market with the backing of
callable capital provided by governments. With its transformation into the World Bank
Institute (WBI), the scope of WBI expanded to develop individual, institutional, and
organizational capacity through knowledge exchange, but it has never achieved the great-
ness of a university within the World Bank (Youker 2003; WBG 2009). IFC remains a very
active player with its lending to agriculture larger than that of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association
(IDA), but IFC’s project-by-project (more appropriately described as “deal-by-deal”)
approach has had limitations in helping developing countries create an overarching envi-
ronment favorable to private investment—which IFC is in the process of shedding in favor
of a more strategic transformative approach (IFC 2019).
Then, in 1960, the Bank established the IDA to provide concessional assistance, starting
with India’s balance of payments crisis in 1958, extending assistance to all LICs, using a
strict GDP per capita income criterion. IDA was instrumental in turning the Bank into the
development institution that it is today. The Bank’s approaches to financing practices have
been adopted by other financial institutions, such as the Asian and African Development
Banks and IFAD. IDA helped turned the Bank into a premier development leader in the
global community (IDA 2007). The latest IDA19 replenishment contains an historic US$82
billion financing package for IDA-eligible countries for fiscal years 2021–3. It is a 3 percent
increase in real terms, compared to IDA18 (IDA 2020), the largest pledge of assistance in a
three-year period by any single organization. And, it is a testament to the confidence that
donors, and increasingly, developing countries have in the Bank as an institution, partic-
ularly those that contribute to IDA. We argue, however, that it is time for the Bank to
increase the voice of its shareholders from emerging and developing countries in its
governance and in defining the Bank’s strategic directions. According to convention, the
United States appoints the Bank president, and Europe appoints IMF’s managing directors.
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All Bank presidents have been American males, with only one woman as an interim acting
president for two months from February to April 2019. And, even with increased voting
shares, developing and transition countries’ shares amount to 46.6 percent (see Chapter 6,
Figure 6.1).
IDA19 builds on the strong momentum of IDA18 to accelerate progress toward the
World Bank Group twin goals of reducing poverty and achieving shared prosperity and the
SDGs. Under the overarching appealing theme of “Ten Years to 2030: Growth, People, and
Resilience,” IDA19 supports the world’s poorest and most vulnerable countries to imple-
ment country-driven solutions that are people-centered, boost economic growth, and bolster
resilience to climate shocks and natural disasters. IDA19 focuses on five special themes: (1)
climate change; (2) fragility, conflict, and violence; (3) gender; (4) governance and institu-
tions; and (5) jobs and economic transformation. IDA19 also incorporates four cross-
cutting issues: debt, disability, human capital, and technology. Together with the IBRD
capital increase, the Bank is the largest lender for development assistance, and particularly,
to food and agriculture, even without considering lending of the entire Bank Group of five
IOs, including IFC (founded in 1956) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA, established in 1988) (MIGA 2015; IFC 2019). The Bank’s role in financial transfers
to developing countries towers over contributions of other international institutions.
Concessional assistance has been critical to minimizing indebtedness, but shares of
agriculture in Bank lending and shares of World Bank lending in total capital flows to
developing countries had declined over time since 1988—yet, the needs of developing
countries have increased, even before the pandemic. It is hard to measure the Bank’s role
in crowding in private capital into developing economies and into agriculture, but it has
been largely limited to helping make transformative policy and institutional changes in
developing countries. An agreement with FAO to create the FAO–CP (cooperative pro-
gram) in 1964 also expanded the Bank’s capacity to lend to softer sectors like food and
agriculture.
With IDA support, the Green Revolution ushered in a package approach of new tech-
nology consisting of hybrid seed, fertilizer, agricultural extension, credit, irrigation, and
market access to farmers, demonstrating that complexity can be addressed in Bank lending.
The IDA support injected energy in the stalled community development program. Working
with the Rockefeller Foundation and the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID), each of which promoted investment in training of scientists through
training abroad and the establishment of land grant universities, the Bank promoted the
package approach throughout Asia (see Heisey and Fuglie 2013).¹⁵ The approach was
nonideological and recognized market failures, creating a public sector delivery system in
extension, seed production and distribution, fertilizer supply, credit, and a government food
procurement program, established as part of the US conditionality of aid in the 1960s. Some
have questioned if the private sector could have played this role then—was government
involvement necessary on such a scale? Our research has led us to conclude that without
¹⁵ The publication, USAID Higher Education: A Retrospective 1960–2020 notes that since the Office of
American Schools and Hospitals Abroad (ASHA) was incorporated into USAID in 1961, USAID/ASHA has
provided assistance “to approximately 300 institutions globally” and aided “in the development of innovative and
state-of-the-art schools, libraries, and medical centers in more than 80 countries,” including in Africa: Cameroon,
Ethiopia, Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Zambia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and
Malawi (McMaster et al. 2019). Had the rates of return to higher education not been wrongly estimated in an
influential World Bank report in the 1980s, compared to returns on basic education, more investment would have
been made in the much needed higher education, particularly in Africa (Tan, Jimenez, and Psacharopoulos 1986).
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government’s role, the Green Revolution would not have occurred on the scale it did. One of
the weaknesses, we point out in Chapter 8, however, was that with the exceptions of China
and Brazil, developing countries have not encouraged the private sector’s role in seed and
fertilizer as rapidly as they could have with better, more predictable policies and enough
public investment in public goods—that is, higher education, research, infrastructure, and
communications—to create a more robust green revolution, as discussed in Chapters 8 and
10 on the World Bank and CGIAR, respectively.
Africa faces far more daunting challenges in developing its agriculture: for example,
limited human, physical, and institutional capital, and more complex ecologies. The
integrated rural development approach to agriculture, which the Bank promoted during
McNamara’s time in the 1970s, and which was supported by donors, worked less well than
in Asia, except for some recent examples of success, such as in Ethiopia. It should be
recalled, however, that the Bank has been present in Africa’s rural development since the
early 1970s. Lele’s early studies of rural development in the 1970s included case studies of
World Bank and the Swedish Assistance to rural development in Ethiopia and other
countries. Yet, few had memories of those projects when Lele visited Africa 20 or 30 years
later. Little of what donors invested remained on the ground, unlike in Asia. Much time was
wasted in agriculture and rural development due to political instability (Lele 1975, 1992).
Several indicators of performance offer evidence: the Bank’s own ratings of project perfor-
mance for well over 2,000 projects in agriculture it has financed over 40 years, presented in
Chapter 8, show ratings of African projects have been poorer than in the rest of the regions,
even when African performance has improved. Given the nature of political systems, weak
internal capacity has been a challenge, even when countries, such as Nigeria and Ghana,
started with well-trained nationals in early years.
A report prepared by the Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities (APLU) for
USAID noted:
Higher education had been relatively neglected for some time by the international
development community, stemming from the belief that it yielded lower social returns
relative to other investments, especially primary and secondary education, and therefore
should receive fewer public resources. Even more importantly, investments in higher
education have often been considered regressive, reproducing existing social and eco-
nomic inequalities. A 1986 World Bank study estimated that social rates of return for
higher education in developing countries were on average 13 per cent lower than the
returns from basic education [Tan, Jimenez, and Psacharopoulos 1986].
These rates of return, however, were calculated using a narrow definition of benefits that
typically considered only worker earnings (including income taxes). Analyses measuring
the larger, broader and well-recognized social benefits lead to substantially different
measures. Re-evaluations of data suggest that traditional estimates of social returns to
higher education do not accurately reflect positive public “externalities,” as metrics have
tended to be based on the private returns measured by wage differentials and the social
costs associated with education.
A [recent] . . . study by Claudio Montenegro and Harry Patrinos [2014] on rates of return
to schooling around the world, which used data from 545 households in 131 economies
from 1970–2011, shows that private rates of return to schooling are significantly higher in
sub-Saharan Africa than in other world regions. . . . This study also found that returns are
highest globally at the tertiary level with a world average of 16.8 percent, while primary
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and secondary returns are at 10.3 percent and 6.9 percent, respectively. Tertiary rates of
return were also highest in sub-Saharan Africa at 21.9 percent. (APLU 2014, iii–v)
Given the state of education in Africa, more donor-funded projects are externally prepared
and are less well vetted internally in Africa. Unfavorable external environments, such as
commodity price declines, have also affected Africa more than most regions.
Neglect of Investment in Research and Education
Investment in R&D similarly has had huge returns, as the Green Revolution and CGIAR
research shows. The World Bank’s vigorous support to large public extension systems,
through the Training and Visit (T&V) system, however, turned out to be a fad, leading to
incentive problems among staff and managers of extension, as well as within the Bank itself
for those who took exception to it (Anderson, Feder, and Ganguly 2006). Issues of scale,
inadequate interaction with the national agricultural research systems (NARS), inability to
attribute benefits, weak accountability, lack of political support, and limited budgetary
resources all posed problems. Domestic stakeholders and external donor agencies also
had different perspectives, posing other challenges. The main cause of the T&V system’s
disappearance was the incompatibility of its high recurrent costs with the limited budgets
available domestically, leading to fiscal unsustainability.
In a study, “Hard Work and Hazard: Young People and Agricultural Commercialisation
in Africa,” Yeboah et al. (2020) examined whether rural transformation will provide farm
and nonfarm employment opportunities for young people in Africa and how youth engage
with the rural economy:
The research was organized around two questions: (1) in commercialisation hotspots,
what pathways do young people use to get themselves started in economic activities? and,
(2) how are the pathways available and outcomes experienced influenced by factors of
social difference, including gender? [The authors identified] three commercialization hot
spots . . . Techiman North District in Brong Ahafo, Ghana; Dumila Ward in Morogoro,
Tanzania; and Mvurwi farming area, Mazowe District, Mashonaland Central Province,
Zimbabwe. Together they represent some of the historical and agro-ecological diversity
within which agricultural commercialization is intensifying. (Yeboah et al. 2020, 144)
The study’s results “challenges the assumption in policy discourse that migration to urban
areas is the default option for rural young people”: the authors do not find clear evidence
that “additional training or skills would make a material difference to the lives of young
people” and yet, “without much better basic education, including but not limited to literacy
and numeracy skills, it is hard to see how the pathways and outcomes of young people will
change for the better” (Yeboah et al. 2020, 150).
Performance of Africa
African projects were too large and complex, relative to Africa’s absorptive capacity, initially
a result of McNamara’s push to meet lending targets he had established for agriculture and
rural development, and did not invest enough resources to build African institutional and
technological capacity (USAID 2013). Unlike in India and other parts of Asia, after an initial
spurt in the 1970s, the Bank and donors such as USAID did not invest in capacity building
in land grant universities globally, as they had in the past, and to the extent that they
continued educational institutions and regional research organizations, did not achieve the
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same effectiveness as in other regions. That USAID approach had been the gold standard
(USAID 2013).
The APLU report on higher education in Africa noted:
A growing body of literature suggests that the conventional estimates of the returns to
investments in higher education do not accurately reflect the social value added by higher
education, including job creation, good economic and political governance, increased
entrepreneurship, and increased intergenerational mobility.
Enrollment in tertiary education in SSA grew by 8.6 percent annually over the past 40
years, compared to 4.8 percent annually on average for the rest of the world. In 1970, there
were approximately 200,000 higher education students in SSA. That number had in-
creased to 4.5 million in 2008 and to 6.3 million in 2011.
Even with this rapid growth in enrollment in higher education institutions in SSA, the
Gross Enrollment Ratio [GER] for higher education is the lowest in the world, at 7.6
percent in 2011 . . . far lower than the global average of 30.1 percent. Therefore, with a very
low GER and a large cohort of 17–20 years olds coming along, the potential for rapid
increases in demand for higher education is quite great.
Despite these dramatic increases in numbers of students, public funding for higher
education increased at only 6 percent annually in SSA from 1970–2008. (APLU 2014,
iv, v–vi)
Africa’s reliance on rainfed agriculture and limited physical infrastructure have been
additional challenges. Furthermore, while food shortages in Asia led to a strong political
commitment to food self-sufficiency, African countries lacked the same political commit-
ment as India, China, or Bangladesh, perhaps because African food deficits were not as dire.
The self-sufficiency imperative was a major driver in Asia, and capacity building by the
United States and private foundations were key to this effort in India and throughout Asia
(Lele and Goldsmith 1986; Lele and Bumb 1994; Lele and Goswami 2020). In contrast to
India, the Chinese investment in human capital has been much more internally driven.
The World Bank’s approach to these challenges changed from one decade to the next.
From the 1970s to the start of the early 1980s, when commodity prices deteriorated and debt
mounted, in Ravi Kanbur’s words, the situation changed from a dogma “where the state
could do no wrong to one where the state could do no right” (Kanbur 2005, 12–13). The era
of structural adjustment was followed more vigorously in the more aid-dependent Africa
than in Asia. Although privatization proceeded, it has not led to a measurable improvement
in performance and produced mixed results, for the reasons Dercon and Gollin (2014)
outlined. Unlike in Latin America, Asian and African countries did not develop a thriving
private sector service delivery. Pursuit of privatization by the Bank in the 1980s was
followed by participatory management in the 1990s. Following the monumental internal
Wapenhans (a senior manager in the Bank) inquiry in the early 1990s, undertaken by the
Bank during the presidency of Lewis Preston, which examined the poor performance of the
Bank lending portfolio and excesses of the structural adjustment period, the Bank shifted
from the top-down approach to lending it had followed to a bottom-up approach. The
principal messages of the Wapenhans report were threefold: (1) the need to improve quality
of lending; (2) the need to improve country ownership; and (3) the need to shift from being
a supply-driven to a demand-driven institution, with greater focus on the countries’ input
into country assistance strategies (World Bank 1992). Community-driven development
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(CDD) was one of the outcomes. It is being practiced widely and has worked better in social
areas than in agriculture. For example, India has the world’s largest numbers of women’s
self-help groups which, while based on India’s own initiative, were helped considerably by
the Bank’s livelihood projects. Participatory irrigation management, however, introduced
when governments were strapped for resources, and agricultural extension have worked less
well—except in China where the idea of participation was embraced and made into its
own—than building community-demanded rural infrastructure, such as access to village-
to-market roads. Mansuri and Rao were highly critical of the CDD approach in the early
2000s (Mansuri and Rao 2004, 2013). Perhaps, both the Bank’s CDD approach and its
evaluators’ views have evolved over time. In Asian countries, like Indonesia and India, CDD
projects, called by different local names (for example, in Indonesia, the Kecamatan Devel-
opment Program [Pollock and Kendrick 2015]; in India, Self-Help Groups [Brody et al.
2015]), are embedded in countries’ own strategies.
In terms of learning by the Bank’s clients, China has demonstrated ability to discrimi-
natingly take on new ideas and make them its own, when Chinese policymakers are
convinced they make sense for China. The Chinese have also been effective implementers
of Bank projects. Among other countries, Vietnam’s agricultural portfolio, albeit smaller
than China’s or India’s, has performed the best, followed by that of China.¹⁶ India received
the maximum amount of IDA and the maximum number of IDA projects, and its
performance has been less stellar than that of China or Vietnam. These differences in
performance among countries and over time have huge lessons for developing countries.
Demand for agricultural lending has been lukewarm since the Bank shifted to using
country demand and country ownership as an approach. This is an important issue which
future research needs to investigate. Governments have found agricultural projects to be
small and slow in disbursing relative to sectors, such as infrastructure and education.
The Bank’s “Vision to Action” report in 1997 and its “Reaching the Rural Poor” report in
2003 on food and agriculture were ineffective in increasing lending to agriculture (Ayres
and McCalla 1997; World Bank 2003). They had emphasized research and extension
through NGOs; sector policy lending in support of policy reforms that governments had
undertaken; and sector investment lending, which in some cases helped consolidate donor
projects into public expenditure support programs.
Rural development, as distinct from agriculture, involved NGOs and community-driven
development—for example, the transfer of responsibilities for irrigation and drainage in
most regions (as in northeast Brazil) to communities, at risk of reliance on overcentralized
bureaucracies; rural finance focused on increased savings; and increased use of microfinance,
¹⁶ The World Bank described Vietnam’s development over the last 30 years as “remarkable.” The Bank
reported:
Economic and political reforms under Đổi Mới, launched in 1986, have spurred rapid economic
growth, transforming what was then one of the world’s poorest nations into a lower middle-income
country. Between 2002 and 2018, GDP per capita increased by 2.7 times, reaching over US$2,700 in
2019, and more than 45 million people were lifted out of poverty. Poverty rates declined sharply from
over 70 percent to below 6 percent (US$3.2/day PPP). The vast majority of Vietnam’s remaining
poor—86 percent—are ethnic minorities.
In 2019, Vietnam’s economy continued to show fundamental strength and resilience, supported by robust
domestic demand and export-oriented manufacturing. Preliminary data indicate that real GDP grew by
about 7 percent in 2019, close to the rate reported in 2018, and one of the fastest growth rates in the region.
(World Bank 2020a)
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less use of subsidies and promotion of increased competition, and land reform through
market-assisted policies (Ayres and McCalla 1997).
The Bank-funded pilot land reform project in Brazil was successful, but it is unclear
how much impact it has had on public policy at large. China’s land reform was internally
driven. Overall, it is unclear how much progress has occurred in countries on issues of land
titling at scale.
The growing criticism of the “Washington Consensus” led President Wolfensohn during
his 10-year tenure (1995–2005) to achieve debt rescheduling in 1996, greater focus on social
safety nets, and increased aid to health and education. Lending to agriculture, however, did
not increase. Poverty reduction was back on the agenda with the rise of CDD and the
adoption of the Comprehensive Development Framework.
The World Development Report (WDR) 2008: Agriculture for Development was a reex-
amination of where the Bank and past assistance had gone wrong and what the direction for
the future should be (World Bank 2007). WDR’s conceptual framework of three worlds in
which it classified countries as predominantly agricultural, transitioning, and urbanized
caught on in the international literature, as a useful device along with its implications for
strategy. TheWDRmade a strong case for greater investment in smallholder agriculture and
created an international buzz. It happened to coincide with a major food and financial crisis
in 2007–8, and there was a temporary rise in investment, but it is unclear if it was due to the
WDR or the food crisis. Overall, we have argued that much of the advocacy on agriculture
by the international community has fallen flat in terms of developing countries investing
more of their own resources, with some notable exceptions, such as China, which has shown
spectacular results.
President Zoellick (2007–12) came to the Bank at the time of the food and financial crises.
Despite many consultations following the crises, as we showed in Chapter 3, the donors’
response to the crises was weak. A notable exception was the Bank’s important Rapid
Response through the Global Food Crisis, amounting to over US$1.6 billion that reached
66 million vulnerable people in 49 countries, mostly in Africa. It set a precedent for rapid
response, which has become good practice in the complex world of COVID-19 and beyond.
Another signature achievement of Zoellick was the open data system, which has thrown
sunshine on Bank operations and made standardized global data widely available, as well as
provided a boost to the development research industry.
The World Bank’s Response to Resilience, Natural Resource Management,
and Climate Change
The Bank’s response to building resilience in the 1960s and 1970s was largely through
investment in surface irrigation for which there has been large potential in Asia and the
Middle East, and through forestry projects. Investment in surface irrigation was also an
important way to keep lending programs to agriculture up, but performance of irrigation
projects has been mixed. Groundwater overdraft and soil degradation have been growing
challenges, which were overlooked in irrigation lending. Over time, the Bank has shifted
from large-scale irrigation to promotion of micro-irrigation and farmer-led irrigation, as
well as investments in forestry projects that have promoted social and community forestry,
sustainable management of tropical forests, poverty reduction, and payment for environ-
mental services, disaster risk management, and more recently, digital agriculture (Dewees,
Kishor, and Ivers 2020). However, on the whole, attention to resilience building has been
relatively small beyond popular approaches, such as highly subsidized crop insurance,
small-scale farmer-led irrigation, and international trade. On healthy food consumption
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the Bank has been promoting nutrition programs for women and children and food safety
standards, but it has not tackled the more difficult issue of dietary transition, which involves
working with the private sector, consumer education, and regulation.
Going Forward for the World Bank
In the preceding discussion, we explored the areas in which the Bank’s lending could be
more focused and prioritize investments in essential public goods, particularly research,
education (capacity building) and extension, and community participation than it has done
so far. It could do more to make factor and commodity markets work better by helping to
improve the overarching policies of governments toward the private sector rather than
financing projects. A study from the World Resources Institute by Searchinger et al. (2018)
is one of the few that takes an integrated view of sustainable development and proposes a
22-item menu of options that could allow the world to achieve a sustainable food future. It
does so by providing a conceptual framework that simultaneously meets growing demands
for food and avoids deforestation, and reforests or restores abandoned and unproductive
land—and in ways that help stabilize the climate, promote economic development, and
reduce poverty, while closing three gaps: the food gap, the land gap and the GHGmitigation
gap. Each country needs to develop such comprehensive approaches, which are currently
lacking. The Bank/IDA can help them in achieving this objective. These options and
approach can well support the forthcoming Food Systems Summit and the need, as stated
by the Secretary General, that “transforming food systems is crucial for delivering all the
SDGS” (UN 2020e).
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAO is a unique organization among the Big Five organizations. It is not a “development”
organization like the other four we review here, which are focused on developing countries.
FAO was conceived as a membership organization of equal partners, 45 member states
when it was established in 1945, and now with 194 member states, 1 member organization
(the European Union [EU]), and two associate members (Faroe Islands and Tokelau).
Understandably, after the Second World War, with widespread incidence of hunger,
nutrition was at the center stage of FAO’s mission. In the 1970s and 1980s, with one of
the sharpest rises in food and energy prices, the sale of US grains to the Soviet Union and the
erosion of US food surpluses in 1972, attention of the international community shifted to
food security, with a focus on meeting the calorie gap. Nutrition has returned to the center
stage since the beginning of the 1990s, with combined efforts with UNICEF on child
nutrition and WHO on health and nutrition (FAO 2015).
FAO was intended to be and continues today as a global platform for discussion of issues
that confront all member countries, in order to reach international agreements on issues,
such as food safety standards, control of cross-border pests and diseases, information and
knowledge on all matters pertaining to food and agriculture—broadly defined to include
forestry, fisheries, livestock, and the management of natural resources. There is much
literature on safety standards too large to summarize here. (See, for example, Unnevehr
and Ronchi [2014]; Jaffee et al. [2019].)
FAO is the only organization among the five with the legitimacy to provide global public
goods with regard to food and agriculture, but over the years it has also been expected to
provide technical assistance to member countries in support of these objectives.
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In Chapter 4 on food security, we document the shifts in FAO’s focus over time from
developing an international consensus on food security, to its downstream work on food
security at the country level, which received much criticism. At the end of the 1990s, FAO
played a critical role in getting “reducing hunger” by half, as part of the twin MDG1 goals
(reducing poverty and hunger), and then retaining and broadening that focus when the UN
adopted the SDGs in 2015. From 2012 to 2013, FAO repositioned itself to monitor progress
on SDG2 (“no hunger”), and over time, it has faced tension concerning its global public
goods (GPGs) function. The reality is, of course, more complex and is related, in part, to
FAO’s financing.
FAO is also unique in the way it has been financed since its establishment. Its financing
has come from assessed contributions of member countries. As these contributions have not
increased in monetary terms and have declined in real terms, FAO has increasingly relied
on voluntary contributions as its agenda has expanded. FAO allocates its assessed contribu-
tions in support of its GPG functions, and voluntary contributions provided by donor
countries steer work accordingly. So, land tenure gets voluntary funding from member
states (for example, from funding from Switzerland and Germany), which may include
bilateral technical assistance. Norway finances antimicrobial resistance (AMR) or locust
control, but again, that is its choice, reflecting the broad development agenda of member
states and support to FAO.
Thus, a matrix to analyze sources of funding and types of programs can be instructive on
what gets funded. If FAO has the assurance of the scale, delivery, and timeliness of payment
delivery of assessed contributions, combined with multilateral governance and strategic
direction funded by assured voluntary support, a stronger FAO could emerge. Yet, as the US
withdrawal from WHO reveals, member countries have not been of one mind.
Out of the biannual budget of about US$2.6 billion (US$1.3 annually), FAO allocates a
portion of its assessed contribution in support of its GPG functions, and voluntary
contributions now provide 61 percent of the total budget (FAO 2020b). It is not surprising,
therefore, that perhaps even inadvertently, donors drive the agenda.
The data FAO collects from countries are a global public good. The data are used
extensively, and the world relies on timely quality data for analysis of the global, regional,
and national food security situation. Its 50X2030: Data-Smart Agriculture initiative is meant
to close the Agricultural Data Gap through a multipartner effort that seeks to bridge the
global agricultural data gap by transforming country data systems across 50 countries in
Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America by 2030. This unprecedented initiative
focuses on improving country-level data by building strong nationally representative
survey programs—building upon the experiences of the FAO Agricultural Integrated Survey
(AGRISurvey) Programme and the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study–
Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS–ISA)—that produce high-quality and timely
agricultural data and make evidence-based decision-making in agriculture the norm.
The locusts in East Africa, the fall armyworm (FAW) in Latin America and Asia, together
with the global pandemic of COVID-19, with diseases spread from plants and animals to
humans, have stressed the importance of both the GPG functions and the country-level
technical programs that FAO can deliver. These capabilities will also provide important
knowledge and direction for at least some of the specific objectives of the forthcoming Food
Systems Summit 2021, including “ensuring access to safe and nutritious food for all”;
“shifting to sustainable consumption patterns”; and “nature-positive production at suffi-
cient scale” (UN 2020d, 2). FAO management, staff, and member states have already been
actively involved in the initial preparations for the Summit.
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FAO played a key role in containing the H1N1 pandemic, working jointly with WHO
and the Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) in containing cross-border spread of H1N1,
which has become endemic in Asia (IEG 2013).
The key issue is the need for funding of FAO on a predictable, sustainable basis, beyond
its current assessed contribution.
CGIAR
CGIAR has made extraordinary contributions to productivity growth since its founding,
mostly through its plant breeding programs and a few key innovations, such as the control
of the cassava mealybug. As yield growth slowed and pressure on natural resources has
increased, the scope of CGIAR’s research has increased and become more complex. Donor
demand on CGIAR to show results on the ground has also increased the shift of research to
applied and adaptive research, which ideally should be carried out by strong and capable
NARS, with CGIAR generating global and regional public goods that require long-term,
complex scientific inputs that are too big for most countries to provide. CGIAR has been in
an almost perpetual state of reform from the start of the new millennium:
• 2001 to 2007: First steps to formalization of governance and management; movement
toward a centralized model
• 2008 to 2015 (June): Transformational change in governance and management
• 2015 (June) to 2016 (July) to present: Further changes to governance and management
• 2019 (November–December): One CGIAR—a unified governance and management
through a reconstituted System Management Board and new Executive Management
Team.
CGIAR’s challenges have been many. First, it has worked to develop an integrated
System-level research program across the System’s 15 independent research centers, with
different research mandates. Second, it seeks to promote research innovations that trans-
form food, land, and water systems, in the context of climate change, to ensure a scientif-
ically sound program. Third, demonstrating its contribution to the realization of SDG2,
CGIAR works to reduce hunger and foster diet diversification by addressing issues of
micronutrient deficiencies. CGIAR must carry out an increasingly complex research agenda
under conditions of fragmented and uncertain financial resources tied to numerous small
projects. Finally, the excessive reliance for food security of the poor on basic staple crops
and livestock (wheat, rice, maize, beans and root crops), which has been at the center of
CGIAR’s research, must be curtailed to incorporate biodiversity into the farming systems to
increase resilience to climate change and resource pressures and promote dietary diversity.
In the light of these strategic imperatives, CGIAR has responded to its funding and
management challenges creatively. The 9th Systems Council (November 2019) approved
yet one more institutional innovation of a unified and integrated “One CGIAR,” to adapt to
the rapidly changing global conditions, while also making the CGIAR System more relevant
and effective. The process of moving to One CGIAR, as agreed to at the Extraordinary
General Assembly of the Centers (Rome, December 2019) includes a unified governance
and management through a reconstituted System Management Board and new Executive
Management Team. An established unifying mission of “Ending hunger by 2030—through
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science to transform food, land, and water systems in a climate crisis,” focused on five
impact areas: nutrition, poverty, gender, climate, and environment in support of the SDGs
to support a more unified and integrated CGIAR as the “One CGIAR” (CGIAR 2019, 2020).
The 2018 CGIAR Annual Performance Report noted that 105 policies, legal instruments,
and investments were modified in their design or implementation, informed by CGIAR
research which involved 1,003 partnerships (CGIAR 2018, 10). The new management
structure of the “one CGIAR” is now in place, with three able managing directors. An
important lesson of the CGIAR experience is that the actual impact of CGIAR derives from
the contribution of its research results and outcomes to complementary policies and
investments at the national level in developing countries, as occurred during the first
Green Revolution. In the successive reforms of CGIAR, the need for substantial comple-
mentary investments in R&D and human and institutional development in developing
countries to foster effective partnerships, with support from the World Bank, bilateral
donors, and national governments, have somehow not received the attention they deserve.
These developments should be seen in the context of the substantial decline in the
funding for public sector research in developed countries, which was the backbone of
supply of upstream technologies that CGIAR could draw upon. CGIAR research, in turn,
benefited both developing as well as developed countries. Rapid technological change in a
variety of fields has led to substantial increase in private sector research filling the void
created by slowdown in public sector research. Relatedly, there has also been a growing
concentration of research in the hands of few multinational companies; issues of intellectual
property have become more complex with growing role of the private sector. And finally,
civil society’s resistance to new genetically modified technologies remains strong, even to
gene editing; thus, even where technologies are available, they are not being introduced.
This is a big difference between the Green Revolution period and 2020. Barrett attributes a
decline in public sector research to a more difficult “regulatory” environment and the post-
2000 EU Cartagena precautionary principle,¹⁷ increasingly complex intellectual property,
and weak anti-trust enforcement, with only large, well-funded private institutions able to take
on these challenges (Barrett 2020). On the other hand, the need for new technologies to the
growing environmental constraints to make agriculture more resistant is greater than ever.
CGIAR’s outputs to deliver the needed impact upon revitalized and connected food
systems requires that the CGIAR reforms be complemented by creative, new funding
instruments: for example, impact investments, results-based investments, investments in
digital agriculture and physical and human capital at the national, and where appropriate,
regional levels. We make a case for investment of IDA and IBRD resources in CGIAR.
The International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFAD came into being because of the 1974 World Food Conference’s focus on the need to
increase investment in food production and the less documented issue of the levels of
international capital generated by high oil prices and production. Three years after the
¹⁷ The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity is an international agreement
adopted on January 29, 2000, and entering into force on September 11, 2003, which seeks to ensure the safe
handling, transport, and use of living modified organisms (LMOs), derived from biotechnology, that could have
adverse effects on biological diversity or present risks to human health. See the “Convention on Biological
Diversity”: https://bch.cbd.int/protocol/
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Rome Conference in 1974, IFAD was set up in 1977, as a specialized agency of the United
Nations, to finance agricultural development projects (with loans on concessional terms
together with some grants) primarily for food production in the developing countries
(IFAD 1976). As an international financial institution (IFI), IFAD’s basic documents (for
example, Lending Policies and Criteria adopted by the Governing Council in 1978 [IFAD
1978]) broadly followed the procedures and processes of the World Bank’s IDA and the
Funds of both the Asian and African Development Banks (ADB and AfDB). Projects and
programs to “introduce, expand or improve food production systems and to strengthen
related policies and institutions within the framework of national priorities and strategies”
were intended to be developed by member state governments, appraised by other IFIs,
funded by IFAD, and then and implemented/supervised by other IFIs, as formally desig-
nated “Cooperating Institutions” (IFAD 2016, 23).
IFAD’s financial modalities were established to follow the standard IFI replenishment
processes, consisting of a three-year cycle with contributions coming from member states,
with equal voting rights.¹⁸ IFAD further subdivided its members into three categories, I, II
and III, or Lists A, B and C, as they have become more commonly known. These three
categories, reflected in the IFAD logo itself, represented the founding financial principle of
IFAD, that the financial contributions of List A (OECD countries) would be matched by
equal contributions (grosso modo) by List B (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries [OPEC] countries), with developing states (List C) also invited to contribute. This
was reflected in the initial contributions (IFAD1) at the time of IFAD’s establishment of
SDR 496m, SDR 381m and SDR 7.8m.¹⁹ President Al-Sudeary, from Saudi Arabia, was
elected in 1977, as the first IFAD President, to be followed by presidents who, with the
exception of President Båge (Sweden), have all been from OPEC member states.
The unique OPEC/OECD/member financial proposition that underpins IFAD was put
under immediate stress by the Iranian Revolution in 1977–9, with the consequence that
Iran’s initial pledge of US$124.75 million has, to date, not yet been fully received. Never-
theless, List A contributions remained consistent from 1980 to 2010 with regular, strong
contributions from the United States (with the IFAD funding decisions moving into
Treasury from the State Department), Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Nordic
countries.
With competition for funds and donor earmarking a constant characteristic of multilat-
eral aid, the need to demonstrate relevance and results has become a key parameter, as well
as maintaining the assessments (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Net-
work [MOPAN], Multilateral aid review [MAR]) of its efficiency and effectiveness. This was
initially led by President Idriss Jazairy (1984–92), who focused on IFAD’s strategy, re-
sources, and operations on targeting the rural poor and the marginalized, including women,
both creating a specific role for IFAD and differentiating itself from the broader agricultural
sector investments of the World Bank and other multilateral development banks.²⁰
Despite the validation of IFAD’s role,²¹ and the evidence of on the ground performance,
the contributions of member states’ replenishment commitments (1997–2012) only covered
about a third of IFAD’s loans and grants program. IFAD’s internal resources covered the
¹⁸ IFAD Replenishment https://www.ifad.org/en/replenishment, and Consultation on the Replenishment of
IFAD’s Resources: https://webapps.ifad.org/members/repl
¹⁹ Initial pledges in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and freely convertible national currencies (IFAD 1976)
²⁰ In 1992, IFAD organized the Summit on the Economic Advancement of Rural Women in Geneva.
²¹ The World Bank’s World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development was a key output at this
juncture (World Bank 2007).
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remaining two-thirds, the highest such ratio among IFIs (IFAD 2011). For IFAD7 and
IFAD8 (2007–12), these internally generated resources included some pre-commitments of
predicted future loan repayments, the Advanced Commitment Authority (ACA). For
IFAD9 onward (2013), the ACA was replaced with a sustainable cash flow approach,
whereby financial obligations are projected and matched by a sequence of forecasted cash
inflows over the disbursement period (IFAD 2012).
The fragility of the IFAD financial model was highlighted during the IFAD9 replenish-
ment (2013–15).
While List A’s total contributions more than doubled over the three replenishment
periods, an important proportion of List A’s IFAD9 pledges were complementary contribu-
tions for the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP).²² The 2014
Corporate-level Evaluation: “IFAD’s Replenishments” noted:
The United Kingdom, Sweden, Belgium, and Canada pledged a portion of their replen-
ishment contributions for the ASAP—a total of US$312 million. Setting aside the funds
pledged for ASAP, List A’s IFAD9 contributions were only three percent higher than their
IFAD8 commitments of US$859 million. Without ASAP, List A’s contributions—and
indeed the entire replenishment—would have been significantly lower. (IFAD 2014, 49)
As ASAP was a grant program, effectively, it did qualify as “regular resources,” as it did not
generate any loan reflows into IFAD’s financial model. Additionally, while total replenish-
ments grew, fewer countries participated in IFAD9 than in IFAD7 and IFAD8. This has
continued with, in IFAD11, no participation from the United States, Spain, Denmark or
Belgium (the latter being the originator and financier of the Belgium Survival Fund). These
concerns were well recognized in 2014 by IFAD’s own evaluation: “In a scenario of low
growth from traditional donors in List A there is however not sufficient evidence to
determine if new and returning members’ replenishment pledges will grow fast enough to
keep up with the increasing demand for IFAD’s assistance” (IFAD 2014, 56). In this regard,
the Evaluation also noted, “the classification of members into three categories (the “List
system”), which is unique to IFAD and not applied in any other international organization,
seems under some pressure” (IFAD 2014, v). And, while “valid when IFAD was established,
has not kept up with global economic development” (IFAD 2014, vi).
Seeking to diversify funding, IFAD established the EUR300 million Spanish Food
Security Co-financing Facility Trust Fund to augment the resources allocated to IFAD-
funded projects in September 2010, with IFAD administering the trust fund as Trustee. As
the repaid loan funds are returned to Spain, there are no reflows entering IFAD’s financial
model for subsequent on-lending (unlike IFAD loans funded by replenishment or other
contributions). Similar additional resources have been mobilized from KfW Development
Bank (Germany) and France, Agence Française de Développement (AFD), though as the
Evaluation notes “any associate risks will have to be carefully addressed upfront” (IFAD
2014, 56).
As IFAD embarks on the IFAD12 replenishment process, in the face of the continued
pressure on IFAD’s finances, cash flow, and liquidity, the ambition to access market
resources for funding would, perhaps, have been concomitantly strengthened by addressing
some of the evaluation lessons clearly identified in 2014. This requires strong and clear
²² ASAP provides climate and environmental finance to smallholder farmers. See https://www.ifad.org/
documents/38714170/40213192/asap.pdf
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leadership both by IFAD and by its members. The competition for multilateral resources
remains high, as does the need, and while IFAD’s effectiveness and efficiency have been well
documented, a greater openness to innovative partnerships with entities such as GAFSP
would send a stronger signal of IFAD’s ability to fundamentally adapt.
This IFAD “specificity” should allow it to make a tangible contribution in the prepara-
tions for, and at, the Food Systems Summit, and in particular, the specific Summit objective
#4 for “advancing equitable livelihoods and value distribution (raising incomes, distributing
risk, expanding inclusion, and promoting full and productive employment and decent
work for all)” (UN 2020d, 2). These are all areas where IFAD has credible, ground-level
experience.
The World Food Programme
WFP won the 2020 Nobel Peace Prize, well deserved for its achievements against many
odds. It is hard to discuss “Food for All” without mentioning geopolitics behind the man-
made crises arising out of power politics. The UN System and its individual agencies are
operating with one hand tied behind their collective back. The Middle East has been the
hotspot for conflicts. WFP, the world’s largest humanitarian agency, faces many other
conflicts in the world, which go unnoticed or are overshadowed by larger ones. Half of
WFP’s emergency assistance went to the Middle East and North Africa in 2018. As
preparations for the Food Systems Summit in 2021 continue, the experience of WFP should
bring needed knowledge and experience to one of the Summit’s specific objectives: “building
resilience to vulnerabilities, shocks and stresses (ensuring the continued functionality of
healthy and sustainable food systems)” (UN 2020d, 2).
As this chapter was being finalized, 1 million people from the Idlib Province in Syria were
on the move. On Amanpour & Co. broadcast on PBS on July 6, 2020, correspondent Arwa
Damon showed babies who had frozen to death in the middle of the night, as freezing
temperatures in Idlib were displacing families, lacking food and clothing, on the move. WFP
Executive Director, David Beasley, former Governor of South Carolina (1995–9) and
Republican Party politician, was making a passionate yet rational argument to the donors
in Geneva to ensure food and cash were flowing to these deprived children, women, and men.
Yemen, another hotspot, suffers from internecine conflicts between Shias and Sunnis,
supported by regional powers, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates versus Iran-backed
Houthi, with superpowers, the United States, United Kingdom, and France, allied with
Saudis, and Russia allied with Iran. According to the charity Save the Children, an estimated
85,000 children with severe acute malnutrition may have died between April 2015 and
October 2018 (Save the Children 2018). About 80 percent of the population, or 24 million
people, need humanitarian assistance and protection. Some 20 million people need help
securing food, according to the UN. Almost 10 million people are considered to be “one step
away from famine” (UN News 2019).
David Miliband, CEO of the International Rescue Committee, argued that an immediate
ceasefire and resumption of peace talks, with assured food and financial assistance, is the
only solution to this suffering, in which the United States has a major peacemaking role,
which it is not exercising.
The COVID-19 pandemic temporarily suspended the war in Yemen. The Saudi-led
coalition fighting in the country implemented a unilateral, two-week ceasefire, hoping to
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support a political solution to the conflict and help prevent the spread of COVID-19. While
United Nations Secretary General António Guterres welcomed the decision, a Houthi
opposition official described the move as “just another ploy” (BBC News 2020b). Rejecting
the ceasefire, the Houthis demanded lifting of air and sea blockades. The UN has warned
that the death toll from the COVID-19 virus could “exceed the combined toll of war,
disease, and hunger over the last five years” and warns that Yemen is “on the brink of the
world’s worst famine in 100 years if the war continues” (BBC News 2020a).
Similar heartbreaking stories of the children separated from their families on the United
States’ southern border made one wonder when international leadership and governance
would address these issues. President-Elect Biden has vowed to reunite nearly 500 children
with their parents. Since June, increasing numbers of COVID-19 cases have been reported
at detention facilities because of the viral outbreaks. A federal judge ruled that the US
Department of Homeland security must release children at the facilities, but the court did
not make an argument for the parents of the children to be released. This followed the order
of another district in Los Angeles who ordered US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) on June 26 to release children from three family residential centers, writing that the
centers were “on fire and there is no more time for half measures” (Hsu 2020).
President Eisenhower approached the United Nations to establish a world food program
in 1961, to dispose of US food surpluses, created by US agricultural policies. It also displayed
the degree of confidence the United States had in the UN System at the height of its
economic power. First established within FAO, it soon became clear that WFP’s emergency
response function was incompatible with FAO’s more deliberative, bureaucratic approach
to addressing issues of global agreements. WFP became an independent entity. Its Executive
Director is still appointed jointly by the UN Secretary-General and the Director-General of
FAO. Like CGIAR, WFP’s funding is entirely based on voluntary contributions with 42.2
percent of the contributions coming from the United States in 2019. WFP’s operations have
also seen considerable growth, with total assistance increasing from US$1.7 billion in 2000
to US$8 billion in 2019.²³ Globally, WFP assisted 86.7 million people in 83 countries in
2018, 70 percent of those facing critical hunger levels (WFP 2020h).
WFP has undergone several transitions: first, from delivering food aid in-kind to
providing food assistance, including cash-based transfers (CBTs). This means the tradi-
tional development activities of its public works program have contracted, but WFP still
remains the largest provider of school feeding programs to well over 16 million children.
Food aid was a top-down, one-way process, whereas food assistance, into which it has
morphed, involves more complex appreciation of people’s long-term development needs
and the diverse approaches needed to achieve them. WFP distributes food in areas where it
is scarce. In places where food is available, but unaffordable, WFP provides vulnerable
people cash or vouchers to buy nutritious foods. These CBTs give people more choice,
protect them from financial exploitation, and support the local economy (WFP 2020c,
2020d, 2020e), but such distribution programs that increase access can also create
distortions.
Second, and related, is the transition from procuring food from traditional food surplus
countries such as the United States to at least partially obtaining it from nearby emerging
countries, thereby reducing procurement costs and speeding up delivery to beneficiaries
(WFP 2017). Third, while remaining the world’s leading humanitarian agency, it is aiming
²³ See “Contributions by Year,” https://www.wfp.org/funding
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to straddle humanitarian aid with development goals, to “combine frontline action with the
quest for durable solutions” (WFP 2020c).
WFP’s CBTs include a range of instruments, ranging from physical bank notes,
vouchers, or electronic funds, given to beneficiaries to spend directly, “empowering
people to feed themselves,” as “a long-haul process: as of early 2016, cash still only
represented just over a quarter of all WFP assistance. But with its benefits of flexibility,
efficiency and beneficiary choice, cash is growing rapidly within [WFP’s] hunger-fighting
portfolio” (WFP 2020c).
Growth in the WFP operations is a result of emergencies caused by a combination of
conflict, climate shocks, pandemics, and other disasters. Among the ongoing emergencies in
15 countries or regions, the majority are fueled by conflicts in the Middle East, North Africa,
and Myanmar in SA, with 68.5 million forced to flee their homes. Of this total, more than 40
million are internally displaced, and nearly 25.4 million are refugees (WFP 2019a).
At the same time, the importance of linking emergency/humanitarian aid to long-term
development assistance is greater than ever to build capacity in the countries to address
long-term needs of development, agriculture, schooling, safety nets—areas in which WFP
has a lot to contribute.
WFP uses state-of-the-art technology to help forecast emergencies and direct assistance
to where it is most needed. Through its global networks, WFP develops quality emergency
programs that help WFP plan, pre-position supplies, and minimize the time needed to
deliver life-saving food assistance. A recent WFP news release reported that the COVID-19
pandemic “could almost double the number of people suffering acute hunger, pushing it to
more than a quarter billion by the end of 2020” (WFP 2020b).
Specific Roles of the World Food Programme
WFP leads the Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications clusters and co-leads the
Food Security cluster. WFP also provides the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service for
all concerned humanitarian agencies and the United Nations Humanitarian Response
Depots for use by the humanitarian community (WFP 2019a, 2019b, 2020g).
Country Capacity Strengthening
National governments are increasingly taking the lead in the fight against hunger. WFP
offers a wide range of capacity development and technical assistance services to facilitate the
design and delivery of sustainable national solutions to combat hunger and malnutrition
(WFP 2018, 2020a).
South–South Cooperation
The WFP supports governments of developing countries in their efforts to achieve Zero
Hunger by facilitating the transfer of knowledge, skills, resources, and technical know-how,
as well as through policy, advocacy, and regional collective action, to strengthen national
capacities. WFP’s Centers of Excellence in Brazil and China are among WFP’s key mechan-
isms for South–South cooperation.
As WFP explains these mechanisms:
Driven by rising country demand, we have stepped up support to governments through
South–South and triangular cooperation. The expression covers the direct exchange of
knowledge, experiences, skills, resources and technical know-how among developing
countries, often assisted by a donor or multilateral organization, such as WFP. This
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“triangular” facilitation may take the form of funding, training, management, technolog-
ical systems, or other types of support. (WFP 2020f)
In describing its country/capacity strengthening, WFP notes:
The World Food Programme (WFP) offers nationally tailored technical assistance and
capacity development to strengthen individual government capacities in all these fields.
We respond to capacity gaps identified through an assessment process that is led by the
partner government, facilitated by ourselves, and supported by other partners.
This process helps identify national demand for capacity strengthening along five critical
pathways, as relevant to achieving national food security and nutrition objectives:
• Policies and legislation
• Institutional accountability
• Strategic planning and financing
• National programme design and delivery
• Engagement and participation of non-state actors
These areas also guide WFP’s offer of technical assistance and capacity strengthening.
Demand for WFP assistance must be articulated around national development priorities,
critical needs, and available resources. Appropriate sustainable food security and nutrition
solutions are jointly decided by the national government and all development partners,
including ourselves. These solutions may entail enhancing capacity for emergency pre-
paredness and response, logistics, and supply chain management; strengthening risk
reduction capabilities through social safety nets; and bolstering climate risk management,
adaptation, and resilience. Frequently included in country programmes is support to local
market development and capacity building in crosscutting areas such as nutrition and
HIV/AIDS programmes.
Both technical assistance and capacity strengthening may be provided through WFP’s
own staff and as part of its programme activities, or through the deployment of external
experts. WFP may . . . facilitate the transfer of knowledge by third parties, for example
through South–South or Triangular Cooperation models, which promote peer-to-peer
sharing of best practices between developing nations. (WFP 2020a)
Global Governance of Food and Agriculture
Global governance should be seen in the context of the rising challenges of pandemics;
climate change; the growing ideological divide between the right and left philosophies; the
increased number of actors at the global level, including bilateral and multilateral donors,
philanthropic and civil society organizations, and the private sector; and the chaos it has led
to in global governance, particularly as the United States abandoned its pivotal role in the
liberal world order, which it had founded. The agreements included the withdrawal from
the Paris Accord, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and support for WHO at the critical time of
the pandemic, when the need for cooperation is greater than ever. The Biden–Harris
administration has rejoined almost all of those efforts, but delivering results will be
challenging for the United States, given that Trump won 72 million votes despite his
abominable performance on many fronts. Further, with the Democrats holding only
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48 seats in the Senate (with 2 Independents caucusing with them and Vice-President Harris
casting tie-breaking votes), Biden needs to generate support from all members in his party
and some Republicans to pursue a multilateral agenda.
For these and other reasons, the Big Five organizations need to work together more by
playing to their comparative advantages and partnering more actively to mobilize public
and private funds. Even if they work together more effectively than they have to date,
however, the available resources are too small relative to the investment needs of LICs.
The G20 has shown the capacity to provide the critical bridge between IOs and the larger
UN System. In its latest communiqué, the G20 provided strong support for the work of
WHO on COVID-19, but it also has a large potential for playing a significant role in
emerging challenges—such as efforts toward the achievement of universal access to vaccines
for COVID-19 and other future pandemics—in the same way that it responded to the
financial crisis.
Role of the G20 in Global Architecture
The G20 countries account for nearly two-thirds of the world’s population, about 85 percent
of global GDP, almost 80 percent of global trade in food and agricultural commodities, and
around 60 percent of the world’s agricultural land.²⁴ Together, they hold an enormous
potential to be the interface between the world’s richest countries that have led the liberal
world order since the Second World War, and the United Nations’ family of 196 countries
and islands. Their potential to provide a collective leadership role has surely emerged over
the last decade, but it is yet to be fully realized with many roadblocks, which will have to be
overcome.
The G20 was established at the level of finance ministers and central bank governors after
the Asian financial crisis in 1997, but had a marginal role in global affairs. It was upgraded
to leader’s level at the instigation of President Bush after the global financial crisis of 2008,
when the credibility of the G7 was low, given that the crisis had originated in New York and
London. At the Third Summit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in September 2009, the G20 was
designated as the premier forum for discussing, planning, and monitoring international
economic cooperation. Its objective was to provide strong, sustainable, and balanced growth
(SSB) with wide ownership (OECD 2009; G20 Information Centre 2015). The G20 suc-
cessfully acted as a coordinating agency to tackle the 2008 financial crisis and some G20
members also contributed their savings through the IMF to alleviate the financial crises in
several countries. The G20 thus transformed itself over time as an agent for change, nudging
other IOs in desired directions (Cooper 2019). Yet, it has also been criticized for mission
creep, as each rotating presidency has sought to introduce new issues. Nevertheless, with a
few exceptions, most notably the development agenda introduced by the Republic of
(South) Korea in 2010, the G20 has not succeeded in doing so with any sustained impact
(Cooper, 2019). Some analysts have described the G20 and its role in international
economic governance more as an interregnum rather than a regime (Helleiner 2010).
Yet, by now the G20 has embedded itself into the system of international governance
²⁴ The G20 is made up of 19 countries and the EU. The 19 countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
China, Germany, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/9/2021, SPi
972   
(Cooper 2019). It is the only body that can deal with issues spanning IOs, ministries, and
countries and is thus critical for successfully addressing many of the international chal-
lenges, such as climate change, environmental degradation, global pandemic, financial
instability, trade, food insecurity, and growing displacement of refugees.
The G20 successfully engineered a recovery from the 2008 crisis through coordinated
expansionary policies. It has failed to deliver, however, on its promise at the Pittsburgh
Summit to promote strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. Also, although the Seoul
Summit successfully put development on the international agenda, so far, there has not been
noticeable progress in this area. Recent IMF estimates suggest a significant decline in GDP
in LAC and SSA.
From the beginning, questions have been raised about the legitimacy of the G20, seen
either as a self-appointed body or one formed by US President Bush. Delivery on develop-
ment is critical for raising its legitimacy among developing countries and particularly, for
the legitimacy of the developing country members of the G20 (Agarwal and Whalley 2013).
In the area of development, the G20 has focused on agriculture and infrastructure. G20
agriculture ministers first met for in Paris on June 22–3, 2011, in response to the global food
crisis. A dramatic spike in food prices occurred, as a result of the perfect storm described in
Chapter 3. With food riots breaking out by January 2009 in more than 30 cities, as an
aftermath of food price spikes, and growing concerns about political instability, G20 leaders
convened their agriculture ministers to manage the crisis. This first meeting, in Paris in
2011, produced the Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture, with several
recommendations on productivity growth. The interagency policy report by key IOs (FAO,
IFAD, IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, WFP, the World Bank, WTO, IFPRI and the UN HLTF)
also made 10 recommendations and several sub-recommendations (G20 2011, 2012). The
G20 leaders endorsed these recommendations at Cannes a few months later in November
2011. One of these recommendations is AMIS, housed in FAO and funded by donors. They
also led to the financing of GAFSP. These decisions show the power of what the G20
countries can do if they put their mind to it. Other key recommendations they should
implement include greater investment in agriculture, less protection of agriculture, and
generally, the creation of a level playing field for all countries.
The ideas emerging in Paris were reinforced in the meeting of the agriculture vice
ministers in Mexico City in May 2012, and by the G20 leaders at the 2012 Los Cabos
Summit that followed in June. Several other countries had imposed bans on exports of
wheat and rice before the agriculture ministers met. As global food prices declined in 2013
and 2014, a consensus emerged that export bans should be avoided to minimize collateral
damage on importing countries. That consensus has lasted through the COVID-19 crisis, as
reported earlier.
The Ebola virus and the Russian annexation of the Crimea diverted attention in subse-
quent meetings until Istanbul on May 7–8, 2015, when G20 agriculture ministers met for a
second time and made several commitments, followed by the G20 leaders’ 2015 summit in
Antalya.
They have repeatedly called for a halt to any increase in trade protection and for
completion of the Doha Round, but protection levels have gone up broadly. Global Trade
Alert tracks state interventions taken since November 2008 to date, which are likely to affect
foreign commerce—trade in goods and services, foreign investment, and labor migration.
From 2008, 17,928 protectionist interventions were undertaken by G20 countries, com-
pared to 7,271 liberalizing interventions, and there has been a precipitous drop in both
liberalizing and protectionist interventions since 2019, when the COVID-19 pandemic
started (GTA 2020).
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Yearly, interventions were rising until 2017 for liberalizing actions and until 2018
for protectionist actions. Since then, annual interventions have decreased for both kinds
of interventions, but protectionist interventions remain greater than liberalizing ones
(GTA 2020).
The G20 has not been effective in pushing for a successful conclusion to the Doha Round
of the WTO membership, in which the G20 countries are major stakeholders. The G20
declaration of the G20 Extraordinary Agriculture Ministers Meeting in 2020 reaffirmed the
importance of “continued flow of food, products, and inputs essential for agricultural and
food production across borders,” and acknowledged the challenges of “minimizing the risk
of COVID-19 while keeping food supply chains functioning” and ensuring “the health,
safety, welfare, and mobility of workers in agriculture and throughout the food supply
chain.” They also stressed the important role of AMIS and the need for financial support of
it. They agreed “not to impose export restrictions or extraordinary taxes on food and
agricultural products purchased for non-commercial humanitarian purposes by the
World Food Programme (WFP) and other humanitarian agencies.” They called on “other
members to continue providing timely and reliable information on global food market
fundamentals to help markets, countries, and consumers make informed choices” (G20
Information Centre 2020).
“Acknowledging the critical role of the private sector in food systems,” the ministers
called for “enhanced public and private partnership to help mobilize rapid and innovative
responses to the impacts of this pandemic on the agriculture and food sectors.” Given the
current challenging circumstances, they further urged the avoidance of “food losses and
waste caused by disruptions throughout food supply chains.” The ministers further urged
that, “in line with the One Health approach,” there was a need to strengthen “mechanisms
for monitoring, early warning, preparedness, prevention, detection, response, and control of
zoonotic diseases, and for developing science-based international guidelines on stricter
safety and hygienic measures for zoonosis control” (G20 Information Centre 2020).
The ministers expressed gratitude to the farmers, workers, and “small, medium, and large
scale agri-food businesses for their continuous efforts to ensure our food supply.” The
ministers stated that they would intensify efforts, “in line with WTO rules and the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development, to support them to sustain their activities and
livelihoods during the crisis and to assist their recovery afterwards” (G20 Information
Centre 2020).
The G20 ministers declared their intention to continue their:
. . . cooperation with relevant international organizations and within their mandates to
work to: reinforce international cooperation; identify additional actions to alleviate the
impacts of COVID-19 on food security and nutrition; share best practices and lessons
learned, such as addressing barriers to supply chains; promote evidence and science-based
information and combat misinformation; provide capacity building and technical assis-
tance; and promote research, responsible investments, innovations and reforms that will
improve the sustainability and resilience of agriculture and food systems.
This work could build on the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO’s) evolving
response to COVID-19, the International Fund for Agricultural Development’s (IFAD’s)
evolving efforts to support a strong recovery from the effects of COVID-19, policy
monitoring and analysis by the OECD, and other relevant initiatives, such as the prepa-
ration for the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit. (G20 Information Centre 2020)
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 7/9/2021, SPi
974   
To summarize, G20 has rhetorically adopted a huge agenda. With slowing economic growth
in OECD countries, however, even before the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic crisis
that the pandemic has caused, combined with aid weariness, the prospect of generating
more aid does not seem promising. Hence, the need to shift from billions to trillions has
largely entailed a call for either more private sector investment or public–private partner-
ships. To realize the G20 declarations, some countries have provided support to IOs to
tackle issues: for example, in addition to support to AMIS, the German government has
provided support to FAO to work on water security and water quality. G20 does not have its
own secretariat. Central monitoring to follow up on compliance of these declarations is ad
hoc, except for worthy programs like at the University of Toronto or the Global Trade Alert.
More fundamentally, growing tensions among G20 members, such as the Sino-American
tensions, the growing tension between the United States and EU members, and the China–
India border dispute and the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which is playing out
in Yemen, have the potential to reduce the effectiveness of the G20. Differential perfor-
mance among G20 countries with respect to the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted some
key issues such as the importance of national leadership—well illustrated by the changed
outcomes concerning COVID-19 infection in the United States, following the change of
leadership after the 2020 presidential election. Also, there is the urgent need to learn cross-
country lessons on best practices with regard to the containment of COVID-19 within G20
countries: for example, from the experiences—besides in China—of the successful South
Korea. Trade and intellectual property issues affecting vaccine know-how, given the case
that most of the developing world lacks access to vaccines, have been raised by several
southern members of G20, including Brazil, South Africa, and India. Along with these
issues, there are, of course, the thorny issues of human rights.
In addition to Trump’s exit, the G20 is losing some of its highly respected leaders such as
Angela Merkel. It needs to fill the leadership vacuum to credibly address the vacuum that
currently exists at the level of global governance and begin to address some of the key issues
of climate change, pandemics, health, food security, and trade aid.
Role of 54 Industrial and Emerging Countries Going Forward
In this book, we reviewed history of thought and action on food and nutrition security,
covering a 75-year period. Success in achieving broad-based food and nutrition
security contributed in a positive way to the pace and pattern of structural transformation
of some countries. Global and national governance and international assistance have played
a key role in that process. The share of emerging countries in global GDP has increased
dramatically since the 1990s.
Yet, food security for all has not been realized. Where success has been achieved, it has
required broad-based investment in the population and in education. Those investments
have helped achieve rapid demographic transition among the Asian Tigers, and later, in
China and Southeast Asia. Investment in infrastructure and in R&D helps to accelerate
transformation. In these Asian countries, where small farmers dominate, even the smallest
farms have been highly productive.
In Asia, external assistance played a demonstrably positive role. East Asian and Southeast
Asian countries have done well, not only in food and nutrition security, but in structural
transformation and industrialization. Their higher domestic savings and investments and
generally open economies have helped.
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SA and Africa have done less well. The countries still face many challenges, including
persistent poverty, widespread chronic and transitory food and nutrition insecurity, in-
creasing income inequality, large gender gaps, environmental degradation, climate change
(seriously affecting the Pacific Island countries), and continuing inadequate access to health
and education, electricity, and safe drinking water. There is no room for complacency.
Most of these countries have been relatively peaceful, although several African countries
(Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, for example) have experienced considerable internal conflict that
has affected their development.
Peace and stability set the groundwork for Asia’s economic success.
There are overarching policy issues at the global and regional level, which influence
incentives for agricultural production in developing countries. We list below the 11 recom-
mendations of the OECD report, Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2020, of 54
countries which support agriculture at levels between US$500 billion and US$700 billion
annually, depending on how they are measured. This compares with the enhanced IDA of
US$85 billion over three years. Reforms in these policies would not only release substantial
resources to assist developing countries but also improve incentives for production and
trade by creating a level playing field, as well as improving environmental management. The
recommendations are:
1. Dismantle, in a gradual but consistent process, all policies identified as particularly
detrimental to market efficiency and the sector’s environmental performance. The priority
reform should be the sectors where high support is provided via the most distorting
measures. Such reforms would reduce intra-sectoral distortions and allow markets to
function better, while simultaneously reducing environmental pressures that derive from
incentives to intensify production in unsustainable ways.
2. Phase out distorting budgetary support. This would liberate funds for more targeted
policies, as well as for investments to make agriculture more productive, environmentally
sustainable, and resilient. Such funds could be allocated to wider societal priorities
including climate adaptation and mitigation.
3. Remove, as quickly as possible, trade restrictions imposed in the context of the COVID-19
pandemic. This would allow the market to perform its distributing and signalling role.
4. Ideally, anchor reductions in distorting support and associated trade protection through
the multilateral process. If that cannot be achieved, the trend towards broader and deeper
regional trade agreements can offer a way forward.
5. Improve the efficiency of support to individual producers by targeting well-defined,
quantifiable outcomes of public interest. Payments for non-commodity outputs (such as
the landscape) are means to create markets for public goods, while providing agricultural
producers with additional income opportunities.
6. Strengthen the efficiency of agri-environmental policies by successively raising baseline
requirements for agricultural practices, including by making cross-compliance mandatory
where relevant. More ambitious public good and environmental outcomes can be deliv-
ered through targeted support.
7. Integrate farm households into social security systems to reduce the need for spending
on agriculture-specific income support. Governments should improve their understand-
ing of the financial situation of farm households and target any market failures that lead to
persistent low incomes within the agriculture sector.
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8. Focus public efforts in risk management on catastrophic and systemic risks for which
private solutions cannot be developed. Care should be taken that public support does not
crowd out on-farm and market-based risk-management tools. Governments should
prioritise investments that build farmers’ capacity to both manage current risks and to
adapt to an evolving risk environment, especially under climate change.
9. Collect lessons from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, notably regarding the effec-
tiveness of different forms of government interventions in responding to shocks and
developing preparedness.
10. Increasingly prioritise the provision of key public services to the sector by investing in
agricultural innovation systems, in relevant hard and soft infrastructure, and appropriate
biosecurity systems protecting human, animal and plant health. Explore opportunities to
improve the delivery of such services via digital technologies.
11. Improve the coherence and transparency of policy packages by avoiding the
provision of conflicting incentives to market participants, and by integrating agricultural
policies into economy-wide programmes, such as those related to labor markets and
social security, the environment, transportation and communication, trade and other
infrastructure. (OECD 2020, 20–1)
Healthy food systems similarly call for improved information to consumers and smart
government regulation, implementation, and monitoring. These are not areas in which
conventional aid projects have been active. To date, food systems that extend beyond the
farm have almost exclusively been in the private sector. Whereas there has been a great deal
of analytical work on the growth of value chains, economists have not wrestled with the
impact of these value chains on accelerating dietary transition, which would require active
involvement of both the private sector and consumers. A food systems approach links food
and agricultural production to human health, planetary health, and economic health. The
food value chain, as the COVID-19 pandemic has shown, influences what is produced,
where it is produced and consumed, lost or wasted, processed and traded locally, regionally,
and internationally. As we document in Chapter 4, countries would need more political
commitment to healthy food systems; the development of coherent cross-sectoral policies,
combined with more investment in institutional capacity at all levels; engagement with both
national and international food processors; and value chains to develop the right initiatives
for production (for all farm scales); and marketing, including at consumer level to support
the right choices being made by those both purchasing and preparing food. This political
commitment should come from the forthcoming Food Systems Summit and the leadership
of the Secretary-General António Guterres in recognizing that “Transforming food systems
is crucial for delivering all the Sustainable Development Goals,” together with the specific
objectives of the Summit (UN 2020d, 1):
1. Ensuring access to safe and nutritious food for all (enabling all people to be nourished
and healthy, progressive realization of the right to food);
2. Shifting to sustainable consumption patterns (promoting and creating demand for
healthy and sustainable diets, reducing waste);
3. Boosting nature-positive production at sufficient scale (acting on climate change,
reducing emissions and increasing carbon capture, regenerating and protecting critical
ecosystems and reducing food loss and energy usage, without undermining health or
nutritious diets);
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4. Advancing equitable livelihoods and value distribution (raising incomes, distributing
risk, expanding inclusion, promote full and productive employment and decent work for
all); and
5. Building resilience to vulnerabilities, shocks and stresses (ensuring the continued
functionality of healthy and sustainable food systems). (UN 2020d, 2)
These recommendations entail addressing national, regional, and global reforms that need
to be undertaken collectively. The broad range of stakeholders involved in the process offers
a singular opportunity to address the need for environmentally sustainable food production
and nutritious, healthy food. Repurposing Agricultural Policies and Support for Sustainable
Food Systems is an ambitious program of work that the World Bank has developed jointly
with FAO and OECD and developing countries to achieve the necessary adjustments in
policies, which will achieve the triple win in equity, efficiency, and environmental sustain-
ability (personal exchange, Madhur Gautam, December 21, 2020)
In these and other efforts, Africa will need special attention—more political commit-
ment, more investment in human capital and institutions, and more transfer of interna-
tional public funds over a predictable, consistent, nonideological basis and on a long-term
basis—to achieve results. Africans will have to drive the development agenda.
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delivery of global and regional public goods 39,
39n2, 368, 707–8, 715, 749, 781b
evaluations of:
benefit–cost ratio of CGIAR’s research 713
Birner and Byerlee synthesis of evaluations 712
CGIAR Meta Review, 2002 719
“tragedy of the commons”—2003 Meta
Review 720
World Bank OED, 1999 715
founding of 37, 39, 368, 510, 641, 712, 712n4, 713
funding 368, 707–9, 711, 713, 715–16, 720, 720n9,
721–2, 741t, 743–5, 744f, 746f, 747–9,
753f, 964
decline in share of unrestricted (core)
funding 744, 747f
dependent on voluntary contributions 342,
347, 707
ODA as main source: more than 50 percent from
OECD and OECD–DAC countries 750, 752
proposed increase of IDA funding to
CGIAR 750–1
Windows 1 and 2 (untied funds), W3 (allocations
to specific Centers) 727–9, 729f, 745, 745f,
748–9, 751–2
governance 368, 708
chairman with 4-year term 369
Center growth in response to donors’ desire to
expand scope of research 368
One CGIAR, a self-governing mechanism of
System and Centers 40, 369, 475, 708, 714
new team of 3 managing directors report to the




Independent Science for Development Council
(ISDC, formerly ISPC) 710, 757
Standing Panel on Impact Assessment
(SPIA) 710, 723
System-wide, Inter-Center, within Centers, of
CGIAR Research Programs (CRPs) 368
impact studies 13, 79, 723, 758–9, 779b
90 percent of gains attributable to germplasm
improvements 758
impacts of technology generation and capacity
development in institutions 758
underfunding of NARS related to dependence on
CGIAR Centers 759
mission, expansion of 37, 707, 710b
alignment with proliferation of global
initiatives 709, 755
build capacity of national agricultural research
systems (NARS) 368, 707
diversify agricultural production with crowding-
in technologies and knowledge 714
ending hunger by 2030 through science 710b
increasing voice for developing countries to
increase ownership, effectiveness 708
opening of System to qualified researchers to lead
research programs 757
working to advance agricultural science,
innovation to enable the poor, especially
women 710b
organizational structure, evolving 369, 710, 710b
11,000 staff in 96 countries 715–16
from 4 to 15 Centers in response to donors, 13
after mergers 37, 368–9, 710, 710b,
713–14, 716, 782t
System-wide CGIAR research programs
(CRPs) 738–9, 739t
3 crosscutting platforms: Genebank, Big Data
in Agriculture, and Excellence in
Breeding 739
4 crosscutting CRPs, 8 agri-food CRPs 739
Gender Platform 779b
partnerships 708–8, 710b
cofounded 2014 Global Alliance for Climate-
Smart Agriculture 755
relied upon GCARD to open itself to outside
partners 755–6
with private sector and civil society 708
Strategy and Results Framework (SRF) 716, 717,
718t, 719
SRF links 11 CRPs to 7 SDGs in 2020 719
Sub-IDOs—outcomes adopted by immediate
users (policymakers, NARS
researchers) 719
Ten IDOs and 30 Sub-IDOs aligned with 3 SLOs,
4 IDOs, and 16 Sub-IDOs 719
Three System Level Outcomes (reduce poverty,
improve food security and nutrition,
improve natural resources and ecosystem
services) 10 targets 719
successive reforms to increase accountability, set
clear priorities, and increase long-term,
unrestricted funding 368, 707, 712n, 722,
736–7, 739t, 754, 964
2001–3 reforms: adoption of a formal Charter of
the CGIAR System 723–4, 781b
Challenge Programs (CPs) to open System to
outside researchers 723
2001–3 reform results 724
2008–15 reforms: creation of Fund Council (FC),
Fund Office (FO), CB (Consortium Board),
CO (Consortium Office), ISPC
(Independent Science and Partnership
Council), and IEA (Independent Evaluation
Arrangement) 722, 724–33
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post-2015 reforms: SC as unitary structure to
replace FC 733–8, 734–5, 734f
reforms in 2020—One CGIAR: new
organizational structure in 2021 734,
770–2, 771b, 964
CGIAR Executive Management Team (3):
appointed for two-year terms 771
CGIAR System Board composition 772
Gender Platform launched 2020, based in
ILRI 708, 740, 773–9, 778, 779b
new mission: “Ending hunger by 2020—through
science to transform food, land and water
systems in a climate crisis” 772
SWOT analysis: strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats 764–7





Chand, R. 80, 151, 172, 216n6, 947n14
Chauhan, J. 526n14, 947n14
Chemnick, J. 15
Chenery, H. 72, 513, 518, 599
Chile: 213, 214, 249–52, 261, 459, 598, 676, 765, 946
China 1, 3, 5, 10, 14–16, 18, 20–1, 24–5, 32–36, 39,
62–9, 78–9, 81, 86, 89, 91–2, 96–8, 100–1,
104, 146, 150–2, 155, 159, 160–1, 165–6,
169, 171, 176–7, 178, 203, 212–3, 227–8,
247, 252, 288–91, 290b, 294, 301–3, 311–14,
317, 344, 346, 348, 350–4, 366–7, 369,
395–6, 398, 404, 407, 413, 422–4, 436, 447,
455, 458–9, 468, 471–2, 474–5, 479, 481,
501–2, 505, 509, 512, 515, 525, 532, 539,
540–4, 557–8, 567–9, 589, 594, 599, 611,
633, 638, 642, 649, 657–9, 676, 680, 689,
708, 711, 713–14, 716, 729, 745, 763–5, 768,
814, 818, 820–1, 827–8, 830, 832, 853, 856,
864, 927–9, 931–5, 937, 942–9, 951–2, 957,
959, 960–1, 970, 975
agricultural reforms in extension, water
management, finance 79, 548
agricultural subsidies 506
assessed contributions to IBRD, WHO and UN
(third in ranking) 342
bilateral talks with United States re: emission
reductions 14, 300
commitment to climate change efforts 15, 18, 289
conservation agriculture on large farms 28
decline in hunger 13, 203, 506
donor, largest, for development in Africa 289,
474t, 770
economic recovery after pandemic 179
entry into World Trade Organization 920
export bans 153, 157, 173
food self-sufficiency 166b
foreign aid on grant equivalent basis 473
Go Global policy of international expansion of
Chinese companies 90
gross capital formation in agriculture and FDI
93–4
growth of global value chains 90, 529
household responsibility system 61, 547
income disparities among regions 87
industrialization 61, 84
Integrated Rural Development Programs, invested
in by World Bank, IFAD 543
investment (multilateral development) banks 35,
90, 295, 479, 504
investment in irrigation, transportation and
communication, human capital 548
investment in R&D 166b, 548
land reforms and governance in 21, 61–2, 79, 155
net disbursement of foreign aid 473f
payment for environmental services 155
population growth 1, 3, 64, 947
price stabilization 165, 166b, 173
productivity growth and reduction of poverty 13,
22, 506
protection of import-competing commodities in 164
protection of small farmers with input subsidies,
minimum prices 165
role in financial transformation 10, 69, 506, 920
stock-to-use-ratios 166b
trading system, multilateral 289
China Development Bank and China Export Import
Bank 473








clean energy research 15
Clemens, M. 33, 456–7
climate change 2, 3, 4–5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 16–17, 28, 30, 68,
83, 205, 284, 350, 920, 925, 978
average temperatures, limiting rise 11, 17, 66
effect on extreme poverty and hunger 21, 107, 146
mitigation and adaption to 4, 11, 17, 18
reduction of resilience in food system 196
climate finance 15, 17, 17n3, 18, 83
Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) estimates 18n4, 18n5
climate-smart agriculture 23, 42t, 297, 314b, 320t,




Codex Alimentarius 337, 355, 355n13, 401b, 631,
640, 657, 672
Cole, E. 259
Collier, P. 20, 74–5, 79, 98, 476
Colombia 165, 250–1, 255, 259, 459, 467, 568, 593,
611, 676, 859, 864–5
Committee on World Food Security (CFS) 22, 149n5,
196, 236–7, 292, 318t
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Committee on World Food Security Reform
Document 298–9
for development of global strategic framework for
food security 298
Committee on Twenty-First Century Systems
Agriculture of the NRC of the National
Academies 23
commodity markets, financialization of and
speculation 152, 157–8, 573f
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 174
communicable diseases 4, 293, 300–1, 461, 675, 907
community-based development (CBD) 313, 317, 518,
531, 535
community-driven development (CDD) 30
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development
Programme (CAADP) 316, 426, 642, 765, 821
Compton, J. 774
conflict 5, 9, 69, 146, 205, 396–7, 410, 506, 904–5
conservation programs, governance of 26
consumer behavior and education 30, 198, 201, 244,
256, 397
Conway, G. 27, 30, 737
Cooke, B. 158
Corben, K. 260
Cornia, G. 549, 553
Corvalan, C. 261
Cossée, O. 689
countries at most risk for being left behind 344n5
country programmable aid (CPA) 412, 470
COVID-19 pandemic 1, 2, 3, 5, 16, 38–40, 67, 80, 150,
177, 179, 198, 215, 284, 289, 303, 396, 455,
476, 738, 754, 919, 924, 926–33, 927–9, 931,
940, 952, 954, 975; see also external shocks
acceleration of digital technology 62, 920
and evolution of value chains 26, 179
effect on ODA—OECD countries provided US
$11billion of COVID-19-related aid 33, 410
global GDP loss 5, 396, 479, 927
impact on the poor 5, 150, 178–9, 921, 927–8
increase in the incidence of hunger 929, 929n5
politicization of and backlash against science and
evidence 300, 921, 932
structural weaknesses revealed by 5, 920, 932
unpreparedness for 5, 143, 931n6




Dasgupta, S. 84, 89, 306, 951
Datt, G. 72
Dawe, D. 158, 161–2
Deaton, A. 205, 212, 338, 398, 506, 537, 549, 592
deforestation 4, 98, 101, 154, 314b, 463b, 632, 691,
920–1, 942, 962
de Freitas, P. 67n5
de Gorter, H. 146, 150, 154
de Haen, H. 773n22
Deininger, K. 73, 78, 151, 566
de Janvry, A. 98
Delgado, M. 72
Dembélé, N. 551
de Melo, J. 84
Demery, L. 72
democratic institutions and mass media 175n14
DemocraticRepublicof theCongo 64,69, 179, 206, 227–8,
476, 541–3, 676b, 862, 873, 895, 903–5, 937
demographic transition 9, 19, 30, 252, 942, 950, 975
Denmark 307, 410–1, 413, 416, 728, 814, 863, 867,
868, 928, 967
Dercon, S. 20, 74–5, 79, 98, 959
destitution 198, 221, 221n8, 222f
de Tray, D. 562
Devarajan, S. 535
developed countries, productivity growth with modern
inputs 22
total Aggregate Measure of Support 396
developing countries 1, 4, 19, 22, 30, 32, 64, 66, 75, 85,
348, 396, 659, 924, 952
domestic financing, limited expenditures on
agriculture 32, 79, 394
financing needs for agriculture and rural
development 39, 348
savings and investments 9, 91, 479–80
vulnerability to large countries’ trade policies 176
de Vries, G. 84, 88, 99
de Vries, K. 84, 88, 99
Dews, F. 84
Diao, X. 84
Díaz-Bonilla, E. 147, 170b
diet, healthy 922–3
dietary transition 9, 25, 32, 84, 213, 243, 265, 924, 945,




disconnect between trends in poverty and hunger 197,
209–10, 212, 213, 922, 938
displaced persons 3, 9, 291, 507, 920; see alsomigration
Doha Development Agenda on trade 16, 163b, 168b,
177–8, 570, 973–4
domestic policies 10, 13
domestic resource mobilization 19, 76n8, 478
Donckt, M. 93
Dongyu, Qu 630
donor trust funds 311, 341–2, 352, 445–8, 508, 512, 661
vertical funds 445–6, 449–50
Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Immunization 450, 462–3, 746, 807
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria 287, 325, 450, 515b, 703, 746,
747, 929n5
program- and project-specific financing by single
donors 445, 449
weaknesses in new partnerships 448–9
Dorward, A. 809
Drabik, D. 150
Drèze, J. 175–6, 212, 218b
Dubey, S. 93
Duffey, K. J. 260
Duflo, E. 537, 590
Dugger, C. 249
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 10/9/2021, SPi
998 
East Asia and the Pacific (EAP): 91–2, 95, 109–18,
123, 150, 158, 209, 221, 227–8, 423–6, 452,
520, 522, 533, 534t, 586, 932, 949
East Asian miracle 67, 84, 481
Easterly, W. 12–13, 398
EAT–Lancet Commission on Healthy Diets from
Sustainable Systems 66, 196, 199–201, 242, 921
Echeverría, R. 796, 948
Ecker, O. 198
e-commerce 26, 63, 67, 178
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) 374, 545
economic growth rates 95, 95f
Egypt: 64–5, 101, 173, 248, 373, 399, 455, 459, 504,
509, 594, 676, 690, 882, 909, 910
Eichengreen, B. 398
Eisenhower, D. 361, 849
Elliott, K. 153
El Niño 139, 174, 205
emerging economies (countries) 1, 4, 17, 19, 21, 25,
32, 35, 73, 146, 151–2, 164, 290b, 295–6,
404, 659, 743, 925, 975
energy crisis, 2007 16, 38, 152, 154–5; see also biofuel
energy transformation: efficiency and renewable 10,
18, 19, 66
Ethiopia 64, 84, 87–8, 142n1, 144, 162–1, 179, 200, 206–7,
217, 221, 242, 259, 309, 361, 427, 459, 512–13,
525–7, 530, 540–3, 546–7, 567–9, 573, 577,
580–1, 584, 594, 600, 607, 612, 686, 695, 765,
857, 860, 866–7, 880, 895, 909, 937, 957, 976
poverty reduction accompanied agricultural growth,
growth in TFP 525, 547
Productive Safety Net Program 547
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) 341n4, 403, 467, 472b, 656, 694
European Commission (EC) 290b, 728, 730, 778, 856
European Parliament’s Committee on
Development 478–9
European Union (EU) 1, 4, 13, 155, 165, 287, 289, 292,
395–6, 402, 411–13, 416, 429–30, 441, 448,
451, 457, 570, 632, 657, 660, 666, 670–1,
676, 687, 691, 857, 962, 975
Evans, J. 515b
exports 10, 84, 86, 88, 89, 119t, 148f, 154–6, 159, 161,
174, 179, 296, 454, 455, 474, 474t, 513, 528,
530, 544, 552, 598, 676b, 874n12, 930,
947n13, 949, 952, 973
external shocks 1, 72, 177, 236f, 242, 303, 533,
552, 687
externalities 23, 148f, 301, 302b, 303, 312, 477,
926, 957
Fan, S. 155, 158
Fanzo, J. 929
FAOSTAT, formerly AGROSTAT 421, 640, 678, 891
Fardoust, S. 541
farm sizes 21, 22, 26, 61, 73, 79, 82, 82f, 151, 566, 925, 948
farmers 21, 66, 172, 174, 341, 529, 568, 640, 685,
708, 722, 821, 882, 887, 900, 947,
974, 977
subsistence 40, 80, 150, 219, 708, 820
women farmers 28, 224, 245b
farmers’ organizations 99t, 499, 547, 655n14, 812b,
884, 885, 900
Feder, G. 73, 567
Feed the Future 34, 313, 314b, 318t, 655n14, 658, 892
Fei, J. 72
Felix, E. 153
Ferreira, F. 209, 535
fertilizers and pesticides 21–5, 37, 63, 80, 83, 96, 99t,
100b, 142f, 148f, 149, 150, 154, 156, 256,
293, 424, 435, 499, 501, 503, 505, 525–6,
528–30, 547, 574, 581, 582b, 635b, 649, 671,
682, 690, 737, 780b, 919, 944, 956–7
financial transformation: South–North global savings
and investment in stock markets 9, 10, 295
financing of UN System, WHO, and international
organizations 305f, 342, 343t, 344
and G20 344




access to 1, 38, 147n4, 149, 203, 207, 234f, 237, 244,
371, 683, 851, 873, 890, 894, 906, 922,
938, 983
animal-sourced 32, 152, 198–201, 213, 243–4, 256,
326, 946
basket, cost of 84, 215
cereals 32, 255f, 714,
consumption patterns 26, 29–32, 65, 152, 163, 176,
198–202, 207, 213, 237, 239–44, 248,
253–60, 265, 307, 726, 852, 946, 963, 977
energy-dense 207, 213–14, 248, 255, 264
processed or purchased 25, 147, 196, 198, 199, 207,
214, 237, 242–3, 249–50, 256, 714, 946
quality (nutritional content) and quantity of 12,
75, 149, 151, 196, 198, 213, 244, 632,
855–6, 945
regulation of 30, 151, 198, 250–2, 256, 261, 263–4,
290, 397, 662, 922n2, 946, 962, 977, 984
stocks and supply 10, 68n6, 143, 145b, 147, 168, 179,
197, 235, 243, 524, 575, 577, 633, 709, 715
sugars and fat additives to 26, 30, 32, 75, 151,
207, 213
utilization of 234, 236–7, 243
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) 630–706, 962–5
advocacy in food and nutrition 198, 231, 634, 682, 921
AGRIsurvey 662, 682; see also 50 30 initiative
and nutrition 682–5
“2012 Strategy and Vision for FAO’s Work
in Nutrition” repositioned, prioritized
work 684
houses permanent secretariat for CFS 682
leads Technical Secretariat (with WHO) of the
UN Decade of Action on Nutrition
2016–25 685
partners with Scaling Up Nutrition, Reach
Partnership (Ending Child Hunger and
Undernutrition), GLOPAN, NEPAD,
UNICEF, WHO, WFP, IFAD, World
Bank 684–5
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Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) (cont.)
assistance to member states 36, 359, 676b
balance between GPGs function and helping
member countries advance SDGs 631, 654
balance between normative public goods function
vs. technical assistance/emergency
work 356–8, 970
budget 39, 356, 359, 638, 670–1, 672t, 688t
assessed and voluntary contributions 39, 356,
360f, 409, 445, 637–8, 963
“business portfolio” to reduce earmarking of
voluntary contributions 667, 670
funding for activities at country level largely from
voluntary funding 638
Regular Programme (RP) resources 670–1
CGD Working Group on Food Security assessment
of FAO 645–6
center of excellence on food and agriculture 356,
360, 630, 632, 664, 667, 694–6
Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture 670, 673–4, 789
country assistance 357–8, 631
Country Program Framework (CPF) 654–5
early warning system 354, 640, 891; see also Global
Information and Early Warning System
emergency assistance 639, 675, 685–90
collaboration with World Organisation for
Animal Health (OIE) and WHO 689
Desert Locust Information Service 690
epidemic disease control: rinderpest, avian
influenza, A(H7N9) influenza virus 687,
689–90
facilitates USAID-funded Global Health Security
Agenda and Emerging Pandemic
Threats 690
FAO Emergency Centre for Transboundary
Animal Diseases (ECTAD) 690
Global Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
Programme 689
Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation
Activities 687
UN Central Emergency Response Fund
(CERF) 689, 867n7
emergency prevention system 354, 685–7
building national and local capacities to reduce
risks and impacts 685
data collection, analysis, dissemination to
monitor, warn, and act on risks 685, 891
disaster risk reduction and management 685
food chain crisis management 685
“Global Report on Food Crises” 685–6
proactive approach through resilience agenda
(SO5) 685
provides assistance, advocacy for protecting
livelihoods of vulnerable farmers, herders,
fishers, and tree-dependent
communities 685
estimates of land use and land change 365
FAO governance 355, 668f
FAO Conference of member nations 38, 355–6,
634, 639, 664
FAO Council: 49 member states, elected by
Conference for 3-year rotating terms 667
Office of Evaluation (OED) created within FAO
to assess FAO projects 646–7
stakeholder model of governance: “one country,
one vote” 354, 641
field presence in more than 130 countries 636, 637t,
637f, 639
focus shift from protein to calories to food
security 196, 231
Food Balance Sheets 10, 145b, 203, 206, 212,
243n12, 255f
Food Systems Dashboard adopted 2020 923, 929
forestry, sustainable management of, part of FAO’s
original mandate 690–1
founding 35–6, 196, 230, 633, 639, 640, 665, 962
funding 668–70, 669f
assessed contributions from member countries
for core technical work 668
largest donors 670
voluntary contributions (61 percent of budget for
2018–19) 668
global data on food and agriculture 2, 36, 101n16,
102n17, 150, 354, 477, 639–40, 662, 678, 836
50 2030 Initiative: FAO’s AGRISurvey, World
Bank’s LSMS–ISA 662, 963
appointment of Chief Statistician 678
critical GPG function in generating information
and knowledge 639, 662, 677–8
FAO Statistical Programme of Work
2010–11 678
FishSTAT: FAO’s Fisheries and Aquaculture
Statistics 678
Global Strategy to Improve Agricultural and
Rural Statistics 678 (with World Bank
and UN)
International Advisory Group on FAO Statistics
(IAGFS) 678
re-engineering of FAOSTAT 678
global goal-setting: elimination of poverty,
eradication of hunger 356, 638
sustainable management and utilization of
natural resources 638
global public goods (GPGs) delivery 354, 649, 657,
663, 674–5, 963
advocacy on food and agricultural issues 649
developing global information, analysis, statistics
on food, agriculture, forests,
fisheries 649
early warning system for plant, animal, bird
diseases, locusts, and other disasters
649, 963
farmers’ field school (FFS) training 12 million
farmers in 90 countries 649
food safety, with the WHO, on the Codex
Alimentarius 649, 657, 672
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greenhouse gas emission estimates 355, 921,
948, 955
Integrated Pest Management without reliance on
excessive pesticides 649, 657
international agreements, norms and
standards 649
monitoring and control of cross-border pests and
diseases 354–5, 649, 962
monitoring and accessing global trends in food
security and agriculture, fisheries, and
forestry 639
regulation of international food safety
standards 649, 657
GPGs, delivery hampered by: 661
lack of support from members to achieve long-
term, sustainable results 661
limited budget 661, 663
lingering internal organization and management
issues 661
“Hand-in-Hand” Initiative to connect stakeholders
with resources 680, 680n33
Independent External Evaluation (IEE) 2007 142nl,
357–8, 630, 638, 643–4
budget spread too thin over many topics,
programs 357
crisis rooted in conservative, slow-to-adapt
leadership 357
failure to predict 2007 food crisis 142, 145b
recommended Immediate Plan of Action
(3-year) 643–4
recommended limiting terms, length for
DGs 358
international norms and standards, voluntary
guidelines, including for food safety 2, 36,
39, 355, 639
International Plant Protection Convention
(IPPC) 640
Investment Centre (TCI) 655, 655n14, 665n25,
680–2
land tenure rights agreement 22
leadership 358
DG elected democratically, by FAO Conference
members 358, 641, 664
DG José Graziano da Silva (2012–2019) 358,
630, 631, 634, 667, 683
DG Qu Dongyu (2019– ) 358, 631, 634,
664n23, 693>
matrix management, working across
departments, decentralization in the
field 631, 634, 638, 653
move to “executive director” style of governing
from top-down style by Qu
Dongyu 631
term limit/length changed to 2 terms of 4 years
after 2005 election 358, 641, 659, 665
MDGs, contributions by FAO, role in active
transition to SDGs 39, 634, 641
measurement of food insecurity 662; see also Food
Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES)
monitoring of SDGs, indicators (custodianship of 21
SDG indicators) 39, 355, 634
MOPAN 2017–18 assessment of FAO 656
Multipartner Programme Support Mechanism
(FMM) 360, 360n18
partnerships 665
50 2030 initiative on data with World Bank 665
Cooperative Programme with World Bank
(FAO–COP) 509, 665
Investment Centre 665
WFP established within FAO in 1960 to
internationalize emergency food aid
659, 665
worked with Work Bank during avian flu
outbreaks, global food crisis 665
platform for agreements 354, 634, 639, 962
policy advice, information, and strategy options to
challenges 634, 639, 678–80
Evaluation of FAO’s Role and Work in Food and
Agriculture Policy 679
Evaluation of FAO’s Role in Investment for Food
and Nutrition Security 679
policy, social, and scientific research shift to
CGIAR 641
PoU: aggregate estimate of undernourishment 633
provider of knowledge related to all aspects of food
and agriculture 634, 639
provider of technical support, technology transfer,
and capacity building 639
publications: State of Food and Agriculture (SOFA),
State of Food Insecurity and Nutrition
639, 836
reorganization 631, 632, 636f
Assistant Directors-Generals (ADGs) as special
advisors, thought leaders 631
cabinet of 3 Deputy Directors-Generals (DDGs),
Chief Economist, and Chief Scientist
631, 635
departments eliminated, division directors report
directly to one of five “cabinet”
members 631, 635
DG seeks to minimize silos, encourage cross-
divisional cooperation, and reduce
hierarchy and “kingdoms” with team
work 631
strengthening capacities of country and regional
offices 631
strengthening partnerships 631–2
serves both developed and developing
countries 639, 640
staff turnover, leading to loss of institutional
memory 358–9
Strategic Objective Results Framework 355,
634, 638
5 strategic objectives: eradicate hunger;
sustainable agriculture, forestry, and
fisheries; reduction of rural poverty; enable
inclusive and efficient food systems;
increase resilience of livelihoods 647
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Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) (cont.)
sixth objective: internal technical capacity and
integrity to achieve results 650
Strategic Programme based on Strategic
Objectives 651
support of small farm development 69
“Save and Grow—A Policymaker’s Guide to the
Sustainable Intensification of Smallholder
Crop Production” 630, 634, 635b
technical capacity 358–9
Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) 357,
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